

# Chad

## AT A GLANCE



### Country data *(2006 figures, unless otherwise noted)*

- 2007 Human Development Index: ranked 170th of 177 countries
- Population: 10.47
- GNI per capita (Atlas method, current US\$): US\$450
- Population living on less than US\$2 a day (1990–2004): NA
- Life expectancy (in years): 51
- Infant mortality rate: 124 per 1,000 live births
- Under five infant mortality rate: 209 per 1,000
- Population undernourished (2002–2004): 35 percent
- Population with sustainable access to improved water source (2004): 42 percent
- Adult literacy rate (over 15 yrs of age) (1995–2005): 25.7 percent
- Primary education completion rate: 31 percent
- Gender-related development index (2005): ranked 151st of 177 countries
- Official development assistance (ODA): US\$284 million
- 2007 Corruption Perception Index: ranked 172nd out of 179 countries

Sources: Transparency International (TI); 2007; UNDP, 2007a and 2007b; World Bank, 2008.

### The crisis

- 2002–2003 initial wave of refugees arriving in south and east Chad faced high mortality and malnutrition; over 250,000 refugees in eastern Chad and 50,000 in the south; 180,000 IDPs across east and south-east; an additional 50,000 Chadian refugees in Sudan and 12,000 in Cameroon;
- Refugees comprise around 22 percent of the population in impoverished east; host population's access to water, health services, and education inadequate; refugee presence and relief operations caused higher commodity prices, somewhat counterbalanced by increased employment opportunities;
- Increasing militarisation of communities and ongoing military recruitment in IDP sites added to overall deterioration of security;
- New waves of refugees arrived in 2008, including at least 12,000 in eastern Chad, resulting from instability after failed coup in N'Djamena;
- Global Acute Malnutrition rate of the refugee population decreased from 36–39 percent in 2004 to 9 percent in the east in 2006.

Sources: Inter Agency Health Evaluation; UNICEF; Human Rights Watch.

### The humanitarian response

- The initial 2007 CAP requested US\$170 million, followed by appeal for additional US\$102 million; 99 percent of Appeal funded, with 84 percent from DAC donors;
- Additional funding provided outside the CAP, especially through ICRC, for total of US\$308 million in 2007;
- With US\$81 million funding in 2007, UNHCR contracts implementing agencies; received funds from 22 donors (19 DAC, CERF, South Africa, and Vatican); contributions directed mainly to east Chad;
- US largest donor, providing over US\$133 million, US\$80 million for food aid; ECHO gave US\$39.8 million; UK, Germany, and Ireland each provided less than 3.5 percent of total humanitarian funds.

Source: OCHA.

# Chad

## Internal Power Struggles and Regional Humanitarian Crisis

RICARDO SOLÉ-ARQUÉS, Independent Consultant, Development and Humanitarian Aid



### Introduction<sup>1</sup>

The Republic of Chad, twice the size of France, with 10 million inhabitants, is among the poorest countries in the world, ranking 170th out of 177 countries in the Human Development Index.<sup>2</sup> Like other countries in the Sahel, it is affected by a chronic, multidimensional, structural conflict, characterized by political instability, the collapse of traditional conflict-resolution mechanisms, the emergence of armed groups, and trans-border involvement of neighbouring conflicts, with many of the hallmarks of a complex emergency.

Regional and localised conflicts have triggered significant humanitarian consequences since 2003, when large numbers of people fleeing the internal conflicts in Sudan's Darfur region and in the Central African

Republic (CAR) sought refuge in Chad. Since then, the humanitarian crisis has worsened, particularly in 2006 and 2007, when a large number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) joined the already large number of refugees in Chad. Despite the difficulties created by the new humanitarian needs of the displaced and continuing problems of humanitarian access due to insecurity and logistical challenges, donors have been generous. Nevertheless, the humanitarian response has been patchy, with shortcomings in coordination and inadequate linking of relief with development efforts.

