


# UNITED KINGDOM

HRI 2011  
Ranking  
**8th**






Group **2**  
**LEARNING LEADERS**

**OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE** **0.56%**  
of GNI

**HUMANITARIAN AID** **7.2%**  
of ODA

**US \$16**  
Per person

## HUMANITARIAN AID DISTRIBUTION (%)



## GENDER RATING

POLICY **↑**

FUNDING **→**

FIELD PERCEPTION **→**

### STRENGTHS

Pillar	Type	Indicator	Score	% above OECD/DAC average
5	QT	Participating in accountability initiatives	9.44	+111.1%
2	QT	Reducing climate-related vulnerability	7.50	+86.2%
3	QT	Funding NGOs	8.01	+76.7%
1	QT	Timely funding to complex emergencies	9.34	+18.0%
5	QL	Implementing evaluation recommendations	4.86	+13.4%

### AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT

Pillar	Type	Indicator	Score	% below OECD/DAC average
5	QT	Funding accountability initiatives	1.11	-73.1%
3	QL	Flexibility of funding	5.68	-18.1%
1	QL	Independence of aid	6.13	-17.2%
4	QL	Advocacy for protection of civilians	4.75	-14.6%
2	QL	Linking relief to rehabilitation and development	5.05	-11.4%

## OVERALL PERFORMANCE

The United Kingdom (UK) ranked 8<sup>th</sup> in the HRI 2011, maintaining its position from 2010. Based on the pattern of its scores, the UK is classified as a Group 2 donor, “Learning Leaders”. Donors in this group are characterised by their leading role in support of emergency relief efforts, strong capacity and field presence, and commitment to learning and improvement. They tend to do less well in areas such as prevention, preparedness, and risk reduction efforts. Other Group 2 donors include Canada, the European Commission, France and the United States.

The UK’s global score was above the OECD/DAC and Group 2 averages. The UK scored above both averages in all pillars, with the exception of Pillar 4 (Protection and international law), where it scored below both averages.

In general, the UK scored significantly lower on the qualitative, survey-based indicators than on the quantitative indicators. Compared to its OECD/DAC peers, the UK did best on indicators on *Participating in accountability initiatives*, *Reducing climate-related vulnerability*, *Funding NGOs*, *Timely funding to complex emergencies* and *Implementing evaluation recommendations* – all quantitative indicators with the exception of the latter. Its scores were relatively the lowest in the indicators on *Funding accountability initiatives*, *Flexibility of funding*, *Independence of aid*, *Advocacy for protection of civilians* and *Linking relief to rehabilitation and development* – all qualitative indicators with the exception of *Funding accountability initiatives*.

SOURCES: UN OCHA FTS, OECD StatExtracts, various UN agencies’ annual reports and DARA

All scores are on a scale of 0 to 10. Colours represent performance compared to OECD/DAC donors’ average performance rating: **↑** Good **→** Mid-range **↓** Could improve **N/A** Non applicable **QT** Quantitative Indicator **QL** Qualitative Indicator

# AID DISTRIBUTION

The UK increased its Official Development Assistance (ODA) dramatically in 2010. The ratio of its ODA in proportion to its Gross National Income (GNI) rose as well, from 0.52% in 2009 to 0.56% in 2010.

Humanitarian assistance comprised 7.2% of the UK's ODA in 2010, or 0.041% of its GNI. The UK Department for International Development (DFID) intends to reach the target of 0.7% ODA/GNI by 2013 (DFID 2011a).

According to data reported to the United Nations (UN) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Financial Tracking Service (FTS) (2011), in 2010, the UK channelled 46.1% of its humanitarian assistance to

UN agencies, 26.4% to non-governmental organisations (NGOs), 4.0% to the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement and 2.3% bilaterally to affected governments. The UK directed 8.8% of its assistance to the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) and 2.5% to Emergency Response Funds. In 2010, the UK supported a total of 31 crises: 19 in Africa, eight in Asia, three in the Americas and one in Oceania. The top recipient countries of UK humanitarian assistance in 2010 were Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Haiti. In 2010, the UK focused its sector-specific funding primarily on health, food and economic recovery and infrastructure.

# POLICY FRAMEWORK

The Department for International Development (DFID) manages the UK's humanitarian assistance. The UK has a number of funding mechanisms and windows for humanitarian aid including the global Conflict, Humanitarian and Security Department (CHASE); the regional Africa Conflict and Humanitarian Unit (ACHU); and country programmes containing elements of humanitarian assistance.

