ADDRESSING THE GENDER CHALLENGE
THE HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE INDEX 2011
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ABOUT DARA

Founded in 2003, DARA is an independent organisation committed to improving the quality and effectiveness of aid for vulnerable populations suffering from conflict, disasters and climate change.

DARA has recognised expertise in providing support in the field of humanitarian aid as well as climate change and disaster risk reduction management. We have conducted evaluations of humanitarian operations in over 40 countries across five continents for a variety of government, United Nations and European Union agencies, as well as other major international humanitarian organisations, such as the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement.

DARA is registered as an independent, non-profit organisation in Spain, has 501 (c)(3) status in the United States and is recognised as an international organisation in Geneva, Switzerland.

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COVER
Relief camp in Pakistan. UNHCR/S. Phelps
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In the summer of 2011 one of the worst famines on record hit the Horn of Africa. Watching images of women and children fleeing the drought and conflict across the border into neighbouring Kenya to reach the largest and most overcrowded refugee camp in the world, it was hard to imagine that things could get any worse for them. And yet, things did get worse. On the way to the supposed safety and security of the Dadaab camp, and even in its vicinity, women were raped by bandits and gunmen. The plight of Somali women is sadly familiar to anyone with experience in large-scale emergencies. Apart from overcoming hunger and disease, shouldering the added burden of caring for children and the elderly, and coping with the loss of family members, property, and livelihoods, women and girls in humanitarian emergencies often face a range of gender-related human rights abuses, including sexual violence.

Pre-existing political, social, and economic structures and conditions determine who lives, who dies, and how populations recover from natural disasters and armed conflict. Two-thirds of mortalities in the 2006 Asian tsunami were female. In some places, women or girls lacked crucial coping mechanisms, mainly because they were never taught to swim or climb trees, like boys, or because dress codes and cultural norms about male consent hampered their mobility. Natural disasters and their subsequent impact, on average, kill more women than men and kill women at a younger age than men — more so in stronger disasters. In camps for people displaced by conflict or disasters, girls may be the last to be fed and the first to go hungry in the face of food shortages, suffer from lack of adequate sanitary conditions and supplies, especially during menstruation and lactation, and from the absence of reproductive and maternal health care. During violent conflicts and natural disasters, the percentage of female-headed households — which are associated with poverty — skyrocket. Early marriage of girls in exchange for dowries and bride price becomes an acceptable survival mechanism.

Humanitarian actors have recognised that women and men, girls and boys have gender and age-specific vulnerabilities and needs. They have adapted approaches to channel food aid to women, distributed rolling water containers and fuel-efficient stoves to minimise workloads and insecurity for women, or built safer latrines for women in camps, together with many other crucial interventions. These are interventions that need to be financed and implemented in a much more systematic way.

The gender-specific security threats women and girls face during humanitarian emergencies also means that their immediate and long-term survival is intimately linked to protection from harm. At UN Women, however, we believe that beyond gender-sensitive relief provision and gender-responsive protection, women’s empowerment is an often neglected element of humanitarian response, which is key to its effectiveness. The miseries endured by women in humanitarian situations are inextricably connected to gender inequality. Resolving these problems in the immediate and longer term will require a greater commitment to engaging women fully in managing humanitarian response in everything from camp management, relief aid distribution and protection to disaster preparedness and risk mitigation.

For this reason, at UN Women we are delighted that this year’s Humanitarian Response Index (HRI) is shedding light on these essential issues, and calling on humanitarian actors and donor governments to live up to their commitments to ensure humanitarian actions are adapted to address the specific and different needs of women, girls, men and boys.

As the findings from this year’s Humanitarian Response Index confirm, far too many people still wrongly assume that the specific threats faced by women should be addressed once broader security issues are solved; that their voices should be heard once peace is consolidated; that their needs will be considered once the emergency situation has stabilised; that, for women and girls, addressing gender equality in humanitarian response is not an urgent, life-or-death matter and can be treated as a secondary priority.

The opposite is true. Without investing in gender equality before, during and after crises, women will not be able to build a protective environment for their communities. Without security and coverage of basic needs, women and girls will not engage in field-based farming or market activity, so crucial for early recovery and basic food security. Girls will not enroll in schools. Women will not engage in public life or contribute...
to inclusive decision-making. Without access to livelihoods and resources, such as the departed or deceased spouse’s land or property, women are pushed into low-reward, high-risk work like survival sex, slowing down community recovery and deepening the immiseration and resentment of their children.

While women and girls are disproportionately affected during crises, they are not just victims. Historically, the role of women in anticipating crises, preventing conflict, and their awareness of threats to themselves, their families and their communities has been seen throughout the world. Their resilience to crisis and contributions to conflict resolution, peace building, disaster preparedness and contingency planning have been demonstrated time and time again.

Donors in particular have an important role to play in transforming political commitments to gender equality into an agenda for action for the humanitarian sector, working with their partners to ensure that aid efforts do not discriminate against women and girls, men and boys, and that gender equality is fully integrated into all aspects of programme design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation. The effectiveness of humanitarian responses aimed at saving lives and preventing and alleviating suffering will be partial at best until they do.

Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has issued a challenge to the UN and the international community to make the empowerment of women and the funding of such efforts a top priority. The creation of UN Women represents an important new component of the UN’s institutional provisions and actions related to humanitarian response, peace, security and development. In all of these areas, UN Women is mandated to support coherence, coordination and accountability for meeting international commitments on women’s rights. The General Assembly and UN Women’s strategic plan have recognised the critical importance of placing the issues of gender equality and women’s rights at the centre of humanitarian efforts.

UN Women is here to act on behalf of women everywhere. UN Women is here to promote action on the widespread recognition that the empowerment of women is not an afterthought in humanitarian operations, peacekeeping or post-conflict recovery efforts and rehabilitation. The aim of UN Women’s engagement in humanitarian action is to ensure consistency and sustainability in addressing gender equality concerns across the humanitarian-development continuum as well as to improve awareness and commitment, enhance capacity and strengthen partnerships with national entities, civil society, regional institutions and the international humanitarian system.

Still, UN Women’s research shows that less than five percent of money in Multi-Donor Trust Funds for post-conflict countries, for example, is dedicated to supporting women’s empowerment or advancing gender equality. This makes it even more urgent that we fully support and implement any mechanisms that help hold donors and partners accountable to their commitments to gender equality or protecting women and girls. UN entities need to meet or surpass the Secretary-General’s call for the dedication of a minimum of 15 percent of their budgets to gender equality and women’s empowerment in post-conflict peace-building. This minimum threshold is not currently applied to the humanitarian arena.

To do so, an analysis is first needed of how much financing is currently targeting women’s needs, empowerment and protection. Consistent application of a measuring tool is needed to conduct this analysis and indeed the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) has developed the valuable Gender Marker that is currently required for use in projects in the Consolidated Appeals Process and is being applied in a number of Pooled Funds. However, as the HRI’s analysis of humanitarian funding shows, in many crises, gender is still largely absent in the design of many projects, and in donor funding allocations. In line with the HRI’s conclusion, we believe that the IASC’s Gender Marker should also be used consistently and professionally to support more effective monitoring of humanitarian action from a gender perspective. It must also be supported with other measures to hold humanitarian actors at all levels and in all sectors accountable for their responsibilities to assess and respond to gender-specific needs.

Over the past few months a number of ‘Open Days on Women and Peace’ have been conducted around the world, in which representatives of women’s organisations have met with the
leadership of the United Nations in countries with UN missions. These meetings have become an annual practice, introduced last year as part of the tenth anniversary of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security. Not surprisingly, many of the recommendations from women’s civil society groups are related to humanitarian response, such as the women and girls’ need for information regarding protection and resources in crises and disasters, the importance of respecting privacy at relief camps, and the need to include trained women in the distribution of food and non-food items in camps and decision-making positions in camp or local disaster management or preparedness committees to ensure gender balance and voice in these structures. The message of these women resonates with that of millions of women and girls affected by emergencies all over the world.

My organisation, UN Women, is in its early days. It will not be a supplier of humanitarian relief services. Its role is to support coordination and accountability efforts and humanitarian providers to make determined and consistent responses to women’s needs in humanitarian emergencies. As part of our plans, UN Women plans to develop the capacity for assessment and coordination of gender-specific needs in humanitarian responses. We will help concentrate the collective synergies, skills and resources of our partners to meet women’s immediate survival and safety needs and to build women’s empowerment for the longer-term resilience of communities and sustainability of humanitarian action.

As humanitarian disasters become more frequent and more devastating, failure to put women’s safety and empowerment at the centre of responses will undermine the effectiveness of relief efforts. In this regard, the HRI 2011 provides valuable analysis and recommendations on how we can collectively move forward. I hope the findings can help us all to better understand the challenges faced by women in humanitarian crises, and find lasting means to build the capacity and resilience of women to face and recover from situations of disasters and conflicts.

MICHELLE BACHELET
This year marks the end of the first five-year phase of the Humanitarian Response Index (HRI). Since the initiative began, we have learned a great deal about the challenge of effectively providing humanitarian assistance in an increasingly complicated operating environment and the strengths and limitations of the different actors involved in the humanitarian sector. We have found that huge difficulties exist in translating our collective commitment to increase the impact and effectiveness of aid efforts into actual changes in policy and practice.

When the first edition of the HRI was published in 2007, no one was sure what the impact of the HRI would be, but I think it is safe to say the HRI has earned its place among the key initiatives in the sector to increase knowledge and promote greater transparency, accountability and impact. While the HRI has primarily focused on the role of donor governments in humanitarian action, our scope and ambition has always been to look beyond this to see how we can collectively do better for those suffering from crises.

The context in which humanitarian action takes place has evolved substantially over the past five years of the HRI — the Arab Spring is evidence of just how quickly the dynamics can shift. At the same time, too many crises, like the Horn of Africa, remain sadly familiar to us despite our pledges to avoid mistakes of the past. This reinforces the need to constantly track trends and assess the implications for the sector.

Through the HRI’s extensive research over the past five years, we have been able to gather evidence on how the humanitarian sector is functioning, and from this, raise concerns about important issues that affect the quality and effectiveness of humanitarian action. This ranges from the importance of need-based approaches and the dangers of aid politicisation, to the need for better prevention, preparedness, and risk reduction, and support for protection and access. All these issues are by no means new for the sector, but as our research shows, much more effort is required to address them in a lasting and meaningful manner.

In this year’s report, we turn our attention to the challenge of incorporating gender more effectively into programming, and the role that donors can play to push the system to improve in this area. For years, there has been a general consensus that humanitarian actors must develop greater sensitivity to gender issues, both in the emergency response and in long term-recovery efforts. However, our HRI research over the past five years in crises such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sudan, Somalia and Haiti, have clearly demonstrated that advances have been too few and too slow, Despite important efforts to raise awareness of these issues.

In the HRI 2011 report, we have gathered and analysed data regarding the way in which donor governments address gender in their policies and funding, and provide field actors’ perspectives of donor commitment to gender. We hope the report makes a modest contribution to a growing body of evidence on the critical importance of gender sensitive approaches in all aspects of humanitarian action. This includes the continuing work of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) Sub-Working Group on Gender in Humanitarian Action to develop tools and raise awareness of gender issues in the sector, a recent study from Tufts University on the importance of sex and age disaggregated data, and an ongoing evaluation sponsored by UN Women, UNICEF and UN OCHA on gender outcomes in the responses to different crises (which DARA is conducting).

This body of work, together with the findings from this year’s HRI, point to the need to scale up efforts to ensure gender sensitive approaches are integrated into all aspects of humanitarian action. We have found that much more needs to be done by humanitarian organisations and donors alike to ensure gender is properly addressed in their programmes in ways that meet the different needs of all within the affected population.

From our perspective, the issue of gender in crises is simple: we will never be able to achieve principled and effective responses unless we can show that assistance is based on, and in proportion to the needs and priorities of all parts of the affected populations, and provided impartially. The only
way to achieve this is by ensuring needs assessments and programme design adequately integrate gender analysis, and by constantly monitoring and evaluating the results of our actions to ensure gender concerns are addressed properly. The chapters contributed by UN Emergency Relief Coordinator, Valerie Amos, and UN Women Executive Director, Michelle Bachelet, highlight just how difficult the challenge will be to achieve this, but also the urgency of making this top priority for all of us. We are extremely grateful for their thoughtful insight and contribution to the debate.

This year's report includes expanded analysis of individual donors' policies and practices, based on key elements of the declaration of Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD). We have also expanded the donor classification into groups to show which donors share similar characteristics, strengths and weaknesses. This is based on statistical analysis of donors' humanitarian policies and funding, and the perceptions and opinions of hundreds of senior representatives of humanitarian organisations at both the field and headquarters level.

The results show three distinct groups of donors, each with its own strengths and weaknesses, but all making a positive contribution to humanitarian actions.

Group 1 donors are referred to as "Principled Partners". They are characterised by their generosity, strong commitment to humanitarian principles of neutrality, impartiality and independence, and for flexible, funding arrangements with partners.

Group 2, the "Learning Leaders" have often taken a leadership role in terms of their capacity to respond, field presence, and commitment to learning and improving performance in the sector.

Group 3 donors are "Aspiring Actors". As a group of donors, they are diverse in terms of their size and capacities, but often have a focus on building strengths in specific "niche" areas, such as geographic regions or thematic areas like preparedness and prevention, and their aspirations to taking on a greater role in the sector.

The classification deserves some explanation. First, the GHD attempts to provide a common framework to guide donors' action, and outlines a series of principles and good practices that donors themselves believed important in order for their aid to have the greatest impact in the response to crises. Donor governments often claim that they work in coordination and in compliance with the principles and practices outlined in the GHD declaration. However, as the HRI's research shows, the reality is different. Donors do not act as a unified collective, but often follow individual priorities and interpretations of what they consider to be the best approach to providing humanitarian assistance, depending on the crisis, and, as we outlined in the HRI 2010, are often influenced by domestic or international political objectives. The classification into groups helps to show more precisely where donors converge and where they diverge in their policies, practices, and how they are perceived in the field.

Second, while the focus of the HRI is on the role of donor governments, this does not mean it is an evaluation of the performance of individual agencies responsible for managing government humanitarian assistance. Over the past five years, we have spoken to and interviewed dozens of representatives of Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development/ Development Assistance Committee (OECD/DAC) donor agencies in our field research, and many others in donor headquarters. Our overwhelming conclusion is that staff of donor governments' humanitarian departments are fully committed to achieving the aims of the GHD principles, and are actively engaged in making the sector work more effectively. Unfortunately, their work is often undermined by bureaucratic legislation and procedures, a lack of resources and capacity, and by political indifference or interference. The HRI's analysis attempts, to the extent possible, to highlight these issues so that governments can work to improve the quality, effectiveness and impact of their assistance, and respect and support the work of their humanitarian departments and partners to achieve these aims.

Third, no performance measurement system or index can fully capture the complexities of reality, and the HRI is no
different. As we have pointed out in every edition of the report, there are limitations to the data available, in the indicators we have selected, and the depth of analysis we can provide. The research process, for example, uses financial data from 2010, which means, as is the case today, that dramatic cuts to aid budgets by many donors, such as Spain, Ireland and others, are not reflected in the analysis. Equally, many of the recent positive moves taken by donors, like the UK and Australia, to update and improve their humanitarian assistance policy frameworks are not reflected in the data. These changes, both positive and negative, will take time to manifest at the field level, so any findings need to be contextualised.

Finally, the HRI research process includes extensive interviews and surveys to capture the views of senior field staff from UN agencies, the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) on the quality of support provided by donors that fund their programmes. The perspectives from the field are critically important to understand how donors’ policies and practices are facilitating or impeding effective crisis responses. This year, as part of the research process, we also followed-up with interviews at the headquarters level, and found that the perspectives from the field were largely corroborated by their headquarter colleagues. The HRI therefore offers a unique window for donors to get a broader overview of how they are perceived and where they could do better to support their partners.

In summary, it is critically important to consider the HRI’s findings and analysis, not as absolute truths, but as evidence of trends in donors’ practices that can help policy makers and their partners reflect on what is working well and what can be improved. Sometimes the HRI data and findings may support and reinforce other research and evaluations – as indeed is the case, for example, with many OECD/DAC peer reviews. Sometimes, the findings may contradict other research, or offer results that may be surprising to us, as they run contrary to our own personal experiences or points of views. The aim is that the HRI is a tool and an entry point to promote more discussion and debate about how donors can contribute positively to greater accountability and impact for people in situations of crisis.

As we look forward to the next phase of the HRI, it is clear that both the new operational contexts and developments in reforming the structure and tools of the humanitarian sector, call for a period of reflection to redefine good practice. The challenges posed by climate change, rapid population growth and tighter financial budgets will require the humanitarian sector to be prepared for even greater challenges. The growing importance of new operational actors and donors is a reality that “traditional” actors need to acknowledge and embrace as part of the growing aid community. We look forward to continuing to engage with the whole donor community in the next phase of the HRI to get as complete a picture as possible of what is needed to ensure we build capacity and resilience to anticipate and prepare for new challenges.

We need to make sure we get it right. The challenges that lie ahead will require us to think outside the box. We should encourage, and not fear, innovation. For starters, the current crisis in the Horn of Africa shows just how crucial support for preparedness and prevention is. We need to invest significantly in building resilience to crises, as the effects of climate change will make this increasingly important. We also need to avoid gender blind approaches, which do not account for the different needs of women, men, boys and girls. Humanitarian responses that do not understand the different ways in which they are affected cannot possibly be effective in meeting their needs.

From the start, we have hoped that the Humanitarian Response Index serves to inspire greater dialogue regarding this and other best practices. As we move forward into the next phase of the HRI, I sincerely hope you will join us in widening the debate to include new actors and contexts, consider the future challenges facing the sector, and look for practical solutions on how we can maximise the resources and support of donors and humanitarian organisations to meet the needs of people affected by, or at risk of crises.
I would like to acknowledge the contributions and support of the hundreds of individuals and organisations that make the HRI possible.

It is an honour for DARA to have the contributions of both Valerie Amos and Michelle Bachelet in this year’s Humanitarian Response Index (HRI). They have shared their thoughts on the importance of gender in humanitarian crises, and ideas on what we collectively must do to ensure the different needs and concerns of all affected and vulnerable populations are met in our responses to crises. We are highly appreciative of their support and endorsement.

I also want to thank the hundreds of people from United Nation (UN) agencies, NGOs, the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement, and host and donor governments working in humanitarian crises, who took time out of their heavy workloads to share their first-hand perspectives with our field research teams. The HRI would simply not exist without their generous collaboration and valuable insights.

Our field research teams benefited from the administrative and logistical support from the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) and UN OCHA, who helped our teams find their way around safely and efficiently. Our sincere thanks for this.

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Special thanks also go to dozens of headquarters staff of humanitarian organisations in Geneva, New York and Washington who shared their perspectives of good practice and provided highly useful guidance to improve the quality of our analysis. UN Women and Gen Cap and the IASC Sub-Working Group on Gender in Humanitarian Action provided essential insight to help us prepare our research on gender. We also interviewed dozens of representatives of OECD/ DAC donor agencies in our field research, and many others in donor headquarters. Understanding the perspectives of donor agencies and the challenges they face in responding to humanitarian crises has been essential to our analysis. We want to reiterate once more our conclusion that staff of donor governments’ humanitarian departments are fully committed to achieving the aims of the Good Humanitarian Donorship principles, and are actively engaged in making the sector work more effectively. They deserve the full respect, understanding and support of their governments to help them achieve these aims, and we look forward to continuing to engage with the donor community in the next phase of the HRI.

The Peer Review Committee has provided technical advice, strategic guidance and moral support for the HRI. Our sincere gratitude goes to Jock Baker, Wolf-Dieter Eberwein, Veronique de Geoffroy, Randolph Kent, Sara Pantuliano, David Roodman, Ed Schenkenberg and Hansjoerg Stromeyer. We also want to thank former committee members Eva von Oelreich and James Darcy for their inspirational support over the past five years.

Our Advisory Board helps us connect the HRI to wider debate on humanitarian and global affairs. We are truly grateful to José María Figueres, António Guterres, Diego Hidalgo, Larry Minear, Iqbal Riza, Mary Robinson and Pierre Schori for their dedication to the HRI.

DARA’s Board of Trustees has been a source of encouragement for us. I would like to thank all of them for their enthusiasm and motivation, specifically Aldo Ajello, Emma Bonino, Jan Eliasson, José María Figueres, Beatriz Iraburu, José Manuel Romero and Juliet Pierce, with a special thanks to the President of the Board, Diego Hidalgo, for his extreme generosity and support for DARA and the HRI over the years.

Sincere thanks go to AVINA STIFTUNG and the Dutch Postcode Lottery (Nationale Postcode Loterij) for their generous support of the HRI.
I want to specifically express my gratitude to Silvia Hidalgo, DARA’s founding Director, who had the vision and initiative to create the HRI. It is because of her enthusiasm and perseverance that the HRI came into being. Her recognition that the sector needed a tool to assess the role of donors, promote good donor practices, and encourage greater accountability to those affected by crises remains as valid today as it did when the HRI was created five years ago. Thank you, Silvia.

Finally, I would like to recognise all of DARA’s staff for their contributions to the HRI. Producing the HRI is a momentous task, and it would not be possible without a team effort. I would like thank Philip Tamminga for his leadership of the initiative over the past four years and for contributing to its increasing recognition in the sector, Fernando Espada for managing the field missions and building stronger connections to humanitarians in the field, Daniela Ruegenberg, Covadonga Canteli and Beatriz Asensio for their remarkable work on the HRI methodology and for carrying out the data analysis and Marybeth Redheffer for her work in deepening our analysis of donor policy frameworks. Eva Cervantes, Miguel Gonzalez, Susana Vicario and Nacho Wilhemi provided logistical and administrative support, without which the project would not be possible. DARA also benefited from the support of several interns, many from the Network on Humanitarian Action (NOHA), whose enthusiasm and dedication was of great assistance. Thanks to Daniel Barnes, Ana Bernthsen, Sophie Broach, Ana del Toro, Caitlyn Hughes, Christina Jang, Ralph Meyers, Rebecca Moy and Laura Schaack.
When people talk about disasters, there is a tendency to think of them as being the great equaliser. The devastating wave, the debilitating drought, or the sudden earthquake, are seen as unifying moments where societies suffer as one, and unite in their response – rich and poor, young and old, men and women. The reality, however, is often strikingly different.

Consider the following facts.

In natural disasters, women tend to die in much larger numbers than men. During the Asian tsunami, for example, three times as many women lost their lives.

In conflict, by contrast, men tend to die in larger numbers as a direct result of conflict – but women and girls die due to indirect causes, as they are left extremely vulnerable, have less access to health care, struggle to maintain households alone, and find themselves prey to sexual violence (Plümper and Neumayer 2006).

In crises that displace a large number of people, the burden of care tends to overwhelmingly fall on women; although, they often also find more opportunities to develop their skills, and become leaders.

In refugee camps, young men and the children they look after often find themselves increasingly malnourished, as they fall through the gaps, without basic cooking skills or the ration cards to receive food.

Women, girls, boys and men are affected very differently by humanitarian crises and, as a result, need to be assisted in different ways. This is what we mean when we talk about the gender dimensions of a humanitarian emergency.

Unfortunately, many people do not understand this. This is why DARA’s Humanitarian Response Index 2011 report is an important contribution to increasing awareness and understanding of the importance of addressing gender concerns in emergency situations.

The findings and conclusions from the Humanitarian Response Index (HRI) field research to crises such as Haiti, Somalia, Pakistan and Sudan, along with its analysis of donor governments’ policies and funding practices related to gender equality, show that there are still significant gaps in understanding the importance of gender issues by all actors, donors and humanitarian organisations alike. Much more needs to be done to mainstream gender into all aspects of humanitarian actions, not simply because we have made many statements and commitments in this regard, but because it is one of the most powerful and effective means to ensure humanitarian actions are based on objective assessments of needs, and provided in ways that do not discriminate against any portion of a crisis affected population.

The HRI findings are not new, but they add new evidence to back up what we already know. For example, a recent study by the UN’s Office on Inspection Services found that more than 50 percent of UN staff do not understand how to implement gender-responsive programmes – many believe it is purely about supporting women’s programming (Muir, Jogoo and Rieper 2010).

Paying attention to women’s needs is, of course, essential. But gender is a broader concept. It looks at how society works, who has the power and what roles different members of the society have. It helps us to understand the profoundly different ways in which men and women experience the same events, and to identify the different responses needed to
keep them alive and healthy and to ensure their dignity in crisis situations. Unfortunately, even where these differences are recognised and understood, aid agencies too often continue to deliver assistance as if one size fits all. In the heat of the moment, humanitarian organisations often rush in and begin to provide aid without differentiation - rather than targeting specific items to people with specific needs.

In the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), for example, a 2010 study conducted in North Kivu found that women did 75 percent of the work in producing food — but that the assistance provided by agricultural aid agencies (such as tools, seeds and training) went to the household – with no indication of how the aid was distributed once it came into the home. This meant that their aid was not always going where it was most needed.

Similarly, after the 2004 Asian tsunami, most of the humanitarian assistance initially went to men, who were provided fishing boats and nets. No one asked what women needed, or how to support them to get back to work. A more gender-sensitive response would have meant rebuilding market stalls and providing goods to restart trading.

**GETTING THE DATA RIGHT**

Tackling this gap between understanding and response is one of the most important challenges affecting the aid industry today. In her foreword to this report, Michelle Bachelet, the head of UN Women, makes a compelling case for a more concerted approach to gender equality.

As Emergency Relief Coordinator, part of my job is to identify practical and effective measures to help make this happen — simple interventions which have been shown to have a powerful impact on the way we help people.

The most important starting point is for humanitarian organisations to recognise the differing needs of men and women in the data they collect at the beginning of a disaster. Ideally before.

A recent study by the Feinstein International Center at Tufts University, supported by OCHA and CARE, provides powerful examples of how early gathering of sex- and age-disaggregated data can make a real difference (Mazurana, Benelli, et.al 2011). For example, in DRC in 2011, data on malnourished children was initially not broken down by girls and boys. A gender advisor urged a closer look and the new analysis showed that more boys than girls were malnourished, - but more girls than boys were coming to supplemental feeding centres. Aid agencies working in the nutrition sector were surprised at this finding and revised their plans accordingly.

**ASSESSING EVERYONE’S NEEDS**

Getting the right data at the right time, however, may require a fundamental rethink of how many aid agencies do business. In the immediate aftermath of an emergency, the first priority is to determine what people need. What is the scale of the problem? Who has been affected?

We must make sure that women and men participate on assessment teams, as men are unable to speak to women or children in many places where we work. If women are not heard, their voices are crowded out. It is men’s needs and men’s voices that will be heard. We must do more to ensure a balance of women and men on assessment teams and train all those conducting needs assessments to understand how to collect information from women and men.

Once needs have been assessed, and the aid starts flowing, humanitarian responders must also do more to measure how their interventions are affecting men and women differently. There is an overwhelming tendency to report numbers in bulk –latures built, tons of food distributed, school rehabilitated – without knowing who used those latrines, who ate the food and who went to school.

If a health centre reports, for example, seeing 5,000 clients a month, humanitarian responders cannot tell whether there are more women than men accessing its services and whether there are specific issues to be resolved around men’s or women’s access to health care. This can have grave implications.

In Pakistan, in 2009, the health cluster was not initially disaggregating data by sex for those using the clinics. Had they done so, they would have found that women did not go to male health care providers and had less social mobility to be able to go to health centres. This was noticed by the media and the gender team. As a result, action was taken to provide female health care workers and mobile clinics. In addition, sanitation facilities were improved by adding purdah walls — protective barriers in front of the latrine so that women would use them safely and with privacy.

Similarly, if a school states that it has 2,000 students, it is not clear if there are more boys than girls attending that school, or if more girls than boys are dropping out. In Somalia, for example, data showed that fewer than 40 percent of children were attending schools — girls slightly less than boys. But the aid agencies dealing with education initially only focused on why girls were not attending, and did not look into why boys were dropping out. This caused a backlash in the community, as female education was seen as a western concern. It was decided to take a more balanced approach, by helping more boys, as well as girls, attend school. This approach won more local support.
Peter Walker, director of the Feinstein Centre, recently said: ‘If I had to put my finger on one thing that will improve programming, in terms of return for your dollar, euro or yen, I would say it is collecting and analysing sex-and-age disaggregated data.”

As the HRI report suggests, donors can help promote this by requiring this kind of data regularly from their partners, not just in the project design stage, but in monitoring and following up. Here, a crucial question that all actors should be asking is what does this data tell us about different needs, and how are we using the data to guide and inform our approaches to interventions so that we can adequately address those needs.

**IMPROVING THE WAY WE DO WORK**

An important recent step in improving the way we think about gender in emergencies was the introduction of the IASC Gender Marker — a coding system attached to project proposals which measures whether those proposals take account of differences in needs. A simple ranking of 0, 1 or 2 is attached to projects submitted as part of the Consolidated Appeals Process or pooled funding mechanism. The code is also recorded online, on OCHA’s Financial Tracking System (FTS).

Analysis of the use of the Gender Marker in 20 countries in 2012 indicated dramatic improvement in the number of projects submitted to the CAPs and Pooled Funds effectively addressing gender issues, and a commensurate decrease in ‘gender-blind’ projects (i.e.: projects that code 0 on the Gender Marker coding system). Out of over 2000 projects submitted to the 2012 CAP, only 10% of projects were coded 0. Just under 50% were designed to address gender equality. But, as the HRI analysis of funding patterns show, there is still significant room for improvement as it is imperative to implement gender responsive programmes – not just strengthen project design. The data shows that a significant proportion of donor funding is not aligned to meeting gender criteria, and in some crises, gender issues are largely absent in project proposals and funding allocations.

Many donors have said that they find the Gender Marker a useful tool to assess projects. The Swedish International Development Agency, for example, recently announced that it would use it when making its funding decisions. If, as the HRI report recommends, more donors make it clear they will only fund projects that address gender concerns, more aid agencies will take gender seriously.

**LEADERSHIP ON GENDER COUNTS**

Improving systems is only part of the process. Stronger leadership, knowledge and expertise are also needed to address gender gaps during emergency responses. Busy programme managers and cluster coordinators often find it difficult to juggle a long list of competing demands, and gender can fall down or off the agenda, as many of the examples from the HRI field research show.

To keep these issues at the centre of programming, a pool of gender experts was created – known as the Gender Standby Roster (GenCap). Since 2007, 57 GenCap Advisers have been deployed to 30 crises to help emergency response leaders design and implement services that acknowledge the different challenges facing men and women of all ages.

A special handbook and e-learning training course, “Different Needs Equal Opportunities”, also offer a number of practical suggestions about how to respond to the distinct needs of women, girls, boys and men. The recent establishment of UN Women offers even more opportunities to strengthen understanding of gender concerns during crises and to improve coordination.

A final and essential step to tackling gender in crises is to do much more when preparing for future emergencies. Women, for example, are often very active in community-based disaster preparedness organisations. At higher levels, however, men still dominate. National disaster management authorities need to do more to engage with women’s networks, which play such an important role in crisis response.

In Tuvalu, when a drought threatened to leave thousands of people stranded without water, the UN contacted the government division responsible for women’s affairs and discovered that they were eager to be involved in the response, but had not been included in the government’s disaster management planning processes.

Gender can also be more effectively addressed during disaster simulations. An example of how this can work well was seen this September, during a Pacific Humanitarian Team simulation. During the exercise, Pacific Island women provided essential information and suggestions to the simulation managers, allowing them to embed gender and social issues into the scenario.
**TAKING GENDER SERIOUSLY**

I want to encourage donors to take a more active stance, placing gender concerns at the heart of humanitarian action. Donors can play a crucial role by demanding that aid agencies use a comprehensive gender analysis to inform programming. The findings and recommendations from the HRI report deserve thoughtful consideration.

Understanding the differing needs of women, girls, boys and men is the responsibility of all humanitarian workers. Without it, we will fail in our responsibility to the people we are seeking to help. Identifying and addressing these distinct needs enhances humanitarian programming and puts participation of everyone in the affected population and accountability by humanitarian actors for their actions to women, girls, boys and men affected by crises centre stage.

We cannot wait any longer to get this right.

**VALERIE AMOS**

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**REFERENCES**


THE HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE INDEX 2011
INTRODUCTION

In late 2011, the United Nations (UN) launched a record appeal for US$7.7 billion to assist an estimated 51 million people affected by humanitarian crises. The appeal launch followed a familiar and predictable script: humanitarian organisations issued dire warnings about the extent of needs and urgently called on governments to scale up their support for relief efforts. The response was equally predictable: by the end of 2011, only 61% of appeal needs were covered—an average that remains largely unchanged for the past five years, with some crises neglected and severely underfunded (OCHA 2011).

Most of the crises included in the 2012 appeal were also predictable. Of the 16 crises included in the appeal, nine have been among the top humanitarian aid recipients over the past decade (Development Initiatives 2011). This underscores the continued inability of the international community to address chronic vulnerability by strengthening community resilience and increasing capacity for prevention and preparedness at the local and international level.

As the principal funders of humanitarian actions, the world’s main donor governments have a special role and responsibility to ensure that aid money is used efficiently, effectively and for the greatest impact for the millions of people affected by crisis each year. Donors recognised this when they jointly drafted in 2003 the declaration of Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD). The GHD set forth a set of principles and good practices intended to make donors’ humanitarian aid more principled, predictable and reliable (See www.goodhumanitarianandonorship.org).

Since 2007, DARA’s Humanitarian Response Index (HRI) has monitored donor governments’ application of the GHD Principles with the aim of contributing to efforts to improve the quality, effectiveness, accountability and impact of humanitarian aid. The HRI combines analysis of quantitative data on donor funding and policies with field research in different humanitarian crises to assess the quality of 23 Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development /Development Assistance Committee (OECD/DAC) donor governments’ humanitarian assistance in five pillars of practice:

- Pillar 1: Responding to needs
- Pillar 2: Prevention, risk reduction and recovery
- Pillar 3: Working with humanitarian partners
- Pillar 4: Protection and international law
- Pillar 5: Learning and accountability

Field research for 2011 covered nine crises: Chad, Colombia, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Haiti, Kenya, and Sudan, which together received almost two thirds of international humanitarian assistance funding in 2010 (OCHA FTS 2011). This edition of the HRI also includes a special focus on how donors address gender concerns in humanitarian action (see the chapter Addressing the Gender Challenge).

After five years of tracking and monitoring donor performance through the HRI, the reality seems that donors are far from achieving the ideals expressed in the GHD Declaration.

SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS

The wide scope of the research covering 23 of the world’s main donor governments and nine major crises gives the HRI a broad perspective of the trends and challenges facing the humanitarian sector. Unfortunately, our findings for the 2011 edition confirm that the issues raised in previous editions largely persist. The ability of the humanitarian sector to deliver assistance has improved over time, but progress in consolidating good donor practices and reforming the sector has been limited. Based on the experience and findings of five years of HRI research, our conclusion is that most donors have not significantly altered
their approaches in order to apply good practices, and the pace of reform efforts is too slow for the humanitarian sector to be able to adequately meet current needs, much less prepare for, anticipate, mitigate and respond to a trend of increasingly complex crises in the coming decade. The main gaps and challenges found through the HRI 2011 research are highlighted below.

**GENDER A LOW PRIORITY FOR MANY DONORS AND ACTORS, LEAVING GAPS IN RESPONSES**

The HRI research shows that gender is far from being mainstreamed into humanitarian action. Many actors do not take the time to understand the different needs of women, girls, men and boys in a crisis, and ensure programming meets these needs equitably. This can result in aid that is unsuitable, such as culturally inappropriate feminine hygiene kits in Pakistan, or worse, putting women and girls in danger, such as inadequate lighting and security in camp latrines in Haiti. While the majority of donors include gender in their policies, their funding is not always allocated towards projects that incorporate adequate gender analysis, and few donors actually monitor and follow up on how gender is addressed in programmes they support. Donors have enormous potential to influence the sector by requiring the humanitarian organisations they support to prioritise gender in the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of programmes, ensuring that aid is not discriminatory and meets the different needs of women, men, girls and boys equally.

**POLITICISATION OF AID CONTINUES TO DENY MILLIONS ACCESS TO AID**

As in the 2010 report, the HRI 2011 research shows that many governments’ political, economic and security agendas continue to undermine the ability of humanitarian organisations to access vulnerable populations and provide aid without discrimination. Anti-terrorism legislation of some governments has led to legal and procedural barriers to access populations in need in crises such as in Somalia or the oPt, and this is having negative spin-off effects on other donors and in other crises. At the same time, the political interests and actions of other parties, such as national authorities or armed groups, have impeded access to and protection of civilians in need. Keeping humanitarian assistance focused exclusively on meeting needs and independent of other objectives is the only effective way to ensure donors’ contributions have maximum benefits and impact in relieving human suffering. Donors also need to step up their support for concrete measures to ensure all actors comply with their responsibilities to protect, including supporting prevention strategies and supporting appropriate legal actions to address abuses of human rights and international humanitarian law.

**PREVENTION, PREPAREDNESS AND RECOVERY DISREGARDED IN AID EFFORTS**

The response to crises like the Haiti earthquake, Pakistan floods or drought and famine in the Horn of Africa show the human consequences of a lack of sustained commitment by donor governments for prevention, preparedness, risk reduction and long-term recovery efforts. Too often, these activities are not prioritised by governments in their development or humanitarian assistance, resulting in missed opportunities to strengthen local capacity and resilience and undermining the ability of the humanitarian sector to anticipate and prepare for and respond effectively to future crises. Given that humanitarian needs will continue to grow exponentially in coming years, reducing the human and economic impacts of humanitarian crises is a critical pending task for all donor governments.

**THE CURRENT AID REFORM AGENDA IS INSUFFICIENT TO TACKLE CURRENT AND FUTURE NEEDS**

The HRI 2011 research suggests that efforts to reform the humanitarian system, including the GHD initiative, are generating slow but uneven progress in improving the planning, coordination and delivery of assistance. Nevertheless, after five years of HRI research, it is more than evident that the gaps are essentially the same as when the reform process began, and the pace of reforms may not be quick enough to match increasing needs and a rapidly changing aid context, much less respond adequately to future challenges. Donors must continue to support current reform efforts, but they also need to actively work towards an ambitious programme to strengthen the capacity of the sector to anticipate and adapt to future needs and challenges.

**DONOR TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY IS WEAK**

Donor governments are not as transparent and accountable as they should be, especially towards the crisis-affected populations. As the HRI research in Colombia, Haiti, Pakistan, Somalia and Sudan shows, decisions around aid allocations are not sufficiently transparent, nor guided by humanitarian objectives, and donor governments in general are still reporting their assistance inconsistently. Accountability is still largely conceived as an exercise on fiscal management and control of the partners they fund, rather than on meeting the needs, priorities and aspirations of affected populations as the primary stakeholder in any aid efforts. By making aid transparency and accountability towards affected populations the cornerstone of their assistance, donors would have greater assurance that their aid is effective in meeting needs.
HRI 2011 DONOR SCORES AND CLASSIFICATION

As in the HRI 2010, a multidimensional statistical analysis was undertaken to classify donors into groups. Donors are scored against 35 quantitative and qualitative indicators, organised into five pillars of donor practices. Quantitative indicators are based on published data on donors' policies, funding and practices, while qualitative indicators are based on a standard field-based survey on perceptions of donor performance in different crises. The results are compiled into scores and a classification, as visually illustrated below. This classification by groups allows donor policy makers and their humanitarian partners the opportunity to compare performance against a smaller set of peers. The grouping is not hierarchical: each group of donors has its own set of strengths and weaknesses, but all have made positive contributions to overall humanitarian aid efforts (See the chapter HRI Research Process for more details).

PARTIALLY-ASSESSED DONORS

This year, four donors were not included in the full HRI assessment due to insufficient data from the field: Austria, Greece, New Zealand and Portugal. In the case of Greece and Portugal, the volume of their humanitarian assistance has been minimal compared to other donors (including new and emerging donors) for several years. Additional aid cuts brought on by the severe financial crisis have further limited their engagement with the sector. Austria and New Zealand, on the other hand, have made concerted efforts to review and improve their aid policies, but the limited number of partners at the field level made it impossible to assess them against the qualitative components of the index.

HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE INDEX
(30% PILLAR 1 + 20% PILLAR 2 + 20% PILLAR 3 + 15% PILLAR 4 + 15% PILLAR 5)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PILLAR 1</th>
<th>PILLAR 2</th>
<th>PILLAR 3</th>
<th>PILLAR 4</th>
<th>PILLAR 5</th>
<th>OVERALL OECD/DAC AVERAGE SCORE</th>
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Lower scores in indicators for coordination, funding of multilateral humanitarian organisations, respect for international humanitarian law, and in field perception indicators on commitment to neutral, impartial, independent aid aligned to needs.

Well perceived by field partners in terms of capacity, commitment to learning and evaluation and support for coordination.

Higher scores in indicators for coordination, funding of multilateral humanitarian organisations, respect for international humanitarian law, and in field perception indicators on commitment to neutral, impartial and independent aid aligned to needs.

Poorly perceived by field partners in terms of capacity, commitment to learning and evaluation, and support or coordination.
Group 1 PRINCIPLED PARTNERS

The Principled Partners group includes Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland. The group is characterised by their generosity, as measured by the ratio of humanitarian assistance compared to Gross National Income (GNI), a strong commitment to humanitarian principles of neutrality, impartiality and independence, and for flexible funding arrangements with partners. A comment about Norway from an interview respondent in oPt summarises the group’s strengths: “Norway is good with flexible and continuous funding and light reporting—agencies need certain amount of flexibility to operate in this context.”

This group has consistently performed well in all the HRI pillars and indicators over the past five years, in part due to well-defined policies and a long-tradition of governmental and public support for humanitarian assistance. At the international level, these donors are strong advocates for humanitarian principles and for a well-functioning, humanitarian system coordinated mainly through the UN system.

Principled Partners are generous, committed to humanitarian principles, and advocate for a strong multilateral humanitarian system.

However, the group also has some deficiencies. While strong supporters of multilateral agencies (the UN and Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement), un-earmarked funding and pooled funding mechanisms, the group provides less support to non-governmental organisations (NGOs) than the overall average for OECD/DAC donors. In field interviews, many UN and NGO respondents suggested that these donors did not demand enough of their partners, and had unrealistic or idealist expectations regarding the capacity and leadership of the UN system to effectively coordinate international aid efforts. As an example, the majority of these donors are strong supporters of pooled fund mechanisms, which many respondents considered a means of disengaging from operational issues at the field level. “Pooled funding is now becoming an easier option for donors to shed their responsibilities to engage with more demanding partners like international non-governmental organisations (INGOs), or confront the issues,” reported one respondent. “Donors are risk adverse, and are therefore using pooled funds, but it doesn’t necessarily mean better accountability,” said another.

While these donors have a good reputation for maintaining the neutrality, impartiality and independence of their humanitarian aid, in several crises field interviewees suggested that their aid decisions were equally influenced by political factors like any other donor. There was a sense among many interviewees that while these donors are good partners, some of the group’s impetus in leading and consolidating principled approaches has been lost in recent years. Many saw the lack of active advocacy to preserve the integrity of neutral, impartial humanitarian action in the light of increasing aid politicisation as an example of their decline as “moral authorities” in the sector.

Some respondents felt that there was a trend for donors like Denmark, Finland and Switzerland to look for “easy wins” and non-controversial programmes, limiting their engagement with the system, both in debates on where the future of the humanitarian system and in the number of crises supported. Norway, for example, was singled out in Somalia for its unconditional support for the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), at the expense sometimes of a more independent stance for humanitarian assistance. Unofficially, many donor representatives interviewed admitted that domestic and foreign policy considerations were indeed factors that influenced where aid was allocated and to which organisations. “Our aid is neutral and impartial when we give it to an organisation,” said one, “but of course, the decision on which crisis to support is completely political”.

At the individual donor level, compared to 2010, Norway shows substantial improvements in its scores in Pillar 3 (Working with humanitarian partners) and Pillar 4 (Protection and international law). The Netherlands also demonstrates improvement compared to 2010, especially for its scores for timely funding to complex emergencies, un-earmarked funding, and funding towards prevention and accountability initiatives. However, it could improve in aligning funding to gender criteria and follow up at the field level on gender issues. Finland, Sweden and Switzerland also show small improvements, while Denmark drops slightly in comparison to 2010.

Group 2 LEARNING LEADERS

Canada, the European Commission (specifically the Directorate General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection department, ECHO), France, the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US) make up the group of Learning Leaders. This group of donors is characterised by their leading role and influence in the humanitarian sector in terms of their capacity to respond, field presence and commitment to learning and improving performance in the sector. They tend to do poorer in areas such as prevention, preparedness and risk reduction efforts, and in perceptions around the neutrality, impartiality and independence of their aid (ECHO is a notable exception, as it scores well above most donors in this regard).
In terms of volume of aid, this group has an enormous impact on the ability of the humanitarian sector to respond to needs. ECHO, the UK and the US are by far the three largest donors to international humanitarian assistance efforts, funding more than 50% of the total international resources mobilised in 2010 (Development Initiatives

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**LEARNING LEADERS PLAY A LEAD ROLE IN CRISIS RESPONSE AND IN EFFORTS TO IMPROVE PERFORMANCE IN THE SECTOR**

2011). Canada and France are among the top ten OECD/DAC donors as well. A senior representative of a UN aid agency, referring to the US, summarised the importance of this group in the humanitarian sector: “A funding cut from a smaller donor is a challenge, but a cut from the US means millions of people would not receive the humanitarian assistance they need to survive. No other donor could pick up the slack.”

Another example of their leadership role is how these donors contribute to coordination at the field level, and to shaping debate on the direction of the sector overall. For example, the UK recently undertook a major review of its humanitarian programmes, and has transformed its overall aid programme to make resilience and anticipation some of the key focus areas for all programmes: the change in policy direction is being closely watched by other donors.

Canada’s strong leadership role in requiring gender-sensitive approaches in humanitarian programmes it funds as well as advocating for gender-sensitive approaches in the wider humanitarian system is another example, as reflected in its top scores in the HRI’s gender indicators.

These donors have also shown a strong commitment to learning and evaluation, and have been the drivers of many of the initiatives to improve aid quality, effectiveness, transparency and accountability. For example, the UK and the US are strong supporters of the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI), and the US has recently expanded efforts to map all aid projects in a publically accessible dashboard. While the commitment to learning, evaluations and transparency is positive, it has not necessarily translated into substantial changes or improvements in their own policies and practices, nor those of their partners and the humanitarian system as a whole.

As a group, these donors tend to provide a balanced mix of support to all components of the system – with some favouring certain aid channels over others. At the field level, there is normally good coordination among these donors, but at the global level, there are differences in their visions of where the system should go and how it should function. This is reflected in different approaches, tools and systems used to assess, allocate and report aid. The lack of harmonisation has in many ways increased the burden on humanitarian organisations, especially smaller ones. The heavy reporting requirements of each of these donors often require additional staff resources that are diverted away from programming, according to many respondents. “I would prefer the same reporting format for all donors because it is currently time consuming and involves high costs. Standard reporting would simplify the accountability framework,” affirmed one respondent in Sudan.

The downside to this leadership role is that these donors can often be interpreted as overstepping boundaries and negatively influencing the sector. A widespread concern among many stakeholders is that humanitarian assistance from these donors is often dictated by other political or security objectives, undermining neutral, impartial and independent humanitarian action. The US is most often mentioned for this, but all other donors in the group received criticism about politicisation in field interviews. Several interviewees expressed concern that this was having a negative influence over other donors and how they relate to their partners. However, the field survey scores were significantly more positive than the comments accompanying the responses, in part because humanitarian organisations appeared to understand the difficulties donor field representatives faced. This viewpoint is reflected by the comments of an interviewee working in Somalia: “The US’ humanitarian funding is heavily influenced by domestic political agendas and concerns with public opinion. US aid officials are acutely aware of this inconsistency with principles, and struggle with it constantly.”

Most field organisations appreciated the strong capacity and resources that allow these donors to take on an active role in the response to crises. “CIDA and ECHO have very good technical follow up and field monitoring visits, which in the longer term serves as a capacity building tool for the NGO, making them more efficient and competitive,” according to one respondent in Colombia. However, these same donors are frequently criticised for intervening in programming design and implementation.

Donors in this group are also criticised for imposing too many administrative, reporting and procedural burdens on their partners, and a lack of flexibility. The comments from an interviewee in Sudan summarises the experience of many: “OFDA [US], CIDA [Canada] and especially ECHO aren’t flexible with funding: you can’t move budget lines and you have to do all the activities in the way you said in the proposal that was approved, regardless of changing situations.” Another respondent in Pakistan shared a similar observation: “Often donors’ micro-management was an obstacle, such as the very excessive reporting requirements of DFID [UK].” Others, however, praise these donors for their flexibility in adapting to needs.
At the individual donor level, compared to 2010, France has improved in terms of the perceptions of its partners in the field. The US has made continued progress in the perceptions of its partners in the field, partially explaining the improvement in its overall scores. This may be a sign reform efforts are beginning to show positive results at the field level. In contrast, the UK received poorer scores in field, survey-based indicators, perhaps explained by the uncertainties caused by a major review process of the UK’s humanitarian aid programme, which was underway at the time of the HRI field research. ECHO’s scores remain largely unchanged, while Canada slipped somewhat in some scores, perhaps reflecting changing political priorities for its aid programmes.

In contrast, the UK received poorer scores in field, survey-based indicators, perhaps explained by the uncertainties caused by a major review process of the UK’s humanitarian aid programme, which was underway at the time of the HRI field research. ECHO’s scores remain largely unchanged, while Canada slipped somewhat in some scores, perhaps reflecting changing political priorities for its aid programmes.

**Group 3 ASPIRING ACTORS**

**Australia, Belgium, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg** and **Spain** make up the group of Aspiring Actors. This group is diverse in terms of their size and capacities, but Aspiring Actors have specific strengths that could be leveraged to take on a greater role in shaping thematic approaches in the sector. As a group, they tend to have more limited capacity to engage with the humanitarian system at the field level and score below the OECD/DAC average in the majority of the HRI pillars and indicators.

In contrast to other donor groups, many of the donors in this group lack clearly defined strategies and sustained, long-term financial commitments for their humanitarian assistance. As a result, this has at times undermined efforts to build their internal capacity and experience to engage more fully with the humanitarian sector.

Spain and Ireland are two good examples of this. Both countries made concerted efforts to scale up their contributions to humanitarian efforts in recent years as part of their aspiration to play a larger role in the humanitarian sector. Spain, for example, became the fifth largest humanitarian donor in 2009. However, the increase in funding was not matched by sufficient investments in building their own capacity to monitor programmes, or building sustained public and political understanding and support for humanitarian assistance. “Spain is good for flexibility,” said one field interview respondent. “But they never go to the field to monitor so they don’t understand the context.” Similar comments were made for Ireland in other crises. The economic crisis has since led to sharp cutbacks to both countries’ aid budgets, which will likely severely limit their potential role and influence in the sector in the years to come. By all accounts, Italy is facing similar challenges.

On the positive side, many of these donors have much more flexibility to find a “niche” where they can develop capacities and expertise to take on a leadership role amongst donors. Australia, for example, recently revised its humanitarian strategy giving it a clearer, more integrated thematic focus on disaster risk reduction, and an ambition to move beyond its traditional geographic focus of the Pacific region to other parts of the world. Germany has also indicated it will prioritise disaster risk reduction, prevention and preparedness as part of their humanitarian assistance strategy. Indeed, most of the donors in this group are above the overall OECD/DAC average in areas like prevention and reconstruction, suggesting that this may be an emerging area of expertise for the group as a whole. The challenge for these donors will be to sustain these efforts over time and build a critical mass of capacity and experience that will allow them to take on a leadership role in the sector.

At the individual donor level, Belgium deserves mention for its concerted efforts to address some of the deficiencies identified in previous HRI assessments. Compared to 2010, Belgium’s scores improved significantly in quantitative indicators for the timeliness of funding, un-earmarked funding, funding to NGOs, and for evaluations and support for accountability initiatives. This demonstrates that it is possible to make positive changes to donor practices in a very short period of time if there is sufficient political willingness and commitment. Australia, Germany and Spain have also improved, while Japan remains largely unchanged compared to 2010. Ireland dropped slightly in indicators based on the perceptions of its field partners and quantitative indicators, indicating that the deep cutbacks in its humanitarian assistance are beginning to have negative effects. Luxembourg saw a significant decrease in its overall scores compared to 2010 due mainly to the poor perceptions from its partners in the field. The country is one of the world’s most generous donors on a per capita basis, but one with little capacity to monitor and engage with its partners at the field level. The poor field-based survey indicator scores suggest a need for further dialogue with partners to understand and address these perceptions.
HRI 2011 DONOR PERFORMANCE: MAIN FINDINGS

Similar to the findings from previous HRI reports, in general, donors scored well for the indicators in Pillar 1 (Responding to needs), though the concern about politicisation of aid featured prominently in many of the crises studied. Collectively, donors scored lower in Pillar 2 (Prevention, risk reduction and recovery) and Pillar 5 (Learning and accountability). Both pillars include indicators around greater participation and ownership of affected populations in the design and management of programmes, and longer-term approaches to build capacity and resilience.

GENDER
A LOW PRIORITY FOR MANY DONORS AND ACTORS, LEAVING GAPS IN RESPONSES

HRI research shows that gender is not integrated in a meaningful way into the practices of donors and humanitarian agencies. This has implications for donor practices in all five pillars of the HRI.

For example, in Pillar 1 (Responding to needs), inadequate attention to gender in the needs assessment, project design and implementation phases of a response has consequences in terms of being able to ensure that different needs are being met fairly, equitably and without discrimination. HRI research shows that gender is often neglected in the emergency phase, and not prioritised in the recovery phase, leading to gaps in the quality and effectiveness of aid efforts.

In Pillar 2 (Prevention, risk reduction and recovery), the importance of ensuring women, men, girls and boys have equitable opportunities to participate and engage in programmes is a critical element for downward accountability, but few donors actually monitor and follow-up how their partners ensure adequate opportunities for affected populations in general to participate in programme implementation, much less promote this as part of a gender or accountability strategy. Additionally, incorporating gender approaches into prevention, preparedness, recovery and development is more likely to generate sustainable results and impact.

In Pillar 3 (Working with humanitarian partners), donors could do much more to promote and support equal opportunities for women to work in the humanitarian sector. With women representing over half the world’s population, and with women and girls often disproportionately affected by crises, it makes practical sense that women should be fully engaged in the response to humanitarian challenges. However, at the moment, women are underrepresented in the sector as a whole, particularly in management and leadership positions.

In Pillar 4 (Protection and international law), the consequences of a lack of protection and respect for human rights in crisis situations are most often felt by women and girls. Donors could work with their partners to promote and support more gender-sensitive approaches to protection, with an emphasis on prevention of sexual and gender based violence (SGBV) and actions to end impunity for violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law.

In Pillar 5 (Learning and accountability), donors could do more to ensure gender is better integrated into monitoring, evaluation and learning. Systematically including an assessment of how gender is integrated into humanitarian actions, and monitoring whether their funding and support is contributing to gender equality is an effective way to ensure programme quality, effectiveness, accountability and impact.

For more detailed analysis, please see the chapter Addressing the Gender Challenge.
Group 1
PRINCIPLED PARTNERS

PRINCIPLED PARTNERS
Characterised by their generosity, strong commitment to humanitarian principles of neutrality, impartiality and independence, and flexible funding arrangements with partners

Group 2
LEARNING LEADERS

LEARNING LEADERS
Characterised by their leading role and influence in terms of capacity to respond, field presence, and commitment to learning and improving performance in the sector

Group 3
ASPIRING ACTORS

ASPIRING ACTORS
Diverse in terms of their size and capacities, but characterised by their focus on building strengths in specific “niche” areas, such as geographic regions or thematic areas, and their aspirations to take on a greater role in the sector
**PILLAR 1** Responding to needs

**PILLAR 2** Prevention, risk reduction and recovery

**PILLAR 3** Working with humanitarian partners

**PILLAR 4** Protection and international law

**PILLAR 5** Learning and accountability

All scores are on a scale of 0 to 10. Colours represent performance compared to OECD/DAC donors’ average performance rating:

- Green = Good
- Orange = Mid-range
- Yellow = Could improve

Circle size is proportional to HRI score
PILLAR 1
RESPONDING TO NEEDS

POLITICISATION OF AID CONTINUES TO DENY MILLIONS ACCESS TO AID
The HRI 2010 raised the issue of growing politicisation of aid in ten of the 14 crises studied. The issue was similarly evident in the majority of the crises included in the HRI 2011 research and there is some speculation among many of the organisations interviewed that the “War on Terror” discourse has forever altered the way donor governments will assess and view humanitarian assistance as subordinate to other interests. The most overt examples of this were found in OI, Pakistan, Somalia and Sudan, where many believe that political, security and military interests have driven donor responses, rather than actual needs. In these cases, anti-terrorism legislation and political objectives are seen by many as undermining humanitarian action and placing civilians and humanitarians at risk.

Politicisation of a different sort was seen in Chad, Colombia, Haiti, and Kenya. In these crises, donor governments were criticised by many actors for interposing their own priorities, acquiescing to host governments by not challenging them on issues of corruption, access to affected populations or accepting at face value their assessments on the extent of needs. “Donors shouldn’t use political criteria in their funding decisions, but should provide aid to all affected populations, not only those in the East,” stated one interview respondent in Chad; similar comments were made for donors in other crises.

The generally high scores received by donors for the survey-based indicators on neutrality, impartiality and independence of aid is partially explained by the recognition by many humanitarian organisations that their counterparts in donors’ humanitarian agencies attempt to respect the need for keeping aid independent of other interests, but that other parts of government sometimes undermine this principled approach. A respondent in OI summarised the experience of many: “For all donors, there are two levels. On one hand, we have the field level, with the procedures, where the donors are neutral. On the other hand, we have the headquarters level in Brussels, Rome, London, etc, where they are not neutral at all. The political agenda determines everything at donors’ headquarters level.”

The most obvious sign that donors are not prioritising and allocating their aid based on and in proportion to impartial and objective assessments of needs, as called for in the GHD Declaration, can be seen in the unequal coverage levels of different appeals. The average appeal coverage of the crises assessed in the HRI was only 65%, generally considered as good. Yet, other crises in 2010 and 2011 such as the Central African Republic, Guatemala, Mongolia, Uganda and Zimbabwe, received less than 50% of appeal funds requested (OCHA FTS 2011).

ANTI-TERRORISM LEGISLATION AND POLITICAL OBJECTIVES ARE SEEN BY MANY AS UNDERMINING HUMANITARIAN ACTION AND PLACING CIVILIANS AND HUMANITARIANS AT RISK

Humanitarian actors, with the support of some donors, have made significant efforts to improve the quality of needs assessments and develop tools to monitor and track risks and vulnerabilities, such as the famine early warning system in place in the Horn of Africa. However, better quality information and analysis has done little to transform donor funding and decision-making processes to be more consistent, objective and transparent. The overwhelming emphasis on emergency relief as opposed to meeting gaps in prevention, risk reduction and recovery efforts is another indicator that donors’ GHD commitments are not being met consistently. Clearly much more work needs to be done to understand the motivations and incentives behind donors’ decision-making processes.

Still, there have been positive moves, as well. The UK Government’s response to the recent Humanitarian Emergency Response Review takes an unequivocal stance that humanitarian assistance should be neutral, impartial and independent, “based on need, and need alone.” Australia has also undergone a review of its aid programme and reaffirmed its commitment to this fundamental humanitarian principle. Hopefully, these donors will push other governments to make similar commitments to apply principled approaches in all situations of humanitarian crisis so that aid efforts can meet their objectives in an effective manner.
OVERVIEW OF OECD/DAC DONOR SCORES

NEUTRALITY AND IMPARTIALITY

INDEPENDENCE OF AID

ADAPTING TO CHANGING NEEDS

TIMELY FUNDING

FUNDING VULNERABLE AND FORGOTTEN EMERGENCIES

TIMELY FUNDING TO COMPLEX EMERGENCIES

TIMELY FUNDING TO SUDDEN ONSET DISASTERS

QUALITATIVE INDICATORS

QUANTITATIVE INDICATORS

Minimum score

Group 1 average score

Group 2 average score

Group 3 average score

75% of assessed OECD DAC donors

Maximum score
PILLAR 2
PREVENTION, RISK REDUCTION AND RECOVERY

PREVENTION, PREPAREDNESS AND RECOVERY DISREGARDED IN AID EFFORTS

Previous HRI reports reveal a persistent lack of political commitment and investment in capacity-building, conflict and disaster prevention, preparedness and risk reduction. On average, donor governments score 30% lower in indicators in this pillar compared to other pillars. This is despite long-held policy commitments to build local capacity and resilience to prevent, prepare for and respond to crises, and widespread agreement that such efforts are cost-effective means to reduce the risks and impacts of crises, and thereby prevent and alleviate human suffering.

The HRI 2011 findings confirm this trend. The inability of donors to respond in a timely manner to the drought and famine in Kenya and Somalia, despite ample early warnings, shows the devastating effects of inaction. The response to Haiti, Chad and Pakistan underlined once again the importance of building local capacity and resilience, and dedicating resources for prevention, preparedness and risk reduction.

Yet, the overall scores in these areas, and the related issue of ensuring adequate engagement and ownership of vulnerable and crisis-affected populations in humanitarian action, show that this is not a priority for the majority of donors.

RISK REDUCTION AND PREVENTION ARE RELEGATED TO A GREY AREA WHERE NO ONE TAKES OWNERSHIP OR LEADERSHIP

Part of the problem is a narrow vision among donor governments of humanitarian assistance as emergency relief in the strictest sense, with everything else falling in the development assistance remit. However, most official development assistance programmes fail to see risk reduction and prevention as part of their mandate. As a result, these activities are relegated to a grey area where no one takes ownership or leadership. This is seen in recent studies of preparedness funding which estimates that less than 1% of all official government aid – development or humanitarian assistance – is allocated towards preparedness activities (Kellet & Sweeney 2011). In the words of one respondent in Kenya, “We tried to propose something for early recovery but donors were not interested. They only want to fund emergencies.” The comment was echoed in many other crises, such as Haiti: “Most donors do not fund the transition to recovery and development. It is difficult to find donors once the emergency has passed over.”

Nevertheless, most representatives of donors’ humanitarian departments interviewed were convinced of the need to scale up and integrate prevention, preparedness and risk reduction strategies into donors’ overall aid frameworks. However, most donor agencies were reluctant to actively seek further responsibilities in this area, partly due to worries about their capacity to give adequate support and attention to this area. One donor representative summarised the problem in the following way: “Look, we could argue internally for this, and maybe even get more funding for risk reduction. But let’s be realistic. Our humanitarian team is only four people. If the government decides to scale up funding, it will fall on our shoulders, without any extra staff, and huge expectations for us to deliver an impossible agenda, when we can’t even meet our other obligations to monitor and follow up on the emergency response side the way we would like too.”

There was also some scepticism among donors of the operational capacity of humanitarian organisations to take on an increased role and mandate in the prevention, risk reduction and recovery. “UNDP is not meeting its responsibilities in this area; it’s too focused on MDG’s and political processes. ISDR is not operational. And OCHA has its hands full trying to manage coordination of the UN agencies, so it can’t take a leadership role in this. So where do we turn?” asked one donor representative. “The problems and
internal divisions we face are the same for organisations with both development and humanitarian activities,” said another, suggesting the problem was both structural and philosophical.

There are some exceptions. Australia and Germany are becoming increasingly engaged in supporting disaster risk reduction and preparedness efforts with a focus on building capacities at the local level as an integrated part of their humanitarian assistance. The UK’s revised humanitarian strategy is now centred on how any aid efforts, including development aid, can contribute to building resilience and anticipating future needs. If other donors were to follow these donors’ lead, it could mean a turning point in transforming the humanitarian system from a reactive, response-driven model, to a proactive, preventive and anticipatory model.
ONGOING AID REFORM EFFORTS ARE INADEQUATE TO ADDRESS CURRENT AND FUTURE NEEDS

For several years now, the humanitarian sector has been engaged in a reform process aimed at improving the efficiency and effectiveness of responses to crises. Initiatives include the creation of the role of Humanitarian Coordinators (HC) and humanitarian country teams (HCT) to lead and coordinate responses, pooled funding mechanisms, such as the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF), and clusters. The HRI research findings show that while reform efforts have been generally positive the results are uneven across crises and efforts to date have been unsuccessful at resolving many underlying issues affecting needs and vulnerabilities.

In some crises, such as Kenya and Somalia, clusters and pooled funds seemed to work well to promote better planning and greater coordination and connectedness. Nevertheless, in these same crises, even with a reasonably well-functioning system, humanitarian actors were able to anticipate and predict, but not avert, the impact of the drought and famine for lack of decisive actions and insufficient funding and support by donors. In other crises like Chad, Haiti or Pakistan, results were less positive, with many complaints that clusters were not effectively or appropriately linked to national authorities, leading to duplication of efforts and parallel and competing coordination systems.

There was a certain degree of scepticism of the value and utility of leadership and coordination and pooled funding mechanisms, particularly among NGOs, who sometimes complained that the system was biased towards benefiting UN agencies. In all crises, complaints were frequent about the quality of leadership of the HC (or Resident Coordinator), agency heads, or cluster leads. Committed leadership in the field has been the decisive factor in leveraging the reform agenda to assure an effective and coordinated humanitarian response.

While donors on the whole scored positively for their support for better coordination, many humanitarian organisations clearly stated that they wanted and expected donors to be more actively engaged in coordination efforts by monitoring progress and holding the HC, cluster leads and pooled funds more accountable. Another message to donors was that they need to coordinate their efforts more closely to avoid duplication or gaps in funding, and ensure alignment, especially in terms of advocacy to local authorities, a survey-based indicator where donors generally scored poorly.

Nevertheless, humanitarian organisations must also shoulder some of the responsibility for this. In several crises, donor representatives said it was the lack of consensus among humanitarian organisations that impeded donors from making consistent advocacy efforts. In other cases, donor representatives complained that many of their advocacy efforts were through quiet behind the scenes diplomacy and therefore unnoticed by humanitarian partners. “We don’t get enough credit for the work we do to try to get the government to address issues around access, or for trying to convene donor meetings to set common strategies”, said one donor representative interviewed. In other crises, donor coordination groups were a good forum to share information, but in many crises, participation was dominated to the “big three” donors, ECHO, the US and the UK. In other cases, decision-making was clearly at the capital level, limiting the effectiveness of donor coordination in the field.

In many crises, concern was expressed regarding the capacity of donors to provide adequate support, monitoring and follow-up to programmes. “Donors don’t have qualified human resources and don’t focus on building their own capacities, so they don’t understand the context,” claimed one respondent in Sudan. High staff turnover of some of the larger donors...
was cited as a factor limiting donors’ ability to understand the context and engage with their partners. “We have only one contact person in DFID, so when the person changes, everything changes. There is no continuity and we have to re-adapt programmes to new requirements,” said another. Haiti was another crisis where high turnover of donor staff was a limitation. Small and medium-sized donors also faced similar capacity issues, but some of these donors were commended for their frequent field visits from donor capitals — a positive example of how donors could overcome this limitation.

Concerns over donor capacity to engage with humanitarian organisations at the field level are partly the consequence of continued funding cuts on many governments’ humanitarian assistance departments. The overwhelming majority of donor governments’ humanitarian representatives are firmly committed to applying humanitarian principles and good donor practices in order to achieve greater impact of aid efforts. However, most donor aid agencies are under increasing pressure and scrutiny to deliver results with fewer financial and human resources. Humanitarian assistance budgets are still on average around 10-15% of official development assistance budgets, reflecting the relative lack of importance given to humanitarian action, despite its high public profile and obvious needs. At the same time, political interference or indifference means that donors’ humanitarian departments are often placed in the impossible situation of trying to support principled approaches while other parts of governments pursue other incompatible aims.

All this suggests that if governments are truly committed to ensuring aid is effective, they need to invest in building the capacity of their own humanitarian agencies and their partners to meet current needs, increase awareness and political and public support for principled approaches to humanitarian assistance, and adapt good donor practices to respond to future humanitarian needs and challenges. If anything, the financial crisis should be even more an incentive to ensure adequate capacity to monitor the effectiveness of every dollar spent. Donors must also work closely with other actors to go beyond the limitations of the current reform agenda to redefine and reshape the humanitarian sector to become anticipatory and proactive, and capable of responding effectively to increasing humanitarian needs in the future.
PILLAR 4
PROTECTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

ACCESS TO AND PROTECTION OF CRISIS-AFFECTED POPULATIONS IS A MAJOR CONCERN
One of the main consequences of the politicisation of aid is the continued challenges of safe humanitarian access to populations in need of assistance and protection. As in the 2010 report, the research for the HRI 2011 found that in many crises, civilian populations and humanitarian organisations are often deliberately targeted by armed actors, and as a result, people in need are denied access to life-saving assistance. Governments’ policies and practices can be a significant factor in provoking this situation. Anti-terrorism legislation that requires humanitarian organisations to guarantee that there is no contact with listed terrorist groups, and complicated vetting procedures on local staff and partners are a costly and counterproductive measure that does little to ensure that aid is actually reaching people in need.

In oPt, for example, such policies were highlighted as detrimental to aid efforts. “Counter-terrorism legislation is closing down humanitarian space. Humanitarian organisations need contact with Hamas in Gaza in order to deliver aid,” commented one respondent. Similar concerns were raised in Somalia by many respondents. “Funding in Somalia is gravely conditioned by the US security agenda in the region and its position regarding Al-Shabaab. Other donors don’t want to take risks, so they follow the same line,” said another. Donor government support for the TFG in Somalia was seen as indirectly leading to the perception that humanitarian organisations were an extension of donor governments’ political agendas in the ongoing conflict there, placing them and the populations they work with at risk.

Beyond politicisation of aid, donors were often criticised for not funding and prioritising protection activities, especially in natural disaster situations, “Donors only paid lip service to protection of civilians. The two percent funding coverage of the protection cluster is evidence enough of this” affirmed one respondent in Pakistan. In other crises like Haiti, issues of protection were largely ignored by donors, despite widespread media reports of sexual and gender-based violence in camps. In other crises, like Chad and DRC, several humanitarian organisations felt that the presence of multi-national peace-keeping forces, often financed and supported by donor contributions, were seen as more of a problem than a solution. “Security is much better now that MINURCAT (United Nations Mission in CAR and Chad) is gone” claimed one respondent in Chad.

Donor governments are sometime criticised by humanitarian partners for not taking a more active advocacy stance on issues of access and protection. However, in reality, in many of the crises researched, there were mixed feelings about the appropriateness of donors engaging in advocacy efforts. For some interview respondents, it was impossible for donors to advocate for access without jeopardising the neutrality and independence of humanitarian actors. “Donors in general should stop trying to facilitate safe access. If they do, it just contributes to the politicisation of aid,” commented one respondent in Sudan. Donor governments are sometimes criticised by humanitarian partners for not taking a more active advocacy stance on issues of access and protection. However, in reality, in many of the crises researched, there were mixed feelings about the appropriateness of donors engaging in advocacy efforts. For some interview respondents, it was impossible for donors to advocate for access without jeopardising the neutrality and independence of humanitarian actors. “Donors in general should stop trying to facilitate safe access. If they do, it just contributes to the politicisation of aid,” commented one respondent in Sudan.

From a donor perspective, this lack of clarity and consensus on what humanitarian organisations expect in terms of donor advocacy make it hard to act in a concerted manner with clear advocacy messages to actors in the crisis. In all cases, any advocacy efforts should be discussed and developed with the specific crisis context in mind, and focused exclusively on the objective of meeting the needs of the population while protecting and preserving humanitarian space.
OVERVIEW OF OECD/DAC DONOR SCORES

ADVOCACY TOWARDS LOCAL AUTHORITIES
FUNDING PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS
ADVOCACY FOR PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS
FACILITATING SAFE ACCESS

INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
REFUGEE LAW

Qualitative indicators | Quantitative indicators

Minimum score | Group 1 average score | Group 2 average score | Group 3 average score | 75% of assessed OECD DAC donors | Maximum score
PILLAR 5
LEARNING AND ACCOUNTABILITY

DONOR TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY WEAK
As in previous years, the HRI 2011 findings found that donor governments are collectively failing to improve their transparency and downward accountability towards affected populations. Scores in these indicators are among the lowest of the entire index, with no notable improvements since the HRI began in 2007. In some regards, this is not surprising. The responsibility for ensuring accountability towards beneficiaries is primarily with the organisations directly engaged with affected populations with programme delivery. Donors are also part of the aid relationship, however, and have responsibilities to ensure that their support is transparent, effective, and appropriate to achieve the best possible results for people affected by crises. This is especially true in crises where donors mixed political, economic or security interests with humanitarian actions, at the expense of their accountability for ensuring aid contributes to humanitarian objectives.

According to many respondents, most donors still conceive accountability in terms of exercising fiscal management and control, rather than the underlying obligation to ensure aid efforts meet the needs, priorities and aspirations of affected populations. “There is too little focus on the beneficiaries, and too much emphasis on documentation and assessments at the expense of action,” in the words of one respondent in Kenya. Another respondent in Sudan complained that “rules and regulations are increasingly making us less effective as we are spending all our time on audits. There is a lack of accountability by donors.” Many respondents suggested that donors’ policies around accountability were adornments, with no real commitment towards implementation. “They are breaking their own rules. Donors do what they want and don’t consider the beneficiaries needs anymore,” claimed one respondent in Haiti.

One important element of accountability in humanitarian action is engagement and ownership of the affected population in the design and implementation of aid programmes. However, as the poor overall scores for indicators for beneficiary participation in Pillar 2 (Prevention, risk reduction and recovery) and the indicators for gender show, donors have not made this a priority. Beyond that, supporting efforts to build and strengthen local capacity is another key element of donor accountability, as expressed in the GHD Declaration. However, for many interviewees, donors avoided this responsibility, preferring to work with established international partners as a way to minimise their risks (financial or otherwise) and better control the aid relationship. A respondent in Kenya summarised the sentiment of many: “None of our donors really want us to work with local partners. They see it as a risk, there is a certain fear of working with local NGOs. They have no trust or confidence in local capacities.”

GREATER TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY TOWARDS AFFECTED POPULATIONS WOULD HELP ENSURE AID IS EFFECTIVE IN MEETING NEEDS

The GHD Declaration also states donors also have a responsibility for preventing human suffering as one of the key objectives of humanitarian actions. However, poor scores for donors in indicators around support for prevention and preparedness, reinforce the widespread feeling of many humanitarian actors that donors are not fulfilling their accountability in this area. The slow donor response to what was clearly an impending famine in Kenya and Somalia is an example of this. Similarly, donors must assume some of the responsibility for the collective failure of the international community to apply lessons from previous disasters in Haiti and other countries in terms of prevention, recovery and risk reduction efforts.

Transparency of donors funding allocations and decision-making processes was also criticised by many humanitarian organisations interviewed. Haiti is a case in point. It is impossible to track much of the billions of aid promised for relief and recovery efforts. In many other crises, even simple
tools like UN OCHA’s Financial Tracking System (FTS) are not being utilised consistently by donors, and aid allocations are often not reported in a timely manner. Still, donors in the field were often commended for the transparency around their decision-making processes – to the extent that field representatives exercised decision-making authority.

There are some positive signs, however, that donors are improving in this area. In many crises, donors were commended for their transparency around funding processes. Reporting requirements are on the whole considered as appropriate, though time consuming and too bureaucratic – suggesting that humanitarian organisations see the need and value of reporting as part of their accountability to funders, through the preference of many would be for harmonised reporting. More and more donors are supporting project evaluations as part of the regular procedures, though the challenge remains in supporting implementation of findings.

At the global level, several donor governments are actively engaged in aid transparency initiatives, such as the International Aid Transparency Initiative which is supported by 14 of the 23 donor governments assessed in the HRI. However, this is mostly limited to official development assistance, and there are gaps in humanitarian assistance reporting. Similarity, efforts to align and harmonise several accountability initiatives in the sector like Sphere and HAP-I, will help reduce duplication and complexities for organisations in the field, and renew the focus on making sure aid efforts are focused on accountability and results for affected populations (see www.sphereproject.org).

By making aid transparency and accountability towards affected populations the cornerstone of their assistance, donors would have greater assurance that their aid contributions and the work of all actors are effective in meeting needs.
CONCLUSIONS

The HRI 2011 findings reinforce many of the same conclusions reached in previous editions of the HRI, and indeed, many other evaluations in the sector. After five years of the HRI, some initial conclusions and lessons are clear.