### The nature of the crisis: From an internal political problem to a regional humanitarian emergency

After becoming independent from France in 1960, Chad suffered a series of civil wars and successive coups, partly reflecting competition between ethnic groups and divisions between north and south. Libya eventually invaded, but was expelled when Hisssein Habré came to power, with support from France and the African Union Organisation. More than 40,000 people disappeared or were reported killed under Hisssein Habré's dictatorial regime between 1982 and 1990.<sup>3</sup> With the support of France, Habré was deposed by the current President and former General, Idris Déby, and multi-party politics and a new constitution were introduced. Since then, President Déby has won three elections, all apparently flawed, and has resisted a number of attempts to overthrow him by force.

Since 2003, the country has been engulfed in a conflict with regional ramifications, driven not only by long-standing competition between the predominantly Arab north and the sub-Saharan African south, between nomadic herders and sedentary farmers, and between Anglophone or Francophone post-colonial models, but also between regional influences of Western (the United States and France) and emerging powers (China and Iran).<sup>4</sup>

The competition for water and access to grazing land between nomadic herders and sedentary farmers has shaped social and economic relations and has been a traditional cause of conflict. Furthermore, oil resources have been exploited commercially since 2003. Oil revenues are likely to add another layer of complexity to the conflict, rather than contributing to socio-economic development. The so called "resource curse," where natural resources drive conflict and corruption, seems applicable to Chad.<sup>5</sup>

The instability of the situation is enhanced by the weak legitimacy of the Chadian government and the democratic immaturity of the country. This context fosters opposition groups based on clan and ethnicity, who resort to violence rather than seeking democratic alternatives. The conflict is exacerbated by the state's lack of effective control of large areas of the country, especially in the east and the south-east. In these areas, numerous armed groups not only fight each other, but attack the local civilian population. The resulting insecurity and climate of impunity allows for widespread violations of international humanitarian law (IHL) and human rights,

as well as seriously impinging on the delivery of humanitarian aid.

The Darfur crisis, the political situation in the Central African Republic (CAR) and instability in Chad are all closely interlinked, increasingly so since 2002. The 2002 coup in CAR triggered the first wave of refugees to Chad. Since then, the trans-border nature and movement of armed groups continue to fuel insecurity in northern CAR, while in eastern Chad the situation deteriorated after the first influx of refugees from Darfur in 2003. In fact, the Sudan and Chad governments accuse each other of supporting opposition groups and armed militias in the other country. Reflecting this, the attack on Chad's capital N'Djamena in February 2008 was carried out by rebels based in, and supplied from, Darfur. The ensuing government repression resulted in the destruction of hundreds of homes in N'Djamena and the flight of 18,000 refugees to Cameroon.<sup>6</sup> The subsequent rebel retreat triggered clashes between Chadian factions in Darfur and a new wave of refugees (at least 12,000) to eastern Chad.

Following the regional escalation of the crisis, the 2007 UN Security Council, in its Resolution 1778, recommended the establishment of a multidimensional force, located in both Chad and CAR "to address the humanitarian situation in the two countries and to stem the spill-over from Sudan's Darfur conflict."<sup>7</sup> This led to the establishment of the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCAT), with 300 police and 50 military liaison officers, and the European Force (EUFOR), a 4,000-strong (predominantly French) European military and police force, mandated to protect civilians and humanitarian operations. These missions face issues of coordination and a confusion of mandates, in particular given French support to the Chadian government, which could jeopardise the mission's neutrality. Similarly, EUFOR's logo – the European flag – is the same as that of ECHO-funded NGO projects. Finally, in the opinion of many observers, MINURCAT and EUFOR forces are poorly equipped and not mandated to deal with the banditry and lightly armed rebel groups in their assigned areas, rendering the military presence ineffective in protecting civilians and humanitarian staff.

