Table of Contents

Abbreviations ................................................................................................................................................. 4
Acknowledgements .............................................................................................................................................. 4
Executive Summary ............................................................................................................................................ 5
Methodology ..................................................................................................................................................... 5
Background .................................................................................................................................................... 6
I. Introduction ................................................................................................................................................ 8
II. Overall Allocation and Disbursement ........................................................................................................ 8
   II.1 Role of the UN flash appeal .................................................................................................................. 17
   II.2 Concentration of funds ........................................................................................................................ 17
   II.3 Funding flows to private companies for implementation purposes ................................................. 17
   II.4 Employment of military assets .......................................................................................................... 17
   II.5 Donations in kind .............................................................................................................................. 17
   II.6 Implementation mechanisms and partnerships development ......................................................... 17
III. Good Humanitarian Donorship .................................................................................................................. 18
   III.1 Humanitarian objectives and principles .......................................................................................... 18
   III.2 Flexibility and timeliness .................................................................................................................. 19
   III.3 Needs based funding ......................................................................................................................... 19
   III.4 Beneficiary participation .................................................................................................................. 19
   III.5 Capacity-building, preparedness, prevention, mitigation ............................................................... 20
   III.6 Linkages to recovery and development .......................................................................................... 20
   III.7 UN Coordination and ICRC/IFRC mandate .................................................................................... 20
   III.8 Effect on other crises ....................................................................................................................... 21
   III.9 Predictability and flexibility ............................................................................................................. 22
   III.10 Appeals and Action Plan ................................................................................................................. 22
   III.11 Response capacity ......................................................................................................................... 22
   III.12 Civilian organization lead role ...................................................................................................... 22
   III.13 Evaluation ...................................................................................................................................... 22
   III.14 Financial transparency and accountability .................................................................................... 22
IV. Decision making criteria ............................................................................................................................ 23
V. Human Resources ....................................................................................................................................... 24
VI. Lessons ....................................................................................................................................................... 24
List of Tables and Figures

Table 1: UK Government funding of tsunami response ........................................ 8
Table 2: Allocation of DFID tsunami funding in £ by country ............................. 10
Table 3: DFID funding committed by actor, country and sector ............................ 15-17

List of Figures

Figure 1: DFID Fund Allocation ........................................................................ 8-9
Figure 2: Allocation of DFID funding in percentage by country ....................... 9
Figure 3: Timing of overall DFID funding .......................................................... 11
Figure 4: Percentage of DIFD funding by dates ............................................... 11
Figure 5: DFID funding: breakdown in secondments, logistics and in-kind donation ... 12
Figure 6: DFID funding to Red Cross, UN Organizations and NGOs over time ...... 12
Figure 7: DFID funding to Red Cross, UN Organizations and NGOs in percent ....... 13
Figure 8: Sectors supported by UN agencies receiving DFID funding ............... 13
Figure 9: Allocation of DFID tsunami funding by date and geographical location ... 20
Figure 10: Allocation of DIFD funds to UN agencies ......................................... 22
Abbreviations

CHAD    DFID’s Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance Department
CHASE   DFID’s Conflict, Humanitarian Assistance and Security
        Department (previously “CHAD”)
DAC      Development Assistance Committee of the OECD
DARA     Development Assistance Research Associates
DEC      Disaster Emergency Committee, UK
DFID     UK’s Department for International Development
FAO      Food and Agriculture Organisation
FCO      UK’s Foreign and Commonwealth Office
HIC      Humanitarian Information Centres
ICRC     International Committee of the Red Cross
IFRC     International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
IOM      International Organisation for Migration
m        Million
MoD      UK’s Ministry of Defence
NGO      Non-Governmental Organisation
OCHA     UN Office of the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ODA      Official Development Assistance
PARC     Performance Assessment Resource Centre
TEC      Tsunami Evaluation Coalition
UNDP     United Nations Development Programme
UNEP     United Nations Environment Programme
UNESCO   United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
UNHCR    United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF   United Nations Children’s Fund
UNFPA    United Nations Population Fund
UNSECOORD UN Security Coordinator
WFP      World Food Programme
WHO      World Health Organisation
£        Pounds Sterling (GBP)

Acknowledgements
The authors of this study, Achim Engelhardt and Silvia Hidalgo wish to thank the colleagues in DFID’s CHASE for their full and continued collaboration despite their high workload followed by the South Asia Earthquakes in October 2005.
Executive Summary
This report is based on an interview with staff from the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID), follow up to that interview and the in depth analysis DFID and other relevant reports by the consultants.

It strikes that in the UK, one government department, DFID clearly led on the tsunami funding response. DFID coordinated a smaller scale operation by the Ministry of Defence, MoD. Despite this focused approach, DFID’s visibility during the tsunami response was intentionally very limited due to the wide range of implementation partners. Overall, DFID collaborated with over 20 UK and non-UK based NGO’s, over 40 UN agencies, development banks, the Red Cross and an UK umbrella organisation for NGOs engaged in emergencies.