FIRST, despite commitments to ensure their aid is needs-based and based on humanitarian principles, donor governments have shown repeatedly that there are other factors that often determine decisions on aid allocations. Increasing politicisation of aid is one of those factors, and it is having serious consequences in determining whether humanitarian actors can access crisis affected populations and provide assistance and assure protection. Understanding these factors from the perspective of donors’ humanitarian agencies is critical to determining how to best preserve and protect the neutrality, independence and impartiality of aid efforts in an increasingly complex environment.

SECOND, as the HRI findings on gender and beneficiary participation in programming confirm, the humanitarian sector is still far from working in ways that ensure aid is equitable, contributes to empowering vulnerable communities, and is focused on meeting the needs, priorities and aspirations of people affected by crisis. If humanitarian actors do not invest the time and effort to understand the dynamics of a crisis from the perspective of the people affected, aid efforts can never claim to be effective or have lasting impact. Donors have a clear role in insisting that their partners take the time to do so, and for ensuring that their own support is respectful and aligned to meeting those needs.

THIRD, the generalised disregard by donors for tackling prevention, risk reduction and recovery in ways that build capacity and resilience is inexcusable. Time and time again, the humanitarian sectors announces that it will not repeat the mistakes of the past, and will invest in prevention and risk reduction as the most efficient and effective way to address vulnerabilities and reduce the impact of crises. Yet, as the sluggish response to famine in the Horn in Africa and the fractured efforts to rebuild Haiti demonstrate, the humanitarian sector has not systematically applied lessons from the past. Donors have much of the responsibility for creating this situation, and could be part of the solution by re-shaping their humanitarian and development assistance policies, procedures and practices in ways that foster better integration of prevention, capacity building and resilience into all the programmes they support.

FOURTH, the current aid reform agenda is unlikely to address existing gaps and challenges facing the sector, such as politicisation or prevention and risk reduction, much less help the sector prepare for and anticipate the challenges on the horizon. These include increasing pressures and needs due to climate change, changing demographics, and the likelihood of a long-term global economic downturn. What is needed is a dramatic shift in direction for the sector, focused on building the necessary capacities and competencies to anticipate, prepare for and adapt to changing contexts. Part of the shift will require traditional donors and humanitarian actors to reach out to other players, ranging from local actors, new and non-traditional donors, or the private sector. It will also require better understanding of the barriers that have so far impeded efforts to adopt good practices, as well as carefully considering the implications of new developments, such as the outcomes of the Arab Spring for humanitarian actions.

FIFTH, improved transparency and accountability of all actors, starting with donor governments, is essential to ensuring aid efforts are principled, and have the maximum impact for affected populations. By putting the focus back where it belongs – on the meeting the needs and respecting the capacities and priorities of affected populations – humanitarian actors can ensure that their policies, procedures and practices are aimed at achieving this end.
THE FUTURE OF GOOD DONOR PRACTICES: NEXT STEPS FOR THE HRI

All these issues have been part of an unresolved agenda for the humanitarian sector for too long now. Rather than continuing to expound on the problems, it is time to look more closely at the reasons why this is such a challenge for the humanitarian sector, and in particular, look for practical solutions that will allow donors to maximise the value and impact of their contribution to aid efforts.

Through our experience of the HRI over the past five years, we have learned of the limitations of using the GHD Principles as the basis for our assessment of donor performance. As a non-binding political declaration, the GHD was, and continues to be, an excellent statement of good intentions. However, the reality of aid politics shows that many of the core concepts of good practice remain difficult to achieve, despite the strong commitment of donor governments’ humanitarian aid departments. As our findings on politicisation show, governments too often have competing priorities, relegating principled approaches to a secondary level in aid efforts.

DONOR PRACTICES NEED TO BE REDEFINED IN LINE WITH TODAY’S CONTEXT AND TO BETTER ANTICIPATE AND RESPOND MORE EFFECTIVELY TO FUTURE CHALLENGES

Since the HRI began in 2007, the GHD group of donors has expanded in numbers, but along the way, the GHD group has perhaps lost some of the impetus and urgency for transforming the way donors act individually and collectively as envisioned by the original group of enlightened donors that drafted the declaration. At the time, political commitment to the GHD was high, as seen in the number of senior representatives of donor agencies involved in process. This should not be interpreted to mean that the current GHD focal points are any less committed, simply that the context has changed, and the GHD no longer appears to be a priority for many donors.

Another disadvantage to the GHD is that the declaration itself is vague and contradictory in many places, leaving it open to interpretation by each donor. Additionally, reforms in the humanitarian sector, such as clusters and pooled funds, have made some of GHD declaration out-dated, and trends such as have the emerging importance of new donors, both government and private, have supplant many of the original GHD donors in terms of size and influence.

The GHD’s lack of clear targets and solid indicators to measure progress and hold donors accountable is a major flaw that has limited its capacity to exert pressure on donors to act in a more consistent and principled manner. To some extent, the HRI was an attempt to provide such indicators and serve as a benchmark to track progress and promote improvements in donors’ policies and practices. However, as we have learned, promoting changes and improvements in donor policies and practices is proving just as difficult as sustaining and extending reforms of the humanitarian system.

This is not to say that there have been no improvements – there have, and donors can take credit for many of these positive changes. Without a doubt, their concerted support and efforts to push humanitarian actors to institute reforms have been critical to the advances made so far. Nevertheless, as the HRI findings suggest, the current humanitarian reform agenda seems close to reaching the limits of effecting substantial changes, and it is time to focus on preparing for the challenges to come.

As we look forward to the next phase of the HRI, DARA intends to investigate these issues in greater detail as part of a renewed approach and orientation to the HRI, focused on understanding the “why?” behind these issues and developing practical guidance on what is needed to ensure all donors can maximise the benefits, results and impact of their support for humanitarian action. We see this as an opportunity to reflect on the lessons and experiences gained over the past five years, and reshape the initiative to go beyond an exercise focused on OECD/DAC donors to include other donors and funders. It will allow the sector to review and, and redefine good donor practices in line with the today’s context, and identify the capacities needed for donors to better anticipate and respond more effectively to future challenges. We look forward to engaging with all stakeholders in this process, and hope that this makes a lasting contribution to improving the quality, effectiveness, accountability and impact of aid efforts.

REFERENCES


The Humanitarian Response Index 2011

### Data Types

- **Quantitative Data**
  - UN OCHA FTS
  - OECD.StatExtracts
  - UN Treaty Collection
  - The World Bank
  - Multi-partner trust fund office
  - IHL database
  - UN annual reports
  - ICRC, IFRC
  - UNFCC
  - World Resources Institute
  - ALNAP, Sphere Project, etc.

- **Qualitative Data**
  - UNFPA
  - IFRC
  - UNDP
  - ACRN

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  - IHL database
  - UN annual reports
  - ICRC, IFRC
  - UNFCC
  - World Resources Institute
  - ALNAP, Sphere Project, etc.

- **Research**
  - UNFPA
  - IFRC
  - UNDP
  - ACRN

### Data Processing by Type

- **Survey Analysis**
  - Multiple correlation analysis of field perception scores on donor respect of GHD Principles
  - Identification of response patterns and adjustment for potential biases

- **Trend and Correlation Analysis**
  - Identification of realistic optimal donor behaviours based on GHD Principles
  - Selection of thresholds and re-scaling methods

### Research Process

- **Qualitative Data**
  - Field Research
    - 9 crises visited
    - 300 personal interviews with humanitarian staff
    - 40 meetings with donor representatives
    - 1,350 questionnaires on donor performance

- **Quantitative Data**
  - Public Data Sources Research

*See next page for further details and www.daraint.org for more information on the HRI methodology.*
CONSOLIDATED DATA ANALYSIS AND INDEX CONSTRUCTION *

REVIEW AND CONTEXTUALISATION OF RESULTS

FINaL KEy FInDINGS

RECOMMENDATIONS TO DONORS

INFORMATION ANALYSIS

CONSOLIDATED DATA ANALYSIS AND INDEX CONSTRUCTION *

REVIEW AND CONTEXTUALISATION OF RESULTS

FINaL KEy FInDINGS

RECOMMENDATIONS TO DONORS

INFORMATION ANALYSIS

20 QUALITATIVE INDICATORS

CLASSIFICATION BY GROUP

PILLAR AND FINAL INDEX SCORES

15 QUANTITATIVE INDICATORS

FIELD PERCEPTIONS OF DONOR RESPECT OF GHD PRINCIPLES

MEASUREMENTS OF DONOR RESPECT OF GHD PRINCIPLES

• In-depth review of field interview comments
• Consolidated analysis of donor performance
• Drafting of preliminary conclusions
• Testing and validation through 40 interviews with senior headquarter staff
• Internal review and quality control by Peer Review Committee
HRI DONOR CLASSIFICATION BY GROUPS

HRI 2011 donor classification organises donors into three groups according to their application of the Good Humanitarian Donorship Principles, as measured by the HRI’s 35 indicators that make up the index. The classification is based on the application of a principal components analysis, followed by a clustering technique, which places donors in the same group when their indicator scores are statistically similar.

HRI PILLARS AND FINAL SCORES

The HRI final index score is the aggregate of the HRI indicators, organised in five different pillars of donor performance. Each pillar is weighted according to its importance in terms of the Good Humanitarian Donorship principles.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HRI PILLARS</th>
<th>WEIGHT</th>
<th>PILLAR COMPONENTS INFORMATION TYPE</th>
<th>WEIGHT</th>
<th>NUMBER OF INDICATORS</th>
<th>WEIGHT BY INDICATOR</th>
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<td>1 RESPONDING TO NEEDS</td>
<td>30%</td>
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<td>15%</td>
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<td>3 WORKING WITH HUMANITARIAN PARTNERS</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>Quantitative</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Qualitative</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 PROTECTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>Quantitative</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Qualitative</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 LEARNING AND ACCOUNTABILITY</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>Quantitative</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Qualitative</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

HRI 2011 INDICATORS

QUALITATIVE INDICATORS

Qualitative indicators are based on responses to the HRI 2011 field questionnaire. The questionnaire consists of 25 closed-ended questions which ask OECD/DAC donors’ field partners to give each of their donors a score from 1 to 5 on different aspects of their support based on the HRI’s five pillars. Field scores are statistically analysed and potential response biases are corrected before the scores are converted into qualitative indicators (on a 0 to 10 scale). The questionnaire also includes a series of open-ended questions to allow research teams to collect additional information that can complement, contextualise and validate scores given.

PILLAR 1
RESPONDING TO NEEDS
- Neutrality and impartiality
- Independence of aid
- Adapting to changing needs
- Timely funding to partners

PILLAR 2
PREVENTION, RISK REDUCTION AND RECOVERY
- Strengthening local capacity
- Beneficiary participation
- Linking relief to rehabilitation and development
- Prevention and risk reduction

PILLAR 3
WORKING WITH HUMANITARIAN PARTNERS
- Flexibility of funding
- Strengthening organisational capacity
- Supporting coordination
- Donor capacity and expertise

PILLAR 4
PROTECTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
- Advocacy towards local authorities
- Funding protection of civilians
- Advocacy for protection of civilians
- Facilitating safe access

PILLAR 5
LEARNING AND ACCOUNTABILITY
- Accountability towards beneficiaries
- Implementing evaluation recommendations
- Appropriate reporting requirements
- Donor transparency
The HRI’s quantitative indicators are drawn from a variety of internationally-comparable, published data sources, including the UN, World Bank and other international organisations. Data for each donor government is collected, verified and then statistically processed and analysed before it is converted into quantitative indicators (on a 0 to 10 scale). Thresholds are set for some indicators in order to establish maximum values and compensate for indicator scores with very little variation among donors, or indicator scores with extreme variation among donors.

**PILLAR 1 RESPONDING TO NEEDS**
- **FUNDING VULNERABLE AND FORGOTTEN EMERGENCIES**: Percentage of a donor’s humanitarian funding allocated to crises classified as forgotten and with high degrees of vulnerability
- **TIMELY FUNDING TO COMPLEX EMERGENCIES**: Percentage of a donor’s humanitarian funding for complex emergencies provided within the first three months following the launch of a humanitarian appeal
- **TIMELY FUNDING TO SUDDEN ONSET EMERGENCIES**: Percentage of a donor’s humanitarian funding for sudden onset emergencies provided within the first six weeks following the crisis or the launch of a flash appeal

**PILLAR 2 PREVENTION, RISK REDUCTION AND RECOVERY**
- **FUNDING RECONSTRUCTION AND PREVENTION**: Percentage of a donor’s humanitarian funding allocated to disaster prevention and preparedness, rehabilitation and reconstruction
- **FUNDING INTERNATIONAL RISK MITIGATION**: Percentage of a donor’s ODA allocated to international risk mitigation mechanisms and participation in global risk mitigation initiatives
- **REDUCING CLIMATE-RELATED VULNERABILITY**: Donor’s contributions to Fast Start Finance, compared to its fair share, and green house gas emission reduction, compared to Kyoto Protocol targets

**PILLAR 3 WORKING WITH HUMANITARIAN PARTNERS**
- **FUNDING NGOs**: Percentage of a donor’s humanitarian funding channelled through NGOs
- **UN-EARMARKED FUNDING**: Percentage of a donor’s humanitarian funding to selected UN agencies and Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement that is not earmarked by region or thematic area
- **FUNDING UN AND RC/RC APPEALS**: Donor’s contributions to UN appeals, UN coordination mechanisms, Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement and pooled funds, compared to its fair share

**PILLAR 4 PROTECTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW**
- **INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW**: Number of humanitarian treaties signed and ratified treaties and existence of a national committee to ensure respect of treaties
- **HUMAN RIGHTS LAW**: Number of human rights conventions signed and ratified and existence of an accredited human rights national institution
- **REFUGEE LAW**: Number of refugee treaties signed and ratified, number of people received as part of UNHCR’s resettlement programs and funding to UNHCR and protection/human rights/rule of law programs, as a percentage of GDP

**PILLAR 5 LEARNING AND ACCOUNTABILITY**
- **PARTICIPATING IN ACCOUNTABILITY INITIATIVES**: Donor’s participation in selected humanitarian initiatives for learning and accountability
- **FUNDING ACCOUNTABILITY INITIATIVES**: Percentage of a donor’s humanitarian funding allocated to selected accountability initiatives and projects on learning and accountability
- **FUNDING AND COMMISSIONING EVALUATIONS**: Number of evaluations commissioned and existence of evaluation guidelines

**GENDER**
In 2011 a question on donors’ commitment to promoting gender in humanitarian assistance funding and programmes was included in the field questionnaire. Additional indicators were developed to assess donors’ funding and policies related to gender issues in humanitarian action, in order to allow for an additional analysis on donors’ performance in this area.

**PLEASE VISIT WWW.DARAINT.ORG FOR FURTHER INFORMATION ON METHODOLOGY AND COMPLETE INDICATOR FORMULAS.**
## HRI 2011 Survey Sample

### Donors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Questionnaires</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>59</td>
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<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>27</td>
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<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>64</td>
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<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub-total</strong></td>
<td><strong>877</strong></td>
</tr>
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#### Questionnaires included in the construction of qualitative indicators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Questionnaires</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OECD/DAC donors*</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other donor countries</td>
<td>24</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN/Pool Fund/Multilateral agencies</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Red Cross Movement</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private organisations/foundations/NGOs</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1359</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Crises

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Questionnaires</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
<td>197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupied Palestinian territories</td>
<td>168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>112</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>247</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1359</strong></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### Sex

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Questionnaires</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>887</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>472</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1359</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*OECD/DAC donors not fully assessed in this edition of the HRI: Austria, Czech Republic, Greece, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Republic of Korea and decentralised aid.

*One interview can produce multiple questionnaires, depending on the number of donors supporting the organisation.
ADRESSING THE GENDER CHALLENGE

For years, humanitarian actors have recognised the need for greater sensitivity to gender issues in emergency response and long term-recovery efforts. Mainstreaming gender is a priority for the humanitarian sector, and a number of policy guidelines and tools have been developed in support of this, ranging from the policies of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) to cluster-specific guidelines, and the internal policies and procedures of many international humanitarian organisations and donor governments. Nevertheless, there are persistent problems in moving from policy commitments around gender to actually incorporating gender sensitive approaches in operations and programmes.

Over the past five years, Humanitarian Response Index (HRI) field research teams have visited dozens of crises and repeatedly found examples of humanitarian actors failing to consider the different needs of women, girls, men and boys, causing gaps in responses, or worse, accentuating suffering. The consequences of a lack of attention to gender range from culturally inappropriate feminine hygiene kits in Bangladesh and Pakistan to latrines for women in internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugee camps with insufficient lighting and security in Haiti or the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). It’s not just about programmes to specifically target the needs of women and girls, however. Men and boys also have specific needs, and programmes which fail to address these needs can have equally negative consequences. In DRC, for example, the needs of men and boys, many of whom are themselves victims of rape and sexual assault, are often overlooked in Sexual and Gender-Based Violence (SGBV) programmes.

Thankfully, the humanitarian sector is beginning to pay closer attention to the issue. A number of recent studies and evaluations (including an ongoing study by DARA for UNICEF, UN Women and OCHA on gender outcomes of humanitarian responses) are beginning to build a solid evidence base to show the importance of gender sensitive approaches for effective crisis response. Initiatives like the IASC Gender Marker (GM),¹ which codes the extent to which gender is incorporated into humanitarian projects on a 0–2 scale, are helping raise awareness among humanitarian agencies of how good project designs can ensure that women, girls, men and boys will benefit equally from projects. The IASC Gender Standby Capacity project (GenCap)² and many humanitarian organisations have deployed gender advisors to more and more crises to help train humanitarian staff from all sectors to better understand gender issues from a practical, programming perspective. The HRI 2011 hopes to contribute to these efforts by providing additional evidence on the role of donor governments in ensuring gender is addressed adequately in humanitarian assistance policies, funding and practices.

DARA’S APPROACH

From DARA’s perspective, gender mainstreaming cannot simply be a political statement of commitment; it is essential to the quality, effectiveness and accountability of aid efforts. Good gender analysis and gender sensitive approaches in programme design and implementation are essential to meet the fundamental humanitarian principle that aid is impartial and based on needs. Any action, no matter how well-intentioned, can fall short of meeting humanitarian objectives if organisations do not know the specific capacities and needs of all the different parts of the population affected by a crisis, and fail to design, monitor and assess the effectiveness of interventions in meeting those needs. Donors can facilitate this by incorporating gender more systematically into all aspects of their policies and procedures, and monitoring their partners to ensure that the aid efforts for which they provide funding and support are gender sensitive, and therefore, more accountable to affected populations.

In order to analyse donor support for gender in humanitarian action, the HRI 2011 incorporated a new indicator into the research methodology based on three components:

- policy reviews to see whether gender is specifically incorporated into donors’ humanitarian or development policy frameworks;
- funding analysis to see whether donors align their funding and distribute aid according to gender sensitive criteria;
- survey questions to see how field-based humanitarian staff perceive donors’ commitments to gender issues in their funding and support.
A desk review of OECD/DAC donors’ policies was conducted to determine whether gender was included in their humanitarian assistance policies, in their overall official development assistance (ODA) framework, or not mentioned at all. Donor governments were also asked to provide examples of any specific requirements for their partner organisations to include gender analysis and sex and age disaggregated data (SADD) in project funding proposals, or as part of reporting requirements; however, this could not be included as an additional indicator due to the limited response.

The IASC GenCap Project and UN OCHA’s Financial Tracking System (FTS) provided the data used for the funding analysis, based on an assessment of funding alignment to the Gender Marker tool. In 2011, the GM was used in nine CAPs (Chad, Haiti, Kenya, Niger, occupied Palestinian territories [oPt], Somalia, South Sudan, Yemen and Zimbabwe), two pooled funds (DRC, Ethiopia) and the Pakistan flood appeal. The HRI field research included seven of these countries, which made it possible to collect perceptions of actors in the field about gender issues and the utility of the GM. The initiative has since been expanded to cover countries in 2012, allowing for further comparative analysis of funding trends in the future (IASC 2011; UN OCHA FTS 2011).

For the purposes of the HRI’s analysis, the funding component of the HRI gender indicator is based on:

- the share of each donor’s funding provided to projects classified as **gender sensitive** (code 2a or 2b) under the GM compared to the donor’s total funding to crises where the GM was applied; and
- the percentage of donor funding to projects classified as **gender blind** (code 0) compared to the donor’s total funding to crises where the GM was applied.

The third component of the HRI gender assessment is based on field staff perceptions of donor commitment to gender, and beneficiary engagement captured by the following questions of the HRI field survey on donor practices: “Does your donor require you to incorporate gender sensitive approaches in your programmes?” and “Does your donor require beneficiary participation in: programme design; implementation; monitoring and evaluation?”.

Survey and interviews did not include questions about specific programmes, though many comments mentioned examples of the degree to which gender was being addressed, or ignored, in different contexts. Nevertheless, it does offer interesting insight on how the sector is dealing with the issue.

Using a statistical analysis of the scores against the HRI’s set of 35 indicators of donor policies, funding practices and field perceptions, donors have been classified into three categories based on their shared characteristics. The specific results for gender are outlined below.3

### TABLE 1. DISTRIBUTION OF FEMALE AND MALE STAFF INTERVIEWED IN THE HRI 2011 FIELD RESEARCH

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position Held in the Organisation</th>
<th>Female %</th>
<th>Male %</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Senior Management</strong></td>
<td>74</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mid-Level</strong></td>
<td>21</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>95</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 It’s not a requirement and not given any importance by the donor
2 It’s not a requirement by the donor, but they like to see it if we include it
3 It’s a requirement but not given much importance by the donor
4 It’s an important requirement for the donor
5 It’s an important requirement and the donor verifies to make sure we do

Over 870 survey responses on OECD/DAC donors’ gender practices were collected from over 270 senior and mid-level representatives of humanitarian agencies in nine crises. In addition, over 150 responses to open-ended questions on donors’ gender approaches were collected, along with supplementary questions regarding how the humanitarian sector deals with gender issues and barriers to women’s participation, either as staff or aid recipients.
OVERVIEW OF DONOR PERFORMANCE AROUND GENDER ISSUES

On the whole, donors could do much better at integrating gender into their policies, funding and support at the field level, as illustrated in Tables 2 and 3. At the individual level, Canada stands out for its consistent support for gender in its humanitarian policies, funding and practices, and is a model for other donors. Sweden, the European Commission (ECHO), Norway and the United States complete the list of top five donors for their support for gender.

POLICIES IN PLACE, BUT INSUFFICIENT ATTENTION TO MONITORING AND FOLLOW UP OF PROGRAMMING

Most donors have gender policies, but very few have specific procedures to monitor and follow up on gender in the programmes they fund. The review of OECD/DAC donor governments’ policies shows that the majority (61%) have a gender policy for humanitarian aid, either as a stand-alone, separate policy or mentioned specifically in their humanitarian policy. Some of the remaining donors include gender in their overall ODA framework, although in some cases this is simply a generic mention of the importance of women in development programmes.

Group 1 donors, “Principled Partners” (Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland), tend to have the most comprehensive and progressive gender policies for their humanitarian assistance, with clearly defined guidelines, objectives and descriptions. Group 2 donors, “Learning Leaders” (Canada, ECHO, France, the UK and the US), also generally have gender policies, though sometimes not as clearly defined as Group 1 donors. Canada in particular, stands out for its long-standing commitment to mainstreaming gender in its humanitarian and development assistance, while ECHO was criticised by many organisations for delays in launching an updated gender policy despite commitments to gender in the European Consensus on Humanitarian Assistance.

As part of the overall donor policy review, DARA also asked donors whether their funding, reporting and evaluation criteria included specific requirements for SADD - generally considered the first step towards ensuring gender-sensitive programming. Of the donors that responded, most stated that they encouraged and promoted gender in their dialogue with partners, but only a few, such as Canada and Spain, cited specific SADD reporting requirements. None of the donors consulted provided specific examples of how they went beyond SADD information to ask the critical question of partners: what does that data mean for the approaches taken, prioritisation of interventions, or monitoring that would demonstrate how partners were addressing gender issues?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 2: DONOR PERFORMANCE AGAINST HRI GENDER INDICATORS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>HRI 2011 GENDER INDICATOR SCORE</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CANADA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWEDEN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUROPEAN COMMISSION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NORWAY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNITED STATES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWITZERLAND</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNITED KINGDOM</td>
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<tr>
<td>AUSTRALIA</td>
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<tr>
<td>FINLAND</td>
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<td>IRELAND</td>
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<td>SPAIN</td>
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<td>DENMARK</td>
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<td>FRANCE</td>
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<td>GERMANY</td>
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<td>BELGIUM</td>
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<tr>
<td>ITALY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JAPAN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NETHERLANDS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LUXEMBOURG</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
SIZEABLE PORTION OF APPEAL FUNDING STILL “GENDER BLIND”

According to data provided by the IASC for the 2011 appeal cycle, 58.3% of funding to CAPs in which the GM was applied was gender-sensitive (i.e. allocated to projects that either significantly contribute to gender equality or whose main purpose is to advance gender equality). Still, 15.4% of project funding was found to be gender blind (in other words, with no evident consideration of gender in the design). There is significant variance, however, from one crisis to another. Funding to CAPs in Kenya and Yemen was largely gender sensitive, with 98.2% and 78.3% respectively allocated to projects making some contribution to gender, while only 6.1% of funding to Zimbabwe and 2.4% of funding to Niger contributed to gender equality.

Similar differences are seen among donors, as shown in Table 4. On the whole, Group 1 donors, “Principled Partners”, did not match their record for good gender policies with corresponding funding. On average, over a quarter of funding (26.3%) of the crises included in the 2011 GM was considered “gender blind” in this group. Within the group, Finland, Denmark, and the Netherlands performed poorly in terms of funding allocations, although, as some respondents pointed out, these donors also tend to support pooled funding mechanisms, which did use gender as one of the criteria for project funding allocations. Group 2 donors “Learning Leaders”, on the other hand, tended to perform best of all donors assessed in terms of allocating funding based on GM scores, with Canada and France leading the group. Of the Group 3 donors, “Aspiring Actors”, Germany and Australia deserve mention for the high degree of funding...
allocated to gender-sensitive programmes. Group 3 donors performed similar to Group 1 donors, with an average of 27.2% of funding to gender blind programmes.

Some field respondents questioned whether funding allocations based on GM scores represented a pro-active position by donors, or were more an indication that humanitarian organisations were simply becoming more aware by including gender in their plans and appeals. “Do donors require gender because agencies do, or is it the other way around?” asked one respondent in oPt. There was a certain amount of cynicism among many respondents, with several commenting that “some organisations use gender ‘to look nice’ for the donors so they will get the funding, but the projects are no good.” “NGOs and UN agencies are simply copying and pasting from past proposals,” said another in Haiti.

Nevertheless, there were many respondents who felt that initiatives like the GenCap and GM project were slowly making a difference in improving the quality of project proposals and using gender criteria for funding allocation. “The Humanitarian Country Team has really accepted and appropriated the Gender Marker. They’re very serious about it. It has really been adopted by people who hold leadership in the humanitarian system: only gender sensitive projects receive financial aid,” according to a respondent in DRC.

Even critics admitted that the GM, while perhaps a “blunt tool for raising awareness,” as one respondent put it, was profiling gender issues more systematically. However, like the issue of quotas for women in programmes, several respondents cautioned about the risk of converting the GM into simply another procedural exercise for both donors and agencies, limited to making “sure basic things are taken into account,” in the words of one respondent in DRC. “It’s very basic. It’s about minimal requirements. It’s not about making a qualitative analysis of the real situation.”

DONOR COMMITMENT TO GENDER QUESTIONED IN THE FIELD

While donors performed reasonably well in the HRI indicators for gender policy and funding, perceptions of donors’ commitment to gender at the field level is a concern. In the HRI field survey question related to gender, OECD/DAC donor governments were given an average score of 5.79 out of 10 by their field partners. This is below the overall average survey score for OECD/DAC donors of 6.02, and among the lowest of all HRI survey scores. Other questions with similarly low average scores include donor support for beneficiary participation (5.08) and accountability towards beneficiaries (4.47), indicating that the issue of promoting inclusive and participatory approaches to understand and meet needs is a collective weakness for donors. One respondent in DRC summed it up this way: “We would have to take affected populations into account to be able to take affected women into account.”

Interview comments overwhelmingly confirmed the generally poor perception of donors in the field, with most viewing donor commitment to gender as “theoretical” and largely limited to asking for some gender sensitivity in project proposals. “There’s no real engagement, donors look at gender in a very general way,” said one respondent working in Somalia. “No donor has a real interest and understanding of gender,” affirmed another in Haiti. “Gender is definitely not an issue for donors. They don’t even know what it means, and while some are more sensitive, most just check on paper,” remarked one respondent in Chad. “Donors have not indicated to their partners that gender mainstreaming is non-negotiable because it is at the root of understanding vulnerability, exclusion and abuse in every single situation,” asserted another respondent working in Somalia.

Several respondents equated the slow progress on gender with a lack of accountability and push from donors, and called for donors to “put your money where your mouth is” by pushing for funding based on gender criteria and requiring gender analysis in all stages of programme design, implementation and monitoring. Many felt that there was “no serious effort by donors to include gender in decision-making and monitoring. Donors themselves are often the first to ignore compliance with gender sensitivity requirements, if any,” said one respondent in Pakistan.

The majority of humanitarian organisations interviewed stated that their organisations had their own internal requirements on gender-sensitive approaches and SADD in programmes. When SADD was requested by donors, it appeared to be due to individual donor representatives’ own initiatives rather than an institutional policy. According to one respondent in DRC, “Gender is in vogue. But donors like the US, UK, ECHO or Spain don’t even know what they want in terms of gender. They don’t put in practice means for verifying whether gender is actually taken into account.”

Even donors most often cited for their commitment to gender issues, such as Sweden and Canada, were often criticised for a lack of follow-up: “CIDA (Canada) is strong at being gender sensitive in the project proposal stage but not in implementation, monitoring and evaluation,” said one respondent in Sudan. “Donors ask us for gender approaches in our proposals, but they never verify it,” commented another in Sudan. “No donor has a real interest and understanding of gender,” affirmed another in Somalia. “No donor has a real interest and understanding of gender,” affirmed another in Somalia.

“OFDA (US) generally requires a gender approach, but in this emergency case, they don’t care that much about it.”
At the field level, several respondents complained about donors like DFID (UK), ECHO or others imposing quotas on the number of women beneficiaries or project staff. Many regarded this as counterproductive to more nuanced assessments of needs and better targeting of programmes. One gender advisor interviewed gave a positive example of how more consistent application of donor commitment to gender could lead to changes in the behaviours and practices of their partners: “I always wondered what would happen if donors were the ones who pushed for gender sensitiveness. It worked! I went to give trainings on the Gender Marker in a very remote area and a lot of programme planners from national NGOs showed up, coming from isolated villages. They came because they were concerned about not getting any more funding if they didn’t incorporate gender.”

MAIN FINDINGS:
THE HUMANITARIAN SECTOR IS STILL TOO MALE-DOMINATED
Each year, the HRI interviews hundreds of field representatives of humanitarian organisations in different crisis contexts. This year, over two thirds of the senior managers interviewed were men (68%) and one third women (32%), a ratio that has remained largely unchanged since the HRI began five years ago (see Table 1). Progress has been made, but there are still structural and attitudinal barriers to more effective engagement of women in the sector, as our field research shows and is echoed by other studies, such as the Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance’s (ALNAP) study on leadership (ALNAP 2010). Several respondents - both male and female - felt that the dominance of “Anglo-Saxon men” in key decision-making positions in donor and UN agencies was an impediment to effectively understanding gender problems in humanitarian settings. Others acknowledged and appreciated the important role that senior male staff can adopt in driving a gender agenda in programming, but complained that female staff attempting to do the same were often perceived as pursuing personal or emotional agendas: “When men talk about gender, it’s perceived as a professional issue, related to effective responses. Women are seen as doing it for more personal reasons.”

At the programming level, several respondents mentioned the difficulties some male colleagues encountered in applying a gender perspective to interventions. “Men wouldn’t understand why it was important to put locks on latrine doors. They thought it was just so the wind wouldn’t open them,” stated one respondent. “When we told men about the importance of doing focus groups separated by sex, they didn’t believe it. We had to use watches during meetings for them to realise how men talk much more than women when focus groups are mixed,” said another working in DRC.

Many field respondents pointed to the difficulty of finding and retaining international and local female staff at the field level for projects. “Gender sensitive strategies or programmes are written in an office, but there are many practical constraints when in the field,” stated one respondent in DRC. Social and cultural barriers, limited access to education opportunities, poor health conditions, and concerns around protection and security were factors cited by many interviewees as impeding greater numbers of women from working in the humanitarian sector. “Lots of women don’t want to work in remote or dangerous areas, especially if they have families,” said one. “It’s hard to hire qualified women. We had a vacancy. We did a first round of applications and no women participated. Even for international staff it’s hard to find women candidates,” commented another in Chad.

Few respondents could offer any concrete examples of how organisations were finding ways to address these kinds of barriers, suggesting there is much more work to be done to resolve some of these structural issues impeding greater numbers of women staff in crisis situations. There were some positive signs, though. Some organisations are more proactively and persistently trying to recruit women, while others are investing in building capacities of female local staff. As one woman working in DRC reflected, “As a woman, it’s now easier to work in the UN than it was before. The atmosphere is better and better. There’s respect towards women. Plus they really try to recruit more women to have a more gender balanced staff.”

Clearly, much more research needs to be conducted to understand the potential bias that the predominance of male humanitarian staff might create in the way needs are understood, assessed and prioritised in the design and implementation of humanitarian programmes. However, it stands to reason that with women and girls making up over half of the world’s population, and with clear evidence that the effects of crises are different for women and men, an increase in the number of women engaged in the humanitarian sector and in decision-making processes could only be a positive move.

GENDER IS OFTEN CONSIDERED A LOW PRIORITY IN EMERGENCY RESPONSES
A recurring theme that emerged in all the crises assessed was the opinion of a significant number of respondents (including several donor representatives) that gender is not a priority in humanitarian relief operations. Rather than seeing gender as an opportunity to improve the quality, effectiveness and efficiency of aid efforts, many respondents saw gender as an “added luxury”- optional depending on timing and
resources. They subordinated gender to more important objectives and activities, arguing that the urgency of a situation requires immediate action, not analysis.

The HRI research teams frequently heard comments like: “there was no time for that [gender analysis] in such an emergency situation” in Haiti, or “gender is something that comes later, in the recovery phase”. Similar comments were made in other crises: “The donor does not go through the gender score card with you because proposals have to be accepted quickly in such an urgent situation,” despite the reality that many of these same crises are now protracted for years or even decades.

Donors themselves contribute to perpetuating such attitudes, according to many respondents: “It is a donor requirement, but they also understand that we are working under very difficult constraints so gender is not pushed.” “Normally, they do require a gender approach in other projects but not in this case. This is a humanitarian crisis targeting entire populations, big numbers. They aren’t focused on women,” commented another in Haiti. In essence, the message from donors seems to be that gender is an important political commitment, but not a practical priority in humanitarian crises. One donor representative in Somalia summed up this line of thinking: “In truth, this is not a priority; it’s more of a ‘tick the box’ approach. The scale and complexities of the crisis mean there are more important issues to address.”

GENDER IS STILL MAINLY EQUATED WITH WOMEN’S ISSUES AND NOT AS A COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGIC APPROACH TO PROGRAMMING

While there is ample evidence that women are disproportionately and differently affected by disasters and effects of conflicts (such as sexual and gender-based violence), this is not to say that gender is or should be limited exclusively to programmes and interventions focused on women. As a recent study sponsored by UN OCHA and CARE demonstrates, a review of SADD in humanitarian programmes shows that humanitarian organisations often make incorrect assumptions about programming priorities, based largely on incomplete or inaccurate information about the affected populations and their needs (Mazurana, Benelli et al. 2011).

Similar conclusions were evident in many of the crises covered by HRI field research. The perception among many interviewed was that gender was often misunderstood to include solely women and girls. “Many donors, like Canada, the US, Sweden or Norway, are very sensitive to gender, but their programmes mainly focus on women. They don’t necessarily discriminate against men, but they mainly target women,” commented one respondent in Sudan. Another in DRC provided examples of how this can inadvertently exclude men: “Males are not included in programme activities. It’s not a real gender strategy; they just focus on providing special care for women. Sometimes they even neglect men’s needs completely.”

One respondent in Sudan reflected the attitude of many when he stated: “Focusing so much on women only worsens the general situation; positive discrimination is not the answer.” This type of attitude was frustrating for other respondents: “Gender is not about underlining the vulnerability of women or constantly showing them as victims! We need less talk about gender and more about gender in projects tackling the needs of all men, women, boys and girls. There are some improvements in humanitarian action in this regard but much more needs to be done.”

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

CONCLUSIONS

Gender only constituted a small component of the overall HRI research process. However, even the limited areas assessed generated a great deal of information that can help the humanitarian sector better understand the constraints and challenges to integrating gender into humanitarian action.

While the majority of OECD/DAC donors were reported to have gender policies, very few actually monitor and follow up with their partners in the field on how gender is integrated into programming. Funding also appears to be mostly aligned with gender criteria, but as the analysis of GM data for 2011 shows, there are huge discrepancies in the level of support for gender sensitive projects in some crises compared to others, and the level of priority given to gender by some donors in their funding allocations.

It is clear from the field research that the majority of humanitarian actors interviewed see donor commitment to gender as limited to the most general and superficial levels, not as an integral part of their strategy and approaches. Even donors that have a reputation for championing gender – and there are a few – were often seen as failing to systematically use gender criteria to guide decision-making, and not actively monitor and follow up to verify how gender approaches were being applied in programming.

In the absence of clear directions and requirements from donors, many humanitarian organisations have developed their own internal policies on gender mainstreaming. Within the sector, initiatives like the IASC GM and the work of GenCap and other gender advisors in the field were generally seen as positive moves to advance gender issues. However, a significant number of the representatives in humanitarian organisations expressed their scepticism about the utility of gender sensitive approaches in emergency responses, and many equated gender with a simplistic view that this
catered only to programmes specifically aimed at women. Many of the donor and agency respondents saw gender as a bureaucratic procedure (“ticking the boxes”) and an administrative burden rather than as a basic and essential step in ensuring that humanitarian assistance is non-discriminatory and allocated on the basis of need.

It seems evident that much more work needs to be done to research, understand and address the continued negative attitudes towards gender issues and to resolve some of the more difficult structural barriers that impede greater participation of women in the sector. To move forward and truly live up to the collective commitment to mainstream gender in humanitarian responses, donors can and must take on a leadership role. In the opinion of many of those interviewed, if donors show that gender is a priority for them, and begin to actively promote gender, the sector is likely to follow, at the very least, due to concerns about continued access to funding.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The following are some recommendations for simple, practical steps that donors can take to promote better acceptance, awareness and understanding of the need for enhanced gender sensitive approaches. The majority of these recommendations have already been made before, but they are worth repeating.

1. MAKE SURE GENDER IS FULLY INTEGRATED INTO NEEDS ASSESSMENTS, DONOR FUNDING DECISIONS, AND PROGRAMME DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION

In the Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) Principles, donors commit to ensure aid is non-discriminatory and in proportion to needs. The only way to guarantee this is by ensuring that needs are properly assessed from a gender perspective. By aligning funding to projects that show how gender is being addressed, donors can send a powerful message to partners that gender analysis must be improved and applied systematically to programmes. While many donors request partners to include gender analysis and provide SADD in proposals, very few actually follow up to see how this data is being used in implementation or require partners to report on how gender analysis is being used to improve quality and effectiveness of interventions for all parts of the population.

To achieve this, donors should:

- Support the roll-out of initiatives like the IASC Gender Marker and align funding decisions to gender coding, justifying when funding is allocated to gender-blind programmes;
- Require partners to include gender analysis, outlining what the different needs of women, girls, men and boys are in the crisis, and how these will be addressed at different stages of the response;
- Insist on the collection and analysis of sex and age disaggregated data (SADD) in all project proposals and reports, and ask partners to show how this data is being used to adapt and improve the quality of responses.

2. INTEGRATE GENDER SPECIFICALLY INTO PREVENTION, PREPAREDNESS, RISK REDUCTION AND RECOVERY ACTIVITIES

Donors are consistently weak at supporting prevention, preparedness and risk reduction in general. But their efforts would likely have much greater and lasting impact if gender was fully integrated into disaster and conflict prevention programmes. As the recent report on the use of SADD concludes, there are numerous steps humanitarian organisations could take prior to an emergency to better understand the different roles and social norms that apply to women, girls, men and boys in crisis prone countries. Donors can facilitate this by supporting their partners to take measures beforehand to anticipate, plan and prepare themselves and vulnerable communities to better address gender in prevention, response and recovery efforts. And as pointed out by Michelle Bachelet, the Executive Director of UN Women, women have a vital role in conflict resolution and post-conflict reconciliation, but are largely absent from these processes. Donors can help rectify this. In order to minimise the possibility of gender gaps in crisis responses donors should:

- Require partners to include gender analysis and strategies in any prevention and risk reduction programmes, preparedness and contingency planning they fund;
- Insist that their partners integrate strategies to increase the engagement with and build the capacity of beneficiary communities to prevent and prepare for crises, with a specific focus on ensuring participation of women in activities;
- Ensure gender is adequately incorporated into recovery and transition programming, including in conflict and post-conflict situations.

3. SUPPORT MEASURES TO INCREASE THE PARTICIPATION AND ENGAGEMENT OF WOMEN IN HUMANITARIAN ACTION

There is a large disparity in the number of men and women working at the field level, especially at the senior management level. The sector is still dominated by men, raising questions about the ability of humanitarian organisations to fully understand the needs of women and men in different cultural and social contexts. At the field level, while there are slow improvements, too many programmes still do not fully integrate crisis-affected populations as a whole, and women in particular, in the design, implementation and decision-making processes of aid interventions. Donors can work towards changing this imbalance, and should:
• Promote greater participation of women in management and leadership roles in the sector;
• Support and fund initiatives and tools like the Gender Marker, the GenCap project and the use of gender advisors to help increase understanding of gender issues and address gender gaps in humanitarian action;
• Support humanitarian partners to increase their capacity for integrating women and gender into their human resources strategies, programming policies, planning, reporting and operational procedures, including SADD;
• Support partners in addressing some of the cultural, social and other barriers to women’s and men’s participation in humanitarian action, as part of an overall strategy for increased accountability towards crisis-affected populations.

4. INCREASE EFFORTS TO ENSURE GENDER IS AN INTEGRAL PART OF PROTECTION STRATEGIES

Women and girls are often extremely vulnerable in situations of conflict, and are frequently the targets of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV). In disaster situations like Haiti, SGBV is often present as well, but does not receive the same attention as it does in conflicts. At the same time, men and boys are often themselves victims, or require special focus in prevention efforts. Much progress has been made, but there are still disturbing incidents where the international community’s responsibility to protect these vulnerable people has not been fulfilled, and where perpetrators of SGBV act with impunity. In order to ensure that the rights, dignity and physical integrity of all affected populations are protected donors should:
• Support better training of humanitarian and other actors (such as peacekeeping and military forces) on gender, human rights and the responsibility to protect, and monitor compliance;
• Insist that partners incorporate gender perspectives into all protection activities, including an analysis of the specific needs of men and boys;
• Support international mechanisms to end impunity for acts of SGBV

new and compelling evidence that gender needs to be an integral part of an overall strategy to improve the quality and effectiveness of aid. In order to ensure that aid resources are effectively meeting needs, donors and their partners must monitor and report how interventions are contributing, or not, to meeting gender needs at all points in the response cycle, especially in the emergency response phase. Unless donors and their partners make gender an integral part of monitoring, evaluation and learning, there is a risk that gender remains marginalised rather than mainstreamed in humanitarian action. Donors have an important role to play in this, and should:
• Require all partners to monitor and report on SADD and demonstrate how gender is being addressed in all phases of programming;
• Integrate gender as a component of all monitoring, reporting and evaluation requirements for themselves and their partners;
• Sponsor and support more evaluations and learning around gender issues for the sector;
• Develop and/or refine their policies on gender in humanitarian action, making clear links between gender, beneficiary participation and inclusiveness, and accountability towards affected populations;
• Develop a collective donor policy statement on their commitment to gender equality in humanitarian action.

5. MAKE GENDER AN EXPLICIT FOCUS OF MONITORING, EVALUATION AND LEARNING IN HUMANITARIAN ACTION

As HRI research indicates, donors do not consistently monitor, follow up, or evaluate how gender issues are being addressed in humanitarian action. Awareness and understanding of gender are still limited in the sector, and attitudes towards gender issues are often negative. Progress is happening in many crisis contexts, thanks in part to initiatives like the Gender Marker and gender advisors, and recent and ongoing evaluations are adding
### TABLE 4. DONOR FUNDING ALLOCATIONS BASED ON GENDER MARKER CRITERIA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification under Gender Marker is Not Specified</th>
<th>No Signs that Gender Issues were Considered in Project Design</th>
<th>1 The Project is Designed to Contribute in Some Limited Way to Gender Equality</th>
<th>2A The Project is Designed to Contribute Significantly to Gender Equality</th>
<th>2B The Principal Purpose of the Project is to Advance Gender Equality</th>
<th>Total Funding Committed/Contributed (USD)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>29.9%</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>23.1%</td>
<td>40.8%</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>47.7%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>52.3%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>41.8%</td>
<td>12.2%</td>
<td>46.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>14.9%</td>
<td>14.8%</td>
<td>67.9%</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>31.1%</td>
<td>31.7%</td>
<td>11.0%</td>
<td>26.2%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Commission</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>16.0%</td>
<td>21.9%</td>
<td>61.6%</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>12.3%</td>
<td>26.5%</td>
<td>18.0%</td>
<td>43.2%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
<td>40.9%</td>
<td>50.9%</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
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<td>12.5%</td>
<td>10.3%</td>
<td>73.8%</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>45.7%</td>
<td>21.4%</td>
<td>11.4%</td>
<td>21.5%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
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<td>17.4%</td>
<td>39.9%</td>
<td>42.7%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>26.4%</td>
<td>21.0%</td>
<td>50.7%</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>53.2%</td>
<td>22.6%</td>
<td>24.2%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>28.4%</td>
<td>59.5%</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>8.6%</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>42.5%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>57.5%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>60.1%</td>
<td>14.7%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>25.2%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>27.8%</td>
<td>25.5%</td>
<td>8.5%</td>
<td>38.1%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>32.7%</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
<td>20.4%</td>
<td>37.6%</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>18.6%</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
<td>66.1%</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>77.6%</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
<td>10.3%</td>
<td>9.7%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>12.8%</td>
<td>26.9%</td>
<td>53.9%</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Total</td>
<td>11.8%</td>
<td>14.9%</td>
<td>21.1%</td>
<td>48.8%</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
NOTES

1 The IASC Gender Marker is a tool that codes, on a 0–2 scale, whether or not a humanitarian project is designed well enough to ensure that women/girls and men/boys will benefit equally from it or that it will advance gender equality in another way. If the project has the potential to contribute to gender equality, the marker predicts whether the results are likely to be limited or significant. http://oneresponse.info/crosscutting/gender/Pages/The%20IASC%20Gender%20Marker.aspx

2 The IASC Gender Standby Capacity (GenCap) project seeks to build capacity of humanitarian actors at country level to mainstream gender equality programming, including prevention and response to gender-based violence, in all sectors of humanitarian response. GenCap’s goal is to ensure that humanitarian action takes into consideration the different needs and capabilities of women, girls, boys and men equally. For more information: Inter-Agency Standby Capacity Support Unit http://gencap.oneresponse.info

3 For more information on the methodology and the donor classification, please see: www.daraint.org

4 Group 1 donors, “Principled Partners”, are characterised by their generosity, strong commitment to humanitarian principles of neutrality, impartiality and independence, and for flexible, funding arrangements with partners.

5 Group 2 donors, “Learning Leaders”, are characterised by their leading role and influence in terms of capacity to respond, field presence, and commitment to learning and improving performance in the sector.

6 Group 3 donors, “Aspiring Actors”, are diverse in terms of their size and capacities, but are characterised by their focus on building strengths in specific “niche” areas, such as geographic regions or thematic areas like preparedness and prevention, and their aspirations to take on a greater role in the sector.

REFERENCES


DONOR ASSESSMENTS
澳大利亚

集团 3

Aspiring Actors

官方发展援助 0.32%

人道主义援助 10.9%

US $19

澳大利亚在HRI 2011中排名第10位，较2010年排名上升3位。基于其评分模式，澳大利亚被分类为集团3捐赠者，“有望成为演员”。该集团的捐赠者通常在更有限的水平上参与人道主义系统，但往往希望在该领域扮演更大的角色。他们通常专注于少数核心优势，例如在预防、准备和风险减缓方面，或在特定地理区域。

澳大利亚的总体得分为OECD/DAC平均值以上，但低于集团3平均值。除了支柱1和3外，澳大利亚在各个支柱中的得分均在OECD/DAC和集团3平均值以上。

澳大利亚在与本地当局的倡导方面表现较弱。在实施评估建议方面，澳大利亚得分低于OECD/DAC平均值，但在其他方面表现良好，特别是在定量指标方面。其得分在某些方面较低，包括适应变化的需求、资助脆弱和被遗忘的紧急情况、受益人参与。

澳大利亚在人道主义援助分配方面

- 人道主义援助：10.9%的ODA
- 人均：US $19

- 澳大利亚在HRI 2011中的排名为10th。

### OVERALL PERFORMANCE

澳大利亚在HRI 2011中排名第10位，较2010年排名上升3位。基于其评分模式，澳大利亚被分类为集团3捐赠者，“有望成为演员”。该集团的捐赠者通常在更有限的水平上参与人道主义系统，但往往希望在该领域扮演更大的角色。他们通常专注于少数核心优势，例如在预防、准备和风险减缓方面，或在特定地理区域。

澳大利亚的总体得分为OECD/DAC平均值以上，但低于集团3平均值。除了支柱1和3外，澳大利亚在各个支柱中的得分均在OECD/DAC和集团3平均值以上。

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澳大利亚在与本地当局的倡导方面表现较弱。在实施评估建议方面，澳大利亚得分低于OECD/DAC平均值，但在其他方面表现良好，特别是在定量指标方面。其得分在某些方面较低，包括适应变化的需求、资助脆弱和被遗忘的紧急情况、受益人参与。

### SOURCES:
- UN OCHA FTS
- OECD StatExtracts, various UN agencies’ annual reports and DARA

所有得分均在0到10的范围内。颜色代表与OECD/DAC捐赠者平均表现的比较：
- 🔺 Good
- 🔵 Mid-range
- 🔻 Could improve
- ☐ Non applicable
- 🔶 Quantitative Indicator
- 🔷 Qualitative Indicator
AID DISTRIBUTION

In 2010, Official Development Assistance (ODA) represented 0.32% of Australia's Gross National Income (GNI), with 10.59% of ODA allocated to humanitarian aid, or 0.034% of its GNI. According to data reported to the United Nations (UN) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs’ (OCHA) Financial Tracking Service (FTS), in 2010, Australia channelled 67.2% of its humanitarian assistance to UN agencies, 6.5% to the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement, 10.7% to NGOs and 1.9% bilaterally to affected governments. In 2010, the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID) provided humanitarian assistance to 21 emergencies in Asia, ten in Africa, four in the Americas and two in Oceania (OCHA FTS 2011). The 2005 Humanitarian Action Policy affirmed Australia’s intention to focus aid “primarily…on the Asia-Pacific region.” It has also played a significant lead role in spearheading humanitarian relief efforts with France and New Zealand in the South Pacific. Recently, AusAID has begun to increase its development and humanitarian assistance to other regions of the developing world and has announced its intention to scale up development and humanitarian relief efforts in the Middle East and Africa, particularly in Sudan, South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and the Horn of Africa in the coming years (AusAID 2011c).

POLICY FRAMEWORK

The Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID), an autonomous body within the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), manages Australia’s humanitarian aid. In 2010, AusAID was established as an Executive Agency directly accountable to the Minister of Foreign Affairs (Australian Government 2011). AusAID’s Corporate, Humanitarian and International Group now encompasses four divisions, including the Africa, West Asia and Humanitarian Division (AusAID 2011a). AusAID has strengthened its base in Canberra, while further expanding the role for its overseas offices and offshore programme management (AusAID 2009a). AusAID also cooperates with other areas of the government when mobilising responses to humanitarian emergencies, in particular with the Australian Defence Force. In 2011, Australia established the Australian Civilian Corps for the deployment of Australian specialists to countries affected by natural disaster and conflict to facilitate recovery and longer-term rehabilitation efforts (AusAID 2011c).

The 2005 Humanitarian Action Policy governs Australia’s humanitarian assistance, blending humanitarian action with development, conflict prevention, peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction goals and is complementary to Australia’s 2002 Peace, Conflict and Development Policy. The Humanitarian Action Policy is rooted in a Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) Principles and explicitly references them multiple times. A new policy is currently being developed and is due for release at the end of 2011.

The 2011 Independent Review of Aid Effectiveness called for the development of a comprehensive policy statement and the articulation of multiple year strategies (AusAID 2011c). AusAID responded to this review by producing An Effective Aid Program for Australia: Making a Real Difference—Delivering Real Results. In recent years, AusAID has focused on incorporating disaster risk reduction (DRR) efforts into its development programmes, publishing Integrating Disaster Risk Reduction, Climate Change and Environmental Considerations in AusAID Programs (AusAID 2010b) and Investing in a Safer Future: A Disaster Risk Reduction Policy for the Australian Aid Program (AusAID 2009b).
**HOW DOES AUSTRALIA’S POLICY ADDRESS GHD CONCEPTS?**

**PILLAR 1**

**RESPONDING TO NEEDS**

AusAID’s 2005 *Humanitarian Action Policy* describes the need to incorporate gender considerations into all stages of humanitarian action, taking into account the different effects of crises on women, and to ensure female participation in activities (AusAID 2005). AusAID has also declared gender equality and female empowerment to be an overarching goal of its aid programme at all levels of activities. The 2007 publication, *Gender Equality in Australia’s Aid Program*, insists on preserving gender perspectives, especially in crisis situations and DRR efforts, and seeks to promote equal participation of women in decision-making roles in conflict situations (AusAID 2010c). AusAID has also reaffirmed its commitment to promoting gender equality in all programmes in *An Effective Aid Program for Australia*, and has declared its intention to collaborate with multilateral agencies and NGOs to implement gender sensitive policies (AusAID 2011c and AusAID 2011f). In recognition of women’s increased vulnerability in humanitarian crises, Australia helped fund the production of the 2010 *Inter-agency Field Manual on Reproductive Health in Humanitarian Settings*. Australia has supported programmes related to maternal health care and protecting women from exploitation during crises; for example, it supports SPRINT, a programme to provide sexual and reproductive health services to women in crisis situations (AusAID 2011f). Furthermore, Australia has supported GenCap to support the deployment of gender experts to humanitarian crises, as well as training for peacekeepers on prevention and response to sexual violence.

**GENDER**

AusAID’s 2005 *Humanitarian Action Policy* upholds the importance of neutral, impartial and independent humanitarian aid and sets forth plans to allocate funding in proportion to needs and on the basis of needs assessments, according to the changing situations in humanitarian crises (AusAID 2005). AusAID also pledges to provide support based on the scale of the disaster and to mobilise resources rapidly (AusAID 2005). Australia has standby funding arrangements with NGOs, in which funding can be requested through simplified, fast-track procedures during crises (AusAID 2011e). AusAID has also announced its intention to deliver “faster, more effective responses” as the frequency and intensity of humanitarian crises continue to increase (AusAID 2011c).
PILLAR 2
PREVENTION, RISK REDUCTION AND RECOVERY

Australia’s humanitarian action also includes capacity building, vulnerability reduction and the promotion of disaster and emergency prevention and preparedness measures (AusAID 2005). AusAID articulated its commitment to supporting implementation of the Hyogo Framework for Action in the 2009 document Investing in a Safer Future: A Disaster Risk Reduction Policy for the Australian Aid Program to be applied in conjunction with existing policies to integrate disaster risk reduction (DRR) efforts into responses to crises and disease outbreaks (AusAID 2009b). A progress report and the 2010 publication of Integrating Disaster Risk Reduction, Climate Change and Environmental Considerations in AusAID Programs have followed (AusAid 2010b). AusAID also recognises the crucial nature of DRR and the importance of engaging local communities (AusAID 2005). More recently in An Effective Aid Program for Australia, AusAID declared its intention to increase its focus on DRR and disaster preparedness, including measures to anticipate natural disasters. The Peace, Conflict and Development Policy also outlines AusAID’s commitment to conflict prevention and peace-building (AusAID 2002). Australia’s 2005 Humanitarian Action Policy stresses the importance of beneficiary participation in all programme stages and describes its commitment to facilitate the transition between relief and development (AusAID 2011). Australia recently established the Civilian Corps with the Australian Civilian Corps Act 2011, and part of their mission is to “provide a bridge between emergency response measures and long-term development programs,” (DFAT 2011).

PILLAR 3
WORKING WITH HUMANITARIAN PARTNERS

AusAID stresses the importance of cooperation with humanitarian partners in its Humanitarian Action Policy. The policy highlights the usefulness of partnering with NGOs for rapid and flexible emergency responses and plans to support both local and Australian NGOs. Australia holds a leading role in a number of partnerships established for coordinating responses to natural disasters in this region, e.g. the France, Australia and New Zealand (FRANZ) agreement (AusAID 2005) and Talisman Sabre with the US (Department of Defence 2011). AusAID also promotes flexible responses by establishing longer-term funding arrangements with humanitarian agencies for better planning and responsiveness to emergencies and recognises the importance of untying aid to improving effectiveness and efficiency (AusAID 2006). In An Effective Aid Program for Australia, AusAID asserts its commitment to supporting partnerships with governments, NGOs, UN agencies and the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement.
PILLAR 4
PROTECTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

Australia’s 2005 Humanitarian Action Policy expresses a clear commitment to meeting the protection needs of vulnerable people and promoting international humanitarian law, human rights law and refugee law. It pledges to advocate for humanitarian agencies’ access to displaced populations and outlines plans for meeting the safety requirements of humanitarian workers. The policy affirms Australia’s support for the Good Humanitarian Donorship Principles and commits to actively supporting the development of international standards (AusAID 2005).

PILLAR 5
LEARNING AND ACCOUNTABILITY

AusAID’s 2005 Humanitarian Action Policy provides for a robust evaluation system and stresses the need to ensure transparency and accountability of operations. AusAID publishes an evaluation report each year that includes a review of its performance in emergency, humanitarian and refugee programmes. Australia is also an International Aid Transparency Initiative signatory with an implementation plan set for July-October 2011 (IATI 2011). Following the 2011 release of the Independent Review of Aid Effectiveness, AusAID has announced that it will improve its ODA evaluations and issue a Transparency Charter by the end of 2011 to make information on funding and results more accessible (Australian Government 2011).
AusAid’s field partners provided mixed feedback regarding gender. One organisation reported that AusAID “comes back with questions” about its gender sensitive approaches in programmes, seeming to confirm that Australia’s policy focus on gender issues is translated to the field. However, others lumped Australia together with other donors for whom “gender is not an issue.”
PILLAR 1
RESPONDING TO NEEDS

In Pillar 1, evidence from the field suggests that Australia is following through with its promises to respond to needs. Some interviewees situated Australia as part of a group of donors that links needs assessments to project designs. Australia’s field partners held mixed views of the independence and timeliness of Australia’s humanitarian assistance. It received a significantly lower score for its efforts to verify that programmes adapt to changing needs.

PILLAR 2
PREVENTION, RISK REDUCTION AND RECOVERY

Although Australia’s quantitative scores in Pillar 2 were above average, field perceptions were significantly lower. Particularly poor was its score for Beneficiary participation, where one interviewee stressed that “it’s all just on paper,” and that there was “no follow up to see what’s really happening.” Its scores for linking relief to rehabilitation and development and support for prevention and risk reduction were also low. Feedback on Australia’s support for local capacity was more positive.

PILLAR 3
WORKING WITH HUMANITARIAN PARTNERS

Although Australia received its lowest score in Pillar 3, its scores in the qualitative indicators were comparatively higher. Pillar 3 is the only pillar where Australia’s qualitative scores are better than its quantitative scores. Most field organisations considered Australia supportive of coordination, a flexible donor and felt it has sufficient capacity and expertise to make appropriate decisions. For example, one interviewee noted that Australia participated in cluster meetings, and another pointed to AusAID’s strong capacity at the field level, noting that its staff is well prepared. Feedback was not as positive regarding Australian support for its partners’ organisational capacity in areas like preparedness, response and contingency planning, though one respondent thought AusAID would be willing to help strengthen its organisational capacity “if asked”.

PILLAR 4
PROTECTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

In Pillar 4, Australia’s partners praised the country for its funding for the protection of civilians. Its scores were much lower, however, in qualitative indicators on advocacy – both for protection and toward local authorities. Perceptions of Australia’s support for safe access and security of humanitarian works was also poor.
PILLAR 5
LEARNING AND ACCOUNTABILITY

In Pillar 5, field organisations seem fairly satisfied with Australia’s reporting requirements and transparency. One organisation stated that Australia took some steps towards promoting transparency of its funding and decision-making by sending out its scoring sheet. Multiple organisations suggested AusAID could work to improve the integration of accountability towards affected populations into the programmes it supports and work with partners to implement evaluation recommendations.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The following recommendations are based on data from 2010, prior to Australia’s aid review. It remains to be seen how the new policy will influence these issues.

- **ENSURE CRISIS SELECTION IS BASED ON NEED**

  Australia performed well in the majority of the quantitative indicators. Only one quantitative indicator was found to stand out as a weakness: Funding vulnerable and forgotten emergencies, which measures funding to forgotten emergencies and those with the greatest vulnerability. Australia is supportive of forgotten emergencies, but tends to prioritize crises in its geographic region. As a result, Australia provides less funding to crises with high levels of vulnerability when compared to other donors. In 2010, Australia designated 40.2% of its humanitarian funding for these crises, compared to the Group 3 average of 63.0% and the OECD/DAC average of 63.9%. Australia could review its funding criteria to ensure it responds to crises with the greatest need at the global level while maintaining its niche in the Asia-Pacific.

- **ENSURE ACCOUNTABILITY TOWARD BENEFICIARIES IS INTEGRATED IN HUMANITARIAN PROGRAMMES**

  Australia could improve its efforts to ensure accountability toward affected populations. Australia received one of the lowest scores of the OECD/DAC donors for this qualitative indicator, as partners indicated minimal emphasis and follow-up on downward accountability from Australia. Australia should engage in dialogue with its partners to discuss practical measures to ensure accountability towards beneficiaries is integrated in humanitarian programmes.

- **LOOK FOR WAYS TO IMPROVE MONITORING OF PROGRAMMES WITHOUT FIELD PRESENCE**

  Australia also received low scores for Adapting to changing needs, Beneficiary participation and Gender. Partner feedback was similar for all three indicators: greater monitoring is needed to transform them from requirements on paper to meaningful components of programmes. However, it is possible that the crisis selection may have influenced the lower scores and that Australia does verify that these requirements are fulfilled in crises where it has field presence. Australia should consider alternatives, such as partnerships with other donors, greater dialogue or field visits to monitor more closely the programmes it funds beyond its region.

- **ENCOURAGE LEARNING FROM THE PAST**

  Australia’s partners indicate that Australia could also enhance the use and follow-up of evaluations and other lesson-learning exercises to ensure recommendations are integrated in subsequent programming. Australia’s recent announcement of a renewed focus on evaluations is highly positive. It would do well to also enhance its efforts to work with its partners to use the lessons learned.

Please see www.daraint.org for a complete list of references.
Austria is not included in the overall ranking, as insufficient survey responses were obtained to calculate the qualitative indicators that make up the index.

Austria’s overall scores in the HRI’s quantitative indicators were below both the OECD/DAC and Group 2 averages. Austria scored below the OECD/DAC and Group 2 averages in all pillars, with the exception of Pillar 1 (Responding to needs), where the average of its quantitative scores placed it above both the OECD/DAC and Group 2 averages. It received its lowest score by far in Pillar 3 (Working with humanitarian partners).

Austria did best compared to its OECD/DAC peers in indicators on Funding and commissioning evaluations, Timely funding to complex emergencies and Timely funding to sudden onset emergencies. Its scores were relatively the lowest in the indicators on Participating in accountability initiatives, Funding NGOs, Funding accountability initiatives, Un-earmarked funding and Funding UN and RC/RC appeals.
AID DISTRIBUTION

Austria’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) comprised 0.32% of its Gross National Income (GNI) in 2010, an increase from 0.30% in 2009, yet below its 2008 level of 0.43% of GNI. Humanitarian assistance represented 4.09% of its 2010 ODA, or 0.013% of its GNI. According to data reported to the United Nations (UN) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs’ (OCHA) Financial Tracking Service (FTS), Austria channelled 53.4% of its humanitarian funding to UN agencies in 2010, 5.5% to the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement, 4.0% bilaterally to affected governments and 2.5% to non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Austria supported a total of 17 humanitarian crises in 2010: six in Asia, four in Africa, four in Europe and three in the Americas. Pakistan, Haiti and the occupied Palestinian territories received the greatest amount of support in 2010.

POLICY FRAMEWORK

Within Austria, the Federal Ministry of the Interior (FMI), the Federal Ministry for European and International Affairs (FMEIA), the Federal Ministry of Defence (FMD), and the Austrian Development Agency (ADA) coordinate humanitarian affairs (ADC 2009a). The Federal Ministry of European and International Affairs (FMEIA) is responsible for the strategic orientation of humanitarian aid. The Austrian Development Agency (ADA) is the operational arm of the Austrian Development Cooperation (ADC), created by the Federal Ministries Act of 1986 and the Federal Act on Development Cooperation of 2002 (ADC 2009). The Federal Ministry of the Interior (FMI) can also establish crisis teams to coordinate humanitarian action (ADC 2009a). The Austrian Action Plan on Aid Effectiveness 2006-2010/2011 (ADC 2008), the Three-Year Programme on Development Policy (Federal Ministry for European and International Affairs 2008) and the Austrian Development Cooperation International humanitarian aid: a policy document 2009 (ADC 2009a) guide Austria’s humanitarian policy. ADC also refers to the policies of the European Commission for its humanitarian aid (ADC 2009a). ADC’s humanitarian budget is intended mainly for priority and partner countries, but can also be used to respond to humanitarian crises in other places (ADC 2009a). The Austrian Council of Ministers can approve additional federal government funds for the Foreign Disaster Aid Fund if sufficient funds are not available for humanitarian action in the budgets of the individual federal departments (ADC 2009a, p.13).

HOW DOES AUSTRIA’S POLICY ADDRESS GHD CONCEPTS?

GENDER

Women are listed as one of the particularly vulnerable groups Austria targets in crisis situations. Gender is mentioned as a part of Austria’s overall development policy including Focus: Women, Gender and Armed Conflicts (ADC 2011b) and Focus: Gender Equality and Empowerment of Women (ADC 2009), and Gender equality and empowerment of women: Policy document (ADC, 2006). However, Austria’s policy regarding the integration of gender-sensitive approaches in humanitarian action is not clear.
PILLAR 1
RESPONDING TO NEEDS

Austria commits to providing aid based on the principles of neutrality, impartiality and non-discrimination (ADC 2009a). ADC recognises the need to provide aid based on need, especially to vulnerable groups including women, children, sick and disabled persons, refugees and internally displaced and homeless persons (ADC 2009a). Additionally, “particular attention is paid to ”forgotten crises” in ADC partner countries” (ADC 2009a, p.17). Austria also emphasises the need for timely decision-making and provision of funds (ADC 2009a). ADC only supports prequalified, ECHO-accredited NGOs to allow for a rapid response to crises (ADC 2009a).

PILLAR 2
PREVENTION, RISK REDUCTION AND RECOVERY

Austria addresses capacity building and beneficiary participation in its humanitarian policy in multiple ways. Austrian Humanitarian Aid Policy highlights that “the creation of greater prevention and self-help capacities in the target country is enhanced by transferring know-how and strengthening local structures,” (ADC 2009a, pp.18-19), and includes building self-reliance as one of its goals (ADC 2009a). Austria also recognises the need for rehabilitation, reconstruction and disaster prevention to be integrated in humanitarian aid (ADC 2009a). Furthermore, Austria encourages working with local partners in order to strengthen local capacities; however, organisations must be accredited before they can receive funding, as Austria considers that the accreditation process can increase organisations’ capacity. Austria stresses the need to consider the environment before and after crises (ADC 2009a).

PILLAR 3
WORKING WITH HUMANITARIAN PARTNERS

Austria’s humanitarian policy addresses coordination on many fronts: nationally, within Austria, internationally, as well as with host governments, civil society organisations and the affected population (ADC 2009a). Internationally, Austria’s humanitarian policy highlights the important role OCHA plays in coordination, and also notes its participation in the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC), the Partnership for Peace (PfP) and the EU Monitoring and Information Centre (MIC) (ADC 2009a). Austria’s humanitarian policy also emphasizes the need to coordinate before a crisis occurs (ADC 2009a). ADC uses initial UN needs assessments and reviews international situation reports and funding appeals to inform its decisions (ADC 2009a). Austria provides un-earmarked funds to UN agencies, the EU, and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) (ADC 2009a).
PILLAR 4
PROTECTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

International humanitarian law, human rights law and refugee law are addressed in Austria's development policy, but do not seem to be given the same attention in Austria’s humanitarian aid policy, with the exception of human rights, which is addressed in the Human Rights Manual Guidelines for Implementing a Human Rights Based Approach in ADC (ADA 2010). Austria recognizes that “impartiality is an essential prerequisite for access to the affected civilian population on all sides of a conflict and for the safety and security of humanitarian personnel in the field,” (ADC 2009a, p.14). Austria stresses that the military should be used as a last resort, yet acknowledges its use to gain access in certain situations: “The coordination of civil and military activities is vital and should be designed to ensure and safeguard access by aid organizations to the affected population,” (ADC 2009a, p.19). Austria highlights the need to protect refugees and the displaced (ADC 2009a).

PILLAR 5
LEARNING AND ACCOUNTABILITY

ADA has a quality assurance and knowledge building unit, which can evaluate the content and operational aspects of humanitarian projects and programmes (ADC 2009a). Austria’s policy regarding accountability and transparency is not clear.
RECOMMENDATIONS

❖ RENEW COMMITMENT TO ACCOUNTABILITY

Austria has significant room for improvement in relation to its support for and participation in learning and accountability initiatives. Austria does not participate in any of the humanitarian accountability initiatives included in the indicator and its funding of accountability initiatives is also low: Austria allocated 0.1% of its humanitarian funding to this, compared to the OECD/DAC average of 0.4%.

❖ ENHANCE SUPPORT FOR UN AND RC/RC APPEALS, COORDINATION AND SUPPORT SERVICES AND POOLED FUNDS

Austria received the fifth-lowest score of the OECD/DAC donors for Funding UN and RC/RC appeals, which measures the extent to which donors provide their fair share of funding to UN and Red Cross/Red Crescent (RC/RC) appeals, coordination and support services and pooled funds. Austria scores well below average in all the components that comprise this indicator.

❖ LOOK FOR ADMINISTRATIVE SOLUTIONS TO CHANNEL MORE FUNDING TO NGOs

Austria channelled little funding to NGOs – only 2.5% of its humanitarian aid. This places Austria among the donors that channel the least funding to NGOs, well below the OECD/DAC average of 15.3%. Austria could consider flexible working models to increase its funding to NGOs, such as arranging shared management agreements with other donors, or supporting consortiums.

❖ IMPROVE FLEXIBILITY WHILE STRENGTHENING PROGRAMME MONITORING

Austria provided the vast majority of its funding with earmarking: only 9.0% of its humanitarian funding was provided without earmarking, placing it below the OECD/DAC average of 33.2% and the Group 2 average of 15.2%. This would seem to indicate that Austria should review the flexibility of its funding.
OVERALL PERFORMANCE

Belgium ranked 13th in the HRI 2011, a major improvement from its 18th place ranking in 2010, largely due to significantly higher scores in the quantitative indicators compared to 2010. Based on the patterns of its scores, Belgium is classified as a Group 3 donor, “Aspiring Actors”. Donors in this group tend to have more limited capacity to engage with the humanitarian system at the field level, but often aspire to take on a greater role in the sector. They generally focus on a few core strengths, such as in the area of prevention, preparedness and risk reduction, or on specific geographic regions. Other donors in the group include Australia, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg and Spain.

Belgium’s overall score was below the OECD/DAC average, and also slightly below the Group 3 average. Belgium scored below the OECD/DAC and Group 3 averages in all pillars, with the exception of Pillar 4 (Protection and international law), where it scored below the OECD/DAC average, yet above the Group 3 average. Belgium received its lowest overall score in Pillar 3 (Working with humanitarian partners). Belgium did best compared to its OECD/DAC peers in indicators on Facilitating safe access, Appropriate reporting requirements, Funding vulnerable and forgotten emergencies and Independence of aid. Its scores were relatively the lowest in the indicators on Funding and commissioning evaluations, Participating in accountability initiatives, Funding international risk mitigation, Accountability towards beneficiaries and Timely funding to sudden onset emergencies. Overall, Belgium scored significantly higher on the qualitative, survey-based indicators than on the quantitative indicators.

SOURCES: UN OCHA FTS, OECD StatExtracts, various UN agencies’ annual reports and DARA

All scores are on a scale of 0 to 10. Colours represent performance compared to OECD/DAC donors’ average performance rating:

- Good  
- Mid-range  
- Could improve  
- Non applicable  

Quantitative Indicator  
Qualitative Indicator
AID DISTRIBUTION

In 2010, Belgium’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) comprised 0.64% of its Gross National Income (GNI), up from 0.55% in 2009, yet slightly short of its prior pledge of 0.7% by 2010. Humanitarian assistance represented 7.8% of its ODA, or 0.049% of its GNI. Belgium’s sector-specific funding focused on food, agriculture and protection.

According to data reported to the United Nations (UN) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs’ (OCHA) Financial Tracking Service, Belgium channelled 70.0% of its 2010 humanitarian assistance to UN agencies, 13.5% to non-governmental organisations (NGOs), 11.0% the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement and 1.6% to private organisations and foundations. In 2010, Belgium provided humanitarian assistance to 11 crises in Africa - especially the Great Lakes region, which is prioritised in Belgium’s 2006 Strategy Plan - six crises in Asia and three in the Americas. The Democratic Republic of the Congo, Pakistan and Sudan received the greatest amount of funding in 2010.

POLICY FRAMEWORK

The Directorate-General for Development Cooperation (DGDC), under the Department of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation, manages Belgium’s humanitarian aid. Belgium has recently undergone restructuring whereby most humanitarian assistance now falls under the DGDC with the aim of enhancing opportunities for cooperation with development programmes (OECD/DAC 2010). The 1999 Law on Belgian International Cooperation limits the number of partner countries to 25 (Government of Belgium 2011b). With the exception of food aid, which is governed by the 1999 London Food Aid Convention, Belgium’s current policy is largely based on a 1996 Royal Decree. All funding to NGOs is subject to the decree and must be project-based, with limited implementation periods, and undergo an extensive approval process. Funding to UN agencies and the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement, however, generally does not encounter the same restrictions. The 2006 Strategic Plan for Humanitarian Aid has been able to overcome some of these obstacles. In addition, the Royal Decree has been circumvented to a certain extent by the creation of the Belgian First Aid and Support Team (B-FAST) and increased funding to pooled funds, such as the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) (OECD/DAC 2010). Belgium is currently drafting a new humanitarian aid strategy, which has the potential to accelerate the positive changes already underway in its humanitarian policy framework (Government of Belgium 2011a). Belgium currently has field presence in 18 partner countries where programmes are monitored by relevant Belgian embassies’ development cooperation attachés and are often implemented by Belgian Technical Cooperation (BTC).

HOW DOES BELGIUM’S POLICY ADDRESS GHD CONCEPTS?

GENDER

Both Belgium’s 2006 Strategic Plan and its draft humanitarian strategy contain a number of cross cutting issues, including gender (OECD/DAC 2010). The draft humanitarian strategy emphasises the importance of mainstreaming gender and Belgium’s intention to financially support gender-sensitive approaches in humanitarian situations. Belgium also prioritises sexual reproductive health and rights and has developed a national action plan to ensure implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security (Government of Belgium 2009).
**PILLAR 1
RESPONDING TO NEEDS**

Belgium recognises the importance of a principled, needs-based approach to humanitarian assistance. Its draft humanitarian aid strategy reaffirms Belgium’s commitment to humanitarian principles, including the importance of needs-based humanitarian action, while also acknowledging its limitations to do so due to its comparatively small size. Therefore, Belgium intends to focus on geographic and thematic areas such as the Great Lakes region, food security and protection (Government of Belgium 2011a). Belgium acknowledges the importance of timeliness but is hampered by the limitations of the Royal Decree (DBEO 2008, DBEO 2009). Belgium endeavours to enhance the timeliness of its support by maintaining B-FAST, its rapid response unit and by providing flexible and core funding to multilateral organisations (DBEO 2008 and Government of Belgium 2011a).