### The humanitarian impact of the crisis: High vulnerability, scarce resources and breaches of protection – protracted crisis vs. acute IDP emergency

The initial wave of refugees arriving in 2002 in the south of Chad, and in 2003 in the east, faced a critical situation, with high mortality and malnutrition rates. Currently, more than 250,000 refugees live in eastern Chad and 50,000 in the south, with around 180,000 IDPs across the east and south-east. There are an additional 50,000 Chadian refugees in Sudan and 12,000 in Cameroon.

In 2007, the refugees in the east (principally from Darfur) were gathered in 12 camps, while those in the south, hosted in four sites, were primarily from the Central African Republic. New arrivals are normally placed in existing sites, in some cases stretching the available capacity. However, in terms of humanitarian standards and delivery of basic services, the situation in the camps was judged to be acceptable. In general, this was also the case for the IDP sites, although these faced a more volatile situation, including occasional raids by armed groups.

Until 2006, the crisis was seen primarily as spillover from the Darfur conflict, and the response was predominantly oriented towards the refugees. The distant possibility of the refugees' return set the conditions for a protracted crisis. Therefore, the humanitarian response was focussed on a stable caseload (number of refugees) with specific needs, as well as on support to local communities and early recovery strategies. However, the situation changed when rebels directly threatened the capital and the Chadian government in April 2006, and government forces retreated from large areas in the east. This created a power vacuum in the region which led to factional and inter-ethnic violence and incursions from Darfur-based armed groups, triggering the displacement of more than 140,000 people between late 2006 and mid 2007. The increasing militarisation of communities and ongoing military recruitment in IDP sites – including of children – has added to the overall deterioration of the security situation. New waves of refugees arrived in 2008, including at least 12,000 in eastern Chad, as a consequence of the instability created after the failed coup in N'Djamena.<sup>8</sup>

In terms of the number of refugees, the spillover of the CAR crisis into the south of Chad has been less significant than the one in Darfur to the east, and the challenges not as complex, strategically, logistically or financially. Greater ethnic homogeneity, the absence of

significant numbers of displaced people, as well as a better security situation and access to land, explain the better outlook in the south. Moreover, access to the sites in the south has always been easier for humanitarian actors. But even in the south, an additional 8,000 refugees from CAR joined the existing 40,000 in 2008, further destabilising the situation. And despite decreasing aid dependency and improved livelihood prospects, the roots of the conflict and the lack of security in northern CAR remain unchanged.

Chad is already a poor country and the east in particular faces extreme poverty and scarcity of resources. For this reason, the impact of the refugees and displaced on local resources cannot be ignored. Refugees already represent around 22 percent of the population in the east. In fact, access to health services, education, and water and sanitation are often better in the refugee camps than in the surrounding local communities. The level of Global Acute Malnutrition (GAM) in the refugee population decreased from 36–39 percent<sup>9</sup> in 2004 to 9 percent in the east in 2006.<sup>10</sup> In contrast, the GAM in the host population has been estimated at 36–39 percent. The presence of refugees and relief operations has also resulted in a rise in commodity prices, although this is partially compensated for by an increase in employment opportunities. Tensions between host communities and the refugees have been reported, but seem to have subsided after the proactive policy of humanitarian agencies of assisting host communities through aid programmes.<sup>11</sup>

Insecurity is widespread in eastern Chad, affecting access to the affected population and the delivery of humanitarian aid. Aid agencies and relief workers have been and still are the subject of attacks and robberies; tragically, for example, Pascal Marlinge, head of mission of the Save the Children Fund, was killed only two days after the HRI team interviewed him in Abeche.

Some reports suggest that specific communities receive less humanitarian assistance because their political alignment and ethnicity make access to them more risky, so that they are sometimes deliberately ignored by the Chadian authorities.<sup>12</sup> However, it is commonly accepted that a certain level of protection can be granted inside the refugee sites, although this entails a considerable investment by aid agencies. The situation *outside* the camps is judged precarious.