DFID’s humanitarian aid activities after the tsunami were transparent, clearly and regularly documented and are accessible to the public. Monitoring and evaluation have been accompanying DFID’s relief efforts in 2005.

There were high pressures on the UK government immediately after the disaster to match the US funding or the £400m of the UK Emergency NGOs umbrella organisation. The public and parliamentarians demanded that the UK should do “more than everyone else”. Even tough DFID did increase its pledge for immediate humanitarian funding from £15m on December due to strong public pressures, it did not increase it beyond the £75m pledged for by the Secretary of State, Hilary Benn on January 17th and withstood further public pressures¹. In hindsight, this firm standpoint paid off as the 75m pledge was even slightly higher than the demands for funding to date.

Nearly half of the UK’s humanitarian aid budget was dedicated to the UN (46, 5%). Over one third of this funding was designated to UN co-ordination and communication efforts lead by OCHA (36%). It is striking that the UK is the donor that most importance and funding gave to OCHA compared to other donors.

By mid March, DFID had nearly reached its current level of funding. In January, the Secretary of State pledged £75 m and by Mid March £ 67 m had been allocated. Approximately 3 weeks after the disaster, DFID had allocated 34.5% of pledged funds, compared to 54.5% at the same point in time at the current earthquake relief efforts in South Asia. By September 2005, approximately 91% of pledged DFID’s funds had been allocated.

In-kind contributions counted for 17% of the UK’s humanitarian aid funding. DFID provided vehicles and Humanitarian Information Centres to the UN as multipliers for UN performance. Pharmaceuticals were not provided directly but rather through WHO and a specialised NGO.

The geographical focus of the funding is Indonesia (34%), followed by 27% of the funding for interventions at a regional level. There is no specific sectoral focus of DFID’s funding response to the tsunami as partners allocated funding depending on needs and their comparative strengths.

Methodology
For the purpose of this review, the evaluators used a questionnaire they had previously designed for the overall review of the funding study of the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC). This standardised questionnaire was presented and discussed in a TEC coordination meeting in Geneva in September 2005 and subsequently applied for all donors related funding studies of the TEC. The questionnaire is focusing

¹ These pressures reflected upon the governments planning. By January 9th, Tony Blair had predicted that the UK government would eventually give “hundreds of millions” of pounds in aid, according to the BBC
on five key areas: Overall allocation and disbursement of funds, good humanitarian donor ship, decision making criteria, response strategy and human resources. All 22 DAC donors have signed up to the criteria of good humanitarian donor ship. Hence it seemed appropriate to use these criteria as a key area for the questionnaire.

The evaluators met on September 15th members of DFID’s Conflict, Humanitarian Assistance and Security Department (CHASE), lead by Peter Troy, Humanitarian Programmes Manager, for an interview based on the questionnaire. Prior to this meeting, relevant materials from the UK government were assessed on the Internet sites of DFID, Ministry of Defence (MoD), the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and the UK Government’s official website. Due to the “Freedom of information act” in the UK, the data availability on these websites is very rich.

The interview in DFID was followed up to obtain further qualitative data and information of DFID’s “CHAD operations room situation report Indian ocean earthquakes and tsunamis” was analysed in depth.

**Background**

Early in January 2005, in recognition of the added-value joint evaluations bring to the humanitarian sector, OCHA and WHO together with the ALNAP Secretariat began to discuss how best to coordinate evaluations of tsunami response. The intention was twofold:

1. To promote a sector-wide approach to evaluations of the tsunami response in order to optimise sector-wide learning.
2. To develop, test and validate produces for the future timely establishment of such an evaluation coordination (coalition) mechanism that could facilitate such an approach.

An interagency and donor meeting was convened in Geneva on 23 February 2005 to discuss how best to develop this approach. At that meeting participants agreed to constitute an ‘evaluation coalition’ (subsequently named the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition or TEC).

The TEC was constituted in February 2005, tasked to evaluate the international response to the Tsunami Disaster. The TEC is undertaking six thematic evaluations, one of which is the Funding Study that aims to grasp the overall funding flow from the various governments, UN agencies and NGOs to the disaster-affected areas. This study has been conducted as part of the Funding Study, and focuses on the funding provided through the UK’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) in response to the tsunami disaster.

The key state donors funding studies for the UK, but also the studies for Sweden, the EC and Spain have been commissioned and financed by DARA in accordance with Danida, the coordination partners for the theme “funding” and the TEC.

In accordance with the terms of reference, the purpose of this thematic evaluation on the international community’s funding response is:

1. To provide an overview of the total volume of financial and in-kind funding of the response by the various actors,
2. To assess the appropriateness of the allocation of funds in relation to the actual relief and reconstruction needs and in relation to other emergencies,
3. To contribute to a better understanding of public responses to emergencies,
4. Provide a basis for follow-up studies after 2 and 4 years.