**PILLAR 2
PREVENTION, RISK REDUCTION AND RECOVERY**

Belgium’s previous humanitarian policies have highlighted the need to mainstream environmental issues, although this is absent from its draft humanitarian strategy (OECD/DAC 2010 and Government of Belgium 2011). The need for disaster risk reduction and linking relief, rehabilitation and development are expressed in Belgium’s current humanitarian policy, but do not form an integral part thereof as a result of the Royal Decree. This is due to the fact that the decree limits the funding of local capacity building and action by local NGOs. For similar reasons, Belgium is also restrained from promoting disaster preparedness (OECD/DAC 2010). However, the draft humanitarian strategy could bring about significant progress in these issues, as it emphasises the importance of beneficiary participation and local capacity building (Government of Belgium 2011a).

**PILLAR 3
WORKING WITH HUMANITARIAN PARTNERS**

Flexibility and multi-year funding are limited by the Royal Decree, although Belgium has been able to circumvent this to an extent by providing core funding with limited earmarking for multilateral organisations and by contributing to pooled funds, such as the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) (OECD/DAC 2010 and DBEO 2008). The draft humanitarian strategy continues this approach, in addition to narrowing the number of NGO framework partnerships with the aim of increasing flexibility and predictability. Belgium recognises the leading role of UN agencies, particularly OCHA, for the coordination of the humanitarian system (Government of Belgium 2008).
PILLAR 4

PROTECTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

Belgium’s current humanitarian policy makes little mention of protection and international law, although they are addressed to a greater extent in the draft humanitarian strategy, which contains a thematic focus on protection, particularly that of children. The same strategy mentions the importance of international humanitarian law (IHL), refugee law and human rights, in addition to specific UN resolutions, as establishing the international legal framework for humanitarian aid. Belgium intends to advocate against breaches of IHL, and for the security of aid workers and increased humanitarian space (Government of Belgium 2011a).

PILLAR 5

LEARNING AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Belgium’s draft humanitarian strategy lays out plans to provide additional funding to projects and international efforts that build knowledge, particularly in relation to standards. It also affirms its commitment to supporting initiatives such as the Sphere Project and views international standards as an important means to increase transparency (Government of Belgium 2011a). Belgium has its own “Special Development Cooperation Evaluation Unit” (DBEO), which conducts independent evaluations of Belgium as a donor. These evaluations have previously called for an increase in transparency and accountability, as well as a greater focus on evaluations (DBEO 2008 and DBEO 2009), which are reflected in the draft humanitarian strategy. It stresses the importance of applying different methods of evaluation, both internally and for partners (Government of Belgium 2011a), as well as the need for upward and downward accountability.
FIELD PARTNERS’ PERCEPTIONS

BELGIUM’S FIELD PERCEPTION SCORES

Collected questionnaires: 17

Belgium’s average score 5.87

OECD/DAC average score 6.05

SOURCE: DARA

Colours represent performance compared to donor’s average performance rating:

- Good
- Mid-range
- Could improve
HOW IS BELGIUM PERCEIVED BY ITS PARTNERS?

GENDER

Field organisations do not consider Belgium to be strong in ensuring gender-sensitive approaches are integrated in programming. The country received low marks in this regard; some asserted that gender did not seem to be on its agenda.

PILLAR 1
RESPONDING TO NEEDS

Belgium received some of its highest qualitative scores in Pillar 1. The vast majority of Belgium’s field partners felt that its humanitarian aid was neutral, impartial and independent, although a few considered that “Belgium is very much influenced by their politics” and that “Belgium places a high economic conditionality on aid”, but they were in the minority. Organisations in the field held slightly more mixed views regarding Belgium’s verification that programmes respond to changing needs. For example, one organisation praised Belgium, as its “director of cooperation visited Haiti for two weeks, traveling everywhere in the country […] There was a will to understand the needs and see what projects other donors were funding and learn from their experience.” Another agency in a different country reported, however, that Belgium “just checks reports”, while its other donors engaged in monitoring visits.

PILLAR 2
PREVENTION, RISK REDUCTION AND RECOVERY

Belgium’s scores were relatively low in the qualitative indicators that make up Pillar 2. Field perceptions in this pillar were lowest regarding Belgium’s support for prevention, preparedness and risk reduction, followed by beneficiary participation.

PILLAR 3
WORKING WITH HUMANITARIAN PARTNERS

In Pillar 3, Belgium’s field partners were largely positive regarding the flexibility of the country’s funding. One organisation noted that Belgium is “generally accommodating for change”. Most partners also considered that Belgium has sufficient capacity and expertise to make appropriate decisions. They were more critical in relation to Belgium’s support for partners’ organisational capacity and for coordination.
**PILLAR 4**

**PROTECTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW**

In Pillar 4, Belgium’s partners found it to be somewhat weaker in issues related to advocacy, both for protection of civilians and toward governments and local authorities. Facilitating safe access and security of humanitarian workers, on the other hand, was found to be a “top priority”.

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**PILLAR 5**

**LEARNING AND ACCOUNTABILITY**

In Pillar 5, Belgium received one of its highest scores for the appropriateness of its reporting requirements. One organisation highlighted that Belgium was also “generally accommodating with common reporting mechanisms.” Field organisations were much more critical, however, regarding requirements to ensure accountability toward affected populations and the transparency of Belgium’s funding and decision-making.
The following recommendations are based on data from 2010. It remains to be seen how Belgium’s new policy will influence these issues.

- **RENEW COMMITMENT TO ACCOUNTABILITY**

Belgium has room for improvement in its commitment to accountability. Although Belgium financially supports a number of humanitarian accountability initiatives, it received one of the lowest scores of the OECD/DAC donors for its participation in accountability initiatives. Its partners also report that Belgium could do more to ensure accountability toward beneficiaries at the field level, as Belgium received the lowest score for this qualitative indicator. It appears this will be addressed in Belgium’s new strategy, but Belgium would do well to follow-up with field partners to ensure mechanisms for accountability are properly integrated into programmes.

- **ENHANCE USE OF EVALUATIONS**

Belgium received the third-lowest score for Funding and commissioning evaluation, which measures the number of joint and individual evaluations commissioned and the existence of an evaluation policy. Belgium has not yet formalised an evaluation policy and has only commissioned one joint evaluation and two individual evaluations (publicly available) over the past five years. This appears to support the findings of Belgium’s DBEO, which called for a greater focus on evaluations.

- **CONTINUE PROGRESS UNDERWAY TO IMPROVE TIMELINESS**

Belgium has improved substantially the timeliness of its funding to complex emergencies. In 2009, it provided only 4.4% of its funding within the first three months following a humanitarian appeal, while in 2010 it provided 51.4% during this time frame, compared to the OECD/DAC average of 59.4%. It has also improved significantly the speed of its response to sudden onset emergencies, but still has room for improvement. In 2009, Belgium provided 14.9% of its funding within the first six weeks of sudden onset disasters. In 2010, it provided 65.2% of its funding within this period, though it is still below the OECD/DAC average of 80.5%.

- **ENSURE AID MEETS THE DIFFERENT NEEDS OF WOMEN, MEN, BOYS AND GIRLS**

Although Belgium’s policy highlights the importance of gender, its partners indicate the need for greater emphasis on gender-sensitive approaches and follow-up to ensure it is properly integrated into humanitarian programmes.

Please see www.daraint.org for a complete list of references.
Canada ranked 14th in the HRI 2011, improving one position from 2010. Based on the pattern of its scores, Canada is classified as a Group 2 donor, “Learning Leaders”. Donors in this group are characterised by their leading role in support of emergency relief efforts, strong capacity and field presence, and commitment to learning and improvement. They tend to do less well in areas such as prevention, preparedness, and risk reduction efforts. Other Group 2 donors include the European Commission, France, the United Kingdom and the United States.

Overall, Canada’s performance is below the OECD/DAC and Group 2 averages. Canada scored below the OECD/DAC average in all pillars, with the exception of Pillar 4 (Protection and international law), where it was above both the OECD/DAC and Group 2 averages.

Canada was also slightly above its peer group average in Pillar 2 (Working with humanitarian partners), but below the Group 2 average in Pillars 1 (Responding to needs), 2 and 5.

Canada did best compared to its OECD/DAC peers in the indicators on Implementing evaluation recommendations, Beneficiary participation, Strengthening local capacity and Timely funding to partners – all qualitative indicators. Its scores were lowest in indicators on Funding accountability initiatives, Funding reconstruction and prevention, Reducing climate-related vulnerability, Un-earmarked funding and Timely funding to sudden onset emergencies – all quantitative indicators. In fact, overall Canada scored significantly higher on the qualitative, survey-based indicators than on the quantitative indicators.
AID DISTRIBUTION

Canada’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) comprised 0.33% of its Gross National Income (GNI) in 2010. Humanitarian assistance represented 12.2% of its ODA and 0.04% of its GNI (OECD 2010).

According to data reported to the United Nations (UN) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs’ (OCHA) Financial Tracking Service (FTS), in 2010 Canada channelled 69.1% of its humanitarian funding to the

POLICY FRAMEWORK

The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), under the Minister of International Cooperation, is responsible for managing Canada’s development and humanitarian programming. The Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) develops its humanitarian policy and coordinates the response to natural disasters when a whole-of-government response is required, while the International Humanitarian Assistance Directorate (IHA), within CIDA, manages Canada’s operational response to humanitarian crises in developing countries (DFAIT 2011b). The Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) of the Canadian military may also be deployed to provide emergency health and water services for up to 40 days (National Defence 2005, DFAIT 2011b). Other government departments, such as the Department of National Defence and the Privy Council Office, may also participate in operational coordination mechanisms when a whole-of-government approach is required (CIDA 2011a).

Canada lacks a comprehensive humanitarian policy document, but has been one of the leading members of the Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) Principles group, and has a GHD Domestic Implementation Plan. This plan called for a humanitarian assistance policy, which was drafted and consulted with Canadian NGOs, but ultimately not formalised (CCIC 2009). CIDA published the Guidelines for Emergency Humanitarian Assistance Project Proposals and Reports, revised in 2006, and includes the main principles that guide its humanitarian policy on its website (CIDA 2011b). CIDA currently has 49 field offices to respond to development and humanitarian needs in partner countries. Canada’s Aid Effectiveness Action Plan 2009-2012 foresees increasing its field presence and delegating greater authority to field offices.

HOW DOES CANADA’S POLICY ADDRESS GHD CONCEPTS?

GENDER

Canada expresses a firm commitment to gender-sensitive approaches in humanitarian and development policies, and gender is a cross-cutting theme in all programmes. CIDA’s revised Policy on Gender Equality (2010) emphasises Canada’s commitment to gender equality and outlines how to incorporate a gender-sensitive approach in all programmes (CIDA 2010). The Gender Equality Action Plan (2010-2013) lays out goals for Canada’s gender-sensitive policies, and calls for an annual report
CIDA expresses a firm commitment to timely, impartial, independent aid that adapts to changing needs (CIDA 2011b). Canada relies on multiple sources for needs assessments, including those of the UN Disaster Assessment and Coordination Team (UNDAC), calling on its embassies and offices abroad for additional information (DFAIT 2011a). Its Interdepartmental Strategic Support Team (ISST) provides expert analysis in humanitarian situations to support relief efforts (Parliament of Canada 2011). CIDA has expressed its commitment to provide funding to improve needs assessment tools (CIDA 2011a). With the aim of providing timely aid to crisis situations, Canada is a strong supporter of the CERF and has vowed to increase its funding of pooled mechanisms (CIDA 2011b), and accepts abridged proposals from pre-approved NGOs (CIDA 2006). The 2007 DAC Peer Review also states that Canada regularly contributes to the Canadian Red Cross Emergency Disaster Assistance Fund, created to provide a speedy response in times of crisis (OECD/DAC 2007).

Regarding progress on gender equality measures in CIDA’s work (CIDA 2010), Partners must include sex and age disaggregated indicators in funding proposals and reporting, and CIDA encourages the inclusion of gender-sensitive policies (CIDA 2006). The integration of gender into humanitarian aid is guided by CIDA’s toolkit, Gender Equality and Humanitarian Assistance: A Guide to the issues (CIDA 2003), and the results of gender equality institutional assessments CIDA has conducted of its main multilateral partners. Its Framework for Assessing Gender Equality Results also serves as a tool to measure partners’ commitment to gender equality, and was the first of its kind to be released by an OECD country (CIDA 2010). Canada has supported the Gender Standby Capacity (GenCap) project to mainstream gender into humanitarian response (CIDA 2011c). Most significantly, 2011 will see the start of Canada’s action plan for the implementation of UN Security Council resolutions regarding women, peace and security (CIDA 2011a).
conflict prevention programmes under the Global Peace and Security Fund (DFAIT 2011d). Finally, Canada’s Aid Effectiveness Action Plan stresses the need to “more effectively bridge humanitarian, recovery, and longer-term development phases,” (CIDA 2009, p. 6).

**PILLAR 3**

**WORKING WITH HUMANITARIAN PARTNERS**

CIDA commits to provide flexible and predictable funding to humanitarian organisations and to support the coordination and organisational capacities of their partners (CIDA 2011b). Canada has recently taken a series of steps to ensure its funding is more flexible and predictable. As part of its Aid Effectiveness Action Plan, Canada untied 100% of its food aid budget in 2008 (CIDA 2009). Canada also provides multi-year funding to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the CERF (CIDA 2011a). In addition, Canada supported the Policy Action Group for Emergency Response (PAGER), which is intended to enhance policy and operational dialogue among NGOs, the Canadian Red Cross and the Canadian government.

**PILLAR 4**

**PROTECTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW**

CIDA asserts that protection of civilians, promotion of international humanitarian law (IHL), facilitation of access to affected populations and safety of humanitarian workers are priorities for Canada’s humanitarian efforts (CIDA 2006). Apart from funding organisations with a protection mandate, Canada has continuously supported the Protection Standby Capacity (ProCap) project, which supports the strategic and operational protection response of UN agencies (CIDA 2011c). CIDA’s Funding Guidelines state that it will fund proposals that seek to improve the protection and security of the affected population or the dissemination of refugee law and IHL (CIDA 2006). Canada works with humanitarian organisations to improve training and equipment with the aim of supporting the safety of aid workers (DFAIT 2011c). Additionally, Canada has endeavoured to secure extra funding to support security measures in particularly unstable crises (DFAIT 2011c). The *Official Developmental Assistance Act* (2008) requires all Canadian ODA to be provided in line with international human rights standards.

**PILLAR 5**

**LEARNING AND ACCOUNTABILITY**

CIDA has recently taken steps to improve the accountability and transparency of its funding (CIDA 2009). Canada requires all NGOs to perform evaluations of their humanitarian assistance, and CIDA manages the evaluation of programmes it implements directly. As part of the *Official Development Assistance Accountability Act* (2008), CIDA publishes a yearly report to Parliament on its programmes, budgets, and progress on overarching policy goals. Furthermore, all humanitarian projects funded by CIDA are published on an online database, “Project Browser”. Canada commits to continue participating in initiatives like
the Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance (ALNAP) and to provide leadership in groups like the Multilateral Organizations Performance Assessment Network. In 2011, CIDA announced its intention to strengthen the independence of its evaluations by bringing in more outside expertise and conducting more joint evaluations of country-level programmes (CIDA 2011a). Following a disaster requiring a whole-of-government response, DFAIT convenes an interdepartmental meeting to identify actions to improve future responses (DFIAT 2011a).

## FIELD PARTNERS’ PERCEPTIONS

### CANADA’S FIELD PERCEPTION SCORES

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pillar 1</th>
<th>Neutrality and impartiality</th>
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<th>Adapting to changing needs</th>
<th>Timely funding to partners</th>
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Canada’s average score 6.03 ➤ OECD/DAC average score 6.05

Colours represent performance compared to donor’s average performance rating:

- **Good**
- **Mid-range**
- **Could improve**

**Source:** DARA
PILLAR 1
RESPONDING TO NEEDS

Canada’s partners held mixed views regarding the neutrality, impartiality and independence of its aid. Many organisations reported that Canadian aid was “very dependent” on other political, economic or military interests. In particular, multiple organisations reported that CIDA frequently established “no-go” or “no-engagement” policies with certain groups or regions which prevented aid from going where it was needed most. Organisations interviewed held mixed views over Canada’s efforts to ensure the programmes it supports adapt to changing needs. For example, one interviewee asserted that “CIDA doesn’t really care,” and another noted that “CIDA is disengaged with us, they don’t have a real presence here” to be able to verify these details. On a more positive note, organisations appreciated the timeliness of Canada’s funding. Some lauded Canada’s quick reactivity in making more aid available when the humanitarian situation worsened; another reported that Canada was “very good” in terms of timeliness.

PILLAR 2
PREVENTION, RISK REDUCTION AND RECOVERY

In the field, Canada’s partners provided mixed reviews of beneficiary participation. Some pointed to improvement, stating: “This has become more and more important in the last few years. Now it’s a requirement,” and reporting that, contrary to the other donors, “Canada promotes this.” Partners were impressed with CIDA’s engagement with this issue in the field, reporting that CIDA “sent a consultant that went with us to the field,” and that “CIDA came in for a monitoring mission and even organised focus groups with beneficiaries.” On the other hand, others reported that beneficiary participation in monitoring and evaluation was “promoted, but not required,” and many considered that “It’s all just on paper,” and a “tick-off-the-box” requirement. In terms of linking relief to rehabilitation and development, NGOs reported that Canada was unhelpful in this regard because it had very strict definitions of what constituted “humanitarian” versus “development” aid and was unwilling to finance the transition to the latter. For example, one interviewee reported that Canada does not allow construction, which “hinders sustainability,” while another revealed that “Canada considers livelihoods recovery so they don’t want to finance that.”
PILLAR 3
WORKING WITH HUMANITARIAN PARTNERS

Many organisations in the field felt that Canada was fairly flexible in its funding. Interviewees stated that “Canada is excellent for funding four-year plans!” that there was “flexibility within the log frame of the project,” and that CIDA was “generally accommodating for change.” Canada received significantly less favourable reviews in regards to its support of its partners’ organisational capacities, as organisations reported that Canada does not finance this. Many NGOs had positive views of Canada’s capacity to make appropriate decisions, though a few dissented. One organisation complained that CIDA’s field representatives did not participate sufficiently in decisions made at headquarters. On the other hand, another reported that “CIDA has the capacity and experience, and their decisions are appropriate towards the government’s policies.”

PILLAR 4
PROTECTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

Similar to many other donors, Canada’s field partners felt the country was stronger in funding protection of civilians than in advocating for it. Its efforts in advocating toward local authorities to fulfil their responsibilities in response to humanitarian needs was also somewhat weaker, according to field partners, although some pointed to improvement in this area. In one crisis, an NGO affirmed that CIDA “engages closely with the humanitarian coordinator” and local authorities to this end. Partners noted that Canada “requires an access strategy” of its partners, but “does not facilitate it.”

PILLAR 5
LEARNING AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Canada’s partners were largely appreciative of its reporting requirements, although one interviewee noted that “CIDA changes the design and plans of their reporting forms too often.” Most interviewees also praised the transparency of Canada’s funding, although a few pointed to an interesting paradox. While CIDA is “extremely clear” about who it funds, it is reportedly much less transparent about why it funds them. An interviewee revealed they did not understand “why a specific NGO is selected and another one isn’t . . .” and another stated that “Canada at the capital level is completely inaccessible to us . . . we just don’t understand how decisions are taken and what goes on there.” For other matters, however, several organisations lauded Canada’s communication and transparency. Canada’s partners were much more critical regarding accountability toward affected populations and implementation of evaluation recommendations.
RECOMMENDATIONS

◘ PROTECT THE NEUTRALITY, IMPARTIALITY AND INDEPENDENCE OF HUMANITARIAN AID

Canada should engage with its partners to discuss practical measures to ensure the neutrality, impartiality and independence of its humanitarian aid. This is especially important in crises with counter-terrorism operations underway and in crises where Canada adopts integrated approaches. Canada’s partners reported that no-contact policies are inhibiting aid from reaching those most in need. In particular, partners considered Canada’s aid to be less neutral, impartial and independent in Somalia, the occupied Palestinian territories (oPt) and Colombia.

◘ ENHANCE SUPPORT FOR PREVENTION, PREPAREDNESS, RECONSTRUCTION AND EFFORTS TO REDUCE VULNERABILITY

In Pillar 2, Canada scored slightly above average for its support for international risk mitigation mechanisms, but received low scores for Funding reconstruction and prevention and Reducing climate-related vulnerability, indicating the need to place greater importance on preventing and preparing for future crises. In 2009, Canada allocated 14.1% of its humanitarian aid to prevention, preparedness and reconstruction, but dropped to 5.9% in 2010, placing it well below the OECD/DAC average of 18.6%. Regarding climate vulnerability, Canada provided only 36.3% of its fair share to Fast Start Finance, which supports climate change mitigation and adaptation efforts, compared to the OECD/DAC average of 102.4%. Furthermore, Canada has fallen short on its commitments to reduce emissions.

◘ RENEW COMMITMENT TO ACCOUNTABILITY

Consistent with the HRI 2010, Canada received its lowest score of the index in Funding accountability initiatives, an indicator which measures financial support for humanitarian accountability initiatives. In 2009, Canada allocated 0.09% of its humanitarian aid to these initiatives, and dropped to 0.04% in 2010. Canada’s Group 2 peers allocated an average of 0.2% to these initiatives. Similarly, Canada received its second-lowest qualitative score for Accountability toward beneficiaries, indicating that Canada should review its practices related to accountability toward beneficiaries and consider increasing its support for humanitarian accountability initiatives.

◘ CONSIDER EXPANDING CURRENT MEASURES TO EXPEDITE FUNDING

Canada has improved significantly the timeliness of its funding to complex emergencies. In 2009, it provided only 14.4% of its funding within the first three months of a humanitarian appeal. In 2010, it gave 49.3% within this time frame. Canada’s funding to sudden onset disasters has become slower, however. Although Canada was particularly strong in responding quickly to sudden onset disasters in 2009, it was below average in 2010, providing 65.0% of its funding within the first six weeks of a disaster, compared to the OECD/DAC average of 80.5%. Canada’s partners seem to confirm this, rating the country below average for the timeliness of its funding. Canada’s policy of accepting abridged proposals from pre-approved organisations is highly positive. Canada would do well to consider engaging with a greater number of organisations prior to the onset of emergencies to enlarge this programme.

◘ IMPROVE FLEXIBILITY BUT MAINTAIN PROGRAMME MONITORING

Canada received one of its lowest scores in Un-earmarked funding. Canada’s partners seem to confirm this, rating Canada below average for the flexibility of its funding. In 2009, Canada provided 15.2% of its funding without earmarking, but dropped to 12.1% in 2010. The OECD/DAC average was 33.2%. Canada should review the flexibility of its funding and consider taking advantage of its Policy Action Group for Emergency Response (PAGER) to discuss this issue with its partners.

Please see www.daraint.org for a complete list of references.
OVERALL PERFORMANCE

Denmark ranked 2nd in the HRI 2011, dropping one position from 2010. Based on the pattern of its scores, Denmark is classified as a Group 1 donor, “Principled Partners”. This group is characterised by its commitment to humanitarian principles and strong support for multilateral partners, and generally good overall performance in all areas. Other Group 1 donors include Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland.

Denmark’s overall score was above the OECD/DAC and Group 1 averages. Denmark scored above the OECD/DAC and Group 1 averages in all pillars, with the exception of Pillars 2 and 3. In Pillar 2 (Prevention, risk reduction and recovery) Denmark scored above the OECD/DAC average, yet below the Group 1 average. Similarly, in Pillar 3 (Working with humanitarian partners) Denmark scored above the OECD/DAC and slightly below the Group 1 average. Denmark’s performance stands out in Pillar 5 (Learning and accountability), where it scored well above both the OECD/DAC and Group 1 average scores.

DENMARK

Group 1
PRINCIPLED PARTNERS

OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE 0.90% of GNI
HUMANITARIAN AID 6.2% of ODA
US $32 Per person

HUMANITARIAN AID DISTRIBUTION (%)

BY CHANNEL

NGOs 28
Red Cross / Red Crescent 11
Private orgs 2
Govts & inter-govt orgs 2
Other 6

UN 51

BY SECTOR

Food 11
Protection 9
Coordination 6
Education 5
Infrastructure 5
Health 4
Shelter 4
Other 7

UN 51

BY RECIPIENT COUNTRY

Sudan 11
Haiti 11
Pakistan 9
oPt 6
Afghanistan 5
Somalia 4
Others 16

Denmark did best compared to its peers in the indicators on Funding accountability initiatives, Participating in accountability initiatives, Funding NGOs, Funding and commissioning evaluations and Funding UN and RC/RC appeals - all quantitative indicators. Its scores were relatively the lowest in Funding reconstruction and prevention, Timely funding to sudden onset emergencies, Facilitating safe access, Adapting to changing needs and Appropriate reporting requirements.

AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT

Pillar Type Indicator Score % above OECD/DAC average
5 CT Funding accountability initiatives 10.00 +143.1%
5 CT Participating in accountability initiatives 9.44 +111.1%
3 CT Funding NGOs 8.40 +85.3%
5 CT Funding and commissioning evaluations 7.59 +83.4%
3 CT Funding UN and RC/RC appeals 7.21 +77.3%

Pillar Type Indicator Score % below OECD/DAC average
2 CT Funding reconstruction and prevention 3.01 -32.9%
1 CT Timely funding to sudden onset emergencies 7.64 -5.2%
4 CL Facilitating safe access 4.94 -3.0%
1 CL Adapting to changing needs 6.12 -2.4%
5 CL Appropriate reporting requirements 7.01 -1.1%

SOURCES: UN OCHA FTS, OECD StatExtracts, various UN agencies’ annual reports and DARA

All scores are on a scale of 0 to 10. Colours represent performance compared to OECD/DAC donors’ average performance rating:

↑ Good □ Mid-range □ Could improve □ Non applicable ▲ Quantitative Indicator □ Qualitative Indicator
AID DISTRIBUTION

Danish Official Development Assistance (ODA) increased from 0.88% of Gross National Income (GNI) in 2009 to 0.90% in 2010. Humanitarian assistance represented 6.2% of Denmark’s ODA in 2010, or 0.056% of its GNI.

According to data reported to the United Nations (UN) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs’ (OCHA) Financial Tracking Service (FTS) (2011), Denmark channelled 51.0% of its 2010 humanitarian aid to United Nations (UN) agencies (2011), 27.7% to non-governmental organisations (NGOs), 11.0% to the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement, 1.8% to private organisations and foundations and 0.8% bilaterally to affected governments. Denmark contributed 3.8% of its total humanitarian aid to the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF), 3.2% to Common Humanitarian Funds and 2.2% to Emergency Response Funds. In 2010, Denmark supported a total of 29 emergencies: 16 in Africa, 11 in Asia and two in the Americas. The top three countries receiving Danish humanitarian aid in 2010 were Sudan, Haiti and Pakistan. Sectorally, Denmark concentrated its funding on food and protection, human rights and rule of law initiatives (OCHA FTS 2011).

POLICY FRAMEWORK

Denmark’s humanitarian aid is managed by the Danish International Development Agency (Danida) and the Department of Humanitarian Assistance and NGO Co-operation, both of which fall under the umbrella of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). Denmark’s 2002 Strategic Priorities for Humanitarian Assistance lays out overarching guidelines for Denmark’s humanitarian action and the Strategy for Danish Humanitarian Action 2010-2015: Addressing Vulnerability, Climate Change, and Protection Challenges sets forth specific objectives for the coming years. The strategy intends to address current challenges to humanitarian aid and outline Denmark’s approach, key directions and priorities that will be used to translate the strategy into action. Danish embassies coordinate humanitarian aid, often for multiple crises in the region. Embassies in Afghanistan, Syria, Pakistan and Namibia are especially involved in overseeing humanitarian efforts in their regions (MFA 2011).
Denmark’s humanitarian policy shows a strong commitment to administering timely aid along the lines of neutrality and impartiality, with a focus on the most vulnerable populations (MFA 2009). Denmark states that funding will be provided to partners who can provide the fastest relief in emergency situations. Furthermore, Denmark commits to engage in dialogue with partners on how to strengthen focus on vulnerability, including marginalised groups, displaced people and persons with disabilities. A small reserve fund is made available annually through Danish embassies for rapid response activities (MFA 2009).

Denmark’s policy, Strategy for Danish Humanitarian Action 2010-2015: Addressing Vulnerability, Climate Change and Protection Challenges, lays out its commitment to prevention, risk reduction and recovery. The 2002 Strategic Priorities for Humanitarian Assistance also highlights the importance of disaster and conflict prevention in humanitarian efforts. Danida aims to implement the Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015 into its humanitarian and development initiatives, while identifying, assessing and monitoring disaster risks and enhancing early warning (MFA 2009). Furthermore, Denmark developed Guidelines for Disaster Risk Reduction in Danish Development and Humanitarian Assistance in 2007, providing specific objectives and plans to integrate disaster risk reduction through Denmark’s aid. Denmark considers beneficiary participation in programming a priority when selecting humanitarian partners (MFA 2009). A new development policy, Freedom from Poverty – Freedom to Change, was put in place in 2010 and calls for greater integration between humanitarian and development activities (MFA 2010).
PILLAR 3
WORKING WITH HUMANITARIAN PARTNERS

In its 2010-2015 humanitarian strategy, the MFA recognises that it can only achieve its humanitarian objectives by working closely with a range of different partners. With the aim of increasing funding predictability and operational flexibility, Denmark has entered into Partnership Framework Agreements with UN agencies and a range of humanitarian NGOs with in-depth knowledge and experience in specific areas (MFA 2009). Denmark has also expressed its continued support for OCHA.

PILLAR 4
PROTECTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

Denmark’s humanitarian strategy states that protection of civilians should be based on the global framework of international humanitarian law, human rights law, refugee law and the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. The MFA also pledges to strengthen its use of humanitarian diplomacy as an active tool for humanitarian access to people at risk (MFA 2009). By working with EU partners and other relevant forums, Denmark attempts to improve access to vulnerable populations and increase the safety of humanitarian aid workers, especially national staff (MFA 2009). In terms of advocacy, Denmark seeks to increase its own efforts and encourage other donors and organisations to do the same by engaging in dialogue with international actors, governments, authorities and other parties.

PILLAR 5
LEARNING AND ACCOUNTABILITY

As a supporter of the Humanitarian Accountability Partnership (HAP) standards, Denmark’s humanitarian policy advocates for accountability toward affected populations (MFA 2009). In an effort to enhance learning, the MFA states that it will establish partnerships with research institutions that can assist in promoting learning and innovation within the humanitarian community (MFA 2009). Implementation of Denmark’s humanitarian strategy will be subject to independent mid-term review in 2012 and evaluation in 2015 (MFA 2009). The MFA affirms that its funding for humanitarian partner organisations is based on a set of transparent selection criteria (MFA 2009).
FIELD PARTNERS’ PERCEPTIONS

DENMARK’S FIELD PERCEPTION SCORES

Collected questionnaires: 28

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<th>PILLAR 1</th>
<th>Neutrality and impartiality</th>
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<th>Overall perception of performance</th>
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SOURCE: DARA

OECD/DAC average score 6.05
Denmark’s average score 6.56

Colours represent performance compared to donor’s average performance rating:

- Good
- Mid-range
- Could improve

HOW IS DENMARK PERCEIVED BY ITS PARTNERS?

PILLAR 1

RESPONDING TO NEEDS

Field partners were largely positive regarding the neutrality, impartiality, independence of Denmark’s humanitarian assistance. Most partners reported that Denmark provides funding on time and that responding to needs is a priority. “For Danida, the priority is the community and how the project is addressing their needs,” stated one organisation.
PILLAR 2
PREVENTION, RISK REDUCTION AND RECOVERY

Pillar 2 encompasses many of Denmark’s lower scores when compared to its overall qualitative average. In general, all donors scored lower on the qualitative indicators on Strengthening local capacity, Beneficiary participation, and Prevention and risk reduction, and Denmark is no exception. Nevertheless, Denmark’s scores were better than most. “Denmark scores the highest in my opinion,” stated one organisation, after describing a Danida project that was implemented with a local womens group. Other organisations reported that Denmark requires a local capacity assessment before and after programme implementation. Another stated that Denmark requires partners to show that programmes do not contribute to the conflict and to take measures to avoid putting beneficiaries in potentially harmful situations.

PILLAR 3
WORKING WITH HUMANITARIAN PARTNERS

Field partners consider that Denmark is a flexible donor, supportive of coordination and with the capacity and expertise to make appropriate decisions. Perceptions were less positive regarding Denmark’s support for organisational capacity in areas like preparedness, response and contingency planning. While one interviewee criticized the lack of support in this area, another reported that Denmark provides funding for training and emergency stocks.

PILLAR 4
PROTECTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

According to field partners, Denmark is highly supportive in relation to providing funding for protection. Feedback was less positive, however, regarding the country’s engagement in advocacy for protection, as well as toward local authorities, perhaps because several organisations noted that Denmark relies on the European Union to carry out this function.

PILLAR 5
LEARNING AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Field interviews indicate that Denmark’s partners regard highly its practices in terms of transparency and reporting. “Danida’s reporting requirements are a little stricter and the design is better than most,” responded one representative. Another organisation added to this by stating that Denmark makes efforts to clearly explain reporting procedures. In general, most donors received low scores for Implementing evaluation recommendations and Accountability toward beneficiaries. Denmark, in comparison, stood out for some field partners. One noted, “Danida scores off the charts in this category,” commenting on the country’s efforts to work with partners to implement evaluation recommendations.
RECOMMENDATIONS

**ENHANCE SUPPORT FOR PREVENTION, PREPAREDNESS, RISK REDUCTION AND RECONSTRUCTION**

Denmark’s partners rated the country highly for its support for prevention, preparedness and risk reduction. It also received one of the best scores of the OECD/DAC donors for the quantitative indicator, *Funding international risk mitigation*. However, similar to most of its Group 1 peers, Denmark received a low score for the quantitative indicator, *Funding reconstruction and prevention*. This was also one of Denmark’s weaknesses in 2009, when it allocated 12.8% of its humanitarian aid to reconstruction and prevention. In 2010, it dropped to 12.0%, while OECD/DAC donors allocated an average of 18.6% of humanitarian aid to these issues.

**LOOK FOR WAYS TO IMPROVE MONITORING OF PROGRAMMES**

Denmark scored slightly below average in *Adapting to changing needs*, a qualitative, survey-based indicator regarding donor verification that programmes adapt to changing needs. Its scores were especially low in Kenya and Somalia. It received a higher score in Pakistan, where it has field presence and is a member of the International Humanitarian Partnership. Denmark also received a fairly good score in Sudan, despite not having field presence. It should endeavor to improve monitoring to ensure consistently that the programmes it supports adapt to changing needs.

**EXPLORE OPTIONS TO EXPEDITE FUNDING TO SUDDEN ONSET EMERGENCIES**

Denmark is the second-fastest donor to respond to complex emergencies, but could improve the timeliness of its funding to sudden onset emergencies. This indicator measures the percentage of funding provided within the first six weeks following the disaster. Denmark provided 76.4% of its funding within this time frame, compared to the OECD/DAC average of 80.5% and the Group 1 average of 84.1%.

**ENHANCE SUPPORT FOR HUMANITARIAN ACCESS AND THE SAFETY OF HUMANITARIAN WORKERS**

Despite Denmark’s strong policies regarding humanitarian access and safety of humanitarian workers, its partners scored the country below average on this indicator. Its score was substantially lower in Pakistan and substantially higher in the occupied Palestinian territories. Denmark should engage in dialogue with its partners to discuss the reasons behind the variation and strive to support humanitarian access and the safety of humanitarian workers consistently.

[Please see www.daraint.org for a complete list of references.]
The European Commission (EC) ranked 7th in the HRI 2011, dropping one position from 2010. Based on the pattern of its scores, the EC is classified as a Group 2 donor, “Learning Leaders”. Donors in this group are characterised by their leading role in support of emergency relief efforts, strong capacity and field presence, and commitment to learning and improvement. They tend to do less well in areas such as prevention, preparedness, and risk reduction efforts. Other Group 2 donors include Canada, France, the United Kingdom and the United States.

The EC’s overall score is above the OECD/DAC and Group 2 averages. The EC scored above the OECD/DAC and Group 2 averages on all pillars, with the exception of Pillar 1 (Responding to needs), where it scored below the OECD/DAC and Group 2 averages. In all pillars, the EC scores significantly higher in the qualitative, survey-based indicators than in the quantitative indicators.

The EC did best compared to its OECD/DAC peers in the indicators on Funding NGOs, Participating in accountability initiatives, Funding accountability initiatives, Implementing evaluation recommendations and Facilitating safe access. Its scores were relatively the lowest in indicators on Un-earmarked funding, Timely funding to sudden onset emergencies, Timely funding to complex emergencies, Flexibility of funding and Appropriate reporting requirements.
AID DISTRIBUTION

Humanitarian assistance represented 13% of the European Commission’s (EC) Official Development Assistance (ODA) in 2010.

According to data reported to the United Nations (UN) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs’ (OCHA) Financial Tracking Service (FTS) (2011), in 2010, the EC channelled 41.5% of its humanitarian aid to non-governmental organisations (NGOs), 41.1% to UN agencies, 10.9% to the Red Crescent/Red Cross Movement, 4.9% to intergovernmental organisations and 0.9% to private organisations and foundations. The EC provided humanitarian assistance to a total of 76 crises in 2010: 30 in Africa, 26 in Asia and 13 in the Americas, five in Europe, and two in Oceania. Pakistan, Sudan and Haiti received the largest amount of assistance in 2010.

POLICY FRAMEWORK

The EC’s humanitarian aid is managed by the Directorate-General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (DG ECHO). ECHO is supported by contributions from 27 EU member states and is complementary to the countries’ individual allocations for humanitarian assistance. The European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid specifically highlights the importance of gender-sensitive approaches, and ECHO operates under a mandate laid out in European Council Regulation No. 1257/96, through EC Budget Title 23. Additional humanitarian funding come from both the budget line for emergency aid to African-Caribbean-Pacific countries within the European Development Fund and from an Emergency Aid Reserve, which allows funds to be rapidly allocated to unanticipated crises. ECHO’s current humanitarian policy is outlined in the 2007 European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid, its corresponding Consensus Action Plan (2008) and Mid-term review of the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid Action Plan (2010) and an annual strategy document. ECHO has also developed sectoral policies for its humanitarian aid. The EC places great importance on humanitarian aid, and to this end, appointed a Commissioner solely for this purpose (European Commission 2010a, p.3). ECHO maintains 50 field offices: 22 in Sub-Saharan Africa, 17 in Asia, five in the Middle-East & North Africa, four in Latin America/Caribbean, and two in Europe. Humanitarian assistance represented 12.00% of the European Commission’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) in 2010.

HOW DOES THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S POLICY ADDRESS GHD CONCEPTS?

GENDER

The EC has committed to systematically consider gender and women’s different needs and promote their active participation (European Commission 2008). It also acknowledges, however, that “it has supported specific projects on an ad hoc basis, without developing a gender policy” (European Commission 2008). The European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid specifically highlights the importance of gender-sensitive approaches, and ECHO foresaw the creation of gender policy for humanitarian aid at the end of 2010, but it has not been published as of yet. ECHO conducted a Review of Gender Issues Including Strategies Against Gender-Based Violence in Humanitarian Interventions in 2009. Additionally, the European Commission stated, “DG ECHO will continue to work on a systematic framework for dealing with gender issues in general and sexual violence in particular. The issue will be mainstreamed in regional response strategies where necessary,” (2010a, p.6).
PI LLAR 1
RESPONDING TO NEEDS

ECHO has developed a Global Needs Assessment and Forgotten Crisis Assessment as tools to allocate funding. The Global Needs Assessment uses a vulnerability index to identify the most vulnerable countries and a crisis index to identify countries experiencing humanitarian crises (European Commission 2010b). Maintaining adequate funding especially for protracted crises is considered a key challenge in the Mid-term Review of the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid Action Plan (European Commission 2010c). The EC expresses a firm commitment to humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence, including for its civil protection forces (European Council, European Parliament and European Commission 2007). ECHO also affirms that military forces should only be used as a last resort to maintain the neutrality and independence of humanitarian action (European Council, European Parliament and European Commission 2007). With regards to the timeliness of funding, “ECHO uses ‘primary emergency decision’ which is a unique tool that allows the Commission to provide funds of up to €3 million almost immediately (a decision must be adopted within 72 hours of the event that provoked the crisis),” (Europa 2007, p.5).

PI LLAR 2
PREVENTION, RISK REDUCTION AND RECOVERY

ECHO supports disaster risk reduction (DRR) through the creation of its Disaster Preparedness ECHO (DIPECHO) programme and the development of a related policy, the EU Strategy for Supporting Disaster Risk Reduction in Developing Countries 2009, which describes its intention to support community-based preparedness activities, mainstream DRR into humanitarian and development aid, engage in advocacy and provide funding for this purpose (Commission of the European Communities 2009). To address transitional activities, the EC uses the Instrument for Stability, which allows for a rapid financial response while linking short-term crisis response and long term development assistance (European Council, European Parliament and European Commission 2007, p.10). The Mid-term Review states that participatory approaches increase local ownership, strengthen local capacity, and increase the effectiveness and appropriateness of humanitarian response (European Commission 2010c). This document also acknowledges that “there remains scope for consolidating collective EU efforts and strengthening individual donor commitment on some key challenges including a stronger commitment to promoting the role of local actors,” (European Commission 2010c, pp. 5-6).
PILLAR 3
WORKING WITH HUMANITARIAN PARTNERS

The EC underscores the need for flexible humanitarian funding. ECHO has a Financial and Administrative Framework Agreement with multiple UN agencies and Framework Partnership Agreements with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) (European Commission 2011). The EC highlights its responsibility to coordinate on multiple fronts, and unique role in uniting European countries. The EC also affirms its support for OCHA and encourages “broad participation in and flexible use of ‘the Cluster Approach,’” (European Council, European Parliament and European Commission 2007, p.6). Additionally, ECHO highlights its permanent field presence as a means of coordination (European Council, European Parliament and European Commission 2007, pp.7-8).

PILLAR 4
PROTECTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

The EC considers international humanitarian law (IHL) a priority and provides funding to partner organisations with this mandate (European Commission 2010a). The EC expresses its concern for the decreasing respect for IHL, as it limits access to vulnerable populations and increases security risks for humanitarian workers (European Council, European Parliament and European Commission 2007, p.1). In 2009, the European Commission published Humanitarian Protection: DG ECHO’s funding guidelines regarding funding and monitoring protection-related humanitarian projects. Humanitarian aid and civil protection are the responsibility of the same Commission department and Commissioner but have separate strategy documents (European Commission 2010a, p.3). The Mid-term Review points to progress toward “ensuring full complementarity and maximum synergies between traditional humanitarian aid approaches and the use of civil protection expertise and assets,” (European Commission 2010c, p.4) and lists the advantages of civil protection resources, while stating the risk of compromising humanitarian principles through collaboration with civil protection forces. Access is a defining criterion in selecting implementing partners (European Council, European Parliament and European Commission 2007, p.6). Refugee law is not specifically highlighted in ECHO’s humanitarian policy, and human rights are only briefly addressed as a related policy field.

PILLAR 5
LEARNING AND ACCOUNTABILITY

The European Commission reports that it is required “to regularly assess humanitarian aid operations financed by the Community in order to establish whether they have achieved their objectives and to produce guidelines for improving the effectiveness of subsequent operations,” (European Commission 2010d). ECHO conducts evaluations of its operations, as well as evaluations on a thematic basis and of its...
partnerships. The European Commission states that “accountability and transparency vis a vis the... ultimate beneficiary is ensured by the process of setting priorities, providing humanitarian aid, reviewing and refocusing areas for funding as necessary, and ceasing activities when appropriate,” (2010a). Additionally, “accountability, including reporting transparently on results” is listed as a defining criterion for selecting implementing partners (European Council, European Parliament and European Commission 2007, p.6). The European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid states that humanitarian aid should be based on minimum standards of assistance and protection and that partners should adhere to the same standards (European Council, European Parliament and European Commission 2007). Additionally, ECHO reaffirms its commitment to jointly assess the implementation of the Principles of Good Humanitarian Donorship as well as Good Humanitarian Partnership (European Council, European Parliament and European Commission 2007, p.24).

FIELD PARTNERS’ PERCEPTIONS

EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S FIELD PERCEPTION SCORES

Collected questionnaires: 159

| PILLAR 1          | Neutrality and impartiality | 8.11 |
|                  | Independence of aid         | 7.12 |
|                  | Adapting to changing needs | 7.83 |
|                  | Timely funding to partners  | 6.85 |
| PILLAR 2         | Strengthening local capacity| 6.12 |
|                  | Beneficiary participation    | 5.90 |
|                  | Linking relief to rehabilitation and development | 5.35 |
|                  | Prevention and risk reduction | 5.61 |
| PILLAR 3         | Flexibility of funding      | 4.63 |
|                  | Strengthening organisational capacity | 5.97 |
|                  | Supporting coordination     | 7.91 |
|                  | Donor capacity and expertise | 7.95 |
| PILLAR 4         | Advocacy towards local authorities | 6.60 |
|                  | Funding protection of civilians | 6.69 |
|                  | Advocacy for protection of civilians | 6.55 |
|                  | Facilitating safe access    | 6.55 |
| PILLAR 5         | Accountability towards beneficiaries | 5.01 |
|                  | Implementing evaluation recommendations | 5.81 |
|                  | Appropriate reporting requirements | 6.60 |
|                  | Donor transparency          | 6.52 |
|                  | Gender sensitive approach   | 6.23 |
|                  | Overall perception of performance | 7.01 |

SOURCE: DARA

Colours represent performance compared to donor’s average performance rating:

- Good
- Mid-range
- Could improve

OECD/DAC average score 6.05
European Commission’s average score 6.45
HOW IS THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION PERCEIVED BY ITS PARTNERS?

GENDER

EC/ECHO's efforts to ensure programmes integrate gender-sensitive approaches received mixed feedback from field partners. Some organisations seem to consider it a requirement on paper that is not taken as seriously as it should be. For example, one interview felt that it “is not an imperative demand from ECHO at all.” Another noted that they “ask us for gender approaches in our proposals, but they never verify it. It’s not a real gender policy, they just target women because of their vulnerability, like the handicapped, but it’s not that important.”

PILLAR 1
RESPONDING TO NEEDS

Similar to most donors, the European Commission’s field partners gave high marks for its performance in Pillar 1. Field partners largely consider its humanitarian aid neutral, impartial and independent. One organisation stated, “ECHO is the least restrictive donor in contexts dealing with non-state actors, like in oPt and Somalia,” a sentiment many others shared. Another expressed appreciation for EC/ECHO taking a stand to support humanitarian principles. Its partners are also highly positive regarding EC/ECHO’s efforts to ensure the programmes it funds adapt to changing needs, although a few felt it could be “too interventionist” in internal decisions. Feedback was mostly positive regarding the timeliness of funding, although there were a few reports of delays: “ECHO funding is not on time. Even big NGOs are in trouble... up to four months delay in implementation.”

PILLAR 2
PREVENTION, RISK REDUCTION AND RECOVERY

Compared to other donors, the EC/ECHO performed well in the qualitative indicators that comprise Pillar 2. However, it encompasses some of the EC’s lowest qualitative scores. Some of the EC/ECHO’s field partners provided negative feedback of its support for transitional activities: “ECHO has a very big barrier between development and humanitarian,” and “[they] don’t adapt the response to actual needs now. It’s time to assure transition to development.” Feedback on beneficiary participation was mixed. On the one hand, some organisations praised EC/ECHO for ensuring beneficiary participation: “they [other donors] ask us for it but they never verify it. ECHO, however, is more demanding on beneficiary participation,” and “with the exception of ECHO, no donor prioritizes beneficiary participation.” Another organisation, however, observed that “ECHO's requirement on beneficiary participation is limited to the implementation stage,” though partner organisations held differing opinions in this regard. Others reported greater interest in beneficiary participation in monitoring and evaluation.
PILLAR 3
WORKING WITH HUMANITARIAN PARTNERS

Partner organisations expressed appreciation for the EC/ECHO’s capacity and expertise. “Their knowledge of the context is great,” affirmed one interviewee. Another noted that EC/ECHO “comes and speaks with you… and provides you with knowledge from other contexts.” In fact, EC/ECHO received the highest score of all donors for this, and also its second-highest qualitative score. Partners also praised EC/ECHO’s support for coordination. One organisation indicated that EC/ECHO “tries to go beyond its limits” and participates in “weekly coordination meetings with all actors, information sharing and is involved in the field’s mechanisms.” Feedback was more critical regarding the flexibility of funding and support for organisational capacity in areas like preparedness, response and contingency planning: “ECHO does not support strengthening of organisational skills.”

PILLAR 4
PROTECTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

Partners in the field were mostly positive regarding support for protection. One organisation observed that it has changed over time: “ECHO has evolved significantly the support they provide for protection of civilian activities. Originally they refused to fund protection activities and now they do.” In comparison, partner feedback was less positive for its advocacy for protection – a trend common to many donors. Field partners generally gave high marks for EC/ECHO’s efforts to obtain access: “they support the UN access team which is very useful for NGOs,” although several disagreed. One interviewee considered that “ECHO could do more in terms of humanitarian space in buffer zone and Gaza restricted areas,” and another added “ECHO does not support humanitarian access.”

PILLAR 5
LEARNING AND ACCOUNTABILITY

EC/ECHO received some of its lowest scores for Accountability toward beneficiaries and Implementing evaluation recommendations, although it outperformed other donors in these indicators. When asked about requirements for accountability toward beneficiaries, one interviewee asserted that “ECHO is more dynamic, has more imagination to include beneficiaries’ voices in its programmes.” In Somalia, however, one organisation reported that they “do not require accountability to beneficiaries. They just audit the funds but do not go beyond.” Perceptions of the appropriateness of reporting requirements were mixed. Here, EC/ECHO scored below most donors on this indicator, yet close to the average of its qualitative scores. Most organisations agreed that EC/ECHO had highly meticulous reporting requirements. The disagreement lied in whether this level of rigor was appropriate. Some organisations complained of “onerous reporting requirements which lose sight of the core humanitarian mandate,” while others considered that “ECHO could simplify the reporting requirements, but they are right in being so strict,” and “if all donors were like ECHO, the system would work better, but we would need one person for reporting only.”
RECOMMENDATIONS

- **IMPROVE FLEXIBILITY AND REPORTING**

EC/ECHO is considered a strong donor with the best capacity and expertise of the OECD/DAC donors. However, feedback from partners and data in the quantitative indicators suggest that it could improve in several administrative areas, such as flexibility of funding and reporting requirements. For example, EC/ECHO’s partners rated it poorly for the flexibility of funding. The related quantitative indicators seem to confirm this, as EC/ECHO received the lowest score of the OECD/DAC donors for Un-earmarked funding, which measures the percentage of humanitarian funding provided without earmarking to ICRC, UNHCR, WFP, OHCHR, UNICEF, IFRC, OCHA and UNRWA. EC/ECHO provided 2.9% of its humanitarian funding without earmarking to these organisations in 2010, less than in 2009, when it gave 3.4% without earmarking and well below the OECD/DAC average of 33.2%. Furthermore, partners consider EC/ECHO’s reporting requirements to be among the most rigorous. While they disagreed over whether or not this was appropriate, even those organisations that appreciated the meticulousness affirmed that at least one staff member was required to dedicate their time to comply with EC/ECHO’s reporting requirements.

- **ENSURE COHERENCE BETWEEN EC AND ECHO TO SUPPORT TRANSITIONAL ACTIVITIES**

Some partners indicated difficulty linking relief to rehabilitation and development, though it appears to vary according to the crisis. EC/ECHO obtained its lowest scores for this in Somalia and Pakistan, where partners reported that transitional activities fell in a gap outside of ECHO’s mandate, which did not facilitate a continuum of funding with the EC to ensure these activities were covered.

- **EXPLORE OPTIONS TO EXPEDITE FUNDING DISBURSEMENT**

EC/ECHO could improve the timeliness of its funding. It provided 53.5% of its funding within the first six weeks of sudden onset emergencies in 2010, while the OECD/DAC average was 80.5%. Timely funding to sudden onset emergencies was a former strength of the EC/ECHO in the 2009, but its funding for complex emergencies has been slower in 2010. The EC/ECHO provided 48.8% of its funding to complex emergencies within the first three months of a humanitarian appeal, making it the slowest of its group whose average is 64.0%.

Please see www.daraint.org for a complete list of references.
OVERALL PERFORMANCE

Finland ranked 9th in the HRI 2011, improving two positions from 2010. Based on the pattern of its scores, Finland is classified as a Group 1 donor, “Principled Partners”. This group is characterised by its commitment to humanitarian principles and strong support for multilateral partners, and generally good overall performance in all areas. Other Group 1 donors include Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland.

Overall, Finland scored above the OECD/DAC average, yet below the Group 1 average. Compared to OECD/DAC donors, Finland scored above average in all pillars, with the exception of Pillar 3 (Working with humanitarian partners) and Pillar 5 (Learning and accountability). It was below the Group 1 average in all pillars, except for Pillar 4 (Protection and international law), where it was above average.

Finland did best compared to its OECD/DAC peers in the indicators on Funding reconstruction and prevention, Refugee law, Accountability towards beneficiaries, Funding vulnerable and forgotten emergencies and Advocacy for protection of civilians. Its scores were relatively the lowest in the indicators on Participating in accountability initiatives, Prevention and risk reduction, Timely funding to complex emergencies, Adapting to changing needs and Strengthening local capacity.

SOURCES: UN OCHA FTS, OECD StatExtracts, various UN agencies’ annual reports and DARA

All scores are on a scale of 0 to 10. Colours represent performance compared to OECD/DAC donors’ average performance rating:
AID DISTRIBUTION

Finnish Official Development Assistance (ODA) increased slightly from 2010 as a proportion of its Gross National Income (GNI): rising from 0.54% in 2009 to 0.55% in 2010. Humanitarian assistance represented 19.6% of its 2010 ODA, or 0.061% of its GNI.

According to data reported to the United Nations (UN) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs’ (OCHA) Financial Tracking Service (FTS) (2011), Finland channelled 70.4% of its 2010 humanitarian aid to United Nations (UN) agencies, 18.0% to the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement and 9.2% to non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Finland also supported the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) and Common Humanitarian Fund (CHF). In 2010, Finland supported 31 crises with humanitarian assistance: 15 in Africa, 12 in Asia and four in the Americas. Pakistan, Haiti and Sudan received the largest percentages of Finland’s humanitarian aid in 2010.

POLICY FRAMEWORK

The Unit for Humanitarian Assistance, within the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFA), manages Finland’s humanitarian assistance. In April 2007, the government published a revised humanitarian policy based on the Principles of Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD). These Humanitarian Assistance Guidelines strongly emphasize the need to focus on the most vulnerable communities in both disasters and armed conflicts (MFA 2007). Humanitarian assistance falls within the development budget and is allocated by the Department for Development Policy. Finland intends to allocate 70% of its humanitarian funding early in the year, and the remaining funds in the final quarter to respond to humanitarian needs assessed by field representatives or humanitarian agencies in respective countries of crisis. Aid decisions are based on individual proposals from partner organisations, which state the target groups, plans and estimated costs for providing aid. The MFA also retains a small reserve to respond to sudden onset emergencies.

HOW DOES FINLAND’S POLICY ADDRESS GHD CONCEPTS?

GENDER

Finland’s humanitarian policy recognizes the importance of a comprehensive inclusion of gender awareness in all of its humanitarian activities. It particularly points out that women’s special needs must be addressed in crises situations and that women must be guaranteed the right to participate actively in humanitarian decision-making. Finland also supports the active implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security in all humanitarian operations, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs recently announced that it will triple its funding to UN Women (MFA 2011).

PILLAR 1

RESPONDING TO NEEDS

Finland’s humanitarian policy, Humanitarian Assistance Guidelines, states that it will adhere to the humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence when administering humanitarian aid (MFA 2007). It also emphasises the need to focus on least developed
countries and the poorest and most vulnerable within these countries. The policy also promotes ways in which Finnish NGOs and experts can participate in programmes funded by the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (ECHO) that focus on forgotten and underfunded crises. Finland seeks to improve the timeliness of its funding by supporting pooled funding mechanisms, such as the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF).

**PILLAR 2**

**PREVENTION, RISK REDUCTION AND RECOVERY**

According to its humanitarian policy, Finland aims to promote disaster prediction and preparedness by supporting international initiatives for disaster risk reduction such as the *Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015*. Finland’s policy stresses that local communities have the right to participate in every phase of humanitarian action, especially in sudden-onset disasters. The *Humanitarian Assistance Guidelines* state that Finland will link relief to rehabilitation and development (LRRD) within its humanitarian initiatives and that beneficiary participation in programming will be essential to this process (MFA 2007). Both Finnish humanitarian and development policies recognise the dangers of climate change, especially in already vulnerable countries, and call for greater international attention to the issue (MFA 2007).

**PILLAR 3**

**WORKING WITH HUMANITARIAN PARTNERS**

Finland’s *Humanitarian Assistance Guidelines* express support for coordination among humanitarian actors (MFA 2007). Given Finland’s relatively small field presence and limited capacities, the Finnish MFA supports the UN’s central role in coordination efforts and strongly encourages its partners to participate in sectors or clusters to avoid gaps or duplication of efforts. *Humanitarian Assistance Guidelines* also emphasise the importance of flexibility of humanitarian aid (MFA 2007). Finland bases its decision making on recommendations from humanitarian agencies in the field and states that it will enhance dialogue and exchange of information with UN agencies and other donors, and increase visits to headquarters and field offices to consult with workers in crisis areas.

**PILLAR 4**

**PROTECTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW**

Finland bases the legal framework of its humanitarian policy on the fundamentals of international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law. It cites the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and its protocols as the most important source for international humanitarian law. The *Humanitarian Assistance Guidelines* state that Finland is currently working to promote coordination between European Union (EU) civil protection mechanism and the UN in humanitarian operations in developing countries; however, no specific steps are mentioned (MFA 2007). Finland also expresses its support for OCHA’s approach in the use of military and civilian defence assets in disaster relief, as well as the Oslo Guidelines for the use of military assets in humanitarian action. It is not clear from Finland’s humanitarian policy if it engages in advocacy toward local authorities, or delegates this to the EU.
PILLAR 5
LEARNING AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Finland’s The Humanitarian Assistance Guidelines highlight the need to further develop its monitoring and evaluation capacities (MFA 2007). Harmonising reporting requirements is also a stated objective for Finland, and its policy mentions the need to increase the country’s research in humanitarian aid. However, Finland’s official policy on transparency of funding and accountability towards beneficiaries is not clear.

FIELD PARTNERS’ PERCEPTIONS

FINLAND’S FIELD PERCEPTION SCORES

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| Pillar 2 | Strengthening local capacity | 4.68 |
| | Beneficiary participation | 6.53 |
| | Linking relief to rehabilitation and development | 2.99 |
| | Prevention and risk reduction | 7.73 |

| Pillar 3 | Flexibility of funding | 7.73 |
| | Strengthening organisational capacity | 7.73 |
| | Supporting coordination | 7.73 |
| | Donor capacity and expertise | 7.73 |

| Pillar 4 | Advocacy towards local authorities | 6.58 |
| | Funding protection of civilians | 7.65 |
| | Advocacy for protection of civilians | 7.65 |
| | Facilitating safe access | 7.65 |

| Pillar 5 | Accountability towards beneficiaries | 7.92 |
| | Implementing evaluation recommendations | 7.92 |
| | Appropriate reporting requirements | 7.92 |
| | Donor transparency | 7.92 |
| | Gender sensitive approach | 7.92 |
| | Overall perception of performance | 7.92 |

Finland’s average score 6.03 → OECD/DAC average score 6.05

Source: DARA

Colours represent performance compared to donor’s average performance rating:
- Good
- Mid-range
- Could improve
HOW IS FINLAND PERCEIVED BY ITS PARTNERS?

GENDER

Finland’s partners provided positive feedback regarding the country’s support for gender-sensitive approaches. In fact, Finland received the highest score of the OECD/DAC donors for this issue. An interviewee in DRC praised Finland in particular for its support for gender.

PILLAR 1
RESPONDING TO NEEDS

Finland’s field partners provided generally positive feedback regarding the neutrality, impartiality and independence of the country’s humanitarian assistance. “Given their relative small size they are more interested in their humanitarian investment than other conditions,” observed one aid worker. Organisations interviewed also praised the timeliness of Finland’s funding: “Finland, especially, provides funding when most needed,” stated one interviewee. Another reported that Finland responded rapidly to the 2010 cholera outbreak in Haiti. Partners were more critical of Finland’s efforts to ensure the programmes they support adapt to changing needs, although a few pointed to occasional field visits from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and open dialogue as a means of monitoring.

PILLAR 2
PREVENTION, RISK REDUCTION AND RECOVERY

Similar to most donors, field perceptions were poor of Finland’s support for local capacity, beneficiary participation and prevention, preparedness and risk reduction. “Finland cannot verify beneficiary participation because they are not in the field. They don’t require this in their programming but they know we work with communities to identify specific needs,” reported one organisation. Finland scored higher, however, for its efforts to link relief with rehabilitation and development.

PILLAR 3
WORKING WITH HUMANITARIAN PARTNERS

In Pillar 3, Finland stood out for the flexibility of its funding. “Finland is totally flexible,” responded one organisation. Partners also appreciated its support for coordination: “Finland stresses coordination, especially through the cluster system,” stated another organisation. “They distributed aqua tabs through the WASH [water, sanitation and hygiene] cluster instead of giving them to a particular agency. This allowed them to be distributed more efficiently.” Partners were more critical regarding Finland’s capacity and expertise and its support for organisational capacity in areas like preparedness, response and contingency planning.
PILLAR 4
PROTECTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

Finland’s field partners praised the country for its funding and advocacy for protection, and advocacy toward local authorities. One organisation reported that Finland is supportive of programmes with a strong advocacy component. Feedback of Finland’s efforts to facilitate safe access and security of humanitarian workers was more negative, although one organisation noted that Finland requires an access strategy in its project proposals.

PILLAR 5
LEARNING AND ACCOUNTABILITY

In Pillar 5, partner organisations largely seem to consider Finland’s reporting requirements appropriate. Although it is one of Finland’s lower scores, Finland is one of the better donors for ensuring accountability toward affected populations. One partner described Finland’s requirements to set-up accountability mechanisms in camps for the displaced. Finland received one of its lowest scores on the qualitative indicators on Implementing evaluation recommendations.
RECOMMENDATIONS

ACTIVELY PARTICIPATE IN HUMANITARIAN ACCOUNTABILITY INITIATIVES

Compared to other donors, Finland does fairly well for ensuring accountability toward beneficiaries in the programmes it supports. It also increased its funding of accountability initiatives from 0.07% in 2009 to 0.3% in 2010. It could improve, however, its participation in international initiatives for humanitarian accountability. The indicator Participating in accountability initiatives measures the commitment of OECD/DAC donors to six different humanitarian accountability initiatives. Finland received the lowest score of Group 1, as it is involved in only one initiative, the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI).

CONTINUE PROGRESS UNDERWAY TO IMPROVE TIMELINESS

Finland is the second-fastest donor to respond to sudden onset disasters; representing significant improvement from 2009. It provided 55.1% of its funding in the first six weeks following sudden onset disasters in 2009 and jumped to 94.3% in 2010. It received the second-lowest score of its group, however, for Timely funding to complex emergencies, which measures the percentage of funding that arrived within the first three months after the launch of an appeal. Finland provided 43.6% of its funding within this time period, while the OECD/DAC average was 59.4%.

STRENGTHEN SUPPORT FOR PREVENTION, PREPAREDNESS, RISK REDUCTION, BENEFICIARY PARTICIPATION AND CAPACITY BUILDING

With the exception of Linking relief to rehabilitation and development, Finland received low scores in the qualitative, survey-based indicators that comprise Pillar 2. Within this pillar, Finland obtained its lowest qualitative score for Prevention and risk reduction. It is interesting to note that Finland did fairly well in the related quantitative indicators in this pillar on Funding reconstruction and prevention, Funding risk mitigation and Reducing climate-related vulnerability, perhaps because Finland’s policy stresses support for initiatives aimed at disaster risk reduction at the international level. Partners seem to indicate a lack of support in general for prevention, preparedness and risk reduction at the field level, however, and minimal follow-up to verify beneficiary participation and efforts to strengthen local capacity. Finland should engage in dialogue with its partners to discuss their perceptions of its support for these issues.

ENSURE PROGRAMMES ADAPT TO CHANGING NEEDS

Finland performed well in the qualitative indicators of Pillar 1, with the exception of Adapting to changing needs. The survey question related to this indicator refers to the donors’ efforts to verify that programmes adapt to changing needs, which is likely more difficult for Finland due to its limited field presence. However, a few partners highlighted Finland’s efforts to compensate for this in Haiti through field visits and open dialogue. Finland should endeavour to replicate this model in other crises and engage in dialogue with its partners to discuss their perceptions in this regard.

Please see www.daraint.org for a complete list of references.
France ranked 11th in the HRI 2011, improving four positions from 2010. Based on the pattern of its scores, France is classified as a Group 2 donor, “Learning Leaders”. Donors in this group are characterised by their leading role in support of emergency relief efforts, strong capacity and field presence, and commitment to learning and improvement. They tend to do less well in areas such as prevention, preparedness, and risk reduction efforts. Other Group 2 donors include Canada, the European Commission, the United Kingdom and the United States.

France's overall score was below the OECD/DAC and Group 2 averages. Compared to OECD/DAC donors and its Group 2 peers, France scored below average in all pillars, with the exception of Pillar 1 (Responding to needs), where it scored above the OECD/DAC and Group 2 averages.

France did best compared to its OECD/DAC peers in the indicators on Funding and commissioning evaluations, Timely funding to complex emergencies, Facilitating safe access, Strengthening local capacity and Beneficiary participation. Its scores were relatively the lowest in indicators on Funding UN and RC/RC appeals, Funding accountability initiatives, Funding reconstruction and prevention, Funding international risk mitigation and Refugee law.
AID DISTRIBUTION

France’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) as a proportion of its Gross National Income (GNI) rose to 0.50% in 2010, up from 0.46% in 2009. Humanitarian aid represented 2.2% of its ODA in 2010, or 0.010% of its GNI. According to data reported to the United Nations (UN) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs’ (OCHA) Financial Tracking Service (FTS), in 2010 France channelled 57.2% of its aid to UN agencies, 21.4% to NGOs, 16.8% to affected governments and 4.0% to the Red Cross / Red Crescent Movement. France also contributed to the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF), representing 0.5% of its total assistance, and Emergency Response Fund (ERF), with 5.0%. In 2010, France supported a total of 38 emergencies: 17 in Africa, 17 in Asia, three in the Americas and one in Europe (OCHA FTS 2011).

POLICY FRAMEWORK

France’s humanitarian assistance system has recently undergone significant structural change. Three separate agencies coordinate the French humanitarian effort, all under the supervision of the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs. The main agency is the Crisis Centre (CDC), created in 2008, responsible for assessing emergency situations and organising the initial response and follow-up to humanitarian emergencies (MAEE 2011a). The CDC has access to the Humanitarian Emergency Fund and the Aid Fund and provides funding to French and international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) (CDC 2011). It can also conduct humanitarian action directly with its own 50-person staff (CDC 2011). The United Nations and International Organisations Department (UNIO) manages French funding to UN agencies and to the Red Cross / Red Crescent Movement. Finally, the General Directorate for Globalization (DGM) coordinates contributions for food aid (MAE 2011a). It is important to note that the French Agency for Development (AFD) also has a Crisis and Conflict Unit (CCC), which directs some prevention and preparedness activities (AFD 2011). The coordination of French humanitarian assistance is further complicated by the fact that sub-national authorities in France can also have their own aid programmes (OECD/DAC 2009). France has humanitarian officials posted to some of its embassies for field support and has a total of 55 country offices (OECD/DAC 2008, OECD/DAC 2009).

France does not have a comprehensive humanitarian policy, but has endorsed the Principles of Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD). Several documents are important for France’s general development policy; the Development Policy: a French Vision Strategy (2011) delineates France’s overarching goals (DGMDP 2011). This document includes “crisis countries” as one of the four possible partnerships for French aid; however, given that the document does not provide a specific policy for humanitarian action in these crisis countries, it is often unclear if the general developmental policy outlined in the document applies directly to crisis situations as well (DGMDP 2011). The Cross-cutting Policy Document (2011) presented to Parliament sets forth France’s aims for its development policy for the next few years and in a similar manner includes France’s activities in crisis countries (Republic of France 2011).
HOW DOES FRANCE’S POLICY ADDRESS GHD CONCEPTS?

GENDER

France has a *French strategy for gender equality* (2010) with the aim to “guarantee a cross-cutting approach to gender equality in all of the policies, fields of intervention and instruments that characterize French cooperation,” (DGMDP 2010). This action plan calls for the use of OECD “gender markers” in France’s ODA, the use of gender-sensitive indicators in evaluations, and the promotion and monitoring of gender-sensitive programmes (DGMDP 2010). Though this document is mostly limited to actions undertaken by the AFD, there are some measures that overlap and apply to humanitarian assistance. Most notably, France includes the appointment of “gender equality” correspondents in embassies and specific training courses for MAEE officers concerning gender equality (DGMDP 2010).

PILLAR 1

RESPONDING TO NEEDS

Though there is no guiding humanitarian policy, the French Ministry’s website declares that humanitarian aid should be guided by the principles of humanity, impartiality, independence and neutrality. France has adopted a leading role in dealing with fragile and highly vulnerable states. In 2007, it revised its *Fragile States and Situations of Fragility: France’s Policy Paper* (2007), which delineates special considerations to take in regards to these states, including its “Fragilities Grid” - a tool to assess vulnerability. In its *Policy on Fragile States*, France emphasizes the importance of rapid response in sudden onset disasters and complex emergencies (CICID 2007). To this end, France’s Crisis Centre, on call day and night, has access to the Emergency Humanitarian Fund. The Crisis Centre can fund NGOs, multilateral organisations, or operations led by its own group of experts and staff (CDC 2011).

PILLAR 2

PREVENTION, RISK REDUCTION AND RECOVERY

France has expressed a strong commitment to beneficiary participation and building local capacity in its *Aid Effectiveness Action Plan* (MAEE 2006), although its application to humanitarian crises is not clear. Its *Policy on Fragile States* emphasizes the importance of the transition from relief to rehabilitation and calls for institutionalising links between different players in the field to improve the transition to development (CICID 2011). France’s *Policy on Fragile States* repeatedly underscores the importance of conflict and disaster prevention, preparedness and risk reduction (CICID 2007). This same policy declares that France abides by the OECD/DAC *Principles for Good Engagement in Fragile States* and guidelines on conflict prevention (CICID 2007). Finally, France states that it will introduce a conflict prevention element into its partnership frameworks (CICID 2007).
PILLAR 3
WORKING WITH HUMANITARIAN PARTNERS

France’s Policy on Fragile States stresses the importance of flexible funding for fragile states (CICID 2007). Special emphasis is given to the flexibility of the Emergency Humanitarian Fund (EFH), now under the direct control of the Crisis Centre (CICID 2007 and CDC 2011). The Interministerial Commission for International Cooperation and Development (CICID) is intended to coordinate development, security, peace-keeping and humanitarian strategies (OECD/DAC 2009). The Crisis Centre also serves to focus France’s emergency activities, and is attached to the Foreign Ministry directly in order to better mobilise all actors (CDC 2011). France states in its Fragile States Policy that its Fragility Grid is meant in large part to increase coordination, as it provides French actors with the same assessment of the field situation (CICID 2007). Additionally, the Centre organises meetings with French NGOs to discuss security or cross-cutting issues to further increase coordination among French actors (CDC 2011). In terms of coordinating with non-French actors, the French Vision states that in crisis management, “effective coordination between widely differing public and private players” is key, and highlights France’s cooperation with the European Union (DGMDP 2011).

PILLAR 4
PROTECTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs highlights the importance of international humanitarian law, human rights and refugee law in its humanitarian action (MAEE 2011b). This includes access to affected populations and the safety of humanitarian workers, as well as a clear commitment to the protection of civilians (MAEE 2011b). The Crisis Centre states that it “supports and coordinates the action of NGOs by organising meetings to develop discussion on humanitarian issues and meetings that are more theme-based or related to the security of teams in the field,” (CDC 2011). France’s policy on advocacy toward local authorities is not clear.

PILLAR 5
LEARNING AND ACCOUNTABILITY

In the Aid Effectiveness Action Plan, France called for the creation of cross-cutting evaluations of all instruments, countries, and sectors, and for the analysis and assessment of the effectiveness of the Framework Partnership Documents. The 2008 DAC Review confirms that evaluations of humanitarian aid are conducted mid-term and at the end of the project, programme or crisis response, and for cross-cutting themes (2008). The Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs (MAEE) carries out evaluations of all bilateral and multilateral aid, including humanitarian efforts, often hiring external consultants to do so. To increase transparency, the 2006 Institutional Act of Financial Legislation Law requires the Foreign Ministry submit a report to Parliament detailing all budget costs and aid flows for each year. France is also part of the Multilateral Organization Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN) which aims to monitor the performance of multilateral organisations (OECD 2009). Accountability towards beneficiaries is included in France’s Aid Effectiveness Plan for the implementation of the Paris Declaration (MAEE 2006), but the policy for humanitarian assistance is unclear.
# FIELD PARTNERS’ PERCEPTIONS

## FRANCE’S FIELD PERCEPTION SCORES

Collected questionnaires: 32

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PILLAR 1</th>
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<th>Independence of aid</th>
<th>Adapting to changing needs</th>
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France’s average score 5.84 ➔ OECD/DAC average score 6.05

**SOURCE:** DARA

Colours represent performance compared to donor’s average performance rating:
- **Good**
- **Mid-range**
- **Could improve**

## HOW IS FRANCE PERCEIVED BY ITS PARTNERS?

### GENDER

Partner organisations reported that France’s efforts regarding gender are lacklustre and “all rhetoric”. Implementing partners stated that France “doesn’t know what [it] wants in terms of gender,” and that it does not “have a real gender approach strategy,” or “a means for verifying gender is actually been taken into account.” Another interviewee revealed that the French gender strategy is developed far from the field without taking into account field constraints; this results in systems like gender quotas for staff, which can be difficult to implement in some crises.
PILLAR 1
RESPONDING TO NEEDS

France scored lower than most donors for the independence of its humanitarian assistance. One organisation declared: “The CDC always has a political interest . . . When they intervene, it is for political reasons.” The timeliness of its funding was similar – again France scored below most donors yet above its qualitative average score. One interviewee called the French “proactive” in this respect, and another mentioned that though France had a set calendar for funding it was accessible to the staff of its partner organisations. Some implementing partners would still like to see a quicker response time, reporting that the funding process could take a long time.

PILLAR 2
PREVENTION, RISK REDUCTION AND RECOVERY

In Pillar 2, field partners were particularly critical of France’s support for Prevention and risk reduction. According to its partners, however, incorporating the reinforcement of local capacity in programmes is one of France’s strengths. Partner organisations praised France’s efforts in cooperating with and building local authorities’ capacities, and in asking for verification of this component through reports from its partners. Feedback was somewhat less positive regarding beneficiary participation, though France still outperformed its peers. Partner organisations report that beneficiary participation in programme design and implementation “has become more important over the past two years,” though they also report there is more emphasis on beneficiary participation in the implementation stage than in the design stage. Some interviewees considered that beneficiary participation in monitoring and evaluation is the weakest, where France reportedly encourages participation but does not verify.

PILLAR 3
WORKING WITH HUMANITARIAN PARTNERS

France’s partners generally praised its commitment to providing flexible funding, stating: “They don’t even ask for justification,” and that French funding is “totally flexible”. However, France received significantly lower scores than its peers on this indicator. In terms of coordination, humanitarian organisations in the field pointed out several impressive aspects of the French system. One revealed that there was “real synergy” among France, European Commission’s Directorate-General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (ECHO) and a pooled funding mechanism, emphasising that France consulted ECHO for information on its funding before making decisions on its own funding to avoid duplication of efforts. Another interviewee stated that France “has a steering committee that includes all of their partners to follow up on the action.” Overall, it seems that interviewees appreciated France’s knowledge of the crises, stating that it has “the right expertise and experience to make good decisions at the right moment.” Partners were more critical of France’s limited support for their organisational capacity.
PILLAR 4

PROTECTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

Partner organisations reported that France does fairly well in regards to protection and international law in the field. One organisation confirmed that France took measures to advocate for central governments to fulfill their responsibilities in response to humanitarian needs. Interviewees stressed the importance France places on protection, describing the protection of civilians as “an entry point in the implementation and design of projects for the CDC.” Regarding France’s efforts for the security of humanitarian workers, some organisations underscored that France is cautious in terms of security: one interviewee reported that France, “doesn’t want you to go where there’s insecurity,” and that security “is a great priority... [France wants] to go everywhere, but only if security is assured.”

