



Inter-Agency Real Time Evaluation of the Humanitarian Response to Pakistan's 2010 Flood crisis

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Cover photo: Three women during focus group discussion in an ‘flood affectees’ camp, new Sukkur, Sindh Province © Riccardo Polastro 2011.

1 - Executive Summary

Executive Summary:

This is the report of the Real Time Evaluation of the International Humanitarian Community's response to the 2010 Floods in Pakistan. The evaluation was commissioned by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), funded by OCHA and undertaken by a team of four evaluators between January and March 2011. The team visited Pakistan two times.

The first mission took place in January to undertake an extended field visit in three of the worst affected Provinces to interview aid providers and aid recipients as well as to at federal level, observe patterns of the response and collect evidence (a teleconference was organised with representatives from Balochistan). An initial debriefing was held with the HCT to present preliminary findings. Within two weeks a draft report was shared.

In mid-February, during the second visit, three provincial and a national workshop were held with key stakeholders involved in the humanitarian response to the floods. Findings, conclusions and recommendations were initially presented by the team leader during the workshops. Then, stakeholders jointly validated and prioritized recommendations and defined the organization(s) responsible to implement them (by whom) and timelines (by when). The main changes in the formulations resulted from group discussions. This process contributed to boost the ownership of the evaluation recommendations and fostered real time learning among stakeholders engaged. Once workshops ended the Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator agreed that the HCT would draw an implementation plan of the recommendations outlined below.

Following the second visit to Pakistan, headquarter debriefings were held in with IASC representatives Geneva and New York.

As this participatory and utilization focused approach is new to Inter Agency Real Time Evaluations a lessons learned exercise on the process will be held in Geneva in mid April so that in can be integrated in future IA RTEs.

Conclusions and recommendations based on the Provincial and National Workshops, February 2011

Area	Finding	Conclusion	Recommendation	Priority	Level	By whom	By when
Funding 1	<p>The Floods Response was generally well funded, with initial emergency response plan's life-saving activities more swiftly and better funded. Rapid funding (e.g. CERF) response mechanisms were essential to kick start the response however not all players had them in place or could access them. With the floods, donors focused entirely on PIFERP and the PHRP was taken out of the limelight. No contribution has been made to the PHRP since it was revised in July 2010. Ref. paragraph 22 and 23</p>	<p>Funding for other non life-saving and early recovery activities was slower and funding commitments were lower.</p>	<p>NDMA/HCT to draw a reprioritized Pakistan Plan according to different geographical area needs and dynamics, involving the PDMAs, to respond holistically to a 'complex' emergency and disasters.</p>	High	National /Provincial	NDMA & HCT with PDMAs	Continuously
			<p>Donors should provide flexible funding commensurate to priorities outlined in joint recovery and rehabilitation plans.</p>	High	National	Donors (GoP & HCT)	March 31 st
			<p>HCT, in consultation with GoP and donors, should define ways to ensure that funding for existing emergency appeals is not undermined by any new emergency appeal</p>	High	National/ Provincial	HCT & GoP	March 10 th
			<p>OCHA/Clusters need to build the capacity of implementing partners to ensure they can effectively access ERF.</p>	Low	Provincial	Clusters/ OCHA with INGOs	Onwards as from April 1 st

Area	Finding	Conclusion	Recommendation	Priority	Level	By whom	By when
Funding 2	The UN is not always perceived by all as accountable for how resources were spent. Some UN agencies did not manage to spend the large amounts of funding received. Some donors question the UN value for money having high transaction costs, where funding go through multiple IPs for implementation (multiple layers). Ref paragraph 28	Effectiveness, efficiency and accountability of some UN agencies & INGOs have been questioned by donors, GoP and implementing partners. Broadly there is insufficient commitment to the aid effectiveness agenda.	HCT members will ensure that response is monitored and results shared.	High	National	HCT	Ongoing and continuous
			The UN must reduce transaction costs.	High	Global/ National	UN Agencies/ INGOs	Ongoing
			UN agencies and IPs produce results commensurate to the level of funding received (i.e. through unit cost analysis).	High	National	UN agencies	Ongoing

Area	Finding	Conclusion	Recommendation	Priority	Level	By whom	By when
Assessments 3	There is a clear need to focus on getting updated data on recovery.	While few sectors have clarity of early recovery scope and needs, today, there is no comprehensive assessment of outstanding recovery needs.	NDMA/PND/Line Departments, with clusters, roll out a joint recovery needs assessment	Medium	National/ Provincial/ Districts	NDMA (clusters and PND)	March 15 th
	The current response plans are based on individual agency and sectoral early recovery needs assessments. Even if some were conducted in September a comprehensive assessment is still missing.	Residual relief needs have partially been identified in priority districts.	In future disasters NDMA defines who coordinates needs assessments	Medium	National/ Provincial/ Districts	GoP	June 30 th
	Most organizations are preparing new assessments but few of these are coordinated Ref. paragraphs 42 and 51						

Area	Finding	Conclusion	Recommendation	Priority	Level	By whom	By when
Assessments 4	<p>Multiple single agency assessments and a lack of common criteria for needs assessments have also meant that humanitarian partners have been unable to jointly prioritize interventions</p> <p>Information is gathered in multiple formats by Government, Agencies, NGOs, cluster, through individual assessment. Ref to paragraphs 42-46-47.</p>	<p>Disaster response better meets requirements where assessment is an ongoing process and is responsive to changing conditions and feeds into programming.</p> <p>Without compatible information, relief and early recovery activities are more likely to be provided in an uncoordinated manner, based on organizational priorities and assumptions of what the affected population needs.</p>	For current and future emergencies in Pakistan, NDMA and cluster leads agree on standard assessment formats and methodology, based on new IASC guidelines.	High	National (Provincial to follow)	GoP NDMA, PDMA with HCT	March 31 st
Response 5	As a whole the humanitarian response to the floods prevented a major food crisis and disease outbreaks. It also helped raise awareness and improve access to health facilities. However, a principled approach was missing due to strong political interference and limited access (physical security). Ref. paragraphs 68 to 70	<p>The humanitarian space was compromised during the response to floods and displacement crisis.</p> <p>Considering the sheer scale of the emergency, the response was soon stretched to the limit. As a result coverage was limited and generally poorly prioritized.</p>	The Special Envoy and HC/RC promotes needs based and principled approaches during humanitarian responses and all Humanitarian actors need to commit to it.	High	National	Special Envoy, HC/RC	Continuously
Response 6	The response was constrained by insufficient	There is a distinct need to build human and	To mobilise qualified resources:				

Area	Finding	Conclusion	Recommendation	Priority	Level	By whom	By when
	<p>surge capacity and high turnover of international staff.</p> <p>KPK demonstrated a comparatively better response than the southern provinces largely due to continued engagement of government organization in disaster responses (Earthquake 2005, displacement crisis 2009 and small scale disasters).</p> <p>Additionally many NGOs, INGOs, UN Agencies, Clusters, etc were still working there from the earthquake which made a large impact in the speed of response. Government actions were also politicized.</p> <p>In Sindh, Punjab and Balochistan the local capacity was comparatively less experienced in DM (PDMA/IPs). Ref. paragraph 75 and 76.</p>	<p>institutional (ref. Recommendation 9) capacity within Pakistani disaster management structures.</p> <p>Insufficiently qualified international and national human resources were made available.</p> <p>International staff turnover represented another constraint affecting the response.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> GoP develop a national surge capacity registry (including provincial and district levels) OCHA with UN agencies ensure that cluster-leads are trained (in compulsory web-based training before deployment) UN agencies, with stand-by partners, ensure that lengths of contracts of surge deployments are commensurate to scale and duration of emergencies. 	<p>Medium</p> <p>Medium</p> <p>Medium</p>	<p>National/ Provincial/ Districts</p> <p>Global National</p> <p>UN- agencies</p>	<p>GoP and National IASC representatives and NGOs</p> <p>OCHA and UN-agencies</p> <p>UN agencies with stand-by partners</p>	<p>May 31st</p> <p>September 30th</p> <p>May 30th</p>

Area	Finding	Conclusion	Recommendation	Priority	Level	By whom	By when
Response 7	<p>The sheer scope of the disaster made it difficult to apply internationally agreed standards (Sphere and Oslo Guidelines). Ref. paragraphs 77 to 79 + context part in report</p> <p>Pressure from donors to use NATO air bridge during relief phase, HC and OCHA stood up.</p>	<p>The experiences from the Pakistani floods clearly show the need to adapt the response to the context and conditions on the ground. International standards serve as guidelines for what should be achieved, but it is clear to all parties that given the extent of the disaster it was difficult to follow internationally agreed standards and guidelines. Some clusters managed to agree on adapted standards (Sphere-related).</p> <p>Military assets were used (both national and international) as civilian assets (air) were insufficient and physical access constrained. There was not a common position across the agencies with regards to use of military assets. In areas such as Balochistan and KPK, where the government is a party to the conflict, these assets should not be used.</p>	<p>NDMA and Line Departments, with cluster leads, define minimum assistance standards for disaster response in Pakistan (considering type of disaster, scale and length, as well as pre-existing capacities and vulnerabilities).</p>	Medium	National & Provincial	NDMA, Line Departments and UN agencies	June 31 st with periodic reviews
			<p>HC/RC, with OCHA, will ensure HCT alignment on guidelines for use of military assets in future emergencies (only as providers of last resort).</p>	Medium	National	GoP, IASC representatives and donors	April 30 th

Area	Finding	Conclusion	Recommendation	Priority	Level	By whom	By when
Connectedness 8	Most of the international response focused on relief rather than on recovery activities.	In general, ER was not timely planned for by the clusters. GoP (NDMA) is currently drawing ER strategic plans, non-aligned to PFRERRP.	NDMA, with HCT, promote a common understanding of the different emergency phases.	High	Federal and Provincial	GoP, Line Departments and UN agencies	February 28 th
	Strategy related to early recovery, recovery and rehabilitation was not carefully planned for by most clusters as requirements from NDMA and OCHA were inconsistent and changed over time. Ref. paragraphs 87, 88 and 92		NDMA/PDMA, with line departments and UN agencies (led by UNDP) must develop a joint early recovery and rehabilitation plans	High	National Provincial	NDMA, Line Departments, OCHA and UNDP	March 31 st
Connectedness 9	Pakistan is a disaster hotspot exposed to recurrent hydrological and meteorological events. Disaster management is essentially reactive as investments in DRR are low. The civilian disaster management capacity at provincial and district level is low and coordination capacity is not always functioning properly. Contingency planning is generally missing. The One UN has been	The links between national and provincial disaster management are generally weak and preparedness was insufficient to provide a more effective and efficient response.	UNDP, with OCHA, support NDMA's Disaster Management Plan: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ To build up national capacities at provincial, district and local levels. ▪ To develop specific contingency plans for areas at risk. ▪ To strengthen cooperation between NDMA, PDMA and DDMA. ▪ To better define the role of clusters in future disasters 	Medium	Federal Provincial District	UNDP (OCHA) and NDMA, PDMA and DDMA (UNDP)	February 2012
						(OCHA)	June 30 th
						(UNDP)	December 2011
						NDMA	June 30 th

Area	Finding	Conclusion	Recommendation	Priority	Level	By whom	By when
	rolled out and DRM is one of the five strategic priorities Ref. paragraph 97 and 98						
Coordination (General) 10	<p>Government structures were distant from areas where humanitarian response concentrated. Most humanitarian actors had presence in the hubs rather than provincial capitals, which contributed to reinforced capacity among local NGOs and authorities.</p> <p>Their presence was justified by bringing coordination closer to relief operations. Now the overall response is moving into recovery and reconstruction. Reference paragraphs 105 and 106</p>	<p>Now that the emergency is over in most of the country and is transitioning Sindh, the decentralized hubs in Punjab and Sindh are losing momentum.</p> <p>In these two provinces, decision making processes were not integrated in the existing provincial government structures</p>	<p>NDMA, with UNDP and OCHA, must plan progressive phase out of Multan, Hyderabad and Sukkur hubs by ensuring:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ that provincial coordination is brought within the PDMA in Karachi and Lahore ▪ operational coordination at district level 	High	Provincial and districts	<p>NDMA, PDMA, OCHA and UNDP</p> <p>(UNDP)</p> <p>(OCHA national staff)</p>	<p>March 31st</p> <p>March 31st</p>
Coordination (Clusters) 11	Initially four clusters have been rolled out for life saving activities in Sindh, Punjab and Balochistan, following the request of the GoP, while in KPK they were already active.	Life-saving clusters (food, health, WASH and shelter + support services such as telecom and logistics) have been widely praised. The appropriateness of the 'verbatim' roll out (or	IASC Working Group adapts guidelines on roll-out of clusters, according to contextual realities (i.e. size of disaster, strength of national capacities, cross cutting issues and	Medium	Global	IASC working group and ERC	Discussions start March 17 th (GVA meeting)

Area	Finding	Conclusion	Recommendation	Priority	Level	By whom	By when
	However within weeks all clusters were rolled out. Ref paragraphs 117 and 118	<p>business as usual) of clusters has been questioned</p> <p>Clusters often operate autonomously, independently from contextual realities and to a large extent also to the phases of the operation.</p> <p>At the national, and consequently at provincial levels, clusters were not always aligned with recovery planning (link 8) and line departments (link 3).</p>	<p>civil- and military response mechanisms and funding) and Governments' priorities.</p> <p>HC/RC should streamline coordination and Early Recovery Working Group should be made functional at national, provincial and district levels</p> <p>NDMA, with the relevant government authorities and HCT, will thematically regroup clusters to specific phases of the emergency, contextual (provincial) realities and reviewed ER plans.</p>	<p>Medium</p> <p>Medium</p>	<p>National, provincial and district</p> <p>National and Provincial</p>	<p>NDMA, Line Ministries/Departments, with support from UNDP</p> <p>NDMA and HCT</p>	<p>March 1st</p> <p>March 15th</p>
Coordination (Leadership) 12	The HC, HCT and clusters provided insufficient leadership over the UN agencies and the clusters. Ref. paragraphs 112, 114 and 120	Both the HC and clusters lacked clear leadership and strategic prioritization. Cluster leads generally favoured their own agencies' interests rather than the sector priorities.	<p>The HC and HCT must be in a position to prioritize and lead the humanitarian response above individual agencies interests.</p> <p>Cluster lead agencies should appoint skilled, experienced, independent/dedicated full-time cluster leads.</p>	<p>High</p> <p>High</p>	<p>Global and National</p> <p>Global and National</p>	<p>IASC working group and ERC</p> <p>UN-Agencies</p>	<p>June 2011</p> <p>June 30th</p>

Area	Finding	Conclusion	Recommendation	Priority	Level	By whom	By when
Information Management and Monitoring 13	<p>The information flow was massive but with limited strategic use. Only some clusters had their own reporting formats; as a result information was not consolidated.</p> <p>OCHA , together with NDMA, has been working on rolling out single reporting format since the onset of the disaster</p> <p>Indicators as specified in the PFRERRP are not used because they are overly complicated and baseline data is missing.</p> <p>Limited availability and reporting of sex and age disaggregated data.</p> <p>Ref. paragraphs 123, 124 and 128</p>	<p>There was a need for a standardized reporting format with clearly defined targets and indicators.</p> <p>However, single reporting format was far too late (posted online Mid-January 2011) preventing strategic overview and action prioritization.</p> <p>Integrated information for monitoring results is still missing. Reporting against indicators as outlined in the PFRERRP is generally missing.</p>	<p>NDMA, with OCHA, should ensure the roll-out of the newly developed Single Reporting Format in the current and future disasters.</p> <p>NDMA, with EAD and IASC representatives, define integrated results based monitoring framework for future emergencies (aligned with single reporting format) which includes:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ measurable progress indicators ▪ outcome indicators ▪ level of expenditures ▪ 4 W's (who, what, where and when) 	High	National	OCHA with NDMA	March 15 th
	Medium	National	NDMA with Line Departments. EAD, PND and IASC representatives	July 31 st			
General 14	In Pakistan the humanitarian community did not take stock of lessons learned from prior evaluations (i.e. GoP and IA RTE), including	A more systemic approach in this regard would help improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the humanitarian system's	To improve effectiveness of current and future responses, NDMA, with representatives from HCT and PHF and national NGO counterpart forums	Medium	National	NDMA, HCT and PHF	April 15 th

Area	Finding	Conclusion	Recommendation	Priority	Level	By whom	By when
	<p>systematic follow up on previous recommendations.</p> <p>Ref. paragraphs 29, 44,45, 60, 68, and 120</p>	<p>response to future disasters.</p>	<p>must form a Working Group to:</p> <p>1) track and follow-up on the application of recommendations from recent evaluations and the extent to which they have been implemented and</p> <p>2) draw management a response plan on recommendations from the Floods 2010 IA-RTE</p> <p>RTE team follow-up visit to check implementation process</p>			tbd	tbd
General 15	<p>Ref. paragraph 66.</p>	<p>Multi-sector area based approaches are best suited for disasters of this size as sector based approaches soon spread thin.</p> <p>Geographic - area based approaches allow for better coverage and are more adaptive to fast changing situations.</p>	<p>The international humanitarian system should implement geographic area based responses in future disasters of similar scale</p>	Medium	Global, National and/or provincial	IASC (NDMA and HCT)	June 30 th

2 - Context


Magnitude of the disaster:

1. Pakistan's 2010 floods are considered amongst one of the major disasters of the 21st century due to the disaster's widespread geographical scale and distribution (from the Himalayan Plateau to the Arabian Sea), the unprecedented caseload of affected population and its economic impact. In fact, it was the largest disaster ever recorded in terms of affected area, affected people and households damaged. Comparatively, in total, a wider area and more people have been affected by these floods than those affected by the Indian Ocean Tsunami that swept across 14 countries in 2004, the Pakistan 2005 and the Haiti 2010 earthquakes combined.
2. According to the Pakistan's National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA), the 2010 floods constitute the country's largest disaster¹ as some 20,202,327 persons, approximately 10% of the country's population, was affected, despite the scale of the disaster, casualties remained relatively low at 1,985. However, the number of casualties was relatively low in comparison to other recent disasters such as the 2005 Kashmir earthquake (casualty ratio 1:100). However, it must be noted that the 2005 earthquake, while deadlier was more localized².
3. The 2010 Pakistan floods began in late July, and following heavy monsoon rains that lasted for more than eight weeks, they evolved from normal flash floods into a massive disaster affecting large parts of the country. The floodwater waves washed down from north to south as the Indus River caudal extended to about forty times its usual size and at one point, submerged a fifth of the country's land mass. Initially, the provinces of Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) were flooded. In mid August, as flood waters flowed south and as Punjab and Sindh provinces experienced resultant widespread flooding, entire populations residing on both sides of the Indus River basin were affected. The floods directly and/or indirectly affected 78 of Pakistan's 121 districts, devastating and submerging entire villages, roads, bridges, water supply and sanitation infrastructure, agricultural lands, livestock as well as washing away houses and health and education facilities.

¹ IRIN PAKISTAN: Top 10 natural disasters since 1935. It is the fifth flood in Pakistan affecting 5 million or more in less than 40 years.

² Link to comparative graph: http://ndma.gov.pk/Documents/flood_2010/flood_comparison.pdf

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Map 1: Pakistan: Flood Affected Districts - as of 23 Sep 2010, Source Government of Pakistan³

4. Overall, the economic damage caused by this disaster has been estimated at some 10.1 billion USD, or 5.8% of GDP⁴. Immense infrastructure losses were registered including 2.9 million households of which 1.9 were severely affected or completely destroyed, livelihoods disrupted with 80% of food reserves lost. As a result of the floods prices have been dramatically driven up while the affected population's purchasing power has fallen.

³ <http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/RKRR-8BCQ5A?OpenDocument&rc=3&emid=FL-2010-000141-PAK>

⁴ According to the Pakistan Floods Preliminary Damage and Needs Assessment 2010, ADB/WB, November 2010 direct damage caused by the floods is estimated to PKR 552 billion (US\$ 6.5 billion) while indirect losses amount to PKR 303 billion (US\$ 3.6 billion)



Map 2: Pakistan: Flood Situation comparing the maximum flood extent 16 of September 2010 with the current flood extent as of 16 January 2011, Source OCHA

5. The impact of the flood was very diverse in each province due to the changing nature of the disaster, the different levels of preparedness (in terms of capacity, resources and systems in place), and the access to individual and common resources. Kyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) was only affected by flash floods while other provinces were exposed to both flash and riverine floods. Sindh was the worst affected province, as the Indus River did not find an outlet due to the flat topography of this area.

6. While waters receded within days in Balochistan and KPK, it took several weeks in Punjab and months in some areas of Sindh. Where water receded rapidly most of the displaced population was able to return during the months of August and September, October most of the affected population in these areas had returned. Several cases of water breaches in Sindh and Punjab submerged more districts under water in Balochistan, Sindh, and Punjab. As of January 2011 entire union councils are still submerged in four districts of Sindh and one district in Punjab. Areas in the Sindh Province are confronted with longer-term displacements and situations where most vulnerable parts of the populations remains under severe difficulties

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from recovering due to lack of access to land, economic debts to landlords and because livelihoods could not be re-established as quickly as in other affected areas.

Province	Deaths	Injured	Houses Damaged	Population Affected
Balochistan	54	104	75,596	700,000
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	1,156	1,198	284,990	3,800,000
Punjab	110	262	497,700	6,000,000
Sindh	411	1,235	876,249	7,274,250
P.A.K	71	87	7,106	200,000
Gilgit Baltistan	183	60	2,830	100,000
Total	1,985	2,946	1,744,471	18,074,250

Table 1: Pakistan: Flood losses as of 21 November 2010. Source NDMA, PDMA's and GBDMA. On 9 February 2011 the total number of population affected has reached 20,184,550⁵

7. Pakistan was not prepared for such a large-scale disaster, probably beyond what any government can handle. It soon became clear that the Government of Pakistan (GoP) was unable to allocate sufficient resources to respond to such a monumental catastrophe.

8. As a result of the floods, more than 12 million people required humanitarian assistance⁶. The geographical scale of this disaster and the number of affected people therefore makes this a larger and more complex situation than almost any other faced by the humanitarian community.

9. Nationwide the floods washed out years' achievements through developmental efforts. The impact of floods has worsened chronic poverty and inequality, especially among the most vulnerable parts of the Pakistani population. Affected regions such as KPK and Punjab are traditionally wealthier than Sindh, despite the latter's wealth in agriculture and incipient tourism. Some of the main reasons behind the already existing poverty levels and inequalities are of a structural character mainly related to restricted access to land and social services. According to the World Bank, about 2 percent of Pakistani households control more than 45

⁵ For NDMA updates on damages and losses consult <http://www.pakistanfloods.pk/daily-updates/situation-report>

⁶ USAID, DCHA, OFDA Pakistan Floods Fact Sheet #7, Fiscal Year 2011 November 30, 2010. http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/humanitarian_assistance/disaster_assistance/countries/pakistan/template/fs_sr/fy_2011/pakistan_fl_fs07_11-30-2010.pdf

percent of the land area⁷. Such structures are imposed by feudal landlords, whose tenants are deprived from many basic rights, including access to basic services such as health and education. According to surveys done by Pakistani health departments, the problem of Global Acute Malnutrition rates has surfaced in Sindh, where rates over 20 per cent are far beyond World Health Organization's (WHO) 15% emergency threshold⁸. People that were already affected by the chronic poverty and vulnerability were further marginalised as a result of the floods, according to Nutrition Cluster data⁹.

10. Pakistan is a disaster hotspot which is frequently exposed both to geophysical and hydrological (earthquakes, cyclones, droughts, floods and landslides) events and conflicts on several fronts, including Pakistan being a frontline U.S. ally in the war on terror. In KPK, as well as areas of Balochistan, the impact of the flood has been compounded by conflict and insurgency, some of which derives from regional geopolitical situation, which adds an additional layer to what is already considered a complex emergency situation¹⁰¹¹.

3 - Methodology

11. This evaluation is the ninth Inter Agency-Real Time Evaluation (IA-RTE) conducted for the Inter Agency Standing Committee (IASC)¹² of the current series and the fourth IA-RTE to be rolled out in Pakistan. An IA-RTE is an evaluation that provides immediate feedback in a participatory way to those executing and managing the response. IA-RTEs seek to unlock operational challenges and provide real time feed-back for both immediate corrective action and more system-wide institutional learning.

12. The UN's Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) managed and funded the evaluation on behalf of the IASC. The Terms of Reference (ToR), which define the objectives

⁷See: <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/SOUTHASIAEXT/EXTSAREGTOPAGRI/0,,contentMDK:20273773~menuPK:548216~pagePK:34004173~piPK:34003707~theSitePK:452766,00.html>

⁸http://www.unicef.org/pakistan/media_6750.htm

⁹Nutrition Cluster Brief, 23 January 2011

<http://pakresponse.info/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=QBCyuhI5eNc%3d&tabid=83&mid=492>

¹⁰ For a better understanding of the conflict and its implication see the Inter Agency Real Time Evaluation of the humanitarian response of Pakistan's 2009 Displacement Crisis http://daraint.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/10/IARTE_PK_displacement_2010_report.pdf

¹¹The authors acknowledge the international terminology of 'complex emergencies' (i.e. one country dealing with several recurrent events within its frontiers, some being conflict related, while others are related to natural disaster). However, in this report we will refer to the 'complex' terminology only when referring to the 'emergency situation' in Balochistan and KPK and 'floods emergency', when referring exclusively to the emergency that occurred as a result of the 2010 floods.

¹²The previous IA RTEs in the present series are: Pakistan 2005 earthquake, Darfur crisis 2006, Mozambique 2007 floods and cyclone, Pakistan 2007 floods and cyclone, Myanmar 2008 cyclone, Philippines 2009 cyclone, Haiti 2010 earthquake, Pakistan 2009 2010 displacement.

and tasks of the evaluation team, are presented as Annex I. Between January and February 2011, a team of four consultants working for DARA¹³, an independent organization specialized in humanitarian evaluation, conducted this RTE. It is the fourth IA-RTE and the second in Pakistan that DARA carried out.

13. The evaluation commenced with a home based in-depth documentation review. Upon arrival, the team travelled directly into the field, following the river Indus from Karachi to Peshawar visiting Sindh, Punjab and KPK Provinces to grasp operational response realities on the ground. Balochistan could not be visited due primarily to security constraints as well as time restrictions. Field visits were complemented by meetings with a range of stakeholders in Islamabad.

14. An initial feedback session was organized in both Multan (Punjab) and Peshawar (KPK) at the end of each of field visit, and an overall debriefing session was held at the Humanitarian Country Team HCT at the end of the field mission to present initial findings and conclusions. Workshops will be carried out in Pakistan in mid February both at provincial and federal level to further validate the findings of the report and draw Specific, Measurable, Accountable, Reasonable and Time bound (SMART) recommendations and draw a process action plan.

3.1 Structure of the report

15. This report is structured according to the different dimensions of the IA-RTE Framework as outlined in the ToR, namely context, needs assessments, funding, response, coordination, connectedness and cross-cutting issues. Each dimension is subdivided into a number of key issues addressing the questions outlined in the ToR.

3.2 Methodology

16. The evaluation followed a deductive analysis based on a mixed methods approach for data collection. Data collected has been entered into an evidence table organized according to key issues outlined in the ToR¹⁴. The findings of the evaluation are based on:

- A desk review of key documents, web-pages and other relevant publications – references are outlined in the bibliography in Annex 8
- Semi-structured individual interviews (interview guide for semi structured interviews - Annex 5) and group interviews with some 1,107 key stakeholders of which 421 were carried out with representatives from the UN agencies and programmes, the Red Cross Movement, international and national non-governmental organizations (INGOs), government at the central and local level, the military and donors. Annex 4 outlines the

¹³ The team consisted of two international consultants (Riccardo Polastro and Nicolai Steen) and two national consultants (Farwa Zafar and Aatika Nagrah). See bio's in annex 9.

¹⁴ The evidence table contained 2700 pieces of evidence gathered from the desk review, interviews and observations.
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full list of people met, by organization, affiliation and the type of interview method used.

- Group interviews held with over 686 people from the affected population including people still displaced in spontaneous camps and people that had returned to their land annex 3.1 outlines the list of camps and locations visited and the number of affectees interviewed at each.
- Direct observation of coordination process both at district, provincial and federal level as well as the outcomes of relief and recovery responses.
- Field visits to 20 different locations in three different provinces and the Federal Capital. The locations visited include two provincial capitals and 11 districts. An overview of localities visited can be found in annex 4

17. The evidence collected was used as basis to draw conclusions and recommendations. To the degree possible, the evaluators triangulated data and drew on multiple sources to ensure that findings could be generalised and were not the result of bias or views of a single agency or single type of actor involved in the response.




Figure 1: Triangulation. Information from interviews and the findings of the desk review were validated from the findings and cross-validation.

18. Adopting utilization focused approach in order to boost the ownership of the process, conclusions and recommendations were validated, prioritized and organizations responsible to implement them and timelines were defined through three Provincial workshops and one national workshop (see annex 4). Following the workshops in Pakistan, headquarters debriefings were held with IASC representatives in Geneva and New York.

19. Evaluation Constraints

- Timing of the evaluation; although this IA RTE was fielded at an earlier stage of the humanitarian response to the epic floods disaster, as compared to the previous IA-RTE

done in Pakistan, the main relief efforts had been carried out between August and December (2010), prior to the visit of the RTE mission in January 2011. When the evaluation team visited the affected areas, small pockets of relief operations were still ongoing, but the majority of organisations were preparing, and some undertaking, early recovery activities;

- Staff turnover – especially among surge capacity, with rare exceptions this meant that people that dealt in the initial phase of the response could not be interviewed;
- Limited time for fieldwork; the team spent only three weeks in Pakistan. While the team divided itself at several locations to maximize coverage, the numbers of locations visited were still relatively limited compared to the geographical spread of the disaster;
- Security: In Pakistan, security represents a major concern were humanitarian actors operate. The team was required to travel under police escort.

