



## Evaluation of Specific Rehabilitation and Reconstruction projects, implemented in the Special Tsunami Plan (PEM) framework.

### Executive Summary

The following report presents the collective findings of an evaluation team, composed of two external consultants and two headquarters staff from the Spanish Red Cross' (SRC) Central Office (CO). It results from information gathered through: briefings from SRC CO staff and with SRC delegates in Indonesia and Sri Lanka; review of relevant documents provided by SRC and other sources; field visits to the district of Aceh Barat from October 8<sup>th</sup> to 19<sup>th</sup> to carry out structured interviews with beneficiaries, then to Yogyakarta on 30<sup>th</sup> and 31<sup>st</sup> of October and to Jakarta on November 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> in Indonesia, and to Sri Lanka from October 20<sup>th</sup> to 26<sup>th</sup> (Colombo and the districts of Galle and Kalutara); interviews with representatives of the Red Cross and the Red Crescent Movement (Movement), the United Nations (UN), local and international non-governmental organisations, and representatives of the government; and finally, information was also gathered from debriefings in Meulaboh, Yogyakarta, Jakarta, Colombo and Madrid.

### Purpose and Methodology

This review is a SRC initiative and represents a positive endeavour to enhance organizational learning through the analysis of post-emergency projects. As defined in the Terms of Reference (ToR), the report consists of the summative evaluation of five post-emergency projects in Indonesia and Sri Lanka, with a total budget of €3,056,595.11, corresponding to 7.6% of the Special Tsunami Plan's (PEM) total budget. These five projects were:

- Environmental cleaning in communities affected by the earthquake of the Galle and Kalutara districts (January to September 2005), in Sri Lanka (€121,617.06).
- Improvement of water and sanitation conditions in nine temporary centres for displaced people (TLC) in Aceh Barat (February 2005 to June 2006), in Indonesia (€382,643.26).
- Improvement of sanitation and of hygiene promotion in eight temporary centres for displaced people, victims of the tsunami in Aceh Barat (July 2005 to July 2006), in Indonesia (134,394.27 €).
- Improvement of temporary shelters in five communities of Aceh Barat affected by the earthquake and tsunami (June 2005 to July 2006), in Indonesia (€918,237.46)
- Normalisation of economic life of those affected by the earthquake and the tsunami, on December 26<sup>th</sup>, 2004. Donation of agricultural and livestock resources, as well as supplies for small businesses (from June 2005 to October 2006), in Indonesia (€1,534,849.96).

Another achievement of this evaluation is drawing **work schemes in post-emergency contexts** for future interventions, stemming from the lessons learned, and indicating the conditions under which similar projects can be set out. This proposal is presented as a separate document. SRC as a means to provide hands-on training and improve the PEM capacity on evaluation skills, participated with two of its technicians in the main phases of this evaluation.

The methods used for this evaluation included briefings with SRC's staff, semi-structured interviews with key members of the Indonesian Red Cross (PMI), Sri Lanka Red Cross (SLRCS) and SRC, along with other organisations and local authorities related to the areas and sectors of intervention. The

perceptions and expectations of the population affected by the tsunami were explored through semi-structured interviews with beneficiaries of the projects, and a mini-survey was circulated both amongst the beneficiaries of the temporary shelter and livelihoods projects. The triangulation of information was a key element during the evaluation process.

## Conclusions

From the mid-nineties onwards, SRC has been involved in post-disaster and post-conflict programmes however; the effectiveness, efficiency and impact of its interventions have seldom been documented. This **lack of organisational learning** – frequently affecting not only SRC but the whole humanitarian system – has also marked the response to the Indian Ocean tsunami, which represents one of the main international relief and recovery operations ever carried out.

The purpose of this evaluation is to consider the implementation of five post-emergency projects and to incorporate the lessons learned, be they positive or negative, into everyday procedure of the organisation.

Globally, SRC's post-emergency interventions which have been subject to evaluation and are representative of basic sectors of intervention have been **positively assessed**. In the post-tsunami context, **they all are relevant**, whereas **the evaluation of their design, efficacy, efficiency, impact and sustainability vary depending on the way the projects were carried out**.

Some general observations must be highlighted to avoid repeating them in future post-emergency interventions of this type. The **main lessons learned** in SRC's response to the tsunami are as follows<sup>1</sup>:

A) In a large scale disaster like this, an organisation cannot pass directly from a relief phase to one of rehabilitation and long-term development – there has to be a **transition phase**, in which the population needs another kind of support that **requires a specific response according to the time of the intervention and the sector**.

