Interim evaluation of IOM’s Regional Response to the flows of refugees and migrants from Venezuela

FINAL EVALUATION REPORT

31st March 2020

Evaluation commissioner: Office of the D.G. Special Envoy for the Venezuelan Situation

Evaluation Firm: DARA

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Disclaimer

The contents of this report are only attributable to the authors and may not reflect the view of the commissioning agency, the IOM.
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**Acronyms and abbreviations**

ABIN  
Agencia Brasileira de Inteligencia

ADRA  
Adventist Development and Relief Agency

CBO  
Community Based Organisation

CO  
Country Office

CERF  
Central Emergency Response Fund

DAC  
Development Assistance Committee

DEA  
Direct Emergency Assistance

DEO  
Department of Operations and Emergency and

DPU  
Public Defence (Brazil)

DRD  
Donor Relations Division

DV  
Domestic Violence

FGD  
Focus Group Discussion

HRBA  
Human Rights Based Approach

HT  
Human Trafficking

IBM  
Integrated Border Management

ICS  
Institutional Capacity Strengthening

IOM  
International Organization for Migration

KII  
Key Informant Interview

MiGOF  
Migration Governance Framework

MMF  
Mixed Migration Flow

MSC  
Most Significant Change

M&E  
Monitoring and Evaluation

NGO  
Non-Governmental Organisation

OECD  
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development

OIG  
Office of Inspector General

P  
Protection

PRM  
US State Department, Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration

PTRIG  
Posto de Triagem (screening post – Brazil)

RAMV  
Registro administrativo de migrantes venezolanos en Colombia
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RAP</td>
<td>Regional Action Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>RBM</td>
<td>Results-Based Management</td>
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<tr>
<td>RMRP</td>
<td>Refugee and Migrant Response Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SECI</td>
<td>Socioeconomic and cultural integration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SG</td>
<td>Secretary General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SGGBV</td>
<td>Sex and Gender Based Violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIDA</td>
<td>Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ToC</td>
<td>Theory of Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ToR</td>
<td>Terms of Reference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDG</td>
<td>United Nations Development Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNEG</td>
<td>United Nations Evaluation Group</td>
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1. Executive Summary

IOM has commissioned an external team to undertake the interim evaluation of IOM’s Regional Response to the flows of refugees and migrants from Venezuela. The evaluation is undertaken by DARA Inc. and covers six regional projects funded by five different donors in sixteen countries for a total budget of USD 54.1 million. The regional response was initially structured under four areas of intervention: Direct emergency assistance (DEA), Protection (P), Socioeconomic and Cultural Integration (SECI) and Strengthening the capacity of host government (ICS). The scope of the evaluation is from May 2018 until 31st December 2019.

The purpose of the evaluation is to gather reliable information to improve ongoing and future IOM activities within the response to Venezuelan flows. Externally, it will promote accountability and transparency, which, in turn, will assist governments and other donors in their decision making about future project funding.

The evaluation used a mixed methods approach based on:

a) Documentary review and analysis for the global response and use of IOM regional M&E information and financials;
b) Case studies in three countries: Brazil, Colombia, Peru;
c) Key Informant Interviews (KII) and Focus Group Discussions (FGD) with government institutions, implementing partners, UN agencies, NGOs and migrants and refugees in the three case study countries;
d) Use of qualitative methods to link the immediate results to the expected results: contribution analysis and appreciative inquiry;
e) Use of tools such as five-point rating scale for institutional perception of IOM effectiveness and traffic light rating to reflect evaluation team’s judgement per evaluation criterion in case study countries;
f) On-site observation in case study countries;
g) Debriefings after the completion of the case study visits and a validation workshop with the key evaluation stakeholders.

Considering that primary data was mostly available only for the three countries where the case studies were conducted, it is important to note that findings and conclusions apply primarily to the case study countries and cannot be generalised to the entire regional response, which covers 16 different countries.

The evaluation found that then IOM positioning on a regional level is fully relevant to the needs of the primary stakeholders, including host governments, and particularly migrants and refugees themselves, and the response is filling a critical need. Given that a number of countries have seen their public services overwhelmed by the high migration flows, the response is directly contributing to mitigating the negative consequences of the migration flows in countries where public services are overstretched. IOM is seen as very supportive and responsive of the host governments in most countries reviewed, with a specific focus on the three case study countries, with high marks regarding its effectiveness in the response, and a highly appreciated collaborative and responsive spirit and technical capacity that has contributed to ‘learning by doing’ through responding to the situation alongside the government institutions.

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1 The exchange rates refer to the budget shared by IOM and date of internal endorsement within IOM.
The activities undertaken by the IOM as part of the regional response are effective and operationally sound. Many of the partners and institutions interviewed saluted the attitude and commitment of the IOM staff, particularly in Brazil and Peru, during the interviews. The main limitation is that the magnitude of the needs in countries such as Colombia is so large that it is difficult to ensure proper coverage, and, more broadly, the global efforts of the international community and the government are not able to fulfil the identified needs given the lack of resources. Also, as more migrants use irregular border crossing points to enter into the host countries, there is a risk of under reporting the actual numbers, adding to the difficulty in obtaining reliable data. A final factor to be identified is the diversity of the country contexts and therefore the need to adapt the response to the needs of all 16 countries.

IOM could further improve its effectiveness if it was to focus more on the actual results achieved rather than on the completion of activities. While in emergency crisis situations the initial view is that the humanitarian activities are themselves a result (distribution of food and NFI, medical attention, transportation, provision of services), in the current context of a protracted regional migration crisis, IOM needs to start thinking in terms of demonstrating the change process linked to the expected results it wants to achieve. For this, country missions should have a clear written strategy regarding IOM involvement in the regional response, to not only guide its interventions in-country, but also strengthen the development of future regional projects. While some managers, though not all, consider the RMRP as the national and regional plan, it does not detail how IOM is expected to prioritise the activities in the response in each of the case study countries. More discussion on the applicability of the RMRP to guide the national response is needed within IOM, particularly to align the national projects with the regional response in specific countries that have leveraged national resources to complement the regional funding. The RMRP indicates the immediate activities required, but it does not provide a results framework or any sort of qualitative indicator that allows for measurement of the results. The RMRP provides sector-specific targets, based on a needs assessment, for all the actors involved in the regional response. This is different from having each IOM country mission clearly spell out, based on the level of funding received and its own capacities, how the priorities for streamlining the response in the country are defined. SECI interventions have rightly been included as part of the response, and these are becoming increasingly critical for migrants to lessen the burden on humanitarian assistance. However, the SECI strategy must now be looking at different parameters for success and shifting towards the capacity of the migrants to generate income to sustain the family as success indicators, instead of looking at the number of migrants trained and who has received a grant. Similarly, on the DEA interventions, more focus should be placed on gathering evidence of results achieved beyond the numbers assisted (e.g. answering the question “how is the support contributing to empowering migrants or developing resilience of migrants”).

A challenging area for the IOM response is protection. IOM is carrying out protection activities and services, but there is no results matrix to indicate and appraise the expected results under this area of intervention. The strategic outcome for protection defined in the RMRP 2019 is that “refugees and migrants enjoy rights and protection”, which does not provide any benchmarks for success and is a broad statement. Considering that UNHCR has a clear protection mandate and normative frameworks from International Conventions, it would be useful for IOM to attempt to define its protection strategy. Considering the different types of protection and the different groups in need of protection, as identified in the IOM AVM handbook, it would be

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useful to have a protection results framework at the country level against which to appraise success. Anecdotal evidence from case study interviews show that IOM has been able to identify and even ensure family reunion of one case of a trafficked minor, an area where IOM has extensive experience, but protection is a very broad concept that needs to be grounded in the risks, needs and realistic support that can be offered to migrants in the complex and fluid context of the migration flows in the region. The efficiency of protection activities in each country would be enhanced with a protection results framework for each country, encompassing the different types of protection activities and target groups.

As mentioned previously, the institutions of the three case study countries showed a high appreciation for the responsiveness and support from the IOM and recognized its beneficial influence in learning by doing in the various interventions undertaken to inform the response. From the three country case studies, Peru’s government institutions showed the most interest in continued and increased ICS, requesting further capacity strengthening. Indeed, it is less clear today if the other government institutions are open to this. Through documentation review, some of the 16 countries report strong collaboration with governments, such as Mexico and Aruba. Ecuador reports interest from government counterparts in training.

The IOM Regional Response Team has been able to establish a coherent M&E and results framework for the current phase of the response. The challenge will be for IOM to move towards better capturing and showing evidence of results achieved (i.e. at the outcome level), as the focus on completed activities and number of beneficiaries assisted is not able to inform as to the usefulness of the activities, thereby failing to provide donors with the full story regarding its performance. To do so requires enhanced planning capacity and the introduction of a theory of change approach to IOM’s interventions, so the pathway to the solutions are embedded in the response and it is easier for each country to slot in its interventions according to the national priorities. Finally, in order to develop its level of visibility and evidence-based reporting, IOM needs to invest resources in its internal M&E capacity.

Provided below is a brief of key recommendations, the full list is detailed in the recommendations section of the report.3

At the regional level:

1) The situation is likely to become a protracted crisis, therefore continued needs call for continued support from IOM.

2) Although regional projects are important, IOM needs to review the intervention strategy of IOM country missions and develop more comprehensive data sets at country level to capture qualitative data in its results matrix, monitoring and reporting.

3) Together with the development of said intervention strategy, a TOC should be developed at country level to include more qualitative data sets at outcome level (behavioural change). This will pave the way for a stronger regional and country response and lead to the expected institutional and behavioural change.

4) Increase the capacity development at country level on M&E, especially at outcome-level indicators and reporting, possibly through a regional planning workshop. This would increase use, utility, understanding and ownership of evaluation processes.

5) Internal learning exercise needs to reflect on the activation of corporate emergency mechanisms.

3 Recommendations for Brazil, Colombia and Peru can be found in each country case study.
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6) Greater communication and advocacy for the respect of humanitarian principles (Sphere, Do No Harm).
7) Need for an integrated referral system for refugees and migrants from Venezuela.
8) To show articulation from the RMRP to the IOM country level operations, IOM could benefit from a country-level strategic plan.

Global operational recommendations:

1) At programming level, extend coverage of SECI activities to temporary resident migrants to respond to the needs for a stable source of income. Additionally, SECI needs to be done with a stronger technical approach as follows:
   a. Review vulnerability criteria to improve targeting.
   b. Integrate vocational training, technical skills and business development skills into SECI activities as well as technical oversight and support.
   c. Support employment schemes by facilitating administrative regularisation.
   d. Implement a three-months timeframe to assess SECI’s beneficiaries’ capacities to secure their basic needs.
   e. Improve cohabitation and integration between host communities and refugees and migrants through a mixed scheme to include vulnerable host populations.

2) More outreach through DTM at informal border crossings, being mindful of ethical data protection considerations, to gather data on migration flows and reinforce/strengthen data sets.

3) Define a clear strategy to define its protection framework taking into account the diverse types of activities and target groups and reflect it in the results matrix.

4) Develop a regional communication strategy to support the coherence, visibility and reporting of the IOM offices through a common language for external reporting.

5) Replicate and extend an integrated referral system for incoming refugees and migrants to main host countries.

6) Integrate aspects related to mental health in the intervention strategy.

7) Develop strong regional partnerships to increase coordination and coherence of the regional response.