The legal basis for the UK's humanitarian assistance is grounded in the 2002 *International Development Act*, which vests responsibility in the Secretary of State. The UK government recently commissioned a *Humanitarian Emergency Response Review* (HERR) to

ensure the quality of its humanitarian assistance. In response to this comprehensive review, in September 2011, the UK government updated its humanitarian policy: *Saving lives, preventing suffering and building resilience: The UK Government's Humanitarian Policy*. In addition, it has produced sector-specific humanitarian policies, such as those regarding disaster risk reduction (DRR) and protection. DFID appears to be making significant efforts to operationalise the new policy framework by aligning all existing and new programming to it, and increasing its humanitarian funding and staffing. DFID maintains field offices in 52 countries.

## HOW DOES UNITED KINGDOM'S POLICY ADDRESS GHD CONCEPTS?

### GENDER

The UK's *Gender Equality Action Plan 2007-2009* (later extended to 2011) lays out goals to help developing countries achieve gender equality and women's empowerment (DFID 2007). Adding to the Home Office's *Call to End Violence Against Women and Girls* (2010), the 2011 humanitarian policy calls for gender and age disaggregated data in needs assessments, as well as ensuring humanitarian responses meet the different needs of women, children, the elderly and the disabled (DFID 2011b).

## PILLAR 1

# RESPONDING TO NEEDS

In its latest policy, *Saving lives, preventing suffering and building resilience: The UK Government's Humanitarian Policy*, the UK expresses a firm commitment to the principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence in humanitarian action, stressing that "UK humanitarian action will be based on need, and need alone," (DFID 2011b, p.6). Supporting forgotten emergencies has historically been a priority for DFID, which set a goal in its 2006 humanitarian policy to eliminate forgotten emergencies by 2010 (DFID 2006a). In order to improve the timeliness of its response to humanitarian crises, the UK intends to invest in anticipation, including regular review of the UK's Conflict Early Warning System and Watch list of fragile countries, established as part of the Building Stability Overseas Strategy, and "find[ing] news ways of acting quickly in 'slow onset' disasters to stop them becoming major emergencies." Moreover, the UK aims to improve predictability and timeliness of its aid by "making early pledges to appeals, agreeing multi-year funding, supporting global and country-level pooled funds, fast track funding and pre-qualifying NGOs and private sector partners," (DFID 2011b, p.13). In addition to improving the timeliness of its funding, the UK also seeks to address delays in deploying expert staff to the field by expanding its surge capacity to support multilateral partners.

## PILLAR 2

# PREVENTION, RISK REDUCTION AND RECOVERY

Building on its 2006 *Reducing the Risk of Disasters – Helping to Achieve Sustainable Poverty Reduction in a Vulnerable World: A DFID policy paper*, the UK continues to place great importance on disaster resilience in its latest humanitarian policy, calling for disaster resilience and risk reduction to be integrated into all country programmes, and climate change and conflict prevention initiatives (DFID 2006a and DFID 2011b). In addition, the UK plans to take advantage of science and the Chief Scientific Advisers' network to predict and prepare for disasters by integrating scientific data in country and regional resilience work (DFID 2011b). The UK also seeks to ensure coherence between development and humanitarian action through cooperation with development organisations and the private sector and to "strengthen local capacity to prevent, prepare for and mitigate crises," (DFID 2011b). Finally, the UK commits to ensure beneficiary participation in the design and evaluation of humanitarian action, although their participation in implementation and monitoring is not specified (DFID 2011b).

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## PILLAR 3

# WORKING WITH HUMANITARIAN PARTNERS

The UK recognises the leading role of the UN, particularly OCHA, and the Inter-Agency Standing Committee to coordinate humanitarian assistance, and commits to advocate for reform. “The UK will take on a ‘championing’ role to support humanitarian partners deliver reforms,” and plans to work closely with the European Commission’s Directorate General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (ECHO), the United States and the Good Humanitarian Donorship initiative, as well as with newer donors (DFID 2011b, p. 12). In line with the *Good Humanitarian Donorship Principles*, the UK intends to provide flexible, predictable funding with limited earmarking (DFID 2011b). Furthermore, it has committed to increase core funding to multilateral agencies “that have demonstrated they can deliver swiftly and appropriately to emergencies,” (DFID 2011b, p.7). Finally, in an effort to enhance its capacity, the UK plans to invest substantially in innovation and research, including the establishment of a humanitarian research and innovation team (DFID 2011b).