B) In Indonesia, not all of the projects implemented by SRC were carried out in the same communities; this in turn did not allow the adoption of an **integrated intervention approach**. This was mainly due to the effort SRC made to satisfy the emergency needs caused either by the tsunami or the earthquake in March 2005 in Nias (where part of the SRC delegates were redeployed); and to the high concentration of NGOs in the district of Aceh Barat who quickly monopolised the post-emergency space, resulting in SRC's loss of opportunities to intervene in certain communities in an integrated way.

C) All interventions carried out by SRC should respond to the **strategic priorities of the National Society** of the country. Nevertheless, in the case of Indonesia, the response to the needs and the development of an integrated approach was prioritised over the strategic plan of the PMI; the PMI decided neither to get directly involved nor to build capacities in key post-emergency sectors such as housing or livelihoods recovery. On the other hand, in Sri Lanka, SRC's activities completely matched the priorities of SLRCS.

**Previous experience** of SRC in the country facilitates the post-emergency response, as was shown in Sri Lanka. SLRCS and SRC took advantage of the shared knowledge acquired after the floods in 2003, and this enhanced SRC's incorporation into the already well defined working schemes to assist the

---

<sup>1</sup> For further details, please see each project's individual evaluation, and the post-emergency work schemes proposal, in a separate document (only in Spanish).



## Executive summary

tsunami crisis. In Indonesia, where SRC intervened for the first time as a consequence of the tsunami, coordination with the National Society showed more difficulties, and was worsened due to the loss of most of its branch staff as a consequence of the disaster.

D) The main source of **funding coming from an emergency appeal exerts certain pressure on the management to quickly allocate the funds**, making it difficult to accurately plan the interventions. This translated into a fight between many organisations to mark out areas of intervention in the field which, in several cases, were not adequately covered later on, but did not allow SRC to adopt a more integrated and geographically concentrated focus.

E) **Human resources are crucial for the success of a recovery operation**. In this emergency, the **difficult identification and high turnover** have underlined SRC's limitations in this field.

F) A **single and punctual assessment is not enough** to capture the changing needs of the affected population. The need to check official information on damage and needs is evident.

G) In some cases, work started without appropriately formulating the intervention, thus it was lacking the correct planning to achieve the desired outcome. Better insight into activities to be developed, timetable and necessary resources (including logistics) would improve the service provided to beneficiaries, although unforeseen matters could arise while executing them. On the other hand, even though the logical frameworks of the projects mentioned Sphere Standards, indicators were not specified to measure the progress achieved, and that is a **weakness of design** that hinders project monitoring.

It is positively appreciated that the necessary adjustments and **reformulations were managed with flexibility in order to improve the effectiveness** of the intervention.

H) **Beneficiary selection** was based on criteria that intended to identify the most vulnerable sector of the population in each case, something considered positive. However, the strict application of the selection criteria proved of little use in the livelihoods project in Indonesia. In other cases (projects of water and sanitation and temporary shelter), beneficiaries lists provided by the authorities were not thoroughly checked, so that a more comprehensive coverage was not guaranteed and effectiveness was negatively affected.

I) The evaluators observed that **the projects tried to involve beneficiaries in the decision making process and reinforce their abilities, which contributed to the sustainability of the interventions**. As an example, beneficiaries participated in the design of the kits delivered in some projects – environmental cleaning, hygiene promotion and livelihoods - identified as good practice. Another way to positively involve the community in the implementation of the projects was through offering **cash for work**, as used in the environmental cleaning, temporary housing, water and sanitation and livelihoods projects. As can be seen, SRC's new approach also contributes to invigorate the local economy through the exchange of cash for work. However, it is important to mention that sometimes it is possible to mobilise the community without the introduction of money, as it can prove damaging in subsequent phases of the project.

Besides, **efforts to communicate with the community were not effective in all cases**. Miscommunication of beneficiary selection criteria for the environmental cleaning project resulted in a conflict in Peraliya (Kalutara). The apparent lack of transparency in the distribution of supplies in Pucok Lueng (Samatiga) contributed to aggravate the conflict within the community. The information deficit was also perceived in the uncertainty detected amongst temporary housing beneficiaries, regarding the location and the delivery time of their permanent residence, as was stated in the mini-poll.



## Executive summary

Although these examples represent isolated cases in the projects evaluated, it is necessary to highlight them in order to avoid repeating these mistakes in the future and to keep a pro-active attitude towards communicating with beneficiaries.

J) **Projects are generally assessed as efficient. Beneficiaries received the inputs within the planned periods and budget**, with the exception of few components in the livelihoods project. Few more people were assisted than those initially planned for. Logistic restrictions, such as the bad state of communications in the first phases of the interventions in Indonesia, were dealt with accordingly. However, the inexperience of the staff when applying the purchase guidelines of SRC and the initial absence of an administrator brought up several shortfalls.