Logistical difficulties created further complications, as road transport in the country is limited to six months a year. The rainy season, from May/June to October, renders the roads impassable throughout the country,



and limits the movements of both humanitarian actors and warring factions alike. For the latter, these months are used for rearming and building up new alliances, while humanitarians must store up enough supplies before the rains begin.

### **The donor response to the crisis: Unmatched generosity**

The response to the request for humanitarian funds for Chad has been quite generous. In 2006, 80 percent of the required US\$193 million for the UN Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP) was collected, in addition to the US\$31 million contributed outside the Appeal.<sup>13</sup> The new situation in 2006–2007 increased needs – mainly the result of additional numbers of IDPs. These were addressed through supplementary CAPs in 2007 in February, April, and July, requesting an additional US\$102 million, beyond the initial US\$170 million. This multi-appeal process was not always clear, as sector breakdown was not consistent from one document to the other and duplications occurred – although these were eventually corrected. Nevertheless, 99 percent of the CAP was funded in 2007, with 84 percent of the funds coming from OECD/DAC donors.<sup>14</sup> Additional significant funding was provided outside the UN Appeal<sup>15</sup> to the Red Cross Red Crescent Movement, especially the ICRC, as had occurred in previous years. Overall, 19 OECD/DAC donors provided humanitarian funds in 2007: the US, EC/ECHO, the UK, the Netherlands, Japan, Canada, Germany, Sweden, France, Finland, Norway, Ireland, Switzerland, Italy, Denmark, Spain, Luxembourg, Belgium, and Austria.<sup>16</sup> In total, over US\$308 million of humanitarian aid was provided in 2007.

The allocation of aid per beneficiary in Chad is the second highest in the world. With CAP requirements of around US\$377 per beneficiary, this is slightly less than the CAP requirements for the Democratic Republic of the Congo (US\$393), but higher than those for Sudan (US\$221).<sup>17</sup> High per capita allocations in Chad are probably related to the logistics involved in the delivery of humanitarian aid, the extra costs associated with the poor security, and the relatively small case load.

The US was by far the largest donor in 2007, providing more than US\$133 million (43.3 percent of total humanitarian funding), of which more than US\$80 million was for food aid. The US adopted a regional approach, linking the response to the crisis in Chad financially and operationally to the response to the

Darfur conflict. However, these funds are not reflected in the figure reported for Chad in the Financial Tracking Service (FTS). For the fiscal year 2007/2008, the U.S. contributed US\$1.196 billion to Sudan and eastern Chad.<sup>18</sup> The lion's share of these funds (US\$853 million) went for food aid, but logistical support for aid operations, such as air services and telecommunications, was also funded. It should also be noted that US funding was explicitly earmarked for IDPs and refugees from the CAR. Additional investments related to Quick Impact Projects and poverty reduction interventions in targeted communities are also not accounted for by the FTS. The United States has regional strategic interests which go beyond humanitarian action, most notably because the Sahel has been described as a breeding ground for radical Islamism.

In 2007, EC/ECHO provided US\$39.8 million (12.9 percent of total humanitarian aid), of which US\$9.4 million was spent for food aid, with UNHCR receiving US\$8.1 million and US\$800,000 for eastern and southern Chad, respectively. The next largest donors were the UK, Germany and Ireland, each contributing less than 3.5 percent of the total humanitarian funds.

France's contribution to humanitarian aid in 2007 was modest (US\$5.5 million to the CAP), of which US\$1.8 million was for food aid and US\$1.5 million for UNHCR, including assistance to IDPs. France also earmarked an additional US\$1.1 million for bilateral aid to the government of Chad to provide assistance to IDPs and purchase commodities, in line with GHD Principle 8, which calls for donors to support local capacity to respond to crises.

In 2008, France committed €10 million to the Stabilisation Programme, intended to support the return of displaced people. However, this programme has raised concerns among the humanitarian community, as it risks encouraging IDPs to return before security conditions are stable. French officials, however, assured the HRI mission of their firm commitment to respect for The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement,<sup>19</sup> as called for in the GHD *Principles*.