4 - Funding

4.1 Timeliness of appeal and funding mobilisation

20. To date, pledged foreign assistance for the Pakistan flood response reaches a record high of 3 billion USD¹⁵. However, more than half of the 3 billion USD remains 'soft pledges' and have not been disbursed. In total, 79 donors have contributed to the humanitarian response both through in-kind and in-cash contributions. Most of the funding was disbursed through bilateral aid channels and through emerging and non-traditional donors such as Turkey and Saudi Arabia, the Pakistani Diaspora and the private sector. Enormous amounts of funding and donations in kind for humanitarian relief came outside of the UN appeal¹⁶ – through private foundations, charities, religious groups, community groups, and, the Army.

21. Following the request of the GoP, the UN acted in a timely manner by launching the Pakistan Initial Floods Emergency Response Plan (PIFERP) on August 11th, requesting 459 million USD to respond to the immediate relief needs for an initial three months period, concentrating on four priority areas, namely food, shelter, health and water, sanitation and hygiene. Initial funding was swift and commitments and pledges reached 67% by the end of the month, reaching 90% by September 15th, shortly before the revised Plan was launched on September

¹⁵ See EAD <http://www.ead.gov.pk/>

¹⁶ Even in its first edition, the appeal comprised projects from 29 NGOs, nine UN organizations, and IOM.

17th 2010. However, in comparison to other major recent disasters, funding was generally slow and incommensurate with needs¹⁷.

22. A series of factors bolstered the timeliness of PIFERP funding:

- The plan's focus on life saving activities (including food, health, shelter and water), in addition to services vital for the international response, such as telecommunication aviation services and telecommunication and security);
- Large international media coverage throughout the month of August;
- The unprecedented level of the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) funds made available; 40 million USD was mobilised through three funding decisions¹⁸. This represents the CERF's largest funding allocation to a disaster and facilitated an immediate response;
- The UN Secretary General (SG) made an immediate visit urging donors to respond to the PIFERP, followed by three institutional visits of the newly appointed Emergency Response Coordinator (ERC);
- The extraordinary General Assembly session (August 18th) and Special Event (August 19th) both helped raising awareness of the floods;
- Pakistan is considered a top priority for major donors of the Organisation for Economic Development/Development Assistance Committee (OECD/DAC), such as the United States (US), the United Kingdom (UK) and the European Commission (EC), as well as for non-traditional donors such as Turkey and Saudi Arabia. These donors generally supported the central role of the UN as the primary organ through which aid is channelled;
- Donors opted to contribute to the UN response plan against the GoP Response Fund, mainly due to concerns related to transparency in disbursement of funds in the past and the corruption track-record reported throughout Pakistan;
Pakistan floods represented the largest humanitarian response ever for key donors such as the UK's Department for International Development (DFID), Directorate General of the European Commission for Humanitarian Aid (ECHO) and Civil Protection and Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA);

23. However, many NGOs scrambled to mobilize funding as few donors had funds immediately available reportedly due to their heavy engagement in other crises such as Haiti. National NGOs were less funded than INGOs and generally reported a feeling of marginalisation from international funding. Those organizations that did not have rapid response or revolving funds mechanisms in place and those that could not reallocate resources from other on-going

¹⁷According to Oxfam, funding for Pakistan floods was relatively lower than other recent emergencies with only 3.2 USD for every affected person within the first 10 days, compared to 495 USD for the 2010 Haiti earthquake, 70 USD for the 2005 Pakistan Kashmir earthquake, 46 USD Myanmar 2008 Cyclone Nargis. See: *Six months into the floods – Resetting Pakistan's priorities through reconstruction*, Oxfam 2011.

¹⁸ The first of 16.6 million USD to kick start the response, the second to bolster and expand the operation and the third considering the widespread of flooding. For more information refer to <http://ochaonline.un.org/CERFaroundtheWorld/Pakistan2010/tabid/6618/language/en-US/Default.aspx>

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activities were faced with difficulties in terms of initiating activities immediately after the onset. For these organisations, funding was slow.

24. The emergency response fund (ERF) was activated in September 2010 to provide international and national NGOs, UN agencies and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) with rapid and flexible funding to respond to the floods. More than 30 projects were funded for a total of 8 Million USD in the areas of Food, Health, Water and Shelter and Non Food Relief Items (NFRI). However, national NGOs considered it was difficult to apply for as procedures were not known to some NGOs, especially national ones, while others perceived the procedures as being cumbersome. Generally, ERF was perceived as a funding mechanism for UN agencies and INGOs and those that were granted funding considered that it took a lot of time to be disbursed as compared to other bi-lateral funding mechanisms, such as the OFDA RAPID.

25. Other clusters involved in nonlife-saving activities faced serious difficulties in accessing funds and getting their operations started. The expansion of number of clusters took attention away from life saving activities (see also part 7). A funding overview is found in Annex 6.

26. OFDA, the largest donor to the Pakistan floods emergency response, was generally praised as a donor allowing modifications to existing grants and flexibly adapting programs to changing needs. It mobilized several funding mechanisms to facilitate organizations' response. In contrast, DFID had cumbersome procedures to approve funding for new partners as opposed to for the larger organizations already in longer term partnerships with DFID. Initial ECHO funding was redirected from the Internally Displaced Person (IDP) crisis in conflict affected areas and funding was made available to organisations weeks after the floods with contracts being signed in the second half of August¹⁹. Some actors felt ECHO funding was slow.

The international focus on funding the initial plan, and consequent flood plans, however meant that the Pakistan Humanitarian Response Plan (PHRP) was taken out of the limelight. In fact, the PHRP only received 25 million USD since its revision in July 2010, despite the imminent challenge of addressing the needs of an estimated 2.6 million IDPs. This represents a major concern in a country that is regularly and simultaneously exposed to different types of disasters.

27. While the launch of the initial response plan (including the initial appeal for 0.5 billion USD) was swift, the revision process of the Pakistan Floods Emergency Response Plan (PFERP) was slow, both in its formulation process and in terms of funding commitments. The PFERP, launched on September 17th in New York, requested 2 billion USD and represented the largest appeal ever launched by the UN. However, this appeal was not officially endorsed by the GoP

¹⁹ The Pakistani Government uses the IDP category only for those affected by conflict or complex emergency (e.g. as in KPK); those affected by floods are referred to as 'flood affectees'. In this report the authors recognize the terminology of the Pakistani Government, while still maintaining that 'flood affectees' are and should be protected by international humanitarian law.

due to disagreement between GoP and UN with regards to the scope of the plan (i.e. number of clusters and whether it should include early recovery activities or if this should be part of a separate appeal). The disagreement nearly compromised the relationship between GoP and UN and represents a serious breach of GoP-UN protocols. The GoP finally endorsed by the appeal in November (as Pakistan Floods Relief and Early Recovery Response Plan - PFRERRP). However, when launched in November, the PFRERRP did not represent the evolution of needs within the affected union councils as many relief activities had already concluded. Furthermore, the data regarding affected populations and needs, upon which the PFRERRP was based on dated back to September 15th. At federal level it is widely agreed that cluster lead agencies had to dedicate too many efforts on the appeal process, taking focus away from the actual response.

28. There are several factors to consider in relation to the funding of the PFRERRP and the delay in its endorsement:

- a. Initially, funding concentrated in life-saving sectors, while the revised plan focused on a large amount of projects without a common strategy. Many interviewees considered it a wish list with limited prioritisation.
- b. The appeal was not considered as a strategic framework but rather a fundraising tool, focusing on financial needs. Many of the projects contained in the FRERRP are based on assumptions rather than on thorough needs assessments.
- c. Most UN agencies did not manage to spend the large amounts of funding received; their capacity to digest such funding was questionable.
- d. Some donors consider that the UN is not always value for money and has high transaction costs while remaining behind the curve in terms of implementation.
- e. Most UN agencies and INGOs are not direct implementers²⁰ but operate through implementing partners, they are often considered an additional layer, adding administration costs. Donors channel large amounts of funding out of the appeal directly through national and international NGOs, the RC Movement and bilateral aid. Some consider this reduces transaction costs to reach people in need
- f. The UN is not always considered accountable for on how resources have been spent by both the government and international donors.
- g. Most of the donor funding focused on the emergency relief while early recovery and reconstruction funding is more limited.
- h. Most donor resources were committed to Haiti.
- i. Reduced media coverage after August diverted donor attention
- j. Progressive donor fatigue may have contributed to a slower donor response as two major UN appeals were launched for Pakistan within the same year.
- k. The widespread scale of the disaster meant reduced presence on the ground of agencies, particularly in Sindh and Punjab and limited number of implementing partners.
- l. The GoP is not keen on having too many appeals as it does not want to be perceived as a failed State.

²⁰ The revised appeal contains some 315 NGO projects, which have received \$120 million of direct funding.
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29. Currently, the FRERRP has received 1.255.381.156 USD contributions, corresponding to 63,9% of the funds requested²¹. In absolute terms the amount is higher than the funding mobilised for the Haiti appeal, but to date the Haiti appeal was proportionally better funded, with up to 74% of the 1.5 billion USD funding requirements covered over a longer period.

Conclusions

30. Funding for other non life-saving and early recovery activities was slower and funding commitments were lower.

31. Currently in Pakistan the UN has two stand alone appeals; the PHRP and PFRERRP - with limited funding. PFRERRP took PHRP out of the limelight.

32. Effectiveness, efficiency and accountability of some UN agencies & INGOs have been questioned by donors, GoP and implementing partners. Broadly there is insufficient commitment to the aid effectiveness agenda.

Recommendations

33. Funding for other non life-saving and early recovery activities was slower and funding commitments were lower.

34. Currently in Pakistan the UN has two stand alone appeals; the PHRP and PFRERRP - with limited funding. PFRERRP took PHRP out of the limelight.

35. HCT members will ensure that response is monitored and results shared.

36. The UN must reduce transaction costs.

37. UN agencies and IPs produce results commensurate to the level of funding received (i.e. through unit cost analysis).

5 - Assessments

38. From the onset of the disaster the GoP and the UN made strong efforts to ensure that joint assessments were carried out in order to make the response as effective and efficient as possible. While some clusters were able to link joint assessments with programming activities,

²¹ According to the Financial Tracking System consulted on February 21, 2011. For more information see <http://pakresponse.info> and

there is a general perception amongst most partners that more could have been done to ensure that needs assessments were more strategic and instrumental, hence feeding into organisations' flood response.

39. United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC) teams were deployed in early August to perform initial needs assessments. The UNDAC was, however, not instrumental in addressing needs and was more focused on setting up hub-coordination mechanisms. Since a very early stage, attempts to consolidate data and information from different agencies' assessments were not successful, as formats and methodologies were not compatible, an issue that continues till date.

40. Several joint assessments have been carried out in the aftermath of the floods in order to arrive at a more comprehensive understanding of needs, including the Multi-Cluster Rapid Assessment Mechanism (MCRAM)²² assessing humanitarian issues, Early Recovery Needs Assessment (ERNA) and the Damage Needs Assessment (DNA) that looked at economic infrastructure. While these assessments are clear evidence of attempts of concerted efforts, linkages are missing and there is an absence of joint programming around the assessments.

41. The MCRAM was carried out during the last week of August and while it is recognised as a 'joint' step forward in terms of strengthening joint assessment tools, it is still considered an 'imperfect tool' or 'works in progress'. Its main utility was as baseline data in the formulation of the initial response plan (e.g. PIFERP) and it was not used in the field as organisations did not have access to collected data immediately. Furthermore, this assessment and other assessments have been criticised for not being sufficiently disaggregated and disseminated to province- and district levels and therefore, were of little usage in terms of informing organisations' programming.

42. From August to September, WFP carried out rapid needs assessment and a Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping (VAM) in four provinces with the assistance of its local implementing partners (IPs). Findings were shared with OCHA and the GoP. The VAM provided the basis upon which much of the initial assistance was provided, including that of PDMAs.

43. The different joint assessments and single agency assessments carried out were criticised for their lack of interlinkages, especially MCRAM and the DNA. From the onset of the disaster, there was no clear strategy as to how different assessments would feed into programming to ensure timely and smooth transition from relief to (early) recovery.

²² The MCRAM was already inter-cluster project already in place in Pakistan prior to the floods with equipment, capacity and partners could be quickly mobilized. The MCRAM benefited from ownership by the Clusters in Pakistan, financial support of UNICEF, coordination from OCHA and in kind support from a range of UN organizations including WFP and WHO and several implementing partners.

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44. At the cluster level, organisations (e.g. WFP, WHO and UNICEF) carried out assessments related to joint operational frameworks (e.g. the survival strategy). The nutrition cluster succeeded in combining response with assessments (“active case finding” methodology) enabling the cluster partners to identify immediate needs and take proper action. These are examples of cluster-wide assessments that paved the way for what are considered to be positive responses (see part 6 ‘Response’). They are nonetheless exceptions, as most assessments were carried out based on single agency operational needs and programming requirements.

45. For different reasons and purposes, INGOs and most UN agencies have carried out numerous single agency needs assessments. The main reason being the need to have data that is strictly relevant for organisations’ response planning, while others mentioned that data was not disaggregated which limits its usefulness in planning local-level response activities and that joint assessments took too long to be carried out; once the results from assessments were ready, the situation on the ground had already changed. Large movements of populations further challenged assessments, particularly in the Sindh province. This was further complicated by the lack of an initial registration and profiling of the affected population caseload.

We were affected by the floods but we were not asked about what our needs were. Some groups visited, but they met with the local feudal landowners only. These people made promises to provide us with repair support for homes, food, tents, and took our land ownership papers and never came back (Rahm Ali Shah Village, Kot Addu)

46. While there is an understanding of organisation’s need to have information on needs up front, there are several drawbacks of single agency assessments, one being that too many of them are carried out, with the result that affected populations are consulted several times, and are often left without receiving what is needed or without explanations as to why certain needs are met while others are not.

47. Furthermore, many of the assessments used different formats, making information consolidation a challenging and as yet unresolved task. Information sharing was also problematic, particularly from agencies and INGOs. This prevented humanitarian partners, especially OCHA, from getting a more nuanced picture of needs across the affected areas and within each of the clusters. National authorities also complained of the lack of information sharing, especially at district levels, which prevented them from coordinating efforts more effectively. A further challenge was that data from Government institutions, such as PDMA and NDMA or line departments, rarely tallied with those put forward by humanitarian partners, especially the MCRAM and the DNA. These discrepancies added to the confusion at operational levels.



Photo 2: Group discussion with villagers in Rahm Ali Shah Village, Kot Addu, Muzaffargarh, Punjab Province © Riccardo Polastro 2011.

48. Multiple single agency assessments and a lack of common formats and criteria for needs assessments have also meant that humanitarian partners have been unable to jointly prioritise interventions (see: Part six “Response”) and target most vulnerable groups within the affected population, including women and children. Intervention prioritisation is of particular importance in a disaster such as the Pakistan floods due to its dimensions and the inability of the government and international community to reach all those affected. While there are several existing instruments, GPRS-data and data bases identifying Pakistan’s poorest and most vulnerable populations (e.g. Pakistan Poverty Alleviation Fund, the National Rural Support Programme, the Benazir Income Support Programme, etc.), these were not sufficiently incorporated and used during the assessments.

49. Access has been another problem, particularly at the beginning of the emergency primarily due to infrastructure damages and security concerns, as well as access granted by authorities before the No Objection Certificate (NOC) was installed. On a more permanent basis, access issues have been related to security concerns, especially in the FATA, Balochistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and parts of Punjab.

50. The lack of access prevented organizations from carrying out independent needs assessments. Instead, organizations were often directly given lists of beneficiaries by the local administration or feudal landlords. These beneficiary lists were not always verified or prioritized.

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51. OCHA's leadership in coordinating assessments across the entire response was clearly affected by the scope and evolving nature of the response. Six months into the crisis significant steps still needs to be taken in terms of improving the collection and management of data, including disaggregation by sex and gender, including applying the single formatted reporting systems.

52. Currently, there are plans for conducting several assessments in light of the need to address recovery needs. Village profiling and union council assessments are being rolled out in the attempt to address current needs although these assessments are late and ideally should have been implemented two-three months ago. While there is an obvious need to focus on getting updated data on recovery needs, the current plans are not timely and should have been carried out months ago.

With most organisations and agencies preparing new assessments, with absolute limited references to the need for coordinating these, there is an imminent risk that a new wave of data collection efforts is unfolding with little attention to a more strategic approach, including prioritisation of areas and clusters and need for consolidation of data. Avoiding this will require strong leadership from OCHA, UNDP and NDMA, supported by PDMA, UN agencies and INGOs. While NDMA's currently plans to coordinate all assessments may be instrumental in avoiding duplications, they must ensure that assessments are all inclusive and impartial.

Conclusions

53. While few sectors have clarity of early recovery scope and needs, today, there is no comprehensive assessment of outstanding recovery needs.

54. Residual relief needs have partially been identified in priority districts

55. Disaster response better meets requirements where assessment is an ongoing process and is responsive to changing conditions and feeds into programming.

56. Without compatible information, relief and early recovery activities are more likely to be provided in an uncoordinated manner, based on organizational priorities and assumptions of what the affected population needs.

Recommendations

57. NDMA/PND/Line Departments, with clusters, roll out a joint recovery needs assessment

58. In future disasters NDMA defines who coordinates needs assessments

59. For current and future emergencies in Pakistan, NDMA and cluster leads agree on standard assessment formats and methodology, based on new IASC guidelines.

6 - Humanitarian Response

60. Overall, the humanitarian response to Pakistan 2010 floods has achieved some positive outcomes. The death toll was relatively low due to the strong resilience of the affected populations, comparatively better early warning mechanisms in the Northern Province of KPK, evacuation and rescue efforts by the Pakistan military, combined with initial primary relief operations which prevented a major food crisis and epidemic outbreaks. Nonetheless, the overall results are considered to be both 'scattered' and 'patchy'²³.

6.1 Timeliness

61. First and foremost, the response was initially carried out by "first responders" (the local population, local governments at district levels, local philanthropists and the military), particularly the military whom immediately deployed troops and assets to evacuate people and distribute essential relief supplies to displaced and isolated populations. Many interviewees considered that military efforts have prevented massive losses of lives throughout the country.

62. Overwhelmed by the magnitude of the evolving disaster, the GoP asked for support from the international community which immediately responded by mobilising the humanitarian system actors (i.e. UN agencies, Red Cross Movement and INGOs). Humanitarian support added to the GoP's efforts, foreign military support²⁴ and bilateral aid. Through the PIFERP, the GoP requested that the UN prioritise four clusters (food, shelter, health and WASH) to focus attention on life-saving activities, rather than rolling out what has become the standardised eleven-cluster approach.

63. In a matter of weeks, the humanitarian response in Pakistan became the largest relief operation ever launched by the international community, but it was primarily organisations with longstanding presence in the country which immediately mobilised staff and contingency emergency stocks. The international relief efforts were sped up as GoP exempted relief goods from tax and granted visas upon arrival to the humanitarian personnel deployed

64. The overall humanitarian response was characterised by many, including the UN, INGOs, Government and donors, to be running behind challenges in most areas, i.e. winter needs were not prioritized in a timely manner – especially in Sindh, and recovery plans are being drawn in some clusters, while most affected people have returned to their places of origin for several months already. As a result, key stakeholders consider the response today to be 'patchy',

²³ These were the labels many interviewees gave when asked how they would characterize the response

²⁴ Foreign military from Afghanistan, Australia, Japan, UAE, and US mobilized personnel, medical teams, field hospitals and air logistic facilities

'reactive' or 'slow'. Some agencies characterised the international response as far too late to be considered life saving with the exception of a few areas, coming in as a second wave of support, raising questions concerning where and how the assistance was provided. As for the IDP crisis, in-kind assistance should therefore only be provided where items are no longer available on the market²⁵. Several factors therefore led to the fact that the response has largely been considered to be supply driven rather than needs based.

6.2 Response Modes

65. The GoP has been clear on its role and responsibility with regards to leading the response and coordinated international efforts. Heading these tasks was the NDMA, established in 2007. Despite vested efforts in taking the lead and coordinating the response efforts, there have been issues concerning its role versus that of other national institutions, such as the Economic Affairs Division (EAD), key line departments as well as NDMA's provincial branches, the Provincial Disaster Management Authority (PDMA)²⁶. A late 2010 law, approved by the Pakistani parliament, has clarified these issues, giving NDMA full fledged authority on matters related to disasters. PDMAs in the affected provinces are also emerging institutions and the most experienced, also with the strongest capacity, is the one in KPK due to the recurrent disasters affecting the Northern regions. While most coordinating efforts at national level went through the NDMA and to some degree also PDMAs, the apparent unresolved division of labour between national institutions have seemingly also hindered a more smooth cooperation between the GoP and the international community's prime humanitarian representative, the UN.

66. On its side, the UN's performance during the initial stages did not cater for a smooth collaboration either. Despite requests from the Pakistani Government's side on limiting the response efforts to four key clusters, the UN favoured, once again, to activate the 'traditional response setup' through eleven clusters²⁷, implying also that these were reflected in the appeal processes (i.e. the PFERP and PFRERP's widened scope). There are different reasons why the Pakistani Government may insist on one option and the UN on another. On one side, the Pakistan Government, keen on solving internal affairs fast, favoured the more focused and short-lived option. On the other side, the UN, driven by a more rights based approach, favoured the inclusive and all-encompassing scope.

67. The RTE found that while all clusters indisputably have made contributions to ease suffering of the affected populations, many interviewees argued that the large cluster setup was too cumbersome and took away focus from the response (see part 7 on Coordination and

²⁵ See recommendation 7 in *IA-RTE of Humanitarian Response to 2009 Displacement Crisis*, DARA, 2010

²⁶ The 8th Amendment to Pakistan's constitution passed in April, 2010 devolves more autonomy to the Provincial level than the Federal level. However, the Federal Government still leads on international development and humanitarian assistance and its allocation to the provinces.

²⁷ The 2007 IASC RTE pointed to the same issue where NDMA preferred four clusters and not the 12 that were finally setup as a response to the emergencies following the floods and cyclone Yemyin earlier that same year.

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Clusters). The general impression is therefore that the mere scale of the disaster made it impossible for the humanitarian community to respond effectively through 11 clusters. While the cluster roll-out has been dealt with in earlier evaluations, including IA-RTEs, the UN still has to act on relevant recommendations.

68. Despite divergent views on what is the ideal setup, international organisations managed to mobilised responses that benefitted parts of the affected population; some responses went through collaboration with line departments or NDMA, while others went directly through implementing partners on the ground. Some examples of positive responses are: Mobile teams for disease early warning systems (DEWS) which have been successful in ensuring that timely action is taken to control disease outbreaks. Collective effort, under the so-called “survival strategy approach” which integrated food, nutrition and WASH, has also generally been considered to be an effective measure as major epidemic outbreaks have been avoided. The WFP and its partners managed to scale up its food emergency distributions from three to eight million beneficiaries from August to October which is also considered a significant achievement, preventing millions from temporary hunger.

69. The response also had some positive “side-effects”, such as improving access to and awareness of health and education, issuing of women ID cards (upon detecting that many women did not have access to assistance due to lack of proper identification), as well as improving awareness and habits related to basic hygiene habits among the affected population, such as open air defecation, screening of over 750,000 children for malnutrition with treatment of over 80,000 most acute cases²⁸.

70. Two dominant humanitarian response modalities emerged; some organisations adopting a multi-sector area-based approach while the others shaped around sector-based priorities. While the first rolled out integrated responses, providing an integral and multi-sector complementary response, the second approach focused on specific sector interventions (e.g. delivery of NFIs). While the relief phase saw some thematic regrouping, yet an integrated approach in areas of return and recovery is yet to be developed.

6.3 Constraints

71. The unfolding nature and scale of the disaster posed severe operational difficulties for both the GoP and humanitarian agencies, including; the sheer size of the caseload of affected people combined with limited level of preparedness, underlying political issues, limited access and security constraints, limited presence of humanitarian actors throughout entire parts of the country, inadequate human and financial means, poor capacity to prioritise, limited capacity among staff and appliance of IASC guidelines, etc. These constraints meant that soon after the

²⁸Nutrition Cluster Brief, 23 January 2011
<http://pakresponse.info/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=QBCyuHI5eNc%3d&tabid=83&mid=492>
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response was scaled up organisations were quickly stretched to the limit in terms of resources and available capacities.

Non-prioritised and politicised response

72. The response was poorly prioritised from the start. As a humanitarian organization representation stated *“initially there was an excessive rush to start without deciding on how and where to respond that led to fundamental distortions in terms of equity and proportionality”*.

73. Humanitarian actors have been confronted with challenges of being able to drive forward an independent needs-based response, partly because of limited presence and capacity, but also for political reasons. The selection of beneficiaries was, at times, not done independently but was subordinated to political interference. Targeting was particularly weak as there was no systematic registration or verification process - often there were no beneficiary lists or selection criteria established. When lists were prepared, these were not always drawn up on the basis of vulnerability. As a result, unknown quantities of assistance have reportedly reached those that were the least vulnerable, close to feudal landlords or connected through certain political affiliations. Many people from ethnic and tribal minorities and most vulnerable individuals and groups, such as widows or other female-headed households, were not prioritised and therefore deprived from any assistance at all. People that went into organised camps were better assisted than those in spontaneous camps; while those in host families received limited assistance.



Photo 3: Flood affected family in Shahbaz Tent City, Jamshoro district, Sindh Province © Riccardo Polastro 2011

74. As a principled approach based on an impartial, neutral and independent humanitarian response²⁹ was missing, the humanitarian space has been compromised, especially in areas such as KPK, FATA and Baluchistan. Few organisations managed to carry out neutral and independent operations in some areas, among these Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) and ICRC³⁰. The UN and its implementing partners were questioned about their relations with the GoP and the military, which was mainly an issue in conflict-torn areas such as KPK.

Coverage and Changing Situations

²⁹ According fundamental principles, humanitarian action should be guided by the humanitarian principles of *humanity*, meaning the centrality of saving human lives and alleviating suffering wherever it is found; *impartiality*, meaning the implementation of actions solely on the basis of need, without discrimination between or within affected populations; *neutrality*, meaning that humanitarian action must not favour any side in an armed conflict or other dispute where such action is carried out; and *independence*, meaning the autonomy of humanitarian objectives from the political, economic, military or other objectives that any actor may hold with regard to areas where humanitarian action is being implemented.

³⁰ ICRC's main partner, the Pakistani Red Crescent Society, is headed by the KPK governor raising questions about their ability to act impartially.

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75. Considering the scale of the disaster, the overall geographical coverage was expectedly limited, but too focused on accessible areas. Humanitarian assistance was mostly concentrated in larger towns and areas that were more accessible such as the Peshawar Valley, Charsadda and Mansehra in KPK, or Rajanpur and Muzaffargarh districts in Punjab. Smaller communities or entire areas in the same provinces received significantly less or no attention at all. Most people interviewed mentioned that assistance was proportionally larger in KPK and Punjab than in Sindh. Coordination within and in-between clusters was not instrumental in enhancing a clearer division of labour among organisations to ensure a more comprehensive coverage, clearer prioritisation or rationalised relief efforts. Initially, duplications were reported in some areas, but were generally dealt with at district coordination levels.

76. The situation on the ground changed continuously making it a challenge for the humanitarian community to adapt to changing needs in terms of contiguum of relief and early recovery as well fast changing locations, primarily due to movements of flood affected. In comparison to Balochistan, Punjab and Sindh, humanitarian actors in KPK, who were already organised around the PDMA/PAARSA structures and working with experienced implementing partners, were in a better situation to anticipate and adapt to changing needs. The GoP also differed somehow from UN with regards to the emergency's different stages considering the different phases to be much clearly divided. This meant that in some cases the transition from relief to recovery was not understood in the same way.

77. At the provincial level, the response capacity varied substantially and successes depended largely on the proportions of damage, the government structures in place and the presence of international and national organisations.

78. Another dimension that needs to be considered is that the procurement and logistics pipelines were significantly disrupted. Stocks of nationally-produced relief items (Pakistan produces some 85% of the world's emergency tents shelter) had been shipped to Haiti and not replenished. When the floods hit, the production capacity and distribution channels were heavily disrupted. Only those humanitarian organisations that had national and regional contingency stocks, such as the ICRC, UNICEF, UNHCR, WFP and WHO, could immediately respond³¹.

Staff capacities and turn-over

79. The existing human resource capacity and competency was overstretched. The response was also heavily constrained by insufficient surge capacity as resources had been depleted to other disasters, particularly the Haiti earthquake. Those human resources that were mobilised, particularly during the initial stages, often lacked leadership skills to effectively carry out

³¹This despite the fact that WFP had significant contingency stocks damaged during the floods.

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coordination and management functions and the necessary experience to deal with a disaster of such proportions (see part eight coordination).

80. The high turnover of international staff, especially during the initial phases when people only came for fortnight-periods, was another challenge, especially for coordination activities. As mentioned earlier, better qualified national staff was more present in KPK as this area has been home to most of the recent emergency situations in Pakistan, hence reflecting efforts to develop capacities in these areas. In the aftermath of the 2007 floods, which affected Balochistan and parts of southern Sindh, recommendations focusing on developing national capacities as first responders have not been followed through and response as well as coordination activities have largely depended on surge capacity which, by many, has been considered to be insufficiently qualified and experienced.