PILLAR 5

LEARNING AND ACCOUNTABILITY

According to its field partners, France does not do enough to ensure accountability to affected populations. One organisation declared the “CDC does not understand what accountability is. They try but there is no translation of the word in French.” Partner organisations also reported that the French system for implementing recommendations from evaluations was “very weak”. Interviewees would also like to see greater transparency of France’s funding. Many organisations complained that France’s funding mechanisms are “impossible to understand,” or that France is “not so transparent... for example they refused a project... and then agreed to it [later].” On a more positive note, organisations appreciated France’s reporting requirements, as it accepts the ECHO’s report from its partners, considerably reducing their workload.
RECOMMENDATIONS

🔴 FORMALISE COMMITMENT TO HUMANITARIAN PRINCIPLES IN A COMPREHENSIVE HUMANITARIAN POLICY

France would do well to create an official humanitarian policy which explains its commitment to Good Humanitarian Donorship principles and unites the information from various web pages and documents into a common humanitarian policy.

🔴 INVEST ADEQUATELY IN PREVENTION, PREPAREDNESS AND RISK REDUCTION

France could improve its support for prevention, preparedness and risk reduction, as it received some of its lowest scores for indicators on these issues. For example, funding for reconstruction, prevention and preparedness represented only 4.1% of its humanitarian aid, while the OECD/DAC donors allocated an average of 18.6%. France also received the second-lowest score for Funding international risk mitigation and among the lowest in the qualitative, survey-based indicator, Prevention and risk reduction.

🔴 ENHANCE SUPPORT FOR UN AND RC/RC APPEALS, COORDINATION AND SUPPORT SERVICES AND POOLED FUNDS

France received the third-lowest score of the OECD/DAC donors for Funding UN and RC/RC appeals, which measures the extent to which donors provide their fair share of funding to UN and Red Cross/Red Crescent (RC/RC) appeals, coordination and support services and pooled funds. France scores well below average in all the components that comprise this indicator.

🔴 PROTECT THE INDEPENDENCE OF HUMANITARIAN AID

France’s partners perceive that its humanitarian aid is not independent of other political, military, security or economic objectives; France received the fourth-lowest score of the OECD/DAC donors for this indicator. Field perceptions of its independence were especially low in Somalia and Kenya. France should put practical measures in place to safeguard the independence of its aid and engage with its partners to discuss their perceptions.

🔴 RENEW COMMITMENT TO ACCOUNTABILITY

France improved slightly its participation in humanitarian accountability initiatives compared to 2009, but its funding of these initiatives dropped from an already low 0.22% (of France’s humanitarian aid) in 2009 to 0.04% in 2010. OECD/DAC donors allocated an average of 0.43%. It also received the third-lowest score for the qualitative, survey-based indicators on accountability towards beneficiaries, indicating that France should renew its commitment to accountability.

🔴 REVIEW SUPPORT FOR REFUGEES

France does fairly well in the indicators on International humanitarian law and Human rights law, but received one of the lowest scores for Refugee law, which measures the number of treaties signed and ratified, refugees accepted under resettlement programmes and related funding. France scored especially low in the components related to refugee resettlement and funding.

Please see www.daraint.org for a complete list of references.
Germany ranked 12th in the HRI 2011, improving two positions from 2010. Based on the patterns of its scores, Germany is classified as a Group 3 donor, “Aspiring Actors”. Donors in this group tend to have more limited capacity to engage with the humanitarian system at the field level, but often aspire to take on a greater role in the sector. They generally focus on a few core strengths, such as in the area of prevention, preparedness and risk reduction, or on specific geographic regions. Other donors in the group include Australia, Belgium, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg and Spain.

Germany did best compared to its OECD/DAC peers in indicators on Funding NGOs and Timely funding to complex emergencies. Its scores were lowest in indicators on Funding UN and RC/RC appeals, Un-earmarked funding, Funding protection of civilians, and Advocacy towards local authorities.

Overall, Germany scored below the OECD/DAC average, and slightly above the Group 3 average. It was below the OECD/DAC average in all pillars, with the exception of Pillar 2 (Prevention, risk reduction and recovery), where it scored above average. Compared to other Group 3 donors, Germany scored above average in all pillars, except for Pillar 3 (Working with humanitarian partners) and Pillar 4 (Protection and international law), where it scored above average. Germany did best compared to its OECD/DAC peers in indicators on Funding NGOs and Timely funding to complex emergencies. Its scores were lowest in indicators on Funding UN and RC/RC appeals, Un-earmarked funding, Funding protection of civilians, and Advocacy towards local authorities.
AID DISTRIBUTION

Germany increased its Official Development Assistance (ODA) in proportion to its Gross National Income (GNI) from 0.35% in 2009 to 0.38% in 2010. Nevertheless, significant progress still needs to be made to achieve the target of 0.7% by 2015. Humanitarian assistance represented 4.5% of its total ODA in 2010, and 0.017% of its GNI – slightly higher than in 2009.

According to data reported to the United Nations (UN) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs’ (OCHA) Financial Tracking Service (FTS), Germany’s 2010 humanitarian funding was channelled as follows: 49.6% to UN agencies, 33.2% to non-governmental organisations (NGOs), 14.5% to private organisations and foundations, 9.2% to the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement, 2.1% to governments, and 1.5% to intergovernmental organisations. Pakistan was the country that received the highest percentage of German funding, followed by Haiti and Afghanistan. In 2010, Germany supported 28 countries in Africa, 25 in Asia, 12 in the Americas, six in Europe, and one in Oceania.

POLICY FRAMEWORK

Germany’s humanitarian assistance is principally managed by the Federal Foreign Office’s Task Force for Humanitarian Aid and the Commissioner for Human Rights Policy and Humanitarian Aid. The Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) handles food aid and transitional assistance. BMZ often commissions the work of the German Society for International Cooperation (GIZ), a private corporation which as of 1 January 2011 brings together the German Development Service (DED), the German Technical Cooperation (GTZ) and Inwent – Capacity Building International. The Humanitarian Aid Coordinating Committee brings together humanitarian non-governmental organisations (NGOs) with government agencies to coordinate Germany’s humanitarian assistance. Germany’s crisis response centre seeks to expedite the response to sudden onset crises. Germany’s humanitarian aid policy is principally governed by the 2007 Federal Government’s Humanitarian Aid, which includes the 12 Basic Rules of Humanitarian Aid - written in 1993 and updated in 2000. Germany also expresses its commitment to the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid.

HOW DOES GERMANY’S POLICY ADDRESS GHD CONCEPTS?

GENRE

Germany’s humanitarian policy recognises the importance of meeting the specific needs of women and girls in humanitarian emergencies. At the same time, Germany reports that “no-one is favoured or disadvantaged due to their sex” in the provision of humanitarian aid (Federal Foreign Office 2007, p.4). Germany has further addressed gender in its development policies, Development Policy Action Plan on Gender 2009-2012 and Taking account of gender issues in German development cooperation: promoting gender equality and empowering women (Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development 2009 and 2006), although they do not specifically mention humanitarian aid.
**PILLAR 1**

**RESPONDING TO NEEDS**

Germany’s humanitarian policy expresses a clear commitment to need-based aid, grounded on the principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality, and independence (Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany 2011). Germany states that “Humanitarian assistance has no political strings attached,” (Federal Foreign Office 2007, p.5). Germany prioritises rapid response to the needs of refugees and internally displaced persons and considers that the response to all humanitarian emergencies should be “implemented within a matter of days and timeframes limited to the period of extreme emergency,” (Federal Foreign Office 2011a).

**PILLAR 2**

**PREVENTION, RISK REDUCTION AND RECOVERY**

Although not included in its humanitarian policy specifically, Germany considers conflict prevention a cross-cutting issue and adopted an action plan, *Civilian Crisis Prevention, Conflict Resolution and Post-Conflict Peace-Building*, in 2004. To address disaster risk reduction within Germany and internationally, Germany created a special committee - the German Committee for Disaster Reduction (DKKV), which developed specific funding guidelines for disaster risk reduction initiatives (German Committee for Disaster Reduction 2011 and Federal Foreign Office 2008) and affirms that five to ten percent of its humanitarian assistance is set aside for this purpose (Federal Foreign Office 2007, p. 2). Rule 11 of Germany’s *12 Basic Rules of Humanitarian Aid* mentions beneficiary participation in the design and implementation of humanitarian assistance, yet participation in monitoring and evaluation is not specified. Rule 9 incorporates capacity building to some degree: “Humanitarian assistance…shall help people to help themselves,” (Federal Foreign Office 2007, p. 11). Germany’s humanitarian aid policy does not specifically address the environment, although the Federal Foreign Office highlights climate and environmental protection as important global issues (2011b). BMZ’s transitional aid is intended to bridge the gap between humanitarian assistance and longer-term development (Federal Foreign Office 2007).

**PILLAR 3**

**WORKING WITH HUMANITARIAN PARTNERS**

Within Germany, the Humanitarian Aid Coordinating Committee brings together German non-governmental organisations (NGOs), the Federal Foreign Office and other German ministries and relevant institutions to coordinate German humanitarian assistance (Federal Foreign Office 2007). However the 2010 DAC Peer Review highlighted the need for greater coordination among German government agencies. Internationally, Germany expresses its strong support for the coordinating role of OCHA, participates in UN supervisory board meetings, and endorses the mechanisms created in the humanitarian reform (Federal Foreign Office 2010). Along these lines, Germany has also progressively increased its contributions to the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF). Germany provides un-earmarked funding to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations Relief and
Rule 2 of Germany’s 12 Basic Rules of Humanitarian Aid describes Germany’s position on protection: “Everyone has the right to receive, and must have the right to provide, humanitarian assistance and humanitarian protection,” (Federal Foreign Office 2007, p.2). Germany created a position of Commissioner for Human Rights Policy and Humanitarian Aid in 1998 and considers the promotion of human rights “a cornerstone of Germany’s foreign policy,” (Federal Foreign Office 2011c). International humanitarian law is given great importance, and in 2006, Germany published a collection of international humanitarian law documents, including refugee conventions. Germany stresses the need to work with local authorities to obtain access, and notes that adherence to humanitarian principles is essential (Federal Foreign Office 2007, pp. 8-9).

Germany designates funding specifically for external evaluations of the projects supported (Federal Foreign Office 2007). Germany mentions upward and downward accountability in Rule 8 of its 12 Basic principles of Humanitarian Aid: “Those providing aid shall be accountable to both the recipients of the aid and those whose donations and supplies they accept.” Positively, Germany affirms its commitment to the Principles of Good Humanitarian Donorship in the Federal Government’s Humanitarian Aid. Although Germany does not mention transparency in its humanitarian policy, guidelines are publicly accessible and Germany is currently preparing to implement the International Aid Transparency Initiative at the end of 2011/ beginning of 2012. The 2010 DAC Peer Review noted the strong distinction between development and humanitarian aid within the German government’s aid architecture. This translates into different funding proposals and reporting systems for partners, which makes situations of protracted crises and overlap among the sectors difficult to navigate, and increases transaction costs (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 2010).
# FIELD PARTNERS’ PERCEPTIONS

## GERMANY’S FIELD PERCEPTION SCORES

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<tr>
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<th>Advocacy for protection of civilians</th>
<th>Facilitating safe access</th>
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<th>PILLAR 5</th>
<th>Accountability towards beneficiaries</th>
<th>Implementing evaluation recommendations</th>
<th>Appropriate reporting requirements</th>
<th>Donor transparency</th>
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<td>6.74</td>
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| Overall perception of performance | 6.66 |

Germany’s average score 5.25  

OECD/DAC average score 6.05

**SOURCE:** DARA

Colours represent performance compared to donor’s average performance rating:
- **Good**
- **Mid-range**
- **Could improve**

## HOW IS GERMANY PERCEIVED BY ITS PARTNERS?

**GENDER**

One field partner reported the following in reference to Germany and the other donors supporting its humanitarian programmes: “All donors require us to incorporate the gender approach, but finally they do not verify how it is been done.” Another organisation in Kenya, stated the following regarding Germany, together with its other donors, “no one looks at different gender issues and cultural issues. We have never been given feedback on a proposal in this regard.”
PILLAR 1
RESPONDING TO NEEDS

Similar to most donors, Germany received some of its highest qualitative scores in Pillar 1. However, compared to other donors, Germany’s scores were relatively lower for the neutrality, impartiality, independence and timeliness of its humanitarian assistance. Field partners reported: “I think Germany has political and economic interests,” and, “the German funding for Haiti is not independent of economic or political interests. The funding for this crisis is really poor.” Some partners indicated that Germany’s funding was, however, linked to needs assessments. One interviewee affirmed, “with Germany we have a first needs assessment for our proposal, then they pay for a second one, more accurate and in real time, then we reformulate our project.” Germany was positively recognised by some for carrying out field visits to ensure that programmes adapted to changing needs. However, another interviewee disagreed, pointing to the time required to make changes to programmes: “Germany isn’t very open to unexpected changes in programmes. They need too much time (several months) to accept those changes.” Although Germany scored lower than its peers for the timeliness of its funding, some partners were pleased with the speed of disbursement. One interviewee in Pakistan noted that Germany was quicker than any other donor in disbursing funds.

PILLAR 2
PREVENTION, RISK REDUCTION AND RECOVERY

In field interviews, Germany was acknowledged for building the capacity of the local population in general, but not the authorities. Regarding beneficiary participation, one of Germany’s partner organisations wondered: “The question is: would the Germans drop a proposal if it didn’t include beneficiary participation?” Another organisation reported: “It’s all just on paper. Donors don’t follow up to see what’s really happening,” referring to Germany, as well as to the other donors supporting its programmes. Germany’s partners were generally more critical regarding the participation of affected populations in monitoring and evaluation, compared to other programming stages. “Donors lose interest when it comes to monitoring and evaluation,” commented one interviewee.

PILLAR 3
WORKING WITH HUMANITARIAN PARTNERS

Partner organisations provided mixed feedback on the flexibility of Germany’s funding. One interviewee criticized Germany for agreeing to finance a project at the end of the year, but requiring that the money be spent before a tight deadline. Another interviewee pointed out that, “Germany gives us funds every three months. It’s difficult to live with deadlines, but here it makes things much easier, especially when we work with local NGOs. This helps them be more realistic on what can and can’t be done.” While most organisations felt that Germany did not do enough to support their organisational capacity, one interviewee commended Germany for allowing four percent of the budget to be invested in organizational capacity. Many of Germany’s field partners praised its support for coordination, reporting “Germany finances our attendance to the coordination meetings, and asks us to actually attend them”.

DARA/HRI 2011/DONOR ASSESSMENTS/GERMANY #129
PILLAR 4
PROTECTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

Although most interviewees considered that Germany did not actively advocate for local authorities to fulfill their responsibilities, one field organisation noted, “Germany is vocal at the federal level, not at the district level...Germany is more silent and does this behind closed doors.” Another felt that “the German government doesn’t have much influence.” Most organisations pointed to a lack of support for humanitarian access and safety of aid workers: “They are reluctant to fund security training. If you include it in proposals you may not win because of that. They want to say that the highest amount goes to the beneficiaries, probably for publicity reasons.” However, some interviewees noted that Germany “includes funding for security materials like radios” and “Germany has been very good because they asked us to provide a realistic budget for security, instead of a minimalistic budget.”

PILLAR 5
LEARNING AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Most of Germany’s field partners felt that Germany’s reporting requirements were appropriate, although some complained that they were requested to report every three months. Germany received mixed feedback for integrating recommendations from past evaluations: one organisation reported “Germany integrates some recommendations and lessons learnt from evaluations.” Germany’s field partners indicated that requirements to ensure accountability to affected populations were generally lacking, although one interviewee noted that Germany proposed a “suggestions mailbox” in a refugee camp but had yet to implement it.
RECOMMENDATIONS

- **IMPROVE FLEXIBILITY OF FUNDING**

  Germany provided only 9.0% of its funding without earmarking, while its OECD/DAC peers provided an average of 33.2% without earmarking. Germany received the lowest score of the OECD/DAC donors for the qualitative indicator *Flexibility of funding*, pointing to the need for improvement.

- **ENSURE FIELD KNOWLEDGE INFORMS DECISION-MAKING IN CRISES WITHOUT FIELD OFFICES**

  Germany received low scores in all the qualitative indicators that make up Pillar 4: *Funding protection of civilians, Advocacy for protection of civilians, Advocacy towards local authorities* and *Facilitating safe access*. It also received the third-lowest score for *Donor capacity and expertise*. It is interesting to note that Germany tends to receive the lowest scores in these indicators in crises where it does not have a field presence, indicating that Germany’s partners consider Germany to be more supportive of these issues and to have greater expertise when they have a field office. Some partners also highlighted the difference in capacity between the field and headquarters, generally considering the field offices to be better placed to make appropriate decisions. While Germany may not be able to open additional field offices, it could consider augmenting its efforts to integrate knowledge from the field through coordination with partner organisations and other donors and field visits.

- **IMPROVE TRANSPARENCY OF FUNDING AND DECISION-MAKING**

  Germany is considered the least transparent donor, though this may improve with Germany’s recent commitment to the International Aid Transparency Initiative. Germany should engage in dialogue with its partners to discuss how to improve its transparency.

*Please see [www.daraint.org](http://www.daraint.org) for a complete list of references.*
OVERALL PERFORMANCE

Greece is not included in the overall ranking, as insufficient survey responses were obtained to calculate the qualitative indicators that make up the index.

Greece’s overall scores in the HRI’s quantitative indicators were below the OECD/DAC and Group 3 averages. Greece scored below the OECD/DAC and Group 3 average in all pillars, with the exception of Pillar 1, where it scored above the OECD/DAC and Group 3 average, and Pillar 3, where it scored below the OECD/DAC average, yet above the Group 3 average.

Compared to its OECD/DAC peers, Greece did best in the indicators on Un-earmarked funding and Timely funding to sudden onset emergencies. Its scores were relatively the lowest in indicators on Participating in accountability initiatives, Funding accountability initiatives, Funding and commissioning evaluations, Funding reconstruction and prevention and Funding UN and RC/RC appeals.

SOURCES: UN OCHA FTS, OECD StatExtracts, various UN agencies’ annual reports and DARA

All scores are on a scale of 0 to 10. Colours represent performance compared to OECD/DAC donors’ average performance rating:
AID DISTRIBUTION

In 2010, Greece’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) comprised 0.17% of its Gross National Income (GNI), down from 0.19% in 2009. Humanitarian assistance comprised 5.8% of its ODA in 2010 and 0.010% of its GNI. Greece had deferred the intermediate European Union target of 0.51% ODA/GNI ratio to 2012, but is unlikely to reach this target due to the economic crisis (Hellenic Aid 2009).

According to data reported to the United Nations (UN) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs’ (OCHA) Financial Tracking Service (FTS), in 2010, Greece channelled 48.0% of its humanitarian assistance to UN agencies, 34.5% in bilateral form to affected governments and 17.5% to a variety of NGOs. Greece contributed to nine crises in 2010, including four in the Americas, two in Asia, two in Europe and one in Africa, with Haiti, Chile and Yemen receiving the greatest amount.

POLICY FRAMEWORK

Greece’s humanitarian system is coordinated by two main bodies under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: the Inter-Ministerial Committee (ESODOS) and Hellenic Aid. EOSDOS decides whether and how to respond to humanitarian emergencies and Hellenic Aid, the international development cooperation department, coordinates the operational response (OECD/DAC 2006). Within Hellenic Aid, the First Directorate and Second Directorate (“Emergency humanitarian and food aid directorate” and “Rehabilitation and development directorate”) work closely together to respond to humanitarian crises (OECD/DAC 2006).

According to the most recent DAC Peer Review, a wide range of government actors are involved in the Greek humanitarian system, and Hellenic Aid manages the coordination among them, which may include the Ministries of Defence, Health, and Agriculture and the National Centre for Emergency Assistance (OECD/DAC 2006). Hellenic Aid is also in charge of relations with non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and multilateral organisations (OECD/DAC 2006).

Standing Order 5-4/2009, Procedures of Humanitarian Aid Provision Abroad provides the legal framework for Greek humanitarian assistance (Hellenic Aid 2009). Although no formal humanitarian aid strategy exists, Greece includes the Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) Principles in its guidelines for implementing partners (OECD/DAC 2006). Greece also expresses its commitment to the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid (Hellenic Aid 2011). The Strategic Framework for Co-operation with the developing world and Hellenic Aid’s 2009 Annual Report both serve as guiding frameworks for Greece’s overarching international cooperation policy. Greece is in the process of adapting its foreign assistance programmes to its new financial situation, and the new plan will be presented in the 2011-2015 Development Co-operation and Assistance Program (Hellenic Aid 2011). Greece has attached “Development Officers” to some of its embassies as called for in the Action Plan, which recognised the need to provide support for humanitarian assistance and monitor implementation (Hellenic Aid 2004 and OECD/DAC 2006).
HOW DOES GREECE’S POLICY ADDRESS GHD CONCEPTS?

GENDER

Greece’s policy for gender in relation to humanitarian aid is unclear. However, gender equality is included as a cross-cutting theme in its developmental policy, the Strategic Framework of Cooperation (Hellenic Aid 2009). Greece is also a signatory of both the GHD Principles and the European Consensus on Humanitarian Assistance, which call for the inclusion of a gender-sensitive approach in all parts of the humanitarian assistance process.

PILLAR 1
RESPONDING TO NEEDS

Greece has expressed its commitment to the GHD Principles, and has explicitly stated that it provides aid based on need and in adherence to the principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence (Hellenic Aid 2004, Hellenic Aid 2009). The Annual Report asserts that EOSDOS uses information and needs assessments from the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC), and the EU Monitoring Information Centre (MIC) supplemented by information from Greek organisations to decide which crises to support (Hellenic Aid 2009). Greece regularly donates to the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) with the aim of providing timely funding, (OECD/DAC 2006). Hellenic Aid has also expedited procedures to fund NGOs responding to crises (OECD/DAC 2006).

PILLAR 2
PREVENTION, RISK REDUCTION AND RECOVERY

The latest DAC Peer Review notes that in order to facilitate a proper transition from relief to development, “the Director General of Hellenic Aid presides over a committee which meets monthly or on ad hoc basis in case of crisis to discuss linking relief and development,” since this requires the coordination of two separate directorates within Hellenic Aid (OECD/DAC 2006). The Hellenic Aid website states that environment and climate change are cross-cutting issues in the Greek development programme, but it is unclear if these also apply to its humanitarian assistance (Hellenic Aid 2011). Greece’s policy on beneficiary participation, local capacity, prevention, preparedness and risk reduction is not clear.
PILLAR 4

PROTECTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

Greece’s 2009 Annual Report devotes a section to human rights, emphasizing that “a major area of activity of Greek humanitarian aid is human rights protection and especially human security protection,” and this is expressed formally in the annual call for NGO projects (Hellenic Aid 2009). Greece’s policy on supporting international humanitarian law, refugee law, or facilitating humanitarian access is not clear, though these are principles included in documents Greece has endorsed, such as the GHD Principles and the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid.

PILLAR 5

LEARNING AND ACCOUNTABILITY

The Hellenic Aid Action Plan for Coordination and Harmonization (Hellenic Aid 2004) states: “It is in the immediate plans of Hellenic Aid to improve extensively its monitoring, auditing and evaluating systems so as to increase transparency [and] efficiency” regarding Greece’s developmental policy, but it is unclear if this also applies to its humanitarian assistance. According to this same document, the current monitoring system, started in 2004, includes visits to project sites by experienced staff who “complete record reports in which they evaluate competence, effectiveness, development impact, suitability and expected sustainability of projects and programmes in cooperation with local partners,” (Hellenic Aid 2004). The country has had difficulty fully implementing these plans due to financial troubles and the subsequent scaling down of its aid. The DAC Peer Review does note, however, that “Hellenic Aid has tightened the rules and set up an extensive ex-ante assessment process covering the technical, management and financial capacity of the NGO…” (OECD/DAC 2006). In regards to its own transparency, Hellenic Aid currently publishes an Annual Report on Development Cooperation to the Greek Parliament that gives a comprehensive summary of its projects and the budget allocated to each. Unfortunately, there is no mention of concrete strategies for accountability measures toward affected populations.
RECOMMENDATIONS

Given the severe economic crisis Greece is currently facing, it may need to postpone the following recommendations until after it has surpassed the crisis. Greece’s recovery will also present an opportunity for the country to review its position on humanitarian aid and recommit itself to Good Humanitarian Donorship Principles.

FORMALISE COMMITMENT TO HUMANITARIAN PRINCIPLES IN A COMPREHENSIVE HUMANITARIAN POLICY

Greece would do well to create an official humanitarian policy which explains its commitment to Good Humanitarian Donorship Principles and unites the information from various web pages and documents into a common humanitarian policy.

INVEST ADEQUATELY IN PREVENTION, PREPAREDNESS AND RISK REDUCTION

Greece spent 0.52% of its humanitarian aid in 2010 on prevention, preparedness and reconstruction, while the OECD/DAC average is 18.6%. It could also improve its support for international risk mitigation mechanisms, having allocated only 0.37% of its ODA, compared to the OECD/DAC average of 0.77%. This also makes sense from a financial standpoint, as prevention has been repeatedly demonstrated to cost less than emergency response.

RENEW COMMITMENT TO LEARNING AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Greece has significant room for improvement in its support for learning and accountability. Greece has not participated in any of the initiatives for humanitarian accountability included in the indicator Participating in accountability initiatives. Greece also did not provide financial support for learning and accountability initiatives. Furthermore, it does not have evaluation guidelines and has not commissioned any publicly-accessible evaluations over the past five years.

ENHANCE SUPPORT FOR UN AND RC/RC APPEALS, COORDINATION AND SUPPORT SERVICES AND POOLED FUNDS

Greece received a low score for Funding UN and RC/RC appeals, which measures the extent to which donors provide their fair share of funding to UN and Red Cross/Red Crescent (RC/RC) appeals, coordination and support services and pooled funds. It scored well below average in all components that comprise this indicator. Greece provided 0.52% of its fair share to UN appeals, compared to the OECD/DAC average of 41.0%; 3.2% of its fair share to coordination and support services, compared to the OECD/DAC average of 47.5%; 2.0% of its fair share to Red Cross/Red Crescent (RC/RC) appeals, compared to the OECD/DAC average of 117.1%; and 9.1% of its fair share to pooled funds, compared to the OECD/DAC average of 298.0%.

Please see www.daraint.org for a complete list of references.
OVERALL PERFORMANCE

Ireland ranked 4th in the HRI 2011, dropping two positions from 2010. Based on the patterns of its scores, Ireland is classified as a Group 3 donor, “Aspiring Actors”. Donors in this group tend to have more limited capacity to engage with the humanitarian system at the field level, but often aspire to take on a greater role in the sector. They generally focus on a few core strengths, such as in the area of prevention, preparedness and risk reduction, or on specific geographic regions. Other donors in the group include Australia, Belgium, Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg and Spain.

Overall, Ireland scored above the OECD/DAC and Group 3 averages in all pillars, with the exception of Pillar 2, where it was below both averages.

Ireland did best compared to its OECD/DAC peers in indicators on Funding accountability initiatives, Funding UN and RC/RC appeals, Funding NGOs, Un-earmarked funding and Participating in accountability initiatives – all quantitative indicators. Its scores were relatively the lowest in Funding international risk mitigation, Advocacy towards local authorities, Advocacy for protection of civilians, Donor capacity and expertise and Strengthening local capacity. Overall, Ireland performed better in quantitative indicators than in the qualitative, survey-based indicators.

SOURCES: UN OCHA FTS, OECD StatExtracts, various UN agencies’ annual reports and DARA

All scores are on a scale of 0 to 10. Colours represent performance compared to OECD/DAC donors’ average performance rating:
AID DISTRIBUTION

In 2010, Ireland’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) decreased substantially in absolute terms, although similar drops in its Gross National Income (GNI) left Ireland’s ODA/GNI ratio relatively stable. In 2010, ODA comprised 0.53% of Ireland’s GNI compared to 0.54% in 2009. Humanitarian assistance represented 15.3% of Ireland’s ODA in 2010, or 0.078% of its GNI.

According to data reported to the United Nations (UN) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs’ (OCHA) Financial Tracking Service (FTS) (2011), Ireland channelled 29.5% of its humanitarian assistance to non-governmental organisations (NGOs), 26.4% to UN agencies, 14.5% to the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement and 5.9% bilaterally to affected governments. In 2010, Ireland supported 28 crises: 16 in Africa, 10 in Asia, one in the Americas and one in Europe. The top recipient countries of Irish humanitarian aid in 2010 were Sudan, Haiti and Liberia. In 2010, Irish Aid focused its sector-specific funding primarily on health, coordination and food sectors.

POLICY FRAMEWORK

Irish Aid, which falls under the Development Cooperation Division of the Department of Foreign Affairs, manages Ireland’s humanitarian assistance. Ireland’s 2009 Humanitarian Relief Policy is its main humanitarian policy, and is fully coherent with the strategies for development cooperation outlined in the 2006 White Paper. In June 2011, the Minister of State for Trade and Development announced an upcoming review of the White Paper, which will set out clear priorities for the future direction of the Irish Aid programme. Additionally, Irish Aid has produced sector-specific strategies and policy papers, particularly with regards to mainstreaming issues such as gender and the environment.

Two important funding channels utilised by Irish Aid are the Emergency Humanitarian Assistance Fund (EHAF), and the Emergency Preparedness and Post-Emergency Recovery Fund (EPPR). These are complemented by the Rapid Response Initiative, which partly functions to provide funding for emergency capacity building. Irish Aid’s Multi-Annual Programme Scheme (MAPS) provides multi-year funding to five partner organisations. Irish Aid has a field presence in 16 core countries, primarily in Sub-Saharan Africa.

HOW DOES IRELAND’S POLICY ADDRESS GHD CONCEPTS?

GENDER

Irish Aid developed a Gender Equality Policy in 2004, updating it in 2010 (Irish Aid 2004 and Irish Aid 2010). A large part of the policy focuses on gender mainstreaming, which is also reflected in the 2009 Humanitarian Relief Policy. Ireland recognises that men and women have different needs in crises (Irish Aid 2004). To this effect, Irish Aid requires that partner organisations have a clear understanding of gender specific needs in emergencies and that their programmes are in line with the goal, objectives and strategy outlined in Irish Aid’s Gender Equality Policy. Irish Aid also stresses its commitment to a rights-based approach, and specifically pledges to address gender based violence (GBV) (Irish Aid 2009).
**PILLAR 1**

**RESPONDING TO NEEDS**

Ireland’s *Humanitarian Relief Policy* (Irish Aid 2009) states that it respects and promotes the principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence, and will provide assistance on the basis of need. It further emphasises the importance that the scale of response should be commensurate with the scale of need, with a special reference to forgotten emergencies. In addition, Ireland recognises that vulnerable groups within a society often have special needs, which is catered to accordingly (Irish Aid 2009). Irish Aid prides itself in responding to various disasters in a timely and appropriate manner (Irish Aid 2011a). It has endeavoured to increase its ability to respond quickly to emergencies through the creation of the Rapid Response Initiative and support for the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF).

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**PILLAR 2**

**PREVENTION, RISK REDUCTION AND RECOVERY**

Ireland’s various policy documents emphasise the importance of a proper transition from relief to development, as well as support for local capacity, prevention, preparedness, and risk reduction initiatives. In relation to the environment for example, a mainstreaming strategy is set out in the *Environment Policy for Sustainable Development* (Irish Aid 2007). According to Ireland’s humanitarian policy, disaster risk reduction (DRR), linking relief to rehabilitation and development (LRRD) and prevention/preparedness are all part of a broader humanitarian effort which take into account longer term objectives and address the core vulnerabilities of communities which are affected or prone to acute crises. Ireland considers that this can be achieved in part by building local capacities. Finally, Ireland’s humanitarian policy mentions that relief assistance should build on existing local capacities and ensure the participation of the affected population (Irish Aid 2009).

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**PILLAR 3**

**WORKING WITH HUMANITARIAN PARTNERS**

Ireland’s policy highlights the need to provide flexible, predictable assistance and support the work of the organisations comprising the humanitarian system (Irish Aid 2009). It does not appear to specifically favour Irish NGOs over others, except for the long term funding scheme available for Irish NGOs (Irish Aid 2011b). Ireland provides core funding to UN agencies and contributes to multi-donor pooled funds with the aim of providing flexible aid (Government of Ireland 2006). Ireland recognises the lead role that the UN plays in coordination and expresses its support for the reform of the humanitarian system, including the role of Humanitarian Coordinators and the cluster approach (Irish Aid 2009). In an effort to provide predictable funding, Ireland created the Multi-Annual Programme Scheme (MAPS), which provides predictable, multi-year funding to five partner organisations.
PILLAR 4

PROTECTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

Ireland’s policy in relation to protection, access and international law is slightly less elaborated than other areas, although it does mention the importance of these issues. With regards to protection, Ireland’s Humanitarian Relief Policy recognises this as a humanitarian need, specifically for internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees. This is also true with regards to respecting and promoting the implementation of international humanitarian law (IHL), refugee law and human rights law. Furthermore, Ireland recognises the leading role of the International Committee of the Red Cross to promote IHL (Irish Aid 2009). In relation to security and human rights, Ireland’s policy states that the Department of Foreign Affairs will use appropriate channels at the country level and inter-governmentally through the UN and other bodies to inform programming and advocate as needed (Irish Aid 2009).

PILLAR 5

LEARNING AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Ireland’s policy stresses the importance of transparency, learning and accountability. It specifically mentions promoting and supporting the Principles of Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD), Sphere standards, the Inter-Agency Standing Committee standards and guidelines and the Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief (Irish Aid 2009). Issues of transparency and accountability are mainly addressed through the promotion of good governance. The White Paper includes public ownership and transparency as one of its guiding principles. Ireland states the importance of “accountability to both the Irish taxpayer and aid recipients,” (Irish Aid 2009). Driven by the need to enhance programme effectiveness through continued learning, Ireland focuses on the evaluation of its performance as a donor, as well as that of its partners. Ireland also refers to its GHD domestic implementation plan to assess its own performance (Irish Aid 2009).
FIELD PARTNERS’ PERCEPTIONS

IRELAND'S FIELD PERCEPTION SCORES

Collected questionnaires: 18

PILLAR 1
- RESPONDING TO NEEDS

Organisations receiving funding from Irish Aid were generally positive in relation to their commitment to Pillar 1. One agency described Ireland as an “extremely good donor that isn’t interested in politics.” Partners consider Ireland an engaged donor that is “interested in reviewing annual

PILLAR 2
- STRENGTHENING LOCAL CAPACITY

PILLAR 3
- FLEXIBILITY OF FUNDING

PILLAR 4
- ADVOCACY TOWARDS LOCAL AUTHORITIES

PILLAR 5
- ACCOUNTABILITY TOWARDS BENEFICIARIES

Ireland’s field partners seem to consider gender an important priority for the country. According to one organisation, incorporating gender sensitive approaches in programmes “is a must for Irish Aid.” Another organisation commented that “Irish Aid requests gender disaggregated data,” adding that Ireland supported a GBV programme.

HOW IS IRELAND PERCEIVED BY ITS PARTNERS?

GENDER

Colours represent performance compared to donor's average performance rating:

- Good
- Mid-range
- Could improve

Ireland’s average score 5.60

OECD/DAC average score 6.05

SOURCE: DARA
reports and regular communication with the field.” In terms of timeliness, most organisations appreciated the speed of disbursement, although a few dissented, stating that “Ireland always arrives a bit late, but at least wants to cover gaps and answer our requests.”

PILLAR 2
PREVENTION, RISK REDUCTION AND RECOVERY

Ireland’s field partners were more critical regarding its support for local capacity and beneficiary participation. One organisation stated that Irish Aid does not require it, as “they are more interested in delivering humanitarian aid.” Similarly, in relation to beneficiary participation in humanitarian aid, it was claimed that “they encourage it, but don’t insist.” Feedback was much more positive regarding Ireland’s support for prevention, preparedness and risk reduction: “Irish Aid is very strong in this, while the others [other donors] do not care that much.”

PILLAR 3
WORKING WITH HUMANITARIAN PARTNERS

In Pillar 3 (Working with humanitarian partners), partner organisations praised Ireland for the flexibility of its funding. One organisation stated: “We have a longstanding relation with them based on trust. They assume what we do is right as the grants are not earmarked.” Another added: “We have a long-term framework agreement with Irish Aid, so we can use the money as we need it.” In relation to supporting the organisational capacity of its partners, Ireland outperformed its peers, though one interviewee claimed: “This is included in development, but not in humanitarian aid.” The responses on Irish Aid’s focus on coordination differed depending on the country. One organisation asserted that it was a firm requirement: “We have to find out what other organisations are doing and participate in clusters. Irish Aid headquarters coordinates with other donors.” In a different country the response was decidedly more negative: “Coordination about donors is a lot of talk, but not that much acting.”

PILLAR 4
PROTECTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

Ireland received some of its lowest qualitative scores in Pillar 4 (Protection and international law). Partner organisations rated Ireland especially low for Advocacy towards local authorities and Advocacy for protection of civilians. In comparison, Ireland did somewhat better for its funding of protection, though it still received one of the lowest scores of the OECD/DAC donors for this indicator.

PILLAR 5
LEARNING AND ACCOUNTABILITY

In Pillar 5 (Learning and accountability), Ireland received two of its lowest scores for Accountability towards beneficiaries and Implementing evaluation recommendations. One interviewee affirmed that “downward accountability is not a funding requirement or at best a weak one.”
**RECOMMENDATIONS**

**MATCH SUPPORT FOR PREVENTION, PREPAREDNESS AND RISK REDUCTION WITH CORRESPONDING FUNDING**

Ireland’s partners report that the country is highly supportive of integrating prevention, preparedness and risk reduction measures in their humanitarian programmes. In fact, Ireland received the best score of the OECD/DAC donors for this qualitative indicator. However, its scores were very low for the quantitative indicators on funding for prevention, preparedness and reconstruction, and international risk mitigation mechanisms. Ireland allocated 0.31% of its ODA to fund international risk mitigation mechanisms while its OECD/DAC peers averaged 0.77%. Ireland’s funding for prevention and reconstruction is only 10.0% of its humanitarian assistance, while overall OECD/DAC donors dedicated an average of 18.6%. The data seems to indicate that Ireland places importance on these issues with its field partners, but is weaker in providing corresponding financial support.

**EXPLORE OPTIONS LIKE INFORMATION-SHARING TO ENHANCE DECISION-MAKING**

Ireland’s partners were critical of its capacity and expertise to make appropriate decisions. In fact, Ireland received the lowest score of the OECD/DAC donors for this indicator, a substantial drop from its score in the HRI 2010. Cutbacks in Irish Aid seem to have taken their toll on its capacity and expertise, according to Irish Aid’s partners. Given these circumstances, Irish Aid should partner with other donors and field organisations to share information and ensure information from the field is properly informing decision-making.

**REINFORCE REQUIREMENT FOR DOWNWARD ACCOUNTABILITY**

Ireland could reinforce more strongly its requirement for accountability to aid recipients, as field partners indicate that Irish Aid does not place sufficient emphasis on this.

**ENCourage LEARNING FROM THE PAST**

Ireland has substantial room for improvement in Implementing evaluation recommendations. It should redouble its efforts to work with its partners integrate lessons from the past into future programmes.

There were some organisations that were more positive regarding lesson learning however: “they evaluate our projects and encourage changes for the next time,” reported one organisation, and “very involved and care about lessons learnt,” noted another. Ireland’s partners seem to consider its reporting requirements appropriate. Responses on its transparency were mixed however: “There is transparency about funding but not about decision making.”
OVERALL PERFORMANCE

Italy ranked 19th in the HRI 2011, improving one position from 2010. Based on the patterns of its scores, Italy is classified as a Group 3 donor, “Aspiring Actors”. Donors in this group tend to have more limited capacity to engage with the humanitarian system at the field level, but often aspire to take on a greater role in the sector. They generally focus on a few core strengths, such as in the area of prevention, preparedness and risk reduction, or on specific geographic regions. Other donors in the group include Australia, Belgium, Germany, Ireland, Japan, Luxembourg and Spain.

Italy scored below the OECD/DAC and Group 3 averages in all pillars, with the exception of Pillar 2, where it scored above both averages, and Pillar 5 (Learning and accountability), where it was below the OECD/DAC average yet above the Group 3 average.

Italy did best compared to its OECD/DAC peers in the indicators on Funding accountability initiatives and Funding reconstruction and prevention. Its scores were relatively the lowest in indicators on Participating in accountability initiatives, Funding UN and RC/RC appeals, Funding NGOs, Un-earmarked funding and Reducing climate-related vulnerability.
AID DISTRIBUTION

In 2010, Official Development Assistance (ODA) comprised 0.15% of Italy’s Gross National Income (GNI), a drop from 0.16% in 2009. Humanitarian assistance represented 6.3% of Italy’s ODA in 2010, or 0.009% of its GNI.

In 2010, according to data reported to the United Nations (UN) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs’ (OCHA) Financial Tracking Service (FTS), Italy channelled 51.6% of its humanitarian assistance to UN agencies, 39.1% bilaterally to affected governments, 3.5% to the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement and 2.0% to NGOs. In 2010, Italy supported 41 crises: 17 in Asia, 14 in Africa, nine in the Americas and four in Europe, with Pakistan, Somalia and the occupied Palestinian territories receiving the greatest amount (OCHA FTS 2011).

POLICY FRAMEWORK

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Directorate General for Development Cooperation (DGCS) manages Italy’s humanitarian assistance. DGCS Office VI focuses on emergency operations and food aid, overseeing Italy’s humanitarian action. Though Italy has not created a humanitarian policy, Italy asserts that principles contained in the Good Humanitarian Donorship Initiative (GHD) and the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid guide its humanitarian action (MFA 2009). Office IV of DGCS specifically focuses on saving lives, alleviating suffering and protecting human dignity during humanitarian emergencies.

Law 49/1987 forms the legal basis of Italian foreign assistance, describing conditions for the involvement of Italian non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and civil protection assets in delivering aid. Article 1 emphasises the importance of humanitarian action, while Article 11 governs Italy’s bilateral emergency responses. Italy’s 2009 Action Plan on Aid Effectiveness seeks to ensure the effectiveness of Italy’s development and, to a minor degree, humanitarian assistance, and the 2011-2013 Programming Guidelines and Directions chart plans for aid policies and activities for the next three years. A yearly parliamentary financial law determines the quantity of Italy’s humanitarian assistance, but specific laws can be issued in parliament to increase funding for unexpected emergencies.

Italy uses its 20 Local Technical Units (LTUs) to manage operations at the field level. However, Italy’s 2011-2013 Programming Guidelines and Directions announce a scaling down of ODA. As part of this downsizing, the number of countries where DGCS operates will be reduced by 15% and the network of Local Technical Units revised; indeed, six LTUs have been made inactive in the past two years. Furthermore, Italy has declared it will not commence operations in new countries unless dire humanitarian needs arise “consistent with available resources,” (DGCS 2011).
HOW DOES ITALY’S POLICY ADDRESS GHD CONCEPTS?

GENDER

DGCS has long recognised the importance of incorporating gender equality and women’s empowerment within its programmes and in 1998 published *The Guidelines for Empowerment of Women and the Mainstreaming of a Gender Perspective in Development Co-operation*. The 2011-2013 *Programming Guidelines and Directions* likewise state that gender equality and empowerment of women will be prioritised within individual sectors and country strategies, particularly in reconstruction work in conflict-affected countries. The *DAC Peer Review 2009 Memorandum* also mentions gender as a “key,” “cross-cutting” element of Italy’s humanitarian action and describes Italy’s support for gender-oriented programmes through earmarking multilateral aid contributions.

PILLAR 1

RESPONDING TO NEEDS

Although Italy has no policy framework for ensuring its humanitarian action responds to needs, in the *DAC Peer Review 2009 Memorandum*, Italy stresses its commitment to GHD Principles and its intention to respond to needs in an impartial, neutral and independent manner (MFA 2009). In addition, DGCS strives to target the most vulnerable populations, address the most urgent and severe needs and support forgotten crises (MFA 2009). Italy has established funding mechanisms to ensure timely funding for unanticipated emergencies, whereby specific laws can be issued by the Parliament to finance humanitarian action. Italy has also set up an “emergency bilateral fund” to provide financial withdrawals for swift transfer to specific international organisations during humanitarian crises (MFA 2009).

PILLAR 2

PREVENTION, RISK REDUCTION AND RECOVERY

Italy strives to strengthen preparedness for both manmade crises and natural disasters and supports a response depot of emergency supplies in Brindisi (MFA 2009). The *DAC Peer Review 2009 Memorandum* explains that though Italy does not specifically carry out risk reduction activities, it recognises these as an important component of humanitarian action and supports activities to reduce vulnerability through collaboration with UN agencies and NGOs (MFA 2009). After approving *The Hyogo Framework for Action*, Italy launched its National Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction in 2008, led by the Civil Protection Department, to support the integration of risk reduction activities into international development policies and programmes (Protezione Civile 2011); however, it is unclear whether this goal extends to humanitarian assistance as well. DGCS has stressed the need to involve beneficiaries in disaster risk reduction (DRR), promoting activities where local communities are encouraged to identify strategies for vulnerability reduction. Beneficiary participation is also encouraged in finding solutions to problems in the
initial and rehabilitation phases of humanitarian action (MFA 2009), and the DAC Peer Review 2009 Memorandum and Aid Effectiveness Action Plan both highlight the value of capacity-building. Italy underscores the importance of maintaining a “development perspective” in humanitarian action and using emergency programmes as bridges toward longer-term development programmes (MFA 2009).

**PILLAR 3**

**WORKING WITH HUMANITARIAN PARTNERS**

Italy stresses its commitment to collaborating with multilateral organisations and recognises OCHA’s leadership in coordinating humanitarian emergencies. Though 95% of Italy’s humanitarian aid is earmarked (MFA 2009), Italy upholds the importance of pooled, multi-donor emergency funds, and supported the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) in 2010 (OCHA FTS 2011). Italy also established a revolving DGCS-International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Emergency Trust Fund in 2008 (MFA 2009). Italy emphasises the need for collaboration with NGOs, especially for long-term projects, and the 2009 Action Plan on Aid Effectiveness prioritises collaboration with NGOs. DGCS has signed a partnership agreement with the Italian Agency for Emergency Response (ACT), a coalition of 12 Italian NGOs, to improve the monitoring of humanitarian emergencies and better coordinate responses (MFA 2009).

**PILLAR 4**

**PROTECTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW**

Italy’s humanitarian assistance strives to save lives, alleviate suffering and maintain human dignity during and in the aftermath of manmade crises and natural disasters (MFA 2009). Italy affirms that it supports protection and international humanitarian law by funding UN Flash and Consolidated Inter-Agency appeals and ICRC emergency appeals (MFA 2009). It also calls for facilitating protection of civilians and humanitarian workers (MFA 2009), and the DGCS 2011 – 2013 Programming Guidelines and Directions and DAC Peer Review 2009 Memorandum describe measures for collaboration with the Ministry of Defence to ensure safety of aid workers in unstable contexts. Italy insists security measures established by the United Nations Department for Safety and Security are applied when Italian NGOs are involved in UN emergency programmes (MFA 2009).

**PILLAR 5**

**LEARNING AND ACCOUNTABILITY**

Both the Aid Effectiveness Action Plan and the DGCS 2011 – 2013 Programming Guidelines and Directions announce plans to increase transparency of DGCS activities. The DAC Peer Review 2009 Memorandum highlights Office VI’s press releases to OCHA and the MFA as a means of informing the public on crisis management activities and emphasises the importance of monitoring programmes through sound evaluations and annual reports. The MFA has not yet joined the International Aid Transparency Initiative. Italy’s position on accountability toward affected populations is not clear.
FIELD PARTNERS’ PERCEPTIONS

ITALY’S FIELD PERCEPTION SCORES

Collected questionnaires: 22

<table>
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<tr>
<th>PILLAR 1</th>
<th>Neutrality and impartiality</th>
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<th>Adapting to changing needs</th>
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<td>Appropriate reporting requirements</td>
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| Overall perception of performance | 5.00 |

SOURCE: DARA

Colours represent performance compared to donor’s average performance rating:
- Good
- Mid-range
- Could improve

ITALY’S AVERAGE SCORE 5.53

OECD/DAC AVERAGE SCORE 6.05

HOW IS ITALY PERCEIVED BY ITS PARTNERS?

GENDER

Italy’s partners held varied opinions regarding its requirements for gender-sensitive approaches. Some criticised Italy, among others, for not verifying that the programmes it supports integrate gender-sensitive approaches; one interviewee, for example claimed it was “all rhetoric.”

PILLAR 1

RESPONDING TO NEEDS

Many organisations interviewed in the field felt that Italy’s humanitarian aid was not sufficiently neutral, impartial and independent. One interviewee mentioned Rome when underlining that “the political agenda determines everything at headquarters level,” and commented that “Italy is not always neutral.” On a more positive note, interviewees conveyed that Italy’s humanitarian action does reflect a concern with properly addressing needs. An organisation in the field mentioned Italy as a donor that “follow[s] up with needs assessments” and expresses a desire to “check” and “know” needs, while another explained that “Italy was very
involved” with verifying that programmes adapted to meet changing needs but also questioned the constructiveness of this involvement. Several organisations, however, complained about the poor timeliness of Italian funding. Interviewees also mentioned “a total lack of response from the donor” and late funding “with unclear conditions.”

**PILLAR 2**

**PREVENTION, RISK REDUCTION AND RECOVERY**

Feedback from organisations in the field generally recognised Italy’s support for local capacity. However, not all organisations held this positive view regarding beneficiary participation, especially in the monitoring and evaluation stages. One interviewee suggested Italy was “very far away from beneficiaries, with many stages and processes between them and the needs [of the affected population].” Another pointed to Italy’s “little concern for beneficiary participation, both in design and evaluation of programmes.”

Though Italy’s policy upholds the use of a “development perspective” when applying humanitarian aid, an organisation in the field criticised Italy as “only focused on supporting service delivery for life-saving activities,” which perhaps contributed to its low score for *Prevention and risk reduction*.

**PILLAR 3**

**WORKING WITH HUMANITARIAN PARTNERS**

Italy generally received positive feedback from its field partners for its support for coordination among actors. Interviewees in several crises also singled out Italy for its capacity and expertise, especially at the field level. However, feedback on the flexibility of Italy’s funding was varied. Some organisations criticised its inflexible funding arrangements, which were described as “very attached” and changeable only with “extensive administrative processes.”

**PILLAR 4**

**PROTECTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW**

Italy received mixed reviews from organisations in the field for its performance in advocating toward local authorities. One interviewee criticised Italy for its tendency to “operate outside the usual networks and ‘break rank,’” suggesting that Italy’s “strong political interest” coloured its advocacy to local authorities. Other interviewees were more positive in this regard; one organisation commented that DGCS had “very well prepared staff” for advocating for local governments and authorities to fulfill their responsibilities in the response to humanitarian needs.

**PILLAR 5**

**LEARNING AND ACCOUNTABILITY**

Similar to many donors, Italy could improve its efforts to ensure accountability towards beneficiaries. While most organisations generally felt that Italy did not do enough to ensure learning from evaluations, one interviewee did highlight the importance Italy grants to evaluations: “independent evaluations are compulsory, they are very strict on this.” Organisations also held contrasting opinions regarding Italy’s reporting requirements. Although most agreed that they are appropriate, several interviewees considered Italy’s reporting requirements “excessive” and “not very reasonable.”
RECOMMENDATIONS

Formalise commitment to humanitarian principles in a comprehensive humanitarian policy

Italy would do well to create an official humanitarian policy which explains its commitment to Good Humanitarian Donorship Principles and unites the information from various web pages and documents into a common humanitarian policy.

Enhance support for NGOs, UN and RC/RC appeals, coordination and support services and pooled funds

Italy channelled only 2.0% of its funding through NGOs, compared to the OECD/DAC average of 15.3%. Italy also received the third-lowest score of the OECD/DAC donors for Funding UN and RC/RC appeals, which measures the extent to which donors provide their fair share of funding to UN and Red Cross/Red Crescent (RC/RC) appeals, coordination and support services and pooled funds. Italy scored well below average in all components that comprise this indicator. It provided only 6.8% of its fair share to UN appeals, compared to the OECD/DAC average of 41.0%; 5.6% of its fair share to coordination and support services, compared to the OECD/DAC average of 47.5%; 8.3% of its fair share to Red Cross/Red Crescent (RC/RC) appeals, compared to the OECD/DAC average of 117.1%; and 11.7% of its fair share to pooled funds, compared to the OECD/DAC average of 298.0%.

Protect the neutrality, impartiality and independence of humanitarian aid

Italy should engage with its partners to discuss practical measures to ensure the neutrality, impartiality and independence of its humanitarian aid, as it received the lowest score of the OECD/DAC donors for these indicators. Its scores were particularly low in the occupied Palestinian territories and Somalia, followed by Sudan.

Look for measures to expedite funding to complex emergencies

Italy is fairly timely in its response to sudden onset disasters, but provided only 42.5% of its funding to complex emergencies within the first three months following a humanitarian appeal, compared to the OECD/DAC average of 59.4%. Although still low, this is an improvement from 2009 when Italy provided only 26.5% of its funding within this time frame. Italy’s partners were critical of the delays in Italy’s funding; it received the lowest score on this qualitative indicator of the OECD/DAC donors.

Increase flexibility while maintaining programme follow-up

Italy received the fourth-lowest score for Un-earmarked funding. Italy provided only 7.2% of its funding without earmarking to ICRC, UNHCR, WFP, OHCHR, UNICEF, IFRC, OCHA and UNRWA, compared to the OECD/DAC average of 33.2%. Italy’s partners seem to confirm this, as Italy received the third-lowest score for the qualitative, survey-based indicator on funding flexibility.

Please see www.daraint.org for a complete list of references.
OVERALL PERFORMANCE

Japan ranked 16th in the HRI 2011, maintaining the same position as 2010. Based on the patterns of its scores, Japan is classified as a Group 3 donor, “Aspiring Actors”. Donors in this group tend to have more limited capacity to engage with the humanitarian system at the field level, but often aspire to take on a greater role in the sector. They generally focus on a few core strengths, such as in the area of prevention, preparedness and risk reduction, or on specific geographic regions. Other donors in the group include Australia, Belgium, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg and Spain.

Overall, Japan scored below the OECD/DAC and Group 3 averages. Japan scored below the OECD/DAC and Group 3 scores in all pillars, with the exception of Pillar 2, where it scored well above both averages, and Pillar 1, where Japan fell slightly below the OECD/DAC average and above the Group 3 average.

Japan did best compared to its OECD/DAC peers in the quantitative indicators Funding reconstruction and prevention and Reducing climate-related vulnerability and the qualitative indicators Prevention and risk reduction and Adapting to changing needs. Its scores were relatively the lowest in the indicators on Funding NGOs, Un-earmarked funding, Funding accountability initiatives, and Human rights law and Refugee law – all quantitative indicators.

WITH THE EXCEPT OF PILLAR 2, WHERE IT SCORED ABOVE BOTH AVERAGES, AND PILLAR 1, WHERE JAPAN FELL SLIGHTLY BELOW THE OECD/DAC AVERAGE AND ABOVE THE GROUP 3 AVERAGE.

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AID DISTRIBUTION

In 2010, Japan's Official Development Assistance (ODA) comprised 0.20% of its Gross National Income (GNI), up from 0.10% in 2009. Humanitarian assistance represented 5.7% of its ODA in 2010, or 0.01% of GNI. The burden of responding to the Tohoku-Pacific Ocean earthquake and tsunami has forced Japan to cut international assistance in 2011: while its bilateral assistance will remain at previous levels, multilateral ODA will be cut drastically (JICA 2011a).

According to data reported to the United Nations (UN) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs’ (OCHA) Financial Tracking Service (FTS), Japan channelled 87.4% of its 2010 humanitarian assistance to UN agencies, 7.1% to the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement, 1.7% to non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and 1.0% bilaterally to affected governments. In 2010, Japan funded 20 crises in Asia, 16 in Africa and six in the Americas, with Pakistan, Afghanistan and Haiti receiving the greatest amount (OCHA FTS 2011).

POLICY FRAMEWORK

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) oversees Japan’s humanitarian assistance in conjunction with the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA). The MFA directs emergency grant aid (MFA 2011a), and the Humanitarian Assistance and Emergency Relief Division (HA & ER), created within the International Cooperation Bureau of the MFA in 2009, manages Japan’s humanitarian budget. The Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs Division of the MFA’s Foreign Policy Bureau is also involved with planning emergency responses. JICA directs bilateral ODA and technical cooperation. It was restructured in 2008 when the Japanese Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) merged with JICA to improve coordination of humanitarian and development activities as well as technical and financial assistance.

Though Japan does not have an overarching humanitarian policy, its actions are governed by a series of laws and policies that generally distinguish between humanitarian assistance for natural disasters and conflict situations. The 1987 Japan Disaster Relief Law governs the dispatch of the Disaster Relief Team, while the 1991 International Peacekeeping Law covers responses to conflict-related disasters, allowing Japanese Self-Defense Forces to participate in international peace-keeping efforts. The Official Development Assistance Charter (2003), Medium Term Policy on Official Development Assistance (2005) and annual Official Development Assistance White Papers also govern Japan’s approach to humanitarian action, in addition to these three laws. Japan’s approaches toward disaster risk reduction (DRR), prevention and assistance in the aftermath of conflicts are well integrated with larger development goals such as poverty reduction and peace-building, emphasising seamless assistance spanning prevention, emergency aid, reconstruction and long-term development. JICA has 72 field offices throughout the world (MFA 2010).
HOW DOES JAPAN’S POLICY ADDRESS GHD CONCEPTS?

GENDER

Japan has incorporated gender equality into its larger ODA policies, and to a somewhat more limited degree in policies specifically concerning humanitarian action. Japan’s ODA Charter declares the importance of using a perspective of gender equality, and JICA has a goal of “gender mainstreaming.” In Japan’s Gender Mainstreaming: Inclusive and Dynamic Development, JICA emphasises the importance of including gender in all of its activities, though it does not specifically highlight gender involvement in humanitarian assistance. The Thematic Guidelines on Peacebuilding do, however, highlight the importance of accurately responding to the different needs of both men and women. Japan’s taskforce for the development of the Thematic Guidelines on Peacebuilding also included a group devoted to Gender Equality and Peacebuilding. Likewise, The Initiative for Disaster Reduction through ODA declares Japan’s intention to apply a gender perspective in regard to all DRR activities (Government of Japan 2005).

PILLAR 1

RESPONDING TO NEEDS

Japan’s 2003 ODA Charter declares that ODA should be tailored to the “assistance needs” of developing countries, and the 2005 Medium Term Policy on ODA further emphasises the importance of targeting the most vulnerable people. In addition, Japan requires needs and impact assessments to be completed at every stage of peace-building operations (JICA 2011b). Though the principles of neutrality, impartiality and independence are not specifically articulated in a humanitarian policy, the HA & ER Division Director Setsuko Kawahara has outlined them as basic tenets of humanitarian assistance (Kawahara 2011). JICA’s policies regarding assistance in both disaster and conflict situations also emphasise the importance of swift delivery. The 1987 Japan Disaster Relief Law established a comprehensive disaster relief system including a Disaster Relief Team comprised of rescue and medical specialists for rapid deployment to overseas crises, and in 2005, JICA introduced a Fast-Track System to speed the implementation process for post-disaster reconstruction assistance and peace-building support. Japan has also established special procedures to provide emergency grant aid for urgent needs in response to requests from governments and organisations working in countries affected by conflict or natural disasters; the MFA decides the amount and details of this emergency grant aid (MFA 2011a).
PILLAR 2
PREVENTION, RISK REDUCTION AND RECOVERY

In 2005, Japan launched the Initiative for Disaster Risk Reduction to promote the inclusion of disaster reduction in development assistance and provide for implementation of the Hyogo Framework for Action (MFA 2011b). Through this initiative, experts in DRR are deployed in the immediate aftermath of a disaster to assist human capacity development that will enable an emergency response, and DRR assistance is used to link reconstruction to sustainable development (Government of Japan 2005). In 2007, JICA published its Issue-specific Guidelines for Disaster Reduction, and in 2008, it created the report Building Disaster Resilient Societies. It also stocks four warehouses with emergency relief goods to be prepared for the quick distribution of material aid (JICA 2010). The Medium Term Policy on ODA advocates engaging with beneficiaries in all stages of programmes from policy and project formulation through monitoring and evaluation. The Initiative for Disaster Reduction and Thematic Guidelines on Peacebuilding also highlight the need for supporting self-help efforts in developing countries and using local manpower. In 2008, Japan published the Capacity Assessment Handbook: Project Management for Realizing Capacity Development which emphasises the importance of capacity-building in a development context, though without specifically describing humanitarian assistance.

PILLAR 3
WORKING WITH HUMANITARIAN PARTNERS

Japan highlights the need for flexible coordination with UN Agencies, other donors, the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement and NGOs, among other entities (Kawahara 2011). Japan has developed methods for coordinating with Japanese NGOs, notably through the Japan Platform, a collaboration of NGOs that provide emergency aid focusing on refugees and victims of natural disasters. In 2010, Japan also established an NGO Advisory Group on the State of International Cooperation by Japan under the MFA to draw on opinions of NGOs working in the field (MFA 2010). Japan’s 2003 ODA Charter highlights the importance of flexibility in assistance for peacebuilding, and according to “A Guide to Japan’s Aid,” Japan’s emergency disaster relief strategy particularly emphasises flexibility and has simplified procedures for emergency relief funding (MFA 1998).

PILLAR 4
PROTECTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

Japan clearly upholds the importance of human security and protection in the Medium Term Policy on ODA. JICA’s Handbook for Transition Assistance explains the importance of upholding international humanitarian law and human rights law in humanitarian assistance for societies transitioning from war to peace (JICA 2006). Japan has strict regulations guiding the security of its humanitarian workers and their involvement in areas with limited humanitarian space. Before self-defence forces can be dispatched to participate in peace-keeping operations, five conditions must be fulfilled, including the existence of a cease-fire and the consent to the operation of the parties involved in the conflict (MFA 1997). Such documents as the ODA White Paper 2010 and the Thematic Guidelines on Peacebuilding likewise emphasise the importance of guaranteeing the safety of personnel, and the MFA maintains that “securing humanitarian space is challenging but essential” (Kawahara 2011).
Japan has repeatedly affirmed its commitment to maintaining transparency and promoting the public’s access to information on its activities. Japan’s ODA White Paper 2010 expresses the intention to disclose information about ODA activities and publish reader-friendly evaluation reports, especially in light of faltering public confidence in ODA at the time of publication (MFA 2010). Furthermore, both JICA and the MFA have evaluation systems in place declared to foster accountability in operations. JICA’s Guidelines for Project Evaluation (2004) emphasises the importance of accountability to taxpayers as well as to beneficiary countries. These guidelines also stress using evaluations to assess projects’ efficacy, leaving the evaluations open to a public verdict and communicating with both donor and recipient sides at every stage of evaluation.

FIELD PARTNERS’ PERCEPTIONS

JAPAN’S FIELD PERCEPTION SCORES  Collected questionnaires: 32

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<td>Facilitating safe access</td>
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<td>PILLAR 5</td>
<td>Accountability towards beneficiaries</td>
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<td>Implementing evaluation recommendations</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Gender sensitive approach</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Overall perception of performance</td>
<td>4.23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Japan’s average score 5.84  OECD/DAC average score 6.05

Source: DARA

Colours represent performance compared to donor’s average performance rating:
- Good
- Mid-range
- Could improve
HOW IS JAPAN PERCEIVED BY ITS PARTNERS?

GENDER

Japan, along with many other donors, was criticised for its failure to integrate gender issues into programming. Partner organisations conveyed the general idea that all donors superficially address gender, but in reality this is “not an issue.” One interviewee reported that “Japan has no concern for gender at all;” similarly, another said, “Japan is less concerned about gender.”

PILLAR 1
RESPONDING TO NEEDS

Most of Japan’s partners considered its humanitarian assistance to be neutral, impartial and independent, although several organisations disagreed. One placed Japan in a group with other large donors whose aid is “less neutral and affected by government policies.” Though some respondents mentioned the economic and political interests underlying Japanese support, another made sure to stress that “Japan respects humanitarian objectives.” Others cited Japan’s heavy focus on funding refugees and its “interest mainly in actions and outputs but not [the] ground situation.” Japan did especially well compared to other donors for ensuring the programmes it supports adapt to changing needs. One interviewee praised Japan’s assistance as free from conditions that impair the ability to deliver aid, and another commended Japan for being “especially strong on tracking needs and adapting to them.” One organisation complained that annual funding prevented funding from being altered to reflect the current situation, however, and others criticised Japan’s poor timeliness of funding, referring to nearly year-long waits to secure approval for programming.

PILLAR 2
PREVENTION, RISK REDUCTION AND RECOVERY

Responses from interviewees reveal the need for Japan’s requirements from partners to ensure beneficiary participation in the programmes Japan supports. For example, one respondent noted that donors generally require beneficiary participation in design and implementation of programmes before claiming, “Japan is an exception, since they have never expressed any interest.” Japan’s field partners held varying views regarding Japan’s support for local capacity. One interviewee noted, “Japan is pushing to build capacity for sustainability,” though another organisation lumped Japan together with other donors, saying, “No donor requires or supports local capacity building, they only look at local capacity from a risk reduction point of view. Can local staff ensure aid reaches beneficiaries? How much is diverted by mismanagement in a remote control set up?” Field perceptions of Japan’s support for prevention, preparedness and risk reduction were somewhat mixed, though Japan outperformed many of its peers. One organisation proclaimed Japan to be the best donor for these issues although others considered the support insufficient.
PILLAR 3
WORKING WITH HUMANITARIAN PARTNERS
Several organisations commented that Japan was more flexible than other donors, but one did mention the “extensive administrative process” when flexibility was provided. One interviewee asserted that Japan, among other donors, does “not support any sort of organisational capacity building.” While one implementing partner placed Japan in a group of donors “keen on supporting coordination among actors” and following up with clusters, another claimed Japan was “very government oriented” with an “upstream focus.”

PILLAR 4
PROTECTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
Japan’s field partners largely felt that Japan did not actively advocate for local authorities to fulfill responsibilities in response to the humanitarian needs, though one organisation mentioned Japan as one of a group of donors who advocates indirectly through OCHA. On a similar note, one organisation reported that Japan, together with other donors, does not facilitate access, believing it to be the responsibility of OCHA. In terms of the protection of civilians, interviewees were generally more positive regarding Japan’s funding of protection than its advocacy for protection.

PILLAR 5
LEARNING AND ACCOUNTABILITY
Feedback from the field suggested a need for Japan to improve accountability towards beneficiaries, with interviewees claiming Japan required only “limited accountability to beneficiaries.” Once again, there was some disagreement, as one interviewee praised Japan’s “strong exit strategy based on accountability towards affected populations”. Others complained of Japan’s lack of support for implementing recommendations from evaluations. One organisation mentioned that Japan was honest about its true priorities, and another said Japan was “not very heavy on reporting.”
RECOMMENDATIONS

○ FORMALISE COMMITMENT TO HUMANITARIAN PRINCIPLES IN A COMPREHENSIVE HUMANITARIAN POLICY

Japan would do well to create an official humanitarian policy which explains its commitment to Good Humanitarian Donorship Principles and unites the information from various web pages and documents into a common humanitarian policy.

○ ENHANCE SUPPORT FOR NGOs, UN AND RC/RC APPEALS, COORDINATION AND SUPPORT SERVICES AND POOLED FUNDS

Japan provides the majority of its funding to UN agencies. As a result, Japan received a low score for its funding to NGOs - only 1.7% of its funding compared to the OECD/DAC average of 15.3%. Although Japan channels most of its funding through UN agencies, it is short of providing its fair share of funding to UN appeals. Japan received a low score for Funding UN and RC/RC appeals, which measures the extent to which donors provide their fair share of funding to UN and Red Cross/Red Crescent (RC/RC) appeals, coordination and support services and pooled funds. Japan scored well below average in all components that comprise this indicator. Japan provided 33.6% of its fair share to UN appeals, compared to the OECD/DAC average of 41.0%; 24.4% of its fair share to coordination and support services, compared to the OECD/DAC average of 47.5%; 15.5% of its fair share to Red Cross/Red Crescent (RC/RC) appeals, compared to the OECD/DAC average of 117.1%; and 2.0% of its fair share to pooled funds, compared to the OECD/DAC average of 298.0%.

○ RENEW COMMITMENT TO ACCOUNTABILITY

Japan received a fairly low score for its participation in humanitarian accountability initiatives. However, its financial support of humanitarian accountability initiatives was especially low – only 0.08% of its humanitarian aid was allocated to these initiatives, while the OECD/DAC average was 0.43%.

○ ENSURE AID MEETS THE DIFFERENT NEEDS OF WOMEN, MEN, BOYS AND GIRLS

Japan’s partners indicate the need for greater emphasis on gender-sensitive approaches and follow-up to ensure it is properly integrated into humanitarian programmes.

○ RENEW COMMITMENT TO HUMAN RIGHTS AND REFUGEE LAW

Japan has signed 19 of 36 human rights treaties and has not established a national human rights institution. It could also improve its funding to the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), which comprised 0.00001% of its Gross Domestic Product, while the OECD/DAC average was 0.00065%. It also has room for improvement in Refugee law, which measures signature and ratification of international treaties, participation in refugee resettlement and related funding. Of the six treaties, Japan has signed two treaties and ratified others. It could also improve its participation in refugee resettlement.

Please see www.daraint.org for a complete list of references.
Luxembourg ranked 18th in the HRI 2011, dropping eight positions from 2010, mainly due to lower scores from its field partners. Based on the patterns of its scores, Luxembourg is classified as a Group 3 donor, “Aspiring Actors”. Donors in this group tend to have more limited capacity to engage with the humanitarian system at the field level, but often aspire to take on a greater role in the sector. They generally focus on a few core strengths, such as in the area of prevention, preparedness and risk reduction, or on specific geographic regions. Other donors in the group include Australia, Belgium, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan and Spain.

Luxembourg scored below the OECD/DAC average in all pillars, with the exception of Pillar 2 and Pillar 5 (Learning and accountability), where it scored below average. Luxembourg did best compared to its OECD/DAC peers in indicators on Funding UN and RC/RC appeals, Funding international risk mitigation, Independence of aid and Timely funding to partners. Its scores were relatively the lowest in Funding and commissioning evaluations, Participating in accountability initiatives, Funding accountability initiatives, Reducing climate-related vulnerability and Advocacy towards local authorities. In general, Luxembourg ranked significantly better in the quantitative indicators than in the qualitative, survey-based indicators, which may be due to its limited capacity and field presence.
AID DISTRIBUTION

Luxembourg was one of the most generous OECD/DAC donors; its Official Development Assistance (ODA) comprised 1.09% of its Gross National Income (GNI) in 2010, up from 1.01% in 2009. Humanitarian assistance represented 16.2% of Luxembourg’s ODA in 2010, or 0.167% of its GNI. Luxembourg’s 2009-2014 Stability and Growth Programme calls for its ODA to remain at approximately 1% of its GNI (Government of Luxembourg 2010).

According to data reported to the United Nations (UN) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs’ (OCHA) Financial Tracking Service (FTS), Luxembourg channelled 46.3% of its aid to UN agencies in 2010, 34.0% to the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement and 16.2% to non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Luxembourg also supported the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) and Common Humanitarian Fund (CHF). In 2010, Luxembourg supported a total of 42 crises: 18 in Asia, 14 in Africa, seven in the Americas and three in Europe, although a significant portion of Luxembourg’s assistance was provided regionally. The top recipient countries in 2010 were Pakistan, Niger and Haiti. Luxembourg primarily allocated its sector specific funding to food, followed by health and economic recovery and infrastructure.

POLICY FRAMEWORK

Luxembourg’s humanitarian assistance is managed by the Department of Humanitarian Aid, which is under the umbrella of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Development Cooperation Directorate (DCD). Its humanitarian action is carried out under the authority of the Minister for Cooperation and Humanitarian Affairs. Luxembourg’s guiding strategy paper is titled Humanitarian Action: Strategies and Orientations and focuses on the importance of local capacity building, and funding for transition, disaster prevention and preparedness (DCD 2010a). Luxembourg’s development and humanitarian policy have their legal base in the 1996 Development Cooperation Law. Its humanitarian action is further guided by the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid, the Principles of Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) and the Oslo Guidelines on the Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief (DCD 2010a). Luxembourg has also developed sector-specific policies on gender, the environment and water, sanitation and hygiene, among others. Every year Parliament must approve the humanitarian budget as part of the government’s overall budget.
HOW DOES LUXEMBOURG’S POLICY ADDRESS GHD CONCEPTS?

GENDER

DCD published *Gender: Strategies and Orientations* in 2010 with the aim of promoting gender mainstreaming and gender-specific activities, which is echoed in the *Humanitarian Action: Strategy and Orientation* paper. Some of the practical implications for gender mainstreaming include: integrating the gender dimension into the DCD’s policy tools, educating DCD staff on the issue of gender and developing systems of monitoring and evaluation that integrate gender. The strategy paper highlights Luxembourg’s support for relevant multilateral organisations and encourages partners to development projects to promote gender equality.

PILLAR 1

RESPONDING TO NEEDS

Luxembourg’s policy expresses a clear commitment to humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence (DCD 2010a). Luxembourg works to support the primary needs of affected populations, placing particular attention on addressing the needs of vulnerable groups, such as women and children, the elderly, the handicapped, internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees, prisoners, orphans and separated families (DCD 2010a). DCD also asserts the importance of responding to forgotten crises (DCD 2010a). In its 2007 Annual Report, Luxembourg states that it seeks to provide timely funding through its cooperation with OCHA and contributions to the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF). In addition, Luxembourg has entered a joint undertaking with several private companies to create a rapid response communications system called “emergency.lu” (DCD 2011).

PILLAR 2

PREVENTION, RISK REDUCTION AND RECOVERY

Luxembourg’s humanitarian policy states that within humanitarian action, Luxembourg places a particular emphasis on issues of environmental protection and climate change (DCD 2010a). With regards to disaster risk reduction (DRR), Luxembourg strives to spend at least five percent of its humanitarian budget on building local capacities, strengthening national and regional risk prevention strategies, raising awareness and preparing local population for disasters. Luxembourg recognises the importance of linking relief to rehabilitation and development (LRRD) in its *Humanitarian Action: Strategies and Orientations* paper (DCD 2010a). Participation of affected populations and national ownership are mentioned as one of the guiding principles in Luxembourg’s humanitarian policy (DCD 2010a). Accordingly, humanitarian action should, wherever possible, promote the participation of beneficiaries in decision-making of needs-assessments, programme design and implementation (DCD 2010a). Finally, DCD often adopts a strategy to prevent the resurgence of violence after a period of calamity (DCD 2009).
PILLAR 3
WORKING WITH HUMANITARIAN PARTNERS

Luxembourg recognises the UN, and particularly OCHA, as having a central role in coordinating relief, both with partners and donors. It also recognises the importance of efforts to reform the humanitarian system and make it more coherent. It praises the cluster approach as a means to making humanitarian action more efficient and requires its partners to participate in and strengthen national and international coordination mechanisms (DCD 2010a). Luxembourg has contributed to a variety of pooled funding mechanisms, such as multi-donor funds and CERF (DCD 2009). Its *Humanitarian Action: Strategies and Orientations* sets out clear guidelines and duration periods for projects (one year for emergency assistance and three years for transitional contexts); making an exception for crisis prevention and risk reduction initiatives (DCD 2010a). Luxembourg’s policy does not seem to favour Luxembourgian NGOs over those of other nationalities, and provides NGOs with predefined annual funding allocations. It has also signed multi-annual funding agreements with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), World Food Programme (WFP) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) with the aim of providing predictable and flexible funding.

