Sri Lanka at a glance

The crisis and the response

• IDPs face multiple difficulties: destroyed homes, the danger of returning to areas not yet cleared of mines and challenges regaining land.
• By August 2010, 90 percent of the 280,000 Tamils forcibly interned after victory against the LTEE had been released from government-controlled camps.
• Assistance includes immediate shelter cash grants of US$220 per family, supplied by the UN, NGOs and the Sri Lankan government.
• CHAP 2010 initially called for US$337,688,785, but was revised down to US$287,799,870 in June 2010 due to low implementation capacity, staff security issues and funding shortfalls.
• There are significant gaps in funding for some clusters: economic recovery and infrastructure (one percent funded); WASH (seven percent); mine action (22 percent) and agriculture (23 percent).
• Overall response is limited by government’s micromanagement, lack of access and a diminishing number of humanitarian staff.

Donor performance

• Donor coordination was perceived as more active and effective.
• There is widespread concern that donors are now prioritising northern Sri Lanka, with severe consequences for eastern areas where humanitarian needs remain following 20 years of LTTE occupation.
• Donors were criticised for not more highly prioritising the involvement of beneficiaries in the design and implementation of programmes.

Key challenges and areas for improvement

• The government robustly leads the response, has an antagonistic relationship with the international community and seeks to convey a negative image of aid agencies and disparage their efforts.
• The government restricts access, controls reporting of the crisis, manipulates language used to describe it and continues to reject the CHAP.
• Agencies generally lack access to resettlement areas and/or are unable to directly approach communities and vulnerable people.

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