Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC)
The International Community’s Funding of the Tsunami Emergency and Relief

NGO Funding

Spain

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Abbreviations and acronyms

AECI  Spanish Agency for International Development
AOMD-FECEMD  Association of Non Governmental and Non Lucrative Organisations that are Users of Direct Marketing
CONGDE  Coordinator of Spanish Development NGOs
DANIDA  Danish International Development Agency
DARA  Development Assistance Research Associates
NGO  Non Governmental Organisation
SMS  Mobile Short Text Message
TEC  Tsunami Evaluation Coalition
UNICEF  United Nations Children’s Fund
Background

This report on Spain’s NGO funding in response to the Tsunami is part of a series of country studies1 undertaken in the context of an evaluation of the international community’s funding of the Tsunami emergency and relief. The subject is one of five thematic evaluations carried out by the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC). This thematic evaluation on funding is led by DANIDA.

“The Tsunami catastrophe that struck Asia on 26 December 2004 is one of the worst natural disasters in modern history. Although the major impact was felt in India, Indonesia, the Maldives, Sri Lanka and Thailand, several others were affected by the Tsunami including Myanmar and Somalia. More than 250,000 people died and overall, an estimated 1.5 to 5 million people have been directly affected. Damage and destruction of infrastructure has devastated people’s livelihoods, and it left many homeless and without adequate water and healthcare services.

The world – governments and people – responded with unprecedented generosity in solidarity with the rescue and relief efforts of the affected communities and local and national authorities. More than $6 billion has been pledged for humanitarian emergency relief and reconstruction assistance to Tsunami affected areas. This has been instrumental in reducing or mitigating the consequences of the disaster, and in boosting the recovery and reconstruction efforts.”

In accordance with the terms of reference, the general purpose of this thematic evaluation on the international community’s funding response is:

a) To provide an overview of the total volume of financial and in-kind funding of the response by the various actors,

b) To assess the appropriateness of the allocation of funds in relation to the actual relief and reconstruction needs and in relation to other emergencies,

c) To contribute to a better understanding of public responses to emergencies,

d) Provide a basis for follow-up studies after 2 and 4 years.

This country NGO report aims at depicting and analyzing the response of Spanish NGOs to the Tsunami that struck the coastline of the Indian Ocean in December 2004. It does not intend to offer a comprehensive compilation of final figures on funds raised, however, the methodology that has been followed and the participation offered by the Spanish NGOs consulted allow for a fair reflection of how the response was funded and articulated.

1 Other NGO country reviews include Denmark, Japan, Ireland, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands.

2 As stated in the Concept Paper for Evaluating the International Community’s Funding of the Tsunami Emergency and Relief, 28 June 2005, Danida File no: 104.a.e.51
In addition to gathering financial data, the study attempted to draw a timeline to outline and delineate the response to shed further light on the decision-making and financial reporting processes.

Methodology

DARA, throughout the month of August and September 2005 undertook a desk review of background documentation to develop a reporting format, NGO questionnaire, and tables for financial data collection. These were then contrasted with other evaluation teams involved in the country studies in a coordination meeting held in Geneva on September 8, 2005. For the purposes of the study on the Spanish response, DARA started sending information on the TEC and requesting interviews to Spanish NGOs in the course of the months of August and September 2005. All interviewees received prior written information on the questions to be raised by the evaluation team.

The report has been constructed around the information gathered by means of personal interviews with staff from NGOs and the information facilitated by them by means of tables and questionnaires. It is worth mentioning that the response to the study has been uneven, and that many NGOs have not responded to the requests posed by DARA’s team, thus the study is not comprehensive and has to be considered a case study. It has been possible to interview and gather direct data from nine Spanish NGOs. Information from another 11 NGOs was available from the webpage of CONGDE (Coordinadora de ONG para el Desarrollo-España, www.congde.org), which has been included in the report, along with information provided from 2 other NGOs not present in the CONGDE data. Information from 22 NGOs guarantees representation of the study in terms of quantitative and qualitative issues.