---

2 The six themes are: 1) Funding, 2) Coordination, 3) Needs assessment, 4) Impact on local and national capacities, 5) Linking relief, rehabilitation and development, and 6) Impact assessment.

3 Other state donors reviewed include Canada, Denmark, Japan, Ireland, and the United States.
The purpose of this study on the UK’s governmental response is to assess the British funding policy and decision-making against Good Humanitarian Donorship Principles and:

- Document the amount and pattern of pledges made by the UK as a state donor in the months following the tsunami. Analyse these pledges commenting on evidence that they represent new funding, or reallocated funding. Seek to comment on the relationship between appeals for assistance on the one hand and the nature of pledges on the other.
- Record actual financial commitments made and comment on how these relate to pledges. Where possible show to which agencies and which countries commitments have been made. Comment on where these commitments with to agency and affected-state identified programming.
- Of these commitments, identify what has actually been spent and how well spending in these first six months was prioritised and disbursed in a way that demonstrates impartiality.
- Analyse the flow of goods in kind paying particular attention to military assets and pharmaceuticals. Have unsolicited goods been donated? Has military assistance been charged at cost?

Finally, while focusing on the funding role of state actors, the study recognises that official donors have increasingly far wider, multi-faceted roles and responsibilities in the field of humanitarian action. It is in the context of this broader donor function and the Good Humanitarian Donorship agenda that this study aims to review British state funding policies and decision making processes.
I. Introduction
In the UK, the government response to the Tsunami was lead by DFID. This report captures DFID’s funding of the tsunami response. The MoD was the only other UK government department that funded mainly logistical operations while the Foreign Office offered consular services to UK citizens in the affected areas. Despite various attempts to interview the relevant official in the MoD, it was not possible to obtain information from the MoD. The operations from the Foreign Office were not taken into account as they aimed at UK citizens overseas only. Hence only DFID’s funding response is considered in the following chapters.

II. Overall Allocation and Disbursement
The UK Government has allocated the equivalent of around £275 million to disaster relief and reconstruction in the Tsunami affected countries. This can be broken down into tax relief, EC contributions, debt relief and funds channelled through the DFID for humanitarian relief and long-term reconstruction and rehabilitation as shown in figure 1.

The UK Treasury estimates that the government will be contributing approximately £50 million through tax relief on public donations made through the Gift Aid Scheme. The British government also contributes through the European Commission (EC). The EC has already committed €123 million in humanitarian assistance and up to €350 million for longer-term reconstruction. The UK’s share of this latter total would be approximately £40 million. One further way in which the UK is planning to support affected governments is through debt relief. Following the tsunami, the UK announced that Sri Lanka would be added to the list of countries for the UK’s new multilateral debt relief initiative. Under this initiative, the UK will pay our share (10%, or around £45 million) of Sri Lanka's debt service costs to the World Bank until 2015.

Table 1: UK Government funding of the tsunami response

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Funding in £</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DFID humanitarian relief</td>
<td>75,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFID long-term reconstruction and rehabilitation</td>
<td>65,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tax relief on public donations</td>
<td>50,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC humanitarian relief long-term reconstruction</td>
<td>40,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka debt relief initiative</td>
<td>45,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>275,000,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Subsequently the report will focus on DFID’s funding response to the Tsunami.
DFID started with the tsunami funding response immediately after the disaster. By December 31\textsuperscript{st} 2005 DFID has already disbursed a total of £2,896,500. By August 2\textsuperscript{nd} 2005, DFID had allocated £66,896,347, including the funding for the Disaster Emergency Committee (DEC), an umbrella organisations for UK emergency NGOs, funds for M&E and secondments. By September 15\textsuperscript{th}, approximately £68 m had been spent.\textsuperscript{4} DFID had overall pledged for £75 m in January 2005.

\textbf{Figure 2: Allocation of DFID funding in percentage by country}\textsuperscript{5}

The general allocation of funds by August 2\textsuperscript{nd} was as follows: 46. 50% of the total budget was allocated to 40 UN organisations. 14.54% was allocated to 25 NGOs. The majority of these NGOs are UK based while some were based outside the UK. 12.49% of the funds were allocated to DFID’s office in Indonesia directly. 16.54% of the total funds were allocated for donations in kind and 3.11% for flights for the DEC. 0.73% of the budget were spent in staff secondments and 0.25% in M&E, as shown in figure 3.

\textsuperscript{4} Peter Troy, DFID, personal communication

\textsuperscript{5} Date: 02.08.2005, excl. MoD, DEC funding, M&E and secondments, source: www.dfid.gov.uk
The geographical allocation of funds is presented in figure 3 and 4. By August 2nd, 34% of the funds were allocated to Indonesia, 8% to Sri Lanka, 4% to India, 2% to the Maldives and 1% to Somalia. 27% of funds were regional and 27% unspecified.