6.4 Standards

81. The sheer scope of the disaster made it difficult to apply internationally agreed upon standards and guidelines across the clusters (e.g. Sphere standards or IASC guidelines on gender mainstreaming, etc.). There have been attempts, and some clusters have also succeeded in defining standards, some of which are also supported by the GoP: WASH has managed to adapt standards to the context (e.g. such as water-drilling in southern Punjab) and in coordination with the shelter cluster, WASH partners seek to provide adequate sanitation facilities where more permanent shelters are made; the shelter cluster has applied a one-room standard policy for permanent shelter, in the beginning only applied by some PDMA's; agriculture provides guidance to implementing partners on what kind of products should be provided, at what time and to whom; the nutrition cluster applies international criteria for surveying malnutrition and where detected, standard supplementary feeding schemes are established; the food cluster likewise managed to maintain acceptable levels in the rations distributed despite a record high number of beneficiaries; and finally WHO ensured drug usage control within the health cluster.



Photo 4: Self made latrine in Gozo Camp, Dadu district, Sindh Province © Riccardo Polastro 2011

82. Nonetheless, many interviewees reported that they considered the standards to be complicated, either because the GoP decided on standards other than those agreed to internationally (i.e. sphere) or because of scarce resources preventing organisations from providing assistance according to standards. One example is the shelter one-housing policy; many NGOs reported difficulties in implementing the standards due to their relatively high costs, and consequently, they decided to go for cheaper and less permanent solutions – often inadequately prepared for future floods. Other more easy applicable standards were not applied either, including gender based violence guidelines, basic sanitary kits lacking essential female products, etc.

83. While the sheer scope of the disaster made it difficult to apply internationally agreed standards (Sphere and Oslo Guidelines) the UN did not speak with one voice and there was not a common stance on the humanitarian space, standards, principles and guidelines. Pressure from donors to use NATO Air Bridge during relief phase, HC and OCHA Emergency Relief Coordinator stood up while some UN agencies pushed for the use of military air assets. Furthermore, in a country like Pakistan standards, principles and guidelines should be negotiated in due time with relevant government entities and institutions, and not dealt with once the emergency strikes. The 2010 IA-RTE (Displacement Crisis) already highlighted this issue (see recommendation 5)³².

³² *The HCT should develop an active strategy of humanitarian diplomacy to work toward a more principled approach and a less constrained humanitarian space in Pakistan, including putting the issue on the agenda for donors.*

Conclusions:

84. The humanitarian space was compromised during the response to floods and displacement crisis.

85. Considering the sheer scale of the emergency, the response was soon stretched to the limit. As a result coverage was limited and generally poorly prioritize.

86. There is a distinct need to build human and institutional capacity within Pakistani disaster management structures.

87. Insufficiently qualified international and national human resources were made available

88. International staff turnover represented another constraint affecting the response.

89. The experiences from the Pakistani floods clearly show the need to adapt the response to the context and conditions on the ground. International standards serve as guidelines for what should be achieved, but it is clear to all parties that given the extent of the disaster it was difficult to follow internationally agreed standards and guidelines. Some clusters managed to agree on adapted standards (Sphere-related).

90. Military assets were used (both national and international) as civilian assets (air) were insufficient and physical access constrained. There was not a common position across the agencies with regards to use of military assets. In areas such as Balochistan and KPK, where the government is a party to the conflict, these assets should not be used

91. Multi-sector area based approaches are best suited for disasters of this size as sector based approaches soon spread thin. Geographic - area based approaches allow for better coverage and are more adaptive to fast changing situations

Recommendations:

92. The Special Envoy and HC/RC promotes needs based and principled approaches during humanitarian responses and all Humanitarian actors need to commit to it.

93. To mobilise qualified resources:

- GoP develop a national surge capacity registry (including provincial and district levels)
- OCHA with UN agencies ensure that cluster-leads are trained (in compulsory web-based training before deployment)
- UN agencies, with stand-by partners, ensure that lengths of contracts of surge deployments are commensurate to scale and duration of emergencies.

94. NDMA and Line Departments, with cluster leads, define minimum assistance standards for disaster response in Pakistan (considering type of disaster, scale and length, as well as pre-existing capacities and vulnerabilities. HC/RC, with OCHA, will ensure HCT alignment on guidelines for use of military assets in future emergencies (only as providers of last resort).

95. The international humanitarian system should implement geographic area based responses in future disasters of similar scale

6.5 Connectedness

Response focus, the missing link of recovery

96. Most of the international response focused on relief rather than on recovery activities, with few resources allocated to fund the PFRERP's more than 252 early recovery projects. As focus is now gradually shifting to recovery, agencies find themselves with few resources to provide assistance to meet expected recovery needs, hampering current efforts to bring people back on their feet. Furthermore, these efforts are coming too late for most of the affected population as most of the affectees returned to their places of origin as early as September and October last year.

97. NDMA currently have already defined early recovery strategies for 7 sectors Nonetheless, with a few exceptions, they seem to be detached from cluster efforts. Generally, recovery has not been carefully planned for by most clusters, with exception of logistics and nutrition; logistics have a clear transition strategy, while there is progress on a similar nutrition 18-month transition strategy. The challenge facing the shelter strategy's one-house policy is the inability of actors and government to effectively act upon it due to limited financial resources. The result is that only very limited numbers of one-room shelters have been build (see further below). To date, recovery activities carried out has essentially been on individual agency level with fewer cluster perspectives. The isolated efforts are at the clear expense of more integrated approaches.

Economic and livelihood recovery constraints:

98. During the emergency response, WATAN cards distribution was instrumental in reactivating local markets. Also the Benazir Income Support Programme (BISP) rapidly supported affected population with small cash grants of Rs 4,000 only weeks after the floods. According to data from National Database & Registration Authority (NADRA) as of January 30, 1.48 million WATAN cards have been distributed, representing a total value of approximately Rs. 27.5

billion³³. Local procurement of food and non-food items (such as blankets, hygiene products and tents) as well as the use of local labour (e.g. for building shelters or re-building of houses) has also contributed to recovering the local economy. According to those people interviewed with longstanding experience in Pakistan, when compared to the 2005 earthquake markets were re-established faster in 2010, as both the immediate injection of cash and together with local procurement have contributed to this. Although the WATAN cards were considered in assisting affected people during the relief phase (affectees have received Rs. 20,000 as part of a first instalment), affected population still have not received the second instalment (i.e. Rs. 80,000). In Punjab and Sindh, many affected people have not received the cards, especially women in female headed households and other vulnerable groups. While the WATAN card is acknowledged as an effective support mechanism, there have been reported incidents of nepotism and corruption, mainly impelled by local politicians or landlords. It was also reported that the scheme has lacked the basic infrastructure needed for the population to access the assistance provided through WATAN cards (i.e. lack of ATMs and knowledge of their usage). Unfortunately, the UN did not engage with the Government to seek complementary interventions (e.g. concerning in-kind assistance) with the WATAN cards.

99. 80% of the population in flood-affected areas depends on agriculture. Seeds, fertilizers and tools were distributed to populations that had returned and restarted agricultural / farming activities especially in KPK and Punjab. In KPK and Punjab, the team witnessed that the affected population had returned and managed to plant the rabbi (*wheat winter crop*). Those interviewed expected good yields by April 2011. Nevertheless, in Sindh more people were unable to return to their lands before the winter planting season ended. As of January 2011, most of the people from the four most severely affected districts still had their lands submerged by water. This leaves them dependant on aid for months to come, expectedly next harvest which will be around September 2011, provided they are given the necessary assistance. The government has declared these residual relief areas, which means that they are exempt from the termination of relief phase, declared on February 1st, 2011.

³³http://nadra.gov.pk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=269:nadra-resolves-flood-victims-151220-complaints-&catid=14:latest-news



Photo 5: Transitional shelter in Hisara, Charsadda, KPK Province © Riccardo Polastro 2011

100. Shelter represents one of the biggest challenges in early recovery, as 1.6 million homes have been partially or totally destroyed. As mentioned earlier, the one-room shelter policy is considered too expensive for most organisations and local governments to implement given the sheer scale of the disaster and the number of houses that were damaged. The result is that alternative solutions have been implemented that are not sufficiently considering risks from future events. Other houses are rebuilt in river bank areas. Land rights represent a key constraint both for livelihood restoration and permanent shelter as many people returning home find themselves without having a place to plant or to build a house.

The involvement of local capacities and local context

101. Government and non-government local capacities have generally not been utilised or sufficiently involved as local contextual knowledge was often poor. In Punjab and Sindh, collaboration from the government was irregular and presence of government official a rare sight. UN decided to head operations from outside provincial government's traditional sphere in Lahore and instead coordinate Punjab operations from Multan, which was praised by operational organisations, but seen as a disconnect and parallel structure by others, including GoP. In Sindh, an integrated recovery plan is being developed to ensure a more integrated recovery approach between UNDP, OCHA and PDMA.

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A country at risk

102. Pakistan is a disaster hotspot and the next monsoon is approaching with heavy rains already predicted. Many of those affected have reportedly sold out of whatever assets were left from the last floods, meaning that their coping mechanisms are stretched to an absolute limit. There is therefore an imminent need to ensure that as much resilience as possible is build up amongst affected and most vulnerable groups.

103. There is a generally very high sensitivity and awareness of the need to ensure that communities are better prepared and that disaster risk reduction (DRR) activities are heavily needed. The need to invest seriously in DRR has been highlighted from several fronts, including GoP, donors, UN and INGOs. According to NDMA: *"A reactive, emergency response approach has remained the predominant way of dealing with disasters in Pakistan till now"*³⁴ – this seems still to be the case. The issue was also raised in an evaluation commissioned by NDMA following the 2007 floods³⁵, but insufficient work seems to have been done since then, despite, amongst others, having disaster risk management (DRM) as one of the five joint programmes under the ONE UN pilot in Pakistan. There is a need to map stakeholders, pre-define emergency response mechanisms (e.g. BISP) and stand-by agreements.

Conclusions:

104. In general, ER was not timely planned for by the clusters. GoP (NDMA) is currently drawing ER strategic plans, non-aligned to PFRERRP.

105. The links between national and provincial disaster management are generally weak and preparedness was insufficient to provide a more effective and efficient response.

106. .

Recommendations:

107. NDMA, with HCT, promote a common understanding of the different emergency phases.

108. NDMA/PDMA, with line departments and UN agencies (led by UNDP) must develop a joint early recovery and rehabilitation plans

109. UNDP, with OCHA, support NDMA's Disaster Management Plan:

- To build up national capacities at provincial, district and local levels.
- To develop specific contingency plans for areas at risk.

³⁴See: <http://ndma.gov.pk/planahead.html#NSDM>

³⁵See: 'Response to Cyclone Yemyin and Floods June-July 2007, NDMA, October 2007

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- To strengthen cooperation between NDMA, PDMA and DDMA.
- To better define the role of clusters in future disasters
- The UN develop a recovery and rehabilitation policy with the GoP

7 - Clusters and Coordination

110. In the months following the first floods, UN progressively set up clusters and coordinating mechanisms in tandem with the ever expanding scope of the Pakistan relief-, and later, early recovery plans. Today, some 11 clusters are functioning across Pakistan at national and provincial/hub levels, most of them also with representatives at district levels. Some villages have received transitional shelter materials which do not cater to long term needs. Others affected populations, fewer, have received permanent shelter, while even less are expected to see entire villages re-built through bilateral aid. OCHA is mandated to support the cluster mechanisms and the coordination within and in-between clusters.

111. After a slow start, there is a general consensus that coordination matured over time, from the national level through to district levels. Coordination effectiveness also differed largely from province to province. Effectiveness of national level coordination varies greatly across clusters, also when it comes to interaction with government (i.e. NDMA and line departments). The general tendency, however, is that coordination was more effective the closer it got to the operations at district levels. District level coordination was rolled out within two weeks in KPK, while it took much longer in other provinces. The setup of regional hubs (within the provinces) was generally considered to be instrumental as coordinating mechanisms during the relief phase.

National Coordination

112. From early on, NDMA summoned line departments, humanitarian stakeholders (including donors) to daily meetings to coordinate relief efforts and inform them about the emergency situation. The meetings were considered to be useful for information sharing and initial coordination. However, coordination between NDMA and the humanitarian system (mainly through UN agencies) evolved into parallel mechanisms for some clusters as some UN agencies opted to coordinate through line departments and not the NDMA. According to several interviewees, there were also internal issues related to roles and responsibilities between EAD and NDMA which also affected the overall effectiveness.

113. Six months into the floods, most stakeholders agree that coordination has improved, partly due to NDMA's setting up of strategic planning units (SPUs), which are aligned with the cluster-division of emergency intervention areas and have increased NDMA's capacity to interact and articulate priorities. SPUs are currently responsible for drawing NDMA early

recovery plans and collaboration is ongoing with some UN-led clusters, like WASH, logistics, shelter and nutrition. It is more uncertain where coordination stands with regards to agriculture, education and protection. The direction NDMA has given early recovery at federal level still has not transcended to provincial levels, perhaps due to limited capacities.

At the province level, the PDMA is the primary government institution for coordination of emergency responses. While the PDMA in KPK and Balochistan have gained experience in emergency responses over the last decade and therefore have become familiar dealing with the cluster system, the 2010 floods were the first major emergency affecting Punjab and Sindh Provinces (with exception of some areas affected in the southern Sindh during the 2007 floods). This means that responses and capacity to lead response from the government-side varies across the four provinces. In KPK, the PDMA and OCHA coordinated response activities closely and clusters have a strong interface with national structures and are co-chaired by line departments (the pattern was reflected also in the response, see part six). In Balochistan, coordination was mainly headed by UNHCR. In Punjab, the PDMA was practically nonexistent until the floods, and there has been very limited interaction with the international community. This was also due to the fact that the hub was created in Multan and not at the provincial capital of Lahore (see also constraints, part six). With exception from district level, coordination in Punjab has been almost entirely detached from government structures. In Sindh Province, the situation was similar to that of Punjab; the UN established two hubs to bring operations closer to the most affected areas, with the same governmental detach as in Punjab. This situation did, however, improve over time as OCHA strengthened its presence in Karachi and through that, its collaboration with PDMA.

Hubs

114. At the height of the emergency, hubs were created close to areas that were severely affected by the floods in Punjab and Sindh. Many organisations consider that the establishment of decentralised hubs was asserted as it brought cluster coordination closer to field implementation, hence facilitating the response in these hard hit areas. It also meant that INGOs and Pakistani organisations had easier access to coordination meetings, avoiding long travel distances to either Karachi or Lahore. Operating from the hubs meant moving into 'unknown' territory for most organisations (except from FAO and UNICEF) and organisations have invested significant resources in setting up facilities to ensure that the hub structure has been well functioning during the relief operations.

115. Nonetheless, the creation of the hubs has meant that provincial government coordination was detached from the international response, meaning that PDMA were not sufficiently informed about international actors' response activities. However, it was widely agreed that the provincial capacity was insufficient in terms of leading and overseeing provincial level coordination (with the exception of KPK). In Punjab there were several attempts from UN to

include PDMA in the coordination activities from the Multan hub (5-6 hours drive from provincial capital Lahore), but provincial authorities did not respond effectively.

116. Today the PDMA involvement in the response activities have been limited both Sindh and Punjab. This has partly due to their limited experience and capacity to involve effectively, partly because hubs were created outside their operation spheres. While this of course is unfortunate, most stakeholders consider that the advantages of responding from the hubs outweighed the disadvantages of disconnect with PDMA structures. Lack of coordination between NDMA and PDMA also meant that the provincial authorities were 'vertically' detached. There are ongoing activities in Sindh to ensure that PDMA takes a more prominent position in the recovery activities, a process led by OCHA and UNDP in close collaboration with the Sindh authorities.

Effectiveness

117. Operational coordination was mainly carried out at district levels, often chaired by the DCO, in some cases with support from an OCHA focal point. OCHA has successfully promoted this level of field coordination, hence bringing coordination closer to operations. District coordination has added value to the operations, progressively ensuring primarily that duplications were avoided, but also that minimum information was shared on needs and gaps. This decentralised coordination mechanism has also contributed to a more effective response where the leadership of the DCO did match the coordination challenges.

118. Among the challenges at district level was the lack of information sharing, especially from INGOs, that bypassed the DCO, limiting the overall district coordination effectiveness. Another challenge is that clusters as such has no authority, and as line departments rarely participated in district coordination meetings, it was difficult to take concrete decisions at this level that would involve sector authorisation.

119. The UN system has invested significant time and resources in ensuring effective coordination across the different levels of the flood response, but generally speaking, it has not met the mandated coordination challenges. For its part, the UN has been criticised for a lack of a clear leadership structure during the floods, especially in its relations with the GoP. It was generally considered that the HC and the clusters lacked leadership from the agencies. One DCO said it was like having "*11 captains of the same team on a football pitch*". Also the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) leadership has been questioned several times, some with particular reference to the fact that the UN Country Team was led by a UNICEF Representative, whom by some, had insufficient humanitarian exposure to such large scale disasters, and favoured his own agencies interest. Added to this comes that during the floods, the UN Resident Co-ordinator (RC) position was between permanent appointments. More recently (January 2011) a double-hatted HC/RC has been appointed to lead the UN Country Team, hence merging the HC and RC functions.

120. National level coordination has primarily been focused on policy issues, standard setting and appeal-process coordination. There is still, however, a visible lack of leadership and agenda-setting from the inter-cluster coordination level, meaning that there is an absence of an effective communication channel between the humanitarian system as a whole and the NDMA, preventing the first to adapt timely and effectively to government priorities. High staff turn-over has also negatively affected cluster coordination efforts and continuity, especially among cluster leads..

121. Added to this are the multiple agendas, driven by agencies' autonomy and core interests. Critical stakeholders see UN coordination becoming an end in itself and not the means to effectively improve the response. Only a few clusters (i.e. logistics, nutrition and other agencies working specifically around the "survival strategy") managed to overcome the divide between policy level decisions at Islamabad level and operational issues and priorities at district levels. These achievements were mainly carried through by clear and adapted standards and guidelines, coordinated with relevant national authorities and humanitarian partners within the clusters. Where coordination was more effective, the cluster was lead by experienced staff. The lack of leadership, also affected the ability to address different needs of women and men as well as those of girls and boys.

122. Added to the coordination challenge comes the fact that many INGOs primarily viewed the clusters as funding opportunities; once real opportunities (and cluster purpose) became clear, many stopped attending meetings. Furthermore, some INGOs were reluctant to share information with the clusters and they did not always inform local authorities about their activities – or even ask for permission to carry out activities at district level. These factors made coordination efforts a challenging act. Other INGOs that had engaged in close coordination with provincial authorities early on have been commended on their successful participation in the response (i.e. CRS).

Clusters

123. Coordination activities within the clusters have generally been considered instrumental in avoiding duplication and enhancing sharing of information. With a few exceptions, the cluster meetings have not been the expected fora for strategic planning and prioritisation³⁶, nor have

³⁶*The responsibility of cluster leads at country level as set out in the Guidance Note on the Cluster Approach (IASC, 2006b) and the generic terms of reference for cluster leads (IASC, 2009).* 1. Inclusion of key humanitarian partners 2. Establishment and maintenance of appropriate humanitarian coordination mechanisms 3. Coordination with national/local authorities, State institutions, local civil society and other relevant actors 4. Participatory and community-based approaches 5. Attention to priority cross-cutting issues (e.g. age, diversity, environment, gender, HIV/AIDS and human rights) 6. Needs assessment and analysis 7. Emergency preparedness 8. Planning and strategy development 9. Application of standards

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they been a platform where government and international community met to communicate and plan operations.

124. However, according to several interviewees, 11 clusters are too many and they have diverted attention from critical areas. The initial response plan (PIFERP) envisioned seven clusters, in accordance with NDMA's criteria. However, as the revised appeal was launched in September, the number of clusters rose to 12 (including Camp Management which is no longer functioning) and was implemented like a standard model for emergencies in an uncoordinated manner without the GoP's approval (see also funding, part four). Hence, instead of aligning and reinforcing national structures, the UN imposed the 'clusters approach verbatim'. Many organisations questioned the appropriateness of having so many clusters activated, especially in relation to the ongoing 'mega-disaster' as there was an imminent need for resource prioritisation (human and financial).

125. Furthermore, the clusters are considered to be "too heavy, with too much coordination", taking focus away from operations. Clusters main purpose has been information sharing – exemplified by 3W maps which, to some extent, were useful for avoiding duplication, but not as a planning and programming tool. All organisations considered the cluster meetings to be very time-consuming, with far too many meetings and comparatively little outcome.

126. Considering that many organisations have invested heavily in cluster coordination – OCHA alone has approximately 40-50 staff members whose time is dedicated exclusively to coordination activities – the general appreciation that clusters are being used primarily for information sharing. This does not add up with the financial and human resources invested in these coordination structures. Interestingly, on asking different agencies in Pakistan on how much have been invested in coordination through the clusters, no one was able to give accurate figures or estimates.

127. A consequence of the many clusters being rolled out is that clusters were generally characterised as "operating in silos" with little or no interface with other areas or sectors. The exception was the more thematic areas approach taken on by WHO, UNICEF and WFP. The more integrated coordination was also due to already existing partnerships between line ministries and some UN agencies, like UNICEF and WHO. Added to this comes the fact that the inter-cluster coordination mechanism is considered to be lacking sufficient strength and leadership in order to provide the necessary strategic guidance.

128. Some cluster leads, organisations, donors and Government representative argues that the response lacks more integral approaches in order to become more effective and efficient. The

10. Monitoring and reporting 11. Advocacy and resource mobilization 12. Training and capacity building
13. Provision of assistance or services as a last resort

aforementioned survival strategy is the only example of agencies and implementing partners gathering around a thematic area, as opposed to cluster-divided areas. Currently, early recovery activities carried out on an individual agency base – or at most, through a cluster approach. This may warrant uncoordinated and non-prioritised efforts, if immediate action is not taken.

7.1 Communication

129. Communication within clusters is crucial to ensure guidelines, standards and conditions for delivering aid in a manner which is agreed upon and follows certain criteria (for more analysis, see Part six). Communication also refers to how information is managed and used in order to ensure that assistance is used in the most effective and efficient ways. Finally, communication refers to ensuring that the population is informed about what can be expected, from whom and when.

130. The information flow was massive but with limited strategic usage (i.e. decision making and prioritisation). Since the early stages of the response, there have been concerns raised about the need for a common reporting format used by the different organisations involved in the response. However, only until recently has the 'single reporting format' (SRF) been tested, but massive roll out is still pending. The format was delayed due to differing positions between NDMA and UN on its design (i.e. content on data to be collected, details of data, etc.). The lack of a common reporting format has meant that organisations do not systematically report activities to OCHA, and if they do, the information is not consolidated because each organisation uses their own formats and reporting criteria. Consequently, precise and consolidated data does not exist, affecting not only monitoring but also the humanitarian system's strategic programming in terms of identifying precisely how have been attended, where, by whom and for how long. Thus, much time is spent at cluster meetings at different levels to gather this type of information, instead of devoting valuable time to strategic programming.

131. Communication has been a general issue in the response as many affected people were not properly informed about what they were expected to receive, when, by whom and for how long. The humanitarian community and governmental counterpart should agree on a simple but clear communication strategy in order to avoid misunderstandings and abuse. Civil society and NGOs should be engaged in this process in order to ensure wide dissemination. A communication strategy would also be an important contribution to improving accountability towards affected populations. NDMA has recently established a working group to coordinate and systematise communication. Though it is too early to judge whether this has improved communication³⁷, it seems relevant and a possible way to tackle communication challenges.

Many organisations issued bulletins on a regular basis, however, in many of these bulletins data was insufficiently disaggregated on key issues related to gender and age.

³⁷ In fact, no clusters made reference to the working group at federal level.

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7.2 Monitoring

132. The scope of the disaster has made monitoring a major challenge for UN and cluster members. Nonetheless, basic measures to enhance monitoring have not been applied, including the type of information that the SRF would bring about. Existing monitoring is therefore agency based, focusing on accountability towards bilateral funding and organisation's own reporting needs. For example, UNICEF has contracted a consulting firm to do monitoring and the work of third party monitors in Balochistan has also been highlighted, but primarily for UNICEF's own programming purposes. NGOs are doing monitoring, but within the scope of their own programming purposes.

133. Some monitoring was used as control or surveillance; WPF uses food monitors to oversee food distribution, which is a demanding task considering the number of beneficiaries, unavoidably, there were reports of cases of unequal food distribution (i.e. not targeting most vulnerable, political interference with food distribution, etc.). Positive feedback came from the health cluster where surveillance teams monitored health-related issues at local levels with a high degree of embedding of the same within the existing Department of Health setup and involved regular cluster feedback mechanisms. Generally, however, monitoring of aid remains a challenge across many clusters, and where mechanisms have been established, there is still room for improvement.

134. When the evaluation team was fielded, there were no reported cases of organisations doing reporting or monitoring to inform progress at neither cluster nor inter-cluster levels. This means that the response plan as such is not being monitored. The PFRERP envisioned the establishment of a monitoring system using output and outcome indicators, but there were no reporting or adequate indicators in place to support such a system (a general recompilation of outputs is outlined in annex 7). This means that there is no entity within the government or the UN system that has the necessary oversight of the assistance provided. Therefore, crucial questions remain widely unanswered: Where did the aid go? Who benefitted and who did not? Was it useful and did it cover needs (sometimes identified)?

135. Consequently, the absence of a thorough monitoring system with consolidated information prevents humanitarian actors from providing the affected population, Pakistani authorities and donors with the necessary results and accountability data, mandated to them under humanitarian reform. Civil society is also sidelined in matters related to accountability as no platforms or mechanisms exist where their views and opinions can be raised. These organisations' strength varies across the different affected areas and strengthening their capacity will be instrumental in ensuring that future responses becomes more demand driven and accountability measures generally strengthened.

7.3 Cross-Cutting

136. During the assessment, the multi-cluster assessment tool, MCRAM, was applied which explicitly targets gender issues. Most interviewees consider the instrument to be a step in the right direction in terms of placing gender and other cross cutting issues into the agenda of response activities. There were other positive examples related to gender; funding proposals under the appeal process were screened in order to ensure that sufficient attention to gender issues were included (488 proposals were screened using a specific gender-markers instrument) and there were efforts to ensure that female health-workers be involved in health-sector work, especially as means to reach out to pregnant and lactating mothers.

137. Notwithstanding, delivery of relief assistance was, at times, characterised by insufficient understanding or attention to cultural or contextual factors which prevented both women and vulnerable groups from accessing aid on equitable terms. Widows or female-headed families, as well as elderly and undocumented individuals were negatively affected (i.e. did not benefit from WATAN cards, food distribution, NFIs, etc.). While corrective measures were taken as the response matured, these did not prevent inequitable access from the earliest stages of the response. Lack of consolidated monitoring data and SRF has meant that there is not a comprehensive assessment of how gender issues are and have been addressed. In the Pakistani context it is essential that standards are agreed upon in order to ensure more gender-sensitive responses.

138. The 2010 floods again³⁸ underlined the need for the GoP to take significant steps to increase preparedness and early warning measures and address underlying causes of vulnerability. In an NDMA evaluation related to the 2007 floods, the need for strengthening national capacities (NDMA, PDMA and DDMA) was highlighted. High risk due to the high concentration of poor people living in rural areas along river shores, preparedness for upcoming monsoon season, early warning systems lacking.

Conclusions

139. Now that the emergency is over in most of the country and is transitioning Sindh, the decentralized hubs in Punjab and Sindh are losing momentum.

140. In these two provinces, decision making processes were not integrated in the existing provincial government structures

141. Life-saving clusters (food, health, WASH and shelter + support services such as telecom and logistics) have been widely praised. The appropriateness of the 'verbatim' roll out (or business as usual) of clusters has been questioned

³⁸The same issue was brought forward in relation to the 2007 floods by the IASC Inter-Agency RTE (October 2007)
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142. Clusters often operate autonomously, independently from contextual realities and to a large extent also to the phases of the operation.

143. At the national, and consequently at provincial levels, clusters were not always aligned with recovery planning (link 8) and line departments (link 3).

144. Both the HC and clusters lacked clear leadership and strategic prioritization. Cluster leads generally favoured their own agencies' interests rather than the sector priorities.

145. There was a need for a standardized reporting format with clearly defined targets and indicators.

146. However, single reporting format was far too late (posted online Mid-January 2011) preventing strategic overview and action prioritization.

147. Integrated information for monitoring results is still missing. Reporting against indicators as outlined in the PFRERRP is generally missing.

148. NDMA, with OCHA, should ensure the roll-out of the newly developed Single Reporting Format in the current and future disasters.

Recommendations

149. NDMA, with UNDP and OCHA, must plan progressive phase out of Multan, Hyderabad and Sukkur hubs by ensuring:

- that provincial coordination is brought within the PDMA in Karachi and Lahore
- operational coordination at district level

150. IASC Working Group adapts guidelines on roll-out of clusters, according to contextual realities (i.e. size of disaster, strength of national capacities, cross cutting issues and civil- and military response mechanisms and funding) and Governments' priorities.

151. HC/RC should streamline coordination and Early Recovery Working Group should be made functional at national, provincial and district levels

152. NDMA, with the relevant government authorities and HCT, will thematically regroup clusters to specific phases of the emergency, contextual (provincial) realities and reviewed ER plans.

153. The HC and HCT must be in a position to prioritize and lead the humanitarian response above individual agencies interests.