In order to respect confidentiality and avoid misleading comparisons, concrete figures for individual NGOs are provided only when referring to total amounts raised. Those are public figures that in many cases have been updated through direct interviews. In other cases, the figures are taken from figures published by CONGDE in March 2005. CONGDE is the main coordinating body of Spanish NGOs. Twenty-three NGOs offered some information at that time on their activities regarding the Tsunami. For the rest of the figures, aggregated data and percentages are given to offer trends and general assessments.
In-person interviews were carried out and questionnaires were answered by the following organisations:

Table 1: List of organizations that contributed information to this report

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NGO</th>
<th>Mandates</th>
<th>Contact Person</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Acción Contra el Hambre</td>
<td>Health, Infrastructure, Food Security, Humanitarian Action</td>
<td>Manuel Sánchez-Montero</td>
<td>25/08/05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asociación Paz y Desarrollo</td>
<td>Gender, Capacity Building, Social Development</td>
<td>José Lino Devesa</td>
<td>12/09/05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caritas</td>
<td>Health, Education, Infrastructure, Capacity Building, Social Development</td>
<td>Marisa Salazar</td>
<td>19/09/05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONGDE</td>
<td>Coordination</td>
<td>Ricardo Angora</td>
<td>18/08/09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cruz Roja Española</td>
<td>Health, Education, Infrastructure, Capacity Building, Social Development, Humanitarian Action</td>
<td>Alberto Castro, Rubén Cano, Jaime Gregori</td>
<td>01/09/05, 13/09/05, 23/09/05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entreculturas</td>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Alberto Begué</td>
<td>30/08/05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fundación Vicente Ferrer</td>
<td>Capacity Building, Social Development</td>
<td>Mireia Pérez Díaz</td>
<td>10/11/05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manos Unidas</td>
<td>Health, Education, Capacity Building, Social Development</td>
<td>Ana Bonet</td>
<td>4/10/05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Médicos del Mundo</td>
<td>Health, Humanitarian Action, Social Development</td>
<td>Donato Capozzi, Antonio Millán</td>
<td>30/09/05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPDL</td>
<td>Infrastructure, Capacity Building, Social Development Humanitarian Action</td>
<td>José Jaime de Domingo</td>
<td>03/10/05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Save the Children</td>
<td>Education, Humanitarian Action</td>
<td>Boris Aristin, Elena Turnes</td>
<td>06/09/05</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Summary and Key Points

This report provides an overview of the response of the Spanish NGOs to the Indian Ocean Tsunami of 26 December 2004. Most NGOs reacted in a similar way since they have comparable

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3 Source: Annual Activity Reports from the NGOs and/or webpage statements
procedures to respond to an emergency context. They were the main recipients of the donations from the public as well as the main managers of the allocated funds for the emergency and the reconstruction efforts. NGOs in Spain received more than 89 million Euros, with almost 90% coming from private general public sources, and very small shares from official sources.

Humanitarian Action does not represent the core annual expenditure of mainstream Spanish NGOs, and annual expenditure in Asia is not a central part of their activities. The response to the Tsunami however, was that of active fundraising for the emergency and NGOs sought to participate in relief efforts by sending personnel and equipment when possible. This fundraising activity was focused on the public, since NGOs in many instances did not engage in aggressive fundraising and chose not to request state donor funding. Only one Spanish NGO received ECHO funding and the Spanish Red Cross which is one of ECHO’s top 20 partners (according to ECHO aid statistics) did not channel any EC funding for its Tsunami response.

One significant figure to illustrate NGOs active involvement shows how two Spanish NGOs raised over 70% of the total amount raised. The Spanish Red Cross raised 44% alone, with the direct support of a private TV channel that actively campaigned for the organisation.

The study shows how most of the donations were made through traditional banking services (money transfers – 65%), while Internet donations in Spain represented less than 3%. It also depicts how the bulk of donations (almost 90%) took place during the first three months after the disaster.

The funds have been directed mainly towards Indonesia, Sri Lanka, and India (in that order) and relatively small amounts have been allocated to other affected countries. According to the interviewees, the procedures for allocation of funds were based on needs assessments, founded on the information from international and local partners, since, in most of cases, no Spanish staff was present in the region prior to the disaster. Again according to their statements, NGOs devoted much time and effort to planning and coordinating with other local and international stakeholders. The time consumed in planning and the big amount of funds to be managed has meant that a small share has been spent during the emergency phase, and that the core of the funding available has been allocated for future reconstruction and development projects.

Most interviewees coincide that media coverage, especially TV, greatly influenced the response from the general public. Opinions also coincided on the little impact that the flow of incoming funds had on their internal structures in terms of human resources and financial management. NGOs are of the opinion that the amount of new work generated at headquarter and field level as a result of the operations undertaken has not influenced their general functioning attending their other humanitarian or development work.