PILLAR 4
PROTECTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

DCD attaches particular importance to the protection of minorities and vulnerable persons and purports to guarantee the protection and physical security of populations in disaster affected areas by supporting programmes for disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration, return and reintegration of IDPs and refugees, demining and defusing of unexploded devices, as well as policing bodies (DCD 2010a). In addition, Luxembourg affirms its commitment to the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) (DCD 2010a). *Humanitarian Action: Strategies and Orientations* expresses support for international humanitarian law, human rights and the Geneva Convention, but does not specifically highlight refugee law. Luxembourg’s policy on the facilitation of safe humanitarian access and the safety of humanitarian workers is not clear.

PILLAR 5
LEARNING AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Luxembourg created an Evaluation and Audit Unit in 2001, which has carried out a number of evaluations of Luxembourg’s development and humanitarian assistance (DCD 2004). *Humanitarian Action: Strategies and Orientations* notes that Luxembourg will reimburse partners for costs associated with monitoring and evaluation (DCD 2010a). Luxembourg requires its partners to abide by quality standards, including the *Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief*, SPHERE standards, the technical guidance of the World Health Organization and the principle of “Do No Harm” (DCD 2010a). Luxembourg’s position regarding transparency of funding and accountability toward beneficiaries is not clear from its policy.
### Field Partners’ Perceptions

**Luxembourg’s Field Perception Scores**

Collected questionnaires: 17

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pillar</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Average Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PILLAR 1</td>
<td>Neutrality and impartiality</td>
<td>4.80</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Independence of aid</td>
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<td>Adapting to changing needs</td>
<td>3.07</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Timely funding to partners</td>
<td>3.31</td>
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<tr>
<td>PILLAR 2</td>
<td>Strengthening local capacity</td>
<td>4.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Beneficiary participation</td>
<td>5.22</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Linking relief to rehabilitation and development</td>
<td>3.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Prevention and risk reduction</td>
<td>7.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PILLAR 3</td>
<td>Flexibility of funding</td>
<td>7.74</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Strengthening organisational capacity</td>
<td>4.60</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Supporting coordination</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Donor capacity and expertise</td>
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<td>PILLAR 4</td>
<td>Advocacy towards local authorities</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Funding protection of civilians</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Advocacy for protection of civilians</td>
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<td>Facilitating safe access</td>
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<td>PILLAR 5</td>
<td>Accountability towards beneficiaries</td>
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<td>Implementing evaluation recommendations</td>
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<td>Gender sensitive approach</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Overall perception of performance</td>
<td>6.61</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Luxembourg’s average score 5.30

OECD/DAC average score 6.05

Colours represent performance compared to donor’s average performance rating:
- **Good**
- **Mid-range**
- **Could improve**

Source: DARA
HOW IS LUXEMBOURG PERCEIVED BY ITS PARTNERS?

GENDER

Field partners seem to indicate that Luxembourg could strengthen its efforts to ensure gender-sensitive approaches. One organisation commented, “Luxembourg is not very strict on this compared to other donors though it does require sex and age disaggregated data.” Another interviewee observed some improvement in this regard: “This wasn’t a requirement two years ago, but now is. They ask for this in every project. I don’t know if they will check it on it though.”

PILLAR 1
RESPONDING TO NEEDS

Luxembourg’s field partners are appreciative of the neutrality, impartiality, independence of its funding. However, a few organisations felt its aid could be more closely aligned with need. One organisation pointed to different approaches of the decentralized aid compared to the Ministry: “Luxembourg communes may only be interested in funding certain activities whereas the Luxembourg ministry funds the entire project from A to Z.” Regarding Luxembourg’s efforts to ensure the programmes it supports adapt to changing needs, field partners gave low scores. One interviewee, for example, considered that “Luxembourg doesn’t have a clue what the needs are.” Another reported the following: “usually we have a contract for a certain period with Luxembourg and they want you to do what you have said you would do. If there are changes you can make them in the next period. Funding periods normally last one year.” Partners largely considered Luxembourg’s funding timely, though one interviewee noted that it depends on the availability of funding: “Yes and no. When Luxembourg has the money, it’s fine. They are quite fast. Once you have a green light for funding, it’s fast.”

PILLAR 2
PREVENTION, RISK REDUCTION AND RECOVERY

Feedback from Luxembourg’s field partners seems to point to a need for improvement in Pillar 2 indicators. While some interviewees felt that “Strengthening local capacity is one of the pillars for Luxembourg,” and “they are big on working with local institutions,” others noted that they are scared to work with local NGOs due to corruption issues.” Feedback was regarding support for transitional activities and linking relief to rehabilitation and development. One interviewee commended Luxembourg, stating, “Compared to other donors, Luxembourg is very interested in LRRD.” Others reported problems in this regard: “We have a problem with Luxembourg with this because they want to keep them separate, probably because they have separate funding schemes.” Feedback was generally negative regarding beneficiary participation and support for prevention, preparedness and risk reduction, though one organisation reported receiving support for this: “with Luxembourg it used to be more for conflict and disaster prevention and now it is a lot on preparedness and DRR.”
PILLAR 3
WORKING WITH HUMANITARIAN PARTNERS

Luxembourg’s partner organisations seem to consider its funding sufficiently flexible. When asked about the flexibility of its funding, one interviewee noted, “For Luxembourg it depends how much funding they have. If they have a lot, yes.” Another reported: “For the Luxembourg Ministry, we can move money between budget lines, but if we do we have to make a ledger.” Its scores for supporting the organisational capacity of its partners were significantly lower. “For the Luxembourg Ministry, if we need more staff they will support us. For the Luxembourg communes, they don’t support our contingency planning or support us with more staff if we need it.”

PILLAR 4
PROTECTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

Partner organisations seem to find Luxembourg’s advocacy toward local authorities weak, however one interviewee disagreed, stating: “Luxembourg is a small country but with a very active diplomacy”. Luxembourg’s partners seem to consider it a strong financial supporter of the protection of civilians, rating it lower for advocacy for protection. Luxembourg also received low marks for its efforts to facilitate humanitarian access and the safety of aid workers.

PILLAR 5
LEARNING AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Luxembourg’s partners generally consider its reporting requirements appropriate. Though its scores for implementing evaluation recommendations were significantly lower, several organisations reported positive experiences: “Luxembourg applies lessons learnt in different programmes and different crises to others. There are bridges between programmes and projects even about technical issues.” Another interviewee noted that Luxembourg wants us to do evaluations and have a management response on the recommendations.” Most organisations felt that Luxembourg was transparent about its funding and decision-making. “We are very happy,” stated one interviewee when asked about Luxembourg’s transparency. Another organisation disagreed, stating: “Luxembourg is not very transparent. You don’t hear much how they decide or how many organisations apply.”
RECOMMENDATIONS

○ RENEW COMMITMENT TO LEARNING AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Luxembourg has significant room for improvement in its support for learning and accountability. It has not participated in any of the initiatives for humanitarian accountability included in the indicator Participating in accountability initiatives. Luxembourg’s financial support for learning and accountability was also low - only 0.06% of its humanitarian funding, while the OECD/DAC average was 0.43%. Furthermore, it has not published evaluation guidelines and has not commissioned any publicly-accessible evaluations over the past five years.

Luxembourg’s partners seem to confirm the need for greater investment in prevention, preparedness and risk reduction, as well as transitional activities (LRRD), scoring well below average in both of these qualitative, survey-based indicators.

○ ENGAGE IN DIALOGUE WITH PARTNERS TO PARTICIPATE IN ADVOCACY AS APPROPRIATE

Luxembourg received a low score for the qualitative indicator Advocacy towards local authorities. Luxembourg should engage in dialogue with its partners to discuss the most appropriate means to advocate for local authorities to fulfill their responsibilities in response to the humanitarian needs in each crisis.

○ INVEST ADEQUATELY IN PREVENTION, PREPAREDNESS, RISK REDUCTION AND Transitional ACTIVITIES

With the exception of its funding international risk mitigation mechanisms, Pillar 2 appears to be a weakness for Luxembourg. In particular, it could improve its efforts to reduce climate-related vulnerability. Luxembourg provided only 32.6% of its fair share to Fast Start Finance, which supports climate change mitigation and adaptation efforts, compared to the OECD/DAC average of 102.4%. Furthermore, it has fallen short on its commitments to reduce emissions.

Also in Pillar 2, Luxembourg scored below average in Beneficiary participation and Strengthening local capacity, both of which could be influenced by Luxembourg’s limited capacity. Luxembourg received the second-lowest score for this indicator. While Luxembourg may not be able to increase in size and capacity, it should strive to increase programme follow-up through other means to ensure its partners strengthen local capacity and involve beneficiaries.

○ ENHANCE PROGRAMME MONITORING TO IMPROVE BENEFICIARY PARTICIPATION AND STRENGTHEN LOCAL CAPACITY

Luxembourg’s partners indicate the need for greater emphasis on gender-sensitive approaches and follow-up to ensure it is properly integrated into humanitarian programmes.

Please see www.daraint.org for a complete list of references.
The Netherlands ranked 5th in the HRI 2011, improving four positions from 2010. Based on the pattern of its scores, the Netherlands is classified as a Group 1 donor, “Principled Partners”. This group is characterised by its commitment to humanitarian principles and strong support for multilateral partners, and generally good overall performance in all areas. Other Group 1 donors include Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland.

The Netherlands’ overall score was above the OECD/DAC average, yet below the Group 1 average. The Netherlands scored above the OECD/DAC average in all pillars, with the exception of Pillar 5 (Learning and accountability), where it was average. Compared to Group 1 donors, the Netherlands was below average in all pillars, except for Pillar 2 (Prevention, risk reduction and recovery), where it scored above average.

The Netherlands did best compared to its OECD/DAC peers in the indicators on Funding reconstruction and prevention, Un-earmarked funding, Strengthening local capacity, Funding vulnerable and forgotten emergencies and Beneficiary participation. Its scores were relatively the lowest in the indicators on Funding NGOs, International humanitarian law, Funding and commissioning evaluations, Funding accountability initiatives and Timely funding to complex emergencies.
POLICY FRAMEWORK

The Netherlands’ humanitarian assistance is managed by the Humanitarian Aid Division (DMH/HH), which is part of Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Human Rights, Gender, Good Governance and Humanitarian Aid Department. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ 2006 Grant Regulations, the Minister for Development Cooperation, recently replaced by the Minister for European Affairs and International Cooperation, has the authority to award grants for emergency aid or conflict management (Government of the Netherlands 2008a). The Department for Fragile States and Peace-building (EFV) manages early recovery assistance, although this is not funded through the humanitarian budget, and the Department for United Nations and Financial Institutes (DVF) provides core funding to a number of United Nations (UN) agencies.

The Netherlands has published a number of documents on its humanitarian policy, such as the A World of Difference (1990) and A World of Dispute (1993). Further policy objectives are published in the Grant Policy Frameworks for Humanitarian Aid, 2004 and 2005 and more recently, the 2008 Humanitarian Aid Policy Rules (and annexes) (IOB 2006 and OECD DAC 2006). These policy rules also serve as guidelines to organisations applying for funding. In 2011, the Netherlands created a new overarching strategy on foreign policy set out in the Focus Letter on Development. It has identified the following priorities for its humanitarian and development assistance until 2015: security and rule of law, sexual and reproductive health, water and food security (MinBuZa 2011a). The Netherlands’ humanitarian aid division is expected to publish a new humanitarian policy this year, in which it will further specify the role for its humanitarian assistance (MinBuZa 2011b).
HOW DOES NETHERLAND’S POLICY ADDRESS GHD CONCEPTS?

GENDER

The 2008 Humanitarian Policy Rules require a focus on gender as one of the general criteria for NGOs to apply for funding (Government of the Netherlands 2008). Further specifics are not provided, however. Previous evaluations have encouraged the Netherlands to consider creating explicit gender-sensitive requirements for partner organisations (IOB 2006).

PILLAR 1
RESPONDING TO NEEDS

The Netherlands seeks to provide humanitarian assistance on the basis of needs while adhering to the principles of neutrality, impartiality and independence (IOB 2006). Over the years, the Netherlands’ policy has become more explicit with regards to identifying vulnerable groups, particularly women and children (IOB 2006 and OECD DAC 2006), and this is reiterated in its most recent policy document. The Netherlands also places emphasis on timeliness, which it aims to achieve by supporting the UN as the central coordinator of humanitarian assistance and through the creation of Channel Financing Agreements (Government of the Netherlands 2008a).

PILLAR 2
PREVENTION, RISK REDUCTION AND RECOVERY

The Netherlands’ humanitarian policy takes a “humanitarian plus” stance to humanitarian action in an effort to integrate relief with development (IOB 2006). However, it is limited in doing so from a funding perspective as humanitarian budgets are only meant for the acute needs and early recovery phases. To overcome this, the Netherlands established a Stability Fund in 2004 to facilitate the transition to rehabilitation and reconstruction (IOB 2006). Other budget lines, while not part of humanitarian aid per se, also provide funding for prevention and preparedness (IOB 2006 and OECD/DAC 2006). The 2008 Humanitarian Aid Policy Rules reaffirm the need to address the gap between relief and development. It further mentions capacity building and beneficiary participation as one of its main guiding principles (Government of the Netherlands 2008a).
PILLAR 3
WORKING WITH HUMANITARIAN PARTNERS

The Netherlands’ humanitarian policy stresses the importance of coordination, and recognises the special role of the UN and its various agencies in this regard. The Netherlands intends to strengthen and develop a common, coordinated approach among donors and other relevant actors. In order to be eligible to receive funding, NGOs must participate in OCHA-led coordination mechanisms (Government of the Netherlands 2008a). In recognition of the need for flexible funding, the Netherlands signed the Channel Financing Agreements in 2003-2004 with several UN agencies and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), providing them with one large allocation per year, earmarked only at the appeal level (IOB 2006). The 2008 Humanitarian Aid Policy Rules relating to NGO funding appear considerably stricter in terms of flexibility and extension (Government of the Netherlands 2008a).

PILLAR 4
PROTECTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

The Netherlands affirms that its humanitarian assistance is guided by both the humanitarian imperative and international humanitarian law. In its previous humanitarian policy documents, the Netherlands has vowed to actively promote these principles, along with human rights and refugee law (IOB 2006). With regards to protection, the Netherlands has commissioned evaluations on these issues in an effort to improve their performance. The Netherlands’ undertakes diplomatic action when necessary to facilitate humanitarian access and the safety of aid workers (IOB 2006 and OECD/DAC 2006). However, the 2008 Humanitarian Aid Policy Rules declare that the responsibility of aid worker security lies with the NGOs (Government of the Netherlands 2008a).

PILLAR 5
LEARNING AND ACCOUNTABILITY

The use and implementation of quality and accountability standards have been actively promoted by the Netherlands. It has financially supported accountability initiatives such as the Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action (ALNAP), the Humanitarian Accountability Partnership International and Sphere. The ICRC and UN agencies benefit from more flexible reporting requirements, as they are funding through the Channel Financing Agreements, while reporting requirements for NGOs are relatively stricter (IOB 2006 and OECD/DAC 2006).
### How is Netherlands perceived by its partners?

#### Gender

The Netherlands’ field partners seem to indicate the need for a greater focus on gender. Some organisations reported that gender is “part of the proposal design” for the Netherlands, but “they don’t emphasise it anymore.”

#### Pillar 1: Responding to needs

Most of the Netherlands’ partners consider its aid neutral, impartial and independent, although a few held dissenting opinions: “The Netherlands pays lip service to humanitarian principles, but are beholden to decisions in their capital driven by the domestic political agenda.” Another organisation criticised that the Netherlands, “should be more interested in meeting gaps [of needs] and saving lives. If they are not, you wonder why they started funding in the first place.” On the other hand, an organisation felt that “the Netherlands has a lot of field presence,” which helped to ensure programmes adapt to changing needs.
PILLAR 2  
PREVENTION, RISK REDUCTION AND RECOVERY

Compared to other donors, the Netherlands does well in Pillar 2 indicators, particularly for its support of local capacity. However, partner organisations gave lower scores for Beneficiary participation, Linking relief to rehabilitation and development and Prevention and risk reduction. Regarding the latter, one organisation noted that they were requirements “on paper, but there’s no follow-up.”

PILLAR 3  
WORKING WITH HUMANITARIAN PARTNERS

Partner organisations were mostly positive regarding the flexibility of Dutch funding. Some organisations praised the Netherlands, stating that “the Dutch have very good flexibility and high capacity to adapt to needs.” Similarly, another organisation affirmed: “the Netherlands are more flexible on funding.” On the other hand, a few organisations commented that “the Dutch have heavy procedures to do cost extensions.” Most organisations felt that the Netherlands was supportive of their organisational capacity, one noting that they “ask for the training of national staff.”

PILLAR 4  
PROTECTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

The response from the field in relation to the Netherlands' government’s commitment to protection and international law is particularly positive. One organisation stated that “the Netherlands is the only one offering funding for advocacy positions on protection of civilians”, while another organisation, in relation to facilitating safe humanitarian access, commented that “the Dutch government has been particularly engaged, in fact, their engagement has been extraordinary.”

PILLAR 5  
LEARNING AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Compared to its donor peers, the Netherlands’ received one of the highest scores for Accountability towards beneficiaries, though notably below its qualitative average, as this is a common weakness among donors. One organisation reported that “they [the Netherlands] consider accountability key and have the commitment to manage.” Regarding the implementation of evaluation recommendations, an interviewee claimed that “the Netherlands does not closely follow the implementation of the project. Their participation is merely through funding.” In relation to transparency, one of the recipient agencies commented that the “decision-making process stays at the headquarters level in the case of the Dutch ministry for foreign affairs, so we really do not get that much information.”
RECOMMENDATIONS

◊ LOOK FOR ADMINISTRATIVE SOLUTIONS TO CHANNEL MORE FUNDING TO NGOS

The Netherlands provides a large portion of its funding through multilateral channels, but has one of the lowest scores for its funding to NGOs. In 2010, the Netherlands channelled 4.0% to NGOs, while the Group 1 average is 15.3%. Staff cut-backs will likely make it difficult for the Netherlands to manage a large number of grants to NGO partners, but it may be able to increase its support to NGOs and reduce somewhat the administrative burden by creating flexible working models, such as shared management arrangements with other donors, supporting NGO umbrella organisations or consortia.

◊ RENEW SUPPORT OF LEARNING AND ACCOUNTABILITY INITIATIVES

The Netherlands’ partners consider it one of the better donors for ensuring accountability toward beneficiaries. It could improve, however, its funding for humanitarian learning and accountability initiatives. The Netherlands provided 0.31% of its humanitarian funding for these initiatives, compared to the OECD/DAC average of 0.43% and the Group 1 average of 0.69%.

◊ FORMALISE COMMITMENT TO INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW

In Pillar 4, the Netherlands could improve its commitment to International humanitarian law, which measures signature and ratification of treaties, funding to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and establishment of a national committee to ensure respect of ratified treaties. The Netherlands has signed 49 of 50 treaties on international humanitarian law. However, it provided 0.005% of its GDP to the ICRC, below the Group 1 average of 0.01%. Furthermore, the Netherlands is one of only four OECD/DAC donor countries without a national committee. The Netherlands is encouraged to establish a national committee to ensure respect of ratified humanitarian treaties and to consider increasing its support of the ICRC.

Please see www.daraint.org for a complete list of references.
New Zealand is not included in the overall ranking, as insufficient survey responses were obtained to calculate the qualitative indicators that make up the index.

New Zealand’s overall scores in the HRI’s quantitative indicators were below the OECD/DAC and Group 3 averages. New Zealand scored below the OECD/DAC and Group 3 averages in all pillars, with the exception of Pillar 2 and Pillar 4 (Protection and international law), where it scored above the OECD/DAC and Group 3 averages.

New Zealand did best compared to its OECD/DAC peers in the indicators on Funding reconstruction and prevention, Un-earmarked funding and Human rights law. Its scores were relatively the lowest in indicators on Funding NGOs, Funding accountability initiatives, Timely funding to complex emergencies, Funding UN and RC/RC appeals and Reducing climate-related vulnerability.
AID DISTRIBUTION

In 2010, Official Development Assistance (ODA) comprised 0.26% of New Zealand’s Gross National Income (GNI), and humanitarian assistance made up 10.9% of its ODA, constituting .026% of its total GNI. According to data reported to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs’ (OCHA) Financial Tracking Service (FTS), in 2010, New Zealand channelled 81.9% of its humanitarian aid to UN agencies, 6.0% to the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement, 3.0% to NGOs and 2.4% bilaterally to affected governments. In 2010, New Zealand funded four emergencies in Africa, three in Asia, three in the Americas and one in Oceania (OCHA FTS 2011).

POLICY FRAMEWORK

The International Development Group, a division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT), directs New Zealand’s humanitarian aid through the New Zealand Aid Programme. The New Zealand Aid Programme draws on the expertise gained by its predecessor, the New Zealand Agency for International Development (NZAID), which was dissolved in April 2009 when its semi-autonomous status was rescinded and it was reintegrated into MFAT and renamed (New Zealand Aid Programme 2011a). This restructuring was intended to improve effectiveness and efficiency and better situate the programme to link development, trade and diplomacy in New Zealand’s foreign policy (MFAT 2010a). During this transition, the Humanitarian Action Fund was discontinued, and the Humanitarian Response Fund was created to provide disaster relief, recovery and reconstruction assistance through non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in the wake of disasters. The New Zealand Aid Programme coordinates with New Zealand’s Emergency Task Force (ETF) to respond to disasters and the New Zealand Defence Force and the New Zealand Police to support peace-building and conflict prevention efforts (New Zealand Aid Programme 2011b). A new humanitarian action policy is expected to be completed in late 2011. New Zealand Aid Programme representatives are stationed at four embassies in countries in Southeast Asia and the Pacific (MFAT 2011). The New Zealand Aid Programme often plays a leading role in responding to humanitarian needs in the Pacific, taking a “hands-on, whole of government approach” to such crises (New Zealand Aid Programme 2011d). Responses beyond this region are generally part of a larger international effort in collaboration with United Nations (UN) agencies, the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement and local, international or New Zealand NGOs (New Zealand Aid Programme 2011d).

HOW DOES NEW ZEALAND’S POLICY ADDRESS GHD CONCEPTS?

GENDER

NZAID strives for “gender mainstreaming” and more recently, the 2011 International Development Policy Statement named gender as a cross-cutting and thematic issue that will be taken into account in all New Zealand Aid Programme activities. In 2007, NZAID published Achieving Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment, which plans to reduce gender-based violence and take into account women’s and men’s differing needs, priorities and experiences, particularly in conflict and post-conflict settings. Preventing Conflict and Building Peace further emphasises gender sensitivity in peace-building and conflict prevention work and recognises the specific roles for women in these efforts.
PILLAR 1
RESPONDING TO NEEDS

New Zealand has affirmed its commitment to providing need-based assistance; the scale and human impact of a crisis as well as requests for assistance from the affected country’s government guide New Zealand’s humanitarian responses (New Zealand Aid Programme 2011d). MFAT also identifies needs in the wake of a disaster before funding NGOs through the Humanitarian Response Fund (MFAT 2010b). Through this mechanism, the New Zealand Aid Programme supports timely humanitarian assistance funding by delivering “fast and effective relief, recovery and reconstruction via non-government organisations (NGOs),” (MFAT 2010b). NZAID’s 2005 publication Preventing Conflict and Building Peace similarly mentions the need for targeting “at risk” sections of society. This document also highlights the need for humanitarian assistance to be neutral, impartial and independent although it remains to be seen if efforts to link development more closely with diplomacy and trade will affect the independence of humanitarian assistance.

PILLAR 2
PREVENTION, RISK REDUCTION AND RECOVERY

The New Zealand Aid Programme has asserted its commitment to providing humanitarian assistance in the Pacific, spanning from disaster preparedness to response and recovery (New Zealand Aid Programme 2011d). It also emphasises the importance of disaster risk reduction (2011d), and NZAID’s 2006 Environment in International Development mentions the goal of enhancing preparation for natural disasters. NZAID’s peace policy also highlights measures for conflict prevention (NZAID 2005), and the Humanitarian Response Fund provides funding to NGOs for disaster response preparation (MFAT 2010). In addition, Preventing Conflict and Building Peace explains the importance of ensuring a “seamless transition from humanitarian relief work to longer-term development activities.” The New Zealand Aid Programme has articulated its commitment to building local capacity and fostering beneficiary participation for all its undertakings in the 2011 International Development Policy Statement (New Zealand Aid Programme 2011e), while Preventing Conflict and Building Peace stresses the importance of these principles in conflict prevention and management activities.
PILLAR 3  
WORKING WITH HUMANITARIAN PARTNERS

New Zealand plays a particularly important role in the coordination of international and local resources for humanitarian responses in the Pacific. As a member of the France, Australia and New Zealand (FRANZ) agreement, it may engage in joint crisis responses in conjunction with France and Australia (New Zealand Aid Programme 2011d). The New Zealand Aid Programme provides annual core funding to multilateral partners and also supports the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement, UN agencies and civil society organisations (New Zealand Aid Programme 2011d). The Humanitarian Response Fund allocates funding for disaster preparedness, relief, recovery and reconstruction to accredited New Zealand NGOs, and the 2011 International Development Policy Statement asserts New Zealand’s intention to channel more aid through New Zealand NGOs for humanitarian emergency and disaster relief. The 2011 International Development Policy Statement also mentions increasing responsiveness and flexibility as a goal, though not specifically in the context of humanitarian assistance.

PILLAR 4  
PROTECTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

New Zealand’s humanitarian engagements prioritise the safety of civilians (New Zealand Aid Programme 2011d), and NZAID asserted a strong commitment to human rights in its 2002 Human Rights Policy Statement. NZAID also upheld its support for international humanitarian law in peace-building activities and followed the principle ‘Do No Harm’ and Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) guidelines for the delivery of humanitarian assistance (NZAID 2005). New Zealand’s formal policy on safe humanitarian access and advocacy toward local authorities is not clear.

PILLAR 5  
LEARNING AND ACCOUNTABILITY

The 2011 International Development Policy Statement explains that the New Zealand Aid Programme carries out reviews and evaluations to assess programme performance and effectiveness and to foster learning and accountability. MFAT also publishes an annual report to this effect. The New Zealand Aid Programme has an Evaluation and Research Committee to oversee evaluative activities and ensure that their findings inform future programme planning. It also stresses the need to share knowledge within the Aid Programme and with development partners and other donors (New Zealand Aid Programme 2011f). The former NZAID published the 2007 NZAID Evaluation Policy Statement which highlights fairness and accountability towards beneficiaries.
RECOMMENDATIONS

Ensure Crisis Selection Is Based on Need

New Zealand received a low score for the indicator Funding vulnerable and forgotten emergencies, which measures funding to forgotten emergencies and those with the greatest vulnerability. New Zealand was slightly below average for its support of forgotten emergencies – 25.9% of its funding, compared to the OECD/DAC average of 32.1%. New Zealand tends to prioritise crises in its geographic region. As a result, it provides less funding to crises with high levels of vulnerability when compared to other donors. New Zealand designated 41.6% of its humanitarian funding for these crises, compared to the Group 3 average of 63.0% and the OECD/DAC average of 63.9%. New Zealand could review its funding criteria to ensure it responds to crises with the greatest need at the global level while maintaining its niche in the Asia-Pacific.

Explore Options to Expedite Funding to Complex Emergencies

New Zealand does fairly well in responding in a timely manner to sudden onset emergencies, but could improve the timeliness of its funding to complex emergencies. New Zealand provided 21.2% of its funding for complex emergencies within the first three months of a humanitarian appeal. The OECD/DAC average was 59.4%.

Look for Administrative Solutions to Channel More Funding to NGOs

New Zealand channelled only 3.0% of its humanitarian funding to NGOs, compared to the OECD/DAC average of 15.3%. As New Zealand may not be able to handle a large number of smaller contracts to NGOs, it could explore flexible working models, such as shared management arrangements with other donors and supporting NGO umbrella organisations or NGOs of other nationalities.

Renew Support for Learning and Accountability

New Zealand could improve its support for learning and accountability initiatives. In 2010, New Zealand dedicated 0.10% of its humanitarian aid for these initiatives; the OECD/DAC average was 0.43%.

Strengthen Support to Reduce Climate-Related Vulnerability

New Zealand provided only 62.5% of its fair share to Fast Start Finance, which supports climate change mitigation and adaptation efforts, compared to the OECD/DAC average of 102.4%. Furthermore, New Zealand has fallen short on its commitments to reduce emissions, which seems to indicate that New Zealand could augment its support to reduce climate-related vulnerability.

Enhance Support for UN and RC/RC Appeals, Coordination and Support Services and Pooled Funds

New Zealand received a low score for Funding UN and RC/RC appeals, which measures the extent to which donors provide their fair share of funding to UN and Red Cross/Red Crescent (RC/RC) appeals, coordination and support services and pooled funds. It scored well below average in all components that comprise this indicator, with the exception of its funding for pooled funds, where it is close to average. New Zealand provided 12.6% of its fair share to UN appeals, compared to the OECD/DAC average of 41.0%; 0.0% of its fair share to coordination and support services, compared to the OECD/DAC average of 47.5%; and 71.8% of its fair share to Red Cross/Red Crescent (RC/RC) appeals, compared to the OECD/DAC average of 117.1%.

Please see www.daraint.org for a complete list of references.
**OVERALL PERFORMANCE**

Norway ranked 1st in the HRI 2011, improving three positions from 2010. Based on the pattern of its scores, Norway is classified as a Group 1 donor, “Principled Partners”. This group is characterised by its commitment to humanitarian principles and strong support for multilateral partners, and generally good overall performance in all areas. Other Group 1 donors include Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland.

Overall, Norway scored above the OECD/DAC and Group 1 averages. Norway scored above the OECD/DAC average in all pillars. It was above the Group 1 average in all pillars, with the exception of Pillar 1 (Responding to needs) and Pillar 5 (Learning and accountability), where it scored below average.

Norway did best compared to its OECD/DAC peers in the indicators on Funding UN and RC/RC appeals, Reducing climate-related vulnerability, Funding NGOs, Un-earmarked funding and Refugee law. Its scores were relatively lower in indicators on Funding reconstruction and prevention, Funding vulnerable and forgotten emergencies, Timely funding to complex emergencies, Implementing evaluation recommendations and Prevention and risk reduction.

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**HUMANITARIAN AID DISTRIBUTION (%)**

- **BY CHANNEL**
  - UN: 46
  - NGOs: 30
  - Private orgs: 3
  - Other: 7
- **BY SECTOR**
  - Protection: 12
  - Coordination: 12
  - Health: 8
  - Mine action: 7
  - Others: 11
- **BY RECIPIENT COUNTRY**
  - Sudan: 11
  - Pakistan: 9
  - Haiti: 6
  - oPt: 4
  - Afghanistan: 4
  - Somalia: 3
  - Others: 17
  - Un-earmarked: 49

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**STRENGTHS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pillar Type Indicator</th>
<th>Score</th>
<th>% above OECD/DAC average</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3 Funding UN and RC/RC appeals</td>
<td>10.00</td>
<td>+145.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Reducing climate-related vulnerability</td>
<td>8.40</td>
<td>+108.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Funding NGOs</td>
<td>8.98</td>
<td>+98.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Un-earmarked funding</td>
<td>10.00</td>
<td>+92.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Refugee law</td>
<td>10.00</td>
<td>+77.8%</td>
</tr>
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**AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Pillar Type Indicator</th>
<th>Score</th>
<th>% below OECD/DAC average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2 Funding reconstruction and prevention</td>
<td>3.21</td>
<td>-28.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Funding vulnerable and forgotten emergencies</td>
<td>6.36</td>
<td>-7.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Timely funding to complex emergencies</td>
<td>7.67</td>
<td>-3.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Implementing evaluation recommendations</td>
<td>4.22</td>
<td>-1.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Prevention and risk reduction</td>
<td>4.50</td>
<td>-0.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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**GENDER RATING**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Rating</th>
<th>Policy</th>
<th>Funding</th>
<th>Field Perception</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>STRENGTHS</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT</strong></td>
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**HUMANITARIAN AID**

- OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE: 1.10% of GNI
- HUMANITARIAN AID: 12.2% of ODA
- US $113 Per person
AID DISTRIBUTION

Norway’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) has consistently risen since 2008 and currently represents 1.10% of its Gross National Income (GNI). Humanitarian assistance represented 12.2% of Norway’s ODA in 2010, or 0.14% of its GNI.

According to data reported to the United Nations (UN) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs’ (OCHA) Financial Tracking Service (FTS) (2011), Norway channelled 45.6% of its 2010 humanitarian aid to UN agencies, 29.6% to non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and 14.5% to the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement. Norway supported 14 crises in Africa, ten in Asia and eight in the Americas. Of the humanitarian aid allocated to specific countries, Pakistan, Haiti and Sudan received the greatest amount in 2010. Sectorally, Norway concentrated its funding on coordination and support services; and protection, human rights and rule of law initiatives (OCHA FTS 2011).

POLICY FRAMEWORK

The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) manages Norway’s humanitarian aid, with the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad) operating as a technical directorate. The Department for UN, Peace and Humanitarian Affairs and the Department of Regional Affairs and Development are the two main departments involved in overseeing humanitarian action. Norway continues to base its humanitarian policy on the MFA’s 2008 Humanitarian Policy, which aims to make the country a world leader in the humanitarian field. The MFA has also developed sector-specific humanitarian policies, such as the Norwegian policy on the prevention of humanitarian crises and the 2011-13 Strategic Plan for Women, Peace and Security (MFA 2011). To meet the challenges of an increasingly complex international system, Norway sees its humanitarian engagement as part of a coherent foreign and development policy that aims to promote peace and sustainable development (MFA 2008). The Norwegian Emergency Preparedness System (NOREPS), a partnership among the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Directorate for Civil Protection and Emergency Planning (DSB), was established to strengthen the response capacity of humanitarian organisations, especially in the critical first phase of a humanitarian crisis (MFA 2008).

HOW DOES NORWAY’S POLICY ADDRESS GHD CONCEPTS?

GENDER

Norway’s Humanitarian Policy aims to set new standards in women’s rights and gender equality. This commitment is highlighted by the MFA’s 2011 publication of the 2011-13 Strategic Plan for Women, Peace and Security which intends to enhance women’s influence and participation and strengthen the protection of women during armed conflicts. Norway supports the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security and contributed to the Gender Handbook for Humanitarian Action (MFA 2008). Its humanitarian policy states that all partners must ensure that the needs of girls and women are taken into account in all humanitarian activities, on par with the needs of boys and men (MFA 2008).
PILLAR 1
RESPONDING TO NEEDS

Norway bases its humanitarian aid on the principles of neutrality and impartiality and attempts to ensure effective responses to changing humanitarian needs in both sudden and protracted crises (MFA 2008). Special priority is also given to promoting more balanced, needs-based activities where all affected groups are consulted, especially women and children. It pledges to allocate sufficient reserves to respond quickly, with substantial funding, to at least two new humanitarian crises per year (MFA 2008). Norway’s Humanitarian Policy also mentions that the MFA is increasing multi-year cooperation agreements with selected partners.

PILLAR 2
PREVENTION, RISK REDUCTION AND RECOVERY

Norway’s humanitarian policy expresses a strong commitment to prevention, risk reduction and recovery (MFA 2008). In 2007, the Norwegian MFA published the Norwegian policy on the prevention of humanitarian crises, highlighting the need to strengthen the participation of affected parties at the local level, especially women and children and in prevention and preparedness activities. Norway’s Humanitarian Policy also states that the international community should focus more on capacity building in countries prone to humanitarian disasters.

PILLAR 3
WORKING WITH HUMANITARIAN PARTNERS

Norway’s Humanitarian Policy emphasises the need to support coordination activities and flexible funding for humanitarian crises. Un-earmarked funds are dispersed early in the year to UN and International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) appeals. The MFA has set forth a strategic plan to work with and fund Norwegian humanitarian organisations while holding them to high standards. Since its inception, NOREPS has worked to improve coordination and responsiveness in providing immediate relief goods and personnel for humanitarian relief operations worldwide. Moreover, the MFA states that more resources will be invested in humanitarian assistance and that a strong humanitarian research capacity will be established in Norway (MFA 2008).

PILLAR 4
PROTECTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

Protection and international law is a centrepiece in Norwegian humanitarian efforts (MFA 2008). Norway’s Humanitarian Policy dedicates a section to the protection of civilians in complex emergencies, highlighting the need for greater international focus on protection measures for displaced persons, women and children. Oslo has spearheaded the effort to promote the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions and the 1997 Mine Ban Convention, as well as other disarmament initiatives. Norway’s humanitarian policy also regards the Geneva Conventions as the pillars of international humanitarian law and advocates for greater implementation of refugee law in protecting displaced populations (MFA 2008). The MFA recognises that humanitarian crises often call for political solutions and therefore promotes advocacy towards local authorities when appropriate (MFA 2008).
Norway's Humanitarian Policy expresses a clear commitment to improving learning and accountability within humanitarian aid. Norway is making an effort to improve administrative capacities, simplify the reporting system and increase the use of evaluations and reviews (MFA 2008). The MFA (2008) has also adopted a zero tolerance policy regarding fraud and corruption for recipients. Furthermore, it is stated that in countries where Norway has a diplomatic presence, embassies will increase the use of evaluations and reviews, in cooperation with Norad, in order to facilitate learning. It is not clear from Norway's humanitarian policy whether there are measures promoting accountability towards beneficiaries.

### FIELD PARTNERS’ PERCEPTIONS

#### NORWAY’S FIELD PERCEPTION SCORES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Collected questionnaires: 41</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Neutrality and impartiality</td>
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<tr>
<td>Independence of aid</td>
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<tr>
<td>Adapting to changing needs</td>
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<tr>
<td>Timely funding to partners</td>
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<tr>
<td>Strengthening local capacity</td>
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<tr>
<td>Beneficiary participation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Linking relief to rehabilitation and development</td>
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<tr>
<td>Prevention and risk reduction</td>
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<tr>
<td>Flexibility of funding</td>
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<tr>
<td>Strengthening organisational capacity</td>
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<tr>
<td>Supporting coordination</td>
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<tr>
<td>Donor capacity and expertise</td>
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<tr>
<td>Advocacy towards local authorities</td>
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<tr>
<td>Funding protection of civilians</td>
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<tr>
<td>Advocacy for protection of civilians</td>
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<tr>
<td>Facilitating safe access</td>
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<tr>
<td>Accountability towards beneficiaries</td>
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<tr>
<td>Implementing evaluation recommendations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Appropriate reporting requirements</td>
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<tr>
<td>Donor transparency</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gender sensitive approach</td>
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<tr>
<td>Overall perception of performance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** DARA

OECD/DAC average score 6.05  
Norway’s average score 6.47

Colours represent performance compared to donor’s average performance rating:
- Good
- Mid-range
- Could improve
Field partners largely held positive views of Norway’s support for gender-sensitive approaches in humanitarian action. One interviewee affirmed that Norway “requires a strong commitment to women, generally women in conflict zones and this always features as a point in grant letters.” Another added to this by stating that most Norwegian projects target women. When NGOs were expelled from one country, another organisation reported that Norway took the lead in coordinating a gender task force.

The majority of partner organisations interviewed describe Norwegian aid as neutral, impartial, independent and based on need. A few organisations observed political influence in Norway’s aid, but felt that it was not a hindrance: “Norway’s humanitarian action is influenced by its political interests, but not in a bad sense.” Partner organisations also generally seemed to consider Norway’s funding timely and to take into account changing needs, however, an interviewee in a crisis where Norway does not have field presence asserted that “Norway is not on the ground so they can’t verify changing needs.”

Although below Norway’s qualitative average, Norway outperformed its peers on Strengthening local capacity. One interviewee highlighted Norway’s capacity building efforts in strengthening local institutions by training local staff and empowering women. In relation to Linking relief to rehabilitation and development, partner organisations gave slightly lower marks, though an interviewee noted that Norway was supporting recovery and developmental activities. Similar to most donors, Norway’s partner organisations seem to indicate that there is room for improvement. One interviewee included Norway, together with other donors when commenting “it’s not done so much because they’re humanitarian programmes.” On the other hand, another interviewee reported that beneficiary participation is required in every contract and final report. Partner organisations reported that Norway has supported measures to reduce risks in areas vulnerable to natural disasters; however, some would like to see a broader risk reduction and recovery plan.
PILLAR 3
WORKING WITH HUMANITARIAN PARTNERS

Norway's partners seem highly appreciative of the flexibility of its funding. "Norway still gives a portion of funds that is completely un-earmarked, which greatly assists flexibility," described one recipient. However, it is worth noting that one recipient organisation stated that the funding is too flexible and that there should be greater oversight mechanisms in place. Norway’s partners also praised its support for coordination: "After the NGOs were expelled, Norway encouraged increased coordination." Several commented on Norway’s active field participation allowing for informed decision making. “Norwegian staff go out into the field, meet with partners and encourage consultation,” stated one interviewee. Though Norway outperformed its peers, support for partners’ organisational capacity has room for improvement. One of Norway's partners stated that Norway, together with their other donors, “have been reluctant to fund this.” However, another organisation reported that Norway offered to provide support to train national staff.

PILLAR 4
PROTECTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

Similar to most donors, partner organisations considered Norway stronger in funding the protection of civilians than in advocating for protection. However, Norway still outperformed its peers in this indicator. Norway received its lowest qualitative score in Pillar 4 in the indicator on Facilitating safe access. One organisation stated, "They try to implement safe humanitarian access but rarely succeed." Another criticised Norway, together with other donors, for not responding adequately to threats of abduction of humanitarian workers.

PILLAR 5
LEARNING AND ACCOUNTABILITY

In Pillar 5, Norway stands out for its strong performance in Donor transparency and Appropriate reporting requirements. While most partner organisations have praised its reporting requirements, others thought that partners should be held more accountable. It received two of its lowest scores in Accountability towards beneficiaries and Implementing evaluation recommendations. In relation to the former, while most organisations were not very positive regarding accountability toward beneficiaries, one organisation stated that Norway is always interested in getting feedback from beneficiaries. Referring to the implementation of evaluation recommendations, one organisation stated, “Norway is very involved,” while another felt that “they don’t really do qualitative follow-up.”
RECOMMENDATIONS

CONTINUE PROGRESS UNDERWAY TO IMPROVE TIMELINESS TO COMPLEX EMERGENCIES

Norway has improved the timeliness of its funding substantially. In 2009, Norway provided 69.3% of its funding in the first six weeks following a sudden onset emergency. In 2010, Norway provided 88.4% of its funding within this time frame, surpassing the OECD/DAC and Group 1 average. For complex emergencies, Norway provided only 11.2% of its funding in 2009 within the first three months following the launch of a humanitarian appeal. In 2010, this percentage jumped to 57.5%, though it still fell short of the OECD/DAC average of 59.4%.

ENCOURAGE LEARNING FROM THE PAST

Norway’s partners would like to see greater engagement from Norway in the way it works with partners to incorporate lessons learnt from the past and evaluation recommendations. Norway should engage in dialogue with its partners to discuss their perceptions regarding the implementation of evaluation recommendations.

INVEST ADEQUATELY IN PREVENTION, PREPAREDNESS AND RISK REDUCTION

In 2010, Norway allocated 12.8% of its humanitarian aid to prevention, preparedness and reconstruction, while the OECD/DAC average is 18.6%. Norway’s partners seem to confirm the need for greater support for these issues, giving Norway its second-lowest qualitative score.

Please see www.daraint.org for a complete list of references.
PORTUGAL

OVERALL PERFORMANCE

Portugal is not included in the overall ranking as insufficient survey responses were obtained to calculate the qualitative indicators that make up the index.

Portugal's overall score was below the OECD/DAC and Group 3 averages. Portugal also scored below both averages in all pillars.

Portugal did best compared to its OECD/DAC peers in the indicators on Un-earmarked funding and Timely funding to sudden onset emergencies. Its scores were relatively the lowest in the indicators on Funding accountability initiatives, Funding UN and RC/RC appeals, Participating in accountability initiatives, Funding NGOs and Funding international risk mitigation.
AID DISTRIBUTION

In 2010, Portugal’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) comprised 0.29% of its Gross National Income (GNI), up from 0.23% in 2009. Humanitarian assistance represented 2.8% of Portugal’s ODA in 2010, or 0.008% of its GNI.

According to data reported to United Nations (UN) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs’ (OCHA) Financial Tracking Service (FTS) (2011), in 2010, Portugal channelled 76.4% of its humanitarian aid bilaterally to affected governments, 17.8% to UN agencies, and 4.2% to non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Portugal also provided 15.1% of its total humanitarian aid to the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) (OCHA FTS 2011). In 2010 Portugal contributed to one crisis: Haiti.

POLICY FRAMEWORK

The Portuguese Institute for Development Support (IPAD) is responsible for coordinating Portugal’s humanitarian assistance. The Portuguese aid system is fairly decentralised, and IPAD coordinates the work of approximately 20 ministries and 300 municipalities that also play a role in international cooperation (OECD/DAC 2009). The National Civil Protection Authority is often the mechanism by which Portugal manages the operational delivery of humanitarian aid (OECD/DAC 2010). According to the 2010 DAC Peer Review, “The unit responsible for humanitarian assistance [in IPAD] has been closed and operational responsibility now rests with the head of the Civil Society Unit,” (OECD/DAC 2010).

Decree Law 5/2003 provides the legal framework for Portuguese foreign assistance (OECD/DAC 2009). The Strategic Vision for Portuguese Development Cooperation (2006a) serves as a general guiding framework for Portugal’s development policy; including a brief section on humanitarian action and key guiding principles. Though the Strategic Vision for Portuguese Development Cooperation declares that “humanitarian actions must be viewed, planned and executed within the framework of, and in coordination with, the other instruments that integrate the concept of Official Development Assistance” (IPAD 2006a), it does not provide many details regarding Portugal’s strategy for humanitarian action. The Action Plan for the Portuguese Strategic Vision calls for the creation of a humanitarian assistance policy, but this has not yet been developed (IPAD 2006b). IPAD includes both the European Consensus on Humanitarian Assistance and the Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) Principles for reference under the humanitarian aid section of its website, asserting their importance as guiding frameworks for humanitarian action (IPAD 2011). IPAD has no staff members fully dedicated to humanitarian assistance, though it has tried to increase its field presence, adding several “Technical officers” or “Cooperation attachés” to embassies to work on development projects that can be co-opted as support in times of humanitarian crises (OECD/DAC 2010).

HOW DOES NEW PORTUGAL’S POLICY ADDRESS GHD CONCEPTS?

GENDER

Portugal’s Cooperation Strategy for Gender Equality (2011) serves as the main policy document regarding the incorporation of a gender-sensitive approach to its aid. This framework calls for the incorporation of a gender-sensitive approach in all of Portugal’s long-term projects for each of the six Portuguese-speaking countries as well in its humanitarian aid programmes (IPAD 2011a). Since there is no overarching policy for humanitarian aid, however, it is unclear if or how a gender-sensitive approach is incorporated into Portugal’s humanitarian assistance.
PILLAR 1
RESPONDING TO NEEDS

Portugal affirms that “humanity, independence, impartiality, universality and neutrality” guide its humanitarian assistance (IPAD 2006a). Since the Portuguese Civil Authority is sometimes deployed to deliver assigned humanitarian aid, Portugal notes that it will ensure its aid remains neutral, impartial and independent. However, there is no concrete policy on how this is done; the latest DAC Peer Review states that there is no way of knowing if “funding levels are based on an objective determination of the severity of a particular crisis,” (OECD/DAC 2010). In its Strategic Vision for Portuguese Development Cooperation, Portugal states that “although traditionally . . . [humanitarian] assistance has predominantly been sent to partner countries of Portuguese development cooperation, humanitarian aid has also been distributed in other areas when the dimension of the disaster has entailed particularly devastating consequences,” (IPAD 2006a). Portugal seems to be increasingly willing to respond to emergency needs in countries outside of the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries. Portugal regularly contributes to the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) in an effort to provide timely funding to sudden-onset emergencies.

PILLAR 2
PREVENTION, RISK REDUCTION AND RECOVERY

The Developmental Strategic Vision affirms that beneficiary participation in the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of programming is key to Portugal’s cooperation efforts (IPAD 2006a). It is not clear, however, how beneficiary participation is incorporated into Portugal’s humanitarian aid. The same document also stresses that “the transition to the development phase must be taken into account at the earliest possible moment in [humanitarian] aid operations, by building bridges with rehabilitation and sustainable development actions,” (IPAD 2006a). Disaster risk reduction, for example, is not integrated into partner country programmes (OECD/DAC 2010). Portugal’s policy on prevention and preparedness is also unclear. The same report, however, adds that the Ministry of Interior’s civil protection unit is “strengthening existing national disaster response mechanisms in some partner countries,” though this has not been mainstreamed into an official policy (OECD/DAC 2010).

PILLAR 3
WORKING WITH HUMANITARIAN PARTNERS

The Strategic Vision for Portuguese Development Cooperation emphasises Portugal’s wish to move towards multi-year financing for all of its international cooperation programmes, but the 2010 DAC Peer Review asserts that this is still not a reality (IPAD 2006a and OECD/DAC 2010). The Strategic Vision for Portuguese Development Cooperation also called for the “creation of a specific budget line under the responsibility of IPAD, sufficiently flexible to respond to the specificities of Humanitarian Aid,” (IPAD 2006a). Since most of its humanitarian assistance is “project-specific,” however, the 2010 DAC Peer Review concludes that Portugal “is an unpredictable source of financing for humanitarian agencies,” (OECD/DAC 2010). It also adds that “Portugal does not provide funds to the
international Red Cross [Red Crescent] movement, or provide core funding for multilateral agencies or NGOs, or fund Common Humanitarian Funds (pooled funds) or Emergency Rapid Response Funds (ERRFs),” (OECD/DAC 2010). Even for project-specific financing, the 2010 DAC Peer Review noted that “disbursement of funds can sometimes be rapid, but can also take over 12 months, especially funds for NGOs” (OECD/DAC 2010).

In terms of fostering cooperation with other national and international actors, the Strategic Vision for Portuguese Development Cooperation calls for the coordination both of “the various state and civil society actors” as well as “the international community’s efforts, namely the coordination mechanisms existing within the European Union, as well as at the United Nations level,” (IPAD 2006a). IPAD identifies inter-institutional coordination within Portugal as the most important challenge for the Portuguese humanitarian system (2006a). The 2010 DAC Peer Review echoes these concerns, noting that without a humanitarian strategy and guidelines for NGOs, it is difficult to coordinate across the different ministries involved in humanitarian aid (OECD/DAC 2010).

**PILLAR 4**

**PROTECTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW**

The Strategic Vision for Portuguese Development Cooperation emphasises that humanitarian aid must be “governed by respect for human rights and international law...namely the right to protect victims and defend humanitarian principles,” (IPAD 2006a). The 2010 DAC Peer Review notes that Portugal has begun to “upgrade the civil-military coordination (CIVMIL)” in an effort to ensure “compliance with the Oslo Guidelines and respect for International Humanitarian Law,” and has created dialogue with Portuguese NGOs regarding the issue (OECD/DAC 2010).

In terms of protection, the Portuguese National Strategy for Security and Development emphasises Portugal’s commitment to human security and protection defined as “support for civilian victims of violent conflict” through “political, military, humanitarian and development-related approaches” and outlines a general set of aims regarding this purpose (IPAD 2009). These measures include the creation of a unit in IPAD to coordinate safety issues, the training of Portuguese staff to consider safety in plans and the encouragement of communication with other actors to increase awareness of this issue (IPAD 2009). The Strategic Vision for Portuguese Development Cooperation adds that “it is especially important to pay attention to the situation of refugees and internally displaced persons and to support the work of international organisations which protect and promote their rights,” though there is no more information in terms of how this will be incorporated into its humanitarian activities specifically (IPAD 2006a). Portugal’s position on advocacy for local governments and for the facilitation of humanitarian access is not clear.
PILLAR 5
LEARNING AND ACCOUNTABILITY

The Strategic Vision for Portuguese Development Cooperation calls for the implementation of comprehensive monitoring and mainstreamed evaluations, both of financed projects and IPAD’s overall and country strategies (IPAD 2006a). The assessment of the Strategic Vision in 2009 reports that IPAD has released the evaluation guidelines titled Evaluation Policy, as well as the Evaluation Guide (IPAD 2009). The agency also attempts to monitor field implementation “through visits to the locations where the programmes are being implemented and through joint action by Headquarters and by the Embassy co-operation services,” but this is often difficult due to IPAD’s limited staff. IPAD’s Evaluation Unit (GAII) has recently expanded its scope, also responsible now for internal audits of IPAD. Overall, the latest DAC Peer Review concludes that Portugal’s efforts in this regard are lacklustre. It states that “Portugal has not yet participated in joint evaluations of multilateral partners,” instead relying on audited accounts from its implementing NGOs, though it does conduct lesson learning exercises after civil protection units return from carrying out relief activities (OECD/DAC 2010). In regards to transparency of funding decisions, the 2010 DAC Peer Review reports that the lack of guidelines for humanitarian action means that, “NGOs are not sure what format to use for proposals, what their funding limits will be, or who should act as their focal point within IPAD,” (OECD/DAC 2010). The 2010 DAC Peer Review also notes that “the humanitarian budget is not transparently available in any form during the budget year, even within IPAD, which further hinders accountability and transparency,” (OECD/DAC 2010). Portugal’s position on accountability towards affected populations is not clear.
RECOMMENDATIONS

Given the severe economic crisis Portugal is currently facing, it may need to postpone the following recommendations until after it has surpassed the crisis. Portugal’s recovery will also present an opportunity for the country to review its position on humanitarian aid and recommit itself to Good Humanitarian Donorship Principles.

**CONSIDER CHANNELLING MORE FUNDING TO NGOS**

Portugal channelled only 4.2% of its humanitarian funding to NGOs, compared to the OECD/DAC average of 15.3%. As Portugal may not be able to handle a large number of smaller contracts to NGOs, it could explore flexible working models, such as shared management arrangements with other donors, supporting NGO umbrella organisations or NGOs of other nationalities.

**FORMALIZE COMMITMENT TO HUMANITARIAN PRINCIPLES IN A COMPREHENSIVE HUMANITARIAN POLICY**

Portugal would do well to create an official humanitarian policy which explains its commitment to Good Humanitarian Donorship Principles and unites the information from various web pages and documents into a common humanitarian policy.

**ENHANCE SUPPORT FOR UN AND RC/RC APPEALS, COORDINATION AND SUPPORT SERVICES AND POOLED FUNDS**

Portugal received a low score for Funding UN and RC/RC appeals, which measures the extent to which donors provide their fair share of funding to UN and Red Cross/Red Crescent (RC/RC) appeals, coordination and support services and pooled funds. It scored well below average in all components that comprise this indicator.

**INVEST ADEQUATELY IN RISK REDUCTION**

Portugal allocated 0.26% of its ODA to international risk mitigation mechanisms — the lowest of the OECD/DAC donors. The OECD/DAC average was 0.77% and the Group 3 average was 0.72%.

**RENEW COMMITMENT TO LEARNING AND ACCOUNTABILITY**

Portugal could improve its support of learning and accountability initiatives. Portugal is participating solely in Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action (ALNAP) meetings, but in none of the other initiatives included in the indicator Participating in accountability initiatives. In addition, Portugal did not provide financial support for learning and accountability initiatives.

Please see www.daraint.org for a complete list of references.
Spain ranked 15th in the HRI 2011, improving two positions from 2010. Based on the patterns of its scores, Spain is classified as a Group 3 donor, “Aspiring Actors”. Donors in this group tend to have more limited capacity to engage with the humanitarian system at the field level, but often aspire to take on a greater role in the sector. They generally focus on a few core strengths, such as in the area of prevention, preparedness and risk reduction, or on specific geographic regions. Other donors in the group include Australia, Belgium, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan and Luxembourg.

Spain’s overall score fell below the OECD/DAC and Group 3 averages. Spain scored below the OECD/DAC and Group 3 average in all pillars, with the exception of Pillar 1, where it was above both averages, and Pillar 4 (Protection and international law), where Spain scored below the OECD/DAC average, but above the Group 3 average.

Spain did best compared to its OECD/DAC peers in the indicators on Funding vulnerable and forgotten emergencies and Timely funding to complex emergencies. Its scores were relatively the lowest in indicators on Funding NGOs, Reducing climate-related vulnerability, Funding international risk mitigation, Implementing evaluation recommendations and Donor capacity and expertise.
AID DISTRIBUTION

Spain was formerly one of the largest donors to the World Food Programme and the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF), but the financial crisis has led to budget cutbacks. In 2010, Spain’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) comprised 0.43% of its Gross National Income (GNI), down from 0.46% in 2009. Humanitarian assistance accounted for 8.9% of its ODA, and 0.040% of its GNI.

According to data reported to the United Nations (UN) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs’ (OCHA) Financial Tracking Service (FTS) (2011), Spain channelled 74.6% of its funding to the UN system, 11.5% bilaterally to affected governments, 3.9% to the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement and 1.2% non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Spain contributed 10.9% of its humanitarian assistance to the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) and 8.2% to Common Humanitarian Funds. Spain supported 30 emergencies in 2010: 14 in Africa, seven in the Americas and nine in Asia.

POLICY FRAMEWORK

The Humanitarian Aid Office of the Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation (AECID), under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, oversees Spain’s humanitarian assistance. An important characteristic of the Spanish humanitarian system is that some of the autonomous communities in the country provide humanitarian assistance using separate funds and strategies. Over the past few years, Spain has attempted to focus and coordinate these efforts through the Humanitarian Aid Office of the AECID. The General Directorate for Planning and Evaluation (DGPOLDE) is in charge of evaluating all of Spain’s cooperation efforts, including its humanitarian aid. Law 23/1998 serves as the legal framework for Spanish foreign cooperation, establishing AECID as the main organ in the Spanish body for coordinating Spanish assistance; the Royal Decree 1403/2007 formally established the Humanitarian Aid Office and its mandate (AECID 2011b). Spain is in the process of passing a new law to replace Law 23/1998, which will substantially modernise its international aid system, mostly to improve coordination among the Spanish actors (ECD Política 2010). The Humanitarian Action Strategy (2007) guides Spanish humanitarian action and explains the principles governing Spanish humanitarian efforts. Spain endorsed the Principles of Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) in 2004. Though it is in the process of developing its domestic implementation plan, it has already incorporated the GHD Principles into its humanitarian framework. The 2009-2012 Cooperation Master Plan (2009) is the main policy document for Spanish aid and maps out cooperation activities until 2012. This document includes a section addressing humanitarian programmes specifically and echoes the commitments expressed in the Humanitarian Strategy. Every year, AECID also publishes the Annual Plan for International Cooperation (PACI) document, which delineates how the agency will carry out the goals of the Cooperation Master Plan during the year and provides a brief overview of the progress accomplished the previous year. AECID has a total of fifty “Offices for Technical Cooperation” or “Offices for Policy Formation” in beneficiary countries (AECID 2011a).
HOW DOES SPAIN’S POLICY ADDRESS GHD CONCEPTS?

GENDER

Spain’s Gender in Development Strategy (2007) is the main framework that outlines Spain’s policy for gender equality measures in development and humanitarian aid. The Humanitarian Action Strategy incorporates the principles outlined in this document and calls for a gender sensitive approach to humanitarian aid. This includes a gender analysis in all humanitarian activities, the representation and participation of women in the implementation phase, special attention to the security concerns of women, and the compilation of gender-disaggregated indicators (MAEC 2007).

PILLAR 1
RESPONDING TO NEEDS

Spain’s policy expresses a clear commitment to providing timely humanitarian assistance based on the principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence. The Humanitarian Action Strategy asserts that Spain uses the European Commission’s Directorate General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (ECHO) Global Needs Assessment (GNA) and the Forgotten Crisis Assessment (FCA) to determine its priority countries for humanitarian aid (MAEC 2007). For disaster operations, Spain uses the analysis of the United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination Team (UNDACT) and is currently in the process of elaborating an official protocol of its own for emergency activities (MAEC 2007).

PILLAR 2
PREVENTION, RISK REDUCTION AND RECOVERY

The Humanitarian Action Strategy and the Cooperation Master Plan emphasise Spain’s pledge to engage beneficiaries at all levels of humanitarian action and to link relief to rehabilitation and development along with prevention and preparedness (MAEC 2007). The Humanitarian Aid Strategy calls for the inclusion of beneficiaries in the design and implementation of a project, and requires an evaluation of beneficiary participation (MAEC 2007). The Humanitarian Action Strategy declares that Spanish aid shall be provided “in line with local capacity,” in an effort to strengthen and support it (MAEC 2007). The Cooperation Master Plan emphasises the importance of risk reduction and disaster prevention, in line with the Hyogo principles (MAEC 2009).
PILLAR 3
WORKING WITH HUMANITARIAN PARTNERS

The Humanitarian Action Strategy and the Cooperation Master Plan recognise the importance of predictable, multi-annual and flexible funding for humanitarian assistance. The Cooperation Master Plan calls for a review and reform of the current financing rules for NGOs to provide “more efficacy, efficiency and relevance” in responding to humanitarian crises (MAEC 2009). Spain has tried to make its funding more consistent through a permanent appeals process for implementing partners, and has called for an increase of multi-annual funding mechanisms for its biggest implementing partners (MAEC 2007). The Annual Plan, however, reports that multi-annual partnerships have not been implemented “in a massive way” with Spanish implementing partners yet (MAEC 2010). Spain has also vowed to continue supporting the Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP) and the CERF, along with providing longer-term contracts to its more important and preferential partners, especially UN agencies (MAEC 2009). Both the Humanitarian Action Strategy and the Cooperation Master Plan emphasise the importance of coordinating Spanish humanitarian assistance, especially within its own system and in regards to the aid provided by the Autonomous Communities of Spain (MAEC 2007). There is less concrete discussion, however, about how to coordinate with other international actors.

PILLAR 4
PROTECTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

Spain states its policy of providing access to civilians and promoting international humanitarian law, including human rights and refugee law, in the Humanitarian Action Strategy, and echoes these commitments in the Cooperation Master Plan (AECID 2009). Spain also strongly affirms in both documents that it will facilitate safe humanitarian access and help guarantee the security of humanitarian workers (MAEC 2009). The Humanitarian Action Strategy mentions that Spain is committed to advocacy in the form of increasing public awareness and sensitivity to humanitarian issues, but Spain’s policy regarding advocacy to local governments is unclear (MAEC 2007).

PILLAR 5
LEARNING AND ACCOUNTABILITY

The Humanitarian Action Strategy specifies that DGPOLE has adapted the Evaluation Methodology for Spanish Cooperation to evaluate the national humanitarian assistance programme (MAEC 2007). Both the Humanitarian Action Strategy and the Master Cooperation Plan state that Spain aims to improve the publication of its funding information to the public, and is a signatory of the International Aid Transparency Initiative (MAEC 2007). In regards to the accountability of funded NGOs, Spain has reporting and evaluation policies that are guided by Spain’s System for Results-oriented Development Management, which include accountability towards affected populations (MAEC 2007).
FIELD PARTNERS’ PERCEPTIONS

SPAIN’S FIELD PERCEPTION SCORES

Collected questionnaires: 45

Spain’s average score 5.63
OECD/DAC average score 6.05

PILLAR 1
Neutrality and impartiality
Independence of aid
Adapting to changing needs
Timely funding to partners

PILLAR 2
Strengthening local capacity
Beneficiary participation
Linking relief to rehabilitation and development
Prevention and risk reduction

PILLAR 3
Flexibility of funding
Strengthening organisational capacity
Supporting coordination
Donor capacity and expertise

PILLAR 4
Advocacy towards local authorities
Funding protection of civilians
Advocacy for protection of civilians
Facilitating safe access

PILLAR 5
Accountability towards beneficiaries
Implementing evaluation recommendations
Appropriate reporting requirements
Donor transparency

Gender sensitive approach
Overall perception of performance

SOURCE: DARA

Colours represent performance compared to donor’s average performance rating:
- Good
- Mid-range
- Could improve

HOW IS SPAIN PERCEIVED BY ITS PARTNERS?

Spain’s partners provided mixed feedback regarding gender. Several highlight Spain’s interest in gender-sensitive approaches, but point to problems in the follow-up. One interviewee reported, “AECID does not use well-defined gender markers in the needs assessment, so later it is not easy to have a good gender approach.” Others reveal that though AECID has a formal gender analysis requirement, “there is no monitoring for its implementation,” or that they get a sense it is important to Spain “because of the gender marker in the CAP, but not because of any real commitment.”
PILLAR 1
RESPONDING TO NEEDS

Similar to most donors, Spain performed fairly well in the qualitative indicators that comprise Pillar 1. While most organisations deemed Spain’s aid to be sufficiently neutral, impartial and independent, several organisations questioned whether Spain endeavoured to ensure programmes adapt to changing needs. Some partners complained that funding decisions are taken far from the field and seem to be poorly informed of real needs: one interviewee reported that “decisions take place at headquarters” and do not always make sense given the ground situation. Several organisations felt that AECID could not monitor to ensure programmes adapt to changing needs due to limited field presence and that it “does not even try to get there.” Opinions about the timeliness of Spain’s funding are highly mixed. In some crises, interviewees praised Spain for providing funding ahead of time. In others, however, timeliness was the biggest issue: organisations in the field explained that “AECID has the same tools for applying for developmental and humanitarian aid funding, which doesn’t make any sense,” since the latter often requires a more timely response.

PILLAR 2
PREVENTION, RISK REDUCTION AND RECOVERY

Most organisations in the field considered that the AECID did not seem sufficiently concerned with beneficiary participation, although a few interviewees noted that participation in implementation and design was somewhat better: “AECID pays more attention to the design part of the process ...than in implementation or evaluation.” Another interviewee maintained that AECID’s follow-up on a project was minimal, and provided “no requirements, recommendations, [or] questions about the project.” Feedback regarding Linking relief to rehabilitation and development was fairly mixed. One interviewee stated that “AECID has a formal standard... but [has not] implemented a process at all for that.” As for prevention, preparedness and risk reduction initiatives, field organisations were largely critical. One interviewee affirmed that “AECID has the idea but... it is a reactive process, and there is no proactivity.”

PILLAR 3
WORKING WITH HUMANITARIAN PARTNERS

In terms of coordination, some organisations claimed that while Spain encourages coordination among its own partners, Spanish field representatives “do not even think about attending any cluster meetings.” Regarding the flexibility of Spain’s funding, interviewees were largely positive. One organisation stated that they are “excellent donors in terms of flexibility.” However, others revealed that it was only possible to apply to the permanent appeal fund three times a year, which was somewhat limiting and inflexible.
PILLAR 4
PROTECTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

Most of Spain’s partners appreciated the country’s funding for protection programmes, though one interviewee added that these had to be “purely protection programmes. They do not want to mix protection with, for example, human rights programmes.” Spain’s field partners were more critical concerning advocacy to ensure the protection of civilians. One interviewee named Spain, together with other donors, for being “silent” on these issues. In terms of the facilitating humanitarian access and the safety of humanitarian workers, humanitarian organisations in the field agree that current efforts are simply not enough: one organisation revealed that while AECID tried to provide some assistance – for example, giving humanitarian staff an unofficial identification – it was ineffective. That said, when one of Spain’s partners took the initiative to take measures on their own to obtain access, “AECID didn’t push for it, but when we proposed it, they were ready to fund because they were overlooked areas.”

PILLAR 5
LEARNING AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Organisations in the field asserted that AECID was strict in the funding proposal but was lacking in its monitoring and evaluation. One aid worker reported that AECID is “focusing too much in the bureaucratic process . . . it seems it is more important for the proposal to be perfect in a formal way than the impact the project has.” Another stated that AECID has a good reporting framework, but project tracking is lacking. Spain’s partners also indicate that there is room for improvement in relation to accountability towards beneficiaries.
RECOMMENDATIONS

🎯 LOOK FOR ADMINISTRATIVE SOLUTIONS TO CHANNEL MORE FUNDING TO NGOs

Spain provided only 1.2% of its humanitarian funding to NGOs, compared to the OECD/DAC average of 15.3%. Spain provided the bulk of its funding to UN agencies, but should consider allocating a larger portion to NGOs. To reduce the administrative burden, it could explore flexible working models, such as shared management arrangements with other donors, or supporting NGO umbrella organisations.

🎯 ENourage LEARNING FROM THE PAST

Spain received the third-lowest score for the qualitative, survey-based indicator Implementing evaluation recommendations, which measures the extent to which donors work with partners to integrate lessons learnt in programming. Spain would do well to strengthen its efforts to follow up with partners to utilise lessons learnt and evaluation recommendations in programming.

🎯 BOOSTER THE CAPACITY OF THE AECID

Spain received one of the lowest scores for the qualitative, survey-based indicator, Donor capacity and expertise. In several of the crises covered by the HRI, field-staff were also tasked with non-humanitarian tasks, limiting their ability to follow up with supported programmes. Spain should consider investing in its capacity at the field and headquarters level to ensure aid is used effectively.

🎯 STRENGTHEN SUPPORT TO REDUCE RISK AND CLIMATE-RELATED VULNERABILITY

Spain could improve its support to reduce risk and climate-related vulnerability. Spain designated 0.36% of its ODA to international risk mitigation mechanisms – well below the OECD/DAC average of 0.77%. Spain provided only 52.5% of its fair share\(^3\) to Fast Start Finance, which supports climate change mitigation and adaptation efforts, compared to the OECD/DAC average of 102.4%. Furthermore, it has fallen short on its commitments to reduce emissions, indicating that Spain could augment its efforts to support these issues.

Please see www.daraint.org for a complete list of references.
OVERALL PERFORMANCE

Sweden ranked 3rd in the HRI 2011, improving two positions from 2010. Based on the pattern of its scores, Sweden is classified as a Group 1 donor, “Principled Partners”. This group is characterised by its commitment to humanitarian principles and strong support for multilateral partners, and generally good overall performance in all areas. Other Group 1 donors include Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway and Switzerland.

Sweden’s overall score was above the OECD/DAC and Group 1 averages. It scored above both average in all pillars, with the exception of Pillar 3 (Working with humanitarian partners), where it scored above the OECD/DAC average, but below the Group 1 average.

Compared to its OECD/DAC peers, Sweden did best in the indicators on Reducing climate-related vulnerability, Funding UN and RC/RC appeals, Funding accountability initiatives, Funding international risk mitigation and Refugee law. Its scores were relatively lower in indicators on Funding reconstruction and prevention, Funding NGOs, Timely funding to complex emergencies, Un-earmarked funding and Appropriate reporting requirements.

SOURCES: UN OCHA FTS, OECD StatExtracts, various UN agencies’ annual reports and DARA

All scores are on a scale of 0 to 10. Colours represent performance compared to OECD/DAC donors’ average performance rating:

- **Good**
- **Mid-range**
- **Could improve**
- **Non applicable**
- **Quantitative Indicator**
- **Qualitative Indicator**
AID DISTRIBUTION

After rising from 0.98% in 2008 to 1.12% in 2009, Sweden’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) dropped in 2010 to 0.97% as a percentage of its Gross National Income (GNI). Humanitarian assistance represented 12.7% of its ODA in 2010, or 0.12% of its GNI.

According to data reported to the United Nations (UN) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs’ (OCHA) Financial Tracking Service (FTS) (2011), Sweden channelled 60.6% of its 2010 humanitarian aid to UN agencies, 13.7% to the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement, 13.1% to non-governmental organisations (NGOs), 3.2% bilaterally to affected governments and 1.6% to private organisations and foundations. Sweden allocated 10.9% of its total humanitarian aid to the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF), 6.0% to Common Humanitarian Funds, and 1.6% to Emergency Response Funds. In 2010, Sweden committed humanitarian aid to 53 different countries: 25 in Africa, 17 in Asia, 11 in the Americas and one in Europe. The Democratic Republic of the Congo, Haiti and Pakistan were the top recipients of Sweden’s 2010 humanitarian aid. Sectorally, Sweden concentrated its funding on coordination and support services and health initiatives.

POLICY FRAMEWORK

The Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the Swedish International Development Agency (Sida) manage the country’s humanitarian affairs. Swedish humanitarian policy is based on The Government’s Humanitarian Aid Policy (2004) and has been enhanced with Sida’s 2008-2010 Strategy for Humanitarian Work. In order to better meet today’s demands, Sida’s restructuring process was completed in 2010. The new structure became effective on 1 January 2011 with nine departments directly under the Director General. The series of reforms include reducing staff at headquarters and increasing staff abroad. The 2009 DAC Peer Review has lauded Sweden for being proactive in responding to past recommendations and urges Stockholm to continue to overhaul, rationalise and clarify its policy framework (OECD/DAC 2009). Sida currently has field presence in 44 Swedish embassies worldwide (Sida 2011), though it is not clear if this will change the current restructuring.

HOW DOES SWEDEN’S POLICY ADDRESS GHD CONCEPTS?

GENDER

Both The Government’s Humanitarian Policy and Sida’s 2008-2010 Strategy for Humanitarian Work emphasise the need for a gender-sensitive approach in humanitarian operations. Sweden calls for appropriate measures to protect and meet the needs of women in armed conflict and pledges to pay particular attention to the special situation of the women in both disaster and conflict situations in its funding decisions (MFA 2004).
PILLAR 1
RESPONDING TO NEEDS

Sweden’s humanitarian policy expresses a strong commitment to need-based humanitarian responses. In The Government’s Humanitarian Aid Policy, Sweden pledges to adhere to the humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence and to provide timely humanitarian assistance that focuses on the most vulnerable groups (MFA 2004). In its 2008-2010 Strategy for Humanitarian Work, Sida states that it will inform partner organisations of the funding levels they expect to provide early in the financial year, placing special importance on forgotten crises (Sida 2007).

PILLAR 2
PREVENTION, RISK REDUCTION AND RECOVERY

The 2008-2010 Strategy for Humanitarian Work recognises the importance of supporting the transition from relief to rehabilitation and development. It also states that Sida prefers to support organisations with local partners in order support the capacity of local structures to handle crisis situations (Sida 2007). In order to reduce vulnerability, the Swedish government asserts that it will allocate funds to promote disaster preparedness and prevention, and for initial reconstruction programmes following a humanitarian crisis (MFA 2004). Sweden, however, does not seem to place the same emphasis on conflict prevention and preparedness.

PILLAR 3
WORKING WITH HUMANITARIAN PARTNERS

The Swedish MFA expresses its commitment to making humanitarian aid as flexible and predictable as possible. For long-term crises, the government can commit itself to grants that extend beyond the current fiscal year, provided Parliament approves the government’s budget proposals (MFA 2004). In the 2008-2010 Strategy for Humanitarian Work Sweden recognises the importance of multilateralism, affirming its support for the coordination efforts of the UN and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), as well as for the Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeals Process and the Common Humanitarian Action Plan (Sida 2007). Sweden supports both national and international NGOs and specifically states that “conditions to the effect that organisations must employ Swedish staff or material in connection with aid must not be attached to the grants,” (MFA 2004).

PILLAR 4
PROTECTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

Sweden’s humanitarian policy is rooted in international law, especially those derived from the 1949 Geneva Conventions and subsequent protocols. The Government’s Humanitarian Aid Policy states that Sweden “constantly” advocates for improving the protection of civilians in conflict situations when Sweden engages in international dialogue in multilateral arenas. Sweden recognises the need to adhere to international standards when participating in complex emergencies; these include the Guidelines on the Use of Civil and Military Defence Assets and the Inter-Agency Standing Committee’s reference paper Civil-Military Relationship in Complex Emergencies. Sweden’s formal policy regarding advocacy toward local authorities is not clear.
PILLAR 5
LEARNING AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Sida’s 2008-2010 Strategy for Humanitarian Work expresses its support for the Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) Principles regarding learning and accountability. The agency is required to annually assess whether or not goals in its humanitarian policy are being met (Sida 2007). Sweden also participates in several accountability initiatives such as the Humanitarian Accountability Partnership International (HAP-I), Sphere and the Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action (ALNAP). Sida’s humanitarian policy calls for increased support for qualified research and methods development in the humanitarian field (Sida 2007).

FIELD PARTNERS’ PERCEPTIONS

SWEDEN’S FIELD PERCEPTION SCORES

Collected questionnaires: 59

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<th>Adapting to changing needs</th>
<th>Timely funding to partners</th>
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SOURCE: DARA

OECD/DAC average score 6.05 → Sweden’s average score 6.37

Colours represent performance compared to donor’s average performance rating:
- Good
- Mid-range
- Could improve
HOW IS SWEDEN PERCEIVED BY ITS PARTNERS?

GENDER

Organisations interviewed in the field responded positively to Sweden’s approach to gender issues in its humanitarian work. “Sweden is especially keen on incorporating gender initiatives,” reported one interviewee. Another responded that many of Sida’s programmes pay special attention to women’s needs.