154. Cluster lead agencies should appoint skilled, experienced, independent/dedicated full-time cluster leads.

155. NDMA, with EAD and IASC representatives, define integrated results based monitoring framework for future emergencies (aligned with single reporting format) which includes:

- measurable progress indicators
- outcome indicators
- level of expenditures
- 4 W's (who, what, where and when)

8 - General Conclusions and Recommendations

General Conclusions

Pakistan's 2010 floods represent one of the major disasters of the 21st century considering its widespread geographical scale, the unprecedented caseload of affected populations and its economic impact. This was the largest disaster ever recorded in terms of affected area, number of affected people and households damaged. The disaster affected 78 out of 122 districts in Pakistan and one-tenth of its nearly 200 million population and at one point one-fifth of the country was submerged by flood waters. Nonetheless, the impact of the disaster at province level was diverse, mainly due to different levels of vulnerability, existing capacities, preparedness and resilience. The emergency was further compounded by pre-existing chronic poverty, inequality, limited access to basic services, inadequate governance, fragmentation of the state, military dominance and the superposition of conflict and displacement in KPK and Balochistan.

Donors generously funded the initial life-saving activities during the emergency phase, while funding for other non life-saving and early recovery interventions was slower and funding commitments lower. Rapid response mechanisms were essential to kick-start the response, however not all players had them in place or could access means to provide immediate response. In Pakistan two stand-alone appeals co-existed; one focusing on the humanitarian response to the 2009 IDP crisis while the other was launched in response to the floods. However, as from August 2010 donors focused almost entirely on the floods appeal for which contributions reached over 1.2 billion USD, while contributions to the IDP appeal were limited to 25 million USD.

The overall response has generally been positive thanks to the assistance provided by the local population, Pakistani diaspora, local organizations, philanthropists, the military and the civilian government, strongly supported and assisted by the international community. Despite affecting more than 20 million people, there were no large scale deaths following the disaster as flash floods were limited and the unprecedented humanitarian response prevented a major food

crisis and epidemic outbreak. Within weeks the humanitarian response became the largest emergency operation ever staged by humanitarian community.

Nonetheless, even if the humanitarian community initially managed to scale up the response, resources were soon stretched to the limit due to the sheer scale and geographical spread of the disaster, compounded by a general lack of preparedness, especially in Sindh and Punjab Provinces. The response was further constrained by insufficient surge capacity of qualified resources and high turnover of international staff.

Timing, resources and geography has made it difficult to assess adequately the needs across the affected areas. Joint assessments, such as the MCRAM, were used to some extent but did not prevent most actors (and clusters) to run their own assessments. The needs assessments were more for individual agency use than for use by the broader humanitarian community. Multiple single agency assessments and a lack of common criteria for needs assessments have also meant that humanitarian partners have been unable to jointly prioritize interventions. It was also found that assessments would have benefited from including more disaggregated data by age, gender or vulnerability. There was a general lack of consolidated information and relief and early recovery activities were therefore largely provided in an uncoordinated manner, based on organizational priorities and assumptions of what the affected population needs. Although the response slowly adapted to changing needs, it initially ran behind challenges and was generally poorly prioritized and largely supply driven rather than needs based.

A principled approach and independent needs based response was often missing due to interference, primarily at local levels from politicians, landlords or tribal leaders, but also due to limited access. Coverage of assistance was limited due to the sheer scale of the disaster, but where assistance was provided it was not proportionate and adapted to needs; there were cases where aid mainly reached people that were locally well positioned and/or aligned to political parties. These factors, combined with access issues in conflict affected areas meant that the humanitarian space often was compromised.

The experiences from the Pakistani floods clearly show the need to adapt the response to the context and conditions on the ground. While international standards serve as guidelines for what should be achieved, it is clear to all parties that given the extent of the disaster it was difficult to follow such standards and guidelines. Sometimes military assets were used where civilian assets were insufficient and physical access constrained. A common position across the agencies with regards to use of military assets was absent, despite having adapted earlier in 2010 a set of country specific guidelines for civil-military interventions. In areas such as Balochistan and KPK, where the government or regional actors are party to the conflict, military assets should not be used.

Initially four clusters (food, health, WASH and shelter + support services such as telecom and logistics) have been rolled out for life saving activities in Sindh, Punjab and Balochistan, following the request of the GoP, while in KPK they were already active. Generally these clusters have been praised for the assistance provided, despite the challenges they were all facing as a

result of the magnitude of the needs, but within weeks all clusters were rolled out. The relevance and appropriateness of this 'verbatim' roll out of clusters has been unanimously questioned by the GoP, donors and implementing partners, the main reasons being that the clusters were operating independently from contextual realities and to a large extent also to the phases of the operation. At the national, and consequently at provincial levels, clusters were not always aligned with recovery planning and efforts, dictated by line departments or other national authorities.

The HC, HCT and clusters lacked strong leadership and strategic prioritization. UN's relationship with national authorities and counterparts was characterised by diverging views both on how to approach the emergency situation as well as leadership and accountability. The UN as well as other stakeholders involved in response did not have a common stand. Cluster leads generally favoured their own agencies' interests rather than the sector priorities. Often cluster leads were not trained and ignored their responsibilities. Nevertheless, co-leadership both at national and district level was considered positive, when clusters were rolled out at district level clusters contributed to avoid duplications.

In the most affected provinces, government structures were distant from areas where humanitarian response concentrated. In Punjab and Sindh most humanitarian actors were present in the hubs rather than in provincial capitals, which contributed to reinforced capacity among local NGOs and authorities. Initially their presence was justified, and largely praised, as coordination was brought closer to relief operations. Despite seeing most flood-affected population leaving camps and settlements between October and November, the overall response has only now officially moved into recovery and reconstruction although except from so-called residual relief areas in Sindh. This also means that the decentralized hubs in Punjab and Sindh are losing momentum and decision making processes needs to be integrated in the existing provincial government structures.

The information flow was massive but with limited strategic use. Only few clusters had common reporting formats and information was therefore not consolidated. OCHA, together with NDMA, has been working on rolling out a standardized single reporting format with clearly defined targets and indicators since the onset of the disaster. Nonetheless, the format was only posted online in mid January 2011. This has meant that key humanitarian actors could not obtain a strategic overview of the response and prioritize assistance within and across clusters. Integrated information for monitoring results and accountability towards population, peers and donors is still missing.

Most of the international response focused on relief rather than on recovery activities. Strategies related to early recovery, recovery and rehabilitation were not carefully and timely planned for by most clusters, as requirements from NDMA and OCHA were inconsistent and changed over time. To date recovery has been dealt with from a cluster perspective rather than a more integrated fashion. Furthermore, to draw an integrated recovery strategy a common understanding of the different emergency phases is needed. The floods again brought to the surface underlying issues related to land rights and women's rights. While the land property remains unchanged, some corrective measures have been implemented (food distribution,

separate latrines...) to address women's access to assistance. However, the response was generally gender blind on most fronts.

The current response plans are based on individual agency and sectoral early recovery needs assessments. Most organizations are preparing new assessments but few of these are coordinated centrally to ensure that they are aligned to GoP's recovery strategies and efforts. While only a few sectors claim to have clarity of early recovery scope and needs, today, there is no comprehensive assessment of outstanding recovery needs. Disaster response better meets requirements where assessment is an ongoing process and is responsive to changing conditions and feeds into programming.

Multi-sector area based approaches are best suited for disasters of this size as sector or cluster based approaches soon spread thin. Geographical area based approaches allow for better coverage, they are more adaptive to changing needs and they provide better opportunities for interlinkages between relief, recovery and rehabilitation.

Effectiveness, efficiency and accountability of some UN agencies and INGOs have been questioned by donors, GoP and implementing partners. Some donors questioned UN's added value with high transaction costs and multiple implementation layers before reaching beneficiaries. In general, there is insufficient commitment to the aid effectiveness agenda, specifically in areas of accountability.

Pakistan is a disaster hotspot exposed to recurrent hydrological and meteorological events. Despite the existence of national and sometimes also provincial plans, to date disaster management has been reactive as investments in DRR are insufficient. The civilian disaster management capacity at provincial and district level is low and coordination capacity is not always functioning properly. The links between national and provincial disaster management are generally weak and preparedness was insufficient to provide a more effective and efficient response. Pakistan is one of the eight pilot countries where the One UN has been rolled out and disaster risk management (DRM) is one of the five strategic priorities, however, contingency planning with a clear division of labour among the government and the international community is generally missing. The next disaster is "just around the corner" as the next monsoon season will soon start. The risk for a new emergency situation is high due to the concentration of poor people living in hazardous areas along river shores. Today there is a clear need to consider DRM and preparedness into UNDAF process, led by One UN within the joint programming approach

Pakistan has been a key test-ground for the humanitarian reform and currently faces some of the most important humanitarian challenges. However the humanitarian community is suffering from a chronic amnesia as it does not take stock of lessons learned from prior evaluations. A more systemic follow up on previous recommendations is needed as it would help improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the humanitarian system's response to future disasters, both within Pakistan and globally. A strong UN leadership must engage and ensure a continued and close dialogue with Pakistani authorities as well as ensuring that stakeholders and partners are held accountable.

General recommendations:

I) NDMA/PND/Line Departments, with clusters, must roll out a joint recovery needs assessment. On this basis the NDMA/PDMA, with line departments and UN agencies (led by UNDP) must develop a joint early recovery and rehabilitation plans according to different geographical area needs and dynamics. To do so:

- a) HC/RC should streamline coordination and Early Recovery Working Group should be made functional at national, provincial and district levels.
- b) NDMA, with the relevant government authorities and HCT, will thematically regroup clusters to specific phases of the emergency, contextual (provincial) realities and reviewed early plans.
- c) NDMA, with UNDP and OCHA, must plan progressive phase out of Multan, Hyderabad and Sukkur hubs by ensuring:
- d) That provincial coordination is brought within the PDMA in Karachi and Lahore, while ensuring operational coordination is maintained at district level
- e) Donors should provide flexible funding commensurate to priorities outlined in joint recovery and rehabilitation plans.
- f) Support and strengthened emphasis on disaster management and preparedness is needed, therefore: UNDP, with OCHA and cluster leads, must support NDMA's Disaster Management Plan and with specific emphasis on:
 - Building up national capacities at provincial, district and local levels.
 - Developing specific contingency plans for areas at risk.
 - Strengthening cooperation between NDMA, PDMA and DDMA.
 - Defining the role of clusters in future disasters
 - Introducing standard assessment formats and methodology, based on new IASC guidelines.
 - Defining minimum assistance standards for disaster response in Pakistan (considering type of disaster, scale and length, as well as pre-existing capacities and vulnerabilities.
 - Implementing geographic area based responses in future disasters of similar scale

II) The UN must reduce transaction costs UN agencies and IPs produce results commensurate to the level of funding received (i.e. through unit cost analysis). HCT members will ensure that response is monitored and results are shared in a transparent fashion. To do so:

- g) NDMA, with OCHA, should ensure the roll-out of the newly developed Single Reporting Format in the current and future disasters.
- h) NDMA, with EAD and IASC representatives, define integrated results based monitoring framework for future emergencies (aligned with single reporting format) which includes:
 - measurable progress indicators
 - outcome indicators
 - level of expenditures
 - 4 W's (who, what, where and when)

III) The Special Envoy and HC/RC with OCHA should promote humanitarian diplomacy to guarantee needs based and principled approaches during humanitarian responses and all Humanitarian actors need to commit to it. To do so:

- i) The HC and HCT must be in a position to prioritize and lead the humanitarian response above individual agencies interests.
- j) HC/RC, with OCHA, will ensure HCT alignment on guidelines for use of military assets in future emergencies (only as providers of last resort).

IV) Overall funding for the current disaster has been insufficient particularly for recovery assistance and many local organisations have had difficulties in assessing funds. Therefore; in future crisis:

- k) HCT, in consultation with GoP and donors, should define ways to ensure that funding for existing emergency appeals is not undermined by any new emergency appeal.
- l) OCHA with Clusters need to build the capacity of implementing partners to ensure they can effectively access funding, especially ERF.

VI) At global level, cluster approached need to be adapted to host countries' capacities and structures as well as to the specific scale of disaster

- m) IASC Working Group must ensure that guidelines on roll-out of clusters are adapted to contextual realities (i.e. size of disaster, strength of national capacities, cross cutting issues and civil- and military response mechanisms and funding) and flexible to be aligned with host governments' priorities and existing institutions.

VII) There is a need to strengthen leadership of clusters. Cluster lead agencies should appoint skilled, experienced, independent/dedicated full-time cluster leads. To mobilise qualified human resources:

IA RTE of the humanitarian response to Pakistan's 2010 Floods crisis

- n) GoP develop a national surge capacity registry (including provincial and district levels)
- o) OCHA with UN agencies ensure that cluster-leads are trained (in compulsory web-based training before deployment)
- p) UN agencies, with stand-by partners, ensure that lengths of contracts of surge deployments are commensurate to scale and duration of emergencies.

VIII) To improve effectiveness of current and future responses, NDMA, with representatives from HCT and PHF and national NGO counterpart forums must form a Working Group to:

- q) Track and follow-up on the application of recommendations from recent evaluations and the extent to which they have been implemented and
- r) Draw management a response plan on recommendations from the Floods 2010 IA-RTE. The RTE team should do follow-up visit to check implementation process

9 - Annexes

Annex 1: Terms of Reference

INTER-AGENCY REAL-TIME EVALUATION (IA RTE) OF THE HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE TO FLOODS IN PAKISTAN

Terms of Reference

5 January 2011

1. INTRODUCTION & RATIONALE

IA RTEs are an initiative of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC). An IA RTE can be defined as an evaluation carried out at the early implementation stages of a humanitarian operation which almost simultaneously feeds back findings for immediate use by the broader humanitarian community, particularly at the field level. An IA RTE is primarily intended for sudden-onset disasters, or protracted crises undergoing a phase of rapid deterioration or escalating violence. These evaluations differ from other forms of humanitarian evaluation in their speed, coverage, methods, and outputs. IA RTEs are typified by their shared management and methodological oversight through global and national level inter-agency support, management groups and in-country Advisory Groups; speed of mobilization, feedback and follow-up; light, agile approaches; restricted scope; and participatory methods. Ideally, IA RTEs seek to unlock inter-agency coordination problems or operational bottlenecks and provide real-time learning to the field.

The IASC IA RTE Support Group³⁹ has agreed to carry out an IA RTE in Pakistan since the humanitarian emergency meets the selection criteria identified by the IASC as automatic triggers. According to the 'automatic trigger criteria' endorsed by IASC Working Group in July

³⁹ Members in the IASC IA RTE SG are: UNICEF, UNDP, INGOs (Care, Oxfam for ECB/SCHR), IFRC, FAO, WFP, OCHA, ALNAP.

2010, an IA RTE is triggered if **more than 1 million individuals are affected** and if the Flash Appeal asks for more than **50\$ million US Dollars**. In the case of Pakistan, the August 2010 Pakistan Initial Floods Emergency Response Plan identified the affected population as **14 million** and the total funding requested was at **459\$ million US Dollars**.

2. BACKGROUND TO THE CURRENT CRISIS

Over the course of the 2010 monsoon season, Pakistan experienced the worst floods in its history.

Heavy rainfall, flash floods and riverine floods combined to create a moving body of water equal in dimension to the land mass of the United Kingdom. The floods have affected 84 districts out of a total of 121 districts in Pakistan, and more than 20 million people – one-tenth of Pakistan's population – devastating villages from the Himalayas to the Arabian Sea. More than 1,700 men, women and children have lost their lives, and at least 1.8 million homes have been damaged or destroyed. Since heavy rainfall and flash floods claimed their first victims, flood waves continue to devastate the southern province of Sindh, where the full extent of losses and damages may not be known for several more weeks.

3. OBJECTIVES AND USE

The IA RTE team will be deployed during the current response phase, ideally in January/February.

The IA RTE will aim to provide snapshots of current situations, including real-time feedback and learning to the HCT: (local IASC, Cluster, NGO's, Government, NGO's involved in the humanitarian response – at Federal, District and Provincial level). The main objective of the IA RTE is to assess the current response to date and provide real time feedback and input into ongoing decision making in the field. This will enable the adoption of corrective actions as needed and demonstrate a visible capacity for the humanitarian system as a whole to learn lessons.

The evaluation will in this way support the ongoing operational planning of the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT), which will be the most immediate user of the feedback and recommendations.

4. METHODOLOGY

The applied methods for IA RTE shall be light and participatory. The evaluation will be conducted by teams comprising independent consultants, with the possibility that members of the IASC IA RTE Support Group will participate. The evaluation will be carried out through analyses of various sources of information including desk reviews; field visits; interviews with key stakeholders (affected population, UN, / I/NGOs, donors, governments) and through cross-validation of data. While maintaining independence, the evaluation will seek the views of all parties, especially the affected population. Evaluation teams will serve as 'facilitators', encouraging and assisting field personnel, both individually and collectively, to look critically at their operations and find creative solutions to problems.

The IA RTE will be a one-phase approach, which would be carried out within the two first months and consist of remote monitoring and the IA RTE mission to Pakistan

In order to best prepare the consultants / consultant team for the upcoming evaluation, members of the IA RTE Support Group remotely monitored the response and gathered relevant information since the onset of the emergency. Data has been gathered along the main questions set out in the IA RTE Framework (see below) and consist of: e.g. Situation Reports, Needs Assessment Reports, Key Messages, timelines of key decisions, timelines of cluster activation, timelines of the funding status, exit surveys, and main contact lists of key humanitarian stakeholders. The data will be handed over confidentially to the consultant team to carry out a desk review well in advance of the field mission.

5. FOCUS & 'IA RTE FRAMEWORK'

Main Focus

The evaluation will first identify the extent to which the overall response achieved or did not achieve key objectives including addressing in a timely and meaningful way the needs of all

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segments of the affected population. Deductive analysis will then guide the evaluators to the other elements and dimension (as displayed in the IA RTE Framework below) on which the evaluation should specifically focus. In general, the IA RTE will focus in large part on the effectiveness and efficiency of the coordination and management systems, addressing critical issues related to both the provision of relief and to the transition to recovery.


IA RTE Framework, including Key Issues & Key Questions

The IA RTE Framework is a model that intends to display crucial characteristics of an 'ideal humanitarian response'. It was developed to be applied for natural disasters and rapid external evaluation. Moreover, the Framework serves a communication tool between all stakeholders and can therefore be slightly adapted to local issues and relevant opportunities for learning. The IA RTE Framework intends to provide the evaluators and the HCT with guidance on the most critical questions and issues to be evaluated. Ideally, the IA RTE Framework should be shared with all relevant stakeholders. It is expected that evaluators use the Framework as main reference tool for their assessment.

To reiterate, evaluators should try to first focus on the outputs and outcomes of the humanitarian response at the level of the affected population, especially by answering one of the main questions of the Framework – **“How adequate was the response as a whole, and what operational results as well as positive and negative outcomes for the affected population did it produce?”**. Deductive analysis should then guide the evaluators to the other relevant dimensions as outlined below in the Framework.

Please find below the IA RTE Framework as Table

The 'IA RTE Framework' as Diagram



Green: "MUST" Questions

IA RTE EVALUATION FRAMEWORK			
Dimensions	Characteristics of an Ideal Operation	Key Questions (apply generally and also to each Cluster)	Indicators & Data Sources (Timelines daily during the first 2-3 weeks, then weekly and later monthly tbd)
<u>I. SITUATION/CONTEXT, NEEDS</u> Context,		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> What were the main (security or other) events which hampered the response? What parts of the affected populations benefitted from humanitarian assistance? What were the most important facts and figures characterizing the humanitarian situation? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Have coordinated assessments of the needs of all parts of the populations, men and boys, women and girls and vulnerable groups 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Number of Dead, Wounded, Sick Degree of destruction, number of homeless / IDP National Politicians and Institutions International system / context Affected / Assisted population Security <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Assessment mission reports reflect discussions with women or identify needs of women Humanitarian priorities are defined and based on analysis of data disaggregated by

IA RTE EVALUATION FRAMEWORK			
Dimensions	Characteristics of an Ideal Operation	Key Questions (apply generally and also to each Cluster)	Indicators & Data Sources (Timelines daily during the first 2-3 weeks, then weekly and later monthly tbd)
Needs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> All parts of the affected population could be assisted according to their needs and in an adequate and timely manner. 	<p>been performed?</p>	<p>vulnerable groups including by sex/age and gender</p> <p><i>Sitreps, Press releases, tbc</i></p>
<p><u>II. PLANNING & RESOURCES</u></p> <p>Strategic and Operational Planning</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Coordinated needs assessment and discussions with all actors have resulted in a timely and adequate common humanitarian strategic action and operational response plan. Appeals were issued and responded to in a timely and sufficient manner. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Have <u>relevant, prioritized, inclusive and appropriate strategic and response plans</u> been developed at all levels in a timely way and <u>based on the analysis of the needs assessment</u>? Were the <u>appeals issued in a timely way and responded to</u>? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Common strategies established Coherent operation plans (general and by Cluster) established Appeal Processes timely organized and launched Financing (pledges and flows) including for activities to enhance capacity for integrating cross-cutting issues into

IA RTE EVALUATION FRAMEWORK			
Dimensions	Characteristics of an Ideal Operation	Key Questions (apply generally and also to each Cluster)	Indicators & Data Sources (Timelines daily during the first 2-3 weeks, then weekly and later monthly tbd)
Resource Mobilization		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Was the continuity of funding and staffing warranted all the time or were there significant gaps? 	<p>strategies and programs</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Human resources: staff deployment Timelines of production of plans Timelines of pledges and funding Timelines and composition (including by sex) of staff deployed to the field <p><i>Flash Appeals and revisions (communications by CAP section), FTS, Sitreps, Briefing papers, Staffing Tables, OTF protocols, Key messages for the USG and SG</i></p>
<u>III. COORDINATION</u> Coordination System Activated (OSOCC / Cluster Approach)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> An inclusive coordination system has been established in a timely and efficient manner. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Has an inclusive and well-managed <u>coordination system</u> been established early on, including with the national actors, the military 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Activation timeline of Coordination hubs (HQ and Field, link with peacekeeping missions, OCHA, Clusters, US, national etc.) Key decisions inventory

IA RTE EVALUATION FRAMEWORK			
Dimensions	Characteristics of an Ideal Operation	Key Questions (apply generally and also to each Cluster)	Indicators & Data Sources (Timelines daily during the first 2-3 weeks, then weekly and later monthly tbd)
Access, Principles, Advocacy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Issues with regard to humanitarian space, access and security could be solved through advocacy in a timely and efficient manner. 	<p>and all other relevant stakeholders at all levels?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> When were the main coordination bodies activated (by whom?) and connected? Were roles & responsibilities, well defined and clear? What key decisions have been taken by whom? How has humanitarian space, access and security been assessed, with a view to identify and address bottlenecks and gaps? <p>Was the coordination system supported by an <u>efficient communication and information management system?</u> (information flow</p>	<p>and timeline (including key stakeholders)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Gaps: dates of identification and addressing of critical bottlenecks and gaps (infrastructures, procedures, security) Date and main features of the coordination arrangements with member states, military and National counterparts IM network's "operationality" Timeline of key advocacy actions and messages Negotiation protocols for access and security CIMCOORD arrangements Inventory of IM systems and their main functions Key messages by main humanitarian actors Quality and availability of

IA RTE EVALUATION FRAMEWORK			
Dimensions	Characteristics of an Ideal Operation	Key Questions (apply generally and also to each Cluster)	Indicators & Data Sources (Timelines daily during the first 2-3 weeks, then weekly and later monthly tbd)
Information Management and Public Information	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> A timely, efficient and effective public information campaign has been put in place in order to explain to all involved stakeholders the humanitarian response. An efficient and effective information management system has been put in place for communication within the field and with the HQ. And M&E system has been put in place. 	<p>within the field, between field and HQs)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Were public messages clear, timely and accurate and proactive? <p>Which systems have been put into place to monitor, report and evaluate the efficiency and effectiveness of the overall response, including the efficiency and effectiveness of implementing partners?</p>	<p>expertise <i>Sitreps and protocols from various coordination bodies (incl.UNDAC, OSOCC, OCHA, press releases, IM protocols and ToR,</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Framework for Gender Indicators (also for each cluster): "IASC Gender Handbook in Humanitarian Action" Number of women and men trained on gender issues Number of GenCaps deployed Framework for HIV/AIDS Indicators IASC Guidelines for HiV/Aids interventions in emergency settings Guidelines on MHPSS in Emergency Settings, IASC (2007) Flash Environmental

IA RTE EVALUATION FRAMEWORK			
Dimensions	Characteristics of an Ideal Operation	Key Questions (apply generally and also to each Cluster)	Indicators & Data Sources (Timelines daily during the first 2-3 weeks, then weekly and later monthly tbd)
M&E	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Cross cutting issues have been correctly addressed and incorporated into all aspects of the response. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Have the cross cutting issues be dealt with adequately in all aspects of the response and in all clusters/ sectors? Has statistical evidence been gathered (e.g. disaggregated by sex and age?) Have standards been developed and did they provide guidance and methodologies for integrating Cross Cutting Issues (XCI) into Clusters / Sector NAs and PDNAs? Have advisors for the various cross-cutting themes been deployed in a timely way, including for early recovery? Have local capacities been involved, used and strengthened and have 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Assessment Tool (FEAT) Integrating environment in Post-Conflict Needs Assessments, Humanitarian action and the Environment: Essential Guidance for Humanitarian Actors Emergency Waste Management Guidelines Application of pre-existing response plan in the current emergency response Participation of local capacities in relevant coordination mechanisms (clusters, common needs assessment etc.)

IA RTE EVALUATION FRAMEWORK			
Dimensions	Characteristics of an Ideal Operation	Key Questions (apply generally and also to each Cluster)	Indicators & Data Sources (Timelines daily during the first 2-3 weeks, then weekly and later monthly tbd)
Cross- cutting issues (gender, environment, HIV/AIDS)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The humanitarian response has been planned and is 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> partnerships with civil society organizations been built-up? Were activities planned in support to pre-existing plans, structures and capacities? Was an inclusive common strategy for security and access developed? Have key stakeholders identified in a timely manner possible limitations for access to beneficiaries and assessed the security for staff and advocated for access? Have Access and Security issues been addressed in the response plan of each Cluster by the Cluster Lead? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Participation of local civil society organization in coordination mechanisms Establishment of national NGO consortia to be included into response plans? Key messages by ERC Speeches by HC <p><i>Meeting minutes from Cluster/ Sector meetings</i></p> <p><i>Meeting minutes between HC and local authorities</i></p> <p><i>Public Information Campaign documents</i></p> <p><i>Cluster Response Plans</i></p>

IA RTE EVALUATION FRAMEWORK			
Dimensions	Characteristics of an Ideal Operation	Key Questions (apply generally and also to each Cluster)	Indicators & Data Sources (Timelines daily during the first 2-3 weeks, then weekly and later monthly tbd)
Ownership and Connectedness	<p>carried out in close collaboration with pre-existing response structures (such as the Government / military and civil protection).</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A common strategy by all involved stakeholders has been developed to guarantee security and access. 		<i>Daily Situation Reports</i>

IA RTE EVALUATION FRAMEWORK			
Dimensions	Characteristics of an Ideal Operation	Key Questions (apply generally and also to each Cluster)	Indicators & Data Sources (Timelines daily during the first 2-3 weeks, then weekly and later monthly tbd)
Common Strategy for Security & Access			
<u>IV. RESPONSE</u> <u>(and preparedness)</u> Quality and Timeliness of Response	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> All parts of the affected population could be assisted in a timely, adequate and effective manner – based on their needs. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> How adequate was the response as a whole, and what operational results as well as positive and negative outcomes for the affected population did it produce? Have critical gaps and issues been identified and addressed in a timely way system-wide and by each Cluster? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Coverage of beneficiary needs Mapping and analysis of operational bottlenecks Tracing of main features of operational response (who did deliver what, where and when?) <p><i>Field visits to affected areas</i></p>

IA RTE EVALUATION FRAMEWORK			
Dimensions	Characteristics of an Ideal Operation	Key Questions (apply generally and also to each Cluster)	Indicators & Data Sources (Timelines daily during the first 2-3 weeks, then weekly and later monthly tbd)
Common Agreement on and Compliance to Standards	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Common standards (appropriate to national context) have been developed in an inclusive manner with the participation of national, local authorities 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Have coherent and appropriate common standards been developed within the coordination systems (globally and for each Cluster) and reached? 	<p><i>Cluster Situation Reports</i></p> <p><i>OCHA Situation Reports</i></p> <p><i>Comparison between outcome of needs assessment (UNDAC needs assessment, common needs assessment & PDNAS) and Cluster Response Plans / revised Flash Appeal / CAP etc.</i></p> <p><i>SPHERE and other standards</i></p>

Evaluators must try to focus on the key questions in the Framework. Additional follow up and more specific questions are listed below – based on the Framework’s dimensions and main questions:

Situation, Context and Needs

- ***What were the main (security or other) events which hampered the response?***
- ***What parts of the affected populations benefitted from humanitarian assistance?***
- ***Have coordinated assessments of the needs of all parts of the populations, men and boys, women and girls and vulnerable groups been performed?***

Specific questions:

- Has a common needs assessment and analysis been carried out and if yes / by whom and where?
- What proportions of the affected population could be assisted? Who was excluded, and what were the key barriers to full access?
- What critical factors (e.g., security events, infrastructure, procedures, access, enabling environment, etc.) help explain why the response was or was not delivered in an adequate and timely manner?
- How far has the humanitarian response been tailored to meet national and local needs and ensure ownership at these levels by, and accountability to, affected populations?
- To what extent have the needs of all segments of the population, men and boys, women and girls and vulnerable groups been assessed and the response tailored to the differential needs of the specific subpopulations? Do the assessment mission reports reflect such discussions with all segments of the population?
- Have the identification of humanitarian priorities been based on sex/age disaggregated data and gender analysis of these data
- Has information about the humanitarian response been communicated in a manner that is widely accessible to the affected people of Pakistan?