Gathering information for this study has not been exempted from difficulties. The working team has encountered that in some cases NGOs were reluctant to provide information, while in other cases silence has been the answer. It has to be mentioned that Intermón Oxfam and MSF Spain (out of the top 5 Spanish NGOs in funds raised for Tsunami operations) could not provide information on time and only website data has been included in this study. Internal communication policies and complex international structures are the main reasons for this. In other cases, NGOs work overload (on an extremely busy year in terms of natural disasters)
hindered a smoother collaboration. In general, the mechanisms in place for information management were not flexible enough in providing adequate information to the questions posed.

A general complacency has been perceived on the part of Spanish NGOs, regarding the way they managed all the issues related to the response, and little self-criticism and search for improvement. Also, there is still a long way to go in order to achieve better and effective coordination mechanisms among Spanish NGOs.

DARA wishes to thank all the organisations and individuals that have participated in and contributed to the preparation of this report. The opinions and conclusions hereby presented are the sole responsibility of DARA and they do not, unless otherwise indicated, represent the opinion of any of the mentioned persons or institutions.
I. Introduction

General description of the country’s NGO response

The research conducted for this report has revealed a high degree of uniformity in the response mechanism, even though there are big differences in the amounts that have been raised (Spanish Red Cross and Caritas Spain raised over 72% of all the funds). Most of the NGOs consulted have similar emergency systems in place and had similar reactions to the disaster. At the same time, as mentioned later, Spanish NGO action was concentrated in three countries (India, Indonesia, and Sri Lanka –in that order). There was also a high concentration of activity in a reduced number of sectors and greater focus on development efforts than emergency action. The funds have been mainly provided by private sources, and Government allocations or corporate donations represent only small shares of the total amount.

Spanish NGOs are satisfied with their response. They claim to have followed correct procedures, acted following humanitarian principles, and planned for future reconstruction and rehabilitation accordingly. However, the difficulties encountered in the process of data gathering between them (described later) has not allowed establishing a clear and independent idea of certain aspects of the response, such as coordination mechanisms among the NGOs themselves.

Overview on Spanish NGO background and response

CONGDE, which is the largest network of Spanish NGOs devoted to International Development, has a membership of close to 100 organisations. Fourteen of them manage more than 10 million euros, accounting for close to 75% of the total funds managed by the network (in 2004).

In order to analyse the response provided by Spanish NGOs to the Tsunami, some background information on how the NGOs consider themselves is in order. Annual Activities reports (years 2003-2004) on a sample of 13 NGOs, illustrates limited specialisation within the Spanish NGO sector (following table).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NGO</th>
<th>Health</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Infrastructur e (water, sanitation, housing)</th>
<th>Capacity Building and Social Development</th>
<th>Fair Trade</th>
<th>Food Security</th>
<th>Emergency and Humanitarian Action (6 months intervention s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In general, all the NGOs have some projects or activities in most of the sectors considered. Moreover, only one Spanish NGO declares having only one specific field of activity, while there are two out of the sample that are active in five of the mentioned sectors. The average in areas of interest is above three.
For the purpose of this particular study, it is possible to roughly classify Spanish NGOs in three groups according to: their mission statement, size in terms of funds managed, international dimension, and response mechanisms:

**Group A:** NGOs that are part of international organisations, alliances or partnerships that have a specific mandate, specialisation or previous experience in Humanitarian Assistance. The Spanish chapters of these NGOs have been able to deploy their own personnel and work in coordination with their own international structures, both in the field and at Headquarters level. Gathering information from these NGOs has been, in some cases, shaded given the International Organisations’ policies set by headquarters to handle financial data.

**Group B:** NGOs that are also part of international associations, without a specific mandate oriented to Humanitarian Action, but that respond to certain Humanitarian Crisis as part of their commitment to development efforts and with local counterparts in the affected countries. These NGOs have responded by tightening their international links with the local branches of their international networks and/or local counterparts and have provided funding for the response. The operational response has been organized locally, but has not meant deployment of Spanish NGO personnel, except for short-term missions for technical assistance and expenditure control.

**Group C:** NGOs that have smaller organisational structures and capacities for fundraising (in terms of annual budget management and staff). The NGOs in this group have funded activities to be implemented by local counterparts, or linked efforts with other stakeholders with presence in the field.

In all cases, and where amounts suffice, the NGOs have established long term plans in the region for the coming 2 to 5 years in order to ensure a *continuum* and guarantee their participation in Reconstruction and Development projects and programmes.