2. Introduction

This is a both a summative and formative interim evaluation of the IOM regional response to the Venezuela situation based on six different regional projects from various donors that amount to USD 54.1 million globally across sixteen countries. The evaluation is commissioned by the Office of the D.G. Special Envoy for the Venezuelan Situation and is undertaken by DARA Inc. The scope of this evaluation is from May 2018, which is the date of the first regional project funded, until 31st December 2019. The following table shows the list of projects that are the object of the evaluation:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Project Code</th>
<th>Amount USD</th>
<th>Start date</th>
<th>End date</th>
<th>Donor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Life-saving assistance to Venezuelan Migrants in Vulnerable Situations and Host Communities</td>
<td>DP. 1930</td>
<td>1,600,000</td>
<td>1.05.2018</td>
<td>31.10.2018</td>
<td>CERF</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Supporting the coordinated response to address the humanitarian needs of Venezuelans in Ecuador and Trinidad &amp; Tobago</th>
<th>DP. 2040</th>
<th>539,275</th>
<th>1.04.2019</th>
<th>31.03.2020</th>
<th>SIDA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strengthening the regional response to large-scale migration of Venezuelan nationals into SA, NA, CA and the Caribbean</td>
<td>DP. 1969</td>
<td>8,100,000</td>
<td>17.5.2018</td>
<td>30.06.2019</td>
<td>PRM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthening the regional response to large-scale migration of Venezuelan nationals into SA, NA, CA and the Caribbean</td>
<td>DP. 2071</td>
<td>38,500,000</td>
<td>1.01.2019</td>
<td>30.06.2019</td>
<td>PRMII</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthening the regional response to the flows of Venezuelans in SA, NA and the Caribbean</td>
<td>DP. 2003</td>
<td>4,459,289</td>
<td>1.12.2018</td>
<td>31.03.2020</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthening humanitarian response to vulnerable Venezuelans in Brazil, Colombia</td>
<td>DP. 1959</td>
<td>890,169</td>
<td>28.03.2019</td>
<td>30.12.2019</td>
<td>Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
<td>54,088,733</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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3. Context and purpose of the evaluation

3.1. Context

Venezuela has experienced a large population movement that has been steadily increasing over the past three years. Since late 2017 and early 2018 it became apparent that a significant shift in migration trends was taking place. The escalating outflow of Venezuelan nationals into neighbouring countries reached a critical point in the first quarter of 2018, when several additional factors converged: 1) A large concentration of Venezuelans at border points and other receiving areas with poor reception conditions generating increased public health risks, protection and humanitarian concerns; 2) Public structures and resources available at the local level in recipient countries clearly overstretched to cope with the immediate protection, shelter, food and non-food item (NFI) needs; 3) High demand for documentation and regularization overstretched the capacities of the migration and asylum authorities; 4) Individuals and families arriving in extremely vulnerable conditions and with significantly reduced resilience and self-sufficiency as a result of a prolonged limited access to basic services and goods; 5) Increasing threats to the life and dignity of Venezuelans on the move resulting from intensified use of unsafe land routes to arrive to their temporary or final destination country.

In view of the above challenges, IOM launched a Regional Action Plan (RAP) in April 2018. Later that year, the UN SG designated IOM and UNHCR as co-leaders of the inter-agency coordination of the response which led to the publication, in December 2018, of the Regional Refugee and Migrant Response Plan (RMRP). This plan replaced the RAP and targeted 2,2 million beneficiaries.
The six Regional Projects that form the object of evaluation of IOM’s Regional Response have been developed with specific attention to ensuring regional coherence while preserving the...
necessary flexibility for each country to adjust to the operational context and the governmental decisions regarding the response to the crisis. In terms of the operational response, as stated in the Results Matrix of each project, five of the six regional projects have the same objective:

*Contribute to a regionally coordinated response to the large migration of Venezuelan nationals, in line with humanitarian principles and sustainable development objectives.*

While one project has a narrower objective, yet compatible with the objective of the other five projects:

*Contribute to the alleviation of suffering and maintain human dignity of vulnerable Venezuelan population in Venezuela, Brazil and Colombia, through targeted humanitarian assistance.*

When looking at the expected results, five regional projects share the same expected results (mentioned as outcome in four of the five regional projects, while mentioned as output in the first regional project funded by CERF), namely:

Venezuelan women, men, girls and boys in vulnerable conditions receive timely and principled humanitarian assistance, referral services and integration support in line with their differentiated protection needs.

The sixth regional project funded by Canada and also covering interventions in Venezuela identifies four outcomes, which are compatible with and can be included in the expected results statement above, namely:

1. Increased access to emergency health care in Colombia.
2. Increased access to emergency water, sanitation, and hygiene items in Brazil.
3. Increased access to protection services through information in Brazil.
4. Increased ability to transport and deliver relief items in Venezuela.

While there is no explicit Theory of Change (ToC) in the projects’ design, the implicit ToC is that IOM’s provision of principled humanitarian assistance, referral services and integration support to vulnerable groups in line with the differentiated protection needs (and based on the four areas of intervention presented above) contributes to a regionally coordinated response to the large migration of Venezuelan nationals, aligned with humanitarian principles and sustainable development objectives. There is a level of disconnect between the areas of intervention and the regional coordination aspect that is not embedded in any of the areas and is linked to the creation of the Platform, something which has been excluded from the object of evaluation. Therefore, the link between IOM’s response and the regionally coordinated response, which is the objective of the regional projects, is actually not analysed in this evaluation.

Regarding the key stakeholders involved in the object implementation, IOM has been working towards supporting the national governments in the Regional Response from an operational perspective (in addition to its role as co-lead of the Platform) with a large range of partners (in some countries over 70 NGOs are present to contribute to the Regional Response). IOM has been working in partnerships with certain NGOs, but has also been using a number of Service Contracts in cases where it was not able to carry out direct implementation (for example the shelters in Colombia). So, the extent of direct implementation also varies according to the country’s response and context. However, the key stakeholders are the IOM Country Missions, the Office of the D.G. Special Envoy for the Venezuelan situation, the host governments, as well as the operational partners and the refugees and migrants from Venezuela in each of the countries.
At the time of the interim evaluation three of the six projects were closed and three remain operational, which means that disbursements and burnt rate are not yet final. The major change during the implementation period is the shift from the area of intervention approach, which was followed in the RAP 2018 and RMRP 2019, to the sector approach in the RMRP 2020. However, it is unclear whether and how this change has impacted the way each country responded in operational terms, except of course for the need to adjust the reporting and monitoring requirements. It is also important to note that the RMRP is a strategy for the Regional Response which goes beyond the IOM Regional Response, and that the object of evaluation are the six regional projects and not the wider regional strategy. Among the key challenges for the implementation of IOM’s Regional Response through the six regional projects, it is important to note that IOM has requested No Cost Extensions due to the fluidity of the situation requiring adjustments to changed conditions in the field, and the fact that the major donor contributions have been disbursed in tranches, thereby affecting the timeliness of the operations.

3.2. Evaluation purpose

The purpose of the evaluation is to gather reliable information to improve ongoing and future IOM activities within the response to Venezuelan flows. Externally, it will promote accountability and transparency, which, in turn, will assist governments and other donors in their decision making about future project funding.

The main users of the evaluation are:

1) The management team at regional level, more specifically the Office of the D.G. Special Envoy for the Venezuelan Situation, which was set up in the last quarter of 2019. The Regional Office in Buenos Aires previously oversaw the coordination aspects of the response, with the aim to improve performance and best use of resources, project conceptualization and design, identify clear lessons and best practices, and understand gaps in the response. 2) IOM Missions implementing projects in the framework of the Venezuela response. 3) HQ staff, particularly from Department of Operations and Emergency (DOE), Donor Relations Division (DRD) and Office of Inspector General who liaise with donors and partner agencies on a regular basis, as deemed appropriate by the Office of the D.G. special Envoy for the Venezuelan Situation

Elements of this evaluation may be shared externally, as deemed appropriate by IOM.

3.3 Evaluation scope

The scope of the evaluation is determined by the six regional projects mentioned in table 1 above. The period under analysis is from May 2018 (date of the first regional project funding) until December 2019. All six regional projects have been structured taking into consideration the four intervention areas. In line with the IOM project handbook, each project has a results matrix to appraise its performance and has been reviewed by regional thematic specialists and HQ (due to the interregional nature of the project). As the response is informed by the specific needs and vulnerabilities of Venezuelan refugees and migrants in the specific countries, as well as by policies, priorities and ongoing efforts of national governments in each country, the project intervention is adapted to the country-level operating context, but along the same four main intervention areas. Each of the areas of intervention (Direct Emergency Assistance -DEA-, Protection -P-, Socio-Economic and Cultural Integration -SECI- and Institutional Capacity Strengthening -ICS-) are aligned with the three principles and the three objectives of IOM’s
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Migration Governance Framework (MiGOF) and the Migrant Crisis Operation Framework (MCOF). The evaluation object is also guided by the following policies and guidelines: IOM Policy on Protection, IOM’s Humanitarian Policy, IOM Rights-based approach to programming, IOM Handbook on Protection and Assistance for Migrants Vulnerable to Violence, Exploitation and Abuse (VAM).

IOM’s regional response, driven initially by the Regional Office in Buenos Aires for South America, shifted in late 2019 to the Office of the D.G. Special Envoy for the Venezuelan Situation in Panama when it was established. It is implemented through the various COs in the region, and with the support of several partners, in collaboration with the government institutions and the UNCTs. Both IOM and UNHCR play a lead role in the response to the Venezuela Crisis, through the designation by the UN Secretary General of a UNHCR and IOM Joint Special Representative for Refugees and Migrants from Venezuela, as well as through the establishment of ad-hoc interagency coordination mechanisms at the regional and national levels, co-led by IOM and UNHCR, known as ‘platforms’.

The six Regional Projects that form the backbone of IOM’s Regional Response have been developed with specific attention to ensuring regional coherence, while preserving the necessary flexibility for each country to adjust to the operational context and the governmental decisions regarding the response to the crisis. In terms of the operational response, as stated in the Results Framework (RF) of each project, five of the six regional projects share the same objective:

Contribute to a regionally coordinated response to the large migration of Venezuelan nationals, in line with humanitarian principles and sustainable development objectives

When looking at the expected results, five regional projects share the same expected results, namely:

Venezuelan women, men, girls and boys in vulnerable conditions receive timely and principled humanitarian assistance, referral services and integration support in line with their differentiated protection needs

In line with the contents of the inception report, the evaluation has used each of the regional project’s results matrix as the reference against which progress and performance are measured.

Exclusions: The creation of a regional platform, co-led by UNHCR and IOM, that is coordinating and providing information and data management at both regional and country level on the regional response has been excluded from the scope of this evaluation, as well as the IOM national projects that are also part of IOM’s response in the Region. This funding can be quite

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5 https://www.iom.int/sites/default/files/about-iom/migof_brochure_a4_en.pdf
6 https://www.iom.int/mcof
8 One project has a narrower objective, but it is compatible with the objective of the other five projects
9 One project has a narrower result, but aligned with the expected results of the other five projects
significant (for example in Colombia) compared to the funding provided through regionally managed projects.

3.4. Evaluation criteria

The four criteria for undertaking the assessment are mentioned in the ToR and are standard criteria used for project evaluations: relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability, defined by the OECD/DAC glossary of key terms in evaluation and results-based management in 2002 as follows:10

“Relevance: The extent to which the objectives of a development intervention are consistent with beneficiaries’ requirements, country needs, global priorities and partners’ and donors’ policies.

Effectiveness: The extent to which the development intervention’s objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance.

Efficiency: A measure of how economically resources/inputs (funds, expertise, time, etc.) are converted to results.

Sustainability: The continuation of benefits from a development intervention after major development assistance has been completed.”

As requested in the evaluation TOR, the evaluation will also use two humanitarian criteria, which have been defined by the ALNAP11 as follows:

“Connectedness: The extent to which activities of a short-term emergency nature are carried out in a context that takes longer-term and interconnected problems into account. Replaces the sustainability criterion used in development evaluations.

Coverage: The extent to which major population groups facing life-threatening suffering were reached by humanitarian action.

Since the definition of connectedness and sustainability seem to be mutually exclusive, the evaluation, in agreement with the evaluation manager, has applied the criterion of connectedness instead of that of sustainability.

The five criteria for this evaluation have been: relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, connectedness and coverage.

4. Evaluation framework and methodology

The evaluation framework and methodology are fully described in the inception report, which forms an integral part of the evaluation deliverables. A brief summary of the methodology is presented here so that the reader will understand the approach and methods used to collect and triangulate, analyse and interpret the data, and develop this evaluation report.

The evaluation used a mix of methods. For the evaluation of the global level (e.g. the sixteen countries covered by the six regional projects), the evaluation used the projects’ M&E results framework and the updated indicators and data sets provided by the IOM evaluation manager.

10 OECD/DAC, glossary of key terms in evaluation and results-based management, Evaluation and Aid Effectiveness series, 2002
At the country level, the evaluation used a case study approach in three countries: Brazil, Colombia and Peru. As of 31\textsuperscript{st} December 2019, a total of USD 10,286,434 was used from five of the six regional projects\textsuperscript{12} in the response for these three countries that host a migrant and refugee population of 2,520,483.

The tools and methods used to inform the findings were the following:

- Documentary analysis and review of the relevant project documentation and secondary sources, as listed in the bibliographical annex;
- Key Informant Interviews (KII), through individual or group interview, using a semi-structured interview approach with a total of 203 respondents across all three countries;
- Focus group discussions and interviews with a total of 148 migrants in all three countries;
- Use of a five-point scale regarding the perception of the effectiveness of the IOM response in the country from a total of 48 institutional partners;
- Use of a traffic light system to rate, based on the interpretation of the findings, each evaluation criterion of the case study countries, with the following scale: Green= on track and minor adjustments required, yellow= on track with some changes and adjustments required, red= off track with immediate and urgent changes required;
- On-site observation in key intervention areas in each case study country;
- Debriefing after the country case studies and a validation workshop with the key stakeholders (Regional Response Team and Country Missions).

