October 21, 2010

HRI Indonesia mission points to Tsunami lessons missing from 2009 earthquakes’ response

DARA’s Humanitarian Response Index (HRI) 2010 mission to Indonesia has found that the international donor response to last year’s two earthquakes has been extremely uneven, with aid being directed to the more “visible” crisis of West Sumatra.

In September 2009 Indonesia suffered two high-magnitude earthquakes. The first struck West Java on 2 September, measuring 7.3 on the Richter scale. The second took place on September 30 in West Sumatra and had a magnitude of 7.9. The damage to housing was similar in both cases, with over 200,000 homes affected and destroyed in each area. Over 1,000 people were killed and 8,000 displaced in West Sumatra, whilst West Java reported 80 deaths, 50 missing people and nearly 200,000 displaced.

DARA sent a team to Indonesia from 22 January to 1 February. The organization’s analysis of donor response reveals that these mobilized en masse to assist West Sumatra, with little aid being provided to West Java. “There was an emotional response to the earthquake in Sumatra since it was badly affected by the Tsunami five years ago. West Java did not suffer the consequences of the Tsunami,” explained HRI team leader Manuel Sánchez-Montero, “Due to this fact, the Sumatra earthquake received great media coverage, donors poured money into the emergency response and hundreds of NGO’s flooded to the area overnight. A week after the crisis there were up to 300 NGOS on the ground in Sumatra. In Java, there were approximately 15 self-funded ones.”

The disparity in response can also be attributed to the fact that the Government of Indonesia considered that West Java, given its level of development, could handle the response on its own and did not appeal for aid. Meanwhile, the international donor community provided funding for Sumatra in response to the Indonesian government welcoming assistance. “The result was a crisis with a massive response on the one hand, and a neglected one on the other,” says Sánchez-Montero.

Further explaining the differences in donor response, Sánchez-Montero adds “In Sumatra, damages and needs were overestimated by the government, so donor response was based on a confusing needs assessment. The consolidation of the official figures led to an excessive request for the emergency response. Agencies and NGO’s competed against each other for funding and attention, much like what has happened in Haiti recently and after the Tsunami.”

On a more positive note, DARA has found that the Indonesian government has clearly improved its emergency response capacity over the past five years. In the aftermath of the Tsunami new departments were created within the Indonesian government to deal with disaster response such as crisis management centers and command posts at both local and central levels. Nevertheless, it must be noted that many of these mechanisms require additional support to be fully operational when the next crisis strikes.

DARA offers the following recommendations:

• Common needs assessment protocol agreed to by donors
• Fighting against “CNN effect” and emotional response
• Integration of Disaster Risk Reduction into the Emergency phase
• Improved selection of partners that would benefit from humanitarian aid budgets, ensuring that the most capable are well supported