Table 2: Allocation of DFID tsunami funding in £ by country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Humanitarian Aid</th>
<th>Reconstruction 2005 and 2006 (?)</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Amount in currency X</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Amount</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>2,766,874</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>20,977,216</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maldives</td>
<td>1,536,221</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seychelles</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>500,000</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>5,075,250</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional</td>
<td>17,438,111</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unspecified</td>
<td>15,543,790</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>63,837,462</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2 presents the allocation of DFID’s tsunami funding by country by August 2nd 2005. As this data excludes DEC funding, M&E and secondments, the total value is below the £66,896,347 stated above.

The timing of overall DFID funding in figure 5 shows funding peaked in January, approximately 3 weeks after the tsunami. Overall “Other DFID funding agreed” was the most important funding area with £52,285,083. This includes funding for UN agencies, NGOs, the DEC, IFRC/ICRC and others (see figure 7). The same pattern applies to logistics. The peak reached £1,056,116 by January 14th. In total, DFID supported NGOs by covering logistical costs with £2,083,126. In-kind donations peaked by February 4th with £4,924,300. Overall £11,724,390 was allocated to in-kind donations. The peak for the funding of staff secondments reached £262,000 by February 4th. A total of £489,000 was used for secondments, mostly for UN agencies.

*Date: 02.08.2005, excl. MoD, DEC funding, M&E and secondments, source: www.dfid.gov.uk*
Figure 3: Timing of overall DFID funding

![Figure 3: Timing of overall DFID funding](image)

Figure 4 outlines in a separate analysis the focus of DFID funding on different key areas. Approximately 55% of the funding of DFID staff secondments were undertaken by February 14th and another 20% for August 2nd. 50% of funding for logistics was allocated by January 14th. Nearly 40% of funds for in-kind donations were allocated by January 14th, slightly more by February 4th and about approximately 20% by March 15th.

Figure 4: Percentage of DFID funding by dates

![Figure 4: Percentage of DFID funding by dates](image)

Overall, 79% of the allocated budget can be categorised as “Other DFID funding agreed” including the funding for UN agencies, NGOs, the DEC, IFRC/ICRC and others. 17% of funding was in-kind, 3% of funding was for logistics and 1% of DFID staff secondments, as shown in figure 7. It is remarkable that 20% of total in-kind donations were still provided 11 weeks after the emergency.
Figure 6 shows that 5 days after the tsunami, DFID published the first statistics about its funding response to the emergency. Most funding went to the Red Cross movement (IFRC/ICRC) in that early stage (£2 m). Funding to the UN was insignificant and 2 NGOs received funding of £800,000. After January 14th, the DFID funding to the Red Cross decreased. In total £3,500,000 were given to the Red Cross movement. The funding of NGOs peaked at £5,865,237 in January. The funding to the UN developed in a similar pattern, but at a much higher level, and peaked at £13,000,000 in January.
Figure 7: DFID funding to Red Cross, UN organisations and NGOs in percent

A detailed break down of DFID funding by actors, sector and country is presented in figure 11. The majority of NGO funding, UK and non-UK NGOs, was allocated in interventions in Sri Lanka, followed by India. For Indonesia, most of DFID’s funding was channelled through the UN system (UNICEF, UNDP, IOM, UNSECOORD), the Asian Development Bank and the World Bank. The majority of the funds channelled through the UN system were used throughout the affected region.