The evaluation used contribution analysis and appreciative inquiry to appraise the extent to which the activities undertaken led to the expected results as defined in the projects’ results matrix. Gender and a Human Rights-Based Approach were analysed from the perspective of their inclusion in the project design and implementation and whether they were mainstreamed in the Regional Response.

4.1. Data sources and collection

At the global level the evaluation used documentary review and analysis as the main source of information. This indicates that while some trends can be extracted from the documentary analysis, the findings are not supported by triangulated evidence and should therefore be considered as anecdotal evidence, but are in no case robust enough to be generalised or considered as representative. The thrust of the evaluation was placed on the three countries subject to a case study, where primary data collection and triangulation were made possible.

Regarding the case study countries, the data sources, collection methods and the tables of respondents are included as an annex, per country, stating the type of interview (FGD or KII), the date, location, and duration of the interviews that took place in country.

For each interview the evaluation team took detailed notes, including ratings on a five-point scale from the institutional partners, qualitative feedback regarding the activities undertaken by IOM and the project, which were then reviewed, triangulated, analysed and used to inform the evaluation team’s interpretation, leading to the conclusions and recommendations contained in this report. A traffic light system was used to give an overall appraisal of the evaluation criteria by country according to the following benchmarks:

\textsuperscript{12} The regional project from SIDA did not cover these three countries, so no funding from that budget was available.
4.2. Data analysis

Data collected was analysed through contribution analysis. The evaluation looked for evidence of linkages from the actual activities undertaken by IOM under the regional projects to the expected results mentioned in the results framework: *Venezuelan women, men, girls and boys in vulnerable conditions receive timely and principled humanitarian assistance, referral services and integration support in line with their differentiated protection needs*, as well as its contribution to the projects’ objective: *Contribute to a regionally coordinated response to improve access to protection and multisectoral humanitarian assistance for Venezuelan women, men, girls and boys in vulnerable conditions in critical destination and transit countries.*

Analysis was carried out taking into account three different perspectives: a) the perspective of the government institutions (which included a five-point scale rating and a qualitative justification); b) the perspective of IOM staff and managers; and c) the perspective of migrants. Triangulation (confirmation by three different sources) was used in order to make a clear distinction between what is a perception and what is a finding.

While findings are factual, interpretation is based on the evaluation team skillset, and is reliant upon both the methodology followed and on previous experience and training in undertaking evaluations. This means that the analysis and interpretation do not necessarily reflect the point of view of a specific stakeholder, but the conclusion of the analysis process from the perspective of the evaluation team, taking into consideration the data collected from the different stakeholders, but particularly from the migrants and refugees themselves. In the end, as stated in the definition of an evaluation, a judgement is required about the performance of the response from the evaluation team.

4.3. Sampling

No statistical sampling was used in this evaluation, as a case study approach was used for the field work in the three selected countries: Brazil, Colombia, and Peru. The three countries host more than half of the total migrant and refugee population that has left Venezuela according to R4V information. The evaluation requested to hold interviews with the key stakeholders of the evaluation, namely IOM staff, government institutions, migrants and refugees, as well as implementing partners and UN agencies, in each of the case study countries. The list was based on the agenda prepared by the IOM country mission for the field visit and the selection of sites visited. Purposive sampling of the sites (to give an overview of the different types of responses) was undertaken for the visit to field locations based on their perceived learning value.

4.4. Limitations and applied mitigation strategies

One limitation is that the diverse response to the Venezuela situation involves 16 different countries, some of which are very large (e.g. Brazil), while others are small island states (e.g. Trinidad and Tobago). The dynamics and challenges of the response are very much linked to the context and the specificity of each country. Since only three countries were visited, the information leveraged at field level cannot be extracted or generalised to the overall response in the 16 countries. Although some general trends can be extracted from the document review,
it was not possible, based on an untriangulated documentary review, to provide a full answer for each key evaluation question at the global level.

Some limitations were rooted in the ToR as, for example, the selection of the case studies, which implied a very reduced representativeness of the range of response capacities. However, the sample was very much restricted by budgetary decisions made during the evaluation planning.

Another aspect is the limited expertise and exposure to M&E and evaluation processes from a majority of IOM staff. This sometimes led to unrealistic expectations regarding the evaluation process. To mitigate this limitation, IOM M&E staff will provide a first technical filter on comments, in line with evaluation norms and practices. The evaluation team will respond to comments received using an audit trail, allowing to see how comments were addressed, in line with good evaluation practice.

The country context varies, and each country has a specific level of complexity. Nonetheless, Colombia is the main country hosting Venezuelan migrants and refugees. It has a sensitive operational environment linked to endogenous factors that existed before the Venezuela crisis. The team made sure to understand and detail county contexts for their analysis in order to reflect operating complexities for IOM. All countries are leading the response, but it is unclear to what extent the concept of “Do No Harm” is being applied by the various actors, including IOM, something which directly affects the expected results (in terms of targeting and coverage). Similarly, the reference standards in emergency assistance (such as SPHERE) only seem to be tangentially referred to in Brazil and for WASH activities in Colombia, but it is unclear whether SPHERE standards are a part of the response applied by all actors in the region.

5. Findings

Findings are structured according to the evaluation criteria to facilitate ease of reading. The findings section is divided into two parts: a) global findings, linked to the 16 countries covered by the 6 regional projects and based on the M&E data of the respective projects’ results matrix, which is data generated by the IOM M&E but that has not been contrasted with other sources; and b) country-specific findings in Brazil, Colombia and Peru stemming from the case studies carried out.

5.1 Global findings

The review of the Regional Project documents and related documentation indicates that IOM has correctly positioned itself in the Venezuelan Crisis Response to ensure effective interventions, and that the Regional Response is articulated in a coherent and coordinated manner across the various countries of the region.

Below is illustrated the total expense at regional level and its distribution by area of intervention, in addition to the total investment per area.\(^\text{13}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DEA</th>
<th>Protection</th>
<th>SECI</th>
<th>ICS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$10,807,059</td>
<td>$5,341,916</td>
<td>$1,213,674</td>
<td>$1,501,984</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

More than half of the total budget is going towards DEA activities, with Protection activities making up 27%. SECI (7%) and ICS (8%) combined make up 15%. Socioeconomic integration will

\(^\text{13}\) Source: IOM Regional office shared financial reports per project and AI, 6\(^{th}\) February 2020. Note that these figures do not account for staff, office and overhead costs.
therefore require additional attention and funding, particularly to lessen the burden on the humanitarian response. Institutional capacity strengthening through joint, hands-on activities and operations will also allow for more long-term planning.

![Total Expense per Area](image)

In terms of country allocation, four countries have received the majority of funds, as shown in the graphic below:

![Total Expense per Country](image)

### 5.2 Case study findings

#### 5.2.1. Relevance

The regional response is found to be entirely relevant to the needs of the migrants. The size, complexity and scope of the crisis is such that a regional response is warranted, first and foremost to address the immediate humanitarian needs of the vulnerable population in line with the projects’ expected results. Individual activities undertaken in each of the countries are directly aligned with the country’s priorities, since in each country the government is responsible for the global response to the crisis. IOM has contributed from the onset (and even before the first regional project was funded), through its flexibility, subject matter expertise and responsiveness, to help shape the government’s own response in the three countries. The activities are further directly contributing to IOM’s mandate and its corporate frameworks (MCOF and MiGOF).
IOM’s position and support remains relevant in the current context. Continued Direct Emergency Assistance is needed as the migration flow is not expected to decrease over the short term, although the flows may change - and have already changed - in line with visa requirements in Ecuador and Peru. Furthermore, a shift in Colombia from migrants in transit to those temporarily residing in the country may also take place. Considering the three types of refugee and migrant flows (pendular, in transit and temporary residents), it is important to develop a specific strategy for each profile, as their needs are different. Socio-economic and cultural integration is a key requirement of all migrants who are temporary residents. It is also a current and increasing priority for the three countries’ government. Socioeconomic integration will therefore require additional attention and funding, particularly to lessen the burden on the humanitarian response. At the onset of the crisis, governments welcomed IOM’s institutional capacity strengthening through joint hands-on activities and operations. At the time of the evaluation of the three case studies, only the institutions in Peru have voiced a high interest for further capacity development from IOM, while in Brazil DPU expressed an interest in capacity development from IOM and in Colombia the desired support that was voiced by Migración Colombia is more on software for data analysis than on specific training courses.

Traffic light rating

Brazil: ☢️
Colombia: ☢️
Peru: ☢️

5.2.2. Effectiveness

Each country has a different operating environment which affects the extent to which the expected project results can be achieved. A brief contextual analysis is necessary to understand the rating obtained for each country case study. The context analysis is included in annex 7.7.

A. Brazil

Considering the context, and since the Operação Acolhida (name given to the government-led programme to welcome refugees and migrants from Venezuela in Brazil, literally translating as “Welcome Operation”) under the government has the lead for the response, IOM has been seen as both highly effective and responsive in the four intervention areas (Direct Emergency Assistance, Protection, Socioeconomic and Cultural Integration, Institutional Capacity Strengthening), and particularly in Direct Emergency Assistance. A strong focus of the response has been on information referral, shelter and accommodation, transportation (bus and air), and to a lesser extent SECI (more recently developed). Good partnerships have been leveraged for integral assistance to migrants with a range of institutions, NGOs and other UN agencies. A strong point of the response is the migrants’ perception of IOM staff’s commitment and attitude, which were praised by all the migrants interviewed except for one person (i.e. 93 of 94 migrants). The different services provided, such as information, orientation, attention, emergency response, transportation, and referral for migrants, are well-implemented, with a high satisfaction from the migrants themselves. Limited cases of SECI were interviewed (transported with IOM support) in Brasilia but showed that the support was indeed highly critical to their objectives when they migrated to Brazil.

Regional projects are more focused on the emergency response, while national projects allow for articulation of longer-term objectives and socio-economic integration of migrants to a greater extent. IOM appears to have been able to leverage enough support in-country to
complement the Emergency Response with more durable and sustainable socio-economic activities (on different donor funds), something that will support the efforts of assisting and integrating the vulnerable migrant population in Brazil.

IOM (through national projects) is also undertaking an outreach campaign (one of the few actors to do so) to other regions of the state of Roraima in order to facilitate the regularisation of those migrants that did not obtain their official documents at Pacaraima or Boa Vista (the two official entry points where integral assistance and information to migrants is provided) through a multi-disciplinary mobile campaign. These are implemented in conjunction with local partners (Caritas) who provide specific services including food assistance and include participation from local-level officials (e.g. from the social affairs department).

SPHERE standards are tacitly applied in the management of shelters, which is placed under the responsibility of the UNHCR. Occasionally there are some issues between the military imperative and the humanitarian principles (such as “informal” settlements not officially recognized as shelters, given a lack of available shelter space where concerns have been voiced regarding protection issues), although IOM is not responsible for those aspects. Stronger advocacy towards the military to observe the “Do No Harm” approach when dealing with migrants would potentially enhance the quality of assistance.

The institutional perception regarding the effectiveness of the IOM is highest in Brazil: an average rating of 5.0 out of a maximum of 5.0 (on a five-point rating scale) shows that the different institutions have the highest appreciation for the effectiveness of the IOM response. The following table shows the results from 26 respondents, all of which gave the maximum rating.

Table 2 – IOM ratings from state institutions - Brazil

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BR date</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>No of persons</th>
<th>ratings</th>
<th>sub-total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>19.12.19</td>
<td>Fed. Sub-Committee</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5,00</td>
<td>55,00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>210.12.19</td>
<td>Op. Acolhida Boa Vista</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5,00</td>
<td>5,00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>310.12.19</td>
<td>Fed. Police BV</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5,00</td>
<td>10,00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>411.12.19</td>
<td>Op. Acolhida Pacaraima</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5,00</td>
<td>5,00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>511.12.19</td>
<td>Fed. Police Pacaraima</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5,00</td>
<td>5,00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>613.12.19</td>
<td>Min. Health Municip.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5,00</td>
<td>20,00 (nat. project)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>713.12.19</td>
<td>ABIN</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5,00</td>
<td>25,00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>813.12.19</td>
<td>Labour inspection</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5,00</td>
<td>5,00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>26</strong></td>
<td><strong>130,00</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>5,00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In terms of operational effectiveness, the additional funding received under one of the regional projects, following a field visit by the donor (PRM), was critical in order to pursue the operational activities. It is important to note that the transportation component has naturally high costs associated with the air transport of migrants to the Southern States of Brazil, where more income-generating activities and employment opportunities are likely to be found.