From the evidence gathered through the Annual Activity Reports 2003-2004 provided by the same above mentioned sample of 13 NGOs, few of these organisations had previous presence in Asia (mainly in India) and we can observe the minor priority granted to Asia by Spanish NGOs.
Table 3. Distribution of NGOs by geographical expenditure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Latin America</th>
<th>Africa</th>
<th>Asia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Max</td>
<td>95.19%</td>
<td>70.88%</td>
<td>36.70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Min</td>
<td>15.98%</td>
<td>4.02%</td>
<td>0.80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Avg.</td>
<td>49.72%</td>
<td>27.94%</td>
<td>13.02%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Furthermore, traditionally, Spanish NGOs have not had a strong presence in Asia, focusing most of their activities in Latin America and to a lesser extent, in Africa. In this regard, it may be mentioned that Spanish Cooperation Law dictates that a minimum of 40% of Official Development Aid must be destined to Latin American developing countries. Then, for many NGOs the Tsunami emergency and its reconstruction phase will mean the possibility of establishing a stronger presence in this continent in the coming years.

**Limitations encountered during the study**

- Several problems derived of the specificities of the Spanish Cooperation System and NGO sector, were encountered in the process of gathering data and promoting NGO participation.

- First, it is worth pointing out the lack of official Spanish support to the study. However, the whole Spanish system has proved reluctant to provide information and there are doubts that NGOs would have cooperated more if there had been official support. In addition, many NGOs did not show the appropriate interest for the study regarding it as a private initiative disconnected from the Spanish system.

- NGOs’ staffs share the general opinion of being overloaded with work. The reasons behind this are: partly because of small expenditure on staff and, the way grants are justified to national donors imply a heavy load of bureaucratic administrative procedures. Thus, there is a strong focus on management and administration, and weak efforts on studies and related activities, such as evaluation and self-analysis.

- In this regard, it appears that the financial management systems in place within NGOs are not flexible or user friendly enough in order to determine and facilitate information in a specific format and in a timely manner. This, together with unclear definitions on certain concepts, has also hindered the gathering of information.

- Although this situation is slowly changing, NGOs have been traditionally dependent on Government funds and extremely competitive between them in order to access these funds. That competition is now shifting to brand building; hence, the climate of competition still continues and shades many coordination efforts. This said, most NGOs

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4 Source: Annual Activity Reports 2003 and 2004; and/or webpage statements
consulted take part in coordinating bodies and networks, which reflects that efforts to be more cooperative are taking place.

- Finally, for the Spanish chapters of international organisations, it has been extremely difficult to gather information regarding the specific Spanish response. In some cases, the international organisations headquarters were unable to provide information on Spanish funds; and in others, headquarters had specific policies in place, which limited the options of making financial information available to the public. An example of this practice is Intermón Oxfam, which is the Spanish chapter of Oxfam International. Since the response to the Tsunami was articulated and managed by Oxfam International, all funds raised were put into the International Tsunami Fund created for this purpose without breaking down funds received by country. Hence, there was no available information about the detailed use of Spanish-raised funds.

**Overall financial response in the country managed by the NGOs**

The general total amount that was raised by Spanish NGOs in response to the Tsunami was roughly over **89 million euros**. According to a survey undertaken in March 2005 by CONGDE, almost 60% (out of 42 million country population) of the Spanish population responded one way or another to the campaigns developed by the NGOs. Our own survey has also revealed

**Table 4. Amounts raised by Spanish NGOs**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NGO</th>
<th>Raised (€)</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cruz Roja</td>
<td>40,200,000.00</td>
<td>45.06%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cáritas</td>
<td>25,000,000.00</td>
<td>28.02%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermón Oxfam</td>
<td>7,300,000.00</td>
<td>8.18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Médicos Sin Fronteras</td>
<td>3,000,000.00</td>
<td>3.36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manos Unidas</td>
<td>2,867,964.00</td>
<td>3.21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Médicos del Mundo</td>
<td>2,644,064.98</td>
<td>2.96%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medicus Mundi</td>
<td>1,427,928.00</td>
<td>1.60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ayuda en Acción</td>
<td>1,075,571.00</td>
<td>1.21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fundación Vicente Ferrer</td>
<td>1,004,143.52</td>
<td>1.13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPDL</td>
<td>897,009.00</td>
<td>1.01%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entreculturas</td>
<td>850,000.00</td>
<td>0.95%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alboán</td>
<td>754,641.00</td>
<td>0.85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acción Contra el Hambre</td>
<td>580,375.00</td>
<td>0.65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Save the Children</td>
<td>556,800.00</td>
<td>0.62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>313,840.00</td>
<td>0.35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmamundi</td>
<td>277,880.00</td>
<td>0.31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mensajeros de la Paz</td>
<td>200,000.00</td>
<td>0.22%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The distribution of the total amounts raised by NGOs shows quite an uneven distribution. There is an acute concentration of donations to six NGOs that raised almost 91% of all funds (with individual shares greater than 3%); while the remaining 9% was raised by 15 other NGOs with individual shares below the mentioned threshold of 3%. This is in line with the usual concentration of funds by a small number of NGOs in Spain as mentioned in page 7.