PILLAR 1
RESPONDING TO NEEDS

Field organisations were largely positive regarding Sweden’s Pillar 1 practices. Several organisations commented that Swedish aid was timely, impartial and need-based. “Sweden is keen on being informed and knowing the situation on the ground but they are never intrusive,” noted one organisation. Most partner organisations appreciated Sweden’s follow-up through field visits and meetings to ensure programmes adapt to changing needs, though a few noted that this was not possible: “Funding is completely unearmarked so you can’t expect them to do verification” stated one organisation. Partners consider its funding very timely. One interviewee felt that Sweden was an example of best practice: “they do only one installment and transfer the whole amount at the beginning of the programme.”

PILLAR 2
PREVENTION, RISK REDUCTION AND RECOVERY

Similar to most donors, Sweden received some of its lowest scores in Pillar 2 indicators with the exception of Strengthening local capacity, where it was stronger. One organisation reported that Sida requires a local capacity assessment before and after each project. One organisation stated that Sida always requests participatory approaches to be included in all programmes, though another noted that “it is in their proposal template, but it’s easier to just say you do it.” Regarding the indicator Linking relief to rehabilitation and development, one organisation reported the following: “Sweden has the same country team for humanitarian and development, so we are able to discuss better both recovery and development approaches in funding, but they are always sending mixed signals with little clarity.” One interviewee attributed the lack of clarity to recent changes within Sida: “Sida has split its funding streams, which makes it hard to know who to deal with. Also, policy changes in Sweden are affecting the work of the donor agency and humanitarian organisations. We are tearing our hair out because no one knows for sure which direction to go.” Regarding prevention and risk reduction, one interviewee highlighted Sida for requesting partners “show that programmes do not contribute to the conflict, and prevent situations that might place beneficiaries in harm, but this is not very explicit.” Another stressed the need for greater focus on prevention: “Sida likes to see how you mitigate risks associated to your programme in your project formulation. Prevention is not as strong as it should be, though.”
PILLAR 3
WORKING WITH HUMANITARIAN PARTNERS

In Pillar 3, Sweden received one of its highest qualitative scores for the flexibility of its funding, several highlighted the no-cost extensions Sweden made available to partners. There was greater concern, however, related to recent internal changes affecting Sweden’s capacity. While one interviewee was fairly positive: “They came to the field, listened to our needs, asked for detailed information and have followed up on the crisis very closely,” others felt that the restructuring process appears to be having negative side effects on Sweden’s work in the field. “Sida is overwhelmed. It has strong expertise but insufficient capacity as their funding has been severely cut due to political decisions,” noted one representative. “Sida’s staff here is only one person, that’s why they can’t be too good,” commented another. Partners see Sweden as a fairly strong supporter of coordination.

PILLAR 4
PROTECTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

While partner organisations state that Sweden is a strong financial supporter of protection, several report that advocacy is less of a priority. However, some interviewees noted that Sweden did engage in advocacy somewhat. One stated that Sweden “engages very closely with the humanitarian coordinator and is very keen to raise the issues.” Various organisations stated that Sida mainly relies on the UN to carry out access and safety initiatives.

PILLAR 5
LEARNING AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Many organisations reported that Sweden does not prioritise accountability toward beneficiaries. “Sweden takes a very orthodox humanitarian position, and does not really think it is important or feel the need for beneficiary accountability,” stated one organisation. Another reported that Sweden “only demands limited accountability to beneficiaries.” Sweden received its lowest qualitative score for implementing evaluation recommendations. On a more positive note, Sweden is considered to be the most transparent donor in its funding and decision-making. Partners held mixed views of the appropriateness of Sweden’s reporting requirements, although one organisation applauded Sweden’s initiative in harmonising reporting requirements with another donor.
RECOMMENDATIONS

The following recommendations are based on data from 2010. It remains to be seen how the restructuring of Sida will influence these issues.

Invest adequately in prevention, preparedness, risk reduction and reconstruction

Sweden received one of the lowest scores of the OECD/DAC donors for Funding reconstruction and prevention, giving only 7.1% of its humanitarian aid for these issues, compared to the OECD/DAC average of 18.6%. Sweden’s field partners also report the need for greater support, as Sweden received one of its lowest qualitative scores for Prevention and risk reduction. Sweden should look into ways to ensure it is supporting these issues sufficiently.

Look for administrative solutions to channel more funding to NGOs

Sweden channelled 13.1% of its funding through NGOs in 2010, slightly below the OECD/DAC average of 15.3% and a significant drop from 2009 when it allocated 21.2% to NGOs. This is somewhat compensated by Sweden’s support for Emergency Response Funds, which normally provides emergency funding to NGOs. Staff cut-backs will likely make it difficult for Sweden to manage a large number of grants, but it may be able to increase its support to NGOs and reduce somewhat the administrative burden by creating flexible working models, such as shared management arrangements with other donors, or supporting NGO umbrella organisations.

Keep internal reforms focused on improving effectiveness

Field interviews with some of Sweden’s long-standing partners warned of the risk of Sweden becoming excessively bureaucratic, asserting that internal restructuring and more exhaustive funding procedures could reduce Sweden’s capacity to engage strategically at the field level as well as the flexibility of its funding. This year, Sweden was among the lowest group of donors for Appropriate reporting requirements. It could also improve the flexibility of its funding: in 2010, 28.5% of Sweden’s humanitarian aid to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the World Food Programme (WFP), the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) was un-earmarked, while the Group 1 average was 47.8%.

Please see www.daraint.org for a complete list of references.
OVERALL PERFORMANCE

Switzerland ranked 6th in the HRI 2011, improving one position from 2010. Based on the pattern of its scores, Switzerland is classified as a Group 1 donor, “Principled Partners”. This group is characterised by its commitment to humanitarian principles and strong support for multilateral partners, and generally good overall performance in all areas. Other Group 1 donors include Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden.

Switzerland’s global score was above the OECD/DAC average, but below the Group 1 average. Similarly, Switzerland scored above the OECD/DAC average in all pillars, with the exception of Pillar 2 (Prevention, risk reduction and recovery). It scored below the Group 1 average in all pillars, except for Pillar 1 (Responding to needs), where it scored above average.

Compared to its OECD/DAC peers, Switzerland did best in the indicators on Participating in accountability initiatives, Funding accountability initiatives, International humanitarian law, Funding international risk mitigation and Advocacy towards local authorities. Its scores were relatively the lowest in the indicators on Funding reconstruction and prevention, Funding NGOs, Reducing climate-related vulnerability, Prevention and risk reduction and Human rights law.
AID DISTRIBUTION

In 2010, Switzerland reduced its Official Development Assistance (ODA) from 0.45% of Gross National Income (GNI) in 2009 to 0.41% of GNI. Humanitarian assistance represented 12.6% of its ODA in 2010, or 0.051% of its GNI.

According to data reported to the United Nations (UN) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs’ (OCHA) Financial Tracking Service (FTS), in 2010, 40.2% of Switzerland’s humanitarian funding was channelled to UN agencies, 27.1% to the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement, 18.7% bilaterally to affected governments, 10.5% to non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and 1.3% to private organisations/foundations. Over half of Switzerland’s funding was not designated for a particular region or country. In 2010, Switzerland supported 24 crises in Africa, 18 in Asia, seven in the Americas, three in Europe, and one in Oceania.

POLICY FRAMEWORK

Switzerland’s humanitarian aid is provided by the Swiss Humanitarian Aid Unit of the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) – which is part of the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs. The 1976 Swiss Federal Law on International Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Aid clearly separates the objectives of humanitarian aid and development in their budgets (SDC 1988). Switzerland’s humanitarian policy, outlined in the humanitarian strategy, Concept of Commitment of the Swiss Humanitarian Aid (HA) and the Swiss Humanitarian Aid Unit (SHA) from 2009 to 2014, is grounded in both international humanitarian law and the Principles of Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) (SDC 2010a). The Humanitarian Aid of the Swiss Confederation: Strategy 2010 regards Swiss humanitarian action as an investment in sustainable development and emphasises support for humanitarian principles and coordination as strategic priorities (SDC 2010b). SDC has also published specific policies on gender, human rights, corruption, climate change, and disaster risk reduction. Switzerland’s Humanitarian Aid Unit, Swiss Rescue Team and Rapid Response Team are available for rapid deployment to humanitarian emergencies.

HOW DOES SWITZERLAND’S POLICY ADDRESS GHD CONCEPTS?

SDC has a comprehensive policy regarding gender, including its relation to humanitarian aid, a specific Gender Unit and a toolkit to help collaborators implement gender mainstreaming in planning (2011b). Most notably, SDC published Gender & Humanitarian Aid: Why and how should SDC integrate gender into Humanitarian Aid? in 2008. Gender is also addressed in Gender Equality: A key for poverty alleviation and sustainable development, especially in terms of capacity building (SDC 2003). In its Guidelines for Disaster Risk Reduction, Switzerland recognises that disasters can provide opportunities for societal change in power structures including gender (SDC 2008b).
PILLAR 1
RESPONDING TO NEEDS

Switzerland’s policy expresses a strong commitment to the principles of neutrality, impartiality, independence, adding that it also “unwaveringly promotes respect for these same principles by other players,” (SDC 2010b, p. 6). Swiss humanitarian aid policies state that decisions are based on the greatest need, level of fragility and vulnerability and pay special attention to vulnerable groups including women, children, sick, elderly, poor and disabled persons. Switzerland’s humanitarian policy also recognises the importance of timeliness in the provision of humanitarian assistance (SDC 2010b).

PILLAR 2
PREVENTION, RISK REDUCTION AND RECOVERY

Prevention and preparedness are highlighted as strategic fields of activity in the Swiss Confederation Humanitarian Aid Strategy 2010. This includes the early anticipation, identification and reduction of disaster risks and damage. The 2008 SDC Guidelines on Disaster Risk Reduction is intended to instruct SDC staff on the best way to ensure disaster risk reduction is integrated into programming. These guidelines, together with the 2009-2014 humanitarian strategy, stress the importance of capacity building (SDC 2008a and SDC 2010a). Switzerland also acknowledges the need for affected populations to participate in the humanitarian programmes it supports, and considers them partners with important decision-making capabilities. Reconstruction and rehabilitation are underscored as strategic fields of activity, and in 2010, Switzerland published Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Concept of the Humanitarian Aid of the Swiss Confederation and the Swiss Humanitarian Aid Unit to guide implementation (SDC 2010c).

PILLAR 3
WORKING WITH HUMANITARIAN PARTNERS

According to the Humanitarian Aid of the Swiss Confederation Strategy 2010, Switzerland coordinates with public institutions, the private sector, governments and state actors, UN agencies, regional organisations, the Red Cross / Red Crescent Movement (especially the International Committee of the Red Cross), Swiss NGOs, as well as international and local NGOs (SDC 2010b). Despite earmarking 10% of its budget for food supplies, Switzerland acknowledges the need for flexibility in its humanitarian policies. Additionally, Switzerland considers that “new kinds of crises and complex emergencies require flexible and adaptable measures as well as innovative solutions,” (SDC 2010b, p.9).
PILLAR 4
PROTECTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

SDC does not have any publicly accessible policy documents specific to human rights, international humanitarian law and refugee law in humanitarian aid, but did publish two related documents for its development work: SDC’s Human Rights Policy: Towards a Life in Dignity, Realising rights for poor people (SDC 2006a) and Promoting Human Rights in Development Cooperation (SDC 1998). The Humanitarian Aid of the Swiss Confederation Strategy 2010 lists advocacy as one of Switzerland’s strategic fields of activity, which further specifies the importance of protection “through presence and testimony,” (SDC 2010b, p.10). Switzerland commits to increasing security training for its employees including behavioral exercises and continuing education (SDC 2010a, p.11). A new group of experts dedicated to security was created to improve self-protection for Swiss mission personnel (SDC 2010a).

PILLAR 5
LEARNING AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Although Switzerland’s humanitarian policy does not specifically mention accountability, Fighting Corruption: SDC Strategy, one of its development policies, addresses transparency and accountability (SDC 2006b). The Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action (ALNAP) is also listed as one of the partners of SDC (SDC 2011a). SDC states that it is committed to transparent planning, implementation, and reporting, and considers the transparent delegation of decision-making powers and responsibilities a way to maintain efficiency and reduce bureaucracy. Transparency is also seen as a means of raising awareness of humanitarian activities among Swiss and global citizens. Furthermore, Switzerland acknowledges the need for evaluation and quality control. In 2002, SDC published Guidelines Evaluation & Controlling, which details programme cycle management and independent evaluation. Humanitarian Aid of the Swiss Confederation Strategy 2010 expresses a commitment to the Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) Principles and Swiss Humanitarian Aid’s Rapid Response Teams have received ISO 9001:2000 certification to ensure conformity with international standards.
In relation to gender, one interviewee reported, “No one looks at different gender issues, and cultural issues. I’ve never been given feedback on a proposal in this regard.” Another noted, “We mainstream gender in our programmes, and donors are not requesting this from us at all,” referring to Switzerland, as well as the other donors supporting their programmes. Some report that while gender is a requirement, it may be reduced to “just check[ing] on paper. That’s all.”
PILLAR 1
RESPONDING TO NEEDS

Switzerland's partners seem to consider its humanitarian funding neutral, impartial, independent and timely. Interviewees also praised SDC for funding based on need, including “things that are not only life saving” and in areas where other donors decided to withdraw. Another interviewee described Switzerland as a “fantastic donor in all senses.” In relation to Adapting to changing needs, one of Switzerland’s partners reported the following: “The Swiss cooperation does field visits. They invite us to elaborate annual plans with them. They discuss with us and get involved in the response. They organise meetings for all NGOs working with them, local and international, and we exchange opinions and good practices.” Another interviewee indicated that Sweden was more reactive than proactive in this regard: “We tell them the needs have changed. They trust our capacity.”

PILLAR 2
PREVENTION, RISK REDUCTION AND RECOVERY

With the exception of Strengthening local capacity, where it received somewhat higher scores, Switzerland’s partners were critical of the country’s support for the other indicators that comprise Pillar 2. Switzerland received its lowest qualitative score for its support of prevention, preparedness and risk reduction. Partner organisations held mixed views of Switzerland’s support for Linking relief to rehabilitation and development (LRRD). While one organisation recognised SDC for supporting a multiyear early recovery programme based on an LRRD approach another interviewee commented, “Our donors could do more. Recovery is not funded.” On a more positive note, Switzerland’s partners stated that SDC is known for strengthening local capacity, with programmes driven by community knowledge and supporting community rehabilitation.

PILLAR 3
WORKING WITH HUMANITARIAN PARTNERS

Partner organisations’ perception of Switzerland’s support for coordination was somewhat mixed, although the organisations were appreciative of Switzerland’s efforts in this regard and spoke of a “true partnership” with Switzerland because “they get involved and discuss annual plans.” Another interviewee said that Switzerland regularly asks for information from another humanitarian organisation which communicated with a party of the conflict. Switzerland was praised for its support and use of the cluster system, pooled funding mechanisms, communication with other organisations, engaging with the humanitarian coordinator and other coordination procedures. However, one interviewee noted a difference in acceptance between the local and headquarters levels of a pooled funding mechanism. Field organisations’ feedback on the flexibility of Switzerland’s funding was largely positive.
PILLAR 4
PROTECTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

According to one interviewee, Switzerland advocated by slowly pushing authorities to fulfill their responsibilities. Another noted that “the Swiss cooperation does advocacy on technical issues. They are totally neutral for everything else.” Partner organisations praised Switzerland’s funding for protection, though seemed to be more critical regarding the facilitation of humanitarian access and security of humanitarian workers. One organisation complained that “they don’t do anything, even with threats of abduction,” in reference to Switzerland, as well as their other donors.

PILLAR 5
LEARNING AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Many field organisations reported that Switzerland did not do enough to ensure accountability to affected populations. According to one interviewee, Switzerland “does not require accountability to beneficiaries; they just audit the funds, but do not go beyond that.” Regarding the implementation of recommendations from past evaluations, Switzerland’s partners would like to see some improvement. One organisation reported, “Donors give you funding and almost forget about you. There is no follow-up,” referring to Switzerland, as well as its other donors. Switzerland’s partners provided much more positive feedback regarding its transparency and reporting requirements.
RECOMMENDATIONS

ינו INVEST ADEQUATELY IN PREVENTION, PREPAREDNESS, RISK REDUCTION AND RECONSTRUCTION

Switzerland received some of its lowest scores on indicators related to prevention, preparedness, risk reduction and reconstruction. In 2010, Switzerland allocated 7.7% of its humanitarian aid to prevention, preparedness and reconstruction, while the OECD/DAC average is 18.6%. Switzerland’s partners confirm this, giving the country its lowest qualitative score for its support for prevention, preparedness and risk reduction.

ינו STRENGTHEN SUPPORT TO REDUCE CLIMATE-RELATED VULNERABILITY

This indicator measures the extent to which donors have fulfilled their commitments in the Kyoto Protocol and funding to Fast Start Finance, which supports climate change mitigation and adaptation efforts. Switzerland provided only 41.9% of its fair share to Fast Start Finance, compared to the OECD/DAC average of 102.4%, which seems to indicate that Switzerland could do more to support efforts to reduce climate-related vulnerability.

ינו LOOK FOR ADMINISTRATIVE SOLUTIONS TO CHANNEL MORE FUNDING TO NGOS

Switzerland’s total allocations to NGOs represented only 7.8% of its humanitarian average, while the OECD/DAC and Group 1 average is 15.3%. To reduce the administrative burden of a large number of contracts, Switzerland could explore flexible working models, such as shared management arrangements with other donors, or supporting NGO umbrella organisations and NGOs of other nationalities.

ינו ENSURE AID MEETS THE DIFFERENT NEEDS OF WOMEN, MEN, BOYS AND GIRLS

Switzerland’s humanitarian policy expresses a firm commitment to gender and requires partners to integrate gender in funding proposals. However, Switzerland’s partners do not feel this is being translated into practice and indicate that greater effort is needed to support partners throughout implementation.

ינו RENEW COMMITMENT TO HUMAN RIGHTS

Just as in 2010, Switzerland received the highest score of all OECD/DAC donors for International humanitarian law. However, it also repeated its low score in Human rights law, which measures signature and ratification of human rights treaties, accreditation of national human rights institutions and funding to OHCHR, the guardian of international human rights treaties. Switzerland has ratified 49 of 66 human rights treaties, and provided 0.00048% of its GDP to OHCHR, compared to the OECD/DAC average of 0.00065%.

Please see www.daraint.org for a complete list of references.
The United Kingdom (UK) ranked 8th in the HRI 2011, maintaining its position from 2010. Based on the pattern of its scores, the UK is classified as a Group 2 donor, “Learning Leaders”. Donors in this group are characterised by their leading role in support of emergency relief efforts, strong capacity and field presence, and commitment to learning and improvement. They tend to do less well in areas such as prevention, preparedness, and risk reduction efforts. Other Group 2 donors include Canada, the European Commission, France and the United States.

The UK’s global score was above the OECD/DAC and Group 2 averages. The UK scored above both averages in all pillars, with the exception of Pillar 4 (Protection and international law), where it scored below both averages.

In general, the UK scored significantly lower on the qualitative, survey-based indicators than on the quantitative indicators. Compared to its OECD/DAC peers, the UK did best on indicators on Participating in accountability initiatives, Reducing climate-related vulnerability, Funding NGOs, Timely funding to complex emergencies and Implementing evaluation recommendations – all quantitative indicators with the exception of the latter. Its scores were relatively the lowest in the indicators on Funding accountability initiatives, Flexibility of funding, Independence of aid, Advocacy for protection of civilians and Linking relief to rehabilitation and development – all qualitative indicators with the exception of Funding accountability initiatives.
AID DISTRIBUTION

The UK increased its Official Development Assistance (ODA) dramatically in 2010. The ratio of its ODA in proportion to its Gross National Income (GNI) rose as well, from 0.52% in 2009 to 0.56% in 2010. Humanitarian assistance comprised 7.2% of the UK’s ODA in 2010, or 0.041% of its GNI. The UK Department for International Development (DFID) intends to reach the target of 0.7% ODA/GNI by 2013 (DFID 2011a).

According to data reported to the United Nations (UN) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs’ (OCHA) Financial Tracking Service (FTS) (2011), in 2010, the UK channelled 46.1% of its humanitarian assistance to UN agencies, 26.4% to non-governmental organisations (NGOs), 4.0% to the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement and 2.3% bilaterally to affected governments. The UK directed 8.8% of its assistance to the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) and 2.5% to Emergency Response Funds. In 2010, the UK supported a total of 31 crises: 19 in Africa, eight in Asia, three in the Americas and one in Oceania. The top recipient countries of UK humanitarian assistance in 2010 were Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Haiti. In 2010, the UK focused its sector-specific funding primarily on health, food and economic recovery and infrastructure.

POLICY FRAMEWORK

The Department for International Development (DFID) manages the UK’s humanitarian assistance. The UK has a number of funding mechanisms and windows for humanitarian aid including the global Conflict, Humanitarian and Security Department (CHASE); the regional Africa Conflict and Humanitarian Unit (ACHU); and country programmes containing elements of humanitarian assistance.

The legal basis for the UK’s humanitarian assistance is grounded in the 2002 International Development Act, which vests responsibility in the Secretary of State. The UK government recently commissioned a Humanitarian Emergency Response Review (HERR) to ensure the quality of its humanitarian assistance. In response to this comprehensive review, in September 2011, the UK government updated its humanitarian policy: Saving lives, preventing suffering and building resilience: The UK Government’s Humanitarian Policy. In addition, it has produced sector-specific humanitarian policies, such as those regarding disaster risk reduction (DRR) and protection. DFID appears to be making significant efforts to operationalise the new policy framework by aligning all existing and new programming to it, and increasing its humanitarian funding and staffing. DFID maintains field offices in 52 countries.

HOW DOES UNITED KINGDOM’S POLICY ADDRESS GHD CONCEPTS?

GENDER

The UK’s Gender Equality Action Plan 2007-2009 (later extended to 2011) lays out goals to help developing countries achieve gender equality and women’s empowerment (DFID 2007). Adding to the Home Office’s Call to End Violence Against Women and Girls (2010), the 2011 humanitarian policy calls for gender and age disaggregated data in needs assessments, as well as ensuring humanitarian responses meet the different needs of women, children, the elderly and the disabled (DFID 2011b).
In its latest policy, Saving lives, preventing suffering and building resilience: The UK Government’s Humanitarian Policy, the UK expresses a firm commitment to the principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence in humanitarian action, stressing that “UK humanitarian action will be based on need, and need alone,” (DFID 2011b, p.6). Supporting forgotten emergencies has historically been a priority for DFID, which set a goal in its 2006 humanitarian policy to eliminate forgotten emergencies by 2010 (DFID 2006a). In order to improve the timeliness of its response to humanitarian crises, the UK intends to invest in anticipation, including regular review of the UK’s Conflict Early Warning System and Watch list of fragile countries, established as part of the Building Stability Overseas Strategy, and “find[ing] news ways of acting quickly in ‘slow onset’ disasters to stop them becoming major emergencies.” Moreover, the UK aims to improve predictability and timeliness of its aid by “making early pledges to appeals, agreeing multi-year funding, supporting global and country-level pooled funds, fast track funding and pre-qualifying NGOs and private sector partners,” (DFID 2011b, p.13). In addition to improving the timeliness of its funding, the UK also seeks to address delays in deploying expert staff to the field by expanding its surge capacity to support multilateral partners.

Building on its 2006 Reducing the Risk of Disasters – Helping to Achieve Sustainable Poverty Reduction in a Vulnerable World: A DFID policy paper, the UK continues to places great importance on disaster resilience in its latest humanitarian policy, calling for disaster resilience and risk reduction to be integrated into all country programmes, and climate change and conflict prevention initiatives (DFID 2006a and DFID 2011b). In addition, the UK plans to take advantage of science and the Chief Scientific Advisers’ network to predict and prepare for disasters by integrating scientific data in country and regional resilience work (DFID 2011b). The UK also seeks to ensure coherence between development and humanitarian action through cooperation with development organisations and the private sector and to “strengthen local capacity to prevent, prepare for and mitigate crises,” (DFID 2011b). Finally, the UK commits to ensure beneficiary participation in the design and evaluation of humanitarian action, although their participation in implementation and monitoring is not specified (DFID 2011b).
PILLAR 3
WORKING WITH HUMANITARIAN PARTNERS

The UK recognises the leading role of the UN, particularly OCHA, and the Inter-Agency Standing Committee to coordinate humanitarian assistance, and commits to advocate for reform. “The UK will take on a ‘championing’ role to support humanitarian partners deliver reforms,” and plans to work closely with the European Commission’s Directorate General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (ECHO), the United States and the Good Humanitarian Donorship initiative, as well as with newer donors (DFID 2011b, p. 12). In line with the Good Humanitarian Donorship Principles, the UK intends to provide flexible, predictable funding with limited earmarking (DFID 2011b). Furthermore, it has committed to increase core funding to multilateral agencies “that have demonstrated they can deliver swiftly and appropriately to emergencies,” (DFID 2011b, p.7). Finally, in an effort to enhance its capacity, the UK plans to invest substantially in innovation and research, including the establishment of a humanitarian research and innovation team (DFID 2011b).

PILLAR 4
PROTECTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

In 2009, the Foreign Commonwealth Office published the UK Government Strategy on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, stipulating that the government will support organisations with a protection mandate, advocate for protection issues globally and at the country level, support peace-keeping missions, as well as a number of other protection related efforts. It also commits to “lobby strongly for humanitarian access, and hold countries to their commitments and obligations under IHL in this regard,” on the issues of humanitarian space and international humanitarian law (FCO 2009, p.14). The 2011 humanitarian policy stresses the UK’s commitment to the principles outlined in the 2009 protection strategy paper, adding that the UK will “implement the appropriate political, security, humanitarian and development actions necessary to uphold respect for international law, protect civilians and to secure humanitarian access,” (DFID 2011b, p.17), including providing funding for security management costs. In line with the Good Humanitarian Donorship Principles, the UK pledges to promote respect for humanitarian, refugee and human rights law.

PILLAR 5
LEARNING AND ACCOUNTABILITY

DFID emphasises the importance of accountability in its humanitarian policy, referring to accountability toward taxpayers, donors and affected populations, which the UK intends to make a central element of its humanitarian support. Furthermore, DFID plans to increase investment in measuring impact and integrating lessons learnt within DFID and will encourage partners to do the same (DFID 2011b). DFID is a signatory of the International Aid Transparency Initiative and calls for greater transparency toward beneficiaries in its humanitarian policy.
DFID’s partner organisations held varied perceptions of its approach to gender. Many claimed that the UK only “pays lip service” to incorporating gender sensitive approaches in programmes because “it is in vogue” and “never verified”. One organisation, however, claimed that: “the DFID pushed us to make our health programme more inclusive in terms of gender. We have to be more attentive to women’s special health needs. We have to calculate our indicators by sex.”
PILLAR 1
RESPONDING TO NEEDS

As one of the largest humanitarian donors, DFID received a great deal of feedback from its partners, both positive and negative. In relation to responding to needs, however, perceptions are more negative than for other donors, though one organisation noted that DFID endeavoured to link projects to needs assessments. On the issue of providing neutral, impartial and independent aid, organisations affirmed that “the UK so far has been an impartial humanitarian donor” and “has made an effort to respond according to needs.” In other contexts, however, DFID was seen as “using donor aid for political, military agendas” and hindering the response due to its “no-contact” policy. One organisation reported that “DFID was very concerned about how aid to Pakistan would look to their constituencies in the UK. They consulted every step they took with London, slowing the process.” Several organisations raised concerns about the UK’s push for value-for-money: “DFID will face cuts and just fund reactive work,” stated one interviewee. Many complained of delays in disbursement: “UK funding has not been timely. It took 11 months to decide on a grant due to a change in government,” noted one interviewee and “Timeliness of UK funding is always problematic, speeding up when the donor’s budget time is up, but not mirroring needs of the population in a sudden onset disaster” reported another.

PILLAR 2
PREVENTION, RISK REDUCTION AND RECOVERY

Similar to most donors, the UK received some of its lowest qualitative scores in Pillar 2. Some agencies were positive about DFID’s requirements to strengthen local capacity, particularly through “supporting the local economy” in one instance. Others reported that the UK “does not support local capacity building, even in the current remote control situation in Somalia which hinges on strong local field capacity.” In terms of beneficiary participation, one organisation mentioned that the DFID “requires it in all stages of the programmes and projects,” though another considered that DFID focused more on beneficiary participation “only in terms of impact on beneficiaries.” On a similar note, another stated: “DFID is more interested in the result of programmes.” DFID scored below the average of its peers for Linking relief to rehabilitation and development. Partners complained of short-term funding inhibiting transitional activities: “There should be longer-term funding available... DFID is great for strategic issues. Why aren’t they more committed to longer term funding? With short term funding we don’t have time to plan and implement properly.” A few partners were more positive, asserting: “The UK completely accepts rehabilitation as a part of humanitarian aid” and “DFID is very much into transitional funding”. DFID, like most donors, also received a low score for Prevention and risk reduction. One of DFID’s partners highlighted the lack of clarity surrounding the issue: “all donors have been talking a lot about risk reduction, but so far it is unclear what they mean.” A few organisations were more positive, praising DFID for its investment in conflict prevention, prepositioning stocks and requiring “that 1/4 of the funding goes to this type of action.”
PILLAR 3

WORKING WITH HUMANITARIAN PARTNERS

The UK received mixed responses from the field in relation to how they engage with humanitarian partners. For example, one organisation described the UK’s funding arrangements as “extremely rigid”, while another argued that “DFID offers flexibility in budget earmarking, but is unflexible with regards to duration.” The UK was one of the best donors for Supporting coordination; partners described this as “a must” for the UK and praised its “support for close coordination through the cluster system and close follow-up of the clusters”. Most organisations felt that the UK had a strong capacity and was highly engaged, although in one particular context the DFID was seen to have “very junior staff who seemed to be overwhelmed.”

PILLAR 4

PROTECTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

Field responses on the UK’s commitment to protection and international law were generally positive. The UK’s partners perceived it to be stronger in advocacy toward local authorities, than for the protection of civilians. One interviewee appreciated that “DFID asked us to provide them with recommendations and policy papers to advocate with the government.” In one context, an interviewee reported that “DFID is more outspoken but not very effective” regarding its advocacy for protection. In terms of funding, feedback was more positive; DFID was seen as “fully supporting” the protection of civilians. In relation to security and access, one organisation stated: “The UK always supports security and access investments and always says yes to security budgets.”

PILLAR 5

LEARNING AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Field perceptions relating to the UK’s performance on learning and accountability were mixed. In relation to integrating accountability towards affected populations in programmes, the UK, like most donors, received one of its lowest qualitative scores. One interviewee asserted that “downward accountability is not a funding requirement or at best, a weak one.” Another interviewee reported: “It’s a bit tick the box thing, like gender; I don’t get many questions.” DFID also received a low score for Implementation of evaluation recommendations, though it outperformed most of its peers as this is a weakness common to many donors. One interviewee commented, “For DFID, it is a requirement to evaluate, but there is less follow-up.” Another agency argued that reporting requirements are heavily “personality dependent.” UK reporting requirements have been described as both “appropriate” and “too general and ambiguous.” One organisation added that “UK reporting requirements are appropriate, but are mostly to ease their mind. There is never any feedback on reporting on dialogue.” Various organisations describe DFID as transparent, but there are uncertainties: “With the new government, it is unclear what and how decisions are taken. They are generally quite open though.”
RECOMMENDATIONS

The following recommendations are based on data from 2010. It remains to be seen how the UK’s new policy will influence these issues.

**RENEW COMMITMENT TO LEARNING AND ACCOUNTABILITY**

The UK performed well in the majority of the quantitative indicators with the exception of Funding accountability initiatives, which measures funding for humanitarian accountability and learning initiatives as a percentage of total humanitarian aid. The UK allocated 0.09% of its humanitarian aid for these initiatives, while the OECD/DAC average was 0.43%. The UK should consider increasing its support for learning and accountability initiatives.

**EXPLORE FUNDING OPTIONS TO ENSURE CONSISTENT SUPPORT FOR TRANSITIONAL ACTIVITIES**

The UK received the second-lowest score of the OECD/DAC donors for Linking relief to rehabilitation and development (LRRD). Partners in Haiti, Colombia, Chad, Pakistan and Somalia were especially critical, while it received significantly better feedback in DRC, oPt and Sudan. Related to this, DFID is considered the second-least flexible donor. According to many partners, this is because of the short-term nature of funding, which they also report inhibits LRRD.

**PROTECT THE NEUTRALITY, IMPARTIALITY AND INDEPENDENCE OF HUMANITARIAN AID**

DFID’s partners were particularly critical of the neutrality, impartiality and independence of the UK’s humanitarian aid in Somalia, Colombia, Pakistan, the occupied Palestinian territories and Kenya. Partners complained of the effects of “no-contact” policies and reported concern over UK interest in funding specific geographic regions or programmes they felt responded to the UK’s political agenda more than humanitarian need. The UK should put in place practical measures to preserve the neutrality, impartiality and independence of its humanitarian aid and engage in dialogue with partners to discuss their perceptions in this regard.

**ENGAGE IN DIALOGUE WITH PARTNERS TO DISCUSS THE MOST APPROPRIATE WAY TO ADVOCATE FOR PROTECTION IN EACH CRISIS**

DFID’s partners seem fairly pleased with its financial support for the protection of civilians. What appears to be lacking is advocacy for protection, where DFID was among the lowest scored donors. DFID received its lowest scores for this in oPt, Chad, Haiti and Pakistan.

Please see www.daraint.org for a complete list of references.
The United States (US) ranked 17th in the HRI 2011, improving two positions from 2010. Based on the pattern of its scores, the US is classified as a Group 2 donor, “Learning Leaders”. Donors in this group are characterised by their leading role in support of emergency relief efforts, strong capacity and field presence, and commitment to learning and improvement. They tend to do less well in areas such as prevention, preparedness, and risk reduction efforts. Other Group 2 donors include Canada, the European Commission, France and the United Kingdom.

The US’ 2011 global score was below the OECD/DAC and Group 2 averages. The US scored below both averages in all pillars, with the exception of Pillar 1 (Responding to needs), where it scored above both averages.

Overall, the US performed significantly better in the qualitative, survey-based indicators than in the quantitative indicators. Humanitarian organisations in the field generally see the US as an engaged, committed partner, but with some clear areas for improvement. Compared to its OECD/DAC peers, the US did best in indicators on Funding to NGOs, Adapting to changing needs, Timely funding to complex emergencies, Advocacy towards local authorities and Facilitating safe access. Its scores were relatively the lowest in indicators on Un-earmarked funding, Reducing climate-related vulnerability, Funding for reconstruction and prevention, Funding international risk mitigation and Human rights law.
AID DISTRIBUTION

Although the US is the largest donor in absolute terms, in 2010 its Official Development Aid (ODA) as a percentage of Gross National Income (GNI) remained low at 0.21%, well below the UN target of 0.7%. Humanitarian assistance represented 17.3% of its 2010 ODA, or 0.036% of its GNI.

According to data reported to the United Nations (UN) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs’ (OCHA) Financial Tracking Service (FTS) (2011), the US channelled 31.6% of its total humanitarian aid to the World Food Programme, representing a large portion of the 53.5% that was allocated to UN agencies in 2010, 24.0% to non-governmental organisations (NGO), 5.4% bilaterally to affected governments, 2.1% to the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement and 0.9% to private organisations and foundations. The US provided 0.23% of its humanitarian aid to the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF). The United States’ country-specific humanitarian aid supported 73 crises in 2010: 25 in Asia, 23 in Africa, 14 in the Americas, eight in Europe and three in Oceania, with Haiti, Pakistan and Sudan receiving the greatest amounts. Sectorally, the US provided the greatest amount of support to food, seconded by coordination and support services (OCHA FTS 2011).

POLICY FRAMEWORK

The United States Agency for International Development’s (USAID) Office for Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) and the Food for Peace Program (FFP) - within the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA) - and the Department of State’s (DoS) Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) collectively manage the United States’ humanitarian assistance. According to the 2011 DAC Peer Review, a total of 27 government agencies play a role in US foreign assistance, although USAID manages the majority of US humanitarian assistance, followed by the Department of State, and to a lesser degree the Department of Defense, Department of Homeland Security, the Center for Disease Control and Prevention under the Department of Health and Human Services, and the Department of Agriculture. Additionally, the Commander Emergency Response Program (CERP), which is part of the Department of Defense, was established to provide US military commanders the capability to effectively respond to urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The US is actively involved in the Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) initiative, though it does not have a comprehensive humanitarian policy. While the Obama Administration issued a new development policy in September 2010, no mention has been made of a humanitarian policy as of yet, despite recommendations from the Organisation of Economic Co-operation’s Development Assistance Committee in this regard (OECD/DAC). The Department of State’s 2010 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review announced a change in the organisational set up: the Chief of Missions at the embassy level will be tasked to coordinate the development and humanitarian programmes of the various agencies. USAID/OFDA has strategically located field offices to facilitate humanitarian coordination and ensure rapid access to disaster sites to assess needs and deliver assistance. The US also has stockpiles of relief supplies at regional warehouse hubs in Miami, Florida; Pisa, Italy; and Dubai, United Arab Emirates.
HOW DOES UNITED STATES’ POLICY ADDRESS GHD CONCEPTS?

GENDER

OFDA’s Annual Report for Fiscal Year 2009 expresses a strong commitment to gender issues in the humanitarian field and PRM emphasises the need to pay special attention to gender-based violence (DoS 2010a). According to USAID, funding for programmes that incorporate gender-sensitive initiatives has increased steadily since 2005 and targets continue to be raised (DoS 2010a). The agency seeks to support efforts to prevent and combat gender-based violence, integrating them into multi-sectoral programmes to maximise effectiveness and increase protection. At the same time, PRM is striving to improve the accuracy of sex and age disaggregated data for multi-sectoral assistance programmes (DoS 2010a).

PILLAR 1
RESPONDING TO NEEDS

The Department of State affirms that its humanitarian assistance is provided on the basis of need according to principles of impartiality, and human dignity and providing emergency food aid to the most vulnerable is considered a priority, especially to those in complex emergencies (DoS 2010a). The 2011 DAC Peer Review reports that the US has made progress in untying its food aid (OECD/DAC 2011); since 2009, the US has invested significantly in the pilot project, “Local and Regional Procurement Project” as part of its food aid appropriation (USDA 2011). DCHA’s Rapid Response Fund allows for a prompt response to unforeseen disasters and conflicts, and OFDA’s Disaster Assistance Response Teams (DARTs) can be deployed in the immediate aftermath of a sudden-onset disaster. USAID often consults with other donors and humanitarian organisations in the crisis area to best administer emergency relief according to changing needs (USAID 2009).

PILLAR 2
PREVENTION, RISK REDUCTION AND RECOVERY

The US takes a multifaceted approach to conflict prevention, risk reduction and recovery. Disaster readiness is generally funded out of three accounts: International Disaster Assistance, Development Assistance, and the Food for Peace Program (DoS 2010a). To facilitate smooth transitions from emergency relief to medium and longer-term development activities, OFDA works with other offices within USAID’s DCHA and USAID’s regional bureaus and overseas missions, as well as other partners (USAID 2009). Although short funding cycles have made this difficult, the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review called for greater emphasis on early recovery and a smooth transition to rehabilitation and development (DoS 2010b). DCHA has recently increased its conflict mitigation budget and continues to encourage beneficiaries to participate in programming (DoS 2010a).
PILLAR 3
WORKING WITH HUMANITARIAN PARTNERS

OFDA’s Annual Report for Fiscal Year 2009 stresses the essential role of coordination and information management for the delivery of humanitarian assistance during crisis situations. Most funding in this field is provided through UN and non-governmental organisation (NGO) partners, as well as through local mechanisms. The US supports pooled funding initiatives (OFDA 2009), and USAID intends for its funding to be as flexible as possible (DoS 2010a). The US recently established a Humanitarian Policy Working Group to improve coordination of humanitarian efforts among the agencies. The 2011 DAC Peer Review recommended using this group to coordinate funding procedures for partners, as organisations with funding from different agencies “receive a mix of earmarked and unearmarked funding from a number of US humanitarian bodies, with varying conditions, timeframes and reporting requirements.” It is worth highlighting, however, that the US is currently reforming its procurement guidelines, so these issues may be addressed (USAID 2011a). The Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review suggested greater investment in the capacity of USAID staff by “retaining expert Locally Employed Staff, tripling midlevel hiring at USAID, seeking expansion of USAID’s non-career hiring authorities, expanding interagency rotations, and establishing a technical career path at USAID that leads to promotion into the Senior Foreign Service,” (2010b). It remains to be seen if this recommendation will be taken on board given potential budget cuts.

PILLAR 4
PROTECTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

The Department of State (2010) considers all humanitarian assistance to have a protection component. It reports that USAID was able to reach its target goals of protecting affected populations in 2009 and 2010 thanks to enhanced cooperation with international partners and to efforts to encourage government authorities to improve humanitarian access (DoS 2010a). OFDA aims to improve the safety and security of relief workers by meeting personally with NGOs and funding innovative research in security coordination and information-sharing (OFDA 2009). The US also supports initiatives such as the Security Unit at InterAction. The 2011 DAC Peer Review commended the US for supporting its humanitarian funding with strong diplomatic and advocacy efforts.
In 2011, USAID published a new evaluation policy for its development assistance and named a full-time Evaluation and Reporting Coordinator who will participate in the USAID-wide Evaluation Interest Group. Furthermore, learning and accountability activities will increase throughout the agency with the recent establishment of the Office of Learning, Evaluation and Research. OFDA’s *Annual Report for Fiscal Year 2009* states that OFDA staff carefully monitors partners’ programmes to ensure that resources are used wisely. At the same time, the Department of State mentions that its development and humanitarian programmes promote transparency and accountability at the local level (2010). USAID also provides funding to the Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action (ALNAP) (OFDA 2010). In 2010, the US approved a foreign assistance transparency agenda and now publishes data on US foreign aid on the dashboard, foreignassistance.gov.

### Field Partners’ Perceptions

**United States’ Field Perception Scores**

Colours represent performance compared to donor’s average performance rating:

- Good
- Mid-range
- Could improve

United States’ average score 6.02 ☼ OECD/DAC average score 6.05

**PILLAR 1**
- Neutrality and impartiality
- Independence of aid
- Adapting to changing needs
- Timely funding to partners

**PILLAR 2**
- Strengthening local capacity
- Beneficiary participation
- Linking relief to rehabilitation and development
- Prevention and risk reduction

**PILLAR 3**
- Flexibility of funding
- Strengthening organisational capacity
- Supporting coordination
- Strengthening organisational capacity

**PILLAR 4**
- Advocacy towards local authorities
- Funding protection of civilians
- Advocacy for protection of civilians
- Facilitating safe access

**PILLAR 5**
- Accountability towards beneficiaries
- Implementing evaluation recommendations
- Appropriate reporting requirements
- Donor transparency
- Gender sensitive approach
- Overall perception of performance

Source: DARA
PILLAR 1
RESPONDING TO NEEDS

The United States received one of the lowest scores of the OECD/DAC donors for indicators regarding the neutrality, impartiality and independence of its assistance. Field organisations responded overwhelmingly that US humanitarian agencies are influenced by other interests. One interviewee described the negative effects of this in Somalia: “Extreme politicisation of humanitarian aid reinforces negative perceptions of manipulated aid and endangers all operations in Somalia.” “USAID is 100% political,” stated one representative, and “US assistance in this country is clearly linked to other interests,” stated another. One organisation complained that “the US has an economic interest. You have to use their suppliers.” According to interviewees, US humanitarian assistance often entails conditions that can negatively affect the ability to deliver aid. “With OFDA, we can only purchase drugs from authorised US providers, which is time consuming and directly affects the beneficiaries,” stated one organisation. However, several organisations lauded US field presence and responsiveness to needs. In fact, the US received the second-highest score of the OECD/DAC donors for ensuring the programmes it funds adapt to changing needs. One interviewee praised the US for being the only donor to monitor this for short-term projects. Another interviewee noted that “OFDA is the only donor that came to talk to us and discuss the needs with us.” The timeliness of US funding seems to vary according to the crisis. While in one crisis, organisations complained of six month delays, in others, interviewees reported that it was “exceptionally fast, providing up front funding in every case needed.”

GENDER

Organisations in the field reported that the US often ensures the programmes it supports integrate gender-sensitive approaches. “The US wants to integrate women’s empowerment and gender across all programmes,” reported one organisation. Partners report that the US normally requires sex and age disaggregated data, though in Haiti, gender seems to be given less importance: “OFDA generally requires a gender approach, but in this emergency case, they don’t care that much about it.” Some organisations noted that the US could improve by verifying that gender approaches are actually integrated, and indicated that conditions on US aid often affect gender issues. “USAID is very influenced by US policies and therefore cannot distribute the contraceptive pill because the government doesn’t allow it.”
PILLAR 2
PREVENTION, RISK REDUCTION AND RECOVERY

Partner organisations report that the US is stronger in *Strengthening local capacity* than in the other indicators that comprise Pillar 2. According to one field partner, “Strengthening local capacity is a requirement in all USAID proposals.” However, beneficiary participation seems to be weaker. One interview asserted that “beneficiary involvement is not verified in a systematic manner.” Another reported that “With OFDA, it depends on the kind of project.” Feedback regarding *Linking relief, rehabilitation and development* was more mixed. An organisation receiving funding from OFDA was critical, stating: “OFDA has a strict emergency approach. Their aim is to leave the country in the same situation it was before the crisis, which isn’t good. We want to leave it in a better situation than that.” However, organisations receiving funding from both OFDA and USAID seemed to be in a better position: “The US supports the continuum from emergency life saving relief, through OFDA, to reconstruction and development, through USAID.” The US also received low scores for *Prevention and risk reduction*. One interviewee reported that “USAID pulled prevention and risk reduction out of a programme.” Another partner organisation criticised the lack of funding for these activities, stating: “The donor community rewards those who fight because they don’t fund until there is a conflict. No one funds prevention. It costs much less to prevent.” One organisation did report however, that “OFDA won’t fund any project in this country that doesn’t involve disaster risk reduction.”

PILLAR 3
WORKING WITH HUMANITARIAN PARTNERS

Field organisations provided mixed responses in respect to US humanitarian agencies’ performance in Pillar 3 categories. Responses showed that US funding is often not flexible and provided under very short timeframes. Though the US received a low score for *Strengthening organisational capacity*, this is also a common weakness for many donors. Several interviewees disagreed, however, reporting that the US was highly supportive of this. “Our organisational capacity is exactly what OFDA funded,” stated one organisation. Another noted that “OFDA supported contingency planning. They look at us as real partners and not just implementers.” Most organisations consider that the US actively promotes coordination in the field, though some complained of the “parallel coordination system” the US created with its partners. The US is one of the OECD/DAC donors considered to have the greatest capacity and expertise.
PILLAR 4
PROTECTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

Field interviews show that partner organisations see the US as a strong supporter of protection and access. Organisations reported that the US places great importance on advocacy towards governments and local authorities to ensure they fulfill their responsibilities. Similar to most donors, partner organisations consider the US stronger in funding protection rather than advocating for it. Although the US’ score fell slightly below its qualitative average, the US outperformed its peers in Facilitating safe access. An organisation in Pakistan reported that “the US was extremely concerned by access and human rights violations.” Responses also show that the US funds flights and escorts for humanitarian workers in high-risk situations. One interviewee criticised the lack of a common approach among donors in insecure environments, especially regarding relations with belligerent groups.

PILLAR 5
LEARNING AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Field organisations provided mixed responses regarding Pillar 5 indicators. Partner organisations held varied opinions regarding the integration of accountability towards affected populations. For example, one interviewee reported that the US “asks you to not promise things you can’t do to not create disappointment among the population,” while another felt that the US is more interested in upward accountability: “There are some donors like the US who push for accountability, but it is mostly towards themselves, not to beneficiaries.” Although it is one of the US’ lowest qualitative scores, responses also show that the US is among the most proactive donors in working with partners to implement evaluation recommendations. “It has been great to discuss issues with OFDA,” stated one organisation. “USAID is learning about this with us,” reported another. Partner organisations expressed mixed views on reporting requirements. While one organisation stated that the US has a “good” reporting system, another considered it to be “overbearing.”
RECOMMENDATIONS

FORMALISE COMMITMENT TO HUMANITARIAN PRINCIPLES IN A COMPREHENSIVE HUMANITARIAN POLICY

The US should continue efforts to streamline and modernise its humanitarian assistance, crisis prevention, mitigation and response activities through a comprehensive official humanitarian policy describing its commitment to humanitarian principles and uniting the information from various agencies and documents into a common humanitarian policy, in line with the proposed overhaul of the Foreign Assistance Act (Senator Berman’s proposed “Global Partnerships Act”).

GET THE RIGHT ORGANISATIONAL SET-UP TO ENSURE INTERNAL COHERENCE AND AVOID GAPS

Some of the US’ lower scores in indicators like Unearmarked funding, Linking relief to rehabilitation and development and Prevention and reconstruction seem to be influenced by the agencies involved and their varying mandates. Partners receiving funding from only one agency report difficulty covering issues like risk reduction, prevention and preparedness, while organisations receiving funding from more than one agency seem to be in a better position to respond to the range of humanitarian needs co-existing in crises. However, the complicated aid architecture also influences flexibility, as partners that do access funds from more than one agency must address the different earmarking and funding conditions of each.

PROTECT THE NEUTRALITY, IMPARTIALITY AND INDEPENDENCE OF HUMANITARIAN AID

The US should engage with its partners to discuss practical measures to ensure the neutrality, impartiality and independence of its humanitarian aid. This is especially important in crises where the US has counter-terrorism operations underway, as partners in Somalia, the occupied Palestinian territories (oPt), Pakistan and Colombia reported that politicised aid inhibits their access to populations in need. Many partners also complained of the burden placed on them to comply with the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) regulations. Perceptions of politicised aid led some organisations to reject US funding due to visibility requirements in sensitive crises as they would put at risk the security of aid workers and further restrict access.

INVEST ADEQUATELY IN PREVENTION, PREPAREDNESS, RISK REDUCTION

The United States received its lowest scores of the Index (after Un-earmarked funding) in Reducing climate-related vulnerability, Funding for reconstruction and prevention and Funding for risk mitigation, indicating the need to place greater importance on reducing risk and vulnerability to prevent and prepare for future crises. Given current pressure on the US foreign aid budget, support for these measures also makes sense from a financial stand-point as prevention has been repeatedly shown to cost less than emergency response. In 2010, the US spent only 3.8% of its humanitarian budget on prevention and reconstruction, while the OECD/DAC average is 18.6%.

FORMALISE COMMITMENT TO INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN LAW

Although the US is strong in advocating for local authorities to fulfill their responsibilities in response to humanitarian needs, it is weak in its own commitment to respect international human rights and humanitarian law. The United States is the OECD/DAC country that has signed the least number of international human rights and humanitarian treaties: 18 of 36 human rights treaties and 36 of 50 humanitarian treaties. Furthermore, the United States is one of only four OECD/DAC donors, together with Portugal, the Netherlands and Luxembourg, that has not established a national committee on international humanitarian law, and together with Finland, Italy and Japan, is one of only four OECD/DAC donors that has not established a national committee on human rights law.

Please see www.daraint.org for a complete list of references.
NOTES

1. Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action (ALNAP), the Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) initiative, the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI), the Humanitarian Accountability Partnership (HAP), Quality COMPAS, Sphere and People In Aid.

2. Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action (ALNAP) the Humanitarian Accountability Partnership (HAP), Quality COMPAS and Sphere and projects listed under on learning & accountability in OCHA’s FTS.

3. The concept that all donors distribute the burden of humanitarian needs equitably, based on the share (or percentage) that a country’s GDP represents compared to the total GDP of the OECD/DAC group.

4. In fact, some field interviewees who participated in the French-version of the field survey did not understand the concept behind the French word “redevabilité”; only when interviewers used the English word “accountability” did they understand.

5. Not including donors with insufficient survey responses (Austria, Greece, New Zealand and Portugal)
FOCUS
ON
Over the past five years, the Humanitarian Response Index (HRI) asked humanitarian staff in the field whether they considered the crisis where they were working was unique or different. The answer was almost unanimously yes. Of course, some answers were better informed than others, but the consensus was clear.

In 2010, fifteen Consolidated Appeals, four Flash Appeals, and several other appeals were funded and implemented in diverse contexts like Sudan, the occupied Palestinian territories, Colombia or Pakistan. Millions of vulnerable people received assistance from hundreds of humanitarian organisations – ranging from large United Nations agencies to small non-governmental organisations -- in charge of managing around sixteen billion dollars donated by dozens of governments as well as corporate and private sources. The numbers in 2011 were very similar.

So, if the idea of the uniqueness of every humanitarian crisis were true, the Humanitarian Response Index’s field research would be an unrealistic endeavour. Undeniably, each humanitarian crisis has a certain degree of uniqueness, as every other social process. Nevertheless, beyond relevant context-specific traits, our challenge is to identify, study and infer common factors and trends in the overall humanitarian response from a range of crises.

Since 2007, the first year of the HRI, DARA has been sending research teams to the field to collect comparable information about the overall humanitarian response, with a specific focus on the OECD/DAC donors’ performance. The responses to a questionnaire in hundreds of face-to-face interviews feed the construction of the annual donor ranking, the main analysis and individual donor assessments. Examples of relevant good and poor donor practice are extracted from the internal reports our field teams elaborate after each field mission and aggregated into the overall picture.

In this section, readers will find a group of case studies of the crises included in the HRI 2011 field research while the comparative analysis mentioned above can be found in the main chapter. During 2011, our field research teams spent 54 days interviewing 328 humanitarian organisations in Chad, Colombia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Haiti, Kenya, the occupied Palestinian territories, Pakistan, Somalia and Sudan. While the HRI field research visits are of short duration (one to two weeks), the scope of the research and the variety of organisations interviewed allow our teams to gather invaluable information about each crisis and response. Much of the work of the field teams feeds into the larger process of analysis of donor performance and trends in how the humanitarian sector is working. Much of this information never goes public. Nevertheless, the opportunity to share what we were told by humanitarian partners in the field is an opportunity too good to be missed.

For us, these crisis analyses are a token of gratitude to all those humanitarian workers and organisations that thought meeting the HRI teams – in some cases, for the second or third time - was worthwhile. We hope they find the crisis analysis a fair reflection of the difficult contexts where they work, their not-always acknowledged efforts to help those in need and their ideas for the common effort of improving the quality of humanitarian aid.

FERNANDO ESPADA, HRI FIELD RESEARCH MANAGER
TOTAL FUNDING TO CHAD IN 2010:
US$ 365.4 MILLION
89% INSIDE THE CAP

THE CRISIS AND THE RESPONSE

- Improved security in East Chad in spite the end of the United Nations Mission in Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT). Nevertheless, there are still 332,878 refugees and 131,000 IDPs and only 50,000 returnees. Banditry and lack of basic infrastructures and services in their places of origin make return still difficult.

- The number of vulnerable people increased from 500,000 in 2009 to almost 4 million in 2011 due to floods, drought, cholera, and the malnutrition crisis in the Sahel.

- By year’s end, 69 percent of the $544 million requested in the 2010 Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP) had been funded. The UN’s Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) allocated $15 million to the 2010 CAP to respond to the food and malnutrition crisis. The CAP 2011, $535 million, is financed up to 56 percent as of November 2011.

- The response prioritised assistance to refugees and IDPs in the East camps. Little financial support to address other emergencies (floods, cholera outbreak or malnutrition in the Sahel) or transitional projects.

Source: OCHA
**2010 CHAD CAP COVERAGE**

- **Funding to the CAP**: 60%
- **Total CAP requirements**: US$ 544.1 million
- **Uncovered requirements**: 40%

**MAIN HUMANITARIAN DONORS IN 2010**

- US$ million
  - **United States**: 83.4
  - **European Commission**: 37.6
  - **CERF**: 22.8
  - **United Kingdom**: 13.1
  - **Canada**: 12.4
  - **Japan**: 11.6
  - **Sweden**: 10.6

- **% of total new funding**
  - 34%
  - 15%
  - 9%
  - 5%
  - 5%
  - 5%
  - 4%
  - 4%

**TOTAL HUMANITARIAN FUNDING TO CHAD**

- **US$ million**
  - 2007: 316.4
  - 2008: 307.0
  - 2009: 365.4
  - 2010: 428.7

**FUNDING TO THE CAP**

- 60%

**UNCOVERED REQUIREMENTS**

- 40%

**Hierarchical Risk Information (HRI) Donor Performance by Pillar**

- **Responding to Needs**: OECD/DAC average pillar score 5.81
- **Prevention, Risk Reduction and Recovery**: 6.45
- **Working with Humanitarian Partners**: 6.02
- **Protection and International Law**: 5.83
- **Learning and Accountability**: 5.37

**Donor Performance and Areas for Improvement**

- Deficient prioritisation as a result of a poor understanding of the context and limited assessment and monitoring of the situation.
- Ensure appropriate coverage of all humanitarian needs, ending the de-facto exclusion of early recovery projects from funding and prioritising prevention, preparedness and risk reduction measures in close coordination with local authorities.
- The UN Resident Coordinator / Humanitarian Coordinator must assume his leading role in facilitating the common work of international aid organisations and national authorities.
OLD REMEDIES NO LONGER EFFECTIVE

For many years, Chad was a development environment for international aid. Humanitarian issues were under the radar, mainly focused on refugees as a spin-off effect of Darfur. However, this changed in April 2006 when a major rebel offensive expelled government forces from large areas in the East of Chad and directly threatened the capital. Factional and inter-ethnic violence triggered the displacement of more than 140,000 Chadians in addition to hundreds of thousands of Sudanese refugees.

In February 2008, another rebel attempt to oust President Idriss Déby turned N’Djamena into a battlefield during three days, killing hundreds, expelling thousands from their homes and making foreigners seek refuge or evacuation with the help of the French Army. In May 2009, the second time the Humanitarian Response Index (HRI) travelled to Chad (the first one in 2008), thousands of rebels crossed the Sudanese border, though this time they were disbanded on their way to the capital. Once again, the armed conflict behind the humanitarian crisis in the East bared its teeth.

In February 2011, almost two years later, the HRI found quite a different scenario in Chad, with no more rebel offensives or significant population displacements in the East. A peaceful start of the rainy season—the yearly deadline for any military or rebel operation—and the creation of joint Chad-Sudan border patrols, with good results in terms of controlling rebel movements, can be seen as a major milestone and a token of improved relations between two long-time enemies (Sudan Tribune, 2010). This seemed to confirm an improved security situation in the East, even for the more sceptical observers. In fact, one main humanitarian actor in N’Djamena told the HRI: “There is no longer a conflict neither in the East nor in Chad.”

Perhaps this is too much to say about such an ethnically complex and historically unstable country, but the truth is that security improvements are real and, therefore, the threat to civilians in East Chad has decreased. Beyond discrepancies of opinions over the end of the armed conflict in the East and the subsequent security improvement, most of the humanitarian actors the HRI interviewed agreed that it is time to start the transition to recovery and development, and also pay more attention to different humanitarian needs in other parts of Chad. In fact, according to the Consolidated Appeal Process 2011 Mid-Year Review for Chad, the number of vulnerable people in Chad has increased from 500,000 in 2009 to almost 4 million people in 2011 due to the compounded effects of flooding, water-borne diseases such as cholera, and the malnutrition crisis in the Sahel (OCHA, 2011). Nevertheless, many interviewees in N’Djamena denounced the reluctance of some key humanitarian actors, including donors, to adapt to the new scenario and needs.

THE NUMBER OF VULNERABLE PEOPLE IN CHAD HAS INCREASED FROM 500,000 IN 2009 TO ALMOST 4 MILLION PEOPLE IN 2011

ADAPTING THE RESPONSE TO A POST-EMERGENCY SCENARIO

With the attention of the international humanitarian actors focused on the assistance to the 249,000 Sudanese refugees and 131,000 IDPs in the eastern camps, it was almost impossible to
receive additional donor support to address other emergencies in other parts of Chad such as the floods, the cholera outbreak and the malnutrition crisis in the Sahelian belt. Even less successful were the attempts to secure funding for linking relief, rehabilitation and development projects.

Looking at the projects financed in the Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP) 2010 by geographical area, around 55% of the total funds went to the East. So, in spite of already identified humanitarian needs in the West and the North affecting around 2,000,000 people, the geographical distribution of the response continued to prioritise the assistance to refugees and IDPs in the East, leading to “a huge coverage problem in 2010”. In terms of coverage by sector, the projects in the early recovery cluster were completely neglected by the donor community with no funding received in 2010 and zero funding committed as of October 2011 (OCHA, 2010). Meanwhile, the Government of Chad continues to delay the implementation of the long-expected Recovery Programme of Eastern Chad (OCHA, 2011).

According to different sources, this deficient prioritisation was the result of a poor understanding of the crisis and limited assessment and monitoring of the situation in a country that, until very recently, has remained indecipherable for most humanitarian organisations. One interviewee mentioned the malnutrition crisis in the Sahel, “which humanitarian organisations find confusing” because they did not have previous experience in the region. Although even if they decided to intervene “nothing guarantees the sustainability and durability of projects, because of minimum donor support.”

Many NGOs and UN agencies complained about donors’ unwillingness to fund transition programs: “LRRD is a big problem in Chad. We want to stay in our intervention areas to start doing developmental activities but our donors don’t support us on this”. One interviewee was especially clear in his view: “The international community needs to be aligned with the national strategy to end poverty. There is a clear separation between those donors that understand that the transition phase has already begun and those that keep focusing on the refugee issue. There is a development plan agreed upon by the Chadian government, but with neither a clear strategy nor donor engagement to fund the plan”.

Not surprisingly, the CAP 2011 does not effectively focus on transition and, therefore, prevention and risk reduction activities receive limited attention if any, not to mention other crises in Chad.

Predictably, considering the unbalanced humanitarian approach, most interviewees agreed that gender was not a priority in Chad for any of the humanitarian donors: “The only thing some of them [donors] do is ensure we incorporate the gender approach in the projects, but they don’t even know what that means. Some are more gender sensitive, and others just check on paper. That’s all.” Although some efforts were made, as trainings on the Gender Marker tool by OCHA, it is clear that much more needs to be done in a
context where Sexual and Gender Based Violence (SGBV) and discrimination of women is a huge problem, not only in the camps in the East.

COORDINATION OF THE HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE

Our interviews with humanitarian agencies in N’Djamena (February 2011) showed a combination of organisations in the process of rethinking their role in the new post-emergency scenario, some of them closing operations, and others keeping one foot in the past. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was, according to several interviewees, an example of the latter.

Until 2006, development organisations were the norm in Chad, but after the refugee influx and big displacements, Chad progressively became a humanitarian destination. With Chad considered a refugee, and later an IDP crisis, UNHCR—one of the first to arrive—played a natural leading role in the response. With the biggest budget and human resources, an operational hub in the Eastern town of Abéché and its own coordination system, UNHCR was much more than the leading agency in Chad. According to several sources, UNHCR tried to control—and still does—the what, where and how of humanitarian assistance in Chad, artificially keeping the refugee and IDP crisis label in donor’s minds. Interestingly, several respondents complained about UNHCR, the main donor for many NGOs, placing many administrative conditions that did not necessarily respond to accountability concerns or operational needs but to the UN agency’s “natural tendency to assure its hegemonic position in every crisis”. In fact, some NGOs decided to break their relationship with UNHCR due to the conditions they imposed and their management style.

Until 2010, there was a double-hub in N’Djamena and Abéché in the East. The alleged reason for the decentralised model was that N’Djamena was too far from the humanitarian scenario. Beyond the benefits of this decentralisation, the fact was that Abéché progressively gained autonomy from the capital and complaints of inefficiency, lack of coordination, and duplicity of functions, which were more and more common on both sides. Finally, after UNHCR’s decision to close its office in Abéché, the rest of the agencies followed their example. During the HRI mission, the end of Abéché as humanitarian hub was not perceived as something negative by the interviewees.

In 2010, another leader appeared on scene: the MINURCAT. With a mandate of protecting civilians, promoting human rights and the rule of law, and promoting regional peace, MINURCAT went too far by interfering with the mandate and work of some humanitarian actors. According to several sources, “DPKO’s [the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations] interference damaged the humanitarian space. They used a cold war rationale, with mistrust and secrets”. Maybe because of this, many interviewees referred to civil-military coordination as the Achilles heel of the international intervention in Chad in 2010.

Meanwhile, the two main actors in the coordination of humanitarian response had difficulties playing their roles for different reasons. The Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator (RC/HC) until early 2011 was virtually unknown by many interviewees. In fact, the former RC/HC was not mentioned by respondents until directly asked by the HRI team. There is no clear explanation of the absence of the RC/HC in the different coordination meetings during 2010, although many interviewees deduced a lack of interest of the RC/HC in humanitarian affairs. The new RC/HC, in the position since early 2011, has a good opportunity to fill a leadership void.

An understaffed OCHA office in N’Djamena struggled to find its place but it “couldn’t do its work because of MINURCAT’s manipulation” and UNHCR resistance to coordinate. Paradoxically, even though the office in Chad was fully financed by ECHO, Ireland, Spain, Sweden and the US, OCHA headquarters did not allow them to hire more staff and, therefore, increase their capacity and leverage in N’Djamena.
end of the UN peacekeeping mission: “Paradoxically, once MINURCAT finished their mandate, security increased in the East”. Nevertheless, many respondents were concerned about the financial sustainability of the DIS, a “monster” with extremely high operational costs (US$21 million budget for 2011) and logistics and administrative demands well beyond national capacities. In fact, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) finances the DIS through the Multi-Partner Trust Fund and helps in administrative issues, while the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) takes care of logistical issues, such as car fleet maintenance. The Chadian government commands the forces and pays the high salaries of around 2,000 personnel.

Obviously, security improvements also benefitted aid workers’ safety. The descending trend of security incidents involving humanitarian staff has been significant, from 9 in 2007 to 2 in 2010.

Beyond the reasons behind the apparent indifference of the former RC/HC and a weak OCHA presence, the humanitarian community in Chad had to adapt to this lack of leadership, one example being the Comité de Coordination des ONG (NGO Coordination Committee, CCO). With 25 member organisations and 23 observers, and financed by ECHO, the CCO is the only international NGO forum in Chad. Initially focused on security issues, the CCO saw the opportunity to adopt a more comprehensive strategic role positioning itself as an informal NGO spokesperson vis à vis the UN system, especially UNHCR.

SECURITY IS NEEDED BUT NOT ENOUGH

The end of the MINURCAT in December 2010 did not bring with it the feared deterioration of security in the East. On the contrary, the role of the Détachement Intégré de Sécurité (Integrated Security Deployment, DIS), the Chadian unit responsible for the security of refugee and IDP camps and of aid delivery, was generally praised as crucial and positive after the
need security but much more than security to decide to return to their homes. As one interviewee said: “There is a big problem with returnees, since life conditions are better in camps than in villages. There is a big need to invest in infrastructures,” something international donors should prioritise in coordination with the Chadian authorities.

Donors are a rare animal in Chad, with ECHO as the only humanitarian donor with permanent presence and first-hand knowledge of the situation in the country. The US has a long-experienced official at the Embassy in N’Djamena and a State Department’s Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration (BPRM) commuting official, with an excellent reputation among humanitarian actors, who regularly travels to Chad and participates in meetings. The question is whether a combination of a commuting official and antenna is coherent with a quality-based response of the biggest donor in Chad ($84,116,812 or 22.5% of grand total in 2010). As an interviewee said: “With only one person in N’Djamena, the Americans can’t do a proper follow-up.” Switzerland and France have a more development profile, although the Swiss seem more humanitarian sensitive than the French, and do some field visits to monitor the situation and interact with their partner organisations according to many of the interviewees.

So, with only one of the top 10 donor countries in Chad having dedicated humanitarian staff in N’Djamena it shouldn’t be a surprise that most of them still have a refugee/IDP mindset towards Chad. Moreover, we were told that most of the donors had an either we fund the emergency in the East or we cut the funds approach. On a positive note, presence in the field could also explain why ECHO stands as the donor with a more comprehensive approach to the humanitarian needs in Chad. ECHO’s Plan Sahel, as the main instrument to respond to the malnutrition crisis in the Sahelian belt, is good evidence of that.

(The Aid Worker Security Data Base, 2011). Of course, humanitarian organisations learned to be extremely cautious in their movements in the East, but the role of the MINURCAT as a deterrent force, and especially the efforts of the Chadian authorities, made delivery of humanitarian assistance safer. Nevertheless, while security in the East has improved, there are concerns about the sustainability of the present model if the situation evolves—the conflict in Darfur being the main concern— and if the international financial support to the Chadian authorities declines. This, for many interviewees, is more than a hypothesis.

In fact, the end of rebel activity wasn’t followed by disarmament and reintegration processes. The so-called rebels are just bandits and, therefore, still threaten civilians, although in a less systematic manner. Besides, there is growing insecurity in the South due to the conflict in the North of the Central African Republic as well as prospects of enlarged Al Qaeda presence in the North of Chad, both areas far from the DIS theatre of operations. Fortunately, the Libyan crisis did not affect Chad as much as it was feared, although it made the work of some UN agencies, notably the World Food Programme, more cumbersome (IRIN, 2011).

In summary, a police force—even if capable and efficient as the DIS— is necessary but not enough, as the small return figures demonstrate —no more than 50,000 IDPs and 5,000 refugees by the end of 2011 according to UNHCR. The need to guarantee stability and peace in the East, prioritising the investment in an efficient judiciary system and basic infrastructures, was mentioned several times as the main challenge ahead during our interviews with humanitarian organisations in N’Djamena. People...
HOW COULD THE RESPONSE IN CHAD BE IMPROVED?

The priority, and also the opportunity, in Chad should be to cover all humanitarian needs and take the appropriate steps to assure the transition to development. For that to happen, the different humanitarian actors, including the Government of Chad, must assume their roles and responsibilities.

Donors need to commit funding to cover all humanitarian needs, ending the de-facto exclusion of early recovery projects from funding and prioritising prevention, preparedness and risk reduction measures in close coordination with local authorities. The Recovery Programme of Eastern Chad cannot be delayed any further, and although the Government of Chad is responsible for its completion, this is not an excuse for international donors and the UN not to provide their support in a more decisive manner.

The RC/HC must assume his leading role in facilitating the common work of international aid organisations and national authorities, and helping OCHA to play a stronger coordination role in the humanitarian response. At the same time, UNHCR must adapt its activities and projects to the present needs, respecting other UN agencies’ mandates.

DONORS NEED TO COMMIT FUNDING TO COVER ALL HUMANITARIAN NEEDS AND ALLOW THE TRANSITION TO DEVELOPMENT

International NGOs must move on to the new challenge of a transition scenario, for which their commitment to higher quality and capacity is just as important as appropriate donor funding.

Finally, local communities and development organisations should deploy all of their efforts to regain the ground they lost after the refugee and IDP emergency began in the East.

Only then Chad will have the opportunity to build its own future.
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President Juan Manuel Santos, elected in 2010, approved the Law of Victims and Land Restoration. Among other things, this new law acknowledges a long-denied humanitarian crisis, yet the problem is far from resolved.

The exact number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Colombia remains unknown, with figures ranging from 3,700,381 to 5,200,000. 2010 records indicate that around 280,000 people were displaced and many more were subject to confinement. In the first semester of 2011, almost 90,000 people were forced to flee their homes.

It is estimated that 98.6% of IDPs live below the poverty line - 82.6% of which are considered extremely poor.

La Niña caused the worst floods in Colombia’s recent history, affecting 3,120,628 people, including displaced and already vulnerable populations.

In response to the floods, the Colombian government created Colombia Humanitaria, a response and reconstruction fund. Nevertheless, the crisis still exceeded national capacities.

Although the floods overshadowed the IDP crisis, the armed conflict remains the country’s most pressing humanitarian concern.
DONOR PERFORMANCE AND AREAS OF IMPROVEMENT

- Humanitarian aid has improved in the urban areas of Colombia, while attention to populations in more remote/rural areas continues to be insufficient. Donors need to step up their efforts in rural and conflict areas, where access to humanitarian aid and basic services is very limited.

- An overly cautious attitude on behalf of donor governments to avoid damaging their relationship with the Colombian government still limits the ability of the humanitarian system to respond appropriately.

- The new government’s approach and acknowledgment of the armed conflict offers an unprecedented opportunity for the humanitarian community, in particular donor governments, to provide a more straightforward and coherent response.

- Donor governments and the Colombian government have yet to agree on a long-term plan to address the high rate of annual displacement.

- Donors and the Colombian government should prioritise disaster risk reduction and building local response capacities, as more natural disasters are expected to affect the country.
In 2010, the newly elected Colombian government created unprecedented expectations with the approval of the Law of Victims and Land Restoration. The new law on land restitution put an end to eight years of official denial of the existence of an armed conflict in the country – and therefore of its victims as well – and was evidence of a more constructive attitude toward one of the longest lasting armed conflicts in the world.

Former President Uribe’s intransigent position towards the existence of a conflict with humanitarian consequences infringed international humanitarian law and drastically reduced humanitarian space, aid independence and access to vulnerable groups. On the contrary, the new Law of Victims recognises land dispossession as a key factor of the armed conflict and displacement and allows key issues such as protection of civilians to be addressed openly.

2010 also brought the worst floods in Colombia’s history. By the end of the year, more than two million people across the country were hit by La Niña storms. Although the Colombian government responded with enormous willingness, gathering citizens and corporations around Colombia Humanitaria – a national public-private response and reconstruction pooled fund – a disaster of such unprecedented scale exceeded national capacities.

The new government’s unexpected stance still needs to translate into concrete policies, especially after some doubts were raised regarding the limited definition of “victim” in the new law, and how it combines with existing laws that offer a better legal framework in protection of civilians and humanitarian assistance issues. Nevertheless, it is evident that the humanitarian system is faced with a new window of opportunity in Colombia. It is yet to be seen whether donor governments understand this new scenario and will fully take advantage of it by providing a more coherent and principled response.

Inequity and lack of a state presence and investment remain the root causes of the humanitarian crisis in Colombia. In recent years, Uribe’s military successes prioritised the recovery of guerrilla-controlled territories, but failed to acknowledge existing humanitarian needs. As a result, peace was not reached, not to mention development, whilst, paradoxically, Colombia proudly presented positive macroeconomic indicators.

In fact, Colombia’s annual income grew at an average rate of 4.1% between 2000 and 2009 and its risk rating rose to Investment-Grade, allowing Colombia to join Indonesia, Vietnam, Egypt, Turkey and South Africa (CIVETS) – a group of countries considered attractive for foreign investment thanks to “wise policies and a solid economic ground” (Semana 2010). Moreover, in October 2011, the US signed the implementation legislation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with Colombia, after years of blockade in Capitol Hill due to concerns of human rights violations.

President Álvaro Uribe (2002-2010) proved to be an intelligent propagandist, sparing no efforts to present Colombia as a safe, stable and prosperous country, while hiding human rights violations and turning a blind eye to the needs of the victims of the armed conflict. For that purpose, Colombia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs managed to keep international attention far from the humanitarian crisis, while welcoming bilateral aid agreements and partnerships. Thanks to this successful strategy, the Colombian government avoided uncomfortable questions and most Western embassies in Bogotá seemed to accept the official statement which claimed that there was “no armed conflict but terrorism” in Colombia, to
fear continue to both displace and confine large numbers of people in rural areas, placing thousands of Colombians in a position of extreme vulnerability. In fact, population confinement by legal or illegal armed actors constitutes the most acute problem of the humanitarian crisis in Colombia. Confinement is a twofold reality that isolates entire communities, hindering the free movement of civilians as well as their access to basic services, rights and even humanitarian assistance.

This humanitarian reality was aggravated in 2010 by La Niña, the worst floods in Colombia’s recent history, affecting 3,120,628 people or 6.78% of the total population. With 93% of municipalities hit, and four out of ten flood-affected Colombians being IDPs, the magnitude and complexity of the disaster was unprecedented and a challenge well beyond national capacities.

In 2010 most of the public and private resources and efforts went to the flood response. The responsibility to assist the affected population by the heavy rains relied on the Government’s Directorate General for Risk and, notably, Colombia Humanitaria, a private-public initiative inspired by the experience of the 1999 earthquake response. While recognising a huge effort and political willingness – around US$83 million in cash and in-kind donations were made available – national capacity did not match the scale of the disaster. Mismanagement and a deficient prioritisation limited Colombia Humanitaria’s performance by not making use of already available resources, partner networks and knowledge. Moreover, different legal frameworks for the assistance of those affected by the floods and by the conflict, led to parallel operations, which did not fully benefit from Acción Social’s experience in the registry and humanitarian assistance of displaced population. As a result, unnecessary inefficiencies and delays occurred, lowering the quality of the assistance provided.