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## PILLAR 4

# PROTECTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

In 2009, the Foreign Commonwealth Office published the *UK Government Strategy on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict*, stipulating that the government will support organisations with a protection mandate, advocate for protection issues globally and at the country level, support peace-keeping missions, as well as a number of other protection related efforts. It also commits to “lobby strongly for humanitarian access, and hold countries to their commitments and obligations under IHL in this regard,” on the issues of humanitarian space and international humanitarian law (FCO 2009, p.14). The 2011 humanitarian policy stresses the UK’s commitment to the principles outlined in the 2009 protection strategy paper, adding that the UK will “implement the appropriate political, security, humanitarian and development actions necessary to uphold respect for international law, protect civilians and to secure humanitarian access,” (DFID 2011b, p.17), including providing funding for security management costs. In line with the *Good Humanitarian Donorship Principles*, the UK pledges to promote respect for humanitarian, refugee and human rights law.

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## PILLAR 5


# LEARNING AND ACCOUNTABILITY

DFID emphasises the importance of accountability in its humanitarian policy, referring to accountability toward taxpayers, donors and affected populations, which the UK intends to make a central element of its humanitarian support. Furthermore, DFID plans to increase investment in measuring impact and integrating lessons learnt within DFID and will encourage partners to do the same (DFID 2011b). DFID is a signatory of the International Aid Transparency Initiative and calls for greater transparency toward beneficiaries in its humanitarian policy.

# FIELD PARTNERS' PERCEPTIONS

## UNITED KINGDOM'S FIELD PERCEPTION SCORES

Collected questionnaires: 64



SOURCE: DARA

United Kingdom's average score 5.77 ← ..... → OECD/DAC average score 6.05

Colours represent performance compared to donor's average performance rating:

Good (Dark Orange) Mid-range (Medium Orange) Could improve (Light Orange)

## HOW IS UNITED KINGDOM PERCEIVED BY ITS PARTNERS?

### GENDER

DFID's partner organisations held varied perceptions of its approach to gender. Many claimed that the UK only "pays lip service" to incorporating gender sensitive approaches in programmes because "it is in vogue" and "never verified". One organisation, however, claimed that: "the DFID pushed us to make our health programme more inclusive in terms of gender. We have to be more attentive to women's special health needs. We have to calculate our indicators by sex."

## PILLAR 1

# RESPONDING TO NEEDS

As one of the largest humanitarian donors, DFID received a great deal of feedback from its partners, both positive and negative. In relation to responding to needs, however, perceptions are more negative than for other donors, though one organisation noted that DFID endeavoured to link projects to needs assessments. On the issue of providing neutral, impartial and independent aid, organisations affirmed that “the UK so far has been an impartial humanitarian donor” and “has made an effort to respond according to needs.” In other contexts, however, DFID was seen as “using donor aid for political, military agendas” and hindering the response due to its “no-contact” policy. One organisation reported that “DFID was very concerned about how aid to Pakistan would look to their constituencies in the UK. They consulted every step they took with London, slowing the process.” Several organisations raised concerns about the UK’s push for value-for-money: “DFID will face cuts and just fund reactive work,” stated one interviewee. Many complained of delays in disbursement: “UK funding has not been timely. It took 11 months to decide on a grant due to a change in government,” noted one interviewee and “Timeliness of UK funding is always problematic, speeding up when the donor’s budget time is up, but not mirroring needs of the population in a sudden onset disaster” reported another.

## PILLAR 2

# PREVENTION, RISK REDUCTION AND RECOVERY

Similar to most donors, the UK received some of its lowest qualitative scores in Pillar 2. Some agencies were positive about DFID’s requirements to strengthen local capacity, particularly through “supporting the local economy” in one instance. Others reported that the UK “does not support local capacity building, even in the current remote control situation in Somalia which hinges on strong local field capacity.” In terms of beneficiary participation, one organisation mentioned that the DFID “requires it in all stages of the programmes and projects,” though another considered that DFID focused more on beneficiary participation “only in terms of impact on beneficiaries.” On a similar note, another stated: “DFID is more interested in the result of programmes.” DFID scored below the average of its peers for *Linking relief to rehabilitation and development*. Partners complained of short-term funding inhibiting transitional activities: “There should be longer-term funding available... DFID is great for strategic issues. Why aren’t they more committed to longer term funding? With short term funding we don’t have time to plan and implement properly.” A few partners were more positive, asserting: “The UK completely accepts rehabilitation as a part of humanitarian aid” and “DFID is very much into transitional funding”. DFID, like most donors, also received a low score for *Prevention and risk reduction*. One of DFID’s partners highlighted the lack of clarity surrounding the issue: “all donors have been talking a lot about risk reduction, but so far it is unclear what they mean.” A few organisations were more positive, praising DFID for its investment in conflict prevention, prepositioning stocks and requiring “that 1/4 of the funding goes to this type of action.”