Figure 8: Sectors supported by UN agencies receiving DFID funding

A specification of supported sectors is difficult as most actors used the funding in more than one sector, especially in NGOs and the Red Cross. In the case of UN agencies, the sectoral focus of the agencies is coordination and communication with 34% of the budget allocated to UN agencies, followed by economic recovery & infrastructure and food & logistics, both with 15%, water and sanitation with 14%, protection with 8% and health with 11%, protection. 1% of the funding for UN agencies was allocated by them to shelter and security, respectively.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>Implementation foreseen</th>
<th>Actor</th>
<th>Committed</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Cash</th>
<th>In kind</th>
<th>Committed by implementers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>NGOs</td>
<td>Save the Children Fund UK</td>
<td>400,000</td>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>Shelter and non-food items; water and sanitation; food; protection</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>14.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>World Vision UK</td>
<td>250,000</td>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>Food and non-food items</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Basic Needs</td>
<td>57,933</td>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>Health</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ZOA Refugee Care</td>
<td>1,124,610</td>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>Shelter, water and sanitation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Norwegian Refugee Council</td>
<td>478,564</td>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>Shelter, water and sanitation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mercy Corps</td>
<td>300,000</td>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>Economic recovery and infrastructure</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Christian Aid</td>
<td>260,008</td>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>Shelter</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Red R</td>
<td>151,852</td>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>Shelter</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ADRA</td>
<td>490,000</td>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>Economic recovery and infrastructure</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>International Health Partners</td>
<td>32,261</td>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>Logistics</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Islamic Relief</td>
<td>590,022</td>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>Shelter, Economic recovery and infrastructure</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ADRA</td>
<td>440,000</td>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>Water supply</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>HelpAge International</td>
<td>483,054</td>
<td>Sri Lanka, India</td>
<td>Health, food, water and non-food items</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Christian Aid</td>
<td>400,000</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>Food, shelter, water and sanitation, health</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Christian Children’s Fund</td>
<td>279,531</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>Economic recovery and infrastructure, Health</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Plan International</td>
<td>325,627</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>Economic recovery and infrastructure, health</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Aide ET Action</td>
<td>394,706</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>Economic recovery and infrastructure</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Agence D’Aide A la cooperação technique et au développement (ACTED)</td>
<td>260,000</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>Shelter, water and sanitation, Economic recovery and infrastructure</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Disaster Mitigation Institute</td>
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<td>India</td>
<td>Shelter, Economic recovery and infrastructure</td>
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<tr>
<td>Donor</td>
<td>Implementation foreseen</td>
<td>Actor</td>
<td>Committed</td>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Sector</td>
<td>Cash</td>
<td>In kind</td>
<td>Committed % by implementers</td>
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<tr>
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<td>---------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO (continued)</td>
<td>Habitat for Humanity</td>
<td>302,275</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>Shelter</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Voluntary Health Association of India</td>
<td>476,000</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>Shelter</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>International Medical Corps</td>
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<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>Health</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Mentor initiative</td>
<td>1,119,680</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>Health</td>
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<td>International Health Partners</td>
<td>5,221</td>
<td>Maldives</td>
<td>Logistics</td>
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<tr>
<td>Disaster Emergency Committee (DEC)</td>
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<td>OCHA</td>
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<td>Somalia</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>250,000</td>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>Communication</td>
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<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>4,000,000</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>400,000</td>
<td>Regional</td>
<td>Shelter</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
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<td>Economic recovery and infrastructure</td>
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<td>Maldives</td>
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<td>Maldives</td>
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<td>…</td>
<td>1,500,000</td>
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<td>Health, water and sanitation, logistics, food and non-food items</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Donor</td>
<td>Implementation foreseen</td>
<td>Actor</td>
<td>Committed</td>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Sector</td>
<td>Cash</td>
<td>In kind</td>
<td>Committed % by implementers</td>
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<td>Direct Implementation (Secondments)</td>
<td>16 members of staff for up to 6 months</td>
<td>489,000</td>
<td>Regional</td>
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<td>Private companies</td>
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<td>Rome, Indonesia, London, India, Sri Lanka, Maldives</td>
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<td>16.6%</td>
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<tr>
<td>IFRC/ICRC</td>
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<td>Total</td>
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DFID: incl. DEC funding, M&E and secondments; date 02/08/2005; excl. MoD
Source: www.dfid.gov.uk
II. 1 Role of the UN flash appeal
The UN flash appeal was the key document for DFID and country teams provided direct feedback. DFID took the risk to provide WHO and UNICEF with funding before the appeal. DFID contributed £10m to the Indian Ocean Flash Appeal launched by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). Nevertheless, in a DFID review the UN flash appeal was critically commented on in three key areas:

- The appeal was prepared too late and unstructured
- UN agencies suffered from a lack of qualified and experienced personnel

II. 2 Concentration of funds
DFID worked through long trusted partners, incl. ca. 23 NGOs and some 40 UN agencies. For Indonesia, DFID used a delegated budget and channelled it through the World Bank, Asian Development Bank and Internews.

II. 3 Funding flows to private companies for implementation purposes
Private companies were only funded for the purpose of hiring helicopters. Generally speaking, the need to use private companies did not occur. Private sector proposal presented to DFID focused on rehabilitation rather than relief.

Ad hoc private sector requests to collaborate in the relief operations were usually forwarded to the “Global Hand” initiative that facilitates capacities to help in the affected region and to transport goods. DFID has no direct quality control of these services.

In Sri Lanka, there were pressures from the private sector to be contracted to get involved in relief activities, but these pressures were perceived as marketing of local businessmen rather than genuine offers to alleviate the consequences of the disaster.

II. 4 Employment of military assets
DFID worked with, and guided a UK military team. MoD provided logistical support through DFID. In response to the Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami, DFID and MoD have an agreement based on marginal costing related to the use of UK military staff and equipment in the relief effort. The costs are agreed in advance and are competitive with commercial rates.

During Parliamentary Questions, the British Secretary of State for International Development, Hilary Benn, responded to a question from the former Secretary of State, Clare Short that up to an estimated £2.5m of marginal costs would be incurred by the MoD.

II. 5 Donations in kind
DFID provided vehicles and Humanitarian Information Centres to the UN as multipliers for UN performance. Pharmaceuticals were not provided directly but rather through WHO and the NGO Merlin. DFID funded transport for donated pharmaceuticals. DFID was not satisfied with the operation of its partner International Health Partners but placed responsibility for clearance of the pharmaceuticals and supplies sent on WHO.