A full referral system is in place in the two main entry points (PTRIG in Pacaraima and Boa Vista), where migrants and refugees receive a comprehensive explanation of the integral referral system, including all the legal requirements in order to file for asylum or temporary residency. The system is anchored in a good partnership with other actors in the response, including
government agencies, and the IOM has made a good effort to include state level institutions in its partnership agreements, as the government-led response is directed from the federal level. The activities undertaken by the IOM are coherent, necessary, directly support migrants’ and refugees’ needs and are clearly embedded in the Operação Acolhida. IOM is doing the right thing and is mostly doing it right. Anecdotal evidence indicates that protection issues for the migrant population is preferably kept to internal household solutions rather than referring to the Brazilian legal system for addressing the problem. Nonetheless, the presence of DPU (Federal Public Defender) at the PTRI in Pacaraima is an added value in terms of providing protection information, but only applies to those who have crossed regularly into the country.

One issue of concern is the assistance to the indigenous population, which is a recognized challenge in the region, given the idiosyncrasy and specific needs of these population. It is likely more feasible to address support to these target groups through locally-based CBOs or NGOs, to the extent possible, with the participation of faith-based organisations that are active in these communities. Anecdotal evidence from a focus group of indigenous migrants suggest there could also be deeper protection issues that may need to be addressed by UNHCR (i.e. reportedly deliberate executions on the other side of the border of the indigenous population according to FGD).

In terms of institutional capacity strengthening (ICS), the feedback from the armed forces running Operação Acolhida has shown that IOM has been a major reference for them and a model of collaboration among UN agencies. Anecdotal evidence suggests IOM was able to softly persuade the military to adopt some of the recognised international practices in assistance to migrants regarding the entire interiorization process: setting up the systems; fit for travel - escort; pre-departure information; management of family and social reunification; Vagas de Trabalho (employment opportunities); ensuring protection against possible labour exploitation; ensuring protection checks are in place; and focusing on quality of interiorization rather than just quantity and number of migrants transported. Some specific support has also been given to associations like AJUFE (Federal Judges), but it could be useful for IOM to develop a strategy for ICS, identifying its primary targets and current gaps.

Finally, while it is not a part of the regional response, nor part of the four intervention objectives, it should be noted that border management is a field in which IOM has extensive experience that could possibly be shared through targeted training to Brazilian institutions. This could enhance both migrant attention, assistance, and service provision, while also identifying protection risks for in-coming migrants (human trafficking, smuggling, etc.). Some training has reportedly been undertaken in 2019 by IOM with border agents, but a more structured activity could be envisaged.

Traffic light rating: 

A summary of the identified strengths and weaknesses is presented hereafter:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strengths</th>
<th>Weaknesses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>✓ Relationship with government</td>
<td>• Not responsible for shelters (UNHCR responsibility)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Flexibility</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Responsiveness</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Interim evaluation of IOM’s Regional Response to the flows of refugees and migrants from Venezuela - Draft Evaluation Report

✓ Hands-on
✓ Strong support and operational capacity
✓ Non-political, seen as a model of collaboration, also inspiring and learning by doing for government institutions
✓ Excellent support to PTRIG and OA
✓ SP office in charge of SEI in many states in the south for migrants, as part of interiorização (OA)
✓ Staff commitment and attitude
✓ Good partnership relations (referrals)
✓ Integral and holistic support
✓ Works on both immediate needs and longer-term needs (SECI)

- Limited involvement with indigenous communities and socio-economic integration in Roraima state
- No humanitarian border management projects to incorporate HRBA and gender for border agents
- Unclear capacity development strategy for government institutions

B. Colombia

Considering the context, the activities undertaken by the IOM have been very responsive and supportive of the government’s priorities. However, from the humanitarian imperative perspective, more person-centred approach could be devoted to the migrants in line with their needs. Of particular need is an integrated referral mechanism to inform all migrants about their options for support from state and non-institutional actors, something IOM has done in other countries. Interviews with migrants show that the attention provided (in shelters/accommodation) is very brief and has some disconnect with the time required to regularise their status.14 Humanitarian transport is only given to migrants who have regularised their situation, a fraction of those who could use transport assistance. Pendular migrants are making longer stays in Colombia and the returnees and host communities also have socioeconomic and health needs.

The public services are entirely saturated and overwhelmed by the magnitude of the migration flow, particularly in border entry points such as Cúcuta, and the support given by the IOM through its emergency assistance and stabilisation programme, as well as from the health programme, contributes to alleviating the burden and directly mitigates the negative conditions. From the migrant’s perspective, however, the support is not enough to cover their needs. At present, and with the recent governmental decision to maintain humanitarian assistance while upscaling the SECI as a means to lessen the need for humanitarian assistance, the most useful support for migrants is obtaining shelter/accommodation (e.g. avoiding living in the streets with the associated protection risks this entails) and finding a source of income. Migrants interviewed during the case study indicated that the dire socioeconomic situation caused by the complex political environment in Venezuela was a main factor of displacement.15

IOM has adapted its response to the various scenarios in the country, in line with the needs. IOM has (outside of the regional projects) also contributed to the profiling and regularisation of

14 For example, IOM used to fund the migrants staying at the Scalabrini migration centre in Cúcuta for a period of 3-5 days, but it can take more than two weeks to get the official documents, as reported by the acting head of the centre.
15 Unlike the MMF in the Balkans in 2015, where the stated objective of most refugees and migrants was to flee the wars and conflicts affecting countries such as Syria in order to obtain asylum or permanent residency in Western Europe.
migrants, as the size and flows make it very difficult to obtain reliable figures and a clear picture of the types of migration. It has been recognised that the migration flows have been changing and that more and more vulnerable people are coming into the country, thereby increasing the assistance caseload and putting additional pressure on the government and the international community, including the IOM, to respond to the situation.

Regional projects are more focused on the emergency response, the largest of which was the PRM project that represented a majority of the funding, and enabled some flexibility in its use. The CERF funding also allowed for the development of some important aspects of the response, as it was the first regional project for the Response which focused on immediate emergency assistance needs. The issue of sexual and reproductive health is insufficiently covered in emergency response but is fully relevant to the needs of the migrants and the priorities of the Ministry of Health, so IOM has rightly taken up this challenge, for which funding is difficult to obtain. The activities undertaken in health (support to MoH structures, attention to pregnant/lactating mothers, working with community leaders, partnerships with a University) contribute decisively to not only lower the caseload of migrants who use emergency health services (the only free health services available to migrants who are not regularised or have no health insurance), but also to decrease the health costs (first and second level consultations are reportedly two to three times less costly than emergency services) and contribute to increasing knowledge and awareness on a range of public health issues (from simple hygiene behaviour to avoid the spread of diseases, to actually being able to identify potential health problems amongst the population, and in some cases mitigating and referring the cases – with concrete examples given by the community leaders’ interviewed). At the same time, it contributes to curbing the spread of infectious diseases. While the health activities are slotted under a distinct programme (health programme) that is separate from the Emergency Assistance and Stabilisation programme, both are under an IOM Head of Programme and the health programme activities are clearly aligned with the expected results of the regional projects: providing humanitarian assistance to vulnerable groups according to their needs. Despite the efforts, the needs remain high, particularly in border points where the pendular migration flows amount to more than 25,000 people on a daily basis (not counting those crossing through informal points).

In terms of attention and support received in the shelters, migrants interviewed were very happy with being hosted in the shelter, but all were concerned about the very short time for which they could stay, as some of them were afraid of having to return to “living on the streets” after being discharged. While there are many organisations who work collaboratively with migrants at the different stages of their migration route, there does not appear to be an integral referral mechanism to accompany the migrants in a way that enables them to preserve their dignity while receiving the necessary support and protection (e.g. ruta integral de referencia para el migrante) and up to which stage support is being provided (e.g. sort of “graduation” or criteria for exiting the assistance programme). There are many sector-specific routes but not one overall reference map that includes public institutions, NGOs and international agencies, to inform, orient, support and assist arriving migrants. This is sorely needed, despite constituting a recognised challenge16. Specific services given to migrants in the capital, Bogotá, where the largest migrant population is found (24% of the migrants in Colombia), indicates that IOM has been instrumental in obtaining the participation of other actors in providing support in the Super CADES social, which is the municipal reference point that integrates the government services

16 Interviews with the head of the super CADES social in Bogota show that this was discussed, but it proved too difficult to obtain one single, integrated referral mechanism inclusive of all government and non-government actors
and those of the international community in relation to providing attention to migrants. This is seen as an example of good practice and should be continued, with a view to developing the required integrated referral information mechanism. It is also important to note that most migrants interviewed indicated that before leaving Venezuela they had no knowledge of the legal requirements or proceedings necessary to regularize their situation once in Colombia or during transit, and very few of those interviewed had received a PEP (temporary residence permit, e.g. regular migrants).

In Barranquilla, where most of the migrants are temporary residents as it is not located on the migration route from the Northern to the Southern border where the migrants in transit are found walking alongside the roads, the work with the municipality is particularly encouraging on the issue of SECI. The municipality has the political willingness to assist migrants, and IOM can count on an established community of active Venezuelan associations that can be partners in implementing the response, as they are familiar with the migrant communities. Furthermore, the new municipal authorities have adopted a migrant assistance policy, opening further venues for partnerships between institutions and the international and local communities.

IOM has been inclusive in the targeting of the beneficiaries: not only are migrants benefitting, but - to the extent possible- so are the returnees and the host population. This is particularly important in a context where the diminishing resources and access to income generating activities are scarce so the pressure and competition for employment and income generation is rising, and the xenophobic reaction of the Colombian population is increasing. However, while there is an understanding of principles regarding an inclusive approach, it remains difficult to know the exact figures of each beneficiary type included in the actual activities undertaken.

The government has requested that SECI be given priority for the next phase of attention, with a focus on regularised migrants. However, all migrants need an income and SECI should be available to all. A good practice example was found in a vocational training centre run by a Church foundation in Barranquilla (Casa Lúdica) that provides certificates to all migrants – those who have a regular status also have their diplomas certified by SENA (government institution), while the others (irregular migrants) do not. This is one way in which assistance can be provided impartially in accordance with humanitarian principles. Host communities and returnees are also able to benefit from this support.

More needs to be done on developing the SECI (stabilisation component) of the response, with the main objective of providing income to beneficiaries so they are no longer dependent on humanitarian aid. This is further developed in the recommendations section.

Data management is intensive and critical, and responsibility is given to the IOM within the GIFMM, working together with the UNHCR in the preparation of information updates. DTM has been specifically mentioned as a very useful mechanism to understand the migration flows and to inform the response activities, and several of the past exercises undertaken by the government to provide a census and profiling of the migrants were done with the technical and logistical support of the IOM (such as the RAMV in 2018), something that was highly appreciated and reported to be an important learning process. Large-scale resources are necessary to ensure proper information and data management, given the size and complexity of the migration flows and the high number of actors, and to facilitate the coordination of the response.