Strategic and operational planning and resource mobilization

Overarching question:

- ***Have relevant, prioritized, inclusive and appropriate strategic and response plans been developed in a timely way and based on analysis of the common needs assessment at all levels?***
- ***Were the appeals issued in a timely way and responded to?***

Specific questions:

- How effective has the overall inter-agency planning and management process been in Islamabad and the various hubs?
- How timely, relevant and coherently inter-linked have the various appeals, strategies and operation plans (e.g., the PIFERP, PDNA, RF and the National Recovery Plan) been?
- To what extent have these been based on an inclusive, prioritized and coordinated needs assessment and analysis that reflects the views of various international and national stakeholders, including government, civil society organizations and various segments of the affected population (including socially excluded groups and groups and individuals vulnerable to human rights violations due to discrimination and stigma)?
- How adequately has the political dimension of the country's context been considered in assessments, planning and provision of relief and transition to early recovery efforts?
- How sufficient have funding flows been, both in quantity and timeliness, so as to allow humanitarian actors to respond effectively to both humanitarian and time-critical early recovery needs?
- Was there any meaningful presence of gender expertise to inform the planning processes.? Was there funding for activities to enhance capacity for integrating gender equality in strategies and programs?

Coordination and Connectedness

Overarching questions:

- ***Has an inclusive and well-managed coordination system been established early on, including with the national (federal, provincial, district level) actors, the military and all other relevant stakeholders?***
- ***Were activities planned in support to pre-existing response plans, structures and capacities?***
- ***Have local capacities been involved, used and strengthened and have partnerships with civil society organizations been built-up?***
- ***Was the coordination system supported by an efficient communication and information management system (e.g., enhancing information flow within the field, between field and HQs)?***
- ***How adequately have cross-cutting issues be dealt with in all aspects of the response and in all clusters/ sectors?***

Specific questions:

- In what ways, if any, has the cluster approach led to a more strategic response in terms of predictable leadership, partnership, cohesiveness and accountability?
- How effective has inter-cluster coordination been (with specific focus on cross cutting issues, Protection and Early Recovery)?
- How effectively has the humanitarian community coordinated the response with the Government (at federal, provincial and district level) and the national military force?
- In what ways, if any, has the government's leadership capacity been strengthened as it has the primary responsibility to respond to its people's needs?
- In what ways, if any, have national and local capacities been capitalized on and strengthened (e.g., in needs assessments)?
- How effectively have cross-cutting issues been addressed in the cluster response? Was there a network to ensure information sharing and gap filling on cross-cutting issues across programs and sectors
- Has statistical evidence been gathered disaggregated by sex and age

Response covering the needs and set standards

Overarching question:

- ***What were the main operational results, and the positive and negative outcomes for all segments of the affected population, during each phase?***
- ***Have critical gaps and issues been identified and addressed in a timely way system-wide and by each Cluster?***
- ***Have appropriate common standards been developed within the coordination systems (globally and for each Cluster) and to what degree have these been met?***

Specific questions:

- How timely and successful is the humanitarian response in delivering against stated objectives/indicators (as per cluster work plans at the global and the country level, individual agencies' articulated benchmarks)?
- Have the Clusters been instrumental in identifying and addressing critical gaps early on?
- What segments of the affected population could and could not be assisted, and why?
- What is the humanitarian system's level of commitment and compliance to standards such as SPHERE, INEE, some subset of the Core Commitments for Children in Humanitarian

Action, HAP 2007 Standard in Humanitarian Accountability and Quality Management, Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief, guidance on civil-military relations and protected humanitarian space and on gender equality?

Additional Questions and Issues raised during the Evaluation Management Preparatory Mission

Further to the pre questions above, the evaluation team should consider the following questions. These questions have been raised during the evaluation manager's preparatory mission to Pakistan:

1. How adequate was OCHA's leadership role, particularly in Needs Assessment (including context analysis of local capacities and existing data) and Information Management.
2. How appropriate, coherent and connected was the wider cluster architecture in Pakistan (at federal provincial and district level)? In how far and for what reasons did / or didn't the cluster approach plug in to existing national coordination structures?
3. How appropriate and coherent were oversight and monitoring capacities of all actors including implementing partners and how were they linked to strategic and operational decision-making?
4. Have appropriate and timely ICMMs been established in order to agree on inter-cluster response strategies including priorities of the response?
5. How to increase and improve capacities of cluster coordination at all levels?
6. How appropriate and timely have early recovery issues been included into life saving cluster strategies?

6. STAKEHOLDER INVOLVEMENT

The evaluation team will engage with staff from UN agencies, international NGOs, national NGOs, national stakeholders, government and donor organizations, as well as military actors. The team will acknowledge the significant workload already borne by in country staff and endeavor to ensure that any staff resource allocations to the evaluations are minimized and that the IA RTE is carried out with a 'light footprint'.

Interagency technical and policy support will be provided through the IA RTE Support Group. It will be expected that the evaluation team will be as much as possible self-sufficient on the ground!

The team will report its findings to all members of the HCT (Clusters, IASC locally) and their international and local counterparts (including Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, IOM, local NGO's, government etc.) in Pakistan, prior to leaving the region. Presentations in Geneva and/or New York will follow within two weeks of the consultants' return from the field mission.

7. MANAGEMENT ARRANGEMENTS

The IA RTE will be overseen by the IASC IA RTE Support Group. Day-to-day management of the evaluation will be led by a smaller Management Group (MG) which will be established on a voluntary basis and be made up of members of the IASC IA RTE Support Group interested to contribute their time and efforts. The MG will be chaired by [yet to be determined] and includes the following members [yet to be determined].

MG members will be expected to:

- Manage the entire evaluation process (including financial resource mobilization, team recruitment, reviewing the inception report, participate in the survey design, reviewing draft reports) for the particular phase;
- Offer in-country support during critical phases of the evaluation and travel to Pakistan as needed;
- Monitor and assess the quality of all outputs on the evaluation;
- Provide guidance and institutional support to the external consultant(s), especially on issues of methodology;

- Approves the final IA RTE report;
- Represent the participating Agencies in discussion with the consultant(s) conducting the IA RTE;
- Represent the participating Agencies of the evaluation in dealings with the UN Country Team, Donor representatives and NGO communities.
- Keep the IA RTE Support Group advised on key developments throughout the evaluation

The evaluation team selected for the IA RTE will report to the MG.

All evaluation products will first be submitted to the Management Group and will then be shared with the wider IA RTE Support Group.

8. DURATION OF EVALUATION AND TENTATIVE TIMEPLAN

Action/event	Projected Dates
Emergency event(s)	
TRIGGERING AND REMOTE MONITORING PHASE	Done
Automatic Triggering of IA RTE or Request	20 Aug 2010
Remote Monitoring from HQ & Data Collection (via OTF, GCL Meetings, Virtual OSOCC, Sitreps)	Since beginning
Drafting of Terms of Reference & Drafting of Expression of Interest	20 Aug (1 st revision 8. Oct)
Publication of EoI on Relief Web & ALNAP (note: until we have a an appropriate stand-by roster in place)	8 Oct 2010
PREPARATORY EVALUATION MANAGEMENT MISSION	Done
Scoping mission by the evaluation management to identify key questions and issues, as well as to explain processes.	25 Nov – 4 th Dec 2010
MISSION ON THE FLOODS RESPONSE	Target dates
Hiring of Consultant – Contract signed	4 Jan 2011
Handover of remotely monitored data to the consultants. Consultants start the Desk Review.	5 Jan 2011
Mission Briefings via phone between consultants and the ad-hoc Management Group	7 Jan 2011
Field visits: Mission to the country – interview and visit period in Sindh, Punjab, Balochistan, KP and Islamabad	12 Jan – 30 Jan 2011

(details see row below)	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <u>Sindh</u>: Karachi – Hyderabad (plus Thatta) – Sukkur (plus Dadu)- Karachi (6 days) • <u>Punjab</u>: Multan - Muzaffargarh (3-4 days) • <u>Balochistan</u>: Quetta – (?) (2 days) • <u>KP</u>: Peshawar – (?) (2 days) • Islamabad – (4 days) 	12 – 17 Jan 18 – 21 Jan 22-23 Jan 24-25 Jan 26-30 Jan
ANALYSIS AND FIRST DRAFT: Analysis of findings and drafting of draft IA RTE report, including recommendations. Draft is shared with HCT and IA RTE Management Group for comments.	1 Feb – 16Feb 2011
IN-COUNTRY WORKSHOPS: Workshops in country to validate findings and recommendations, as well as to discuss next steps and outline timelines and action for a management response to the recommendations	17 Feb- 23 Feb 2011
END OF MISSION: Debriefings in country to HCT (including government counterparts).	23 Feb 2011
FINAL DRAFT: Production of Final Report, including summary of proceedings/outcome of workshop discussion and agreed next steps.	28 Feb 2011
Final Check & Approval by ad-hoc Management Group of Final Report. Report is also shared with the Support Group.	3 March 2011
Debriefing in GVA and / or New York	7 March 2011

9. EVALUATION TEAM: Competency and Expertise Requirements

The evaluation will employ the services of a consultant company / research institute which will probably consists of a team of 2 international and 2 national consultants. Consultant teams must be gender and age balanced! Consultant team will embody the following collective experiences:

- Proven senior-level experience and ability to provide strategic recommendations to key stakeholders;
- Good knowledge of strategic and operational management of humanitarian operations, preferably in Pakistan, the ability to bring on board national consultants(s) from Pakistan would be an asset;

- Good knowledge of humanitarian system and its reforms, including of UN agencies, IFRC, NGOs, and local government disaster response structures and systems;
- Demonstrated experience in conducting evaluations of humanitarian programmes and the capacity to work collaboratively with multiple stakeholders and on a team;
- Strong experience in key sectors and/or in cross-cutting issues;
- Strong analytical skills and ability to clearly synthesize and present findings, draw practical conclusions and to prepare well-written reports in a timely manner;
- Strong workshop facilitation skills;
- Excellent writing and presentation skills in English; and
- Immediate availability for the period indicated.
- Evaluation teams should be gender and age balanced

10. REPORTING REQUIREMENTS AND DELIVERABLES

1. **Field visits** to Sindh, Punjab, Balochistan, KP and Islamabad) to gather information and evidence on questions and issues laid out in this ToR (Field visits will take place during 3 weeks).
2. A **draft IA RTE** report containing evidence-based findings, conclusions (analysis of findings), and recommendations. To be completed within 2 weeks after the field mission.
3. A series of presentations and **lessons learnt and validation workshops of findings and recommendations** to HCT (including ICMM) in Pakistan on all levels (federal and district). The purpose of the workshops are to a) discuss findings, b) validate recommendations and reformulating them (if necessary) into SMART recommendations and c) to identify key stakeholders and timelines to respond to these recommendations. Ideally, a management response matrix will be developed. The workshops will take place for two weeks and should be carried out after completion of draft IA RTE report.
4. **An outcome summary** (2-5 pages) of proceedings of the lessons learnt and validation workshops, including a summary on the action foreseen and the timelines for a management response to the recommendations. To be completed one week after the lessons learnt workshops.
5. A **final RTE report** containing analytical elements related to the issues specified in this set of ToR. The report shall contain a short executive summary of no more than 2,000


words and a main text of no more than 10,000 words, both inclusive of clear and concise recommendations. The outcome summary of proceedings shall become an integral part of the final RTE report. Annexes should include a list of all individuals interviewed, a bibliography, a description of method(s) employed, a summary of survey results (if applicable), and any other relevant materials. The report will be submitted two weeks after the completion of the mission. To be completed two weeks after the workshops have taken place.

Draft reports will be submitted to the HCT and IA RTE Management Group, who will be afforded 7 days to comment. The document will subsequently be disseminated to a wider audience for comment.

The evaluation team is solely responsible for the final products. While maintaining independence, the team will adhere to professional standards and language, particularly that which may relate to the protection of staff and operations. Direct consultations with affected populations will be a formal requirement of the evaluation unless security conditions are overriding. Additionally, agencies at the country level and the IA RTE Support Group will be consulted prior to the dissemination of any products emanating from the evaluation.

All analytical results and products arising from this evaluation will be owned by the IASC RTE Support Group. The team leader and/or members will not be allowed without prior authorization in writing to present any of the analytical results as his or her own work or to make use of the evaluation results for private publication purposes.

Compliance ALNAP quality pro forma is expected and the evaluation report will be judged in this regard. All external evaluation reports will also be submitted to ALNAP for inclusion in the regular meta-evaluation process that rates the quality of evaluation reports.

 **The key to success of the workshops and the pre-requisite for the above mentioned deliverables is availability and commitment by the respective HCT (including ICMM, UN, INGOs, local NGO's, NDMA/ PDMA, DCO) at federal and provincial level for a one-day workshop in each of the four provinces and Islamabad.**

Annex 2: List of Accronyms

ADB	Asian Development Bank
AIDS	Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome
CERF	Central Emergency Response Fund
CRS	Catholic Relief Services
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DCO	District Coordinating Officer
DEWS	Disease Early Warning Systems
DFID	Department for International Development
DG ECHO	Directorate General of the European Commission for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection
DNA	Damage Needs Assessment
DRM	Disaster Risk Management
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
EAD	Economic Affairs Division
EC	European Commission
ERC	Emergency Response Coordinator
ERNA	Early Recovery Needs Assessment
FATA	Federally Administered Tribal Areas
GoP	Government of Pakistan
HCT	Humanitarian Country Team
HIV	Human Immunodeficiency Virus
IA-RTE	Inter Agency-Real Time Evaluation
IASC	Inter Agency Standing Committee
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organization
IOM	International Organization for Migration
KPK	Kyber Pakhtunkhwa
MCRAM	Multi-Cluster Rapid Assessment Mechanism
MSF	Médecins Sans Frontières
NADRA	National Database & Registration Authority
NDMA	National Disaster Management Authority
NFRI	Non Food Relief Items
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OECD	Organisation for Economic Development
OFDA	Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance
PDMA	Provincial Disaster Management Authority
PFERP	Pakistan Floods Emergency Response Plan
PFRERRP	Pakistan Flood Relief and Early Recovery Response Plan
PHRP	Pakistan Humanitarian Response Plan
PIFERP	Pakistan Initial Floods Emergency Response Plan
RC	Resident Coordinator
SG	Secretary General
SMART	Specific, Measurable, Accountable, Reasonable and Time bound
Strategic Planning UNIT	SPU
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNDAC	United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNICEF	United Nations Children Fund
US	United States
USD	United States Dollar
VAM	Vulnerability Assessment
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organisation

Annex 3: Timeline

THE TEN WORST NATURAL DISASTES IN PAKISTAN'S HISTORY	
1935	A 7.7 Richter scale earthquake hit Quetta, virtually leveled the city in the province of Balochistan. And killing 60,000 people in one of the deadliest earthquakes to hit South Asia.
1945	A 7.8 Richter scale earthquake hit southwestern Balochistan causing the deaths of over 4,000 people.
1950	Monsoon rain killed 2900 people across the country. Punjab province and Lahore the worst hit with 100,000 homes destroyed and 900,000 rendered homeless.
1970	Bhola tropical cyclone the deadliest ever hit East Pakistan (now Bangladesh)flooding the low-lying areas of the Ganges leaving 500, 000 dead.
1974	A 6.2 Richter scale hit KohistanHunza earthquake 5300 killed 17,000 injured and 97,000 affected
2000	Drought in Balochistan 1.2 million affected, 100 died lasted for 10 month.
2005	7.6 earthquake hit northwestern Pakistan 73000 killed and 3.3 million homeless
2007	Cyclone Yemyin triggers flash floods killing 730 people 350, 00 displaced and 1.5 million affected.
2010	Landslide in Attabad village in Gilgit-Baltistan threatened floods downstream and created the Hunza Lake Disaster
2010	Monsoon rains, flash and riverine floods hit all 4 provinces, Gilgit-Baltistan, FATA, and AJK areas that combined to create a moving body of water equal in dimension to the land mass of the United Kingdom travelling southwards killing 2000 and affecting 20 million people. Biggest ever disaster faced by the humanitarian community worldwide.
2010	MONSOON FLASH AND RIVERINE FLOODS 2010
July 20	Pakistan Meteorological Department issues flash flood warnings for Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Punjab provinces of Pakistan
July 21	At least 12 people die in KPK and Punjab provinces due to flash floods. Parts of Lahore and Faisalabad in Punjab are inundated.
July 22	Pakistan Meteorological Department issues another significant flood warning for areas in Punjab province.
July 22	Dozens of people are killed and tens of thousands displaced following heavy rains across Balochistan, Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.
July 22	Pakistan Army, local population, and government- the first responders to rescue and evacuate the affectees.
July 23	More than 70 die in Balochistan province. 30, 000 stranded people provided relief by Pakistan military.
July 27	Pakistan Meteorological Department issues another significant flood warning for areas in Punjab province.
July 28	Pakistan Meteorological Department issues significant flood warning for divisions of Kalat, Sibi, Naseerabad and Zhob in Balochistan province; D.G. Khan, Rajanpur districts and Indus river at Tarbela in Punjab; and upper Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province.
July 28	The PHRP's revised requirements are US\$663 million. Taking into consideration funding received to date of \$260 million, the appeal is now 39% funded, and has unmet requirements of \$402 million.
July 29	Pakistan Meteorological Department issues significant flood warning for Districts Mandibahuddin, Chiniot, Jhang, Khanewal, Multan ,Muzaffargarh, Bkakar, Layyah, D.G. Khan, and Rajanpur in Punjab.
July 29	The Swat and Kabul rivers which feed the northern extremity of the Indus can take no more and burst their banks: flood surges crash down through Nowshera , Charsadda and parts of Peshawar. 200 reported killed.
July 29	Flash floods and landslides triggered by monsoon rains hit Northwestern Pakistan-large parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, smaller areas of the Federally Administered Tribal Area, Gilgit

	Baltistan and Pakistan-Administered Kashmir. According to the Government, more than 800 people died and millions may be affected.
July 29	A major relief effort was launched by the Pakistani Government, supported by UN agencies, international NGOs, and local relief organizations
July 31	The UN describes the monsoon floods as the worst in living memory, while Pakistani authorities put the death toll at over 800.
August 01	Pakistan Meteorological Department issues significant flood warning for river Indus at Guddu Barrage for Districts Ghotki, Sukkur, Larkana, Nawabshah, Hyderabad, Naushehroferoze
August 02	Government t Officials put the death toll at over 1,100 as 30,000 military troops join the rescue and evacuation efforts.
August 02	The UN says that nearly 980,000 people have been left homeless or have been displaced. The Red Cross appeals for aid.
August 03	Pakistan Meteorological Department issues significant flood warning for river Indus at Guddu Barrage for Districts Ghotki, Sukkur, Larkana, Nawabshah, Hyderabad, Naushehroferoze.
August 3	PMD draws attention to dams on the Indus that are taking far more water than they were supposed to.
August 04	The UK's Disasters Emergency Committee launches an appeal for aid to help people hit by the flooding.
	Pakistan's Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani calls on his administration to speed up the delivery of aid. There is a growing backlash against the civilian government and President Asif Ali Zardari over failures to provide food, water and sanitation to the victims.
August 05	Pakistan Meteorological Department issues RED ALERT flood warning for river Indus at Guddu Barrage for Districts Khairpur, Jacobabad, Sadiqabad, Shikarpur Ghotki, Sukkur, Larkana, Nawabshah, Hyderabad, Naushehroferoze, and Dadu.
August 06	Pakistan Meteorological Department issues flood warning for Dstricts Sukkur, Larkana, Nawabshah, Hyderabad, Naushehroferoze, Thatta and Dadu.
August 06	Pakistan Meteorological Department issues flood warning for Gujranwala, Sialkot, Gujrat, Hafizabad, and Mandibahauddin districts in Punjab.
August 06	UN says that at least 1,600 have been killed and 14 million people affected.
August 06	PRCS pitches several thousand tents besides roads and railway lines and along the dykes.
August 06	Pakistan government declares a red alert as the flooding worsens, reaching the south and leading to the evacuation of half a million people.
August 06	The floods have affected 12 million people in Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa provinces, the national disaster management agency says.
August 06	Pakistan declares a red alert as floods reach southern provinces. Hundreds of thousands of people are evacuated.
August 07	Pakistan Meteorological Department issues flood warning for Swat, Chitral.
August 07	Pakistan Meteorological Department issues flood warning for KPK, Punjab, Gilgit-Baltistan, AHK and Sindh.
August 07	Landslides and flash floods are reported in Gilgit-Baltistan and other parts of Northern Pakistan.
August 07	Floods move into Sindh and Balochistan. Flooding in the south, notably in the densely populated province of Sindh, brings to 15 million the number affected across the country according to the local authorities.
August 08	Heavy rain hampers rescue efforts and a red alert is issued for the south of the country.
August 08	Prime Minister Gilani visits flood-hit areas of Sindh province.
August 09	Flood levels rise above danger levels at a key flood barrier in the southern province of Sindh.
August 09	Around 13.8 million people have been affected by the floods in Pakistan, making the scale of the disaster worse than the 2004 tsunami, 2005 earthquake in Kashmir and the 2010 Haiti earthquake, a UN official says.
August 09	Huge breach in Indus affecting Sindh.
August 10	Government –EAD sets up Donor Council for oversight of funding to floods.
August 10	Six million people need humanitarian aid in order to survive, according to the UN.
August 11	Pakistan Meteorological Department issues second flood wave warning for Sindh districts.
August 11	The United Nations launches an initial Appeal- The Pakistan Initial Floods Emergency Response Plan (PIFERP) - seeking \$459 million to respond to the immediate relief needs of

	flood-affected people for an initial 3 months
August 11	The United States triples the number of helicopters to 19 to help Pakistan's flood relief effort.
August 12	Pakistan's food minister tells the BBC there have been "huge losses" to his country's crops.
August 13	Aid agencies warn of a potential "second wave" of deaths due to disease.
August 14	Pakistan Meteorological Department issues second flood wave warning for Sindh districts
August 14	Pakistan's Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gilani says 20 million people have been affected by the country's floods and the floods have destroyed standing crops and food stores worth billions of dollars.
August 14	President Zardari makes his second visit to affected regions, after being heavily criticised for his absence
August 15	United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon visits flood-affected areas. and says the scale of the disaster is worse than anything he had seen before and pledges to speed up aid.
August 16	The United Nations warns that up to 3.5 million children are at risk from water-borne diseases
August 16	The World Bank says it has agreed to provide a 900-million-dollar loan to Pakistan.
August 17	A senior World Health Organization official declares that the death toll is much higher than the 1,400 reported by the government.
August 20	Pakistan says it will clamp down on charities linked to Islamist militants.
August 18	The UN holds a special general assembly session on Pakistan floods in New York.
August 18	The European Union nearly doubles its aid to Pakistan to 90 million dollars as those affected continue to criticize their government.
August 18	Secretary Clinton announces State Department creation of the Pakistan Relief Fund for individuals, corporations, and others to contribute toward relief and recovery efforts in Pakistan
August 25	More than 800,000 people are cut off by floods as the bank of Indus are breached in Sindh.. The United Nations requests more support for helicopter missions.
August 26	A breach develops on the eastern bank of the Indus River in Thatta district. Thatta city is officially evacuated as the Indus breaches its western bank in the south.
August 26	Breach at Toru Bund in Sindh.
August 26	PM constitutes the National Disaster Management Oversight Council NDMOC.
August 27	Pakistan Meteorological Department issues flood warning for river Indus at Kotri for Sindh districts.
August 30	At least 1 million people are reportedly on the move in Sindh as villages are submerged.
September 7	United Nations Emergency Relief Coordinator Valerie Amos arrives in Pakistan for a three-day mission.
September 13	Manchar Lake overflows, flooding new areas in Sindh's Jamshoro district.
September 17	A revised UN Appeal-The Pakistan Floods Emergency Response Plan requests an additional \$1.6 billion amounting to a total \$2 billion (\$143 per beneficiary) for relief and early recovery needs for 12 months – August 2010-August 2011.. Approximately 35% of PIFEFRP committed funds have already been spent or committed by the humanitarian organizations
September 17	Flood waters recede. 2 million are at risk for disease.
October 14	ADB/World Bank assess Pakistan flood damage at \$9.7 billion.
November 05	U.N. issues a revised APPEAL - PFERP (\$97 per beneficiary) seeking \$1.9 billion to be disbursed from August 2010 to August 2011.
December 2	Second visit of United Nations Emergency Relief Coordinator Valerie Amos
December 29	NDMA issues directive to UN agencies and humanitarian community to close emergency relief operations by January 31, 2011.
January 07	The Government of Pakistan (GoP) National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) announced that the relief phase of the national flood response would officially end on January 31, 2011.
January 07	Government of Pakistan National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) announced that the relief phase of the national flood response would officially end on January 31. However, GoP officials noted that the relief phase will continue in Jaffarabad District, Balochistan Province, and four of the worst affected districts in Sindh Province, where standing water

	continues to impede returns. The NDMA. plans to approve the continuation of relief projects in other districts on a case-by-case basis.
January 12	NATO donates common funded Logistic Support Bridge to Pakistan.
2011	
January 10 to 28	IA RTE Floods RTE field mission
January 20	Grants totaling \$20.65 million have now been approved for funding from the Pakistan Emergency Response Fund. 60 projects from 8 clusters or sectors have so far benefitted, of which 25 percent are focused on shelter/NFIs and 45 percent involve WASH support. With just over \$34.5 million so far committed to the fund, almost \$10.9 million remains.
January 22	The National Database and Registration Authority - NADRA processed 1,440,966 Watan Cash Cards through which a total of Rs 27.229 Billion have been disbursed.
January 24	According to Government sources 95% of all affectees have returned to their areas.
January 24	Latest government camp figures indicate that 154, 713 flood affectees remain in 228 camps and spontaneous settlements in Sindh, KPK and Balochistan.
January 26	OXFAM releases report on Pakistan six months after noting that the crisis is far from over and could get worse. Warns the government to extend the emergency relief period scheduled to end on January 31, 2011 or put at risk large numbers of people who still need assistance.
January 27	UN says so far almost 10 million people have received essential medicine cover, around seven million people are still receiving food rations on a monthly basis, more than 800,000 households have been provided with emergency shelter and around 3.5 million people have been given access to safe drinking water through rehabilitated water systems.
January 27	Government figures show 78 districts affected by floods; 1,985 people lost lives; 2946 injured; 1,744,47 houses damaged; 20,184,550 population affected; 2,244,64 cropped areas affected;
January 27	UN appeal for \$1.96 billion to rebuild Pakistan remains only 56.3 percent or \$1.1 billion funded.