The transformation of former paramilitary groups into criminal gangs, as well as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia’s (FARC) new strategy from territory-control to guerrilla-warfare, against a backdrop of drug-trafficking, all present major challenges to the government of Juan Manuel Santos. For instance, departments like Córdoba, in the North, are again scenarios of threats, killings and displacement, despite being officially tagged as “pacified territories,” which calls into question the alleged security improvements in recent years. In other departments, especially in the South, fighting between the Colombian Army and armed groups never ceased. The land restitution process is also proving to be a complicated process, with threats and killings of returnees, making evident the need for effective protection of civilians.

While it may appear to be a contradiction at first, fighting, mine fields, direct threats or simply

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**POPULATION CONFINEMENT BY LEGAL OR ILLEGAL ARMED ACTORS CONSTITUTES THE MOST ACUTE PROBLEM OF THE HUMANITARIAN CRISIS IN COLOMBIA**

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In 2010 most of the public and private resources and efforts went to the flood response. The responsibility to assist the affected population by the heavy rains relied on the Government’s Directorate General for Risk and, notably, Colombia Humanitaria, a private-public initiative inspired by the experience of the 1999 earthquake response. While recognising a huge effort and political willingness – around US$83 million in cash and in-kind donations were made available – national capacity did not match the scale of the disaster. Mismanagement and a deficient prioritisation limited Colombia Humanitaria’s performance by not making use of already available resources, partner networks and knowledge. Moreover, different legal frameworks for the assistance of those affected by the floods and by the conflict, led to parallel operations, which did not fully benefit from Acción Social’s experience in the registry and humanitarian assistance of displaced population. As a result, unnecessary inefficiencies and delays occurred, lowering the quality of the assistance provided.
There are, however, other recurrent factors that account for the shortcomings in the response. Firstly, from the number of people affected by the floods and the widespread damage, it is easy to conclude that neither disaster risk reduction nor building local capacity have been a priority in Colombia, which is combined with deep-rooted deficient land planning to render people more vulnerable each time a disaster struck. Finally, good intentions and well-meant efforts are not enough to build a working response system overnight, especially given that Colombia is both a disaster-prone country and has endured several decades of one of the world’s most protracted conflicts.

In an attempt to minimise foreign involvement and funding to United Nations agencies and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) through the usual multilateral channels, the Colombian government has contended that it has sufficient capacity and experience to meet humanitarian needs. Although many donor governments have been willing to consider bilateral agreements as the best option, experience has repeatedly shown that this is not the case. As one interviewee told the HRI in Bogotá: “Budget support should no longer be an option for developing Colombia. Needs are still humanitarian.”

In the face of this reality, the main international humanitarian NGOs in Colombia agreed to call for a more consistent international aid approach, to allow for a more independent, neutral, impartial and efficient response (Consejo Noruego de Refugiados et al. 2011).

International humanitarian assistance in Colombia has traditionally been in a danger zone in its objective of helping victims of the armed conflict. The Colombian government has never allowed the United Nations to launch an international appeal for fear of foreign interference in what they consider internal affairs. This position also affected the recent response to the floods, as the Colombian government called for bilateral funding and blocked the launch of a UN Flash Appeal.

Therefore, in spite of signs of a more constructive attitude to allow humanitarian assistance in places where the state is absent or not sufficiently effective, thanks to President Santos’ acknowledgement of the extent and the reality behind the humanitarian crisis unfolded by the armed conflict, Colombian authorities continue to hamper, in one form or another, the activities of international humanitarian organisations.

In Colombia, the international community faces a multifaceted challenge as to how to provide humanitarian assistance in a middle-income country, with a strong state, a highly politicised environment and an unstable security context. Humanitarian actors need to deliver aid and protect IDPs and confined populations in remote areas where there is no permanent state presence and humanitarian space is at stake.

Even if only moderately successful, the efforts of international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) and the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement, to maintain activities in the most
affected communities constitute their highest added value. This success is possible thanks to their respect of humanitarian principles, whose importance are not always understood by the Colombian authorities, and the financial support of some key donor governments.

Complicating matters further, the already small donor support and presence is decreasing, as most of the humanitarian actors the HRI met in Bogotá confirmed. In fact, one could argue that the Colombian government might end up being successful in its efforts to present the donor community with an excessively positive image of the country. Humanitarian donors with little interest in signing a bilateral agreement and a shrivelling humanitarian budget may be wondering if they should continue in Colombia. In fact, according to the EU’s new financial framework 2014-2020, development aid to Colombia, as well as to 18 other emerging economies, will end in 2014, allowing the European Commission to “help the poorest in the world” (EuropeAid 2011).

Many NGOs interviewed by the HRI were highly critical of humanitarian coordination, which they considered inefficient, although they recognised the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs’ (OCHA) efforts. This criticism is mainly based on what they see as a UN-driven system, where more than twenty UN actors compete for scarce funds, forcing a complicated balance between them and leaving even the main international NGOs little leverage. As a result, not all UN agencies on the receiving end are the most suited for the job.

Clusters, one of the key elements for effective coordination, are seen by many humanitarian actors as disconnected from the field and, again, too UN-driven. The criticism is not limited to the way funds are allocated among organisations, but to the performance of some UN agencies as cluster leads, namely the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), which “hasn’t understood what cluster lead responsibility means yet”, and the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), which “has not understood its role in WASH.”

Many interviewees extended their criticism to the Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator (RC/HC), who they perceived as more focused on balancing UN agencies’ interests, and the relationship with the Colombian government and embassies, than on humanitarian advocacy and coordination.
As a result, international NGOs sought alternative ways to raise attention to what they considered the failures and the priorities of the humanitarian response in Colombia and were even taking steps towards a parallel coordination. In June 2011, after continuous delays in the release of a position paper as part of a Common Humanitarian Framework, 14 international NGOs signed the report *Humanitarian Crisis in Colombia caused by the internal armed conflict*, stressing the need for the international humanitarian system to fully acknowledge and respond to the humanitarian needs in a principled, efficient and coordinated manner (Norwegian Refugee Council, Plan International, et al. 2011). Even some donors were unsatisfied with the self-complacent attitude of UN agencies and, especially, of the RC/HC, the lack of positive results and a slow response.

ECHO is the only donor attending the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) meetings as an observer and is one of the few donors pushing for more and better coordination. Other donors are not invited to attend HCT meetings – not by decision but as a result of inertia. Donor coordination, suffering from the same setback, would be especially welcome in places with a high density of humanitarian organisations and funds, like Nariño, and to avoid situations where most donors stopped funding assistance in places like Córdoba just because they accepted the Colombian government’s politically-motivated positive assessment.

The HRI found a common agreement among the humanitarian community on the need to advocate for and address the gaps in the response. No one doubts Colombia is a complicated environment for humanitarian organisations, but what crisis is easy? Colombia cannot continue to be a humanitarian exception where responding to a crisis that has displaced almost 10 percent of the population is not considered the utmost priority.

At a point when the Colombian government has finally admitted the existence of an armed conflict, and indirectly to the suffering of millions of civilians, the international humanitarian system has the obligation, and a valuable chance, to meet the government halfway. This new scenario leaves little room for past excuses and a great deal of space for a principled response centered on the protection of civilians and prevention of further displacement. The humanitarian response must be comprehensive and also lead to sustainable solutions to the population. Donor fatigue is understandable after so many years of humanitarian crisis, but it is also the result of an inconsistent approach, with donors trying to work in the development of areas of Colombia where the armed conflict was still alive and then complaining about the lack of positive impact. While the need to prioritise humanitarian aid is unquestionable, the transition phase can no longer be neglected. For this endeavour, all humanitarian actors are important, but the donor community (and not only those already present in Colombia) and the United Nations have a fundamental role to play.

**DONOR FATIGUE IS UNDERSTANDABLE AFTER SO MANY YEARS OF HUMANITARIAN CRISIS, BUT IT IS ALSO THE RESULT OF AN INCONSISTENT APPROACH**

**NEXT STEPS**

Colombia cannot continue to be a humanitarian exception where responding to a crisis that has displaced almost 10 percent of the population is not considered the utmost priority.

At a point when the Colombian government has finally admitted the existence of an armed conflict,

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INFORMATION BASED ON 24 FIELD INTERVIEWS WITH KEY HUMANITARIAN ACTORS IN BOGOTÁ FROM THE 15TH TO THE 24TH OF JUNE 2011, AND 70 QUESTIONNAIRES ON DONOR PERFORMANCE (INCLUDING 58 QUESTIONNAIRES OF OECD/DAC DONORS). FIELD RESEARCH CONDUCTED BY IGNACIO MARTÍN-ERESTA. DARA EXPRESSES ITS GRATITUDE TO ALL THOSE INTERVIEWED IN COLOMBIA.
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THE CRISIS AND THE RESPONSE

- The deadliest armed conflict since the end of the Second World War, with over 1.7 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) and nearly 200,000 refugees.

- The DRC has been among the top ten aid recipients over the past decade. Donors provided over US$3.3 billion in humanitarian assistance and US$6.7 billion in peacekeeping during this period.

- Despite this, widespread violence, lack of protection of civilians and pervasive sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV), combined with health epidemics, malnutrition, and natural disasters continue to affect millions of people.

- The world’s largest UN peacekeeping force, MONUSCO, and a government stabilisation initiative, STAREC, have been unable to stem armed violence in the North and East.

- Elections in November 2011 are unlikely to resolve years of conflict, weak state institutions and a lack of capacity to address basic needs.

- Humanitarian funding has decreased since 2009. In 2010, the Humanitarian Action Plan (HAP) was 64% funded. By the 21st of October 2011, the HAP (the equivalent of a CAP) was only 58% covered.
Donor governments have been strong supporters of humanitarian reform efforts in the DRC and have established a Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) group in-country. Donors are generally appreciated for their support for critical humanitarian assistance and for more flexibility to address changing needs, but less so for their support for transition, recovery and linking relief to development (LRRD).

There are concerns about the poor linkages between humanitarian funding and support provided by donor governments for other areas of assistance, such as development, state-building and security.

Donors are encouraged to strengthen monitoring and evaluation, particularly for protection and gender issues, and to measure impact to ensure the gains in humanitarian reform can be consolidated.
LEVERAGING DONOR SUPPORT FOR LONG-TERM IMPACT

INTRODUCTION

The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has consistently been among the top ten recipients of humanitarian assistance in the last decade, with over US$3.3 billion in aid provided during this period. The country has also received significant international support in the form of development assistance and peacekeeping. Since 2004, the international community spent over US$6.7 billion on peacekeeping operations alone (GHA 2011). The HRI field research to the DRC in April 2011, which included extensive interviews and a survey of key humanitarian actors in the country, suggests there has been steady but uneven progress towards more coordinated and effective responses – with of course great room for improvement.

Humanitarian needs in the DRC are far from over. However, the gains made so far, particularly in the area of gender and protection, may be at risk if donor governments do not provide sustained support to meet humanitarian needs, better efforts to support transition, recovery and capacity-building, and a more coordinated and integrated strategy to link humanitarian, development and security agendas. With national elections scheduled for late November 2011, this is a good opportunity for the international community to reflect on the impact of this massive amount of support, and how to best achieve a transition from a series of chronic humanitarian crises to long-term stability and recovery.

NOVEMBER ELECTIONS ARE A GOOD OPPORTUNITY TO REFLECT ON THE IMPACT OF MASSIVE INTERNATIONAL AID TO DRC

THE CRISIS

While it is common to speak about the humanitarian crisis in the DRC, in reality, the country is simultaneously confronting several different crises – not all of them humanitarian – across all parts of this vast territory. Each crisis has its own unique context and dynamics, making it difficult to plan and implement programmes, much less assess the effectiveness of the overall humanitarian response in a concise manner, or come to firm conclusions about long-term solutions to respond to chronic humanitarian needs.

On the political front, the international community continues to support state-building programmes in the lead-up to November’s national elections. But these efforts have been undermined by a long history of corruption, kleptocratic rule and unaccountable elites. The current government under Joseph Kabila has requested international assistance for the elections, and several donor governments have pledged support for the process. Surprisingly, so far only a few violent incidents have marred the process. Yet, there are strong fears that further instability may result if the elections are not perceived as fair and impartial. At the same time, many actors raise concerns about the need to check the increasingly authoritarian tendencies of the Kabila regime (ICG 2011).

The macro-economic situation has improved in the country recently. However, any benefits are bypassing vulnerable and crisis-affected populations, and chronic poverty continues to accentuate humanitarian needs. Epidemics from preventable diseases like cholera, measles and meningitis have ravaged parts of the country, an indicator of the general weak state of the health system. Volatile and high food prices worldwide are
also contributing to food insecurity in parts of the country. As a result, displacement, malnutrition, morbidity and mortality remain high. Finally, natural disasters, ranging from floods, landslides and drought continue to affect the country frequently. However, the greatest concern continues to be protection of civilians. Violence and conflict are still widespread across many parts of the country.

Poor transportation infrastructure, bureaucratic procedures and corruption make it costly and difficult to regularly access large parts of the country. At the same time, the security situation remains critical, with over 142 attacks on aid workers recorded in 2010 in North and South Kivu alone (OCHA 2011a). The most obvious manifestation of the difficulties of providing adequate protection lies in the horrific and widespread problem of sexual and gender based violence (SGBV) in the DRC. SGBV has been closely linked to issues of protection, access and insecurity in the past, though it now appears prevalent throughout society at the domestic level.

Several peace agreements, an ambitious stabilisation plan (STAREC), the presence of the largest peacekeeping force in the world, the UN Organization Stabilisation Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO), and considerable international efforts to build the professional capacity of national security forces have been unable to stem severe violence and the related humanitarian consequences. Years of conflict, combined with weak state institutions and limited economic opportunities, means that violence has become entrenched as a means to gain power and wealth for many actors, or simply to make a living, underlining the challenge of finding any lasting solutions to the conflict.

In the sparsely populated North-East, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) kills, abducts, and plunders local people. Military campaigns against the LRA have so far had limited effect. In the eastern part of the country, military operations by the national army, the FARDC (Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo) against the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR), a Rwandan Hutu rebel group, seem to have stabilised the security situation somewhat, but the situation may be short-lived, as many of the underlying tensions have not been resolved. At the same time, Burundian and Ugandan rebels, as well as various local Mai-Mai groups, are also wreaking havoc in the region. There are numerous disturbing reports that badly trained and under-paid FARDC personnel and the national police are themselves responsible for many human rights violations, including organised group rape. According to some analysts interviewed, the STAREC plan is not yet achieving lasting results, and the military operations may actually be undermining governance and the rule of law.

On the country’s South-Western border, the DRC and Angola have carried out violent expulsions of each other’s nationals, with refugees from both claiming they have been “forcibly expelled and subjected to degrading treatment, including torture and over 1,357 confirmed cases of sexual assault”. Officially, the government has taken steps to prevent and halt human rights violations but several reports rate these measures as insufficient at best (Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect 2011). Against
other main donors in the DRC have also reduced their humanitarian funding support, notably Belgium, Spain, the Netherlands and Germany, although additional funding may be allocated to the DRC by donors before the end of this year. This is somewhat compensated by increases in the EC’s funding from US$72 million to US$87 million, as well as increases by the UK, Japan and Canada. To their credit, many donors have continued and strengthened their support to the CERF and the PF, which have grown in size and importance in the DRC. However, CERF allocations have decreased in 2011, with only US$4 million allocated to the DRC, compared to a maximum of US$29 million in 2010 (CERF 2011).

Part of the explanation for the drop in humanitarian funding may be the shifting priorities of donors towards post-conflict and state-building efforts, despite continued large-scale humanitarian needs. Donors also indicated that it was sometimes hard to find solid local or international partners. They are sceptical about high staff turnover in many humanitarian organisations and the associated lack of capacity to deliver. Maintaining the focus on humanitarian issues is a concern for many actors. As noted by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA 2011a), “humanitarian action is at risk of being...”

A slow decline in funding

However, despite strong political commitment to supporting humanitarian actions, since 2009 humanitarian funding to the DRC has been declining, potentially placing at risk many of the positive gains made over the past five years. The 2010 Humanitarian Action Plan (HAP), which appealed for US$827 million in humanitarian aid, was 64% covered, at US$580 million (OCHA 2011b). Nearly half of this was provided by three donors, the US, the EC and the UK. By mid-October, the 2011 HAP had raised slightly over US$481 million, 58.3% of the US$721 million requested (OCHA 2011c). US funding dropped significantly, from US$154 million in 2010 to US$89 million in 2011. Many of the...
the relatively stable West are asking, “whether they should start using arms to receive aid”.

Not all humanitarian actors share the perception that they should assume responsibility for transition and recovery. Some donors and humanitarian organisations see these issues first and foremost as development issues. One respondent stated, for example, that LRRD projects should preferably take place when the state presence is strong or has become consolidated sufficiently to guarantee the sustainability of projects.

As the early recovery cluster lead, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has attempted to integrate early recovery as both a cross-cutting issue and specific theme, but this has yet to be translated into an effective approach in other programmes. Several people interviewed considered the limited donor funding for the early recovery cluster as an indication of the lack of donor interest, or confidence, in incorporating more transitional or development activities into the relatively stable West.

Gaps in support for transition and recovery

In HRI field interviews and a survey on donor practices among humanitarian actors in the country, respondents consistently rated donor governments poorly on questions around their support for prevention, preparedness, capacity building, recovery and linking relief to rehabilitation and development (LRRD). Yet, from the perspective of many respondents interviewed, this is precisely where donors need to ensure flexible bridge funding between humanitarian activities and other non-humanitarian recovery and development programmes in order to avoid gaps in support.

In the words on one respondent, "In certain parts of the country, the situation has started to evolve into a post-conflict scenario, where organisations might initiate development projects," but donor recognition and support for this was difficult to obtain. This was echoed by other interview respondents: “In general, there is a lack of thematic balance by the donors. They support nutrition, but not subsequent food security.” In other instances, there was a sense that donor focus on regions undergoing or emerging from conflicts was at the expense of addressing needs in other parts of the country. For example, according to one respondent, Congolese in

DONORS MUST REINFORCE INTEGRATED APPROACHES TO TRANSITION AND RECOVERY AND ENCOURAGE LOCALLY-OWNED INTERVENTIONS
humanitarian action. At the same time, there is an expectation from many donors and other actors that UNDP must do a better job of defining a more nuanced, longer-term recovery and development strategy with approaches adapted to the different contexts coexisting in the country.

For their part, several donors interviewed cautioned against setting high expectations for humanitarian action: “The HAP cannot make up for years and years of neglect and lack of investments in social infrastructure such as health centres, wells, etc. That must be the objective of development interventions focusing on alleviating poverty in general.” In this respect, many humanitarian donor representatives – similar to some of the humanitarian organisations interviewed – expressed concerns that development and security actors must also take their responsibility in building ties, and that humanitarian funding and activities should not be used as a stop-gap measure to cover longer term needs. However, the practical reality for many humanitarian organisations is that funding options are limited, and few more developmentally-oriented organisations are ready to step in to address transition and recovery needs, so inevitably, they are left to fill the gaps.

A COMMON UNDERSTANDING OF THE GENDER APPROACH AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR HUMANITARIAN ACTION IS STILL NEEDED

Gender is a crucial cross-cutting issue. The high incidence and media profile of gender-based violence in the DRC has led to greater efforts to address gender needs in programming. The implementation of the GenCap gender marker, which assesses the extent to which programmes incorporate gender equality into programme objectives, was piloted in the DRC. Most respondents, especially UN agency staff, indicated that the gender marker had been used successfully in the selection criteria for allocations of the PF. With nearly 37% of PF projects deemed as contributing to gender equality and 2% specifically for addressing SGBV, sufficient donor funding for gender-related programming appears to be available (IASC 2011). Nevertheless, it seems clear from the HRI interviews and survey responses that a common understanding of the gender approach and its implications for humanitarian action is still needed.

Many respondents conceded that the gender marker was a good starting point for raising awareness of the issues, but felt that the gender approach was not understood correctly by donors and other humanitarian organisations, and called for more policy guidance on gender issues. As an example, ECHO, one of the major donors in the DRC, was criticised because it has still not released a long-announced new policy on gender. Other respondents felt that a more qualitative approach based on an in-depth analysis of the field context was needed: “The gender marker is about minimal requirements. It’s not about making a qualitative analysis of the real situation,” said one respondent. Other respondents criticised donor-imposed quotas for women staff and participation in programming: “They demand quotas despite the difficulty of finding qualified women in the province. They want quotas for women’s participation despite the great workloads that women already have.”

Underlying all this was the sense by several people interviewed, particularly international non-governmental organisations (INGOs), that too many actors, donors and humanitarian agencies alike, still missed the basic point that a gender-sensitive analysis is not just about programming specifically targeting women and girls, but of ensuring programming is sensitive and appropriate to the needs of all different actors. “It is about the quality of aid,” said one interviewee. This point was reinforced in a recent World Health
Organisation report on SGBV in the DRC, which notes that the needs of men and boys, many of whom are themselves victims of rape and sexual assault, are often overlooked when dealing with issues of SGBV: “Certain donors have myopia about helping only women. We visited a programme where a donor had prioritised handing out sexually transmitted infection (STI) treatment to conflict rape survivors. So, the husbands couldn’t get STI treatment, which is clearly counterproductive because you’re just allowing the STI to be passed back and forth between partners,” (IRIN 2011). Finally, humanitarian gender initiatives can benefit considerably from action by development and security actors to achieve better protection, better education, democratic representation, and equal economic opportunities for women.

**Looking forward: An agenda for donors**

Regardless of whether the situation in the DRC is classified as a humanitarian emergency, a transition situation, post-conflict or development context, the country illustrates the difficulties of finding ways to simultaneously meet humanitarian, development, security and protection needs. The relationships among different actors remain a conundrum. No actor has a complete overview. So it would be a huge achievement if activities within and among these three areas would be coordinated. Given that state and civil society in the DRC are at best only very slowly and haphazardly recovering from decades of decline, insecurity, and corruption, it is simply not clear whether and in which ways international actors can ensure such mutual coordination.

One place to start would be greater coherence and coordination within donor governments on the different initiatives they fund and support and to show how they are working towards addressing immediate needs while working towards building the capacity and resilience of the Congolese people. Here, the positive experience of the GHD group in the DRC could be consolidated and expanded so that it does not simply look at strictly humanitarian issues, but also considers where and when the context may require more support for transition and recovery, and facilitate the appropriate linkages with development funding and actors.

Donor support for more flexible and long-term funding arrangements would also be a positive move. One suggestion is to build on the experience of the CERF and the PF, and consider whether donors could contribute to a similar mechanism specifically targeting activities that may fall between the boundaries of humanitarian and development funding, yet are essential to bridge gaps in needs. Longer term funding arrangements would also help address the high turnover of staff in smaller NGOs, and ensure continuity of programming and cluster coordination.

A second area where donor governments could contribute is on improving monitoring, evaluation and measuring impact of interventions. Within the wider donor community, there is great concern on showing value for money, and the DRC is no exception, especially considering the massive funding provided there. It is not yet possible to fully explain or measure the impact of years of humanitarian assistance for the Congolese population in crisis areas. As one respondent asked, “Are we really assisting those people in terms of potable water, rape prevention, preventing child recruitment, etc.?''

The HAP is a valuable stepping stone towards better evaluation and impact assessment because it focuses on general objectives over individual project outputs. Nevertheless, both donors and humanitarian organisations still focus more on outputs than on outcomes, and any support by donors to change this dynamic would be welcome. This should include support to OCHA to continue to develop and implement a more robust impact assessment framework for humanitarian actions. However, if such a framework does not adequately assess and integrate the impact of interventions in other areas, such as more development-oriented governance, community capacity building, conflict prevention, or preparedness activities, the exercise will miss an opportunity to show how donors’ overall funding to the DRC is being leveraged effectively.
would also serve to rationalise the use of resources by showing how funding in one area complements and enhances funding provided in another.

On a more practical level, donors could work more closely together and with their operational partners to monitor the context at the field level. This is particularly the case of gender, where donors could go beyond the gender marker exercise to consider funding allocations based on how well gender is integrated into plans, and then follow-up with more field-level verification of how their partners are addressing gender in practice – which is hardly the case today in the DRC – and how donors could contribute to improving their partners’ work.

While larger donors like the US, ECHO and the UK have more capacity to monitor the situation – certainly appreciated by most actors interviewed – smaller donors have more difficulties in adequately monitoring and following up with their partners. Joint monitoring and evaluation would reduce the amount of reporting and field visits. Another possibility is to divide tasks so that some donors take the lead on coordinating approaches to specific issues such as transition, recovery or LRRD.

Regardless of whether the DRC stabilises further following the elections – and this is not at all clear – donors must reinforce more integrated approaches to transition and recovery, and in particular encourage locally-owned interventions. In the meantime, they must continue to push for better access and protection to affected populations, and be ready to ensure rapid and flexible support for more transitional activities when and if the situation permits.

INFORMATION BASED ON 62 FIELD INTERVIEWS WITH KEY HUMANITARIAN ACTORS IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO (KINSHASA AND GOMA) FROM 6 TO 14 APRIL 2011, AND 189 QUESTIONNAIRES ON DONOR PERFORMANCE (INCLUDING 126 QUESTIONNAIRES OF OECD/DAC DONORS). THE HRI TEAM WAS COMPOSED OF COVADONGA CANTELI, BELÉN DÍAZ, DENNIS DIJKZEUL (TEAM LEADER) AND ALBA MARCELLÁN. THEY EXPRESS THEIR GRATITUDE TO ALL THOSE INTERVIEWED IN THE DRC.
NOTES

1 The FARDC is an amalgamation of the state’s original armed forces with various demobilized armed rebel groups and militias, poorly trained, insufficiently funded and often not under clear central command.

REFERENCES


On January 12th a devastating earthquake struck Haiti, one of the poorest countries in the world, wracked by chronic poverty, weak infrastructures and governance, and subject to frequent disasters. The earthquake causing massive destruction of the capital Port-au-Prince and surrounding areas. Between 70,000 to 230,000 people were killed, millions were left without homes or shelter. Two subsequent cholera epidemics added to Haitians’ misery.

The earthquake mobilised a massive international response, triggered partly by the close proximity to the United States and Canada and high media attention. Billions of dollars of aid were pledged to help Haiti recover and build back better. Hundreds of new, inexperienced donors and organisations flooded the country, causing huge challenges in coordination.

Initial relief efforts were partially successful, but hampered by a lack of experience among humanitarian organisations to deal with major disasters in urban setting, poor planning and coordination, and a lack of integration with Haitian authorities and civil society organisations.

Two years after the disaster, long-term recovery efforts are still inadequate. Hundreds of thousands of Haitians still live in temporary shelters, and the country is ill-prepared to face future crises.
Western donor governments pledged massive amounts of aid to Haiti, but much of that aid has still not been delivered, raising questions about donor accountability and transparency.

The crisis also saw the emergence of new, non-traditional donors, such as Brazil, Venezuela and Cuba, the “Red Cross/Red Crescent”, NGOs and private sector donations, supplanting the role and importance of traditional donors to a certain extent, but also increasing coordination challenges.

Many of the lessons from previous major disasters were not applied. Donors should have done more to ensure Haitian authorities and civil society organisations were better integrated into the response and recovery.

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**DONOR PERFORMANCE**

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On January 12, 2010, a massive earthquake devastated much of Port-au-Prince and Haiti. The earthquake struck one of the poorest countries in the world, highly vulnerable to natural disasters, and with a long legacy of poor governance and weak institutions. Unlike previous disasters, such as four back-to-back hurricanes in 2008, the international community responded quickly and generously to the earthquake. Governmental and private donors offered US$4 billion of aid to Haiti, promising to build back better. Two years later, however, Haiti is as poor today as before and not sufficiently prepared should another major disaster occur.

The Haitian earthquake and the cholera epidemics that followed highlighted the inadequacy of the international humanitarian system to respond to disasters in large, urban settings. Many of the lessons from other major disasters, such as Hurricane Mitch in 1998, were not considered or applied in the response. More than anything, though, the earthquake and the response exposed the failure of the international community to help Haiti build preparedness capacity to face disasters, or link emergency relief efforts to a long-term recovery strategy that reduce vulnerability and strengthen the resilience of the Haitian people.

OVERVIEW OF THE CRISIS

The earthquake – which hit just southwest of the capital city, Port-au-Prince, killed between 70,000 and 230,000 people, depending on the source (Grunewald 2010). The earthquake’s extraordinary lethality and destructiveness resulted from Haiti’s failure to enforce even minimal building standards, itself a reflection of government neglect and corruption. Almost all of the deaths were due to immediate crushing and suffocation from construction collapse. In addition, thousands of Haitians required immediate, life-saving amputations, with many more performed over the months that followed. These amputees and thousands of others required psychosocial support (Kelly 2010; Handicap International 2010).

Since January 2010, the challenge of massive homelessness and displacement has declined from 2.3 million persons to around 500,000 today, although no distinction was made between those affected by the earthquake and those who were homeless prior to the earthquake (Davidson 2011). Concerns remain about the potential for gender-based violence in approximately 750 camps that still exist. By the end of 2011, reports indicated that incidence of rapes increased several-fold in some Port-au-Prince camps. An early survey found that in the weeks after the earthquake, 11,000 people were sexually assaulted and 8,000 physically assaulted in Port-au-Prince. Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) repeatedly appealed to donors to focus on gender-based violence, including transactional sex workers (Kolbe 2010; Center for Human Rights and Global Justice 2011). Meanwhile, Haiti continues to have the highest maternal mortality in western hemisphere. Furthermore, rising food prices have pushed poor Haitians, who already have the lowest per capita income and purchasing power in the Western Hemisphere, to remain dependent on aid.
COMPACTED CRISES: THE SECONDARY DISASTER OF CHOLERA

On top of the earthquake, two waves of cholera epidemic shook the nation beginning from mid-October 2010. Cholera spread quickly during the third quarter of 2010, with an unusually high fatality rate, particularly among the rural poor, who were unfamiliar with the basic treatment: simple, oral rehydration. The epidemic continued to resurge with dramatic increases with each new month until late August to early September 2011. The second wave hit in the second and third quarter of 2011 when donors and aid organisations had become complacent about their success in bringing cholera cases down. By the end of 2011, there were close to 500,000 cases identified, with over 6,500 deaths (OCHA 2012). The cholera epidemics temporarily brought humanitarian organisations together around a common strategy, though cooperation fell apart after only a few months. At the time, there were fears that the epidemic would ravage the population in Port-au-Prince due to the high number of displaced there, between 1 and 2 million people. However, the opposite proved true: there was close to zero mortality in the internally displaced person (IDP) camps, a remarkable testament to the aid community's focused attention on this population and a complete reversal from the patterns of vulnerability seen in almost all other emergencies, where refugees and camp-based populations have exhibited the highest death rates from basic health problems (Tappero 2011). The worst case-fatality rate was not seen in IDP camps, as many feared, but in prisons, where 24% case-fatality was recorded, particularly among male prisoners, partly due to the lack of adequate gender analysis leading to incorrect targeting of women for cholera prevention and treatment. As one interview respondent reflected, "The fact that there is less cholera in camps than in neighbourhoods means that we must have done something right in the earthquake response." Nevertheless, the difficulties of containing the outbreak despite the massive international presence and resources was a source of outrage for many organisations consulted.

THE CHALLENGE: BALANCING INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION WITH BUILDING LOCAL CAPACITY

Aid agencies working in Haiti prior to the earthquake, including development organisations, scaled up their operations, while the earthquake brought a flood of first-time NGOs arrived, and looked to UN cluster meetings for guidance on how to perform as humanitarians. Due to their proximity, dozens of American and Canadian universities and university hospitals responded with volunteer doctors, nurses and logisticians, which proved critical during the early stages when physical trauma needed attention. A great deal of un-coordinated private aid, particularly by unconventional or...
first-time NGOs, was oriented toward medicine, health, and building hospitals. The Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement played a larger role than in any other emergency in recent memory, with numerous large national societies managing camps and building shelters.

The multiplicity of agencies crowding around Port-au-Prince made the need for effective cluster coordination essential; clusters were highly active in the capital, as well as in Leogane and some of the provinces. Cluster meetings in Port-au-Prince tended to be held at the central United Nations logistics base, which facilitated good coordination among the multilateral aid agencies and also proved convenient for international NGOs to meet with the UN. Interestingly, as the cluster system worked well and agencies brought their own funding, OCHA did not play a strong role, and was phased out in 2011.

As an example, according to one respondent, “Coordination was given great importance, especially through the cluster system. Finland distributed aqua-tabs through the wash cluster instead of giving them to a particular agency. It gave them to different organisations in the cluster so they would be distributed in a more efficient manner.”

However, the focus on coordinating international actors came at the price of better engagement and ownership of local actors. After the first few months, however, the UN logistics base system excluded local NGOs: there was no mechanism by which the large number of Haitian NGOs could be identified or contacted, and their participation was physically limited by making their entry difficult to the logistics base and by convening cluster meetings in English. "Donors having meetings in a military base in a humanitarian crisis makes no sense and the fact that they still do it one year and half later is even worse. It hampers participation. Haitians are totally excluded. Many people can’t enter because there are strict controls at the entrance. As Haitians it’s harder for them to get through,” affirmed a respondent interviewed for the Humanitarian Response Index field mission.

"The exclusion of locals from the international coordination system will do little to build capacity and resilience to future crises, especially since individual Haitians and Haitian staff of NGOs played such an important role in the response. Despite the personal suffering and trauma experienced by Haitians, they were the first to respond. NGOs interviewed during field research for the HRI reported that their local staff was extremely effective in the initial response, especially when newly arrived international staff took time to adjust to the situation. In the words of one interview respondent, “it is easy to underestimate the extent of the impact on Haiti. There was no functioning government, up to 20% of government and service providers died in the earthquake, others just left. Everybody knows somebody that died, people were traumatised. Our 70 national staff were totally traumatised, and, still, they performed better than NGOs and UN staff that came in later and had to set out.” Nevertheless, throughout the entire relief and recovery responses, Haitian civil society was largely marginalised and kept out of sight by the donors and the Haitian government."
Camps and shelters were unusually well coordinated by the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) and the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), which established an unprecedented database to track the hundreds of camps early in the crisis and worked both as an implementer and liaison to donors on behalf of the shelter cluster. Throughout early 2010, the donors drove their agenda on high standards for quality shelters – using the refrain “building back better” (MacDonald 2011). No winner was ever declared, and the model home idea quietly lost attention. However, as an audit by the US Office of Inspector General of USAID’s shelter programme concludes there was inadequate monitoring of application of quality standards in temporary shelters, leading to huge differences in quality and costs (US Office of the Inspector General 2011).

One year after the earthquake, major delays in the construction of permanent housing, and even transitional shelter continued due in part to property claims and poor or destroyed land title registries, but mostly poor planning and coordination. The Haitian government had a short window of opportunity to declare eminent domain and squandered it, in large part because donors did not provide early and strong support for such a controversial and bold action despite similar problems occurring in past natural disasters. Meanwhile, the vast majority of Haitians displaced by the earthquake were previously renters, not owners, many of whom remain displaced, migratory, squatting, or renting on precarious income. One INGO field staff who had worked in Haiti in the 1980s and 1990s, upon returning to Haiti in 2011 observed: “Things are much worse than they were in the 1990s. Nothing is started for rebuilding.”

There did not seem to be a clear strategy to move from transitional shelters to permanent housing. Few humanitarian NGOs or contractors are adept at resolving deep-rooted land tenure issues, which have complicated reconstruction efforts for decades in other crises. As one respondent explained, “Most of foreseen temporary shelters haven’t been built yet. The approach now, 18 months after the earthquake, should be permanent shelters, but donors still keep on talking about temporary shelter.”

By the end of 2011, few homes had been built and aid agencies realized that donor funding for permanent housing would be limited. One respondent summarised the situation faced by many: “DFID (UK), the US and ECHO were talking about high standards, but they were not willing to pay for them. They wanted to pay only US$1,500, but the criteria they set would have cost US$3,500. The DEC [Disasters Emergency Committee] was the only donor who did fund the proper shelters.” As a result, the reality has been that many transitional shelters being built will serve as permanent homes. Meanwhile, donors and the Haitian government have merely a very short-term view of plans for the residents of the IDP camps.

The IDP return process also became political. In late 2010 and 2011, much of the donors and the government’s efforts were focused on how to get IDPs out of camps that occupy public spaces. The Martelly government (elected in 2011) recommended a process that began with moving IDPs out of six large, visible camps back to sixteen communities of origin, hence the reference to it as the 16/6 plan. Donor governments and UN agencies supported this controversial process, which involved paying IDPs to move, including the cost of their new rent. Many organisations interviewed for the HRI assert that IDPs were not informed of their rights, and note that many IDPs did not receive long-term residence.
estimated at over 40% of reported aid, though the actual figures were likely quite higher (OCHA FTS 2011). Donors came together to create the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission (IHRC), a joint Haitian-international entity created in April 2010 and vested with the goal of creating transparent procedures for how reconstruction funding would flow. The Commission was slow in becoming operational, and several donors intentionally held back most of its pledges for longer-term recovery and development programs. Eighteen months after the earthquake, the US had disbursed less than 14 percent of the US$900 million that were budgeted. Other donors had similarly low disbursement rates.

The UN Secretary General appointed former President Bill Clinton as Special Envoy to Haiti to attempt to bring some order to this chaotic situation. The Office of the Special Envoy (OSE) reported that virtually all the early relief aid right after the earthquake was channelled through international humanitarian agencies, with little to none going towards rebuilding the shattered Haitian government donors, despite donors’ claims that they were there to support the government. The OSE declared that by the end of 2011, the majority of donors had not yet released roughly two-thirds of the funds pledged for 2010/2011 for the earthquake response and recovery, and only 12 percent of international aid was channelled through the government (OSE 2011). This represented a huge missed opportunity to strengthen the Haitian government and local authorities. “It would be less expensive and more efficient to give funding through the government of Haiti instead of the UN and the World Bank,” asserted one HRI interviewee.

Some of the reasons for the delays were that many donors adopted a wait-and-see attitude for the 2011 election results. Many organisations interviewed for the HRI complained that donors allowed too much time to pass because of uncertainties about the elections and subsequent delays by the incoming Martelly administration to select officials for key ministries and clarify new government policies and priorities. With no functional national government for

DONOR RESPONSE

Even prior to the earthquake, Haiti already had one of the largest poverty-oriented aid programs in the world. Haiti received close to US$1.2 billion the year before the earthquake, complemented by an equally large value of private remittances, largely from Canada and the United States (Fagen 2006). The country also had received international support for the response to crises in the recent past, and was host to a UN peacekeeping force. In other words, there were significant financial and technical resources in the country at the time of the earthquake. The massive destruction caused by the earthquake inspired a flood of publicity and donor support from government and private sources. However, the initial wave of enthusiasm waned under the constant pressure of added challenges that continued to ravage the country, not least the difficulties of a smooth transition to recovery when many state institutions were in shambles.

As with so many high-visibility disasters, donor governments committed millions to support immediate relief and recovery efforts, but pledges were slow to be fulfilled, and were in many cases not reported transparently, making it difficult to monitor. Tracking aid flows was even more complicated by the huge number of private donors,
Donor governments almost universally claimed that they were committed to integrating disaster risk reduction into recovery and rehabilitation efforts as part of the mantra of building back better. Yet few donors followed through to ask implementing agencies how this was being achieved. “Disaster risk reduction is a trendy issue here in Haiti,” reported one HRI interviewee, “It’s in style.” Disaster risk reduction efforts have been oriented toward recurring floods and their associated mortality during rainy and hurricane seasons. However, an example of how limited disaster risk reduction efforts were the struggle to retrofit IDP camps to become resilient to the types of storms that killed many in the past, rather than integrating from the start in the selection of sites, materials and awareness-raising activities around prevention and preparedness. As a result of this poor planning by aid organisations, and poor follow-up by donors, more than 10,000 people were displaced from the flooding of a new hurricanes in 2011 (OCHA 2011b).

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In Haiti, donors supported disaster risk reduction with regard to imminent threats of flooding. Ironically, little attention has been given to mitigating the risks associated with future earthquakes. Donors are aware that even after billions have been spent in aid...
to Haiti, the struggling nation is hardly any better prepared to face another disaster like the 2010 earthquake. Unfortunately, Haiti sits on another fault line that runs through the island of Hispaniola. Geologists claim this fault is building pressure for another earthquake, which could potentially bring to light the failures of the aid community to adequately address risk reduction all too soon.

Organisations interviewed reported that support for the transition from relief to early recovery and longer-term development was lacking. Many donors preferred to support the emergency relief phase solely. “Now there is a gap between emergency and rehabilitation,” affirmed one interviewee. “It is very difficult to get funding for Haiti once the emergency has passed. Donors are not interested in funding rehabilitation and reconstruction,” noted another.

This was especially problematic in the second cholera epidemic. The resurgence of cholera in the spring and summer of 2011 became the biggest scandal between NGOs and institutional donors. NGOs vocally criticised the donors for the abrupt termination of cholera funding at a point when the attack rate of cholera was increasing, in the spring and summer of 2011. For example, one interviewee reported, “donors are only willing to pay for cholera for four to five months. Then you have to find more funding. A lot of NGOs are closing cholera units down.”

Donor rationale for cessation of funding was that cholera was not going to disappear and a long-term orientation toward sustainable primary health care was preferred over short-term operations. However, the donors, collectively and individually, offered no guidance to humanitarian organisation on how to fund the ongoing epidemic. Quietly, the US Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and American Red Cross helped contribute some transitional cholera funding.

Gender was not given the attention it deserved. Many donors and humanitarian organisations seemed to consider the needs so overwhelming that there was no time to address gender. According to one interviewee, “Donors do require a gender approach in other projects, but not here. These are humanitarian projects and target entire populations. Big numbers. They aren’t focused on women.” The misunderstanding that gender-sensitive approaches entail programmes focusing solely on women is prevalent among donors and humanitarian organisations alike. “Did cholera equally affect men and women? We haven’t checked. I just can’t recall any disaggregated data,” noted another. Nevertheless, subsequent epidemiological studies did in fact show that the orientation of cholera prevention and treatment was targeted to woman, when it was men who were the most affected (Mazurana et al 2011). This is just one example of how the lack of attention to gender meant that the specific needs of women, men, boys and girls were not sufficiently taken into account in the response and recovery efforts.
The scale of needs resulting from the earthquake also brought a range of non-DAC donors, both governmental and non-governmental. The governments of Venezuela, Brazil and Cuba, and AGIRE (Agenzia Italiana Risposta alle Emergenze), the Disaster Emergency Committee (DEC) of NGOs in the UK, the American Red Cross, and the United States’ Center for Disease Control (CDC) all played significant roles in the response to the crisis, supplanting in fact the role and importance of many traditional OECD/DAC donors.

Brazil was an early and liberal donor to the World Food Program and has been a leader in the UN Peacekeeping mission in Haiti. The governments of Spain, Venezuela, and Cuba had an innovative tripartite aid arrangement where each contributed different components to a program. Cuba and Venezuela had an agreement with Haiti’s Ministre de la Sante Publique et Population to build hospital facilities, but not in consultation with other donors. Venezuela funded Cuba’s doctors, the Cuban Brigades to work in Haiti.

While the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID) was largely inconspicuous in Haiti, DEC was a very visible donor, with an active system to track and evaluation how the substantial donations raised are being spent. One recipient of funding from DEC admired its evolution: “The DEC asked for ongoing, longitudinal reporting from the beginning of its aid: A good way to report. Sometimes they come and double check our progress.” The newer, DEC-like consortium of Italian NGOs, AGIRE, with twelve NGO members, was also prominent in Haiti as a donor and actively evaluated how donations were spent.

The American Red Cross successfully raised funds passively from a new form of funding: massive numbers of SMS messages that triggered automatic donations, encouraged after the earthquake by the White House. In past emergencies, where the American Red Cross sub-granted to other NGOs, it took them many months to get their legal processes

Few donors funded local NGOs, and international NGOs reported that donors were inflexible in allowing Haitian NGOs to be sub-grantees. Spain was an exception, as it required aid programmes to include Haitian counterparts. Canada also had a fund specifically allocated to strengthening the capacity of local NGOs, and was generally seen as particularly timely and flexible. When coupled with the isolation and exclusion of Haitians from key coordination mechanisms, and the focus on donors on the high-level political issues, it is hardly surprising the response has done little to build and strengthen local capacities and resilience.

Respondents noted that for most of the donors, “personal relationships” were important factors for decision-making, rather than public transparency in their procedures. In the case of the US, many partners complained that relationship was lacking, and criticised the US government for being confusing, non-transparent and inward-looking, despite their large presence. “USAID has had a complete bunker mentality. It’s impossible to have any continuity in conversations with them. OFDA had platoons of consultants rotating in and out.” ECHO, on the other hand, received excellent reviews for its engagement throughout the country, technical expertise, and efforts toward capacity building, including workshops for NGOs. Partners of Sweden also noted that they participated in field visits, asked for detailed information and followed up closely on the response. However, according to one respondent from a multilateral agency, “Most European donors are looking for an exit; they don’t want to be here.”
established in order to disburse funds. In Haiti, however, the American Red Cross had evolved, and acted like a flexible donor from the outset, although their processes of decision-making, awards, and long-term strategy were not transparently evident to the agencies seeking their funds, including the broader movement of Red Cross/Red Crescent national societies.

The United States’ CDC, normally important in emergencies for its technical advice, became a major donor in Haiti, re-directing funds allocated through the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEFPAR) programs for HIV/AIDS to cholera control by NGOs. Other donors also re-directed funds nimbly and quickly that had been in the pipeline for earthquake relief.

LESSEEONS LEARNT AND OPPORTUNITIES

The humanitarian response to the Haitian earthquake and its aftermath exposed the sector’s poor capacity and ability to respond to disasters in large, urban populations settings. The sudden and unexpected earthquake and cholera epidemics of 2010 drew the world’s attention, compassion and donations at a scale not seen since the 2004 tsunami. But coordination between donors and private aid agencies was poor, each working off their own individual agendas. Politics also got in the way of focusing on results and impact for the Haitian people. The international community cannot claim that it helped Haiti build back better, and missed an opportunity to redress years of neglect and inattention to the issue of building capacity, resilience and strengthening preparedness for future crises.

The cholera crisis demonstrated the typical strength of donors to provide funding while the crisis was in the news, but similarly demonstrated the weakness of donors to be transparent or communicative about their proposed solutions for the transitional phases. While cholera was killing increasing number of Haitians in the second semester of 2011, donors individually and collectively pulled back without advice other than to encourage integrated health care. The flaw in this expectation was that integrated primary care programmes and referral networks are far from capable of containing the excess deaths that continued to occur due to cholera throughout 2011. The inter-donor committee on health should have given clearer answers earlier on to frontline NGOs. One major health-oriented NGO complained, “The donors don’t have a vision about what needs to be done, and an overall strategy should be their responsibility as donors.”

When and how aid is spent has a powerful magnet effect on the population. In the case of Haiti, the collective aid community sucked hundreds of thousands of people back into the already over-congested capital of Port-au-Prince, an unintended by-product of the many cash-for-work, other employment, and cash distributions that were focused on the area of destruction, not the areas where people had fled. The lack of a coherent strategy was a major impediment according to many interviewees. “There should be an integrated, multi-donor funding approach,” said one. “It could be led by ECHO, since they fund most projects anyway, and the reporting requirements should be the same for all donors. Unified reporting would save us a big work load.” Others commented on the complicated process that stifled innovation, flexibility and risk taking. “Funding mechanisms are not adapted to respond to needs. The process of having an idea, thinking how to implement it, convincing donors it’s a good idea, getting funding for it and actually putting it in place takes too long, and needs change every month here.”

Donor funding to rebuild Haiti largely missed a window of opportunity. Over 700,000 Haitians fled the capital city of Port-au-Prince, where deaths from the earthquake, homelessness and historic violence had been the worst, but then migrated again to Port-au-Prince where donors spent the greatest share of their donations. This practice generated jobs there and not elsewhere in Haiti where economic
development has long stalled. “Donor coordination is poor in general among humanitarian donors, but it’s even poorer between humanitarian and development donors. There’s a great disproportion of budgets between humanitarian and development agencies and that means a great disproportion of political power too,” explained one respondent. This was seen as a major factor impeding a more integrated approach to linking relief to recovery and development.

Most donors preferred to support the response in the capital, where their aid was more visible. “Aid is too focused in Port-au-Prince. They need to give aid to rural areas, otherwise you’ll never end the overpopulation in this city,” reported one interviewee. A notable exception was Denmark. According to another interviewee, “We designed a program that targeted a rural area. DANIDA was ready to fund it. You have to have guts to target an area without rubble here in Haiti.” Other donors should have extended their funding much earlier to regional development poles, such as Cap Haitian, and to rural areas around Hinche, the Northwest, and East.

There was a similar failure of donors to support implementing agencies with regard to the massive backlog of relief supplies held up at ports and in customs. The Haitian government failed to observe basic principles of international disaster laws (IDRL) by requiring NGOs to pay large fees for the import of donated relief supplies. As a result of this rent-seeking behaviour, nearly every NGO interviewed complained that a wide range of donated goods, from medicines to vehicles, were never able to enter Haiti during the timeframes of their projects, and certainly not during the worst periods of early 2010. Donors should have taken these concerns to the government of Haiti just as they have resolved customs issues in innumerable other crises. However, from the perspective of some donors interviewed, it is also important for partner organisations to report these difficulties to their donors, so that they are fully aware of the situation and can act accordingly.

While the crisis highlighted once more the inadequacies of the “traditional” humanitarian system on donors, UN agencies and other actors, the response also signalled what may be the wave of the future. The importance of new governmental and private donors was evident in Haiti, and much more needs to be done to assess their contributions and learn from their successes and failures.

Similarly, new technologies, crowd-sourcing with SMS-messaging, software for extended logistic systems, mapping, and aerial imagery, continue to inspire networking and the sense of rapid evolution of how humanitarian aid can be delivered. Much of what was learned about mass migrations in Haiti came from surveys of mobile phone owners with built-in GPS, by the large Haitian telecom, Digicel. Digicel worked with aid agencies to track displacements in a way that provided greater insight and precision than has ever occurred before in any emergency. Since the earthquake, there has been a wave of attention to the application of information technologies to Haiti and future disasters. Haiti catalyzed a wide community of mappers and information technologists to work together, both supporting the search and rescue effort and in creating unprecedented city maps of Port-au-Prince, through crowd sourcing. New technologies and collaborations clearly provided an exciting model for the future of humanitarian aid, but more work is needed to take advantage of it fully in information-sharing mechanisms.
CONCLUSIONS

In future crisis situations like Haiti, where a government itself loses many staff to the disaster, a major goal should be to restore the technical capacities of the government. Given the long-term recovery needs in Haiti, UN agencies and clusters should have been physically based within government ministries, to expedite their re-building and support their efforts. Instead, much of the international aid community was isolated from their natural counterparts. At the same time, donor governments’ concerns about the national political process essentially meant that many aid efforts came to a virtual standstill, when much more efforts could have been made to channel aid through local authorities and actors, particularly outside of the Port-au-Prince area.

Given the experience from the past, donors should have actively planned and engaged in creating more space for transition, development and humanitarian planning to be integrated into a long term vision that would have focused on building resilience and capacities of the Haitian people, civil society and government authorities. The Haitian NGO Coordination Committee, for example, repeatedly encouraged donors to integrate – achieve better coherence between their development and emergency funding, a message repeated by virtually all respondents interviewed for the HRI. A clearer focus on how donors would support and facilitate a transition from relief to recovery to development and integrate longer term disaster risk reduction into plans was largely missing, and donors could have done much better at working with their Haitian government counterparts to achieve this.

To be fair, the heavy losses of both human and physical resources of the Haitian government were a key challenge, as was the political uncertainties of the electoral process. And there were a multitude of donors and other actors on the scene, making coordination difficult. But amongst the main OECD/DAC donors, much more could have been done to coordinate their own efforts, and to be more transparent and less political about their aid allocations and decision-making processes. The fact that many of the billions of aid promised has still not been delivered and is near impossible to track is scandalous.

While many mistakes have been made, there are still opportunities to set a new course for longer-term recovery and development that will take these concerns into consideration, and focus on living up to the promises made to Haiti that the international community will not abandon them, but work with them to rebuild and renew.

A CLEARER FOCUS ON HOW DONORS WOULD SUPPORT AND FACILITATE A TRANSITION FROM RELIEF TO RECOVERY TO DEVELOPMENT AND INTEGRATE LONGER TERM DISASTER RISK REDUCTION INTO PLANS WAS LARGELY MISSING

INFORMATION BASED ON FIELD INTERVIEWS WITH KEY HUMANITARIAN AGENCIES IN HAITI FROM THE 27TH OF JUNE TO THE 4TH OF JULY, AND 133 QUESTIONNAIRES ON DONOR PERFORMANCE (INCLUDING 93 OECD/DAC DONORS). THE HRI TEAM WAS COMPOSED OF COVADONGA CANTELI, FERNANDO ESPADA, STEVE HANSCH AND ANA ROMERO. THEY EXPRESS THEIR GRATITUDE TO ALL THOSE INTERVIEWED IN HAITI.
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At the time of the Humanitarian Response Index field mission in February 2011, Kenya was home to more than 300,000 refugees and 30,000 internally displaced persons; drought and flooding left 1.6 million people in need of food assistance.

Since then, the situation has deteriorated sharply; the drought now affects 3.5 million people, acute malnutrition levels have risen sharply and the influx of refugees from neighbouring Somalia has overwhelmed capacity in existing refugee camps.

The 2010 Kenya Emergency Humanitarian Response Plan requested US$ 603 million, of which donors covered 65%; however, the agriculture and livestock, protection and education clusters were severely underfunded.

United Nations (UN) agencies received 88 percent of all 2010 humanitarian funding in Kenya, despite a large presence of national and international non-governmental organisations (NGOs).

The first multiyear appeal, the Kenya Emergency Humanitarian Response Plan 2011+ will cover needs in 2011 to 2013, but is under revision given the current drought situation affecting the region.

**THE CRISIS AND THE RESPONSE**

**TOTAL FUNDING TO KENYA IN 2010:**

**US$ 409.9 MILLION**

96% INSIDE THE CAP
Politicisation of aid and government corruption were widely reported as affecting access in assisting those most in need; there is little consensus among donors and humanitarian actors on the best way to address these issues.

Many donors only funded emergency responses, leaving important gaps in support for prevention and preparedness efforts to address chronic vulnerability.

According to many actors, donor support and funding for transitional activities and strengthening organisational capacity are also inadequate.

Donors need to improve monitoring and follow-ups of the humanitarian situation and advocate to ensure current needs are met.

Donors should also consider investing more toward strengthening the capacity of local organisations and ensuring knowledge from the field is appropriately integrated into programmes to reduce vulnerability.
INVEST IN PREVENTION: A RECIPE FOR THE FUTURE

At first glance, Kenya seemed to be a regional success story, with relative stability and the largest GDP in East Africa. In fact, the United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) Human Development Index reports that human development in Kenya has increased by 0.5 percent annually from 1980 to the present, a score consistently higher than the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa, yet still placing Kenya in the low human development category. Nevertheless, thanks to its reputation for stability, Kenya has developed a booming tourism industry and become the regional hub for embassies and UN agencies. Therefore, many were caught by surprise when violence erupted following the 2007 elections, revealing real humanitarian needs that Kenya’s positive macroeconomic figures had obscured. Since 2007, Kenya has become trapped in a cycle of vulnerability aggravated by government corruption, politised aid and a lack of political will from both local authorities and donor governments to respond properly to current needs or build resilience to respond to those of the future.

KENYA HAS BECOME TRAPPED IN A CYCLE OF VULNERABILITY AGGRAVATED BY GOVERNMENT CORRUPTION, POLITICISED AID AND A LACK OF POLITICAL WILL

The crisis

It is difficult to avoid comparing Kenya with its neighbors, such as Somalia, where limited access greatly inhibits humanitarian action. In theory, Kenya should benefit from the multitude of international agencies and donor governments present in Nairobi to be able to respond in a rapid and appropriate manner. However, Kenya does have a lot on its plate. More than 300,000 refugees from Somalia, Sudan, Ethiopia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Burundi live in Kenya. Of the 650,000 people forced to flee their homes as a result of the post-election violence, 30,000 have not yet returned to their homes (IDMC 2010 and OCHA 2011a). The Kenyan government seems to have prioritised 2012 elections and reformed the constitution over growing social issues, such as the problems facing the 50,000 people whose displacement preceded the 2007-2008 violence (IRIN 2011).

Kenya also suffers the consequences of climate change. The Climate Vulnerability Monitor (DARA 2010, p. 230) currently categorises Kenya as highly vulnerable and predicts it may become acutely vulnerable by 2030. Though climate change has received substantial attention in Kenya, efforts to address the underlying causes of cyclical humanitarian crises have, ironically, failed to materialise. Home to pastoralist communities who relocate in search of water and pasture for livestock, the arid and semi-arid North and Northeastern regions are among the poorest in Kenya. Historically, they have not received the attention they deserve from Nairobi, which some attribute to their lack of political influence. Drought in these regions and flooding in the Rift Valley left 1.6 million people in need of food assistance in 2010, including 242,000 children under five with moderate acute malnutrition and 39,000 with severe acute malnutrition, according to the humanitarian appeal (OCHA 2010).

THE RESPONSE

The 2010 humanitarian appeal for Kenya was the fourth largest in Africa and among the largest globally, calling for US$ 603 million to respond to the crises. The funding requirements for the multi-sector assistance for refugees, food aid and nutrition clusters were the highest, and donors covered more than 66 percent of these needs.
On the other hand, the agriculture and livestock, protection and education clusters were severely underfunded, each receiving less than 30 percent of the respective requirements. In particular, this limited funding for agriculture and livestock threatens the ability of North and Northeastern Kenya to recover from the current crisis and help prevent future crises. According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs’ (OCHA) Financial Tracking Service (2011b), donors covered 60 percent of the total requirements with 37 percent coming from carry-over from previous years. The United States provided the majority of the remaining amount (30 percent) followed by the European Commission (20 percent), Spain (11 percent), the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) and Japan (both with eight percent). Other donors who supported the humanitarian appeal each contributed three percent or less. The World Food Programme (WFP) received the most funding, followed by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) and the World Health Organisation (WHO). In fact, United Nations agencies received 88 percent of all funding to Kenya in 2010 (OCHA 2011b).

**DONOR PERFORMANCE**

Despite the clear need for investment in prevention, preparedness and local capacity, donors are reluctant to fund activities they consider beyond the boundaries of emergency response. The Humanitarian Response Index (HRI) team interviewed humanitarian organisations on donors’ application of the Principles of Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) in their support to the crises in Kenya. In the field survey, team members asked senior humanitarian staff to score their donors—governments, private foundations, pooled funds, UN agencies or NGOs acting as donors—on a series of issues related to the quality of their aid. Survey questions on donor support for prevention, preparedness, transitional funding, and organisational capacity and contingency planning received some of the lowest scores. “They say their mandate is only emergency. This is our biggest challenge with our donors,” explained one interviewee, expressing a concern echoed by many. In fact, some organisations, fearing donors simply were not reliable for funding anything beyond emergencies, reported that the longer term funding commitment required by refugees precluded working with them. This is highly concerning in Kenya, as it is precisely the “humanitarian +” areas that are most in need of support to break the cycle of vulnerability.

**Transitional activities**

Donor support for transitional activities needs major improvement, according to humanitarian organisations. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development / Development Assistance Committee (OECD/DAC) donors and
UN agencies were equally weak in this area. “Our donors could do more. Recovery is not funded,” asserted an interviewee. “We tried to propose something for early recovery but our donors were not interested,” reported another. To interrupt the cycle of emergencies affecting Kenya, however, donors must ensure proper transition from humanitarian assistance. The Kenya Emergency Humanitarian Response Plan 2011+1 is an important step in the right direction. The first appeal to cover multi-year funding, it addresses both emergency and longer-term needs. However, ensuring these needs are met requires a follow-up, as weak monitoring has already produced problems in the current response.

**Prevention and preparedness**

Prevention and preparedness interventions are consistently underfunded, perhaps because they rarely capture the media spotlight. Yet numerous studies have found that investing in prevention and preparedness would actually cost donors significantly less money than emergency response.2 “All donors prefer visibility, so they find humanitarian programmes more showy for domestic constituency. It is a grave fault that there is so little investment in disaster preparedness in a region of recurrent drought,” maintained an interviewee.

Humanitarian organisations rated UN agencies slightly lower than OECD/DAC donors for supporting conflict and disaster prevention, preparedness and risk reduction. “We have to beg them,” remarked one respondent with frustration. UN agencies’ obligation to follow the requirements of their own donors does, however, affect the support they provide to NGOs. While most OECD/DAC donors received low scores for these issues, the European Commission placed relatively higher. Respondents reported that it requests that partners incorporate prevention, preparedness and risk reduction measures in funding proposals and subsequent reporting.

**Organisational capacity and contingency planning**

Though organisational capacity and contingency planning are fundamental to preventing and responding to crises in a better way, humanitarian organisations find securing donor support for this highly challenging. Under pressure for greater efficiency from domestic taxpayers, some donors are increasingly concerned about the amount of funding that directly reaches each beneficiary. While interviewees understood the need for increased efficiency, they reiterated their frustration over donor hesitance to support other essentials such as training and emergency stocks.
UN agencies were reported to perform significantly worse than OECD/DAC donors in this regard. NGO survey respondents repeated that UN agencies treated them merely as service providers, instead of partners. “If there were a zero for this question, they should get it!” exclaimed an interviewee commenting on his organisation’s relationship with a UN agency. While some agencies are reducing overhead allowance, others are reported to have eliminated it completely and pay only upon project completion. Clearly, this system does not allow NGOs to build their capacity for response. Of the OECD/DAC donors, Sweden received the highest score, followed by Germany and the European Commission. The United Kingdom and the United States both scored below the OECD/DAC average for this survey question, although some interviewees reported that the United States actively supported their contingency planning for the possible influx of Sudanese refugees due to the January 2011 referendum.

**Building local capacity**

Donor failure to invest in organisational capacity is problematic for international NGOs, yet greater still for local NGOs - the last in the chain of funding. The difficulty international NGOs encounter in obtaining donor support of this kind also has direct repercussions for the capacity of subcontracted local NGOs, which find themselves with limited budgets and minimal opportunities to influence project design and implementation. In fact, according to a representative of a local NGO, “international approaches are often misguided, as they are not fully aware of the reality on the ground.” Although some donors make an effort to build the capacity of the government, they frequently neglect local NGOs. “None of our donors really want us to work with local partners. They see it as a risk. There is a certain fear of working with local NGOs,” reported a representative of an international NGO. Legitimate or not, this donor lack of confidence prevents many from directly funding local NGOs. One interviewee summed up the problem in the following way: “Donors want local NGOs to have more capacity before they fund them, but if donors don’t fund them, they can’t build their capacity.” The Emergency Response Fund, a locally-managed pooled fund intended to provide emergency funding to NGOs, could be used for exactly this purpose. However, several interviewees reported that the funding requirements are especially burdensome and that local NGOs need support to access this funding.

Many interviewees highlighted that building the capacity of local communities and local authorities still requires attention. Overall, humanitarian organisations considered UN agencies to perform significantly worse than OECD/DAC donors. However, there are mixed opinions regarding the way donor governments and humanitarian organisations work with local authorities. In fact, due to corruption within the Kenyan government, some donor governments like the United Kingdom have cut off all bilateral funding (DFID 2011). Some interviewees opposed local politicians’ selection of aid beneficiaries based on political ties. “Don’t leave it to politicians to decide who gets food,” stated a survey respondent. Several interviewees reported that the interference of local politics in aid decision-making sometimes prevents food aid from reaching those most in need. By
Shortsighted emergency responses will do little to end Kenya’s chronic crises. To compensate for tightened budgets in the current economic environment, tax dollars must be stretched to ensure maximum efficiency. To accomplish this, donors should ensure that their funding decisions are in line with actual needs and subsequently monitor their implementation. They would also do well to invest sufficiently in prevention, preparedness, local capacity and transitional activities so that local communities are more resilient to the risks they face today and those that climate change poses in the longer term.

The situation in Kenya has deteriorated substantially since the time of DARA’s field research in February 2011, yet the arguments still hold true. Once the current food crisis is eventually surpassed, donors must invest in prevention and preparedness to avoid repeating the same mistakes of the past.

INVESTMENT IN PREVENTION AND LONG-TERM STRATEGIES

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INFORMATION BASED ON FIELD INTERVIEWS WITH KEY HUMANITARIAN AGENCIES IN KENYA FROM 20 TO 25 FEBRUARY, AND 158 QUESTIONNAIRES ON DONOR PERFORMANCE (INCLUDING 103 OECD/DAC DONORS). THE HRI TEAM WAS COMPOSED OF BEATRIZ ASENSIO AND MARYBETH REDHEFFER. THEY EXPRESS THEIR GRATITUDE TO ALL THOSE INTERVIEWED IN KENYA.

2 According to the World Bank (2009), “One dollar invested in prevention saves seven dollars spent to remediate hazard effects.”

3 Kenya ranked 154th out of 178 countries in Transparency International’s 2010 Corruption Perception Index.
The easing of the blockade of Gaza in 2010 brought limited improvements in the lives of the population, as they continue to depend on foreign aid and smuggled goods. Poverty in the West Bank has quadrupled since 1999.

Restrictions on movement of people and goods for humanitarian organisations and Palestinians as well as the no-contact policy enforced by many donors make the occupied Palestinian territories (oPt) a difficult and expensive operating environment.

At mid-year, the United Nations (UN) Consolidated Appeal (CAP) for 2010 was reduced to US$603.4 million. Donors provided US$276.3 million (55 percent of the requirements) in new funding to projects within the CAP and US$73 million to projects outside the CAP (OCHA FTS 2011). The United States (US) continued to be the largest donor, followed by the European Commission.

The response to cluster needs was uneven, with priority to food security and limited support to agencies for their cluster leadership roles. The nearly full blockade of construction materials to Gaza prevented most 2009 pledges for reconstruction from materialising.
DONOR PERFORMANCE AND AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT

- Humanitarian organisations complained of donor passiveness in advocating for access and their acceptance of additional operational costs.

- At a time when many donor governments are looking to maximise the results and value of their money spent, the situation in oPt shows just how far the response is from achieving efficiency, much less impact.

- A number of key donors’ application of anti-terrorism legislation continues to threaten the impartiality and independence of aid based on needs.

- Some donors, like the European Commission’s Humanitarian Office (ECHO), Austria and Canada, did stand out for their commitment to gender needs. Other donors seemed satisfied to see gender mentioned in proposals, but did little to prioritise implementation.

- Although donors agree that humanitarian assistance should make links to recovery and rebuilding livelihoods, they continue to provide only short-term funding.

- Donors must continue to deploy all of their means by insisting that all parties work together to create an environment conducive to unconditional peace and stability.
FEW IMPROVEMENTS, FAILING HOPES

The humanitarian crisis in the occupied Palestinian territories (oPt) continues unabatedly, with little sign of progress in the Palestinian peace process and lack of visible improvement in the daily lives of the Palestinian population trapped in the conflict. Field research conducted in early 2011 as part of the Humanitarian Response Index (HRI) found many of the same issues raised in previous HRI reports, revealing a highly politicised crisis with a response characterised by limited respect for humanitarian principles, severe restrictions on access to affected populations, incoherent donor approaches and an excessive focus on short-term needs. If anything, the operating environment has become even more complicated for humanitarian agencies in the last year, underlining the need for donor governments to revise their approaches to be principled and needs-based, while reinforcing efforts to find solutions to this politically-driven crisis.

THE CRISIS

The Israeli government’s decision to ease the blockade of Gaza in June 2010, eighteen months after Operation Cast Lead, has brought only limited improvements in the lives of the population. Gazans continue to depend almost entirely on foreign aid and goods smuggled through tunnels. With one of the highest unemployment rates in the world, at 45 percent of the population, only one in five Gazan households can be considered food secure (WFP, FAO and PCBS 2011, p.8), and housing needs as well as access to basic services, such as healthcare, remain largely unmet. Abject poverty in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, has quadrupled since 1999, and food insecurity has reached 79 percent in Area C, an administrative area under complete Israeli control. The Palestinian Authority (PA) and Israel share control over Area B, and the PA fully manages Area A.

Last year saw some improvement in the overall West Bank economy, although this was largely due foreign aid, investment and, to some extent, to the removal of several restrictions on access in urban areas east of the barrier. Nonetheless, in addition to the consequences of forced displacement, severe restrictions on movement and access to social services and labour opportunities continued, particularly affecting those living in the “seam” zones and Area C of the West Bank. Facing frequent harassment, evictions, stop work orders and demolitions, the population of East Jerusalem remains cut off from the rest of the West Bank, causing tremendous psychological stress and suffering.

By mid-year, the United Nations (UN) Consolidated Appeal (CAP) for 2010 was reduced to US$603.4 million. Donors provided US$276.3 million, or 55 percent of the requirements, in new funding to projects within the CAP and US$73 million to projects outside it (OCHA FTS, 2011). The United States continued to be the largest donor, providing 26 percent of the total response to the CAP, followed by the European Commission with 17 percent. Arab donors did not repeat the generosity
shown in response to the 2009 Operation Cast Lead. The nearly full blockade of construction materials to Gaza prevented most 2009 pledges for reconstruction from actually materialising. The response to cluster needs was uneven, with priority to the food security cluster and only limited support to agencies for their cluster leadership roles.

OPERATIONAL CHALLENGES

As reported in the HRI 2010 report on oPt, in this highly politicised environment, humanitarian organisations face a number of difficulties in attempting to provide assistance to all in need. Having to work around the oPt’s physical and bureaucratic fragmentation is a major obstacle to progress, as agencies struggle with movements between physical zones and the bureaucratic procedures they entail. According to a recent survey, 80 to 90 percent of national and 50 percent of international humanitarian workers with delays or denials when seeking permits for travel between Gaza and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem (AIDA, 2011). Many agencies DARA interviewed reported that they have been forced to hire additional staff to deal with these cumbersome and time-consuming administrative procedures.

At a time when many donor governments are looking to maximise the results and value of their money spent on humanitarian assistance, the situation in oPt shows just how far the response is from achieving efficiency, much less impact. As a result of multiple restrictions, delivery of basic humanitarian goods to Gaza, particularly food items, suffers from significant additional costs, estimated to be at least US$4 million per year for the World Food Programme (WFP) and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) combined. More importantly, lack of access prevents vulnerable communities from being reached and urgently needed reconstruction from taking place. Many of the humanitarian organisations interviewed complained of donor passiveness in advocating for access and an apparent willingness to accept these additional operational costs. However, both the implementing agencies and donor representatives interviewed unanimously considered the Israeli blockade and occupation to be the main impediments to achieving a minimally acceptable level of livelihood and human dignity for the Palestinian population. A recently published Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) report on the effects of the barrier additionally supports this view (OCHA, 2011).

To further complicate an already untenable situation, a number of key donors’ application of anti-terrorism legislation continues to threaten the impartiality and independence of aid based on needs. This legislation obliges humanitarian organisations to show that no assistance will benefit Hamas, placing unreasonable costs and administrative and legal burdens on organisations to justify fulfilling basic humanitarian objectives. For example, the European Union (EU) policy of no-contact with Hamas and the UN rule forbidding communication beyond the purely technical level further compromise key humanitarian principles, including those of neutrality and impartiality, which are essential to gain the trust of all parties and access to affected populations. The restrictions put non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in a difficult situation, as they must simultaneously compromise between complying with their own domestic criminal law, international humanitarian law (IHL), Palestinian law and the administrative procedures of Hamas. Several interviewees made reference to the
“criminalisation of humanitarian aid”, and as one interviewee expressed, “identifying Hamas as a terrorist group undermines the whole humanitarian response: creating parallel networks, wasting money, in addition to not using available services and resources.”

**NEEDS-BASED RESPONSES**

The difficulties of access and the no-contact policy with Hamas, along with a highly fluid and shifting context, make properly assessing needs highly challenging. Most humanitarian programme planning is done around cluster-specific needs assessments, using existing standards. Donors are informed of this process and, in some cases, have participated in cluster needs assessments, but the many donors who have only limited humanitarian capacity on the ground must rely on the agencies’ needs assessments without any verification or follow-up. Although some respondents considered this lack of “interference” to be positive, most would clearly welcome wider donor involvement in the process.

Many donors interviewed stated that they link needs assessments to project design. However, feedback from various humanitarian organisations suggests that needs assessments often do not guide funding decisions, which instead are influenced by national strategic priorities, hearsay and rumours. According to one agency, “the political agenda determines everything at the donors’ headquarter level.” There is also concern that incomplete coverage of needs assessments in the buffer zone and restricted areas of Gaza leaves agencies, the UN and donors with an incomplete picture of needs in these areas. A number of donors do undertake regular field visits and base their recommendations for funding on what they observe. Several donors participate in consultations on needs analysis initiatives, which are based on cluster specific assessments, monitoring them indirectly through interaction with the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) and the Humanitarian Donor Group (HDG). Furthermore, a few donors, such as Australia and Canada, require project specific needs assessments to be included in project proposals. Most donors interviewed explained that they analyse the CAP document and submit advice to their capitals, which then forms the basis for financial decisions. Furthermore, the level of delegation at country level for funding decisions ranges considerably among donors; some field delegations have no authority at all, others manage the funding of smaller projects, while others make decisions on funding for projects over US$15 million. The authority at country level to make funding decisions also influences the timelines of funding upon publication of appeals or in case of additional or changed needs.

**DONOR PERFORMANCE ON PROTECTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Field Perception Scores</th>
<th>OECD/DAC average question score 6.15</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Advocacy towards local authorities</td>
<td>5.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding for protection of civilians</td>
<td>4.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advocacy for protection of civilians</td>
<td>4.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilitating safe access and security</td>
<td>6.98</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: DARA

Colours represent OECD/DAC donors’ performance compared to overall average pillar score:
- **Dark**: Good
- **Mid-range**: Could improve

**GENDER ISSUES**

Incorporating gender analysis into needs assessments and funding decisions continues to lag behind in the oPt. According to a survey commissioned by the UN Gender Task Force in Gaza in the aftermath of operation Cast Lead (UN Inter-Agency Task Force, 2010), both men and women were highly concerned about the increasingly high level of domestic violence, aggravated by the
psychological stress and traumatic effects of war, particularly among the displaced population in the southern part of Gaza (Ma’an News Agency, 2011). Yet, despite both increased attention to gender issues and greater awareness of the prevalence of domestic and gender-based violence tied to traumatic stress in Gaza, humanitarian workers need to improve their knowledge and strategies to address the issue.

Preparation of the 2011 CAP involved integrating a gender dimension and analysis in project proposals to improve gender sensitive programming. Under the guidance of a GenCap advisor (One Response, 2011), all CAP projects were assessed on the extent to which gender-sensitivity was integrated and sex-disaggregated evidence was included. CAP projects coded “2a” indicate that gender is mainstreamed, and those coded “2b” specifically target gender issues. To date, donors have directed 74 percent of their funding to 2a and 2b projects (OCHA FTS, 2011). Some agencies urged donors to prioritise funding for CAP 2011 projects with high gender marks. However, obtaining satisfactory access to Sex and Age Disaggregated Data (SADD) appeared to be a major challenge, compounded by the extensive fragmentation of the oPt.

According to many respondents, some donors did stand out for their commitment to gender; ECHO, Austria and Canada all insisted that gender sensitive approaches be clearly described in projects submitted for their support. Other donors, however, seemed satisfied to see gender mentioned in proposals, but did little to monitor or follow up on implementation. In some cases, gender-focused projects met with limited success when implemented. Furthermore, a few donors, including the US, prioritised activities aimed at empowering women through increasing their involvement in the labour market. However, this continues to be a challenge in a country so dependent on foreign assistance, particularly in a time of overall high unemployment and lack of economic options.

Meanwhile, integrating gender into the response presents more pressing problems, especially concerning safety and protection. Many organisations highlighted the importance of ensuring that relief and recovery programming targets the specific needs of affected populations to guarantee the domestic safety of women and children, as well as the public security of men and boys. More attention must also be given to issues disproportionately affecting women, such as displacement by housing demolitions and evictions, especially in East Jerusalem.
A lack of longer-term approaches to addressing needs has created another gap in donor responses. As in many crises, the long-standing nature of the Palestinian conflict means that needs are chronic. Although donors agree that humanitarian assistance should make links to recovery and rebuilding livelihoods, they continue to provide only short-term funding, in part due to the annual CAP process and the perception that the situation is not ready for aid addressing long-lasting needs. Some agencies warned that this goes against the principle of ‘do no harm’.