As in the other two case study countries, the perception of the institutional partners regarding the effectiveness of the IOM is high, with an average rating of 4.61 out of a maximum of 5.0 (on a five-point rating scale), showing that the different institutions have a high appreciation for the
effectiveness of the IOM response. The following table shows the results from 9 respondents, from three different field locations and at central level.17

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COL date</th>
<th>source</th>
<th>No of persons</th>
<th>ratings</th>
<th>sub-total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 17.1.20 Minsan Cucuta</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>10.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 17.1.20 PMU/SGR Cucuta</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4.50</td>
<td>4.50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 20.1.20 Alcaldia Barranquilla</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 22.1.20 coord. Super CADES Bog</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5.00</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 23.1.20 Migración Colombia</td>
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<td>5.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>6 23.1.20 Cancilleria</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 23.1.20 Presidencia</td>
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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>total</strong></td>
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<td><strong>41.50</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Average</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Traffic light rating:

A summary of the identified strengths and weaknesses is presented hereunder:

**Table 5 – IOM Colombia strengths and weaknesses**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strengths</th>
<th>Weaknesses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>✓ Relationship with government</td>
<td>• No clear strategy linked to the response (e.g. no integral referral mechanism)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Flexibility, evolving with the changing needs</td>
<td>• Unclear line of advocacy on humanitarian principles vis-à-vis government (SPHERE, Do No Harm)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Responsiveness</td>
<td>• Limited involvement with indigenous communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Hands-on</td>
<td>• No humanitarian border management projects to incorporate HRBA and gender for border agents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Strong support and operational capacity</td>
<td>• Unclear capacity development strategy for government institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Opening spaces for other actors, given the good government relationship</td>
<td>• Limited experience in large scale MMF and disconnect in staff profiles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Inclusive approach to assistance (migrants, host communities and returnees) to minimise xenophobia</td>
<td>• Service contracts made with partners rather than partnership agreements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Value of the DTM process and information management</td>
<td>• Data protection for databases of contractors (use of data after contracts expire)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Works on both immediate needs and longer-term needs (SECI)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Willingness to prioritise SECI</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Comprehensive approach to health needs and priorities, working on prevention, mitigation and cure with institutions and at community level</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

17 Note that interviews with ministries were done with lower-level staff who also indicated they were not entirely aware of the activities of the IOM, so their rating was constrained by their limited knowledge level.
C. Peru

Considering the context, and since the Government has the lead for the response, specifically through the Mesa Migratoria, IOM has been both highly effective and responsive under the different activities. The different services in information, orientation, attention, emergency response, transportation, and referral for migrants are well undertaken, with a high satisfaction from the migrants themselves. Implementing partners also noted that the transportation and shelter support allows them to “decongest” the CEBAF, which is important in peak migration periods. IOM is identified as the lead stakeholder at the CEBAF and in Tumbes by migrants. It is important to mention that both government officials and migrants highly praised the staff’s commitment and attitude. Migrants interviewed at the CEBAF state that IOM is the most identifiable and useful (in terms of information and services) actor present. During most interviews where an IOM staff member was present, they offered to follow up on specific cases and there was always very good rapport between government officials and migrants, and IOM staff.

Both IOM and the government identify the need to manage and collect information to improve protection measures, DEA, social and economic integration. Peru is in its 7th round of DTM in Tumbes and Tacna. DTM has proven to be useful to develop projects, take decisions/identify priorities, and evaluate needs, among other uses. During the mission, most government officials knew and had used DTM, mainly to identify the needs and better plan and strengthen their response to Venezuelan flows. The data collected by IOM is an entry point to access government and to increase the impact of their programmes and activities. However, UNHCR, both local and national staff, stated that IOM sometimes reports the information late, due mainly to human resource constraints.

There is a good effort by IOM to establish a coherent communication strategy. As detailed in the 2020 RMRP, Peru has seen xenophobia and discrimination against Venezuelans on the rise. IOM, in conjunction with other organizations such as UNHCR, has developed various campaigns under the umbrella of Tu Causa es Mi Causa. Through this campaign, IOM has managed to leverage a coordination effort between different actors, mainly UNHCR and local NGOs. The various activities developed focus on preventing discrimination and xenophobia, enhancing positive stories of migration (both from Venezuelans and Peruvians), and fostering relationships between migrants and host communities.

Observation during the mission showed that IOM needs to improve its reporting mechanisms, specifically regarding integration figures. When reporting SECI figures, IOM includes how many people have seen a billboard or participated in an activity, for example El Balón no tiene Banderas. However, it is important to mention that participation does not equate to integration. IOM has institutional reporting tools to improve national monitoring and reporting mechanisms. Regional offices need to consider increasing training for national offices to ensure correct reporting is undertaken.

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18 Refugee and Migrant Response Plan (RMRP) 2020, p.110.
Regarding protection interventions, these are very relevant and contribute to the objective of minimising damage. During a Focus Group Discussion with migrants and an interview with IOM staff, it was noted that there is gap in activities focused on mental health. In addition to the hardships endured by migrants that have arrived in Peru, there is an added psychological burden of the regularization process. One interviewee pointed out that this is an additional burden, particularly since the change in the migratory regularization process since June 2019.

IOM has different DEA activities, such as food distribution in Tumbes and in CEBAF (both led by their implementing partner ADRA), a temporary shelter in Tumbes and support in a temporary shelter in Lima, led by the Scalabrini Association. IOM also allocates part of their budget to shelter management training. However, regarding shelter, 75% of migrants are in Lima and, of those, 95% pay rent.

IOM Peru has proven to be adaptable and flexible, for example in June 2019, when the requirements to enter Chile changed and there was a peak of migrants in the southern border, IOM, through the PRM budget, opened an office in Tacna to respond to the high demand. However, the response needs to be more coordinated between all national offices and at regional level (this includes missions between them, such as Ecuador and Peru, and missions with the regional bureau). As seen since June 2019, migration policies from other countries have a direct impact on Peru. This is a regional crisis with national and local impact, therefore the coordination between local, national and regional teams needs to be a priority and considerably improved. During various interviews with IOM staff and UNHCR, it was stated that IOM regional staff and offices need to further support the mission, both at programmatic and coordination/management levels. This ranges from support in technical capacities in the emergency sector, trafficking, information management, etc., to support in better understanding the coordination between the platform and the mission. The new office in Panama is a step toward improving this aspect. IOM staff also noted that the technical staff are often absent during coordination meetings. This is said to weaken the impact of the activities put in place by the teams in the field, as they can’t share information, good practices, learnings, rectifications implemented, etc. Furthermore, the staff noted that there is a burden in reporting figures and activities, seen as a “double reporting”. As this is a regional response and IOM is co-lead, the staff need to report to the Regional Platform (R4V), but also as an individual organization they have to report to IOM Regional Office.

Implementing partners are key figures in the response structure. In order to be effective, it’s important to identify strong local capacity and/or implementing partners. In many interviews, stakeholders noted that there is an important added value in working with implementing partners at a regional level, i.e. the same partners in various countries along the migration route. The specific example was from two IOM interviewees who noted that it was an identified good practice to work with ADRA in Ecuador and in Peru. Implementing partners identify IOM as a strong logistic partner. One partner noted, however, that the technical capacities and size of the team, specifically in Tumbes, is sometimes an issue, especially in this fast paced and rapidly moving context.

As in the other two case study countries, the perception of the institutional partners regarding the effectiveness of the IOM is quite high, with an average rating of 4.77 out of a maximum of 5.0 (on a five-point rating scale) from 13 respondents, showing that the different institutions have a high appreciation for the effectiveness of the IOM response.
Interim evaluation of IOM’s Regional Response to the flows of refugees and migrants from Venezuela - Draft Evaluation Report

Table 6 – IOM ratings from institutional partners - Peru

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>No of persons</th>
<th>Ratings</th>
<th>Sub-total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>21.01.20</td>
<td>Superintendencia Nacional de Migraciones</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5 (x3)</td>
<td>23.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22.01.20</td>
<td>Gerencia de Desarrollo Social (Tumbes)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5 (6)</td>
<td>38.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>62</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4.77</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Traffic light rating:

Table 7 – IOM Peru strengths and weaknesses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strengths</th>
<th>Weaknesses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| ✓ Relationship with government  
 ✓ Flexibility  
 ✓ Responsiveness  
 ✓ Hands-on, especially in Tumbes/CEBAF where they lead on DTM and surveys  
 ✓ Seen as a model of collaboration, also inspiring and learning by doing for government  
 ✓ Staff commitment and attitude  
 ✓ Excellent perception of IOM effectiveness from government institutions  
 ✓ Seen as a strong organization with technical capacities by the government | • Coordination remains a weakness: different levels of coordination, from local to national office, national to regional, and local to regional  
 • Interesting integration activities but remain isolated to specific areas/regions, lack of communication between the implementing teams  
 • No humanitarian border management projects to incorporate HRBA and gender for border agents  
 • Constraining operational environment from a legal standpoint  
 • Long-term strategy is not yet clear  
 • Need stronger technical/management capacities: HR processes are long and do not always respond to the needs  
 • Little done to understand community participation and feedback mechanisms |

5.2.3. Efficiency

The financial analysis shows that, as of closing date of this evaluation (31st December 2019) a third of the budget is allocated to direct operational costs. It should be noted that two projects, NL and Sida projects, close in March 2020, whilst PRM closes in June 2020, therefore the data does not include all of the burnt rate. 58.12% of the total regional projects' budget is allocated to the four AI (DEA, SECI, P, ICS). In some cases, both PRM projects and the Netherlands, some activities linked to coordination and the platform are included, as they are reported in these four AI.
The following findings are made for the case study visits:

A. Brazil

In terms of management efficiency, the IOM has an international emergency coordinator in Boa Vista. The main office is based in Brasilia, and an office in São Paulo with the socio-economic integration component (as most of the destinations for resettlement of migrants are in the southern states, including São Paulo). The set-up and management system appear adequate for the handling of the response in support to Operação Acolhida, although less focus was placed on the SECI component managed from the office in Sao Paulo. The evidence provided is insufficient to draw a conclusive appreciation, so no rating is given, although the set-up appears sufficient to operationalise the response of the six projects. This would justify a yellow or green traffic light rating.

According to the regional projects’ burnt rates, IOM has achieved the following quantifiable results\(^{20}\):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>DEA</th>
<th>Protection</th>
<th>SECI</th>
<th>ICS</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Expenses and commitments</td>
<td>$624,092</td>
<td>$2,116,626</td>
<td>$309,655</td>
<td>$15,087</td>
<td>$3,065,462</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Brazil reports allocating 69% of its budget to protection activities, and a further 31% to the other three activities (worthwhile noting that ICS only makes up 1% of expenses).

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19 Source: IOM financials shared on February 6\(^{th}\), 2020, taking into consideration three projects, PRM II, NL and Sida, are still ongoing.

20 Source: IOM Regional office shared financial reports per project and AI, 6\(^{th}\) February 2020.
B. Colombia

The IOM mission has recently (2019) restructured the programme and has an emergency assistance and stabilisation programme manager, as well as a head of programmes, to coordinate and streamline the response across various areas, including health. Considering the need to attend migrants across the country, the ratio of international staff is very limited compared to other organisations, such as UNHCR, which can place IOM in a difficult bargaining position at field level. An international staff should be in charge of the Cúcuta office, as this would greatly improve IOM’s bargaining position. The lack of the declaration of emergency L2 by IOM is felt as an additional constraint by the CO, as this did not permit more flexibility regarding its administrative procedures, and only a procurement waiver was obtained from IOM Manila, while other components (legal, human resources, etc.) did not benefit from the exemption. It is unclear whether the staff involved in the emergency response had previous experience in management of mixed migration flows. Based on the information available, it is difficult to provide an evidence-based rating regarding this criterion, but the staff are quite stretched in dealing with constant requests and assistance activities and the requirements of procedures used in “normal” (e.g. non crisis) settings have constrained the country office’s ability to ensure a timely response, as reported by the CO.

According to the regional projects’ burnt rate, IOM has achieved the following quantifiable results:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>DEA</th>
<th>Protection</th>
<th>SECI</th>
<th>Inst. Strength</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Disbursed</td>
<td>$4,381,773</td>
<td>$510,385</td>
<td>$123,712</td>
<td>$146,032</td>
<td>$5,161,902</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Colombia, as shown through the analysis, focuses almost primarily on DEA activities. The three other areas of activities (P, SECI and ICS) only make up 15% of the total budget for the country.

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21 Source: IOM Regional office shared financial reports per project and AI, 6th February 2020.
From interviews and documentation, an initial assessment would note the efficiency of the response as yellow, mainly due to human resource issues. The mission remained 5 months without a Chief of Mission, which undermines the credibility of the organisation when engaging at a high-level and sends a message of low commitment to the different actors in the response. Although the team was able to meet, and sometimes surpass, its targets, this shows a weakness in the overall HR, procurement and administrative processes needed to efficiently respond to an urgent crisis of such a large scale. These changes and turnover show that after two years of launching the response, the mission’s organization is not fully adapted to respond to the magnitude of the response. An additional example is that the office did not, at the time of the mission (January 2020), have a team dedicated to human trafficking and smuggling, a key area of expertise for IOM. Many stated that this could be due to the fact that IOM has not declared an emergency, which would allow them to activate and allocate more resources to the mission.

With regards to this response, IOM has offices and presence in Lima, Tumbes and CEBAF, Tacna. While its main office is in Lima, IOM has emergency teams deployed in main cities and border areas, such as Tumbes and Tacna. In Tumbes, there has been a high turnover of the coordinator position which does not allow for proper continuity in activities and consistency in the relationships with implementing partners, government officials and UNHCR, the co-leader of the response.

As mentioned previously, an aspect that was highlighted is that IOM needs to improve its reporting mechanisms. The team’s efficiency is sometimes affected by double-reporting, as stated previously, and by the fact that in some cases they aren’t using existing reporting mechanisms (e.g. for SECI reporting). The structure of the response is complex, as local missions need to report their activities to IOM RO but also to the platform. Staff seem overstretched, and it is to be noted that the visit took place during January 2020, with fewer entries in Tumbes compared to previous months.