Annex 4: List of People Met

Surname, Forenames	Org.	♂♀	Method	Cat	Place	Date	Interviewer
SINDH							
Thomas Gurtner	OCHA	♂	ssi	O	Karachi	Mo Jan 10	rp, ns, fz
Sualeh Ahmed Farooqi	PDMA	♂	ssi	G	Karachi	Mo Jan 10	rp, ns, fz
Manuel Bessler	OCHA	♂	ti	O	Karachi	Mo Jan 10	rp, ns, fz
Nicki Bennett	OCHA,	♀	ti	O	Karachi	Mo Jan 10	rp, ns, fz
JohnLong	OCHA	♂	ti	O	Karachi	Mo Jan 10	rp, ns, fz
Dechassa Lemessa	OCHA	♂	ssg	O	Hyderabad	Tue Jan 11	rp, ns, fz, an
Veronika Wolf	OCHA	♀	ssi	O	Hyderabad	Tu Jan 11	rp, ns, fz, an
Shaheen A. Shah	UN Women	♀	ssg	U	Hyderabad	Tu Jan 11	rp, ns, fz, an
Mussarat Shah	UNHCR	♂	ssg	U	Hyderabad	Tu Jan 11	rp, ns, fz, an
Dr. Kamrani	UNOCHA	♂	ssg	O	Hyderabad	Tu Jan 11	rp, ns, fz, an
Khalid Khan	FAO	♀	ssg	U	Hyderabad	Tu Jan 11	rp, ns, fz, an
Dr. Aqsa	UNDP	♀	ssg	U	Hyderabad	Tu Jan 11	rp, ns, fz, an
Imran Laghari	UNOCHA	♂	ssg	O	Hyderabad	Tu Jan 11	rp, ns, fz, an
Branislan Jekic	WASH Cluster	♂	ssg	N	Hyderabad	Tu Jan 11	rp, ns, fz, an
Florence Lanyero	WFP	♀	ssg	U	Hyderabad	Tu Jan 11	rp, ns, fz, an
Sultan Ahmed	UNICEF	♂	ssg	U	Hyderabad	Tu Jan 11	rp, ns, fz, an
Helene Villeneuve	Child-Protection Sub cluster	♀	ssg	N	Hyderabad	Tu Jan 11	rp, ns, fz, an
Sandeep Bashtal	OCHA	♀	ssg	O	Hyderabad	Tu Jan 11	rp, ns, fz, an
Gert Holtze	UNICEF	♂	ssg	U	Hyderabad	Tu Jan 11	rp, ns, fz, an
Tanveer Ahmed	OCHA	♂	ssg	O	Hyderabad	Tu Jan 11	rp, ns, fz, an
Fazal Rahim	UNICEF	♂	ssg	U	Hyderabad	Tu Jan 11	rp, ns, fz, an
Zorin Elizabeth	OCHA	♀	ssg	O	Hyderabad	Tu Jan 11	rp, ns, fz, an
Riaz Soomro	Focal Person P/CP	♂	ssg	N	Jamshoro	Tu Jan 11	rp, ns, fz, an
Mansoor Ali	IRDS	♂	ssg	N	Jamshoro	Tu Jan 11	rp, ns, fz, an

Surname, Forenames	Org.	♂♀	Method	Cat	Place	Date	Interviewer
Afzal Hussain	MGRDO	♂	ssg	N	Jamshoro	Tu Jan 11	rp, ns, fz, an
Rasheeda Shoro	SWDO	♀	ssg	N	Jamshoro	Tu Jan 11	rp, ns, fz, an
Latifaan Maznani	TRDP	♀	ssg	N	Jamshoro	Tu Jan 11	rp, ns, fz, an
Wali Muhammad	Max Green RDO	♂	ssg	N	Jamshoro	Tu Jan 11	rp, ns, fz, an
Kehkashan	Sugand WDO	♀	ssg	N	Jamshoro	Tu Jan 11	rp, ns, fz, an
Saadat Ali	Max GRDO	♂	ssg	N	Jamshoro	Tu Jan 11	rp, ns, fz, an
Allah Bachayo	VNDO	♂	ssg	N	Jamshoro	Tu Jan 11	rp, ns, fz, an
Helene Villeneur	CP Sub-cluster	♀	ssg	N	Jamshoro	Tu Jan 11	rp, ns, fz, an
Manzoor Mirani	Internews	♂	ssg	N	Jamshoro	Tu Jan 11	rp, ns, fz, an
Sardar Ali	N-IRM	♂	ssg	N	Jamshoro	Tu Jan 11	rp, ns, fz, an
Amjad Ali	IOM Mass Comm	♂	ssg	N	Jamshoro	Tu Jan 11	rp, ns, fz, an
M. Atif Narejo	IOM Mass Comm	♂	ssg	N	Jamshoro	Tu Jan 11	rp, ns, fz, an
M. Junaid	YDO	♂	ssg	N	Jamshoro	Tu Jan 11	rp, ns, fz, an
Nusrat Ali	Youth Dev. Org.	♂	ssg	N	Jamshoro	Tu Jan 11	rp, ns, fz, an
Allah Bachayo	SWD Jamshoro	♀	ssg	N	Jamshoro	Tu Jan 11	rp, ns, fz, an
Hassan Ali	SWD Jamshoro	♂	ssg	N	Jamshoro	Tu Jan 11	rp, ns, fz, an
Peeral	GNCDO	♂	ssg	N	Jamshoro	Tu Jan 11	rp, ns, fz, an
Nasir Balouch	DO SWD	♂	ssg	N	Jamshoro	Tu Jan 11	rp, ns, fz, an
Talha Farooq	OCHA, HAO	♂	ssg	O	Matli, Thatta	Wed Jan 12	rp, ns, fz, an
Hafeez Sial	DCO	♂	ssg	G	Matli, Thatta	Wed Jan 12	rp, ns, fz, an
Shafi	EDO	♂	ssg	G	Matli, Thatta	Wed Jan 12	rp, ns, fz, an
G. Musafa Ulendi	UNICEF / ED	♂	ssg	U	Matli, Thatta	Wed Jan 12	rp, ns, fz, an
Helena Valencia	ACF	♀	ssg	N	Matli, Thatta	Wed Jan 12	rp, ns, fz, an
Dildar Hussain	ACF	♂	ssg	N	Matli, Thatta	Wed Jan 12	rp, ns, fz, an
Inayat Ullah	BCDS	♂	ssg	N	Matli, Thatta	Wed Jan 12	rp, ns, fz, an
Jerome Gasnier	Handicap International	♂	ssg	N	Matli, Thatta	Wed Jan 12	rp, ns, fz, an
Alex Carmignani	Handicap International	♀	ssg	N	Matli, Thatta	Wed Jan 12	rp, ns, fz, an
Ayaz Soomro	Helpage	♂	ssg	N	Matli, Thatta	Wed Jan 12	rp, ns, fz, an

Surname, Forenames	Org.	♂♀	Method	Cat	Place	Date	Interviewer
Dr. Shaista	Helpage	♀	ssg	N	Matli, Thatta	Wed Jan 12	rp, ns, fz, an
Khuda Bakhsh Behram	CDD	♂	ssg	N	Matli, Thatta	Wed Jan 12	rp, ns, fz, an
Tasleem Akhter	SHARP	♀	ssg	N	Matli, Thatta	Wed Jan 12	rp, ns, fz, an
M. Ali	SHARP	♂	ssg	N	Matli, Thatta	Wed Jan 12	rp, ns, fz, an
Yar Muhammad Khan	Merlin	♂	ssg	N	Matli, Thatta	Wed Jan 12	rp, ns, fz, an
Majid Khan	Merlin	♂	ssg	N	Matli, Thatta	Wed Jan 12	rp, ns, fz, an
Dr. Shahbaz Ali	Merlin	♂	ssg	U	Matli, Thatta	Wed Jan 12	rp, ns, fz, an
Dr. Kamrani	UNOCHA	♂	ssg	O	Matli, Thatta	Wed Jan 12	rp, ns, fz, an
Shams ul Qadir	Islamic Relief	♂	ssg	N	Matli, Thatta	Wed Jan 12	rp, ns, fz, an
Aijaz Memon	HANDS	♂	ssg	N	Matli, Thatta	Wed Jan 12	rp, ns, fz, an
Javaid Iqbal	IRP	♂	ssg	N	Matli, Thatta	Wed Jan 12	rp, ns, fz, an
Ashraf Ahmed Shah	SRO	♂	ssg	N	Matli, Thatta	Wed Jan 12	rp, ns, fz, an
Imtiaz Ahmed	PDI	♂	ssg	N	Matli, Thatta	Wed Jan 12	rp, ns, fz, an
Abida Zaman	Oxfam GB	♀	ssg	N	Matli, Thatta	Wed Jan 12	rp, ns, fz, an
Hassan Hote	Revenue Dept	♂	ssg	N	Matli, Thatta	Wed Jan 12	rp, ns, fz, an
Rao Atif Raza	Revenue Dept	♂	ssg	N	Matli, Thatta	Wed Jan 12	rp, ns, fz, an
Agha Shah Nawaz	Revenue Dept	♂	ssg	N	Matli, Thatta	Wed Jan 12	rp, ns, fz, an
Aftab Shoro	Paiman	♂	ssg	N	Matli, Thatta	Wed Jan 12	rp, ns, fz, an
Shafqat Mehmood	Paiman	♂	ssg	N	Matli, Thatta	Wed Jan 12	rp, ns, fz, an
Khalid Khan	FAO - Agriculture Cluster	♂	ssg	U	Matli, Thatta	Wed Jan 12	rp, ns, fz, an
Tadesse Gesre	ACF	♂	ssg	N	Matli, Thatta	Wed Jan 12	rp, ns, fz, an
Asghar Khoso	ACF	♂	ssg	N	Matli, Thatta	Wed Jan 12	rp, ns, fz, an
Iftikhar Khosa	Muslim Aid	♂	ssg	N	Matli, Thatta	Wed Jan 12	rp, ns, fz, an
Neelam Aldalig	Paiman	♀	ssg	N	Matli, Thatta	Wed Jan 12	rp, ns, fz, an
M. Adnan Gandro	KFWS	♂	ssg	N	Matli, Thatta	Wed Jan 12	rp, ns, fz, an
Wazeer Ahmed	HANDS	♂	ssg	N	Matli, Thatta	Wed Jan 12	rp, ns, fz, an
Aijaz Ah,ed Jakhro	AFO	♂	ssg	N	Matli, Thatta	Wed Jan 12	rp, ns, fz, an
Dr. Sarfaraz Ali	Merlin	♂	ssg	N	Matli, Thatta	Wed Jan 12	rp, ns, fz, an

Surname, Forenames	Org.	♂♀	Method	Cat	Place	Date	Interviewer
Thomas Fellows	IOM	♂	ssi	U	Hyderabad	Wed Jan 12	ns, fz
Dr. Salman Safdar	UNOCHA	♂	ssi	O	Dadu	Thurs Jan 13	rp, ns, fz, an
Rizwan Ali Shah	UNOCHA	♂	gm	O	Dadu	Thurs Jan 13	rp, ns, fz, an
Shamira Haider	UNOPS -	♀	gm	U	Dadu	Thurs Jan 13	rp, ns, fz, an
Amir Khan	UNOPS -	♂	gm	U	Dadu	Thurs Jan 13	rp, ns, fz, an
Ikramullah	DRM Coordinator	♂	gm	N	Dadu	Thurs Jan 13	rp, ns, fz, an
Moris Lyonson	GRC/ DRC	♂	gm	N	Dadu	Thurs Jan 13	rp, ns, fz, an
Dr. Muhammad Naeem	President SBDDS	♂	gm	N	Dadu	Thurs Jan 13	rp, ns, fz, an
Muhammad Rizwan Ullah	EDO, CDD	♂	gm	N	Dadu	Thurs Jan 13	rp, ns, fz, an
Ghulam Shabir Kalhoo	DO SW	♂	gm	N	Dadu	Thurs Jan 13	rp, ns, fz, an
Maula Buz Leghari	Coordinator AF	♂	gm	N	Dadu	Thurs Jan 13	rp, ns, fz, an
Attashad Asghar	Admin Officer, Carifas	♂	gm	N	Dadu	Thurs Jan 13	rp, ns, fz, an
Khalid Hussain Ghaloo	PO Sports CDD	♂	gm	N	Dadu	Thurs Jan 13	rp, ns, fz, an
Arshad Hussain	Focal Point Protection	♂	gm	N	Dadu	Thurs Jan 13	rp, ns, fz, an
Dr. Ubedu Rehman	District Officer	♂	gm	N	Dadu	Thurs Jan 13	rp, ns, fz, an
Naseer Ahmed	Camp Manager / R Coordinator	♂	gm	N	Dadu	Thurs Jan 13	rp, ns, fz, an
Hassan Mangrio	Prog Assistant	♂	gm	N	Dadu	Thurs Jan 13	rp, ns, fz, an
Dr. Suhail Ahmed	SO DEWS	♂	gm	N	Dadu	Thurs Jan 13	rp, ns, fz, an
Dr. Javed Samejo	Dist. Manager	♂	gm	N	Dadu	Thurs Jan 13	rp, ns, fz, an
Shabir Ahmad Baloch	PO PDI	♂	gm	N	Dadu	Thurs Jan 13	rp, ns, fz, an
Skiander Brohi	Director PDI	♂	gm	N	Dadu	Thurs Jan 13	rp, ns, fz, an
Ibrar Ali Shah	Care	♂	gm	N	Dadu	Thurs Jan 13	rp, ns, fz, an
Mohd. Sadiq Lashari	Public Health	♂	gm	N	Dadu	Thurs Jan 13	rp, ns, fz, an
Maula Buz Solangi	DSM PPHI	♂	gm	N	Dadu	Thurs Jan 13	rp, ns, fz, an
Lala Neel Amber	EPC, Care Intil	♂	gm	N	Dadu	Thurs Jan 13	rp, ns, fz, an
Dr. Afzal Qureshi	Merlin	♂	gm	N	Dadu	Thurs Jan 13	rp, ns, fz, an
Rukia Fatima	Helpage	♂	gm	N	Dadu	Thurs Jan 13	rp, ns, fz, an
Raqfique Ahmed Soomro	SAWAC	♂	gm	N	Dadu	Thurs Jan 13	rp, ns, fz, an

Surname, Forenames	Org.	♂♀	Method	Cat	Place	Date	Interviewer
Alexandra Krause	UNHCR Protection Cluster	♀	ssg	U	Sukkur	Fri Jan 14	rp, ns, fz
Prem Chand	UNICEF WASH Cluster Coordinator	♂	ssg	U	Sukkur	Fri Jan 14	rp, ns, fz
Miyuki Yamashita	WFP (Coordinator	♀	ssg	U	Sukkur	Fri Jan 14	rp, ns, fz
Syed Wajid	UN Women - GTF	♂	ssg	U	Sukkur	Fri Jan 14	rp, ns, fz
Giovanni Zaneu	ECUSE - Coor	♂	ssg	U	Sukkur	Fri Jan 14	rp, ns, fz
Rizwan U Khan	Education Cluster / UNICEF	♂	ssg	U	Sukkur	Fri Jan 14	rp, ns, fz
Iliana Moufad	WHO	♀	ssg	U	Sukkur	Fri Jan 14	rp, ns, fz
Manuel Peron	IOM	♂	ssg	U	Sukkur	Fri Jan 14	rp, ns, fz
Ali Mir Shah	FAO	♂	ssg	U	Sukkur	Fri Jan 14	rp, ns, fz
Asfar Hussain	FAO	♂	ssg	U	Sukkur	Fri Jan 14	rp, ns, fz
Dr. Ishtiaq Ahmed	UNICEF	♂	ssg	U	Sukkur	Fri Jan 14	rp, ns, fz
Mujeeb Ahmed Rahu	UNDP	♂	ssg	U	Sukkur	Fri Jan 14	rp, ns, fz
Khalida Parveen	CR Cluster Coordinator, UNDP	♀	ssg	U	Sukkur	Fri Jan 14	rp, ns, fz
Mohd. Bakhsh Khaskheu	Muslim Aid	♂	ssg	N	Sukkur	Fri Jan 14	rp, ns, fz
Shahid Nadeem	IT Consultant	♂	ssg	U	Sukkur	Fri Jan 14	rp, ns, fz
Abdul Karim Hussain Ali	Humanitarian Affairs Coordinator	♂	ssg	U	Sukkur	Fri Jan 14	rp, ns, fz
Victor Lahai	HAO	♂	ssg	U	Sukkur	Fri Jan 14	rp, ns, fz
Junaid Ahmed	HAO	♂	ssg	U	Sukkur	Fri Jan 14	rp, ns, fz
Annette Hearn	HAO / TA	♀	ssg	U	Sukkur	Fri Jan 14	rp, ns, fz
Dinesh Jayasuriya	OCHA	♂	ssg	O	Sukkur	Fri Jan 14	rp, ns, fz
Meseret Manio	OCHA	♀	ssg	O	Sukkur	Fri Jan 14	rp, ns, fz
Achoka Laduba	IMO	♂	ssg	U	Sukkur	Fri Jan 14	rp, ns, fz
Wajid Ali	Pakistan Red Crescent	♂	gm	N	Jacobabad	Fri Jan 14	an
Mukhtar Ahmed	Marvi Rural Development Organization	♂	gm	N	Jacobabad	Fri Jan 14	an
Shahid Qureshi	NDMA	♂	gm	N	Jacobabad	Fri Jan 14	an
Kamran Solangi	WFP	♂	gm	U	Jacobabad	Fri Jan 14	an
Mueen Qureshi	WFP	♂	gm	U	Jacobabad	Fri Jan 14	an
Yar Mohd. Jamali	RDO	♂	gm	N	Jacobabad	Fri Jan 14	an

Surname, Forenames	Org.	♂♀	Method	Cat	Place	Date	Interviewer
Imran Khan	UNHCR	♂	gm	U	Jacobabad	Fri Jan 14	an
M. Asif	ICRC	♂	gm	N	Jacobabad	Fri Jan 14	an
Sajida Ali	UNFPA	♀	gm	U	Jacobabad	Fri Jan 14	an
A. Fatteh Soomro	SHARP	♂	gm	N	Jacobabad	Fri Jan 14	an
Zehra Khoso	Social Welfare Dept.	♀	gm	N	Jacobabad	Fri Jan 14	an
Khurshid Khwaja	Oxfam GB	♂	gm	N	Jacobabad	Fri Jan 14	an
Hussain Murad	Save the Children	♂	gm	N	Jacobabad	Fri Jan 14	an
Sajjad Bhyr	CDNO	♂	gm	N	Jacobabad	Fri Jan 14	an
Mohd Ramzan	DDO	♂	gm	N	Jacobabad	Fri Jan 14	an
Sadique A. Katohar	DoE	♂	gm	N	Jacobabad	Fri Jan 14	an
Dr. Ahmed Jakhrani	WHO	♂	gm	U	Jacobabad	Fri Jan 14	an
Z. A. Shah	UNOCHA	♂	gm	O	Jacobabad	Fri Jan 14	an
Dr. Deedar Jamali	EDO	♂	gm	N	Jacobabad	Fri Jan 14	an
Ghulam Ali Soomro	PPHI	♂	gm	N	Jacobabad	Fri Jan 14	an
Nasrullah Naidi	HANDS	♂	gm	N	Jacobabad	Fri Jan 14	an
Muhammad Shahid	HANDS	♂	gm	N	Jacobabad	Fri Jan 14	an
Pahlwan Maffi	NCHD	♂	gm	N	Jacobabad	Fri Jan 14	an
M. Jan Odhano	CDF	♂	gm	N	Jacobabad	Fri Jan 14	an
Asiya Aghar	SHARP	♀	gm	N	Jacobabad	Fri Jan 14	an
Hashmat Effendi	House of Charity	♀	gm	N	Jacobabad	Fri Jan 14	an
Amit Komar	House of Charity	♂	gm	N	Jacobabad	Fri Jan 14	an
Zulfiqar Ali Haider	Oxfam GB	♂	gm	N	Jacobabad	Fri Jan 14	an
Zahid Hussain Odho	YAP	♂	gm	N	Jacobabad	Fri Jan 14	an
Mohd. Akmal Siddique	IFRC	♂	gm	N	Jacobabad	Fri Jan 14	an
Abdul Qayyum	IFRC	♂	gm	U	Jacobabad	Fri Jan 14	an
Joseph D'Amelio	FAO	♂	gm	U	Jacobabad	Fri Jan 14	an
Alex Lugachru	PDMA / IMMAP	♂	gm	U	Jacobabad	Fri Jan 14	an
Arzoo Kamal	UNFAO	♀	gm	N	Jacobabad	Fri Jan 14	an

Surname, Forenames	Org.	♂♀	Method	Cat	Place	Date	Interviewer
Zahra Khoso	SWD	♀	gm	N	Jacobabad	Fri Jan 14	an
Annette Hearn	OCHA, HoO	♀	bd	O	Sukkur	Fri Jan 14	rp, ns, fz, an
Alexandra Krause	UNHCR Protection Cluster	♀	ssg	U	Sukkur	Sat Jan 15	rp, ns, fz
Prem Chand	UNICEF WASH Cluster Coordinator	♂	ssg	U	Sukkur	Sat Jan 15	rp, ns, fz
Miyuki Yamashita	WFP (Coordinator	♀	ssg	U	Sukkur	Sat Jan 15	rp, ns, fz
Syed Wajid	UN Women - GTF	♂	ssg	U	Sukkur	Sat Jan 15	rp, ns, fz
Giovanni Zaneu	ECUSE - Coor	♂	ssg	U	Sukkur	Sat Jan 15	rp, ns, fz
Rizwan U Khan	Education Cluster / UNICEF	♂	ssg	U	Sukkur	Sat Jan 15	rp, ns, fz
Iliana Moufad	WHO	♀	ssg	U	Sukkur	Sat Jan 15	rp, ns, fz
Manuel Peron	IOM	♂	ssg	U	Sukkur	Sat Jan 15	rp, ns, fz
Ali Mir Shah	FAO	♂	ssg	U	Sukkur	Sat Jan 15	rp, ns, fz
Asfar Hussain	FAO	♂	ssg	U	Sukkur	Sat Jan 15	rp, ns, fz
Dr. Ishtiaq Ahmed	UNICEF	♂	ssg	U	Sukkur	Sat Jan 15	rp, ns, fz
Mujeeb Ahmed Rahu	UNDP	♂	ssg	U	Sukkur	Sat Jan 15	rp, ns, fz
Khalida Parveen	UNDP	♀	ssg	U	Sukkur	Sat Jan 15	rp, ns, fz
Mohd. Bakhsh Khaskhela	Muslim Aid	♂	ssg	N	Sukkur	Sat Jan 15	rp, ns, fz
Shahid Nadeem	IT Consultant	♂	ssg	U	Sukkur	Sat Jan 15	rp, ns, fz
Abdul Karim Hussain Ali	OCHA	♂	ssg	U	Sukkur	Sat Jan 15	rp, ns, fz
Victor Lahai	HAO	♂	ssg	U	Sukkur	Sat Jan 15	rp, ns, fz
Junaid Ahmed	HAO	♂	ssg	U	Sukkur	Sat Jan 15	rp, ns, fz
Annette Hearn	HAO / TA	♀	ssg	U	Sukkur	Sat Jan 15	rp, ns, fz
Dinesh Jayasuriya	OCHA	♂	ssg	O	Sukkur	Sat Jan 15	rp, ns, fz
Meseret Manio	OCHA	♀	ssg	O	Sukkur	Sat Jan 15	rp, ns, fz
Achoka Laduba	IMO	♂	ssg	U	Sukkur	Sat Jan 15	rp, ns, fz
Mads Vejstrup	WFP	♂	ssi	U	Sukkur	Sat Jan 15	rp, an
Christian Crighbom	OCHA	♂	ssi	O	Sukkur	Sat Jan 15	rp, an
Rizwan ullah Khan	UNICEF / ED	♂	ssi	O	Sukkur	Sat Jan 15	rp, an
Jacope A'Amelio	Agri Cluster Coord, FAO	♂	ssi	U	Sukkur	Sat Jan 15	ns, fz

Surname, Forenames	Org.	♂♀	Method	Cat	Place	Date	Interviewer
ISLAMABAD Trip 1							
John Long	Deputy Head of Office and Head of Field Coordination, OCHA	♂	ssi	O	Islamabad	Sun Jan 16	rp, ns
Manuel Bessler	OCHA	♂	ssi	O	Islamabad	Sun Jan 16	rp, ns
Nicki Bennett	OCHA, Senior Hum. Advisor	♀	ssi	O	Islamabad	Sun Jan 16	rp, ns
General Nadeem Ahmed	DG NDMA	♂	ssi	G	Islamabad	Monday Jan 17	rp, fz, ns, an
Waqas Hanif	NDMA, Advisor Housing, Shelter Cluster Co Chair	♂	ssg	G	Islamabad	Monday Jan 17	rp, fz, ns, an
Neva Khan	Oxfam, Country Director	♀	ssg	N	Islamabad	Monday Jan 17	rp, fz
Claire Seaward	Oxfam, OGB Advocacy & Media Manager	♀	ssg	N	Islamabad	Monday Jan 17	rp, fz
Alfred Dube	WHO, Health Cluster Lead	♂	ssg	D	islamabad	Monday Jan 17	rp, fz
Usman Hafaz	WHO, M & E Officer	♂	ssg	D	Islamabad	Monday Jan 17	rp, fz
Mohd Shafiq	WHO, Health Cluster Coordination Officer	♂	ssg	D	Islamabad	Monday Jan 17	rp, fz
Thomas D. Kirsch	Consultant WHO	♂	ssg	T	Islamabad	Monday Jan 17	rp, fz
Pauline Lubers	Consultant WHO	♀	ssg	T	Islamabad	Monday Jan 17	rp, fz
Jennifer McKay	NDMA, Advisor Social Sector	♀	ssg	G	Islamabad	Monday Jan 17	rp, fz
Ann Kristen Brunborg	UNHCR, Senior Protection Officer	♀	ssi	U	Islamabad	Monday Jan 17	rp, fz
Mengesha Kebede	UNHCR Representative in Pakistan	♂	ssi	U	Islamabad	Monday Jan 17	rp, fz
Andrea Berloff	FAO, Agriculture Cluster Coordinator	♂	ssi	U	Islamabad	Monday Jan 17	ns, an
Fareeha Ummar	OCHA, GEA	♀	ssi	O	Islamabad	Monday Jan 17	ns, an
Douglas Booth	UNICEF, WASH Cluster Coordinator	♂	ssi	U	Islamabad	Monday Jan 17	ns, an
Fawad Hussain	HAO, OCHA	♂	ssi	O	Islamabad	Monday Jan 17	rp, an
Kamran Sharif	OCHA, CM Coord and Preparedness	♂	ssi	O	Islamabad	Monday Jan 17	ns, an
Caitlin Brady	Deputy Country Director, IRC	♀	ssg	U	Islamabad	Tuesday Jan 18	rp, ns
Wolfgang Herbinger	Country Director, WFP	♂	ssg	U	Islamabad	Tuesday Jan 18	rp, ns
Zulfiqar Rao	Emergency Coordinator, WFP	♂	ssg	U	Islamabad	Tuesday Jan 18	rp, ns
PUNJAB							
Maha Qazi	IOM,	♀	ssg	U	Multan	Tuesday Jan 18	ns, fz

Surname, Forenames	Org.	♂♀	Method	Cat	Place	Date	Interviewer
Shahzad Raza	IOM,	♂	ssg	U	Multan	Tuesday Jan 18	ns, fz
Ahmed Al Yaseen	UNICEF	♂	ssi	U	Multan	Tuesday Jan 18	rp, an
Miro Modrusan	OCHA Punjab	♂	ssi	O	Multan	Tuesday Jan 18	rp, ns, fz, an
Shahzad Qaiser	OCHA	♂	ssg	O	Multan	Tuesday Jan 18	rp, ns, fz, an
Sobia Oberg	OCHA	♀	ssg	O	Multan	Tuesday Jan 18	rp, ns, fz, an
Robin Dartell	OCHA	♂	ssg	O	Multan	Tuesday Jan 18	rp, ns, fz, an
Tahir Khurshid	DCO, Muzaffargarh	♂	ssi	G	Muzaffargarh	Wed Jan 19	rp, an
Tariq Mehmood	DMO, Punjab Education Sector Reforms	♂	ssg	G	Muzaffargarh	Wed Jan 19	rp, an
Muhammad Masood Nadeem	EDO Education	♂	ssg	G	Muzaffargarh	Wed Jan 19	rp, an
Shehla Hameed	NGO Coordinator	♀	ssg	G	Muzaffargarh	Wed Jan 19	rp, an
Usman Ahmed	HAO, OCHA	♂	bd	O	Muzaffargarh	Wed Jan 19	rp, an
Saira Zafar	Action Aid	♂	bd	N	Muzaffargarh	Wed Jan 19	rp, an
Khalid Iqbal	UNHCR	♂	bd	U	Muzaffargarh	Wed Jan 19	rp, an
Mazhar Bhutta	HMSFR & PIC	♂	ssg	N	Muzaffargarh	Wed Jan 19	ns, fz
M. Azhar Munir	Hayat Foundation	♂	ssg	N	Muzaffargarh	Wed Jan 19	ns, fz
Javed Hussain	Awaz Foundation Pakistan	♂	ssg	N	Muzaffargarh	Wed Jan 19	ns, fz
Ghulam Abbas Mahar	SANJH	♂	ssg	N	Muzaffargarh	Wed Jan 19	ns, fz
M. Shahbaz Alam	Bunyard Foundation	♂	ssg	N	Muzaffargarh	Wed Jan 19	ns, fz
Syed Imran Ali Shah	PsycoP"CHAON"	♂	ssg	N	Muzaffargarh	Wed Jan 19	ns, fz
Rana Muhammad Bilal Sarwar	Bunyard Foundation	♂	ssg	N	Muzaffargarh	Wed Jan 19	ns, fz
Shahid Iqbal Khan	World Vision	♂	ssg	N	Muzaffargarh	Wed Jan 19	ns, fz
Mudassar Iqbal	UNWFP	♂	ssg	U	Muzaffargarh	Wed Jan 19	ns, fz
Saima Feroz	IOM	♀	ssg	U	Muzaffargarh	Wed Jan 19	ns, fz
Wakar Khan	Save the Children	♂	ssg	N	Muzaffargarh	Wed Jan 19	ns, fz
Jennifer Bitonde	WFP,	♀	ssi	U	Multan	Thursday Jan 20	ns, fz
Farukh Mirza	UNICEF, \	♂	ssi	U	Multan	Thursday Jan 20	ns, fz
Hamad Khan	UNHCR,	♂	ssg	U	Multan	Thursday Jan 20	ns, fz
Elaine Jepson	UNICEF,	♀	ssg	U	Multan	Thursday Jan 20	ns, fz