This could be used as proxy indicator for the conclusions encountered in the recent (March 2005) survey undertaken by AOMD-FECEMD. This study shows that 43% of the Spanish population prefers to donate to large NGOs because of their perceived international dimension and ability to operate professionally in several fields of activity. This same study reflects that the reasons that drive Spanish people to donate are mainly the fight against hunger, helping children, and development aid. The fourth place in this ranking of driving forces behind donations is humanitarian assistance. In the case of the Tsunami, this tendency was overcome in the opinion

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5 CONGDE Report on NGO Sector in Spain, 2004; pp.43-44
of the interviewees by factors such as the dimension of the disaster, the date it happened, the media coverage and the impact of the images shown.

**Comparison with previous years**

All the NGOs consulted agreed on the unprecedented dimension of the disaster and with the fact that this circumstance blurs any possible comparison with previous response to humanitarian crisis. In some cases, the amounts raised as a result of the Tsunami exceed 50% of previous annual general budgets. Moreover, the crises will definitely change for the coming year’s budget distribution pattern by field of activity and geographical priority due to the increase of activities in South East Asia. As already mentioned, Asia has not traditionally been a geographical area of activity for Spanish NGOs. NGOs with a presence in the area, work on a limited scale especially when compared to other areas in terms of both investment and fields of activity. According to 2004 annual activity reports, Spanish NGOs dedicate on average a rough 13% of their annual expenditure to Asian countries. It is expected that this figure will increase in the coming years as a result of the Tsunami response. However, this analysis will not be available until next year in light of the 2005 annual activity reports.
II. Budget sources and allocations

Description by origin

It is quite remarkable that the amount of funds channelled by the Spanish NGOs from official national sources does represent 0.36% of the total amount raised. NGOs in general declined official funding from AECI besides the participation in the flights scheduled by the agency. This is mostly due to three factors: first, AECI’s grants as already mentioned are characterised by the high administrative burden in the financial justification of its grants. Second, the AECI’s rigid funding mechanisms did not allow funding NGOs until June 2005. To date, only three projects are known to be funded which amount a total of 313,840 € awarded in June 2005⁶. Thirdly, funding from the general public (with no administrative requirements with the only limitation of use for Tsunami operations) was so great that NGOs needed less government funding and opted for not requesting grants.

In any case, the NGOs received 87% of their funds by means of direct public donations, a scarce 2% from private companies that donated cash, and 10% in form of grants or donations from what is called decentralised cooperation (due to the specific structure of the Spanish State, regions in Spain manage their funds for international development and also municipalities and other local entities allocate funds to these activities).

Figure 2. Origin of funds in the Tsunami response

⁶ Source: AECI
Table 5. Origin of NGO funds in the Tsunami response

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Private Sources (€)</th>
<th>Official Sources (€)</th>
<th>Total (€)(^7)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>From Public</td>
<td>Corporate</td>
<td>EU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>67,204,448.00</td>
<td>1,871,718.38</td>
<td>581,400.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>86.90%</td>
<td>2.42%</td>
<td>0.75%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

None of the Spanish NGOs that have facilitated information for the present study accepted donations in kind. They all agreed on the more efficient use of resources by direct money contributions to the counterparts in order to acquire locally the necessary goods.

**Means of donation**

According to the figures, it is estimated for this study that more than 12 million people financially donated to help the victims. During the Tsunami fundraising campaign it was the first time in Spain that SMS technology was used to raise funds on a large scale (more than 8 million euros were collected through this means). However, donations online did not yield a great share of total amount raised as per the graph below. Spanish public still prefers to use the phone or more frequently use banking services for donating.

In the case of SMS donations, it must be noted that donations were limited to 1 € per SMS (by Spanish law) and that the three phone companies providing mobile telephone services in Spain contributed to the donation campaign by donating the taxes associated to the sending of all SMS. Those taxes were later not claimed by the Spanish fiscal authorities as contribution to the public response intent assuring that the whole amount was intact.