According to the regional projects’ burnt rate, IOM has achieved the following quantifiable results22:

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22 Source: IOM Regional office shared financial reports per project and AI, 6th February 2020.
The results show a strong focus on DEA, with some activities focusing on ICS. However, looking at all the activities implemented there’s a clear gap regarding SECI, which needs to be further enhanced.

### Total Expense per Area

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>DEA</th>
<th>Protection</th>
<th>SECI</th>
<th>Inst. Strength</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Disbursed</td>
<td>$1,019,161</td>
<td>$199,173</td>
<td>$54,998</td>
<td>$638,704</td>
<td>$1,912,037</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Traffic light rating: 💩

5.2.4. Connectedness

An important aspect of the regional projects that drove the response to the Venezuelan crisis is that one of the four original strategic objectives of the response, as developed in the RAP 2018 and the RMRP 2019, was that of socioeconomic and cultural integration (SECI), which complemented the Direct Emergency Assistance (DEA), Protection (P) and Institutional Capacity Strengthening (ICS). This means that the regional response was mindful from the start of the need to simultaneously work on the immediate humanitarian response while at the same time developing the linkages for the migrants’ integration through SECI. This should be recognized as a good practice in line with the nature of the crisis.

It is to be noted that there is a significant increase in the SECI indicators in the PRM II regional reporting mechanisms. Some countries, such as Trinidad & Tobago, state there is a need to develop a transitional method to phase out from emergency assistance and promote self-reliance and self-sufficiency.

### A. Brazil

While there remains a need to maintain the urgent attention to the vulnerable cases as part of the emergency response, there is concurrently a shift of focus towards paying more attention to socio-economic and cultural integration. This is both a government priority, a migrant need
and an area where IOM should be increasing its efforts. The high demand for socio-economic and cultural integration of migrants goes beyond the activities undertaken under the regional projects, since the aspect of socio-economic integration is related to national projects funded by different donors. However, the obvious need and response from the IOM towards giving greater attention to SECI is well noted and needs to be maintained. In the context of the regional response, it is particularly important to consider vocational training and grant allocation based on the success of the beneficiaries in leveraging income. In other words, it is not enough to provide the training, the training certificate and a single grant. To be sustainable and successful, the SECI activities should include the provision of closer technical support/monitoring and the possibility of obtaining a second grant to consolidate the business (and even a third grant when expanding and creating employment opportunities). IOM has understood the need to ensure additional efforts are made in this field and is not looking only at the short-term nature of the emergency response (e.g. kits, shelter, NFIs, information, etc.), but also migrants’ integration through productive solutions. However, it needs to have a more clearly developed strategy and focus on business viability/sustainability, ideally at least over a one-year period after having provided the initial grant.

Regional projects are more focused on the emergency response, while national projects allow for the articulation of longer-term objectives and socio-economic integration of migrants to a higher extent. IOM appears to have been able to leverage enough support in-country to complement the Emergency Response with more durable and sustainable socio-economic activities (on different donor funds), something that will support the efforts of assisting and integrating the vulnerable migrant population in Brazil.

Traffic light rating: ☢️

B. Colombia

It is important to note that in Colombia, the country with the largest beneficiary caseload in the regional response, the IOM Country Mission is divided into a number of different programmes which encompass both the Regional Response and other programmes funded from other sources. There is a Head of Programme (present for just over a year) that oversees four programmatic/intervention areas. The bulk of the Regional Response is placed under the Emergency Assistance and Stabilisation Programme (EAS), with a recently recruited Head of EAS programme. A separate programme in health is being implemented, part of which is directly supporting and relevant to the direct assistance component of the Regional Response and contributes to the expected results of the regional projects, even though it is not structured solely according to the EAS needs but has a sector-specific strategy.

There remains a need to maintain the service provision to the vulnerable cases as part of the emergency response. Concurrently, there is a shift of focus towards more attention to socio-economic integration as part of the government’s and IOM’s priorities. While this does not apply to the flow of migrants in transit, it is a priority for those migrants who are temporary residents, which represent an increasing number among the recent arrivals. As the high demand for socio-economic and cultural integration of migrants goes beyond the activities undertaken under the regional projects, it is particularly important for IOM to advocate for more development-oriented donors to support this aspect as a matter of high priority. This is partly covered through national projects. It should also be noted that migrants who are able to generate an income will
lower the burden on the emergency assistance programme and minimise protection problems (linked to illicit trade/activities). Success in the vocational training and grant allocation should be related to the beneficiaries’ capacity to leverage an income, and not the humanitarian approach consisting in providing the training, the certificate and the grant as the main result. To be sustainable and successful, the SECI activities should include the provision of closer technical support/monitoring and the possibility of obtaining a second grant to consolidate the business (and even a third grant when expanding and creating employment opportunities).

The rating is yellow as IOM has understood the need to ensure additional efforts are made in this field and is pursuing a comprehensive approach to migrants’ integration, alongside returnees and host populations, through productive solutions. This also contributes to diminishing xenophobia and discrimination against migrants. However, IOM needs to have a more clearly developed strategy and focus on business viability/sustainability, ideally at least over a one-year period since launching the business. Pendular migrants are difficult to assist, as the current trend seems to indicate a longer stay in Colombia (as opposed to previous one-day or same-day crossing) and the support that can be given should be provided in line with the dimension of the flows, but is possibly the most complex part of the response and the least predictable. For the DEA to migrants, a review of the accommodation/shelter capacities and of their length of stay is recommended, so that the referrals of migrants leaving the shelters are linked to actual solutions and not only immediate referrals to other actors.

Traffic light rating: 🟢

C. Peru

As stated in one of the interviews with IOM staff, there is a need to recognize integration as a fundamental aspect of the response, without setting aside DEA activities in order to respond to the urgent needs of the most vulnerable. This is both a government priority, a need for migrants and a priority area of intervention for IOM. According to the RMRP 2020, approximately 90% of refugees and migrants face high levels of informality. In a country that is prone to this type of work, migrants and refugees are victims to infringement of labour rights, including discrimination, and therefore are more likely to become victims of human trafficking and exploitation.

A remote survey led by WFP in January 2020 shows that the two main preoccupations for Venezuelans are lack of work and discrimination/exploitation. The two main concerns for Peruvians are insecurity and lack of work. IOM’s intervention is relevant because it focuses on integration and combatting discrimination and xenophobia, working with both migrants and host communities. IOM, in conjunction with a university and the ILO, conducted a study to understand the employment characteristics of migrants. The study was used as an advocacy tool to push for integration measures with the government. A pilot intervention, the “1+1” was implemented in San Martin de Porres, where training sessions and seed funding were implemented for 120 people, of which 68 were Venezuelans. To be sustainable and successful, the SECI activities should include the provision of closer technical support/monitoring and the possibility of obtaining a second grant to consolidate the business (and even a third grant when expanding and creating employment opportunities). The rating is yellow as IOM is well aware of

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23 WFP, Encuesta Remota: Migrantes Venezolanos en Perú, 28 January 2020
the need to give greater attention to SECI. However, it needs to have a more clearly developed strategy and focus on business viability/sustainability, ideally at least over a one-year period.

In many interviews with IOM and government staff, it was stated that the complexity also lies in integrating migrants with irregular migratory status. As previously mentioned, this is a key aspect to the response, as many Venezuelans have stated their desire to stay in Peru. There needs to be a better understanding of what assistance and activities can and need to be implemented with this growing population.

Traffic light rating: 🟢

5.2.5. Coverage

Regional M&E information regarding the regional projects’ targets indicates that IOM has generally exceeded its initial targets, with counted exceptions that are mentioned under the effectiveness criterion. It has been particularly challenging to obtain coverage data, as in the case study countries no such data was made available, and at the regional level the evaluation was not able to identify the data in a way that would enable an analysis of the coverage per country, per area of intervention and per project.

When looking at the wider response through the RMRP and R4V platform information, the situation is quite different, something that field visits in Colombia and Peru have highlighted: the response is unable to cover all the identified needs, in part given financial allocations received, but also in part due to the difficulty and complexity of reaching certain areas and being able to operationalise the support (a number of intervention areas in Colombia where IOM operates are considered red zones from a security perspective). It may be necessary, in certain countries, to differentiate the three types of migration flows (pendular, transit and temporary residents) in order to ensure a better-structured response in line with the needs of the vulnerable people in each type of flow, as they are different. At the same time, there was a common agreement by all three governments in the case study countries that a stronger focus and priority should be given to covering SECI needs in the future. As mentioned previously, indicators in regional reporting show that most countries are increasingly focusing on SECI activities.

Using the expected results of the projects’ results matrix, the evaluation team has globally provided a rating of yellow for the three case study countries in view of the unmet needs, although the issue of coverage is linked to the wider response and not specifically to that of the IOM through the regional projects. That said, it could be that IOM needs to upscale its own operations in view of the number of unmet needs that remain at the regional response level through an intensification of its operations on the ground and enhanced advocacy and coordination via its role in the platform, which is not included in the scope of this evaluation. There is a challenge in obtaining reliable figures and data given the fluidity of the flows.

Traffic light rating on IOM six regional project’s targets results matrix:

Traffic light rating on global RMRP response in the three case study countries:
A. Brazil

It is difficult to find information regarding the coverage of the emergency response (e.g. % of beneficiaries versus the estimated number of persons in need used to plan the RMRP figures) and of the various activities, as there is no available online information that gives a number regarding the coverage of the different activities undertaken as part of the response. In November 2019, and despite efforts to accommodate migrants in shelters, 1,627 migrants sleeping in public spaces and in the streets were counted in Pacaraima and Boa Vista and were not able to benefit from spaces in the shelters made available by the international community. There is a certain debate around the priority of either a) expanding the shelter capacity – defended by the Federal Sub-Committee civilian coordination; and b) expand the transport and resettlement capacity (preferred by the military) within government agencies. It should be noted that the site construction of the existing shelters was done under the auspices of the government’s effort to accommodate the influx, and it may be feasible to host a higher number of migrants, even on temporary basis, in Roraima province. Since there are still unmet needs, the rating is yellow.

B. Colombia

On a wider perspective concerning the overall response (broader than the scope of the evaluation which are the six regional projects), according to the R4V platform, the following assistance had been given by GIFMM members: As of December 2019, the GIFMM members and its partners implemented activities in 30 departments and 186 municipalities in Colombia. As a result, 364,145 refugees and migrants from Venezuela received basic medical attention; 268,551 were reached through food assistance; 151,342 children benefited from protection and child friendly spaces; 58,165 people accessed a safe potable water source in accordance with the Sphere Standards24; 56,431 received multi-purpose cash transfers; 21,244 were reached through humanitarian transport assistance; 2,327 people participated in trainings on routes to access employment; and 735 local authorities and health institutions supported with technical assistance, logistics and capacity building for health services. If this is compared to the RMRP 2019 targets of 640,000 refugees and migrants targeted, and 300,000 target host community, it appears that, despite the efforts, a large number of migrants are not able to receive the necessary targeted assistance. A common challenge is to obtain reliable figures given the fluidity of the migration flows in order to capture the real number of migrants who enter through irregular points.

C. Peru

There is a clear and pressing issue regarding reliable figures on the number of migrants in Peru due to registration processes and irregular entries. The official figures, according to key stakeholders interviewed, are far below the reality and the identified needs level.

Regarding protection concerns, the Protection Fund (Fondo de Protección) works regardless of migration status. However, these cases remain few compared to the needs. IOM has time and again tried to involve more hospitals to increase the number of beneficiaries, unfortunately with no success. This protection fund is only implemented through one hospital in Lima and has, at the time of the mission, attended to only 51 cases of Venezuelans for health risks and concerns.

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24 Note that the information from the Platform mentions the Sphere Standards for WASH only
IOM also works through the *Tu Causa es mi Causa* campaign with families, children and women to fight against discrimination and xenophobia. These are also spaces, according to interviewees from IOM, which allow vulnerable migrants to ask for specific information regarding their status.

Something that could improve the coverage of IOM’s activities is incorporating feedback from beneficiaries. However, feedback mechanisms are not commonly used. There are FGD being set up in Tumbes, specifically with women, to better understand the needs and therefore target the activities. However, there needs to be concerted efforts when implementing or developing new activities, as duplication of these would further burden staff and beneficiaries.

Finally, an issue encountered when looking at coverage is how IOM reports its indicators and results. As mentioned under effectiveness, there is sometimes confusion when reporting the impact of an activity, specifically under SECI. During the field visit and in the documentation received, it was noted that much of the figures of SECI are reported as such, although it should once again be specified that the impact of SECI activities is different than that of participation or views (campaigns, *Tu causa es mi causa* activities). IOM institutional reporting tools need to be used more consistently in order to ensure coverage of the most vulnerable population.