As the former colonial power, France has significant influence in Chad, as well as strategic interests in the region. In fact, its backing for the current government has been explicit throughout the crisis, including bilateral aid and technical assistance, as well as military and logistic support. France is also the EU diplomatic representative to the government in N'Djamena. France also pushed for the deployment of MINURCAT and EUFOR and is the principal financial and troop

contributor to EUFOR. During the HRI mission, implementing agencies raised concerns over the role of France, and whether its vested interests compromise the extent to which it honours the GHD *Principles*. However, many agencies believed that the principles of impartiality, neutrality and independence were largely being respected.

### **Implementation of the humanitarian response: Multi-sector assistance and pending cluster coordination**

The response to the crisis by humanitarian agencies has been determined by the logistic difficulties involved, insecurity in the east, agency access to funds, and weak coordination mechanisms.

Since the start of the crisis in 2003, the main player in the humanitarian response has been UNHCR, which received US\$81 million in 2007 from 22 donors (19 OECD/DAC plus CERF, South Africa, and the Vatican). The UN agency is responsible for camp management and protection, and has provided aid both directly, and as a contractor of implementing agencies. The financial contributions were focused mainly on eastern Chad (US\$45.8 million), while southern Chad received US\$2.9 million, with a further US\$8.4 million for IDPs. Additionally, an unspecified US\$12.5 million was allocated, allowing UNHCR to direct them according to need. The World Food Programme – the largest operation in terms of funds and logistics – received US\$139 million in 2007. Other UN agencies, such as UNICEF (US\$15 million) and WHO (US\$2.7 million) also had specific areas of intervention alongside NGO partners. Reflecting the difference in refugee numbers and the level of need, as well as larger logistical difficulties, more funds are directed towards the east than to the south of the country. Access to arable land and better livelihood conditions also help explain the lower allocation of resources to the south.

Donor support to multi-sector needs and food aid illustrates how they perceive the crisis and its response. The donor response may reflect the approach of the UNHCR, which is based on integrated multi-sector interventions, including protection. This contrasts with the cluster approach, where an agency is designated as the lead for a specific sector, with the presumed aim of improving quality and accountability for programming in that sector. The lack of consistency in sector breakdown among the different Appeals is also probably a contributing factor in keeping donors away from fund-

ing by sector. Multi-sector funding accounted for US\$90.1 million (33 percent of total funding), while food aid accounted for US\$128.4 million (47 percent), and coordination and support services for US\$19 million (6.9 percent), leaving only 13 percent for the remaining sectors.

Clearly underfunded were education (12 percent of requirements), protection (38 percent), and economic recovery (33 percent).<sup>20</sup> However, these apparently underfunded sectors are addressed, in principle, through UNCHR's multi-sector funding. Although multi-sector funding tends to give more flexibility to the implementing agency, many NGOs interviewed complained that it also allows UNHCR to act as subcontractor of programmes to NGOs. There is a need for a better balance between the necessary flexibility of allocation of funds and the intended accountability to donors and to beneficiaries.

While UNHCR was quick to request funds and respond to the new needs in 2007, OCHA was the agency that took the lead in responding to the needs of the increasing number of displaced. It is generally agreed that the needs of IDPs have been addressed to a lesser extent than those of refugees, mainly due to the logistical and operational difficulties in reaching them. The situation of the displaced is more fluid and they are more exposed to episodes of violence, harassment by different armed groups, and are also targeted for attacks and retaliation following clashes among different factions. In fact, violence against civilians and the spread of terror are often used as military tactics. Many of these armed groups are not averse to accepting state support when it suits them, and this situation exposes IDPs to increased vulnerability in terms of violations of international humanitarian law.