The data for this section have been provided by a representative NGO by volume (Spanish Red Cross, 45% of the total). Other NGOs have provided some data but the distribution pattern was not similar, since the percentage corresponding to SMS donations was much bigger for the Red Cross than for the rest of NGOs. A weighting mechanism for extrapolation of the percentages for all NGOs would not have reflected reality and, this study opted by showing Red Cross distribution only as an indication. Besides, not all NGOs count with on-line donations mechanism or participated in SMS campaigns, the significant data in this case is that the bulk of the donations were made via bank transfer.

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\(^7\) Not all NGOs were able to provide information on this issue
Figure 3. Distribution of Red Cross funds raised by means of donation

![Means of donation](image)

Response Timeline

- The first coordination meeting took place on 28 December and was coordinated by the Spanish Agency (AECI).

- The first flight that transported personnel and humanitarian assistance to Sri Lanka left Spain on 29 December. It was chartered by the AECI and transported 19 people including staff from five NGOs.

- Up to eight flights were organized by AECI and others were organized by NGOs up to early February. During the first three months, there was continuous shift of staff and transport of Humanitarian Aid.

- From four to 11 January a Spanish private TV channel (Antena3) organised along with the Spanish Red Cross on an unprecedented campaign for the use of SMS as means of donations that gathered more than 8 million euros. This TV channel dedicated all its programmes to campaigning for the Red Cross displayed SMS and telephone numbers with almost no interruption.

- On 23 January the main Spanish public TV channel launched in combination with five organisations (Acción Contra el Hambre, Spanish Red Cross, Intermón Oxfam, Save the Children and UNICEF). A similar campaign and a special informative TV programme that had as secondary objective to claim for a better use of information and images on TV. Criteria for the selection of these four NGOs and the inclusion of a UN agency have not been able to be determined. The results from this initiative were much more modest than the previously mentioned and, the funds raised were split in even parts between the participating organisations.

- By the end of March, most NGOs had stopped campaigning for the Tsunami crisis, but the bank accounts continued open for still some time and some of them are still open.
This study has attempted to depict the evolution of donations in time. The data for this section has been provided by only three NGOs because; in many cases, no record has been kept or produced. However, most of the opinions gathered accepted that the bulk of donations were received in the first two months and linked this pattern of response by the public to the media coverage of the disaster.

It is worth mentioning that in many cases, the active campaigning ended after two to three months but in many cases, the bank accounts remained open as well as banners on WebPages in order to continue receiving donations.

**Figure 4. Evolution of donations in time**

The chart shows the incoming flow of funds of three Spanish NGOs through time. It must be noted how by the end of February 2005 the amount of funds that were raised was at 75% of the total final amount. One of the lines shows a sudden increase at the end of the period under consideration. This is due to funds coming from official grants and not from the general public.

**Destination of funds**

**Geographical distribution**

The following graph indicates allocation of global funds to the affected countries, including money already spent in the emergency and reconstruction phase and for development efforts in the coming 3 to 5 years. The distribution of funds is correlated to the severity of the disaster in the affected countries.

The rough distribution of the allocation of funds by geographical area is shown in the graph below. 71% of the funds have been spent / allocated to the three main affected countries and a slight 10% has been allocated to activities in other countries, due to smaller identified needs and need to concentrate efforts. Indonesia will receive one third of the funds even though the previous presence of Spanish NGOs in the region has been concentrated in India. However, this tendency is counterbalanced by the previous presence on many international NGOs in the affected countries that backed up the Spanish branches operations.
Sector allocation:

Data provided by NGOs has not enabled to establish a reliable distribution of sector allocation of funds because of two main reasons:

1. Spanish NGOs do not follow international standards for sectors definitions; hence, it has been very difficult to distribute funds according to FTS standard sectors, namely:
- Agriculture
- Coordination and Support Services
- Economy Recovery and Infrastructure
- Education
- Food
- Health
- Mine Action
- Multi-sector
- Protection/Human Rights/Rule of Law
- Security
- Shelter and Non-food items
- Water and Sanitation

As a result, some NGOs will classify all infrastructure expenditure as a single sector without distinguishing between (i.e.) water, education or health.

2. Given the Development and generalist character of most Spanish NGOs (according to their own mission and strategic planning), most of the activities identified for rehabilitation and development usually fall under a Multi-Sector category which include many different activities and sectors of intervention. Consequently, the systems in place do not allow for specification of funds according to specific sectors.