**Gender and cross-cutting issues**

Gender has been used as one of the criteria for priority assistance in the regional projects. This is a positive first step, but it does not imply that the regional projects are gender responsive, only that they are gender sensitive. Certain aspects of the interventions, such as the health activities in Colombia targeting pregnant women, show a justified concern for the most vulnerable groups. However, it is important to consider gender in its full dimension when looking at SECI activities, as the most vulnerable are not necessarily the ones who have the skills and capacity to realise income generation (e.g. sick and elderly). Therefore, a full gender analysis is necessary for proper targeting of the SECI projects. Anecdotal evidence also shows that single male migrants have been excluded from entering shelters, as they were not considered to be vulnerable (e.g. interviews in *carpa del caminante* in Pamplona).

Regarding the Human Rights-Based Approach, which is both a normative framework of the United Nations and a cross-cutting evaluation question, it is embedded in the shaping of the response. Attention to the most vulnerable is based on HRBA, but it needs to be grounded in adequate protection measures, for which ultimately the different countries are responsible through their legislation. Contextual factors also mean that the level of protection provided is sometimes limited, and the countries’ legal decisions regarding regularisation and requirements for temporary residence can sometimes lead to protection concerns (e.g. humanitarian visas for Peru and Ecuador). At the same time, the large number of irregular migrants also pose a challenge, as they are not registered and therefore not able to benefit from the protection measures. Nonetheless, it is important for IOM and the international community to ensure that, despite the preference for some governments to focus the SECI assistance on regular migrants, from the perspective of the “Do No Harm” approach and the HRBA normative framework all migrants are entitled to support and protection regardless of their status. IOM can further support governments in the process of regularising migrants, but advocacy towards internationally recognised good practice and standards should also be pursued.
6. Conclusions and Recommendations

6.1. Conclusions

IOM has been able to perform to a good level of effectiveness regarding the activities undertaken under the different regional projects that form the scope of this evaluation. In the three countries visited, the organisation showed to be responsive to the needs of the government, flexible and collaborative, obtaining high ratings from the institutional partners. IOM has further undertaken critical activities in the Direct Emergency Assistance category, to a high level of satisfaction from migrants. The operating environment is particularly complex, given the magnitude and typology of migration flows and the different and varied contexts within a given country. The IOM has been able to reach the expected objectives in line with the results framework of the regional projects, often exceeding the targets, and is providing much needed support in a type of crisis which was unprecedented in the region, with 4.9 million Venezuelans living abroad as of March 2020, most of which are in the region, according to the coordination platform R4V.

IOM’s response was timely and largely effective. The four strategic objectives of DEA, P, SECI and ICS which formed the initial regional response (RAP 2018 and RMRP 2019) were correctly identified as priority focus areas.

In the three case study countries, IOM has mostly achieved good results in relation to DEA, with incipient successes in relation to SECI that need to be intensified in the future. The issue of protection is more difficult to assess, given that there is no results matrix for IOM’s protection activities to inform what the expected results should be. As is, protection refers to counting the number of beneficiaries who receive some assistance related to the many protection activities, but it does so without a clear reporting structure that takes into consideration a) the different types of protection activities; and b) the different target groups for protection. Anecdotal evidence from interviews shows that IOM is addressing protection issues and has leveraged some successes, such as family reunion of a trafficked child (in Colombia) to give but one example.

In some of the case study countries (Colombia, Peru) IOM’s intervention strategy is unclear: the activities undertaken are useful and valued by the government and contribute to assisting vulnerable migrants, but the evaluation team was not able to appraise the rationale behind the type of activities undertaken (whether these are proactively proposed as IOM core services or stem from responsiveness to requests from government institutions), and how each is linked to the expected results. This is important for the future planning exercise, as the IOM response should have clear country intervention strategies that support the regional response.

A strong point mentioned in two of the three countries was the commitment and attitude of the IOM staff (by migrants and institutions alike), which indicates that IOM possesses a good staff and should strive to retain them through its human resource management. The three countries visited indicated that IOM was a good model of collaboration at the onset of the crisis (e.g. before the start of the regional projects) and many examples where given by the different institutions of learning by doing together, as IOM collaborated with and supported the institutions on many occasions to inform, assist, register, profile and regularize migrants in the three case study countries. When looking at future support to ICS, however, only institutions in Peru formulated a desire for continued capacity development from IOM, and the evaluation did not find an articulated ICS strategy in the other country missions.
From the migrants’ perspective, the situation varies from location to location, of course between the countries, but even within different regions of the same country. The evaluation found the response in Brazil (Roraima state) to be coherent and well structured, with a good integral referencing system for incoming migrants. A relatively small number are not being reached by the assistance provided by the international community. The main challenge that migrants expressed when coming to Brazil was the language barrier (Portuguese). Similar findings from regional reports are stated in Guyana, where there is a strong need for translation and interpretation. In Colombia, the magnitude and diversity of migration flows in a very complex and politicised environment means the response was highly challenging. The response was adaptive in that it showed flexibility of the country mission to support an evolving and increasingly complex and large caseload of beneficiaries with changing conditions and in many locations, including areas of high insecurity. Much effort was placed in ensuring that at least DEA assistance and services were provided, although efforts were only able to cover part of the needs (e.g. in specific locations, such as Cúcuta, only 23% of migrants are being assisted according to GFIMM information). In Peru, despite IOM obtaining a high rating regarding the effectiveness of its response, a similarly large number of migrants are not being assisted, and this is linked to the difficulty in obtaining reliable data. The trend shows an increase of irregular migrants in Peru and Colombia, and while the DTM is a useful tool to plan response activities, the actual number of migrants in the country may be substantially higher than the official figures indicate. Considering there is no biometric identification of assisted migrants, there is, on the other hand, a potential risk of double-counting the same beneficiary when providing different forms of assistance.

At the global level the IOM has obtained full allocation for its six projects, with one donor (PRM) funding 86% of the total projects’ allocation. Noteworthy that the PRM projects were formulated after donor allocation to IOM was confirmed and were based on the RMRP planning. This has allowed the response to cover a total of sixteen countries, with enormous variations in size, location, complexity and migrant flows, ranging from the bigger countries with large migrant inflow (e.g. Colombia, Brazil, Peru) to smaller island countries (e.g. Trinidad and Tobago, Curaçao, Aruba). IOM has been able to achieve a coherent position in the operations carried out as part of the regional response under the six regional projects. IOM’s interventions remain fully justified and need to be sustained over time, given an unlikely change of the scenario regarding the situation in Venezuela. A key aspect that will drive the continued response will be the support to SECI in migrants’ host countries, where the support to migrants to develop income generating activities may lessen the burden on the humanitarian response, something that was readily recognized as a priority in all three case study countries visited. In an effort to combat discrimination and xenophobia, an important aspect to implement further is working with both migrants and host communities.

IOM has done well in terms of the operational response, but it should do more in terms of defining its intervention strategy in the next phase of the response, particularly when the results are going beyond the numbers assisted into the qualitative appraisal of how much the interventions contributed to lower the migrant’s vulnerability, enhance their resilience or mitigate the negative consequences of their migration. In short, it should shift its focus from the activities undertaken (often reactive) to planning the results that need to be achieved (i.e. a more proactive role).

There remains, nonetheless, a large caseload of vulnerable migrants to be assisted, and the profile of migrants from Venezuela has been showing an increase in the levels of vulnerability, as those recent migrants interviewed (all but one) indicated arriving without resources or money
in the host countries, especially those migrants in transit or those who stay in the country as temporary residents.

The evaluation’s analysis in response to the key evaluation questions indicates that the Regional Response was clearly relevant and remains relevant in addressing the needs and priorities of vulnerable migrants and refugees. Efforts must be increased to ensure coverage to all vulnerable groups in need, as the resources and funding received fall short of the requirements. It is also aligned to the national response led in each country by the host government, as demonstrated in the three case study countries where government institutions showed a very high level of satisfaction with the effectiveness of IOM’s response. The Regional Response is fully aligned to IOM corporate and global frameworks. The evaluation does not have triangulated evidence to appraise the relevance of the projects compared to donors’ priorities, but this was not a focus area of the evaluation.

Regarding IOM’s support to capacity development, it was noted in the three case studies that the budget expenditures for ICS goes from 1% in Brazil and 3% in Colombia, to 33% in Peru. This seems to indicate that ICS was much higher on the priority list in Peru than the other two case study countries. In Tumbes, the collaboration between the government and IOM, with specific training on data collection, allowed for implementation of an interesting educational project. Furthermore, in all interviews with government institutions or individuals, ICS was said to be one of the more positive actions from IOM in Peru. Anecdotal evidence in Brazil and Colombia indicated that government institutions strongly benefitted from a learning by doing approach through working together with the IOM. This is a different form of capacity development than a targeted strategy focusing on key institutions to build a specific area of capacity. From the three case study countries, only Peruvian institutions were requesting further formal capacity development support. Certainly the experience gained from the joint collaboration with IOM in learning by doing activity implementation has to some extent contributed to increased government capacity and the likelihood of an improved response in the future, although such results cannot be measured given the lack of a specific results matrix to evaluate institutional capacity strengthening.

It is difficult to appraise the efficiency of the Regional Response because three projects remain operational at the time of the evaluation and therefore not all expenditures are included in the financial reports. The conclusion at the time of this evaluation is that insufficient funding was received to cover the needs, even according to the project’s budgets, which led to coverage gaps. The efficiency regarding the regional monitoring of the projects is good, with a very detailed results matrix that allows for identification of the targets and provides evidence of the results versus those targets, along with updated financial information. Management efficiency was not identified as a key area of analysis for the evaluation which concentrated on the operational results, and the most salient challenge from the Country Missions in the three case study countries was related to the internal IOM procedures, due to not having declared an L2 emergency to facilitate and streamline the access to resources. It is not the responsibility of the evaluation team to define whether or not such a declaration should have been made, as the team does not have enough corporate knowledge. However, it was felt strongly at the country level in Colombia and Peru to have been an additional challenge that directly affected the efficiency of the response.

Gender was incorporated in the design of the regional response, and the different areas of intervention equally prioritised women and children as priority beneficiary groups. During implementation it was shown that across activities gender was used to give priority to vulnerable women and girls, which is a necessary measure. Even in the SECI activities vulnerable
women were given priority. The regional response was therefore gender sensitive, although not to the extent that it was gender-responsive (e.g. affecting the power relation between women and men and LGTBQI+ with their environment in order to address the balance of power), something that can be done through the application of a gender mainstreaming policy in the planning of gender-differentiated activities.

The Human Rights-Based Approach (HRBA) is a normative framework of the UN and is embedded by IOM in its own procedures through a number of policies and guidance documents, chief of which are the IOM Policy on Protection, IOM’s Humanitarian Policy, IOM Rights-based approach to programming, and the IOM Handbook on Protection and Assistance for Migrants Vulnerable to Violence, Exploitation and Abuse. It is therefore fully integrated in the approach and operational activities of the IOM, and also complements the humanitarian principles, such as Do No Harm, which are expected to be integrated by the host countries’ institutions in the implementation of the response.

At the regional level, IOM was able to design a coherent response strategy that allowed it to determine a common objective, albeit leaving the flexibility for the operational details to each country, in line with the operational context and the governments’ decisions regarding the migrants. The regional projects proved essential to enable a timely response from the IOM, and the key success areas are found in the DEA and SECI objectives, with more difficulties in demonstrating success in the area of protection (sometimes linked to the context of insecurity and violence in certain regions of the host countries) beyond the number of people receiving protection services. IOM is on the right track but can further improve its record by considering the following recommendations.

6.2 Recommendations

At the regional level

1) The regional projects have been instrumental in allowing IOM to respond to the regional crisis. There is a continued and justified need to support the vulnerable refugees and migrants from Venezuela in the migration flows in the region, as the situation is unlikely to change significantly over the near future. IOM’s regional team should ensure that additional support is received to contribute to the RMRP 2020 response and beyond.

2) IOM should continue to support regional projects but should review the intervention strategy of IOM country missions so the focus can expand from the actual number of persons assisted to more qualitative analysis of the results obtained (e.g. examples of changes as a result of the intervention, moving up the ladder of the results’ hierarchy of its projects’ results matrix). Up to now the IOM has been reporting on numbers of assisted refugees and migrants from Venezuela, with only one of the six regional projects using a satisfaction survey in order to obtain qualitative appraisal from beneficiaries (e.g. Canada). The numbers and percentage provide a measure of results, but do not inform about the importance of the results achieved, or why they were achieved.