II. 6 Implementation mechanisms and partnerships development
DFID worked through partners. Although some people perceived this as a lack of DFID visibility, it was part of the organisation’s strategy. DFID has field offices in Sri Lanka (3-5 staff) and Indonesia (1-2 staff). In Sri Lanka, DFID played a central role of donor coordination and to a less extent in Indonesia. In India, DFID coordinated from its largest office field office overseas. In the case of Somalia there were sufficient relief items in country and no direct DFID implementation was necessary. In the UK, DFID coordinated

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7 lead by David Horobin, Operations Team Director, CHAD, DFID
8 18 October 2005
with MoD, the umbrella organisation for UK emergency NGOs (DEC) and non-DEC members at a weekly basis.

III. Good Humanitarian Donorship

III. 1 Humanitarian objectives and principles
DFID applied throughout its operations a “Do no harm” strategy and showed conflict sensitivity. There is consciousness of its obligations under the Good Humanitarian Donorship initiative. DFID’s principles for a so-called “new humanitarism” are as follows:

DFID’s principles for a new humanitarism

- “We will seek always to uphold international humanitarian law and human rights laws and conventions.
- “We will seek to promote a more universal approach in addressing humanitarian needs. People in need - wherever they are - should have equal status and rights to assistance.
- “We will seek to work with others whose efforts are also aimed at tackling the underlying causes of a crisis and building peace and stability.
- “We will seek to work with other committed members of the international community and, in particular, seek partnership across the North/South divide to secure better international systems and mechanisms for timely joint humanitarian action.
- “We will agree ‘ground rules’ that prevent diversion of humanitarian goods and collusion with unconstitutional armed groups.
- “We will be impartial - our help will seek to relieve civilians’ suffering without discrimination on political or other grounds, with priority given to the most urgent cases of distress.
- “We will seek the best possible assessment of needs, and a clear framework of standards and accountability for those who work to deliver DFID’s assistance.
- “We will encourage the participation of people and communities affected by crises to help them find long-lasting solutions which respect their rights and dignity.
- “We will, where possible, seek to rebuild livelihoods and communities, and build capacity so that communities will be less vulnerable to future crises.
- “We recognise that humanitarian intervention in conflict situations often poses genuine moral dilemmas.
- “We will base our decisions on explicit analyses of the choices open to us and the ethical considerations involved, and communicate our conclusions openly to our partners.”

III. 2 Flexibility and timeliness
The analysis of DFID funding between January and August\(^9\) shows that by March 15\(^{th}\), approximately 11 weeks after the tsunami, DFID had already allocated most of the emergency funding. Increases afterwards are insignificant, as shown in figure 12 with cumulative data.

DFID started a 1\(^{st}\) appeal for concept notes from NGOs 36 h – 48 h after the disaster. The first interventions were started with partners with capacities on the ground. The 2\(^{nd}\) appeal was based on country level strategies developed by DFID offices in the affected countries. Due to the overwhelming public response NGOs did prefer funds donated by the public rather than government funds at that specific point in time.

\(^9\) The funding shown is cumulative
By **January 14**th, approximately 3 weeks after the disaster, the majority of funds were allocated regionally with a secondary focus on Indonesia. Overall 34.5% of funds pledged for by DFID had been allocated by that date, compared to 54.5% of the funds pledged for by DFID 3 weeks after the South Asia Earthquakes in October 2005\(^\text{10}\).

By **February 4**th, approximately 6 weeks after the disaster, the majority of funding was allocated regionally or the location was unspecific. A secondary focus was in Indonesia and a tertiary one in Sri Lanka. By **March 15**th there was a major increase in the allocation of funds to Indonesia and a stronger focus on India after the government of India asked for external assistance.

In-kind support was only given to Indonesia, Sri Lanka and Maldives. In January and February, in-kind support exceeded the value of non in-kind support to Indonesia. In the Maldives, in-kind and non in-kind support had a similar value since March 14\(^\text{th}\).

### III. 3 Needs based funding

The amount pledged by the UK government was not based on needs but rather on public pressure and media focus. From an initial pledge of £ 15 million, the amount was increased twice to arrive at the current £ 75 million.

Regarding the allocation of funds DFID has conducted needs assessment to allocate funds in accordance to identified needs. It is very much relied on the information provided by its teams on the ground that has also contributed to filter the Flash Appeal.

In the case of Sri Lanka a joint UN-USAID-DFID assessment team completed the first rapid, but comprehensive, impact and needs assessment within a few days of the disaster. Before that assessment, a lead staff member of CHAD’s Operations Team met DFID colleagues at the British High Commission and visited UN offices to discuss disaster impact and needs assessment.

### III. 4 Beneficiary participation

\(^{10}\) Source: www.dfdi.gov.uk
For DFID information about beneficiary participation is difficult to answer as DFID itself did not implement any emergency response activities and the ground but worked through partners. Partners on the ground worked with beneficiaries to different degrees.