Surname, Forenames	Org.	♂♀	Method	Cat	Place	Date	Interviewer
Honorine Sommet-Lange	UNHCR,	♀	ssg	U	Multan	Thursday Jan 20	ns, fz
Tehmina Roohi	UNHCR,	♀	ssg	U	Multan	Thursday Jan 20	ns, fz
Syed Wajid	GTF, UN Women, Programme Officer	♂	ssi	U	Multan	Thursday Jan 20	ns, fz
Muhd Sfaquatullah Cheema	UNDP CR Cluster Coordinator	♂	ssi	U	Multan	Thursday Jan 20	ns, fz
Lt. G. Shafqaat	Corps Commander, Multan	♂	ssg	M	Multan	Thursday Jan 20	rp, an
Maj. G. Jamal	Commander Log Area Multan	♂	ssg	M	Multan	Thursday Jan 20	rp, an
Brig. G. Naeem	Pakistan Military	♂	ssg	M	Multan	Thursday Jan 20	rp, an
Col GS Zahid	Pakistan Military	♂	ssg	M	Multan	Thursday Jan 20	rp, an
GSO-1 OPS Taqqi	Pakistan Military	♂	bd	M	Multan	Thursday Jan 20	rp, an
Khalid Sherdil	DG PDMA	♂	ssg	G	Multan	Thursday Jan 20	rp, an
Mahmood Javed Bhatti	EDO, Community Development	♂	ssg	G	Multan	Thursday Jan 20	rp, an
Dr. Jamil I. Yousef	WHO	♂	ssg	U	Multan	Thursday Jan 20	rp, an
Tim Allan	WFP	♂	ssg	U	Multan	Thursday Jan 20	rp, an
Jan Sigismund	UNICEF	♂	ssg	U	Multan	Thursday Jan 20	rp, an
Zahoor ud Din	NRSP	♂	ssg	N	Multan	Thursday Jan 20	ns, fz
Muhammad Yousaf Shakir	Plan International	♂	ssg	N	Multan	Thursday Jan 20	ns, fz
Khalid Saifullah	Doaba Foundation	♂	ssg	N	Multan	Thursday Jan 20	ns, fz
Muhammad Bilal	Doaba Foundation	♂	ssg	N	Multan	Thursday Jan 20	ns, fz
Izhaque Bulanda	Cartitas Pakistan	♂	ssg	N	Multan	Thursday Jan 20	ns, fz
Giovanni LoPorto	CESVI	♂	ssg	N	Multan	Thursday Jan 20	ns, fz
Faisal Khawaja	AAGAH	♂	ssg	N	Multan	Thursday Jan 20	ns, fz
R. A. Shahid	PRCS	♂	ssg	N	Multan	Thursday Jan 20	ns, fz
Dr. Sibghat Ullah Qureshi	EDO Health	♂	ssg	G	Rajanpur	Thursday Jan 20	rp, an, fz, an
Liaqat Ali	EDO Agriculture	♂	ssg	G	Rajanpur	Thursday Jan 20	rp, an, fz, an
Amir Raza	DOC	♂	ssg	G	Rajanpur	Thursday Jan 20	rp, an, fz, an
Ashraf Bhatti	DCO, Rajanpur	♂	ssg	G	Rajanpur	Thursday Jan 20	rp, an, fz, an
Saleem Rana	DO Revenue	♂	ssg	G	Rajanpur	Thursday Jan 20	rp, an, fz, an
Wahid Arjmand Zia	DDO Revenue Rajanpur	♂	ssg	G	Rajanpur	Thursday Jan 20	rp, an, fz, an

Surname, Forenames	Org.	♂♀	Method	Cat	Place	Date	Interviewer
Abdul Ghaffar	DDO Revenue Jampur	♂	ssg	G	Rajanpur	Thursday Jan 20	rp, an, fz, an
Irshad Ahmed Shad	EDO Education	♂	ssg	G	Rajanpur	Thursday Jan 20	rp, an, fz, an
Rauf Ahmed	DDO Revenue Rojhan	♂	ssg	G	Rajanpur	Thursday Jan 20	rp, an, fz, an
Muhammad Amjad	HAO, OCHA	♂	ssg	O	Rajanpur	Thursday Jan 20	rp, an, fz, an
Mushtaq Bilal Bhati	District DRM Coordinator	♂	ssg	U	Rajanpur	Thursday Jan 20	rp, an, fz, an
Alexandra Lanen	CAP Anamur / German Emergency Dr.	♀	ssg	N	Rajanpur	Fri Jan 21	rp, an, fz, an
Volker Rath	CAP Anamur / German Emergency Dr.	♂	ssg	N	Rajanpur	Fri Jan 21	rp, an, fz, an
M. Rehan Ali Hussain	Qatar Charity	♂	ssg	N	Rajanpur	Fri Jan 21	rp, an, fz, an
Narjis Batool	Sangtani WRDO	♀	ssg	N	Rajanpur	Fri Jan 21	rp, an, fz, an
Aqeel Khan Tajik	Save the Children	♂	ssg	N	Rajanpur	Fri Jan 21	rp, an, fz, an
Naeemullah	Hayat Foundation	♂	ssg	N	Rajanpur	Fri Jan 21	rp, an, fz, an
Hussain Ali Awan	Save the Children	♂	ssg	N	Rajanpur	Fri Jan 21	rp, an, fz, an
ISLAMABAD Trip 2							
James W. King'ori	UNICEF	♂	ssg	U	Islamabad	Sat Jan 22	ns, an
Raja Arshad Rashid	IOM	♂	ssg	U	Islamabad	Sat Jan 22	ns, an
Brian Kelly	IOM	♂	ssg	U	Islamabad	Sat Jan 22	ns, an
Jim Kennedy	IOM	♂	ssg	U	Islamabad	Sat Jan 22	ns, an
Simon Hacker	Logistics Cluster	♂	ssi	U	Islamabad	Sat Jan 22	rp, ns
Timo Pakkala	HC	♂	ssi	U	Islamabad	Sat Jan 22	rp
Fotini Rantsiou	OCHA	♀	ssi	O	Islamabad	Sat Jan 22	rp, fz
Jean-Luc Stalon	UNDP	♂	ssi	U	Islamabad	Sun Jan 23	rp, ns
Benoit de Gryse	MSF Netherlands	♂	ssg	N	Islamabad	Mon Jan 24	rp, ns, fz, an
Thomas Conan	MSF France	♂	ssg	N	Islamabad	Mon Jan 24	rp, ns, fz, an
Tassaduq Hussain Jadoon	EAD	♂	ssg	G	Islamabad	Mon Jan 24	rp, ns, fz, an
S. M. Hasan Akhtar	Section Officer	♂	ssg	G	Islamabad	Mon Jan 24	rp, ns, fz, an
Lynn Marie Thomas	OFDA	♀	ssg	D	Islamabad	Mon Jan 24	rp, ns
Katharina I Lauer	USAID Pakistan	♀	ssg	D	Islamabad	Mon Jan 24	rp, ns
Mark W Adams	USAID Pakistan	♂	ssg	D	Islamabad	Mon Jan 24	rp, fz

Surname, Forenames	Org.	♂♀	Method	Cat	Place	Date	Interviewer
Pascal Cuttat	ICRC	♂	ssg	N	Islamabad	Mon Jan 24	rp, fz
John Barrett	DFID	♂	ssg	D	Islamabad	Mon Jan 24	ns, an
Himesh Falconer	DFID	♂	ssg	D	Islamabad	Mon Jan 24	ns, an
Nadia Jeanne Guillin	DFID\	♀	ssg	D	Islamabad	Mon Jan 24	ns, an
Dorothy Blane	Concern	♀	ssg	N	Islamabad	Mon Jan 24	ns, an
Imran Shami	Plan International	♂	ssg	N	Islamabad	Mon Jan 24	ns, an
Mary Cummins	ARC	♀	ssg	N	Islamabad	Mon Jan 24	ns, an
Pashmina Ali	ARC	♀	ssg	N	Islamabad	Mon Jan 24	ns, an
Joe Savage	ACTED	♂	ssg	N	Islamabad	Mon Jan 24	ns, an
Jack Byrne	CRS	♂	ssg	N	Islamabad	Mon Jan 24	ns, an
Dania Gharaibeh	Relief International	♀	ssg	N	Islamabad	Mon Jan 24	ns, an
Areena Ilahi	IRD	♀	ssg	N	Islamabad	Mon Jan 24	ns, an
Dr. Rubina Ali	NCA	♀	ssg	N	Islamabad	Mon Jan 24	ns, an
Frederic Martin	FSD	♂	ssg	N	Islamabad	Mon Jan 24	ns, an
Imran Baig	RedR	♂	ssg	N	Islamabad	Mon Jan 24	ns, an
KHYBER PAKHTUNKHWA							
Rosemary Willey-Al'sanah	OCHA	♀	ssg	O	Peshawar	Tues Jan 25	rp, fz, an
Waheed Anwar	OCHA	♂	ssg	O	Peshawar	Tues Jan 25	rp, fz, an
Asadullah Khan	OCHAg	♂	ssg	O	Peshawar	Tues Jan 25	rp, fz, an
Uzma Inam ul Haq	OCHA	♀	ssg	O	Peshawar	Tues Jan 25	rp, fz, an
Raza Ullah Jan	HAO	♂	ssg	O	Peshawar	Tues Jan 25	rp, fz, an
Abdul Jabbar	HAO	♂	ssg	O	Charsadda	Tues Jan 25	rp, fz, an
Ajmal Khan	ACO, Charsadda	♂	ssi	G	Charsadda	Tues Jan 25	rp, fz, an
Asifullah Khan	Lawari Humanitarian Organization	♂	ssg	N	Charsadda	Tues Jan 25	rp, fz, an
Kalim Nasir Usman	Lawari Humanitarian Organization	♂	ssg	N	Charsadda	Tues Jan 25	rp, fz, an
Asim Jamal	WFP	♂	ssg	U	Charsadda	Tues Jan 25	rp, fz, an
Seema Qazi	Disaster Management Authority	♀	ssg	N	Charsadda	Tues Jan 25	rp, fz, an
Dard Jan	ICMC	♂	ssg	N	Charsadda	Tues Jan 25	rp, fz, an

Surname, Forenames	Org.	♂♀	Method	Cat	Place	Date	Interviewer
Asim Zia	SPARC	♂	ssg	N	Charsadda	Tues Jan 25	rp, fz, an
Javed Wazir	Merlin	♂	ssg	N	Charsadda	Tues Jan 25	rp, fz, an
Dr. Naveed Minood	ICMC	♂	ssg	N	Charsadda	Tues Jan 25	rp, fz, an
Jehanzeb Aneek	ICMC	♂	ssg	N	Charsadda	Tues Jan 25	rp, fz, an
Farman Ullah	Japann Emergency NCO	♂	ssg	N	Charsadda	Tues Jan 25	rp, fz, an
Khalid ur Rehman	Muslim Aid	♂	ssg	N	Charsadda	Tues Jan 25	rp, fz, an
Mian Khalid Jan	SRSP	♂	ssg	N	Charsadda	Tues Jan 25	rp, fz, an
Khalida Malik	WFP	♀	ssg	U	Peshawar	Tues Jan 25	rp, fz, an
M. Asim Khan	WFP, Program Officer	♂	ssg	U	Peshawar	Tues Jan 25	rp, fz, an
Dr. Sardar Hayat Khan	WHO	♂	ssi	U	Peshawar	Tues Jan 25	rp, fz, an
Ahmed Warsame	UNHCR	♂	ssi	U	Peshawar	Tues Jan 25	rp, fz, an
Asif Ali Farraukh	PDMA	♂	ssg	G	Peshawar	Wed Jan 26	rp, fz, an
Amjad Ahmed	PDMA	♂	ssg	G	Peshawar	Wed Jan 26	rp, fz, an
Lucio Melandri	UNICEF	♂	ssg	U	Peshawar	Wed Jan 26	rp, fz, an
Kehkashan B. Khan	UNICEF	♀	ssg	U	Peshawar	Wed Jan 26	rp, fz, an
Dr. Tauqirullah	IMC	♂	ssg	U	Peshawar	Wed Jan 26	rp, fz, an
Alda Cappelliri	INTERMEDIOS	♀	ssg	N	Peshawar	Wed Jan 26	rp, fz, an
Nadira Riaz	ACTED	♀	ssg	N	Peshawar	Wed Jan 26	rp, fz, an
Shama Asad	Handicap International	♀	ssg	N	Peshawar	Wed Jan 26	rp, fz, an
Costa Martino	NRC	♂	ssg	N	Peshawar	Wed Jan 26	rp, fz, an
Abid Hussain Aslam	Relief International	♂	ssg	N	Peshawar	Wed Jan 26	rp, fz, an
Gul Mohamad Khan	UNDP	♂	ssg	U	Peshawar	Wed Jan 26	rp, fz, an
Salma Abbasi	UNICEF	♀	ssg	U	Peshawar	Wed Jan 26	rp, fz, an
Shabana Aman	UNFPA	♀	ssg	U	Peshawar	Wed Jan 26	rp, fz, an
Mewdrikus Raajmahus	WHO	♂	ssg	U	Peshawar	Wed Jan 26	rp, fz, an
Rashida Amir	WFP	♀	ssg	U	Peshawar	Wed Jan 26	rp, fz, an
Urooj Saifi	UNHCR	♀	ssg	U	Peshawar	Wed Jan 26	rp, fz, an
Fawad Aamir	UNHCR	♂	ssg	U	Peshawar	Wed Jan 26	rp, fz, an

Surname, Forenames	Org.	♂♀	Method	Cat	Place	Date	Interviewer
ISLAMABAD Trip 3							
Naeem Sarwar	Human Appeal International	♂	ssg	N	Islamabad	Thur Jan 27	rp, fz, an
Slah Eldin Mohamed	Islamic Relief Pakistan	♂	ssg	N	Islamabad	Thur Jan 27	rp, fz, an
Habib Malik	Islamic Relief Scotland	♂	ssg	N	Islamabad	Thur Jan 27	rp, fz, an
Dr. M. Millat e Mustafa	Islamic Relief Worldwide	♂	ssg	N	Islamabad	Thur Jan 27	rp, fz, an
Saqib Farooq Babar	Muslim Aid Pakistan	♂	ssg	N	Islamabad	Thur Jan 27	rp, fz, an
Rubina Mazhar	Muslim Aid	♀	ssg	N	Islamabad	Thur Jan 27	rp, fz, an
Nisar Ahmed	Human Appeal International	♂	ssg	N	Islamabad	Thur Jan 27	rp, fz, an
Umair Hasan	Islamic Relief	♂	ssg	N	Islamabad	Thur Jan 27	rp, fz, an
Falullah Wilmst	Islamic Relief	♂	ssg	N	Islamabad	Thur Jan 27	rp, fz, an
Adnan Bin Junaid	Islamic Relief	♂	ssg	N	Islamabad	Thur Jan 27	rp, fz, an
Muhammad Naeem	Change thru Empowerment	♂	ti	N	Quetta	Thur Jan 27	rp, fz, an
Mumtaz Zehri	WASH Cluster / UNICEF	♂	ti	U	Quetta	Thur Jan 27	rp, fz, an
Abdul Wajid Khan	BRSP	♂	ti	N	Quetta	Thur Jan 27	rp, fz, an
Saleem Zaman Khan	Taraqee	♂	ti	N	Quetta	Thur Jan 27	rp, fz, an
Muhammad Rahim	Food Dept	♂	ti	G	Quetta	Thur Jan 27	rp, fz, an
Wadood Jamal	WFP	♂	ti	U	Quetta	Thur Jan 27	rp, fz, an
Anwer Ali	DoSW	♂	ti	G	Quetta	Thur Jan 27	rp, fz, an
M. Saqib Aziz	DoE	♂	ti	G	Quetta	Thur Jan 27	rp, fz, an
Tahir Munir Minhas	DG PDMA	♂	ti	G	Quetta	Thur Jan 27	rp, fz, an
Khalid Mehmood	Food Dept	♂	ti	G	Quetta	Thur Jan 27	rp, fz, an
Dr. Tariq Jafa	DoH	♂	ti	G	Quetta	Thur Jan 27	rp, fz, an
Ruksana Tasneem	Save the Children	♀	ti	N	Quetta	Thur Jan 27	rp, fz, an
Farrukh Anwar	UNHCR	♂	ti	U	Quetta	Thur Jan 27	rp, fz, an
Surriya Kasi	UNHCR	♀	ti	U	Quetta	Thur Jan 27	rp, fz, an
Ihsanullah Khan	UNHCR	♂	ti	U	Quetta	Thur Jan 27	rp, fz, an
Dr. Tahira	WHO	♀	ti	U	Quetta	Thur Jan 27	rp, fz, an
Sagheer Ahmed	UNICEF	♂	ti	U	Quetta	Thur Jan 27	rp, fz, an

Surname, Forenames	Org.	♂♀	Method	Cat	Place	Date	Interviewer
Stefand Savi	UNICEF	♂	ti	U	Quetta	Thur Jan 27	rp, fz, an
Abraham Gerbertnasae	UNHCR	♂	ti	U	Quetta	Thur Jan 27	rp, fz, an
Dr. Muhammad Siddiq Aftab	Director PDMA	♂	ti	G	Quetta	Thur Jan 27	rp, fz, an
Shoaib Nadeem Tareen	Irrigation & Power Dept	♂	ti	G	Quetta	Thur Jan 27	rp, fz, an
Nasreen Akhter	Save the Children	♀	ti	N	Quetta	Thur Jan 27	rp, fz, an
David Sevcik	ECHO	♂	ssi	D	Islamabad	Thur Jan 27	rp, fz, an
Sh. Asad Rehman	Sungi	♂	ssg	N	Islamabad	Thur Jan 27	fz, an
Dr. Manzoor	Sungi	♂	ssg	N	Islamabad	Thur Jan 27	fz, an
Ahmed Jan	Sungi	♂	ssg	N	Islamabad	Thu Jan 27	fz, an
Sadia Saeed	Awaz Foundation Pakistan	♀	ssg	N	Islamabad	Thur Jan 27	fz, an
Muhammad Arif	Saiban	♂	ssg	N	Islamabad	Thur Jan 27	fz, an
Gulzar Khan	Saiban	♂	ssg	N	Islamabad	Thur Jan 27	fz, an
Sikander Khan	Saiban	♂	ssg	N	Islamabad	Thur Jan 27	fz, an
Tahira Abdullah	NHN	♀	ssg	N	Islamabad	Thur Jan 27	fz, an
Shandana Khan	RSPN	♀	ssg	N	Islamabad	Thur Jan 27	fz, an
Sarwar Bari	Pattan	♂	ssg	N	Islamabad	Thur Jan 27	fz, an
Azmat Mawat	Sabauon	♂	ssg	N	Islamabad	Thur Jan 27	fz, an
PEPE SALMELA	IFRC	♂	gm	N	Islamabad	Fri Jan 28	rp, fz, an
SUSAN LE ROUX	OCHA	♀	gm	O	Islamabad	Fri Jan 28	rp, fz, an
Fareeha Ummer	OCHA	♀	gm	O	Islamabad	Fri Jan 28	rp, fz, an
FATIMA IQBAL	OCHA	♀	gm	O	Islamabad	Fri Jan 28	rp, fz, an
ERUM BURKI	SAVE THE CHILDREN	♀	gm	N	Islamabad	Fri Jan 28	rp, fz, an
Feau-lue-stolon	UNDP	♂	gm	U	Islamabad	Fri Jan 28	rp, fz, an
Salah Khaled	UNESCO	♂	gm	U	Islamabad	Fri Jan 28	rp, fz, an
Alice Shackelford	UN WOMEN	♀	gm	U	Islamabad	Fri Jan 28	rp, fz, an
KILLIAN KLEINSCHMIDT	UNHCR	♂	gm	U	Islamabad	Fri Jan 28	rp, fz, an
Zulfiqar Rao	WFP	♂	gm	U	Islamabad	Fri Jan 28	rp, fz, an
Oscar Butragueno	UNICEF	♂	gm	U	Islamabad	Fri Jan 28	rp, fz, an

Surname, Forenames	Org.	♂♀	Method	Cat	Place	Date	Interviewer
Dr. Jorge Martinez	WHO	♂	gm	U	Islamabad	Fri Jan 28	rp, fz, an
Kaori Minami	Special Envoy Office	♀	ssg	U	Islamabad	Fri Jan 28	rp, fz, an
Naseer Nizamani	UNFPA	♂	ssg	U	Islamabad	Fri Jan 28	rp, fz, an
Allen Karen	UNICEF	♀	ssg	U	Islamabad	Fri Jan 28	rp, fz, an
Engin Soysal	SE	♂	ssg	N	Islamabad	Fri Jan 28	rp, fz, an
Schaller peter	WFP	♂	ssg	U	Islamabad	Fri Jan 28	rp, fz, an
Claire Seaward	OXFAM	♀	ssg	N	Islamabad	Fri Jan 28	rp, fz, an
Halen Seeqer	IOM	♀	ssg	U	Islamabad	Fri Jan 29	rp, fz, an
Dario Valderrama	IOM	♂	ssg	U	Islamabad	Fri Jan 28	rp, fz, an
Hilour Sverrisclottir	ICRC	♂	ssg	N	Islamabad	Fri Jan 28	rp, fz, an
Carmen Van Heese	SE office	♀	ssg	N	Islamabad	Fri Jan 28	rp, fz, an
Judy Roberts	Save the children	♀	ssg	N	Islamabad	Fri Jan 28	rp, fz, an
Simon Larry White	C IASC Secretariat	♂	ti	U	Geneva	Tue Feb 08	rp
End	End	End	End	End	End	End	

Annex 4.1 Group meetings with the affected population

Group Meeting Summary	♂+♀	♀	♂	No of meetings	♀as%
Individuals in Group Meetings	686	273	413	14	39,80%

Location	Female Participants				Male Participants				Overall Total
	Camp IDPs	Hosted IDPs and Hosts	Returnees and stayees	Total Females	Camp IDPs	Hosted IDPs and Hosts	Returnees and stayees	Total Males	
Shahbaz Tent City, Jamshoro	50			50	76			76	126
Damdama Camp, Thatta	19			19	11			11	30
Gozo Camp, Dadu	20			20	13			13	33
HANDS Camp, New Sukkur	30			30	23			23	53
Selani Camp, New Sukkur	5			5	5			5	10
Rahm Ali Shah Village, Kot Addu, Muzaffargarh			25	25			45	45	70
Daruhai Walla Village, Thatta Gurmani, Muzaffargarh			10	10			20	20	30
Khoo Kasai Wala, Kot Addu, Muzaffargarh		7	8	15		11	17	28	43
Dhooon Wala, Kot Addu, Muzaffargarh			2	2		9	10	19	21
Basti Saiflani, Rojhan, Rajanpur			20	20			35	35	55
Basti Nazar Mohd, Rojhan, Rajanpur			29	29			36	36	65
Darkhan Village, Wong, Rajanpur			6	6			7	7	13
Mala Khair Village, Wong, Rajanpur			15	15			17	17	32
Hisara Camp, Charsadda	22	5		27	69	9		78	105
Grand Total	146	12	115	273	197	29	187	413	686

Summary of interviews by category of person

Summary of Interviews by category of person			of which		
<i>Category of person interviewed</i>	<i>Cat</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>as %</i>	<i>♀</i>	<i>♀ as %</i>
<i>OCHA Staff</i>	<i>O</i>	45	11%	16	36%
<i>Other UN Staff</i>	<i>U</i>	131	31%	36	27%
<i>NGOs and Red Cross</i>	<i>N</i>	194	46%	41	21%
<i>Government Officials</i>	<i>G</i>	34	8%	2	6%
<i>Donors</i>	<i>D</i>	10	2%	3	30%
<i>Military</i>	<i>M</i>	5	1%	0	
<i>Other</i>	<i>T</i>	2	0%	1	50%
Total		421	100%	99	24%

Summary of interview methods

Summary of Interview Methods			of which		
<i>Type of interview method</i>	<i>Type</i>		<i>as %</i>	<i>♀</i>	<i>♀ as %</i>
<i>General meeting</i>	<i>gm</i>	73	17%	12	16%
<i>Semi-structured Interview (Individual interviewee)</i>	<i>ssi</i>	35	8%	6	17%
<i>Semi-structured Interview (Group - two or more interviewees)</i>	<i>ssg</i>	283	67%	75	27%
<i>Brief Discussion (less than ten minutes on one or more topics)</i>	<i>bd</i>	5	1%	1	20%
<i>Detailed discussion (more than ten minutes on one or more topics)</i>	<i>dd</i>	0	0%	0	
<i>Telephone interview</i>	<i>ti</i>	25	6%	5	20%
<i>Other</i>	<i>ot</i>	0	0%	0	
Total		421	100%	99	24%

Annex 4.2: List of Workshop Participants

RTE Workshop, Karachi, 17 February 2011

	Name	Organization
1.	Helena Valencia	ACF
2.	Uma Chandran	ACF
3.	Jacopo D'Amelio	FAO
4.	Lutaf Ali	HANDS
5.	Sikder Ahmed	IFRC
6.	Arshad Rashid	IOM
7.	Maria Ahmad	IOM – Mass Communication
8.	Peter Roberts	IOM
9.	Javed Iqbal	Islamic Relief
10.	Waqas Sharif	NDMA
11.	Nilofer Qazi	NDMA
12.	Thomas Gurtner	OCHA
13.	Annette Hearn	OCHA
14.	Fawad Hussain	OCHA Islamabad
15.	Fotini Rantsiou	OCHA Islamabad
16.	Claude Hilfiker	OCHA Geneva
17.	Andreas Schuetz	OCHA Geneva
18.	Veronika Wolf	OCHA
19.	Naureen Amin	OXFAM GB
20.	Khair M	PDMA Sindh

21.	Ashfar Ahmad	Save the Children
22.	Ghias Khan	SRSO
23.	Shaheen Ashraf	UN Women
24.	Trond Husby	UNDP
25.	Frederic Cussigh	UNHCR
26.	Helene Villeneuve	UNICEF
27.	Begna K Edo	UNICEF
28.	Marit Fikke	WFP
29.	Dr. Iliana Mouradi	WHO
30.	Dr Suhail Ahmed	WHO
31.	Dr Daoud Altaf	WHO

RTE Workshop, Multan, 18 February 2011

	Name	Organization
1.	Miro Modrusan	OCHA
2.	R.Mukhwana	OCHA
3.	Ahmad Wafahat	FAO
4.	Mobashir Ahmad	PDMA, Punjab
5.	Sune Burow	IFRC
6.	James Moloney	WHO
7.	Syed Saeed Qadir	UNICEF (Nutrition cluster)
8.	Cheema	UNDP (CR cluster)
9.	Sajida Zakia	DRM coordinator (NDNA/PDNA)
10.	Shahzada Rashid	Chief Provincial Officer WFP
11.	Syed Inajed	UN-Women
12.	LT Col Ghulam Shabbir	HQ Multan logistic area
13.	M. Rahan Amax	Water quality Officer Islamic Relief Pakistan
14.	Nilofer Cazi	ndma
15.	Mohamed Zia-ur-Relman	Awaz
16.	Shaheryar Khan	Relief International
17.	Khalid Javed	Relief International
18.	Javed Iqbal	UNICEF

19.	Farrusch Mirza	UNICEF
20.	Hamad Khan	UNHCR
21.	Alexis Georgeff	ACTED
22.	Volkmar Engelbrecht	WHH
23.	Itcal Taggi Raji	Corps HQ
24.	Fernando Arocena	IOM
25.	Ali Khokhar	OCHA
26.	Ch. Wajid	OCHA
27.	Sobia Öberg	OCHA

RTE Workshop for KP, Balochistan, 19 February 2011

S. No	Name	Organization
1.	Rukhsana Tasneem	Save the Children
2.	Ayesha Shaukat	ICMC
3.	Ruby Khan	FAO
4.	Surfaraz Lashari	NDMA
5.	Saleem Zaman Khan	Taraqee Foundation
6.	Rizwan Ali	Log Cluster
7.	Sagheer Ahmed	Education Cluster
8.	Tanveer Khan	OCHA
9.	Anwar Panezai	BRSP
10.	Waheed Anwar	OCHA
11.	Stefand Savi	UNICEF
12.	Dr. Fawad Khan	WHO

13	Dube Alfred	WHO
14	Masooma Haider	FAO
15	Bekele Negash	UNHCR
16	Zahir Shah Khan	WFP / Food Cluster
17	Azim Khan	WFP
18	Nilofer Qazi	NDMA
19	Dr. Dawood	WHO
20	Saima Abbasi	UNICEF
21	Farshad Tami	FAO
22	Mumtaz Zehri	UNICEF
23	Khan Mohammed	CERD

RTE Workshop for KP, Balochistan, 22 February 2011

S. No	Name	Organization
1.	DEvanna de la Puente	GBV sc
2.	Jennifer	NDMA
3.	Phyza Jameel	UNESCO
4.	Angel Escobedo	CRS
5.	Maryam Farzanegan	UNICEF / CP sc
6.	Isma Sana	SPO
7.	Manzoor Awan	Sungi
8.	Amir Mohyuddin	NDMA
9.	Hidayat Ullah	Cmmunity Restoration
10.	M Ajmal Malik	CHIP
11.	Kathin Lauer	USAID
12.	Kilian Kleinsch	UNHCR
13.	Zulfiquar Rao	WFP

14.	Fareeha Ummar	OCHA
15.	Maria Zahur	UN-W
16.	Arshad Rashid	IOM
17.	James Kingori	UNICEF
18.	Janet O' Callaghan	OCHA
19	Jim Kennedy	Shelter Cluster
21	Aziz Bismil	SADF (Mardan)
22	Imran ud Din	KDO (Mardan)
23	Gulzar Khan	Saiban (Mardan)
24	Suzanne Murray	UNHCR
25	Oscar Butraguena	UNICEF
26	Sh. Asad Rehman	Sunbgi Foundation
27	Waqas Hanif	NDMA
28	David Sevcik	ECHO
29	David Wright	SC

30	Carmen Van Heese	Special Envoy
31	Irfan Maqbool	NDMA

Annex 4.3: Field Work Itinerary

Date	Riccardo Polastro	Nicolai Steen	Farwa Zafar	Aatika Nagrah
Sunday 09-01	Depart Madrid	Depart Madrid	Depart Islamabad	
Monday 10-01	Arrive Karachi. Team meeting... preparation of evaluation question guide,report structure, approach . Interviews Karachi provincial government. Initial briefing with OCHA	Arrive Karachi. Team meeting... preparation of evaluation question guide,report structure, approach . Interviews Karachi provincial government. Initial briefing with OCHA	Arrive Karachi. Team meeting... preparation of evaluation question guide,report structure, approach . Interviews Karachi provincial government. Initial briefing with OCHA	Depart Islamabad...arrive Karachi. Summary briefing on questionnaire and report methodology.
Tuesday 11-01	Briefing with team before departure for Hyderabad. Arrival in Hyderabad and briefing with OCHA at Hub office; Meeting with cluster reps, INGOs, NGOs. Travel to Jamshoro attend protection cluster meeting and visit Shahbaz Tent city Camp.	Briefing with team before departure for Hyderabad. Arrival in Hyderabad and briefing with OCHA at Hub office; Meeting with cluster reps, INGOs, NGOs. Travel to Jamshoro attend protection cluster meeting and visit Shahbaz Tent city Camp.	Briefing with team before departure for Hyderabad. Arrival in Hyderabad and briefing with OCHA at Hub office; Meeting with cluster reps, INGOs, NGOs. Travel to Jamshoro attend protection cluster meeting and visit Shahbaz Tent city Camp.	Briefing with team before departure for Hyderabad. Arrival in Hyderabad and briefing with OCHA at Hub office; Meeting with cluster reps, INGOs, NGOs. Travel to Jamshoro attend protection cluster meeting and visit Shahbaz Tent city Camp.
Wednesday 12-01	Travel to Thatta to District administration Office. Observe community restoration cluster meeting; meeting with EDO; and cluster focal points/partners. Travel to and visit Damdama spontaneous camp of secondary displaced population. Return to Hyderabad. Meeting with OCHA.	Travel to Thatta to District administration Office. Observe community restoration cluster meeting; meeting with EDO; and cluster focal points/partners. Interview with ACF team.Travel to and visit Damdama spontaneous camp of secondary displaced population. Return to Hyderabad. Meeting with IOM.	Travel to Thatta to District administration Office. Observe community restoration cluster meeting; meeting with EDO; and cluster focal points/partners. Travel to and visit Damdama spontaneous camp of secondary displaced population. Return to Hyderabad. Meeting with IOM.	Travel to Thatta to District administration Office. Observe community restoration cluster meeting; meeting with EDO; and cluster focal points/partners. Interview with ACF team. Travel to and visit Damdama spontaneous camp of secondary displaced population. Return to Hyderabad. Meeting with OCHA.