3) For reporting at the outcome level (e.g. change in behaviour or institutional change), there needs to be an intention in the assistance provided to trigger that change (e.g. planned change). In order to report on the outcome level, IOM needs to develop a Theory of Change (which is a strategy for change) that shows how the activities and the interventions are actually developing resilience, mitigating the negative consequences of migration, or contributing to migrant’s integration and empowerment (e.g. developing successful business/income generating activities). However, to achieve this level there should be a country strategy for the response given through the regional projects, something that the evaluation has not been able to verify in the three case study countries and document
review, although the support to the Interiorização in Brazil is the closest to a strategy for the integration of refugees and migrants from Venezuela.

4) The regional office should provide more training to the various countries in the region on monitoring and evaluation and reporting, especially for outcome-level indicators and reporting on outcome results, so the reporting can capture the key evidence necessary to show success. It is also highly recommended that technical staff attend meetings to enhance learning. There may also be an opportunity within the new structures for closer involvement with the countries in the planning of the regional response through joint regional planning workshops.

5) Contribute to developing an evaluation culture in the various country offices. The evaluation team found a low exposure to and knowledge of evaluation among IOM staff. To enhance evaluation use and utility, it is recommended that more interaction with the country missions is assured when establishing the terms of reference of such an evaluation, as well as discussing its possible uses. A regional planning workshop using the countries’ intervention strategy could be a good base to plan the next evaluation. Including staff involved in the response in early stages of planning and evaluation would in turn maximize ownership and reduce possible friction over interpretation and recommendations.

6) Consider the lessons learnt from not declaring a corporate emergency activation in the countries such as Peru and Colombia (where other UN agencies did declare a state of emergency), as the country missions clearly articulated the lack of this declaration as a key constraint in terms of deploying the resources for the response. This is an internal process that does not require external evaluation expertise and should be analysed internally.

7) IOM is among the key players in the response, but it could be more vocal in advocating for the respect for humanitarian principles (Sphere, Do No Harm) in the assistance to refugees and migrants from Venezuela and communicate more clearly what HRBA means in its operation.

8) It is important for each country to have an integrated referral system for refugees and migrants from Venezuela and IOM should contribute to its development as a matter of priority.

9) RMRP is considered differently amongst IOM staff and managers as a strategic document for regional and national implementation. It would be better to have each country establish a five-year strategic plan (e.g. for example the Country Strategy IOM Djibouti 2017-2020) to show how the regional response is embedded in the country operations. This would contribute to a better understanding of IOM’s longer-term strategy in each of the regional response countries.

At the country level

A. Brazil

1) Initiate language courses in Portuguese for all incoming refugees and migrants from Venezuela as soon as possible, including in Pacaraima and Boa Vista, even on a temporary and short-term basis.

2) Ensure SECI is done with success parameters established based on the income generation leveraged through SECI activities, rather than on the training, certificate and grant received (e.g. moving towards outcome results and not outputs) – see global operational recommendations.

3) Advocate for integration of Sphere standards in AO by the military and humanitarian imperatives (e.g. Do No Harm) – more dissemination of humanitarian principles.

4) Consider the need to develop border management training for border guards, if feasible and resources are available, as part of the process to ensure safe and orderly migration and in line with migrant protection needs.
5) Review/appraise the need for IOM to be involved in rental/cash subsidies (based on IOM’s comparative advantage and that of the other actors).

6) Consider the development of a strategy for ICS (targets, institutions, change processes linked to institutional change – e.g. outcome level results).

7) Consider the establishment of a communication strategy.

8) Consider establishing partnerships with faith-based and community-based organisations to provide support to the indigenous population.

B. Colombia

1) Establish a consolidated integral referral route for incoming refugees and migrants from Venezuela, including information from all involved government institutions, NGOs, CBOs, and the international community.

2) Establish a country strategy for the regional response intervention component (EAS programme) and its links with other programmes that contribute to the response (such as Health) so there is a clearer indication of the expected results and a shift of focus from the activities undertaken towards more qualitative aspects (e.g. linked to outcome level results).

3) Strengthen advocacy towards the government and the international community regarding humanitarian principles (Do No Harm, Sphere standards) to safeguard and preserve migrants’ dignity.

4) Intensify the efforts to develop SECI in a comprehensive manner in locations where it is possible (both in terms of the objective of SECI as well as the target groups, which must be inclusive of host communities, Colombian returnees, regular and irregular refugees and migrants from Venezuela) – see global operational recommendations.

5) Continue the approach used in the health sector, as it is conducive to developing resilience amongst migrants and the host population (e.g. particularly regarding the training and awareness raising at the community level) but also from the perspective of alleviating the burden on the emergency health services and working on preventive and curative aspects.

6) Consider placing DTM at informal border crossing points where security conditions allow.

7) Prepare rain-resistant protected maps for migrants in transit, walking from the Northern to the Southern borders, with the regular and irregular routes and the different organisations that can provide support along the way, as well as the location of the various tents that support the migrants (not only from IOM, but also Red Cross, etc.) and consider providing transportation support to vulnerable cases, even if they are irregular.

8) Develop more partnerships with locally-based organisation and CBOs to address protection concerns, particularly in areas which face serious security concerns (e.g. La Parada, Cúcuta) – local organisations, including faith-based groups, belong and live in the communities and have better entry points for dealing with issues related to protection concerns (HT, SGBV, DV, etc.).

9) Engage in discussions with the government on providing border management training for its staff.

10) Coordinate more closely the field operations between the different programmes so there is a coherence in the position and discourse of the IOM that is not dependent on the specific project donor.

11) For the Direct Emergency Assistance to refugees and migrants from Venezuela, a review of the accommodation/shelter capacities and of their length of stay is recommended, so that the referrals of refugees and migrants from Venezuela leaving the shelters are linked to actual solutions and not only the immediate referrals to other actors.
C. Peru

1) Ensure timely resource staffing for the office, particularly for management or high-level positions.
2) Strengthen coordination efforts from local to national office, national to regional, and local to regional. Training sessions are seen as an added value, these could be expanded to include staff from local, national and regional offices/sub-offices.
3) Linked to the previous point, we recommend that the regional office increase training or support to national offices to ensure reporting is done efficiently. In Peru, this was specifically mentioned regarding SECI reporting.
4) Establish an IOM country strategy for the regional response that includes all sectors of activity and provides a view of the expected achievements beyond the numbers assisted.
5) Develop stronger mechanisms to ensure feedback from local communities and beneficiaries.
6) Consider setting up DTM teams at informal border crossing points.
7) Ensure SECI is done with success parameters established based on the income generation leveraged through SECI activities, rather than on the training, certificate and grant received (e.g. moving towards outcome results and not outputs) – see global operational recommendations.
8) Develop a strategy on ICS in line with the requests from institutional partners.
9) Consider (perhaps as part of recommendation 7) the development of border management training for border guards, if feasible and resources are available, as part of the process to ensure safe and orderly migration and in line with migrant protection needs.
10) Implementing partners are key figures in the response structure. In order to be effective, it’s important to identify strong local capacity and/or implementing partners. IOM should continue its effort in identifying and mapping strong implementing partners and broaden cross-country discussions on lessons learned and good practices when working with these partners. This would also allow to have a regional tracing of key actors.

Global operational recommendations

The following recommendations should be useful for a number of countries involved in the response, in addition to the three countries for which case studies were undertaken, as the need to leverage a source of income and become socially and economically integrated in the host country is a common objective of the refugees and migrants from Venezuela.

1) A stronger push is necessary to ensure SECI activities are providing temporary resident migrants with a source of income regardless of their legal status (both regular and irregular). However, while SECI was rightly done together with other immediate emergency humanitarian needs, it needs to shift its expected results to provide migrants with a source of income, and not stop only at the training, delivery of certificates, and provision of one grant. It is now time for IOM to step up the developmental aspect of SECI and focus on the capacity of those migrants who are temporary residents to leverage a source of income, formally or informally. This means that SECI needs to be done with a stronger technical approach as follows:
   a. Identification of the beneficiaries – here vulnerability criteria do not necessarily apply. Where families are concerned, the most able/skilled family member should benefit, and various members may benefit from the training and the certificates. This means that specific criteria based on the capacity of the beneficiary to leverage an
income should be used to select the target beneficiaries within the family unit, rather than directly targeting the vulnerable individual.

b. A one-year programme including vocational training, technical skills development (and including language classes, when applicable) and business development skills should be carried out, at the end of which business proposals should receive an initial grant. The amount and the contents (eventually machinery, production materials and equipment) should be adapted to the situation. There should be technical oversight and support during one year after the initial grant, with the possibility of a second grant after six months if the business is developing adequately, and a possible third grant at the end of the year, to consolidate the business if it is expanding and creating employment opportunities. The success of this scheme is the ability of the vulnerable beneficiary to sustain the family through income generation (e.g. being able to cover the basic family needs).

c. Some formal employment opportunities appear to be available in certain locations with good income prospects (e.g. welders in Barranquilla). Employment schemes can be part of the SECI, particularly if IOM is willing and able to facilitate the regularisation of the titles, diplomas and certificates that many refugees and migrants from Venezuela possess (through the support of the host country’s institutions and consular networks, where available).

d. Successful SECI beneficiaries could be taken directly off the humanitarian assistance programme once they are able to show they can secure their basic needs for three months.

e. It is important to include the economically depressed and unemployed host population in a mixed SECI scheme with refugees and migrants from Venezuela, including other forms of vulnerable beneficiaries in some countries (e.g. Colombian returnees) in order to actively engage and demonstrate results that will curb mounting discrimination and xenophobia against refugees and migrants from Venezuela, as the situation is becoming a protracted crisis with no quick end in sight.

2) It is very difficult to obtain reliable data regarding the migration flows as well as the number and typology of beneficiaries. Some migrants who were in transit are increasing the number of temporary residents (e.g. Colombia), while there is no biometric identification regarding the beneficiaries of the assistance provided. IOM could consider the need and feasibility of developing a biometric registration system. At the same time, considering the large number of irregular migrants, more outreach through DTM at informal border crossings might provide additional data regarding the migration flows. IOM has to ensure that data protection regarding refugees and migrants from Venezuela in the various databases used in the response follow the necessary ethical requirements.

3) Protection is a very delicate and complex concept, which does not have a results matrix in IOM, so it is unclear what the benchmarks for success are, and what the protection activities are ultimately aiming at. IOM does de facto protection, and some cases of identification and resolution of human trafficking were reported during the interviews in the case study countries. However, considering other actors, such as UNHCR, have a strong protection mandate that is clearly defined, IOM would at least benefit from a strategy to define its protection framework and establish what its expected results are (consider also including frontline border guards in trainings as part of ICS to ensure application of good practice norms towards refugees and migrants from Venezuela).

4) Some countries have developed a good communication strategy (e.g. Colombia, Peru), but it could be useful to have a regional communication strategy to support the coherence,
visibility and reporting of the IOM countries through a common language for external reporting. IOM needs to adapt the communication products to the language of the host countries.

5) The regional response is gender sensitive, although not to the extent that it is gender-responsive (e.g. affecting the power relation between women and men and LGBTQI+ with their environment in order to address the balance of power). IOM should pursue the application of a gender mainstreaming policy in the planning of gender-differentiated activities. Training on border management projects to incorporate gender for border agents is necessary to ensure gender-responsive programmes and operations.

6) Establish an integrated referral system for incoming refugees and migrants from Venezuela that allows them to know from who, where and when to seek assistance from the various actors. IOM has developed this in other countries, and it should consider doing so in the main host countries such as Colombia. The information should be visible through a poster or diagram and kept to its simplest possible expression but include all potential service providers for refugees and migrants from Venezuela.

7) Consider giving a stronger focus and attention to mental health. Almost all refugees and migrants from Venezuela interviewed reported some form of psychosocial disorder linked to their migration (separation from families, living in the streets, begging, etc.) and links to potential protection issues (DV and SGBV).

8) Consider developing regional partnerships with those implementing partners who are involved in the Regional Response across different countries to increase coherence and coordination of the regional response (e.g. ADRA, Scalabrini).

9) Consider whether IOM should be involved in CBI and rental subsidies for migrants. It is a complex activity which should not be undertaken unless IOM has the staff with the technical know-how and local partners that can be used to implement these projects.
5. Annexes

5.1. TOR
5.2. Evaluation Matrix
5.3. List of documents reviewed
5.4. List of persons interviewed
5.5. Data collection instruments
5.6. List of institutional ratings received
5.7. Context analysis