Many agencies urged donors to change their approach, in particular by providing more flexibility, with less earmarking in funding. Establishing multi-year frameworks could also increase the predictability of their funding, and allow for more sustainable programming that could be adjusted to changes in the conditions affecting needs and the implementation of activities. This would allow for slightly more sustainability in projects and inclusion of more recovery activities. The humanitarian community can also play a role in overcoming short-term planning by extending the CAP programming cycle beyond one year.

With most international attention directed towards Gaza, donors must not abandon the West Bank. The need to hold the Israeli authorities to their obligations as occupying power should not eclipse the need for self-criticism on the Palestinian side. Many acts of violence and retaliation, for example, cannot be blamed on the occupation. International actors should try to engage in constructive dialogue as well by talking to, rather than isolating, the Hamas leadership in order to create a better understanding of mutual concerns and obligations that could help open the door to a resumption of the peace process.

DONOR TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY

In general, donor transparency in sharing information about their funding decisions is rather limited, despite examples of good contact between donors and agencies for countries such as Norway, Sweden and Switzerland. Participation of donors in the clusters ranges from attending meetings to active involvement in consultations on programming and prioritisation. Although most donors do report their contributions to the Financial Tracking Service (FTS) in addition to publishing them on their own websites, this usually happens after the fact. Several agencies mentioned they found out about decisions on funding for their projects only later through the web.

Donors only emphasised the need for projects to include local populations in the design and implementation phases to a highly limited degree. Agencies mentioned that donor requirements for accountability to beneficiaries were quite mixed, and many donors did not specifically require any mention in project proposals of ways in which these would involve local communities in the actual implementation. In addition, because participation is often used as a tool to foster greater accountability (Winters, 2010), true downward accountability is significantly harder to realise as a result of the ‘no-contact’ policy enforced by many donors. As one organisation noted, “local capacity building is difficult due to [vetting] restrictions and the no-contact policy. [However], if an organisation...
The majority of agencies interviewed pointed to the need for donor governments to maintain diplomatic pressure on all parties to find a resolution to the crisis as the most critical issue related to accountability. As one agency put it, “donors need political courage to move from the current band-aid [approach] to state-building- recognising the rootcause being occupation.”

A number of factors –particularly restrictions on movement of people and goods for both Palestinians and humanitarian organisations as well as the no-contact policy enforced by many donors–make the oPt a difficult operating environment. This is particularly true when it comes to being accountable to beneficiaries, allowing them to participate in projects and finding sustainable solutions to address long-term needs. While donors have made progress in several aspects, they must continue to deploy all of their means by insisting that all parties work together to create an environment conducive to unconditional peace and stability. It is in their own interest to allow their many years of support to have an impact and bring a positive end to this long-lasting crisis.
1 Despite the announcement of easing Gaza access, Israel closed the Karni border crossing and promised additional facilities at the Kerem Shalom crossing close to the Egyptian border, which are still under construction. According to field interviews, the cost of transport, storage, handling, additional security checks and arduous “back-to-back” procedures has risen from US$25/mt to US$66/mt.

2 Including SPHERE, the European Commission Humanitarian Aid department’s (ECHO) Global Needs Assessment and the Humanitarian Accountability Partnership’s Standard in Humanitarian Accountability and Quality Management.

REFERENCES


A fifth of Pakistan was flooded in July-September 2010 when unprecedented monsoon downpours created a slow-impact complex emergency as rivers broke their banks the length of the nation. Large areas of Sindh remained under water for months. Coming atop the ongoing caseload of those displaced as a result of campaigns against Islamic militants, Pakistan was faced with the largest internal displacement crisis the world has experienced this century.

Some 20 million people – around one in eight Pakistanis – were affected by the floods, many losing houses and livelihoods and suffering from diarrhoeal and skin diseases due to lack of clean water and sanitation.

The United Nations (UN) appeal was the largest in its history $1.88 billion.

The unprecedented humanitarian response prevented a major food crisis and epidemic outbreak.

Pakistani government and military actors again played a lead response role but were unable to deliver on pledges to provide recovery assistance.

A principled approach and independent needs-based response was often missing due to interference from politicians, landlords or tribal leaders.

There was insufficient commitment to the aid effectiveness agenda, particularly around accountability.
By December 2011 the UN flood appeal was 70 percent funded, including from a range of new donors.

Donors could do more to collectively reaffirm the universality of humanitarian principles and the need for greater accountability and coordination.

Donors should urge the UN to work closely with in-country climate change experts to map at-risk areas and devise preparedness scenarios.

Donors should provide more funding to national non-governmental organisations (NGOs).
LESIONS FROM
THE FLOODS

THE CRISIS

Pakistan is highly vulnerable to earthquakes, avalanches, floods and political conflict. This century it has faced recurrent emergencies characterised by extensive displacement. A major earthquake in 2005 which affected 3.5 million people was followed by military operations against Islamic militants which caused the world’s largest displacement in over a decade – some 4.2 million people were affected, and it is thought 1.5 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) are yet to return.

A fifth of the country was inundated after large areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK), Sindh, Punjab and Balochistan provinces were deluged with severe monsoon downpours from late July 2010. Areas of KPK received ten times the average annual rainfall in the space of a week. Within hours, flash floods started sweeping away villages and roads, leaving local and national government agencies apparently at a loss what to do. For the next four weeks the ensuing floods progressed the length of the Indus river system before reaching the Arabian Sea, 2,000 kilometers downstream. At the height of the inundation, 20 percent of the country was under water. The slow-moving body of water was equal in dimension to the land mass of the United Kingdom. Pakistan’s National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) ranked the floods as the worst natural disaster in the country’s history.

Fewer than two thousand people were killed but some 1.74 million houses (particularly those built of mud) were damaged or destroyed. The floods affected 84 of Pakistan’s 121 districts and more than 20 million people – approximately an eighth of Pakistan’s population. While the death toll was relatively low compared to the other massive natural disaster of 2010 – the Haiti earthquake – the affected area was vastly greater and 13 times as many were displaced. Around 14 million people were in need of immediate humanitarian aid. The number of seriously affected individuals exceeded the combined total of individuals affected by the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, the 2005 Kashmir earthquake and the Haiti earthquake. People already affected by chronic poverty and dependent on feudal landlords were further marginalised as a result of the flood.

The protracted presence of standing water rendered swaths of prime agricultural land uncultivable, led to loss of livelihoods and caused large-scale water-borne and skin diseases. The World Bank and Asian Development Bank assessed the disaster cost at $9.7 billion (5.8% of GDP), including the loss of livestock, fodder, crops and food stores, damage to housing and infrastructure and the impact on education, water and sanitation services. Damage to the world’s largest contiguous irrigation network – already inadequately maintained prior to the floods – is massive.

AFTER THE FLOODS
AROUND 14 MILLION
PEOPLE WERE IN
NEED OF IMMEDIATE
HUMANITARIAN AID

THE RESPONSE

Once again, Pakistanis rallied in support of those affected by disaster on a cripling scale. The local culture of hospitality and charitable impulse meant that millions were housed with relatives for months, significantly reducing the burden on the thousands of camps established with donor funds.
Considerable support was received from Pakistani philanthropists, charitable organisations, the general public and the Pakistani diaspora.

The new crisis came as the federal government was already fighting an insurgency and being criticised for not responding sufficiently to the related internal displacement. At both federal and provincial levels, and within senior military ranks, many state officials had experience working with the international community, either during previous Pakistani crises or international peacekeeping operations. It was thus unsurprising that the government of Pakistan immediately called for United Nations (UN) help.

The international response was relatively quick. On August 11 the UN launched an Initial Floods and Emergency Response Plan (PIFERP) requesting $459 million. In September a revised plan in excess of $2 billion was launched, finally endorsed by the Pakistani government in November 2010. The revised PIFERP was the UN’s largest ever appeal.

The floods captured world attention as 79 donors contributed to the humanitarian response through in-kind and in-cash contributions. As of December 2011, the PIFERP was 70 percent funded. More than $600 million is still needed to support early recovery activities and achieve the objectives set out in the plan.

The US has been the largest PIFERP donor (providing $434 million or 31.5% of the total donated), followed by Japan, the UK, private individuals and organisations, the European Commission, Australia, Canada and the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF). The role of CERF was vital in facilitating the early response: the $40 million mobilised represents the CERF’s largest funding allocation to a disaster. PIFERP donations have been the largest ever humanitarian response for such key donors as the United Kingdom (UK) Department for International Development (DFID), the European Commission and the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (ODFDA).

Some three quarters of funds allocated for the floods have come from countries involved in the war in Afghanistan, a reminder “there is a high level of dependency among international humanitarian actors on institutional donors directly or indirectly involved in conflict and a regional stabilisation strategy” (Péchayre 2011).

A separate UN appeal through the CAP, the Pakistan Humanitarian Response Plan (PHRP), revised in July 2010, sought funding for the support of 2.6 million conflict-affected IDPs in north-west Pakistan. It was overshadowed by the PIFERP. As of December 2011 the PHRP was 50% funded.

Despite the volume of funding for the flood appeal it should be noted that it was relatively lower than other recent emergencies with only $3.2 for every affected person within the first ten days after the appeal, compared to $495 for the 2010 Haiti earthquake and $70 for the 2005 Pakistan Kashmir earthquake (Oxfam 2011).

Pakistan now has several years of experience issuing cash cards to those in need. In response to the floods of 2010 it introduced a debit card (the Watan Card) to each household directly affected by the floods. Over a million cards were issued within three months and by the end of January some 1.48 million. The Inter-Agency Real Time Evaluation (IA-RTE) found that injection of cash had been “instrumental in reactivating local markets” but also that many registered recipients had not received a promised second instalment. In Punjab and Sindh, many affected people have not received the cards, especially women in female-headed households and other vulnerable groups (Polastro et al. 2011).

As with the 2008-2009 displacement crisis, UN advice was ignored as a populist decision was made to load each card with a substantial sum. Despite its promise, the programme was marred with administrative difficulties and corruption. The
With so many homes partially or totally destroyed by the 2010 floods it has not been possible for any agency to meet Sphere Standards on per capita provision of water and latrines. The NDMA targets to provide affected households with a one-room shelter could not be delivered due to funding shortages. The IA-RTE noted that alternative solutions have been implemented – including rebuilding on river banks – without sufficient consideration of future risk. Land rights represent a key constraint for livelihood restoration and permanent residence. Many of those returning home find themselves without land to plant or to build a house. Some landlords have benefitted from a disaster which has removed tenants and squatters more efficaciously than by going to court.

The NDMA was the lead federal actor. It has no legislated authority to control the activities of any other agency such as a Provincial or District Disaster Management Authority (PDMA/ DDMA) yet public perception deemed it to be responsible for everything from planning to implementation. Given the size of their tasks the NDMA and PDMAs were under-resourced. Some UN agencies opted to coordinate through line departments and not through the NDMA, which developed its own early recovery strategies but detached from cluster efforts. The creation of decentralised hubs was welcomed for bringing cluster coordination closer to field level but also meant that provincial government coordination was detached from the international response with PDMAs insufficiently informed about what international actors were doing.

The 2010 flood crisis is continuing for many vulnerable families, particularly the landless. A UK parliamentary committee has argued that the UN response to the flooding was “patchy”. In November 2011, the Pakistani Red Crescent report that 288,031 people still remain in more than 900 camps in Sindh. UNICEF report that 341,000 people – the majority women, children, the elderly and those with disabilities – are still residing in temporary settlements and that water-related and vector-borne diseases are still on the rise 15 months after the floods began.
Agencies were able to start the response almost immediately in KPK due to their ongoing presence related to the IDP crisis. However, there were delays of up to four weeks in responding to needs elsewhere due to the lack of capacity and pre-occupation with the KPK conflict (Murtaza 2011). The UN was slow to establish new humanitarian hubs in Sindh and Punjab.

As millions of people were stranded on isolated strips of land, access was central to the response. The humanitarian response was especially slow in Sindh, Punjab and Balochistan due to extreme logistical constraints and the fact that few humanitarian organisations had any presence prior to the floods. In mid-August, the government issued a waiver of its strict regulation of humanitarian actors for certain parts of KPK to facilitate access and speed up international efforts. However, the most sensitive districts of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) – the collective name for 13 administrative entities most of which abut the Pakistan-Afghanistan border - and much of KPK remained practically no-go areas for international actors due to national security reasons. The government did not allow the UN Humanitarian Air Services (UNHAS) to deploy helicopters in KPK/FATA, where the use of Pakistani aircraft by humanitarians was problematic in terms of the perceptions of the local population (Péchayré 2011).

In Punjab and Sindh humanitarian actors used Pakistani military assets at the onset of the emergency invoking the last resort principle of the Oslo guidelines on the use of military assets in disaster relief. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and Médecins sans Frontières (MSF) were strongly opposed to the use of military assets in delivering assistance or any kind of labelling associating them with donors of the UN. They took this to the point of refusing to be mentioned in UN public reporting such as 3W (who, what, where) listing of humanitarian actors so as to control their public image.

Coordination remains the Achilles heel of the UN reform process. Many of the observations about the cluster system made by previous Humanitarian Response Index (HRI) missions and IA-RTEs remain
valid. The cluster system has been misused to allocate funds, rather than coordinated, and meetings have been time consuming and often unproductive. Some of the same problems with the cluster approach were identified when it was rolled out in Pakistan’s response to the 2005 floods and then when the 2008-2009 conflict recurred (Cosgrave et al. 2010). The IA-RTE of the flood responses concluded that “clusters were operating independently from contextual realities and to a large extent, also to the phases of the operation” (Polastro et al. 2011).

The mission heard of the lack of continuity, how “the UN cluster leaders usually stay only for a maximum of two to three weeks in the country”. Many cluster leaders allegedly did not to have the appropriate qualifications and experience, one informant telling the mission that “no cluster leader should start to work without having had a preceding one week training”. Many meetings were also cumbersome due to the large number of organisations represented. Rather than coordinating, said one informant, “the cluster meetings serve just as information centers”. Some cluster leaders were said to have prioritised their own organisations.

A real-time evaluation conducted for the UK Disasters Emergency Committee noted that pricing was never discussed in clusters, a missed opportunity to promote transparency and competition to improve value for money in early relief interventions (Murtaza 2011). For its part, the federal government has argued that the cluster system needs to be reorganised in order to “achieve greater congruity with relevant tiers of government” (NDMA 2011).

Coordination within the UN family was complicated – as it has been during previous emergencies in Pakistan – by the separate roles played by the UN Special Envoy for Assistance in Pakistan, the Resident Coordinator and the Humanitarian Coordinator. An analyst has noted “the ambiguity the UN apparatus is embedded in... On the one hand, UN agencies belong to the One UN and are therefore expected to support Pakistani institutions. On the other, the UN humanitarian reform gave Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the humanitarian country team (HCT) the responsibility to coordinate the response and in doing so, to uphold principles of neutrality and impartiality. UN officials interviewed have described this as a ‘clash between the two reforms’” (Péchayre 2011).

The mission noted the extent to which donors insisted that their implementing partners coordinate among themselves and with the UN. However, there is also scepticism of donors’ increased emphasis on the creation of alliances
The 2010 floods were probably related to the La Niña phenomenon and can thus be expected to recur. Pakistan’s vulnerability was again apparent as the 2011 monsoon brought well above-average rainfall, resulting in the deaths of some 250 people, further massive displacement and another UN appeal. In a November 2011 statement, four major INGOs warned that nine million people were at risk of disease and malnutrition. The UN Food and Agriculture Organisation lacks resources to support the hundreds of thousands of farming households who lost assets during the disastrous back-to-back floods.

In principle, donors recognise the relevance of prevention, risk reduction and preparedness but do not accord them much priority. Disaster risk reduction (DRR) has been discussed by Pakistani authorities and the UN for several years but there is a gap between theory and practice. The World Bank has warned that some responses have relied too heavily on rebuilding infrastructure and not enough on better adaptation and preparedness in complementary investments, such as water and flood management, cropping pattern adjustment, rural finance, enhancing capacities of water users groups and early warning systems (World Bank 2010). The HRI mission, like the IA-RTE team, noted the broad awareness of the need to ensure that communities are better prepared and that DRR activities are supported. The need to invest seriously in DRR has been highlighted by the government, donors, UN and INGOs. Emergency responses to disasters and consortia, and a perception that consortia can be time consuming and short-lived.

A Pakistani government assessment noted coordination challenges between centre-province, government-UN and inter-agency, reporting that “a lack of effective coordination was also identified by some stakeholders in relation to the UN’s internal strategic decision-making processes, because of differences amongst the top-tier UN leadership in the country” (NDMA 2011).

The fact that Pakistan was almost entirely dependent on outside help to sustain the massive humanitarian response “created”, suggests a Pakistani academic, “an interesting love-hate working relationship between the two parties” (Malik 2010). Some key response decisions were made in ways which were not conducive to working relations. The PDMA reported the UN “overstepped their mandate” as the Humanitarian Coordinator and OCHA advised North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) not to establish an air bridge after the government had invited it (as NATO and other military forces had after the 2005 earthquake) to assist in the transport of relief goods (NDMA 2011). OCHA insisted on having a dozen clusters when the Pakistani government wanted seven (in accordance with NDMA criteria). The separate UN appeal for conflict-displaced persons was launched initially against the will of the government. In Punjab the UN opened a humanitarian hub in Multan, rather than in the provincial capital, Lahore, thus creating a parallel structure and reducing government engagement. The federal government did not routinely allow access to conflict areas also suffering from flooding. The transition between emergency relief to recovery was substantially impacted by the Pakistani government’s insistence that all recovery programmes come under its purview.
The 2010 floods again remind us that whatever the size of a natural disaster, diplomatic skills are essential when there is a strong government and a powerful and engaged military insistent on maintaining sovereignty. A certain degree of pragmatism in dealing both with civilian and military authorities is unavoidable. In Pakistan everything is politicised and in the end, decisions made with a view of short-term electoral popularity and appeasement of key interest groups will prevail over principles of humanitarianism and international humanitarian law. It is thus imperative for humanitarian agencies to invest time interacting with all the various field actors they come across.

**HUMANITARIAN SPACE**

Humanitarian space was often compromised. There were cases where aid mainly reached people that were locally well positioned and/or aligned to political parties. Security arguments were used by government authorities to prevent access for a number of experienced humanitarian actors. In areas such as Balochistan and KPK, where the government or regional actors are party to conflict, military assets should not have been used.

**WHAT COULD DONORS DO?**

It is important for donors to collectively reaffirm the universality of humanitarian principles and to be more active in promoting coordination. This may be the best recipe for efficiently and securely reaching beneficiaries. Many of the key recommendations in previous HRI assessments of responses to disasters in Pakistan remain unheeded. The flood response IA-RTE suggested that in Pakistan, humanitarian actors continue to suffer from “chronic amnesia” by not taking stock of lessons learned from prior evaluations.

- Donors need to understand how existing vulnerabilities – particularly related to land rights and gender discrimination – contribute to the impact of disasters.
- Donors should more generously support disaster preparedness and early recovery programmes.
- Donors need to consider ways to allow Pakistani NGOs to access funds and play a bigger role in crisis response; strengthening their capacity (together with that of provincial and district state agencies) is vital if future responses are to be more demand-driven and accountability measures generally strengthened.

**PARTNERING WITH GOVERNMENTS**

Information based on 22 field interviews with key humanitarian actors in Pakistan from 2 to 6 May 2011, and 121 questionnaires on donor performance (including 96 questionnaires of OECD/DAC donors). The HRI team was composed of Wolf-Dieter Eberwein (team leader), Fernando Espada and Aatika Nagrah. They express their gratitude to all those interviewed in Islamabad.
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Somalia has had one of the longest humanitarian crises in the world, with over two decades of conflict and insecurity. It is a highly politicised, complex crisis that brings together extreme vulnerability, a weak and fragile state, complex internal and regional power struggles and the dynamics of the War on Terror.

There are nearly 1.5 million Somali IDPs (Internally Displaced Persons) and almost 800,000 refugees, mainly in camps in Kenya and Ethiopia.

At the time of the HRI mission in February, many parts of the country were suffering from a long-term drought, with over 2 million people requiring assistance.

By June, despite months of warning signs, the situation deteriorated into a full-scale famine, with an estimated 4 million Somalis in need of urgent assistance.

The radical Islamist group Al-Shabaab has killed, threatened and expelled many humanitarian workers, denying vulnerable populations access to assistance in areas they control.

Conflict and insecurity in many parts of the country force humanitarian agencies to manage operations remotely from Nairobi, making it difficult to accurately assess needs and monitor and follow-up on actions.

The UN appealed in June for a record US$1.5 billion to support famine relief efforts, of which 81% has been covered to date. Since then, good rains in October have eased the situation slightly, but needs persist, and a long-term commitment by donors to build resilience, prevent future famines and resolve the political instability in the country is urgently required.
Prior to the declaration of a famine, only 67% of the appeal had been covered. In 2010, the US made major cuts in funding to Somalia, only partially compensated by increases by Spain and other donors.

Despite the magnitude of the crisis, few donors had dedicated humanitarian advisors in the region, and most decisions were perceived to be unduly influenced by domestic political issues and concerns, not driven by humanitarian needs.

Anti-terrorism legislation from several donor governments was seen by many as undermining the principle of providing aid without discrimination and based on needs alone. This led to a general climate where other donors were reluctant to take risks.

The situation is also complicated by several donor governments’ unconditional support for the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), a party to the conflict and perceived by many as weak and corrupt.

Donors were also criticised for not responding early enough to the warning signs of the famine, and for not providing longer-term funding and support for activities that focus on building resilience, prevention and preparedness.
On July 20th 2011, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon declared that parts of Somalia and neighbouring countries in the Horn of Africa were officially in a state of famine, with over half of the population, some 4 million people, facing starvation unless the international community could mobilise over US$1.5 billion in aid (OCHA 2011a). The response to the famine revealed once again the chronic inability of the humanitarian sector to adequately prepare for, prevent and mitigate what was essentially a completely predictable disaster.

So why did it take so long for the world to react? The constraints and challenges expressed by humanitarian actors at the field level in the months leading up to the famine can help shed light on some of the factors behind the slow and inadequate reaction. In the context of Somalia, politicisation of the crisis, severe constraints on access and protection, and structural limitations of a system geared towards emergency relief, not prevention, all conspired against taking more proactive steps to address the famine early on. What’s more, the famine and the subsequent response has overshadowed and perhaps even reversed many of the small but positive steps made over the past two years by humanitarian actors to improve the quality and effectiveness of humanitarian action in one of the world’s most complicated and long-standing crises.

As previous reports and a recent IASC evaluation highlight, Somalia is a highly politicised, complex crisis that brings together extreme vulnerability, a weak and fragile state, complex internal and regional power struggles and the dynamics of the War on Terror (Hansch 2009, Polastro, et al 2011). The competing interests of many of the different actors—Al-Shabaab, Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government (TFG), governments in neighbouring Kenya and Ethiopia and donor governments—has too often meant that political objectives take precedence over meeting humanitarian needs. In this context, the warning signs of the impending famine may have been disregarded in favour of meeting other priorities.

In addition to instability and conflict, Somalia had been facing the effects of a long-term drought in the region for several years. At the time of the HRI mission in February, for months, all indicators pointed towards a dramatic worsening of the situation. The United States Agency for International Development’s (USAID) Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET) and the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation’s (FAO) Somalia Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit (FSNAU) —tools designed precisely to avoid the reoccurrence of famines of the past—were generating warnings that the situation was critical. According to the FSNAU, over 2.4 million Somalis were in need of humanitarian assistance at the time, with one in four children in Southern Somalia acutely malnourished (OCHA 2011a).

During the mission, on a daily basis, the number of Somalis fleeing to camps in Mogadishu or in neighbouring Kenya and Ethiopia were increasing dramatically, an indicator of the growing scale of the crisis. In a two-month period, the number of drought-
related displaced persons increased by 20,000 (OCHA 2011a). All of the representatives of the United Nations (UN), other aid agencies and donor governments interviewed during the HRI field mission unanimously agreed that a major catastrophe was in the making. Following a visit in early February, the UN Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC) called for urgent action, but to little effect. Clearly, it was not a lack of information that impeded the international community to take early action.

Prior to the famine, there was steady progress towards improving and scaling up the quality and effectiveness of the response to existing needs, showing that despite the difficulties, humanitarian actors were finding ways around the particular challenges posed by Somalia. However, many of these efforts were undermined by the lack of respect and understanding of the critical need to maintain the neutrality, impartiality and independence of aid in Somalia.

Continued problems of protection, access and security were major factors that hampered the ability of aid organisations to reach people in need of aid. Al-Shabaab, a militant Islamist group linked to Al-Qaeda, has the main share of the blame for creating and accentuating the scale of the crisis. Access by humanitarian organisations to many Al-Shabaab controlled areas of South and Central Somalia is extremely limited, with many agencies expelled, humanitarian workers killed or threatened, and others facing unacceptable conditions on access, including payment of obligatory “taxes” on humanitarian goods. Even worse, Al-Shabaab has targeted civilians in the conflict, and restricted movement of populations desperately seeking relief from the drought, effectively holding them hostage to the crisis.

The situation is only somewhat better in Mogadishu and areas nominally controlled by the TFG and African Union peacekeeping forces, ANISOM. Despite significant Western backing, the TFG has failed to deliver on the promise of providing stability and security for the civilian population, has faced widespread charges of corruption and nepotism, and according to many, made minimal efforts at facilitating aid organisations’ access to people in need. Likewise, the ANISOM peace-keeping mission in Somalia has not done enough to provide much needed protection and security for civilians.

In contrast, the security situation is relatively stable in Puntland and Somaliland, allowing many humanitarian organisations opportunities to expand relief programmes to include more emphasis on agricultural and livelihood activities and to work with local organisations and authorities to integrate capacity building in their programming. In this context, most agencies continued to rely on remote control management arrangements, with operations directed from Nairobi but delivered through local Somali organisations.

THE RESPONSE

Despite these operational challenges, at the time of the HRI mission, humanitarian actors were working in a more coordinated and rigorous manner to assess and prioritise needs. In fact, the decrease in funding requested in the 2009 Consolidated Appeal (CAP), from over US$850 million to just under US$600 million in 2010, is partially explained by more accurate and reliable information about the extent of needs. Nevertheless, funding was still only 67% of the stated needs, and substantial cuts in the US’ level of aid to Somalia, mainly due to concerns about aid diversion to Al-Shabaab, was only partially compensated by a large carry-over from 2009 and a major increase in funding from Spain and other donors (OCHA 2010a).

With over US$61 million mobilised, the Common Humanitarian Fund (CHF) and Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) pooled funds became important sources of funding to agencies, and were used to help scale up activities in the areas of water, sanitation, nutrition and health, and to a lesser extent, agriculture and livelihoods programmes (OCHA 2010b). The CHF was well-supported by donors, and generally worked well in offering a rapid, locally managed response.
to covering gaps in needs, according to most interviewees. There were, however, complaints from some non-governmental organisations (NGOs) that the funds were too focused on emergency relief, rather than prevention, transition and recovery activities. Some organisations interviewed felt donors were using the pooled funds as a way to circumvent the complicated aid politics of Somalia and transfer risks to the UN: “Pooled funding is now becoming an easier option for donors to shed their responsibilities to engage with more demanding partners like international NGOs, or confront the issues” according to one respondent. “Donors are risk adverse, and are therefore using pooled funds, but it doesn’t necessarily mean better accountability,” said another.

Many NGOs and some UN agencies seemed to be making progress in engaging local Somali actors in the design, management and implementation of programmes, especially in Puntland and Somaliland. As an example, many OCHA reports and other documentation on the response are available in Somali, a sign of increasing transparency and engagement with local actors (OCHA 2011). Given international actors’ near absolute dependency on Somali organisations to deliver aid, this was seen as an important step towards improving the response.

At the time, there was a slow but deliberate shift by the UN in the security paradigm, which previously focused on determining “when do we leave” to a more nuanced stance on “how can we stay”. More heads of UN agencies and international NGOs were making field monitoring visits, which in turn produced better information about needs, and at the same time sent a positive message to other actors, including Somalis, about the UN’s engagement with the crisis and attempt to move away from the remote control management model.

This was combined with a growing recognition that Al-Shabaab was not a monolithic organisation, but was often fragmented, allowing for some tentative, cautious steps towards engagement with local chiefs to negotiate access based on humanitarian principles. At the same time, many actors interviewed expressed serious reservations about the TFG’s legitimacy and its ability to engage positively with the international community on humanitarian issues, and were looking at alternative means to engage with local authorities on programming issues.

**HUMANITARIAN ACTORS WORK IN A MORE COORDINATED AND RIGOROUS MANNER TO ASSESS AND PRIORITISE NEEDS**

Despite these positive efforts, nearly every organisation interviewed stressed that donor politics were compromising the ability of humanitarian agencies to respond to the crisis. Many respondents felt donors mixed security and political agendas were compromising a needs-based approach. Respondents distinguished
between donor regional representatives, who were generally viewed positively, versus representatives at the capital level. “In the case of Somalia, it is a case of different levels of awfulness from donors,” exclaimed one respondent. “The dual or triple track approach, where donors are trying to support the TFG, combat terrorism, achieve stability and meet needs, is not working at all.” Another respondent stated that “donors are not very principled. They have focused excessively on Al-Shabaab and they are not driven by responding to needs.”

Donor capacity was a concern for many respondents. Despite the magnitude of the crisis, few donors had dedicated humanitarian advisors. Most donor government representatives, such as Sweden, also covered development portfolios, and many had additional responsibilities for covering several countries in the region. The UK had a regional humanitarian advisor but the post was vacant for a year, leading to delays in programme decisions, according to some respondents. Italy had a project office to specifically support humanitarian action, but the office was shutdown a few months following the HRI mission. Spain, one the largest donors to Somalia in 2010, had no dedicated humanitarian resources in the field. Nevertheless, an informal humanitarian donor support group provided an important forum to discuss issues and share information, and regular briefings were held between donors and the Humanitarian Coordinator. Additionally, donors were also engaged in the CHF in an advisory role and with other coordination mechanisms.

For many respondents, the real issue was that critical decisions were too often taken at the capital level without an understanding of the complexities of Somalia. There was a strong sense of frustration that government donors’ domestic political priorities were getting in the way of humanitarian issues, leading to “mixed signals and little clarity.” One respondent summed up the widespread sentiment: “Donors pay lip service to humanitarian principles, but are beholden to the decisions of their capitals and driven by domestic political agendas.”

Despite a good dialogue at the field level, the US government’s stance was a major concern for many actors. “The US is the worst example of politicisation of aid and has a schizophrenic approach to Somalia,” stated one NGO respondent. US anti-terrorism legislation, in particular, the regulations from the US government’s Office for Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), imposed severe restrictions on aid agencies trying to work in areas controlled by Al-Shabaab, undermining the principle that aid is provided impartially and without discrimination. While US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and USAID officials subsequently attempted to reassure aid organisations that there would be special exemptions from the OFAC regulations, there was widespread fear that aid agencies and staff could be legally liable for any aid diverted to Al-Shabaab: “You could go to jail! How is it possible to know and control every exact detail about every operation?” exclaimed one respondent.

The US position appeared to be having perverse spin-off effects with other donors. Canada was mentioned by some interviewees as a negative example of following the US’ lead: “Canada has not been neutral, and humanitarian aid funding is heavily conditioned by imposing strict no-engagement rules regarding Al-Shabaab,” remarked one respondent. Other donors were accused of being overly cautious and risk averse, in part for fear that they too might be liable for legal actions, according to some respondents. As one agency representative put it, “at least the US is very clear and explicit in its policy. The rest of donors are ambiguous with regards to Al-Shabaab; everything is fuzzy.” The restrictions, whether explicit or not, have meant humanitarian organisations have lost
precious time and energy that could have been spent to build trust and understanding from all actors and to negotiate unrestricted access to people suffering from the crisis.

The unconditional political and financial support for the TFG by many donors, was also seen as affecting the ability of humanitarian organisations to distinguish themselves as independent from their country of origin or government funders. Some organisations interviewed claimed donor governments had turned a “blind eye” to the corruption and complicity of the TFG. “All donors support the TFG, so donor neutrality is definitely questionable for all of them,” stated one respondent. Several donor field representatives interviewed recognised that supporting the TFG had backfired and not generated stability. “In retrospect, we backed the wrong horse,” said one, “but at this stage, we have very few alternatives.” Many donors interviewed had by then reached the conclusion that working through local authorities and Somali NGOs was a much more conducive approach to building stability and resilience, but this analysis did not appear to lead to a shift in tactics in donors’ capitals.

According to many interviewed, donors had an exaggerated preoccupation about the potential diversion of aid to Al-Shabaab, especially after reports of massive diversion of food aid from the World Food Programme (WFP). For some donors, their concerns reflected anti-terrorism legislation, while other donors like the UK were accused of “an almost obsessive focus on showing value for money” despite the complexities of doing this in a crisis like Somalia. Whatever the arguments from donors, the vast majority of organisations interviewed felt that this had led to delays in programme approvals, restrictive conditions, and time-consuming and costly reporting procedures. There were also serious concerns that some donors’ procedures, such as vetting of all locally-employed staff or sub-contractors and beneficiary lists, were dangerous measures that potentially placed staff and beneficiaries at risk of reprisals.

“The burden of proof is on NGOs that we have the capacity, access, controls in place, etc.,” said one respondent, “but there is little recognition or support from donors for what this implies.” For some, this was a clear example of misplaced accountability: “Donors are very constraining and demand that all aid be accounted for. If not, NGOs have to bear the costs. The quality of work is affected, as this requires many audits and extensive staff capacity and resources in order to meet the different requirements.” Donor governments were also criticised by some for their position regarding neighbouring Kenya: “They are doing nothing to address widespread government corruption and delays in opening access to refugee camps.”

Politicalisation was plainly a major factor limiting the ability of humanitarian organisations to adequately meet existing needs, much less prepare for and respond to the risk of outright famine. Nevertheless,

**LACK OF INVESTMENT IN PREVENTION, PREPAREDNESS AND LONGER-TERM LIVELIHOODS PROGRAMS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DONOR PERFORMANCE ON PREVENTION, RISK REDUCTION AND RECOVERY</th>
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<td><strong>FIELD PERCEPTION SCORES</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>STRENGTHENING LOCAL CAPACITY</td>
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<tr>
<td>BENEFICIARY INVOLVEMENT IN DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION</td>
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<td>BENEFICIARY INVOLVEMENT IN MONITORING AND EVALUATION</td>
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<td>LINKING RELIEF TO DEVELOPMENT</td>
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<tr>
<td>PREVENTION, PREPAREDNESS AND RISK REDUCTION</td>
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Source: DARA

Colours represent OECD/DAC donors’ performance compared to overall average pillar score:

- **Good**
- **Mid-range**
- **Could improve**
opportunities for us to work with more prevention and preparedness and livelihoods activities even in South and Central Somalia, but these are not supported,” claimed one respondent.

Another respondent complained of the acrobatics required to “disguise programmes as humanitarian” in order to get funding: “We call this an ‘emergency operation in a protracted crisis’ so technically we can’t use funds for prevention or recovery in the programme. But in practice, on the ground we integrate whenever possible. We have to. If not, what’s the alternative? We might not have access later, when the drought gets worse.”

Many organisations felt donors were unwilling to recognise and support the use of Somali NGOs, private companies, etc. much less building their capacity – even though the reality is that any aid effort depends on them. “Donors don’t understand and don’t care about Somali capacity and especially fail to engage with the very capable and strong Somali diaspora,” said one respondent. “Building community resilience against famines and other stresses is also a key way to prevent conflict,” argued one respondent.

Gender was another area where donors often failed to make the connection between effectiveness of programmes and beneficiary accountability. The Gender Marker was used in Somalia as a

the famine response was also hampered by an overall lack of commitment to prevention, preparedness and risk reduction efforts. Many organisations complained about an inability of some donors to see beyond the labels of a “fragile state” and look for opportunities to build resilience and capacities of communities to cope with the drought, famine and conflict.

Most donors were criticised for short-term funding cycles and an excessively rigid categorisation of aid into humanitarian only activities, versus other activities that had a component of resilience, capacity-building and transitional funding. This meant, according to many interviewees, that potential support for programmes in Somaliland and Puntland, was not provided as it was not classified as a humanitarian emergency. “After twenty years of crisis, it’s impossible to convince donors to fund longer-term programmes. There are many

DONORS ARE CRITICISED FOR SHORT-TERM FUNDING CYCLES AND AN EXCESSIVELY RIGID CATEGORISATION OF AID INTO HUMANITARIAN ONLY ACTIVITIES
measures, especially against sexual and gender-based violence,” said one respondent. Indeed, one donor representative interviewed admitted gender was not their main concern, despite policy declarations to the contrary. “In truth, this is not a priority; it’s more of a ‘tick the box’ approach,” arguing that the extent of the humanitarian crisis and the complicated politics of the response was more important. But donors are not the only ones to blame –representatives of several humanitarian organisations expressed similar sentiments, claiming gender was “important, but we have so many other issues and concerns, and in an emergency, this is the last thing on our minds.”

The announcement of the famine initially triggered a flurry of international media and donor attention. Funding has, in fact, risen dramatically –from US$492 million in 2010 to US$820 million by December 2011, or 81% of needs– but even so, there are still gaps in important areas like protection and shelter (OCHA 2011). Good seasonal rains in October have also helped to mitigate the worst effects of the drought. The famine has also triggered new collaboration between the UN and other actors with non-traditional donors, such as Turkey and the Gulf States. Meanwhile, the US has restored much of the funding it cut to Somalia in past years, making it one of the top donors to the crisis today. It also recently relaxed some of the restrictions on aid organisations working in Al-Shabaab areas, but so far there have been few concrete assurances that this will be followed through with legal guarantees to protect humanitarians.

However, Al-Shabaab appears to have taken a harder line against international actors, announcing that an additional sixteen aid agencies have been expelled from Al-Shabaab controlled areas. Furthermore, the effects of recent military encroachments by Kenya and Ethiopia and offensives by the TFG and ANISOM remain to be seen in terms of protection of civilians. By any

SITUATION TODAY

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INSUFFICIENT DONOR FOLLOW-UP ON GENDER ISSUES

tool for planning and assessing CHF pooled fund allocations, and sex and age disaggregated data (SADD) collection was slowly making its way in a more consistent manner into agency and cluster reporting, for example. This shows a growing level of commitment to gender issues by organisations in the field. Sweden and Norway stood out as donors with a higher level of awareness and insistence of incorporating gender in programmes and attempting to monitor gender issues in programme implementation. To a lesser extent, the US and the European Commission’s Humanitarian Aid office (ECHO) were also mentioned for expressing a commitment to see gender analysis in proposals, but not in terms of monitoring and follow-up.

However, the prevailing sentiment was that donors in general did not prioritise gender. “So-called ‘mainstreaming’ of gender is not enough. Donors should strongly support more specific

Forty-eight-year-old Marianne, her husband and their eight children fled their home village 40 kilometres away to this IDP camp in search of assistance. With a sick husband, Marianne singlehandedly supports the family by collecting and selling firewood. / UNHCR/ S. Modola
funding and support for these types of activities would have helped aid organisations and vulnerable communities alike to be better prepared to anticipate and confront the drought, and potentially minimise the scale of the subsequent famine.

The fact that several donors funded the IASC evaluation and are supporting implementation shows a commitment to learning and improving the response to the crisis. The question is whether governments are ready to take steps to implement the recommendations and ensure humanitarian assistance is independent from other aims, and support long term prevention, recovery, and resilience strategies. Or will we yet again need the images of starvation and distress to prompt us into action?

So, what is the way forward? Recent evaluations such as the Inter-Agency Steering Committee’s review of the impact of the humanitarian response in South and Central Somalia over the past five years have highlighted important areas where the humanitarian sector can make improvements in programming, and efforts are underway to implement recommendations (Polastro et al, 2011). The evaluation report underlines the need for all actors, especially donor governments, to respect and promote neutral, impartial and independent humanitarian action. This is critical to ensure safe access and protection to affected populations, but donors’ positions regarding Al-Shabaab and the TFG have likely exacerbated the situation for humanitarian actors.

Another clear message to donor governments is to recognise and reinforce the efforts of humanitarian actors at the local level to address the challenges posed in Somalia in delivering aid effectively, instead of imposing conditions and demands that undermine those efforts. In particular, donors could have paid attention to the warnings coming from humanitarian actors that a major crisis was in the making. Donors could have also invested in building resilience, and adopted a more flexible and nuanced stance at supporting prevention, preparedness, transition and recovery when the situation allows, as in Puntland and Somaliland. Access to long-term

SOMALIA UNDERLINES THE NEED FOR ALL ACTORS, ESPECIALLY DONORS, TO RESPECT AND PROMOTE NEUTRAL, IMPARTIAL AND INDEPENDENT HUMANITARIAN ACTION

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The Republic of South Sudan was born on 9 July 2011 in a context of instability due to increased fighting between the Sudanese Army and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North rebels in the border region of South Kordofan.

**THE CRISIS AND THE RESPONSE**

- 468,000 new internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees have been created in the past year due to the ongoing violence in the border states of Blue Nile and South Kordofan. These new IDPs and refugees are supplementary to the 110,000 refugees in South Sudan from the oil-rich region of Abyei. Meanwhile, 1.9 million people still reside in camps in Darfur.

- Humanitarian access in some areas of Darfur and of South Kordofan is denied by the Sudanese Armed Forces, leaving hundreds of thousands of civilians without assistance. Humanitarian actors disagree over how to address the rift and to coordinate assistance in border areas.

**TOTAL FUNDING TO SUDAN IN 2010:**

**US$ 1.4 BILLION**

**74% INSIDE THE CAP**
The Common Humanitarian Fund (CHF) provided approximately 10% of funding in 2010. Although it has contributed to some improvements in coordination, greater effort is needed to streamline management and improve monitoring.

Few donors advocate for safe humanitarian access despite agreement over this need. Donors should take advantage of the High-Level Committee for Darfur to advocate towards the Sudanese authorities for access to Darfur, and consider expanding the mechanism for other regions.

Donors consider protection and gender important issues in programme design, but could do more to advocate to the Sudanese authorities to ensure partners are able to implement these activities.
2011 will go down in Sudan’s history as the year that saw a new independent country emerge: the Republic of South Sudan. Following decades of armed conflict, South Sudan celebrated its Independence Day on 9 July 2011. The founding of the world’s newest state was seen as a great step forward in Africa’s most recent history. The divorce, however, may turn out to be not so peaceful. Air raids and attacks by the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) against the Sudan’s People Liberation Movement-North on South Sudanese villages, and even a refugee camp in November, have dashed hopes that Sudan and its new neighbour would co-exist peacefully.

Meanwhile, the unity of the new state is equally under threat. Tensions within South Sudan among different ethnic groups and communities have existed for a long time. The attacks on villages, burning of homes and cattle raids, however, became increasingly vehement in late 2011 and may be the prelude to future internal, armed conflict. The United Nations (UN) Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC), Valerie Amos, has identified the humanitarian crises in the two Sudans as a priority of the international community.

In 2010, the Humanitarian Response Index (HRI) asked the rhetorical question whether or not Sudan was seeing a humanitarian mission without an end (DARA 2011). Looking at the events of 2011, this question would be answered with a resounding yes. Instead of a reduction in humanitarian needs, Sudan has seen new wars erupting. According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), fighting in the border states of Blue Nile and South Kordofan created 468,000 newly internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees by the end of the year. Prior to this, 110,000 refugees had fled to South Sudan from the disputed oil-rich region of Abyei, where a new UN peacekeeping force was deployed in July. These new conflicts accompanied an already debilitated environment due to the dire situation in Darfur, where 1.9 million people remain in camps (OCHA, 2011).

Much of the occurrences in Sudan fall under the radar. In 2011, most international attention has been on the monumental changes in North Africa and the Arab world, while humanitarian agencies focused their efforts on the food crisis in the Horn of Africa. Under these circumstances, the HRI field research team found a humanitarian community that appeared to be addressing the new Sudanese crises as “business as usual” when it should be of pressing importance. The sense of urgency seemed to be lacking, especially on the part of the UN.

Years of painful, almost fruitless negotiations with the Sudanese authorities over humanitarian access may be one reason for this passivity. Humanitarian assistance is not popular in Sudan and the authorities have become highly skilled in restricting the operational environment for international agencies. At best, the Sudanese authorities accept humanitarian response in the form of service-delivery, while limiting visas and work permits for international staff. However, they have gone as far as to seal off a war-torn area and declare it unsafe for humanitarian agencies, a condition currently seen in much of Blue Nile and South Kordofan states. This pattern has been in place for decades and there is little doubt that these limitations to humanitarian assistance will remain in the near future unless the country makes monumental changes similar to those in Northern Africa.
LEADERSHIP

Addressing the restrictive operational environment is a matter that highly depends on effective humanitarian leadership and coordination. Improving leadership and coordination have been the two key priorities for the ERC in 2011. In Sudan, however, many of the people interviewed by the HRI, including donor, UN, and non-governmental organisations (NGO) representatives, noted the lack of leadership from the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC), the UN’s top humanitarian official in Sudan. His particular silence on the Sudanese authorities’ practices of obstructing humanitarian response is considered highly problematic.

In June 2011, aid agencies in the town of Kadugli, the capital of South Kordofan, found their supplies and offices looted and ransacked. Humanitarian officials estimated that rebuilding their presence and programmes would take weeks, if not months. Meanwhile, violence and mass atrocities leading to the displacement of thousands of civilians continued to be reported. Nonetheless, the HC resisted NGO calls to declare the situation in South Kordofan an emergency, which would raise the level of very much needed attention.

When asked for his strategy, the then HC mentioned his efforts to facilitate a peace-deal for Abyei with the Sudanese government. He felt that by speaking out, he would confirm Khartoum’s views of the international humanitarian community. Aware of the rift in humanitarian and governmental collaboration, the HC asserted that “the Sudanese government perceives the international humanitarian agencies as self-serving, interested in perpetuating the industry, wanting to keep people in camps, having no interest in rebuilding Darfur, and pushing the agenda of regime-change.” He felt constructive engagement with the authorities was more effective at delivering results. One example of such a result, he pointed out, was his achievement to reverse the government’s decision regarding the expulsion of an American NGO several months earlier.

The approach of the then HC raises the question of whom, and on what basis, is the HC’s performance monitored and appraised? In Sudan, the HC had multiple reporting lines, including one to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Administrator. The UN believes that, in principle, humanitarian authority is only appropriate for someone accredited as Resident Coordinator. The latter function is easier to sell to the Sudanese government because it focuses on development aid, requiring close relations with them. Clearly, such a close association with the government may be a detriment to the humanitarian agenda, which at times, may require a more independent course of action.

Instead of the HC, it was the ERC and the United Nation’s Children’s Fund (UNICEF) Country Representative in Sudan who spoke out for increased humanitarian access. More recently, other voices on the ground have joined them, including the OCHA.
Head of Office and the acting HC, with the end of augmenting humanitarian access to Blue Nile and South Kordofan. OCHA should keep systematic records of repeated denials of humanitarian access in order to build an evidence-based argument for the necessity of action.

Following the transfer of the HC to Tripoli, the UN could not immediately find a candidate to fill the HC function. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Representative in Sudan, who has a long-standing career in humanitarian response, was appointed HC as an interim arrangement with the support of some key humanitarian actors in the country. Nevertheless, it is expected that the new Resident Coordinator, with no humanitarian background, will soon assume the position of Humanitarian Coordinator as well.

The picture with regards to leadership and coordination is a very different one in South Sudan. Here, the HC is well-known for her bold attitude and robust advocacy. In terms of ensuring the effectiveness of the clusters, she has insisted that only those relevant to the needs would be put in place. She also wanted the clusters to be co-chaired between the UN and NGOs in order to ensure buy-in. The HCT’s main function is to decide on strategies and priorities in which NGOs play a key-role, mainly because of their high level of organisation in South Sudan. At the end of 2011, the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) recognised the South Sudanese government not keen on the mechanism and prefer the term, ‘sectors’. They also insist on co-chairing the meetings and signing off on every new project proposed by the humanitarian community. Such a level of control may be unhealthy when taking into account the basic humanitarian principles of impartiality and independence, but in Sudan, it is the reality for every humanitarian actor involved.

In such a context, division among UN agencies only creates greater difficulty. Clearly, the HC has the responsibility to address such competition, facilitate agreement on key questions, for example the best way to gain humanitarian access, and build humanitarian kinship with the HCT partners.
Sudanese coordination framework as an example of good practice. The real test for the HC and her colleagues may be yet to come, should South Sudan plunge into war. After its fight for independence, the Government of South Sudan has become less keen on international NGOs. Recently, NGOs in South Sudan also reported increased difficulties for them to work in the country.

**DONOR BEHAVIOUR**

With humanitarian agencies lacking access to Blue Nile State and South Kordofan, the question must be asked: what kind of support can donor governments provide in the use of diplomatic means to put pressure on the Sudanese authorities? Looking into the donors’ reactions on the lack of access in South Kordofan, the HRI team witnessed an interesting phenomenon, comparable to a game of ping-pong. In a meeting hosted by NGOs, both the NGOs and donor representatives agreed on the need to address the lack of access to South Kordofan, but both expected each other to be the ones to take action. The donors asked the NGOs to undertake assessments and to share information on the situation. On their part, the NGOs considered that the donors should address the lack of access with the authorities, especially with the military intelligence.

The responsibility of donors to push for increased access is also a factor in the context of Darfur. Several interviewees reported a reduction in funding due to the lack of access. This lack of access implies that humanitarian agencies cannot sufficiently monitor and verify the distribution of aid. The European Commission’s Directorate General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (ECHO) and the Netherlands were singled out as the donors who reduced their funding for this reason. Many interviewees also noted the alignment of the policies of the UK, ECHO, and the Netherlands.

The mechanism for donors to promote humanitarian access in Darfur is the High-Level Committee for Darfur. This mechanism was established by the Joint Communiqué on the facilitation of humanitarian activities in 2007. While one interviewee referred to the meetings as ‘content-free’, the committee is the only mechanism in Sudan that brings together various parts of the Sudanese government, including a number of donor governments and international humanitarian agencies. Participants from the Sudanese government include the Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC), the National Intelligence Services – considered the main obstacle for humanitarian access– and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. If there is one place the Sudanese authorities could be asked to honour its humanitarian obligations under international law, it is this mechanism. Donor governments should reflect on how they could use this mechanism more effectively, not just for Darfur, but also for other parts of Sudan.

**WHAT KIND OF SUPPORT CAN DONOR GOVERNMENTS PROVIDE IN THE USE OF DIPLOMATIC MEANS TO PUT PRESSURE ON THE SUDANESE GOVERNMENT?**

The financing of humanitarian response in Sudan has changed little over the past several years. According to OCHA’s Financial Tracking System, it continues to be among the top recipients of humanitarian funds in the world, with US $902,293,943 in 2011. One funding mechanism that continues to be the topic of hot debate is the Common Humanitarian Fund (CHF). The CHF is a pooled fund, which has been utilised in Sudan since 2006. In 2010, it funded more than 250 projects for a total of US$156 million - just over 10% of the total funding (nearly US$1.4 million) donors allocated to Sudan for the year (OCHA 2011b). In other words, those who claim that the CHF is “all talk” are unaware of the reality.
thought should be given to CHF’s management. OCHA’s office is largely absorbed by its administration— are these costs worth the benefit? As a CHF is being set up in South Sudan, it is yet to be seen if those involved in the process will learn from the experiences of their northern colleagues.

A March 2011 evaluation of the CHF in Sudan concluded that while the fund “is a work in progress,” it “has served the humanitarian community well in Sudan” (Cosgrave, et al. 2011). It noted that the CHF had been particularly helpful in terms of improved coordination. This conclusion, which is related to the HC determining the allocation of the funds, however needs further qualification. Without exception, interviewees from the NGO community told the HRI team that they viewed the allocation of the CHF funds as a process intended to make everyone happy. One NGO representative qualified it as a “pie-sharing exercise.” Among the larger NGOs, the sense prevails that the fund does not see much return on investment, especially when compared to other donors.

OCHA’s office in Sudan, one of the largest in the world, has a significant undertaking in managing the CHF. Every project for which funding is requested must be part of the work plan for Sudan; special forms must be completed, and several layers of decision-making are involved for a fund that is comparable to a medium donor. Moreover, about half of the international staff in the Khartoum office is involved in managing the CHF, while the accountability of its funding in terms of monitoring project implementation has been reported as one of its weaknesses. Clearly, timely funding decisions are critical in ensuring effective response, but further

PROTECTION AND GENDER

Addressing protection concerns is a risky undertaking for humanitarian agencies in a country like Sudan, which year after year receives poor ratings for its human rights record. High on every agency’s mind remains the expulsion of a dozen or so international humanitarian NGOs on 4 March 2009, the same day that the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued arrest warrants for the Sudanese President and the Minister for Humanitarian Affairs. At the time, media sources quoted Sudanese officials’ statements claiming these organisations had violated “the laws of the humanitarian work” and that “their involvement in cooperation with the so-called International Criminal Court have been proved by evidence,” (UNMIS 2009). While the NGOs denied links with the ICC, the tendency has been for many of them to avoid any association with human rights or protection issues. Advocacy, one of the most important contributions that humanitarian agencies can make toward protection, is probably at its lowest point, as fears for new expulsions continue to dominate the environment. Many humanitarian agencies’ operations considered the Save Darfur alliance their enemy. In the words one of one aid worker: “everything we say will be used by them to support their campaign.” As a result, humanitarian agencies refrain from even the slightest criticism of the Sudanese authorities even though it obstructs humanitarian response. Few countries see international NGOs imposing a similar level of self-censorship as seen in Sudan.

Surprisingly, protection does appear to be high on donors’ agendas in Sudan. Many interviewees noted that donors were pushing protection as a humanitarian priority. The HRI team was informed
of donors requesting agencies to collect and report protection concerns in South Kordofan, where the Sudanese Armed Forces have blocked humanitarian access. Nevertheless, putting protection into practice in such a challenging context seems more of a desire than a reality.

The donor community appears to also require their partners to integrate gender concerns, at least on paper. Similar to protection, gender is a sensitive topic in Sudan. Most agencies report that their donors increasingly identify gender as a humanitarian priority in terms of inclusion in programme designs. Unfortunately, it appears that this expectation is no more than paying lip-service to the issue, as little occurs when agencies do not follow up on their intended activities because of the restrictive environment.

TIME FOR RENEWED, PRINCIPLED ENGAGEMENT

The Sudanese government studies the international humanitarian community carefully and knows its inner-workings perhaps even better than the agencies themselves. Counting on the humanitarian agencies’ unconditional desire to remain present in the country, it knows exactly how much it can ‘squeeze’ them and maintain restrictions on them. At the same time, the humanitarian community is unable to draw a common line in the Sudanese sand. Such a line would determine what level of government interference the agencies find unacceptable. Should the Sudanese authorities continue to flout internationally-recognised humanitarian principles, the agencies might reconsider their operations, including the ultimate step of withdrawal. Nevertheless, such a drastic measure would stand in sharp contrast with the humanitarian imperative of alleviating human suffering wherever it may be found.

Seasoned humanitarian workers will remember the days of ‘Operation Lifeline Sudan’ (OLS), an UN-led arrangement, developed in the late 1980s which promoted a certain level of unhindered humanitarian access. OLS had its shortcomings, but it still served the humanitarian community by creating an arrangement with the UN, which provided leadership, coordination and logistical support based on a common set of humanitarian principles (Taylor-Robinson 2002). The UN should consider recreating such an arrangement, if it is to escape the daily struggle of negotiations with the authorities of the two Sudans. Especially at a time when the risk of further armed conflict is much higher than the chances for peace, humanitarian agencies need to expand their efforts to assist and protect the Sudanese population. Operations cannot be considered effective unless Sudanese authorities allow cross-border movements, and humanitarian actors show greater leadership and coordination between Sudan and South Sudan.

INFORMATION BASED ON 39 FIELD INTERVIEWS WITH KEY HUMANITARIAN ACTORS IN KHARTOUM AND JUBA FROM THE 19TH TO THE 27TH OF JUNE 2011, AND 246 QUESTIONNAIRES ON DONOR PERFORMANCE (INCLUDING 147 QUESTIONNAIRES OF OECD/DAC DONORS). THE HRI TEAM WAS COMPOSED OF BEATRIZ ASENSIO, BELÉN CAMACHO, MARYBETH REDHEFFER, ED SCHENKENBERG (TEAM LEADER) AND KERRY SMITH. THEY EXPRESS THEIR GRATITUDE TO ALL THOSE INTERVIEWED IN SUDAN.
REFERENCES


GLOSSARY

1. ACCOUNTABILITY: The means by which individuals and organisations report to a recognised authority, or authorities, and are held responsible for their actions.
See: http://www.hapinternational.org/

2. AID EFFECTIVENESS AGENDA: Name given to the process initiated at a 2002 conference in Monterey, Mexico – and subsequently leading to the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness – to ensure effective use of aid and promote donor-recipient partnership.
See: http://www.cgdev.org/section/topics/aid_effectiveness

3. BENEFICIARIES: Individuals, groups or organisations designated as the intended recipients of humanitarian assistance or protection in an aid intervention. The term has been criticised. Among many alternatives are: people affected by disaster; the affected population; recipients of aid; claimants; clients.

4. CAPACITY: A combination of all the strengths and resources available within a community, society or organisation to reduce the level of risk or the effects of a disaster.

5. CENTRAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE FUND (CERF): An UN stand-by fund launched in 2006 to enable more timely and reliable humanitarian assistance to those affected by natural disasters and armed conflicts. CERF is funded by voluntary contributions from governments.
See: www.cerf.un.org

6. CIVIL-MILITARY COORDINATION/COOPERATION (CIMIC): Dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors in humanitarian emergencies to protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid competition, minimise inconsistency and, when appropriate, pursue common goals. Basic strategies range from coexistence to cooperation.

7. CLUSTER APPROACH: The central component of the humanitarian reform process initiated in 2005, designating coordinators for sectors of humanitarian response involving coordination between UN agencies, NGOs, international organisations and the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement. There are now eleven clusters: agriculture, camp coordination/management, early recovery, education, emergency shelter, emergency telecommunications, health, logistics, nutrition, protection and water sanitation and hygiene.

8. CODE OF CONDUCT FOR THE INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS AND RED CRESCENT MOVEMENT AND NGOs IN DISASTER RESPONSE: Developed by eight major disaster response agencies in 1994, over 400 NGOs have signed up for this attempt to devise a common operational approach based on international humanitarian law.
See: http://www.ifrc.org/publicat/conduct/code.asp

9. COMMON HUMANITARIAN ACTION PLAN (CHAP): A strategic plan for humanitarian response in a given country or region. The CHAP provides the foundation for developing a Consolidated Appeal and is thus central to the Coordinated Appeals Process (CAP).

10. COMMON HUMANITARIAN FUND (CHF): A pooled-funding humanitarian financing instrument – originally piloted in Sudan in 2005 and subsequently in the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Central African Republic – to fund priority projects included in a crisis-affected country’s Common Humanitarian Action Plan (CHAP). In recent years, donors have provided over $US100 million annual to both the DRC and Sudan CHFs.
See: http://ochaonline.un.org/OchaLinkClick.aspx?link=ocha&docId=1161988

11. COMPLEX EMERGENCY: Concept used by the UN since the 1980s for a humanitarian crisis characterised by complete or considerable breakdown of state authority.

12. COMMUNICATING WITH DISASTER AFFECTED COMMUNITIES (CDAC): A network promoting two-way communication between the humanitarian community and those they assist.
See: http://crisescomm.ning.com/

13. CONSOLIDATED APPEAL PROCESS: Leading tool for humanitarian coordination, strategic planning and programming. CAPs foster cooperation between governments, donors, UN agencies, NGOs and the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement to determine funding requirements in response to a major or complex emergency.

14. CONTINGENCY PLANNING: A management tool to ensure adequate arrangements are made in anticipation of a new humanitarian crisis or expected increase in severity of an existing crisis.

15. COPING CAPACITY: The means by which people or organisations use available resources and abilities in response to adversity and vulnerability.

16. DELIVERING AS ONE: 2007 declaration of intent – building on a 2005 report of the same name – to make the UN system more coherent and efficient – to create “One UN”; a key element of the humanitarian reform process.
See: http://www.undg.org/?P=7

17. DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILISATION AND REINTEGRATION (DDR): Essential element of peace processes, involving collection, control and disposal of weaponry; quartering, disarming and discharge of combatants and provision of assistance with intention of enhancing prospects for their sustainable post-conflict livelihoods.
See: http://www.unddr.org/whatisddr.php

18. DISASTER PREPAREDNESS: Activities and measures taken in advance to facilitate early warning evacuation, rescue and relief in the event of a disaster.
See: http://www.unisdr.org/
19. DISASTER RISK REDUCTION (DRR): The conceptual framework of elements which minimise vulnerability and disaster risk throughout a society to avoid (prevent) or limit (mitigate and be prepared for) the adverse impacts of hazards, within the broad context of sustainable development.
See: http://www.unisdr.org/eng/library/lib-terminology-eng%20home.htm

20. DO NO HARM (DNH): The concept of identifying ways to ensure that humanitarian and/or development assistance in conflict settings does not exacerbate vulnerabilities

21. DOUBLE-HATTING: A term used in the humanitarian community to describe an UN official with multiple official roles: particularly used for those who are simultaneously Resident Coordinator (RC) and Humanitarian Coordinator (HC).

22. EARLY WARNING: Ensuring identified institutions provide timely and effective information prior to disasters.
See: http://www.unisdr.org/eng/library/lib-terminology-eng%20home.htm

23. EARLY WARNING SYSTEMS: Include a chain of concerns, namely: understanding and mapping the hazard; monitoring and forecasting impending events; processing and disseminating understandable warnings to political authorities and the population, and undertaking appropriate and timely actions in response to the warnings.
See: http://www.unisdr.org/eng/library/lib-terminology-eng%20home.htm

24. EARMARKING: A device by which a donor specifies the geographic or sectoral areas in which a recipient agency may spend its contribution. There are different degrees of earmarking: by agency, by country, by sector, or by project.

25. EMERGENCY RELIEF COORDINATOR (ERC): The head of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC). Also has the title of UN Under-Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs.
See: http://lib-unique.un.org/lib/unique.nsf/Link/R05641

26. EMERGENCY RESPONSE FUND (ERF): In-country OCHA-managed mechanisms which primarily enable NGOs to cover unforeseen humanitarian needs. Advisory boards assist the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) to make allocations.

27. FAILED STATE: A state lacking the general attributes of sovereignty: physical control of territory, monopoly on the legitimate use of force and abilities to deliver services or formally interact with the international community.

28. FINANCIAL TRACKING SERVICE (FTS): OCHA-provided web-based searchable system intended to record all international humanitarian aid provided by traditional donors, including that for NGOs and the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement, bilateral aid, in-kind aid, and private donations. All FTS data is provided by donors or recipient organisations.
See: http://fts.unocha.org/

29. FLASH APPEAL: An UN tool for structuring a coordinated humanitarian response for the first three to six months of an emergency. Typically issued within a week of the onset of an emergency.

30. FORGOTTEN CRISIS ASSESSMENT (FCA): An annual exercise by the European Commission to identify severe protracted humanitarian crisis situations where affected populations are receiving no or insufficient international aid and where there is no political commitment to solve the crisis, due in part to a lack of media interest.
See: http://ec.europa.eu/echo/policies/strategy_en.htm

31. FRAGILE STATES: States significantly susceptible to crisis with institutions unwilling or unable to provide basic services and often lacking in legitimacy. Also known as crisis states. Described by the World Bank as low-income countries under stress (LICUS).

32. FOOD SECURITY: A concept defined by the 19956 World Food Summit “when all people at all times have access to sufficient, safe, nutritious food to maintain a healthy and active life”.
See: http://www.who.int/trade/glossary/story028/en/

33. GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE (GBV): Violence directed against a person on the basis of gender or sex: while women, men, boys and girls can be GBV victims because of their subordinate status, women and girls are the primary victims.
See: http://www.unfpa.org/gender/violence.htm

34. GEN CAP: The IASC Gender Standby Capacity (GenCap) project seeks to build capacity of humanitarian actors at country level to mainstream gender equality programming, including prevention and response to gender-based violence, in all sectors of humanitarian response. GenCap’s goal is to ensure that humanitarian action takes into consideration the different needs and capabilities of women, girls, boys and men equally.
See: http://oneresponse.info/crosscutting/GenCap/Pages/GenCap.aspx

35. GENEVA CONVENTIONS: Four 1949 Conventions and two 1977 additional Protocols relating to the protection of victims in armed conflict – the lynchpin of international humanitarian law (IHL).

36. GENDER EQUALITY: Refers to the equal rights, responsibilities and opportunities of women and men and girls and boys. Equality does not mean that women and men will become the same but that women’s and men’s rights, responsibilities and opportunities will not depend on whether they are born male or female. Gender equality implies that the interests, needs and priorities of both women and men are taken into consideration, recognising the diversity of different groups of women and men.
37. GENDER MARKER: The IASC Gender Marker is a tool that codes, on a 0-2 scale, whether or not a humanitarian project is designed well enough to ensure that women/girls and men/boys will benefit equally from it or that it will advance gender equality in another way. If the project has the potential to contribute to gender equality, the marker predicts whether the results are likely to be limited or significant.

See: http://oneresponse.info/crosscutting/gender/Pages/The%20IASC%20Gender%20Marker.aspx

38. GOOD HUMANITARIAN DONORSHIP (GHD): Initiative launched in 2003 to work towards achieving efficient and principled humanitarian assistance. 24 donor bodies have now signed up to these principles. The GHD initiative has become the leading framework to guide principled official humanitarian aid and encourage greater donor accountability.

See: http://www.goodhumanitarianandonorship.org

39. GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT: A series of principles articulating standards for protection, assistance and solutions for internally displaced persons (IDPs)

See: http://www.idpguidingprinciples.org/

40. HUMANITARIAN ACCESS: Where protection is not available from national authorities or controlling non-state actors, vulnerable populations have a right to receive international protection and assistance from an impartial humanitarian relief operation. Such action is subject to the consent of the state or parties concerned and does not prescribe coercive measures in the event of refusal, however unwarranted.

See: http://ochaonline.un.org/

41. HUMANITARIAN ACCOUNTABILITY PARTNERSHIP (HAP): Humanitarian sector self-regulatory body committed to accountability and quality management.

See: http://www.hapinternational.org/

42. HUMANITARIAN ACTION: Name given to activities involving protection of civilians and those no longer taking part in hostilities; provision of food, water and sanitation, shelter, health services, and other items of assistance for the benefit of affected people and to facilitate their return to normal lives and livelihoods.

43. HUMAN RIGHTS: The concept that all human beings, whatever their nationality, place of residence/origin, sex, nationality, ethnicity, colour, religion, political affiliation language, or any other status are equally entitled to enjoy his or her rights. The key instruments asserting human rights are the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) together with the 1966 International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).


44. HUMANITARIAN COORDINATOR (HC): The senior UN humanitarian official at country level. Appointed by the Emergency Response Coordinator (ERC) in consultation with the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) when a situation demands intensive management and/or massive humanitarian assistance. “Double-hatting” is a term applied when the duty of HC is combined with that of Resident Coordinator (RC).

45. HUMANITARIAN REFORM: Process launched in 2005 by UN and non-UN humanitarian actors to enhance humanitarian response capacity through greater predictability, accountability and partnership.


46. HUMANITARIAN SPACE: Term used to describe the environment in which humanitarian actors can operate without compromising principles of neutrality and impartiality or the safety of aid workers.

See: http://www.humanitarian-space.dk/

47. HUMANITARIAN SYSTEM: Name given to the coalition of key crisis response actors: the UN, NGOs and the Red Cross/Red Crescent movement.

48. HYOGO FRAMEWORK FOR ACTION: Outcome of 2005 World Conference on Disaster Reduction recognising the interrelated nature of disaster reduction, poverty eradication and sustainable development, and advocating a culture of disaster prevention and resilience through risk assessments, disaster preparedness and early warning systems.

See: http://www.unisdr.org/eng/hfa/hfa.htm

49. IMPARTIALITY: One of the seven fundamental principles of the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement, affirming that responses to the suffering of individuals should be guided solely by their needs without any discrimination on the basis of nationality, race, religious beliefs, class or political opinions.

See: http://www.ifrc.org/what/values/principles/impartiality.asp

50. INDEPENDENCE: One of the seven fundamental principles of the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement, affirming that humanitarian actors, while auxiliaries in the humanitarian services of their governments and subject to the laws of their respective countries, must always be autonomous, so that the assistance may be given in accordance with the principles of impartiality and neutrality.

See: http://www.ifrc.org/what/values/principles/independence.asp

51. INSTRUMENTALISATION: A post-9/11 term used to describe the risk that humanitarian actors may, inadvertently or consciously, subordinate principles of impartiality and neutrality to serve the political and strategic interests of those who provide them with funding.

52. INTER-AGENCY STANDING COMMITTEE (IASC): The primary mechanism for humanitarian coordination. Chaired by the Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC), it brings together all UN operational humanitarian agencies: the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement, the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) and representatives of three NGO consortia.

53. INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS (IDPs): Persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to leave their homes or habitual residence as a result of, or in order to avoid, the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalised violence, violations of human rights, or natural or man-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognised state border. The non-binding Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement based on refugee law, human rights law, and international humanitarian law, articulates standards for protection, assistance and solutions for such internally displaced persons.

See: http://www.internal-displacement.org/
54. INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (IHL): A set of rules seeking to limit the effects of armed conflict on non-combatants. Also known as the law of war or the law of armed conflict. IHL is primarily set out in the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their two additional Protocols of 1977.
See: http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/section_ihl_in_brief

55. INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE LAW: The body of customary international law and international instruments that establishes standards for refugee protection. The cornerstone of refugee law is the 1951 Convention and its 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees.
See: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4a8aadbc0.html

56. LIVELIHOODS: The capabilities, assets and activities required for a means of living.

57. LOCAL CAPACITY: Participation in the programme should reinforce people’s sense of dignity and hope in times of crisis, and people should be encouraged to participate in programmes in different ways. Programmes should be designed to build upon local capacity and to avoid undermining people’s own coping strategies.
See: http://www.sphereproject.org/component?option=com_docman/task,doc_view/gid,12/Itemid,26/lang,English/

58. LINKING RELIEF, REHABILITATION AND DEVELOPMENT (LRRD): A concept urging emergency responders to identify and protect the livelihoods of crisis-affected populations and their coping strategies at the earliest opportunity, in order to build on resilience essential for post-conflict recovery.
See: http://www.disastergovernance.net/study_groups/lrrd/

59. MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS (MDGs): Set of eight time-bound development goals adopted by world leaders in 2000.
See: http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/

60. MULTI-DONOR TRUST FUND (MDTF): Post-crisis recovery frameworks jointly developed by national governments and UN Country Teams intended to involve a broad range of stakeholders, avoid creating new parallel structures, strengthen aid effectiveness, reduce transaction costs and promote transparency.
See: http://mdtf.undp.org/

61. NEEDS ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK (NAF): A tool for cooperative collation of information on humanitarian needs.

62. NEUTRALITY: One of the seven fundamental principles of the International Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement, affirming that humanitarian actors should not take sides in hostilities or engage at any time in controversies of a political, racial, religious, or ideological nature.
See: http://www.ifrc.org/what/values/principles/neutrality.asp

63. NGO COORDINATION MECHANISMS: Three NGO consortia are formally part of the international humanitarian system and represented on the IASC. They are the International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA), InterAction and the Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response.

64. OFFICE FOR THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS (OCHA): UN body created in 1991 to coordinate UN response to complex emergencies and natural disasters. Headed by the Under Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator (USG/ERC), it is part of the UN Secretariat.
See: http://ochaonline.un.org/

65. OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE (ODA): Compiled by the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD/DAC), it measures financing flows from bilateral donors and multilateral institutions to promote the economic development and welfare of developing countries.

66. ONERESPONSE: Collaborative inter-agency website designed to enhance humanitarian coordination within the cluster approach and support country-level information exchange.
See: http://oneresponse.info

67. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT-DEVELOPMENT-DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE COMMITTEE (OECD-DAC): The principal body through OECD members and multilateral organisations cooperate with developing countries to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).
See: www.oecd.org/dac

68. OSLO GUIDELINES: Informal name for Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief. Promulgated in 1994; they were revised in 2007.

69. PARIS DECLARATION ON AID EFFECTIVENESS: 2005 agreement brokered by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) to harmonise aid and enable developing-country governments to formulate and implement their own national development plans.

70. POOLED FUNDING: An important aspect of humanitarian reform, the term refers to mechanisms seeking to centralise and consolidate funding streams, such as Common Humanitarian Funds (CHFs) and Multi-Donor Trust Funds (MDTFs).
See: http://www.undg.org/index.cfm?p=152

71. PREPAREDNESS: Activities to minimise loss of life and damage, organise the temporary removal of people and property from a threatened location and facilitate timely and effective rescue, relief and rehabilitation.

72. PREVENTION: Activities to avoid the adverse impact of hazards and means to minimise related environmental, technological and biological disasters.

73. PROPORTIONALITY: Principle in international humanitarian law (IHL) that humanitarian funding be distributed in proportion to needs established by objective assessments.
See: http://www.diakonia.se/sa/node.asp?node=887

74. PROTECTION: Activities seeking respect for the rights of the individual in accordance with human rights, refugee and international humanitarian law.
75. QUALITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY INITIATIVES: Major platforms to improve accountability, quality and performance in humanitarian action are:
- the Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action (ALNAP)
- Humanitarian Accountability Partnership International (HAP-I)
- People In Aid
- Sphere Project

76. RECOVERY: Restoring the capacity of national institutions and communities after a crisis: the early recovery phase aims to generate self-sustaining, nationally-owned processes to stabilise human security and address underlying risks that contributed to the crisis.

77. RED CROSS/RED CRESCENT SEVEN FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES: The seven Fundamental Principles bond together the National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC). They guarantee the continuity of the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement and its humanitarian work. They are: humanity, impartiality, neutrality, independence, voluntary service, unity and universality.
See: http://www.ifrc.org/what/values/principles/index.asp

78. REFUGEE LAW: The corpus of law whose principal instruments are:
- the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol
- the two Protocols on Transnational Organized Crime
- the 1954 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons
See: http://www.refugeelawreader.org/

79. RESIDENT COORDINATOR: The head of an UN Country Team. In some emergencies the post of RC is combined with that of the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC). RCs are funded and managed by the UN Development Programme (UNDP).

80. RESILIENCE: The ability of countries, communities and households to manage change by maintaining or transforming living standards in the face of shocks or stresses – such as earthquakes, drought or violent conflict – without compromising their long-term prospects.

81. SPECIAL ENVOY OF THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL (SESG): UN appointee designated to deal with a specific issue. For example, Bill Clinton is SESG for Haiti.

82. SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL (SRSG): UN appointee representing the Secretary-General in meetings with heads of state and negotiating on behalf of the UN.

83. TIMELINESS: Providing information and analysis in-time to inform key decisions about response.

84. UN-EARMARKED: In humanitarian usage, funds or commitment(s) for which a donor does not require the funds to be used for a specific project, sector, crisis or country. Because there are degrees of earmarking (e.g. to a country or crisis or a sector), the Financial Tracking System (FTS) treats as "unearmarked" any funding that is not earmarked at least to the country level.
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- Rebecca Moy
- Laura Schaack
“...at UN Women we are delighted that this year’s Humanitarian Response Index is shedding light on these essential issues, and calling on humanitarian actors and donor governments to live up to their commitments to ensure humanitarian actions are adapted to address the specific and different needs of women, girls, men and boys.”

-Michelle Bachelet, Executive Director of UN Women

“I want to encourage donors to take a more active stance, placing gender concerns at the heart of humanitarian action. Donors can play a crucial role by demanding that aid agencies use a comprehensive gender analysis to inform programming. The findings and recommendations from the Humanitarian Response Index report deserve thoughtful consideration.”

-Valerie Amos, UN Emergency Relief Coordinator

Donor governments mobilised more than US$16 billion to respond to humanitarian crises in 2010, including “mega-responses” in Pakistan and Haiti. Challenges to effective humanitarian response continue to grow. Yet far too often, the pressure to respond to vast emergency needs overshadows the different repercussions of natural disasters and conflict on women, men, boys and girls. The Humanitarian Response Index 2011 focuses on the crucial role donor governments have in ensuring that gender receives the attention it deserves in emergency response.

Now in its fifth year, the Humanitarian Response Index is the world’s foremost independent instrument for measuring individual performance of donor governments against Good Humanitarian Donorship Principles. The Humanitarian Response Index provides in-depth assessments of the 23 most important donor governments to help ensure their humanitarian funding has the greatest possible impact for people in critical need of aid.