On top of that, there is no general agreement on concepts such as emergency and humanitarian aid that influence the allocation of funds to an activity or another. There is no common agreement on definitions and terminology. For simplicity’s sake we have respected each NGO own definition.
III. Fundraising and crisis response policy

Fundraising policy

In general, the consulted NGOs did not devise specific mechanisms for fundraising in response to this crisis. Those NGOs with specific mandates in Humanitarian Action reacted the same way they would have as in response to other humanitarian crisis. Those that do not have Humanitarian Action as a main line of action however, decided to launch fundraising campaigns in order to obtain financial support for the victims. Previous presence in the countries or links with local counterparts prompted fundraising campaign in support of those countries/ counterparts affected foreseeing the big reconstruction process that was on its way.

In addition, many NGOs had their Christmas campaigns ongoing at the time of the Tsunami and it came to impel them strongly - in a sense that it disturbed them strongly since the results gathered were completely different from those expected. Some NGOs relied on their Christmas campaigns to raise un-earmarked funds to cover yearly expenses such as, administrative or structural costs. The inclusion of the Tsunami in the Christmas campaign altered this pattern since most of the donations were earmarked for the Tsunami. In other cases the results of the Christmas campaign for supporters was altered in a way that it created confusion by the type of messages that were conveyed. In any case, the amount of money that was raised amplified any other consideration regarding influence over the fundraising policies.

This said, most of the NGOs launched proactive campaigns on their websites and advertised in the press but their efforts did not significantly differ from that of other crisis. In this occasion however, the media contributed by publishing daily the list of bank account numbers open by the NGOs to financially support relief and emergency activities/ emergency.

Response to appeals

The only Spanish NGOs, who responded to appeals, were the Spanish chapters of international organisations to their appeals. No Spanish NGOs contributed to any UN agency appeal. The NGOs not inscribed in international networks derived their funds to their local partners.

Coordination

NGOs interviewed have stated that coordination efforts were organized in two fronts: headquarters and locally in the affected countries. Coordination at headquarters was depicted as appropriate, although few activities and meetings took place amongst NGOs involved in Tsunami relief efforts. As for coordination in the field, NGOs described their experience as very good in spite of the generally assumed chaotic situation in the first stages of the disaster. It is easy to understand that relationship at headquarter level has a much more institutional dimension and that the priorities at this level are focused on fundraising and build-up of brand image. On the other side, at field level the relationships are based much more on personal experiences and the focus is set on the work itself and the services to be provided to the affected populations.

This said, the NGO sector in Spain is undergoing a slow process of maturity, which is increasing the level of activities and information available through coordinating bodies such as CONGDE (previously mentioned). Nevertheless, existing umbrella organisations and
networks still need to develop better and more agile mechanisms for coordinating the efforts of its members.

**Overview of emergency response mechanisms**

All the NGOs consulted presented similar emergency response mechanisms with immediate contact between the staff holding responsibilities and forming Emergency Committees that quickly articulated the response. There was contact with Government institutions and between NGOs to try to coordinate primarily the flights with the first shipment of goods and staff. But, campaigning for fundraising was not coordinated.

**Communication policy**

All the NGOs consulted followed their regular and usual policies regarding communication and accountability to their donors. No specific measures were devised to communicate actions undertaken but, most NGOs provided information through their websites.

**Media coverage and relationship/influence**

NGOs interviewed agree that the magnitude of the response was influenced by the detailed media coverage of the crisis. Three factors have been identified as a reason for the enormous media coverage of the Tsunami disaster:

- Magnitude of the humanitarian crisis: the figures of deceased and affected population have no precedent in modern history;
- Date in which occurred: Christmas had an emotional effect on the coverage and on the response;
- Visual impact of the images: the tidal waves captured by tourists added a new dimension to other more frequent disasters such as floods and earthquakes.

In Spain, there was a great influence on the donorship pattern and distribution. One single TV channel jointly organised a campaign with the Spanish Red Cross and offered free advertisement for telephone and SMS numbers on all its programmes for a prolonged period. The result was a strong Red Cross presence on TV and an unbalanced fundraising distribution.

Another initiative linked the Spanish public TV channel (Televisión Española) to a group of five NGOs (Acción Contra el Hambre, Spanish Red Cross, Intermón Oxfam, Save the Children and UNICEF) but it did not have such a strong impact in terms of amounts raised (it was much later, on 23 January 2005 and with a strictly informative format). When asked about this initiative, interviewees showed discomfort and preferred not to give straight opinions regarding the format of the TV show or the criteria followed to select the invited NGOs.