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## PILLAR 3

# WORKING WITH HUMANITARIAN PARTNERS

The UK received mixed responses from the field in relation to how they engage with humanitarian partners. For example, one organisation described the UK's funding arrangements as "extremely rigid", while another argued that "DFID offers flexibility in budget earmarking, but is inflexible with regards to duration." The UK was one of the best donors for *Supporting coordination*; partners described this as "a must" for the UK and praised its "support for close coordination through the cluster system and close follow-up of the clusters". Most organisations felt that the UK had a strong capacity and was highly engaged, although in one particular context the DFID was seen to have "very junior staff who seemed to be overwhelmed."

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## PILLAR 4

# PROTECTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

Field responses on the UK's commitment to protection and international law were generally positive. The UK's partners perceived it to be stronger in advocacy toward local authorities, than for the protection of civilians. One interviewee appreciated that "DFID asked us to provide them with recommendations and policy papers to advocate with the government." In one context, an interviewee reported that "DFID is more outspoken but not very effective" regarding its advocacy for protection. In terms of funding, feedback was more positive; DFID was seen as "fully supporting" the protection of civilians. In relation to security and access, one organisation stated: "The UK always supports security and access investments and always says yes to security budgets."

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## PILLAR 5

# LEARNING AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Field perceptions relating to the UK's performance on learning and accountability were mixed. In relation to integrating accountability towards affected populations in programmes, the UK, like most donors, received one of its lowest qualitative scores. One interviewee asserted that "downward accountability is not a funding requirement or at best, a weak one." Another interviewee reported: "It's a bit tick the box thing, like gender; I don't get many questions." DFID also received a low score for *Implementation of evaluation recommendations*, though it outperformed most of its peers as this is a weakness common to many donors. One interviewee commented, "For DFID, it is a requirement to evaluate, but there is less follow-up." Another agency argued that reporting requirements are heavily "personality dependent." UK reporting requirements have been described as both "appropriate" and "too general and ambiguous." One organisation added that "UK reporting requirements are appropriate, but are mostly to ease their mind. There is never any feedback on reporting on dialogue." Various organisations describe DFID as transparent, but there are uncertainties: "With the new government, it is unclear what and how decisions are taken. They are generally quite open though."

# RECOMMENDATIONS

The following recommendations are based on data from 2010. It remains to be seen how the UK's new policy will influence these issues.

## ● RENEW COMMITMENT TO LEARNING AND ACCOUNTABILITY

The UK performed well in the majority of the quantitative indicators with the exception of *Funding accountability initiatives*, which measures funding for humanitarian accountability and learning initiatives as a percentage of total humanitarian aid.<sup>2</sup> The UK allocated 0.09% of its humanitarian aid for these initiatives, while the OECD/DAC average was 0.43%. The UK should consider increasing its support for learning and accountability initiatives.

## ● PROTECT THE NEUTRALITY, IMPARTIALITY AND INDEPENDENCE OF HUMANITARIAN AID

DFID's partners were particularly critical of the neutrality, impartiality and independence of the UK's humanitarian aid in Somalia, Colombia, Pakistan, the occupied Palestinian territories and Kenya. Partners complained of the effects of "no-contact" policies and reported concern over UK interest in funding specific geographic regions or programmes they felt responded to the UK's political agenda more than humanitarian need. The UK should put in place practical measures to preserve the neutrality, impartiality and independence of its humanitarian aid and engage in dialogue with partners to discuss their perceptions in this regard.

## ● EXPLORE FUNDING OPTIONS TO ENSURE CONSISTENT SUPPORT FOR TRANSITIONAL ACTIVITIES

The UK received the second-lowest score of the OECD/DAC donors for *Linking relief to rehabilitation and development* (LRRD). Partners in Haiti, Colombia, Chad, Pakistan and Somalia were especially critical, while it received significantly better feedback in DRC, oPt and Sudan. Related to this, DFID is considered the second-least flexible donor. According to many partners, this is because of the short-term nature of funding, which they also report inhibits LRRD.

## ● ENGAGE IN DIALOGUE WITH PARTNERS TO DISCUSS THE MOST APPROPRIATE WAY TO ADVOCATE FOR PROTECTION IN EACH CRISIS

DFID's partners seem fairly pleased with its financial support for the protection of civilians. What appears to be lacking is advocacy for protection, where DFID was among the lowest scored donors. DFID received its lowest scores for this in oPt, Chad, Haiti and Pakistan.



Please see [www.daraint.org](http://www.daraint.org) for a complete list of references.