III. 5 Capacity-building, preparedness, prevention, mitigation

As part of a policy DFID allocates 10% of its funding in response to each natural disaster to prepare for and mitigate the impact of future disasters, where this can be done effectively. DFID is integrating disaster reduction into its development programming.

For 2006 DFID allocated £7.5 m for disaster mitigation. This is 10% of the funds pledged for in January 2005 for the emergency response.

III. 6 Linkages to recovery and development

A total of £ 65m has been allocated to long-term rehabilitation. This is 46% of DFID’s overall tsunami response. DFID's focus will be on support to rebuilding livelihoods and services for poor people in affected countries. The governments concerned are currently completing needs assessments with the support of the World Bank and others. DFID will consider how we can best channel our support once we have the completed assessments of need.

DFID will work to ensure that the views of the poorest and most vulnerable are taken into account throughout the process of rehabilitation. It will be important that the response of donors and international agencies is coordinated properly to ensure effective use of funds and minimum burden on recipient countries. DFID will work to ensure that the UN relief effort is sustained and that there is a smooth transition from the recovery phase to longer-term rehabilitation

III. 7 UN Coordination and ICRC/IFRC mandate

DFID heavily supported OCHA for UN coordination efforts. OCHA received with £10.75 m the single biggest contributions of all UN agencies as presented in figure 13. Despite this close cooperation to facilitate coordination, DFID staff is worried about possible dependencies created. UNICEF was allocated 20% of DFID’s funding to UN agencies, UNDP 14% and WHO and WFP 11% respectively.

In Sri Lanka DFID was heavily involved with the organisation of transitional shelter. This work was coordinated with UNHCR and the National authorities in order to develop DFID’s response strategy. This latter was the basis for CHAD Operations Team’s recommendations to the CHAD Management in London.

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11 Parliamentary questions, 24 Jan 2005
The support of UN Humanitarian Information Centres (HIC) is another stream of work that is aimed at DFID support of UN coordination and DFID has taken on a predominant role in supporting HICs. An evaluation carried out prior to the Tsunami found that:

“The timing of deployment is critical in achieving the greatest success for HIC. The earlier the deployment, the more impact they will have on their environment. The best way of achieving this is to deploy a core team from headquarters that would stay until it can be replaced by roster staff. The equipment should also be expanded to include smaller deployable units”.

“HICs will fail in their stated goal of supporting decision making unless analytical capacity is added to information management capacity. There are several options for this – analytical capacity can reside within a lead agency, within the office of the humanitarian coordinator, within the OCHA office or in the HIC itself”.

The Central Emergency Revolving Fund (CERF) is advocated by DFID, but there are concerns about accountability by staff at the operational level.

III. 8 Effect on other crises

DFID did not re-channel funds from other emergencies to the tsunami as the £75 m were additional funds to DFID’s budget for CHASE. This has been drawn from DFID’s humanitarian contingency budget and DFID’s central Contingency Reserve (66.7%) and 33.3% from the Treasury’s Reserve.

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12 A DFID review of HIC’s supported by DFID in Bandar Aceh and Colombo after the tsunami emergency found that these HIC’s were not established quickly enough.
In total DFID spent £308 m on humanitarian aid in 2003/04 making it the second largest bilateral humanitarian donor. In that period Iraq received £ 109 m in humanitarian assistance, Zimbabwe £24 m and Sudan £21 m.

III. 9 Predictability and flexibility
The predictability of funding pledged for by DFID is nearly optimal. By September 2005, approximately 91% of funds pledged for in January had been committed. This is an exceptional performance compared to most other donors. According to a publication of ActionAid\textsuperscript{13}, Japan had provided 100% of the committed funding by June 2005 while Australia only managed to give 7% at the date, followed by France (13%), Germany (15%), the Netherlands (16%), Canada (20%), the US and the EC (38%), Norway (46%) and Italy (59%).

III. 10 Appeals and Action Plan
DFID staff at operational and senior management level is critical about appeals. In a speech Hilary Benn, the UK Secretary of State for International Development, prior to the tsunami on December 15\textsuperscript{th} 2004, criticised the lack of co-ordination of funding decisions of donors in crisis responses. He highlighted that the UN appeal for Chechnya in 2003 was 91% funded while the UN appeal for Mozambique in the same year was only 15% funded. This is one reason why the UK is supporting heavily OCHA in order to improve UN co-ordination in emergencies.

III. 11 Response capacity
DFID’s humanitarian contingency budget and DFID’s central Contingency Reserve provide important sources of funding for emergencies. DFID’s response capacity is further strengthened by the possibility to access the Treasury’s reserve in extreme cases like the tsunami response.