The increase in OCHA's funding provided the opportunity to create new dynamics for coordination, to extend their field presence, and introduce the cluster approach to improve coordination and accountability. However, coordination seems to be a pending concern in the response in Chad. It became evident during the HRI mission that the coordination and leadership roles of OCHA and other UN agencies are far from optimal. There was also weak coordination among the sectors, contravening the spirit of the UN humanitarian reform agenda, which aims to improve accountability and leadership in sector response through the cluster approach. During 2007, the Inter-Agency Standing Committee country team requested the development of the cluster approach, and OCHA tried to promote cluster leadership

and coordination with a new sector configuration. However, this appears to have been only partially applied, and then only to IDP-oriented programmes. A lack of leadership in some sectors, and resistance to change in existing mechanisms probably explains the slow implementation of the cluster approach. OCHA's attempt to introduce the cluster system from mid-2007 is still not consolidated, despite the reasonable level of funding obtained for OCHA's activities (US\$4.1 million, or 71 percent of the revised requirements). This is the result not only of the weaknesses inherent in the cluster approach itself, but also of the difficulties in the pre-existing situation in the field. As a result, the modus operandi of UNHCR, with its uncontested leverage regarding coordination issues, has become even more important in defining the approach in Chad.

Furthermore, since most donors are not present in the country, coordination seems to consist of internal negotiation between the UN and NGOs, resulting in little real involvement by donors – other than ECHO – in coordination matters. Geographically, coordination also seems to suffer some shortcomings. The main hub for humanitarian aid is the eastern town of Abeche, where most agencies working in that region maintain a presence. However, it has been reported that communication with headquarters in N'Djamena is poor, and it appears that the same situation applies in the south.<sup>21</sup>

Despite the revised CAP and the increase in funding requirements, not all agencies were able to increase their operations and prevailing insecurity prevented both adequate needs assessments and the implementation of the response. NGOs are basically subcontracted by UNHCR or other UN agencies, but in some cases have their own relative weight as actors in the crisis. This is especially true of Oxfam, Care, International Medical Corps (IMC), Première Urgence (PU) and Cooperazione Internazionale (COOPI), all of which manage significant funds within and outside the CAP process. It is also worth noting the significant presence of the ICRC; according to data from OCHA FTS, the ICRC receives around US\$15 million outside the UN CAP, and their reported expenditure in Chad come to US\$24 million.<sup>22</sup>

As explained above, the main challenges facing the humanitarian operation in Chad are insecurity and logistics, with frequent carjackings, vandalism of NGOs offices, and occasional aggression towards humanitarian workers.<sup>23</sup> Most humanitarian actors expressed frustration at the prevailing insecurity, although the deployment of EUFOR may change this in future.<sup>24</sup> The heightened

vulnerability of the displaced and the difficulties in granting basic protection inside the camps are also important causes of concern for the humanitarian community.<sup>25</sup>

New refugees began arriving in 2008 – around 12,000 to the eastern Chad from Darfur, and 8,000 to the south from the CAR – adding to the challenges of managing the existing caseload, including the need to adapt strategies to a protracted post-emergency situation that demands interventions in host communities and careful attention to sustainability and early recovery. However, these concerns must be balanced with more focused relief to vulnerable new arrivals, who suffer from high rates of malnutrition. In fact, in order to prevent tensions – and even for ethical reasons<sup>26</sup> – support to the host community has become part of the necessary response.

Nevertheless, linking relief and development is a considerable challenge in Chad. The capacity of local structures to absorb external aid for development programmes is very limited. State institutions, in particular in the east, are weak or non-existent and local capacity is very low. Therefore, the situation requires a primary focus on restoring and promoting livelihoods and early recovery programmes. This will go far to easing the structural drivers of the conflict and consolidate stable development in Chad, irrespective of other contextual determinants of the conflict. But in order to create the preconditions for peace, the international community must also adopt strategies addressing the factors driving the regional conflict.