In any case, in a society as influenced by TV as the Spanish, there is no doubt that the enormous media coverage had a great influence on people and their willingness to donate.
IV. Management of funds

Programming systems

All the NGOs consulted claimed that they allocated their expenditure after conducting needs assessment studies. NGOs also declare that in general they used participatory approaches with beneficiaries in order to identify local needs. Confirmation of these statements would have required field visits, which were out of the scope of this study.

A rough estimate of the use of the funds so far reveals that only a small part of the raised funds has been spent in emergency and in the initial reconstruction phase. Most funds however are (though allocated) still unused in order to participate in long-term reconstruction and development activities at a later stage.

Figure 6. Use of funds

The main expenditure on emergency was on food aid, primary health care and psychological assistance and, water-sanitation services.

The programming of the reconstruction and development phases focuses on infrastructure: rehabilitation and reconstruction of schools, hospitals, and livelihoods.

In general, larger NGOs took longer periods of time for their programme analysis due to coordination mechanisms with their International offices. In all cases, follow-up missions have been undertaken by Spanish headquarters staff to supervise, coordinate and continue programming efforts.

Costs

All NGOs consulted retain between 5% and 10% of the total amount donated in order to finance their structural costs. In some cases, it is a one-time operation and in other cases, it is done on a yearly basis. In this regard, each NGO has its own financial procedures. The percentage range is set up following AECI’s Criteria, which cap overhead expenses to 8% of the total amount of the project.
Management of Funding

NGOs have not perceived that there has been an impact on management structures derived from the flow of funds. The absorption capacity has been limited however as a small share of the total funds collected was spent on the emergency phase and, NGOs have concentrated efforts and most of the funds in the reconstruction and development phases in the next 2-5 years.

Monitoring and evaluation systems

None of the NGOs consulted designed specific monitoring and evaluation plans to measure the impact of the actions undertaken. They all relied on their periodical technical and financial reporting. No data with significant indicators on performance efficiency or impact were provided, nor has identification of such indicators been facilitated.
V. Effects on the NGOs

Differences with previous years on donorship patterns

There is no doubt that the response in terms of donorship pattern has been different from previous years. No analytical work however has been conducted to date by the participating NGO in order to assess the magnitude of the difference. It is worth mentioning that very few NGOs in Spain have specific departments devoted to the provision of studies and analysis, and those who usually focus on policy analysis or other generic issues. Some of the most significant comments received regarding donorship pattern include the possibility of the Tsunami Emergency being a potential point of inflexion for Humanitarian Action in Spain. The Tsunami may have directed new Spanish attention towards South East Asia as poverty focal point in need of poverty reduction efforts.

Effects on Human Resources

Only in a limited number of cases, the NGOs established specific management units to respond to the Tsunami crises. In the majority of NGOs, the additional workload that resulted from the response was either divided between existing staff or one person, was hired on a temporary basis to take over some of the administrative burden. In general, however NGOs managed to work it out without deploying their own permanent human resources to the field and without major disturbances from their daily work.

As already mentioned, the workload generated by the response to the Tsunami was distributed between the NGO staff. Usually this responsibility fell on the Asia technical and geographical units, supported by the financial departments. The pressure that this workload added on the staff was labelled as significant but not unbearable since it lasted two to three months. After the initial period of time, it became much of an administrative-financial issue that was solved in most of the cases with a re-assignment and redistribution of tasks.

Since most of the funds come from private sources, NGOs were not burdened by administrative procedures such as financial reporting which is usually the case with government grants. As a result, NGOs had a higher degree of freedom and flexibility to use the funds.

Influence on their overall capacity

None of the NGOs consulted have encountered any difficulties in continuing with their normal activity in other ongoing humanitarian crisis. Nevertheless, they do appreciate that public response tends to pay attention and donate only to those disasters with a big media presence. There is a general perception among NGOs that the Spanish public only react to striking TV images and that recurrent crisis or those with “the usual images” do not drag the attention of the public.

Effects on the supporting base

There is little empirical evidence of the direct influence of the Tsunami on the supporting base of the NGOs interviewed. Almost all the opinions that we collected from the NGOs agreed however, that the Tsunami had a positive influence and that as a result NGOs had increased their number of supporters. Nevertheless, this fact contradicts the findings of a survey on social perception of NGOs undertaken by CONGDE in March 2004. According to the survey, 91% of people who collaborated with an NGO after the Tsunami participated as a one-time donor; only 2.5% declare to have decided as a result to become a regular donor.