K) Generally, projects took into account **cross-cutting issues**, such as the **environment**. In Indonesia, requirement of legally certified wood being used in the temporary accommodation project was upheld despite initial difficulties, and the agricultural component in livelihoods included training to limit the negative impact of pesticide products in traditional practices. However, in Sri Lanka, rubble collected in the environmental cleaning project was dumped in places that did not meet the necessary conditions to guarantee the health and respect for the environment, even though the locations for waste disposal had been assigned by the local authorities.

A **gender approach** was present through the adoption of selection criteria of beneficiaries that allowed the identification of particularly vulnerable females, for example, widows. Nevertheless, a **better systematic approach is necessary - for instance, breaking down the listings of beneficiaries according to sex**.

Other related issues, like protection of children, the elderly and the disabled, did not have a specific approach.

### Main recommendations

A) It is urgent to **agree** and make explicit a **post-emergency policy for SRC and the Movement**, in order to define interventions in the intermediate phases between relief and rehabilitation, and development. It is necessary to predefine intervention sectors to guide operations in the phase following the emergency, as it is the case currently being applied in Java, Indonesia.

B) The application of **criteria for geographical concentration and an integrated approach** is fundamental. Whenever possible, it is recommended to adopt an integrated approach to respond in the recovery phase, intervening in a defined geographical zone with some predefined areas - such as temporary shelter, livelihood, health, and water and sanitation - based on an extensive assessment of the needs. A program that includes these sectors should reduce vulnerability of affected communities, as well as increase the capacity to cope with the effects of potential disasters. This approach will improve the links between emergency, rehabilitation and development responses in future operations.

C) SRC and the rest of the Movement must establish **clear guidelines for post-emergency operations**, explicitly articulating how to combine an integral approach that covers the needs of the affected communities by a disaster and with meeting the strategic priorities of the National Society of the affected country.

D) **Raise the awareness of donors on necessary flexibility to allocate their funding**, so as to optimise coverage of emergency and post-emergency needs, without imposing a risk to efficiency and transparency.

E) **Create a team of trained and specialised post-emergency delegates** who could be deployed rapidly, which will avoid that the intervention remains burdened by the pace and expertise of emergency capacities. Measures to reduce turnover must be included as an strategic priority of SRC.

F) **Needs assessment must be continuous**, in order to gauge the situation of the population who have lost their houses, incomes and/or family members, and to be aware of their own recovery initiatives and support them. The overall context must be understood, integrating the beneficiary communities and systematically carrying out a vulnerability and capacity analysis before defining the intervention.

G) While planning, take into account that post-emergency situations are characterised by fast changing contexts; therefore it is preferable to propose short, fast-implemented projects. In planning activities, it is advisable to include a diagnosis to define a baseline in order to measure progress, and also, to help appropriate programming. **Assessment must include a vulnerability and capacity analysis.** It is essential to assure the quality of the assessment, otherwise there is a risk of having a negative impact when implementing the project. Initial formulation and planning must be accurate, including logistics and available economical and human resources, before activities begin. It is necessary to define which minimum Sphere standards are used in the projects, including them as indicators in the corresponding logical framework, so as to facilitate monitoring and evaluation.

H) Criteria for the **selection of beneficiaries** must be defined in order to identify clearly, amongst the population affected by the disaster, those who are most vulnerable as well as their capacities. In cases where the selection is made by the local authorities, the lists provided must be verified to corroborate that in all cases they concern vulnerable population. Whether the listings of beneficiaries are produced by SRC or the authorities, the selection process should be agile enough to avoid slowing down the project.

I) **Communication with beneficiaries must be fluid and transparent** during every phase of the project, in order to facilitate participation and improve their level of appropriation. It is advisable to explain the selection criteria, and publish and circulate final lists of beneficiaries to minimise conflict risk within the communities. Moreover, the compositions of kits to be delivered must be consulted with beneficiaries in all types of interventions.

Depending on the context, considering population's attitude and available resources, **it is necessary to assess the convenience of introducing cash for work.** In some circumstances it may not be necessary or even have a negative effect for the involvement of the community in subsequent projects.

J) **Delegates** must be **able to manage the purchase procedures of SRC**, thus, an administration delegate should always be present from the beginning of an intervention of such proportions. It is advisable to improve staff knowledge of administrative and managerial matters.

K) **Cross-cutting issues**, such as gender, environment protection and attention to highly-vulnerable groups such as children, the elderly and the disabled, must be always considered in these types of post-emergency projects. It is advisable to reinforce the mechanisms to do so, breaking down the listings of beneficiaries in all cases.

Finally, improve organisational learning and systematise experiences through a greater emphasis on evaluation practice.