Date	Riccardo Polastro	Nicolai Steen	Farwa Zafar	Aatika Nagrah
Thursday 13-01	Travel to Dadu , district administrations offices. Summary update by OCHA Dadu on Floods and affectees. Travel to and visit Gozo Camp, and observe areas where flood waters are still inundating houses field. Return to Dadu and travel to Sukkur. Meeting with OCHA Sukkur at UN Humanitarian Camp.	Travel to Dadu , district administrations offices. Summary update by OCHA Dadu on Floods and affectees. Meetings with EDO health, Merlin Reps and attend DCC Meeting with EDO. Travel to Sukkur. Meeting with OCHA Sukkur at UN Humanitarian Camp.	Travel to Dadu , district administrations offices. Summary update by OCHA Dadu on Floods and affectees. Travel to and visit Gozo Camp, and observe areas where flood waters are still inundating houses field. Return to Dadu and travel to Sukkur. Meeting with OCHA Sukku at UN Humanitarian Camp.	Travel to Dadu , district administrations offices. Summary update by OCHA Dadu on Floods and affectees. Meetings with EDO health, Merlin Reps and attend DCC Meeting with EDO. Travel to Sukkur. Meeting with OCHA Sukkur at UN Humanitarian Camp.
Friday 14-01	Arrive OCHA office Sukkur. Hold series of meetings with OCHA team; PDMA Sukkur; Cluster leads; NGO; Report writing	Arrive OCHA office Sukkur. Hold series of meetings with OCHA team; PDMA Sukkur; Cluster leads; NGO; Report writing	Arrive OCHA office Sukkur. Hold series of meetings with OCHA team; PDMA Sukkur; Cluster leads; NGO; Report writing	Travel to Jacobabad to attend DCC meeting. Observe spontaneous tent settlemnts in Jacobabad. Report writing.
Saturday 15-01	Meetings with OCHA team. Field visit to New Sukkur Hands camp and Selani Camp. Meetings with WFP and OCHA Info management expert. Travel to Islamabad.	Meetings with Education cluster. Field visit to New Sukkur Hands camp and Selani Camp. Meetings with Agriculture Cluster Coordinator/FAO. Meeting with OCHA. Travel to Islamabad.	Meetings with OCHA team. Field visit to New Sukkur Hands camp and Selani Camp. Meetings with FAO/Agriculture Cluster Coordinator. Travel to Islamabad.	Meetings with Education cluster. Field visit to New Sukkur Hands camp and Selani Camp. Meetings with WFP and OCHA Info management expert. Travel to Islamabad.
Sunday 16-01	Meeting with OCHA team. Report writing and desk review	Report writing and desk review	Meeting with OCHA team. Report writing and desk review	Report writing and desk review.
Monday 17-01	Meetings with OCHA, Chairman NDMA, Oxfam, Health Cluster, Protection Cluster and UNHCR. Report writing.	Meetings with OCHA, Chairman NDMA, WASH and Agriculture clusters, and Gender Advisor. Report writing	Meetings with OCHA, Chairman NDMA, Oxfam, Health Cluster, Protection Cluster and UNHCR. Report writing	Meetings with OCHA, Chairman NDMA, WASH and Agriculture clusters, and Gender Advisor. Report writing

Date	Riccardo Polastro	Nicolai Steen	Farwa Zafar	Aatika Nagrah
Tuesday 18-01	Meeting with IRC and WFP. Travel to Multan. Meeting with WASH cluster. Meeting with OCHA Multan team. Work on Report	Meeting with IRC and WFP. Travel to Multan. Meeting with Shelter cluster. Meeting with OCHA Multan Team. Work on Report	Meeting with IRC and WFP. Travel to Multan. Meeting with Shelter cluster. Meeting with OCHA Multan Team. Work on Report	Meeting with IRC and WFP. Travel to Multan. Meeting with WASH cluster. Meeting with OCHA Multan team. Work on Report
Wednesday 19-01	Travel to Muzaffargarh. Meeting with DCO/EDO. Field visit to returnees areas Kot Addu. Travel back to Multan.	Travel to Muzaffargarh. Meeting with DCO. Meeting with NGOs. Field visit to returnee areas of Kot Addu-Rahm Ali Shah village.UC Dogar Klasra; Darohal Wala Village-UC Thatta Gurmani. Travel to Multan.	Travel to Muzaffargarh. Meeting with DCO. Meeting with NGOs. Field visit to returnee areas of Kot Addu-Rahm Ali Shah village.UC Dogar Klasra; Darohal Wala Village-UC Thatta Gurmani. Travel to Multan.	Travel to Muzaffargarh. Meeting with DCO/EDO. Field visit to returnees areas Kot Addu. Travel back to Multan.
Thursday 20-01	Meeting with protection/child protection cluster; Military Corps Commander and Log Area Commander; Meeting with DG PDMA; Unicef, WHO and WFP. Travel to Rajanpur. Dinner Meeting with DCO/DOR/DOC/EDOs/DDMA. Work on Draft Report	Meeting with protection/child protection cluster; Gender Task Force and community restoration cluster lead; meeting with INGOs/NGOs; IFRC; Food and Education cluster . Travel to Rajanpur. Dinner Meeting with DCO/DOR/DOC/EDOs/DDMAWork on Draft Report	Meeting with protection/child protection cluster; Gender Task Force and community restoration cluster lead; meeting with INGOs/NGOs; IFRC; Food and Education cluster . Travel to Rajanpur. Dinner Meeting with DCO/DOR/DOC/EDOs/DDMAWork on Draft Report	Meeting with protection/child protection cluster; Military Corps Commander and Log Area Commander; Meeting with DG PDMA; Unicef, WHO and WFP. Travel to Rajanpur. Dinner Meeting with DCO/DOR/DOC/EDOs/DDMA. Work on Draft Report
Friday 21-01	Travel to Rojhan. Meeting with INGOs NGOs at SCF office . Field visit to Rojhan to visit affected villages and meet with community. Travel back to Multan and onwards to Islamabad.	Travel to Rojhan. Meeting with INGOs NGOs at SCF office . Field visit to Wong to visit affected villages and meet with community. Travel back to Multan and onwards to Islamabad.	Travel to Rojhan.Meeting with INGOs NGOs at SCF office . Field visit to Rojhan to visit affected villages and meet with community. Travel back to Multan and onwards to Islamabad.	Travel to Rojhan. Meeting with INGOs NGOs at SCF office . Field visit to Wong to visit affected villages and meet with community. Travel back to Multan and onwards to Islamabad.

Date	Riccardo Polastro	Nicolai Steen	Farwa Zafar	Aatika Nagrah
Saturday 22-01	Meeting with Logistics Cluster Coordinator and RC/HC at OCHA office. Liuncheon Meeting with OCHA HAO. Work on Draft Report and Key Findings.	Meeting with Logistics Cluster Coordinator; Nutrition Cluster Coordinator and shelter cluster coordinator. Work on Draft Report and Key findings.	Meeting with Logistics Cluster Coordinator and RC/HC at OCHA office. Liuncheon Meeting with OCHA HAO. Work on Draft Report and Key findings.	Meeting with Nutrition Cluster Coordinator and shelter cluster coordinator. Work on Draft Report and Key findings.
Sunday 23-01	Meeting with UNDP Deputy Country Representative. Work on Report.	Work on Report.	Meeting with UNDP Deputy Country Representative. Work on Report.	Work on Report.
Monday 24-01	Meeting with MSF; EAD; OFDA; ICRC; DFID. Work on Report.	Meeting with MSF; EAD; OFDA; Pakistan Humanitarian Forum. Travel to Karchi and onwards to Madrid.	Meeting with MSF; EAD; OFDA; ICRC; DFID. Work on Report.	Meeting with MSF; EAD; Pakistan Humanitarian Forum.. Work on Report.
Tuesday 25-01	Travel to Peshawar. Meeting with OCHA team. Travel to Charsadda and meet with DCO charsadda. Meeting with local NGOs. Travel to Hasara Yasinsai village and visit Hisara camp. Travel to Peshawar. Brief Agency heads-UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP, WHO.. Dinner meeting with UN colleagues. Work on Report.	Arrive in Madrid. Work on Report.	Travel to Peshawar. Meeting with OCHA team. Travel to Charsadda and meet with DCO charsadda. Meeting with local NGOs. Travel to Hasara Yasinsai village and visit Hisara camp. Travel to Peshawar. Brief Agency heads-UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP, WHO.. Dinner meeting with UN colleagues. Work on Report.	Travel to Peshawar. Meeting with OCHA team. Travel to Charsadda and meet with DCO charsadda. Meeting with local NGOs. Travel to Hasara Yasinsai village and visit Hisara camp. Travel to Peshawar. Brief Agency heads-UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP, WHO.. Dinner meeting with UN colleagues. Work on Report.
Wednesday 26-01	Meeting with PDMA. Cluster leads; INGOs and NGOs; OCHA team. Travel to Islamabad. Work on Report.		Meeting with PDMA. Cluster leads; INGOs and NGOs; OCHA team. Travel to Islamabad. Work on Report.	Meeting with PDMA. Cluster leads; INGOs and NGOs; OCHA team. Travel to Islamabad. Work on Report.

Date	Riccardo Polastro	Nicolai Steen	Farwa Zafar	Aatika Nagrah
Thursday 27-01	Meeting with Muslim Charities; Teleconference with Balochistan Humanitarian country Team; Meeting with ECHO; Work on Findings/Presentation.		Meeting with Muslim Charities; Teleconference with Balochistan Humanitarian country Team; Meeting with ECHO; Meeting with National NGOs. Work on Findings/Presentation.	Meeting with Muslim Charities; Teleconference with Balochistan Humanitarian country Team; Meeting with ECHO; Meeting with National NGOs. Work on Findings/Presentation.
Friday 28-01	Presentation of Findings/Conclusions to Humanitarian Country Team. RTE-Team meeting and work on Draft Report. Travel to Karachi for onwards journey to Madrid.		Presentation of Findings/Conclusions to Humanitarian Country Team. RTE-Team meeting and work on Draft Report.	Presentation of Findings/Conclusions to Humanitarian Country Team. RTE-Team meeting and work on Draft Report.
Saturday 29-01	Travel from Karachi to Madrid and report writing			
Sunday 30-01				
Monday 31-01	Report writing	Report writing		
Tuesday 01-02	Report writing	Report writing		
Wednesday 02-02	Report writing	Report writing		
Thursday 03-02	Report writing	Report writing		
Friday 04-02	Report writing	Report writing		
Saturday 05-02				
Sunday 06-02				
Monday 07-02	Report writing	Report writing		
Tuesday 08-02	Report writing	Report writing		
Wednesday 09-02	Report writing	Report writing		
Thursday 10-02	Report writing	Report writing		
Friday 11-02	Report writing	Report writing		
Saturday 12-02				
Sunday 13-02				
Monday 14-02	Report writing and travel to Karachi	Report writing		
Tuesday 15-02	Report writing and travel to Karachi	Report writing and travel to Karachi		
Wednesday 16-02	Preparation of workshops	Preparation of workshops		

Date	Riccardo Polastro	Nicolai Steen	Farwa Zafar	Aatika Nagrah
Thursday 17-02	Karachi workshop and travel to Multan	Karachi workshop and travel to Multan		
Friday 18-02	Multan workshop and travel to Islamabad	Multan workshop and travel to Islamabad		
Saturday 19-02	Balochistan and KPK workshop in Islamabad	Balochistan and KPK workshop in Islamabad		
Sunday 20-02	Preparation of matrix and background material for national workshop	Preparation of matrix and background material for national workshop		
Monday 21-02	Preparation of matrix and background material for national workshop	Preparation of matrix and background material for national workshop		
Tuesday 22-02	National workshop	National workshop		
Wednesday 23-02	Debriefing of the HC and travel to Karachi and Madrid	Travel to Karachi and Madrid		
Thursday 24-02	Travel to Madrid and Geneva	Travel to Madrid		
Friday 25-02	Debriefing in Geneva with IASC representatives and travel to Madrid			
Monday 28-02	Report writing	Report writing		
Tuesday 1-03	Travel to New York and report writing	Report writing		
Wednesday 2-03	Report writing	Report writing		
Thursday 3-03	Debriefing with OCHA, debriefing with Chief of PDES, interview and report writing	Report writing		
Friday 4-03	Debriefing with IASC representatives and travel to Madrid			
Monday 7-03	Final report writing	Report writing		

Annex 5 Interview Guide

IA-RTE

Interview Guide – Pakistan Floods

Overall questions:

- 1- *How adequate was the response as a whole? As the crisis unfolded (At the start and over the following months?)*
- 2- *What operational results as well as positive and negative outcomes for the affected population did it produce?*

Context:

What is the political dimension of the floods-emergency?

How would you describe the disaster?

What are the key characteristics of the disaster?

A – Questions for Organizations (international or national)
--

- 1- What needs **assessments** did you undertake for your current work?
 - a. How did you conduct needs assessment (method, timing, single or joint)?
 - b. Who did you assess? (Groups, gender, age, etc.)?
 - c. Who was consulted? (Women, leaders, beneficiaries, etc)?
 - d. What did you learn from the assessments?
 - e. Were political dimension considered during assessments (exclusion, inclusion, etc.)?
- 2- What were the **needs** best met/least met (by cluster, by group, area) over time?
- 3- What was the **timeline** of your response (assessment, resource mobilisation, planning, procurement and implementation)?
 - a. Where there any elements that led to delays or that expedited things?
- 4- Was **funding** timely and adapted to changing needs?
 - a. Were the appeals realistic and timely (amount of funding requested)?
 - b. Did appeals reflect the needs identified?
 - c. Was there enough funding?

- d. Describe inter-linkages between different appeals?
 - e. Did your organisation have the capacity to respond to more affected people if more money?
 - f. What are the key issues/constraints in receiving and disbursing funds?
 - g. What oversight bodies have been activated? How are they performing?
- 5- Successes and constraints in the overall **response** (security, access, infrastructure, procedures, etc.)?
- a. Who responded first (relief and recovery)? Why?
 - b. What has your agency achieved during the current response (to floods)?
 - c. Have all affected groups received assistance (coverage)? If no – who have not received and why?
 - d. Have the affected population been informed about the assistance they will receive or not receive (**accountability**)?
 - e. Was it necessary to prioritise assistance? What was prioritised?
 - f. Is there general agreement on what delivery **standards** should apply in your cluster?
 - g. How far has the response been **tailored** to meet needs?
 - h. What were the **main gaps** between needs and response?
 - i. Are there any **outstanding gaps** in the response?
 - j. How has the political dimension affected the overall response?
 - k. Was the response adhering to the fundamental Humanitarian Principles of Impartiality, Neutrality, and Independence?
 - l. Do you have free Access to the affected populations
 - m. What systems are in place for cash distribution? Are they successful? If any, what are the key issues/impediments?
- 6- When was **coordination** mechanisms established? By whom?
- a. How well is coordination working (sector/cluster, location, function – avoiding gaps /duplication, standardisation, resource mobilisation, leadership)?

- b. With whom (military, government, international organisations, national, etc.)? Why?
- c. Describe the cluster leadership (for clusters where you or your organisation participates)?
- d. How would you characterise coordination between HQ, Central, province/Hub, and districts? Is it adequate?
- e. Describe management processes between central level (Islamabad) and different hubs (Province level)?
- f. Are issues coming from the field captured by central level (Islamabad)?
- g. Describe the role of OCHA (coordination, assessments, analysis, reporting)?
- h. How well did the cluster system plug in to existing national structures?
- i. How to increase and improve cluster coordination capacities?
- j. What coordination/partnerships are in place with civil society groups?
- k. Are roles and responsibilities of all actors clearly articulated? The military; civilian? Intl groups? UN agencies?
- l. Appropriateness of clusters for mega disasters?
- m. Value added of clusters?

7- Describe how you perform **monitoring**?

- a. How have the monitoring data been used? (Corrective action, accountability, control, etc.)
- b. Has monitoring led to any changes in your response or how you organise the response?
- c. Have humanitarian actors agreed on a common reporting format?

8- What are the main successes/constraints between relief and early recovery?

- a. Did your organisation have pre-existing response plans (contingency)?
- b. Describe the transition between relief and early recovery? What are the main constraints?
- c. Have local organisations been involved in the response?

- d. Where their capacity strengthened before the emergency or during? How and in what areas?
 - e. How would you describe the transition between relief and early recovery?
 - f. How has political dimension influence influenced transition?
- 9- Have any **lessons** been learned from recent responses in Pakistan (i.e. 2005 Earthquake, 2007 floods or 2009/10 displacements)?
- a. What is being done differently?
 - b. How prepared are you now for responding should there be another similar disaster?
- 10- What registration process is in place? Is it appropriate? Does it cover the entire affectees?

B – Questions for Affected Communities



- 1- What has been most successful in the assistance provided to date? What would you describe as being less successful?
- 2- Did anyone ask you about what assistance you needed? Who? When?
- a. Whom did they talk to?
 - b. Were any groups excluded from these consultations (assessments)?
- 3- What was the biggest need you had?
- a. Did anybody ask you about it?
 - b. Have you received what you needed? When?
 - c. Where you informed about the assistance you would get?
- 4- Which of your needs were best met? Least? Why? And by Whom?
- a. In terms of time – which needs were met first?
 - b. Where they the most critical needs at the time?
 - c. Have these needs changed?
 - d. Did you get assistance according to the changing needs?
- 5- Have some groups benefitted more than others?

- 6- Did the needs assessments take into consideration gender- or cultural sensitive issues?
 - a. If yes, is this also reflected in the assistance received?
- 7- What gap in the assistance was the biggest problem for you?
 - a. (returnees) Since the where there significant periods where you did not receive assistance? What has this meant to your family in terms of recovering (re-establish livelihoods, reconstruct house, etc.)?
- 8- What are the biggest problems you are facing now (displaced)/expect to see (returnee)?
- 9- What difference did any assistance you received do to you?
 - a. Would other type of assistance have been more useful? (e.g. cash)
- 10- From whom did you get assistance? Was the assistance useful? Why?
- 11- Who provided the most satisfactory response to your needs? WHY?


C – Questions for Affected Communities and Organisations

- 1- Did these gaps change over time?
- 2- Did different groups have different gaps?
- 3- What is the biggest success of the response? Why?
- 4- Most significant set-backs? Why?
- 11- Do you feel that you are better prepared for similar situations in the future? Why?

Annex 6: Funding Overviews



Sector not yet specified



		August	September	Octubre	Novembre	Decembre
Paid	Agriculture	1.991.603		12.887.143	0	0
	Coordination and Support	13.634.506	19.788.155	3.027.383	1.694.783	0
	Economic Recovery and infrastructure	3.693.456	0	1.042.755	0	966.848
	Education	7.927.698	0	274.246	0	2.467.795
	Food	89.059.984	9.874.719	4.877.465	45.341.753	785.340
	Health	52.626.490	4.588.174	3.000.000	5.578.580	906.118
	Multi-Sector	0	0	0	0	0
	Protection, Human Rights and Rule of	7.240.861	0	1.041.035	0	278.697
	Safety and security of Staff and Opera	0	500.035	501.569	0	0
	Shelter and non food items	28.435.279	10.671.786	2.332.677	0	2.069.047
	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene	28.048.406	7.134.364	2.501.338	0	2.066.874
Committed	Agriculture		58.234.151	8.887.653	8.864.672	0
	Coordination and Support	3.410.647	14.327.002	2.977.027	1.375.777	1.400.000
	Economic Recovery and infrastructure	22.836.594	12.504.485	1.088.435	8.463.455	63.070.384
	Education	260.118	0	0	2.080.978	0
	Food	49.409.682	79.419.948	15.734.990	64.392.010	0
	Health	18.969.455	26.766.571	1.119.575	0	3.500.000
	Multi-Sector	0	0	25.413	0	0
	Protection, Human Rights and Rule of	6.610.772	1.012.894	0	0	0
	Safety and security of Staff and Opera	0	0	0	0	0
	Shelter and non food items	14.221.334	32.172.965	7.065.598	20.374.908	45.486.842
	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene	31.091.115	13.453.105	5.616.946	4.071.882	11.207.087
Paid	Sector Not yet specified	665.407.266	34.791.757	7.005.119	3.654.431	3.060.220
Committed	Sector Not yet specified	155.049.615	80.401.426	42.268.905	19.514.508	27.241.936

Annex 7: Cluster Output Review Table

#	Cluster		1	2	3	4	5
1	Agriculture	Indicator:	Standing Crops (million ha)	Wheat seed at HH level (mt)	Animals / Livestock*		
		Damaged / In Need:	2.400.000	600.000	277.000		
		Supported:	511.180	25.250	261.730		
		DIFFERENCE / GAP:	(1.888.820)	(574.750)	(15.270)	-	-
		<i>Source: Agriculture Cluster, FAO Statistics, 2011</i> <i>* FAO assessment for 39 / 81 districts</i>					
2	Education	Indicator:	Number of Schools:	Number of TLCs	Beneficiaries	ERF Proposals \$	
		Damaged / In Need:	10.493		1.328.482	6.000.000	
		Supported:	479	2.846	331.595	500.000	
		DIFFERENCE / GAP:	(10.014)	2.846	(996.887)	(5.500.000)	
		<i>Source: Education Cluster, Jan 2011</i>					
3	Emergency Shelter	Indicator:	Emergency Shelter (ES)	Blankets	Bedding / Mats	1-Room ER Shelter	
		Damaged / In Need:	1.743.926	4.775.747	3.487.852	657.442	
		Supported:	1.127.598	2.114.892	336.852	176.457	
		DIFFERENCE / GAP:	(616.329)	(2.660.855)	(3.151.000)	(480.985)	
		<i>*Source: Shelter Cluster, Feb 2011</i>					
4	Food	Indicator:	Food Support, people	Funding, USD	Food Support, people*	Food (MT)*	
		Damaged / In Need:	5.700.000	596.000.000	4.685.659	60.907	
		Supported:	5.400.000	363.560.000	2.998.822	34.108	
		DIFFERENCE / GAP:	(300.000)	(232.440.000)	(1.686.837)	(26.799)	
		<i>Source: Food Cluster, January 2011</i> <i>* 24 Oct 2010</i>					
5	Nutrition	Indicator:	Emergency nutrition needs, children*	Outpatient Therapeutic Programmes (OTP), Children screened	WFP Supported Blanket feeding, Children	Emergency nutrition needs, women*	
		Damaged / In Need:	260.000			180.000	
		Supported:	81.463	593.411	520.000	39.000	

		DIFFERENCE / GAP:	(178.537)	593.411	520.000	(141.000)	
Sources: Nutrition Cluster Jan 2011, WFP VAM Sept 2010 *The 'supported' figure is an estimate, based on severely and moderately malnourished children / women identified and supported after screening							
6	Water Sanitation and Hygiene	Indicator:	Estimated WASH Caseload, people*	Water Supply	Hygiene	NFIs	Sanitation
		Damaged / In Need:	7.301.300				
		Supported:		3.474.313	5.246.700	7.608.206	1.832.395
		DIFFERENCE / GAP:		(3.826.987)	(2.054.600)	306.906	(5.468.905)
Source: Wash Cluster Statistics, January 2011 * from Sept 21, 2010							
7	Health	Indicator:	Health Facilities	Acute Respiratory Infection (ARI) Centres	Diarrhoea Treatment Centers (DTC)*		
		Damaged / In Need:	515	100	71		
		Supported:		67	42		
		DIFFERENCE / GAP:	(515)	(33)	(29)	-	-
Source Health Cluster, Jan 2011 * Sept 2010							
8	Child Protection - Sub Cluster	Indicator:	CFSs, beneficiaries	NFIs, beneficiaries			
		Damaged / In Need:					
		Supported:	364.119	369.503			
		DIFFERENCE / GAP:	364.119	369.503	-	-	
9	Protection	Indicator:	Watan Cards				
		Damaged / In Need:	1.463.436				
		Supported:	1.462.168				
		DIFFERENCE / GAP:	(1.268)	-	-	-	
Source: Protection Cluster and NADRA, Jan 2011							
10	Logistics	Indicator:	Airlift (mt)	Sorties			
		Damaged / In Need:					
		Supported:	12.060	3.502			
		DIFFERENCE / GAP:	12.060	3.502	-	-	-

		<i>Source: Logistics Cluster, Feb 2011</i>				
11	Community Restoration / Early Recovery	Indicator:	Cash for Work	Small Businesses		
		Damaged / In Need:				
		Supported:	12.000	656		
		DIFFERENCE / GAP:	12.000	656	-	-
		Source: OCHA Bulletin, Jan 2011				
Information for Logistics, CR/ER, CCM, GBV (sub cluster), IM, Emergency Telecom cannot be calculated / estimated from the currently scattered figures						

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Annex 9: BIOs Team Members

Mr. Riccardo Polastro (Italian) is Head of Evaluation at DARA. He has 18 years of experience in humanitarian affairs and development aid having worked in sixty countries for the International Movement of the Red Cross, the United Nations, NGOs and donor agencies. Since 2001, Mr Polastro has carried out policy, partnership and operational evaluations and reviews for Danida, DFID, the DG ECHO, EC, IASC, ICRC, Norad, OCHA, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNDP, SIDA and other organizations. To date, he has carried out four Inter-Agency Real time evaluations of the humanitarian system response to both conflict and natural disasters. Riccardo lectures in several university MA programs and provides professional training on evaluation and development related topics. He holds an MPhil in Peace and Security, an MA in International Relations, and a Maîtrise of the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, Paris.

Mr. Nicolai Steen Nielsen is a senior evaluator at DARA with more than 15 years of experience in international development and humanitarian assistance in Africa, Asia and Latin America, working for NGOs, the UN and private consultancy firms. He has been a consultant on numerous evaluations (midterm-, post-, and impact), thematic studies, reviews, long-term implementation programmes and appraisals for bilateral (Danida, DFID, SDC, SIDA) and multilateral organizations (World Bank, NDF, UNICEF, WFP, OCHA-IASC), as well as for international NGOs and research entities (Spanish Red Cross, IBIS, ADRA, MS/Action-Aid and DIIS). Nicolai has specialized in the areas of aid effectiveness, governance, disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation, education and as M&E specialist. Nicolai is currently coordinator for a global disaster risk reduction initiative. Nicolai has developed in-depth expertise in **mixed methods** (quantitative and qualitative analysis) and **evidence based** research and studies. Nicolai has been a programme officer for UNICEF for three years as.

Ms. Farwa Zafar a specialist in international affairs and a longtime practitioner, analyst and observer of political, humanitarian and social development trends is an expert monitor and evaluator of humanitarian response and development interventions having a close knowledge and familiarity of the broader sector. She has extensive experience on the interface between policy, research, and practical actions having worked in government, academia, civil society, and the international system. She has been a strategic and operational advisor to a number of international organisations including the UN, World Bank, DFID, USAID, NGOs and local communities and has carried out many project reviews & evaluations, surveys and data analysis in Pakistan and other countries. Farwa also has multiple years of experience in working on political and parliamentary development issues as well as in political research and managing seminars/trainings/consultations. Farwa is a graduate of the School of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University, USA and Punjab University, Lahore Pakistan.

Ms. Aatika Nagrah, a development professional with a strong interest in development and humanitarian aid-effectiveness, specializes in research and data analysis methods. Her work portfolio in the non-profit sector also includes her experience in program design and development, implementation and monitoring. She has worked with the United Nations System in Pakistan and the United States, as well as with a number of international organizations including USAID and DFID. Aatika, a Fulbright scholar, holds a Masters degree in Economics from New York University.