DFID’s senior management is preoccupied by the general response capacity of the international community. In a press release from December 15\textsuperscript{th}, 2004, The UK’s Secretary of State for International Development proposed a new annual $ 1 billion fund for quicker emergency responses. Since this statement a so called Central Emergency Revolving Fund (CERF), has been set up. Only seven governments - UK, Sweden, Norway, Netherlands, Ireland, Switzerland and Luxembourg - have pledged money to date. The total pledges to the CERF fund so far amount to US$187 million.\textsuperscript{14}

III. 12 Civilian organization lead role
DFID makes it clear that it worked with and \textit{guided} UK military crew involved in relief assistance. In 2-3 times MoD decisions were vetoed by DFID and DFID encouraged MoD to follow humanitarian principles.

III. 13 Evaluation
DFID is welcoming the TEC initiative and sees it as an additional effort co-ordination effort. For rigorous monitoring and evaluation DFID undertook field visits to affected countries like Sri Lanka, India, Maldives and Indonesia. By August 2\textsuperscript{nd} 2005, £165,000 had been allocated for M&E related to the tsunami response in DFID.

III. 14 Financial transparency and accountability
Evaluation in DFID serves the purpose for accountability \textit{and} lesson learning. Hence the evaluation efforts so far look at accountability issues, too. Financial transparency has been guaranteed by frequent,

\textsuperscript{13} www.actionaid.org.uk/index.asp?page_id=100063
detailed and publicly accessible financial reporting. Furthermore DFID is providing real-time data to the Financial Tracking System, managed by OCHA.

IV. Decision making criteria
There were high pressures on the UK government immediately after the disaster to match the US funding or the £400m of the UK Emergency NGOs umbrella organisation. The public and parliamentarians demanded that the UK should do “more than everyone else”. Even tough DFID did increase its pledge for immediate humanitarian funding from £15m on December, it did not increase it beyond the £75m pledged for by the Secretary of State, Hilary Benn on January 17th and withstood public pressures15. In hindsight, this firm standpoint paid off as the 75m pledge was even slightly higher than the demands for funding to date.

V. Response strategy
DFID’s strategies for seeking to implement its principles of a new humanitarism for humanitarian assistance are listed below. This strategy is not specific to the tsunami response but generally applicable.

DFID aim to assist disaster-prone countries to better manage natural, environmental and industrial risks through:

- Encouraging countries to include risk reduction, disaster management and mitigation in their development planning processes;
- Supporting community initiatives to reduce their vulnerability to major risks;
- Helping strengthen the ability of countries to carry out landmine clearance in badly affected poor areas;
- Encouraging relevant international organisations such as UNDP and the World Bank to include risk reduction, disaster management and mitigation in their strategies.

DFID aim to help in improving the quality of humanitarian response and promoting speedy recovery through:

- Improving the assessment of needs;
- Encouraging humanitarian agencies to take fuller account of developmental considerations, especially in the case of natural disasters. This includes reducing vulnerability, developing local and national capacities and promoting fuller participation and self reliance, taking account of the views of directly affected communities and helping them to cope better with adversity;
- Supporting rehabilitation and recovery. This includes involving the International Financial Institutions at an early stage in reducing the wider economic impact of disasters, for example, through addressing the question of debt where this is relevant.

15 These pressures reflected upon the governments planning. By January 9th, Tony Blair had predicted that the UK government would eventually give “hundreds of millions” of pounds in aid, according to the BBC.
DFID aim to encourage the strengthening of international systems for dealing with humanitarian crises through:

- Promoting better understanding of the social, economic and environmental factors that affect countries’ vulnerability to disasters;
- Working with international humanitarian organisations to improve their capacity to respond effectively and accountably;
- Seeking the broadest possible agreement on common standards for technical performance, reporting and co-ordination, for example through supporting voluntary NGO initiatives in this area;
- Promoting better co-ordination and more effective humanitarian assistance within the European Union, including the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO).

VI. Human Resources
At the peak of the operations 30 persons worked exclusively on the tsunami emergency relief operations in DFID. Staff was “lend” to the relevant department in DFID, CHASE from other departments on the basis of a database of internal staff with humanitarian assistance experience.

VII. Lessons
The interviewed DFID staff captured the lessons learned from DFID’s tsunami response as follows:

- It paid off to focus on what the department thinks it is good at. This includes staying clear from medicines.
- Good relations with UN agencies and a direct contact between the relevant decision makers enabled DFID to get in advance copies of UN strategies and for agencies like WHO to contact DFID on the very same day of the disaster to address needs.
- For information needs from the field, DFID relied on the information from its country offices.
- The UN flash appeal came late, but quicker than in other emergencies. The dynamics of a flash appeal in general are ambiguous. While it helps putting attention to an emergency, it can lead to politically motivated pledges rather than to pledges based on the needs assessed on the ground, disbursement and absorption capacities.
Persons interviewed

Peter Troy, Humanitarian Programmes Manager, DFID CHASE
Anissa Toscano, Senior Programme Officer, Operations team DFID CHASE
Ian Howard - Williams, Operations team DFID CHASE
John Wearing, Programme Officer, DFID CHASE

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