## Conclusion

The conflict in Chad constitutes a complex emergency involving refugees from neighbouring countries, a large number of IDPs, and refugee flows to Sudan and Cameroon. The conflict is closely interlinked with the crisis in Darfur, and armed groups and militias from both sides of the border are involved in the other country's conflict, contributing to the continuing flow of refugees. Structural, historic, political, and other regional conflicts all contribute to the volatile situation. It has yet to be seen if the benefits from oil exploitation are translated into better living standards for the general population, or if these fuel further conflict.

Insecurity and breaches of international humanitarian law, including attacks on humanitarian workers are common. These factors, along with difficulties of access, seriously constrain the humanitarian response. In partic-

ular, displaced and refugees closer to the Sudan border experience high levels of insecurity, and humanitarian access is very limited there. Security Council resolution 1778, and the deployment of EUFOR and MINUCAT could help to address the situation. However, these missions face complex problems before they can carry out their mandate. The interaction of the humanitarian community with a military force mandated to improve security and to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid will require careful implementation and mutual understanding between two very different cultures. Respect for GHD *Principles* 19 and 20 on military-civilian relationships will be key.

The single most significant evolution of the conflict in 2007 has been the unfolding of the IDP crisis, with more than 140,000 people forced from their homes from late-2006 into mid-2007. These events transformed the aid effort from a response to a protracted crisis with a stable caseload of refugees, to one facing a volatile and acute situation needing a more flexible and immediate response. The displaced constitute the most vulnerable group, due to their exposure to factional violence and forced recruitment, as well as the difficulties in access often faced by aid workers.

The international humanitarian response in 2007 was financially generous, covering 99 percent of the total requirements of the CAP, and providing additional funding to the ICRC and other implementing agencies. In fact, the response has provided acceptable standards of support to refugees and IDPs – at times, even better conditions and services than those available to the local population. Donors have favoured a multi-sector approach when allocating funds, but sector coordination and accountability through the UN cluster approach have so far been weakly implemented.

Overall, the situation in Chad requires an increased focus on restoring and promoting livelihoods and early recovery programmes, as a way to easing the structural causes of the conflict. The urgent need is for the donor community to develop a strategic approach, including the provision of relief, with the ultimate aim of creating the conditions for the consolidation of peace, not just in Chad but in neighbouring countries as well.

## Notes

- 1 The HRI team, composed of Ana Romero, Ricardo Solé-Arqués, and Kim Wuyts, visited Chad in April 2008. The opinions expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of DARA.
- 2 UNDP, 2008.
- 3 Houssein Habré is currently awaiting trial by an international court of justice in Senegal.
- 4 Hugon, 2008; and, ISIS, 2007.
- 5 Pegg, 2006.
- 6 Human Rights Watch, 2008.
- 7 United Nations Security Council, 2007.
- 8 Human Rights Watch, 2008.
- 9 Tomczyk et al., 2005.
- 10 Markus et al., 2006.
- 11 Ibid.
- 12 Human Rights Watch, 2008.
- 13 Most of the funds allocated outside the UN Appeal were destined for the Red Cross Red Crescent Movement, as well as to some agencies of interest to particular donors (e.g., Concern and Caritas), and some bilateral funding.
- 14 Non-DAC donors in 2007 were effectively private contributions (1.3 percent), and minimal contributions were forthcoming from Turkey, South Africa, and Cuba (0.1 percent from each). Carry-over funds, UN unearmarked allocations, and CERF together accounted for 10 percent of the total non-DAC funding.
- 15 Total funding provided outside the CAP amounted to US\$34.9 million.
- 16 All figures taken from the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Financial Tracking Service (OCHA FTS) as of May 2008.
- 17 OCHA, 2007.
- 18 United States Agency for International Development (USAID), 2008.
- 19 See [http://www.reliefweb.int/ocha\\_ol/pub/idp\\_gp/idp.html](http://www.reliefweb.int/ocha_ol/pub/idp_gp/idp.html)
- 20 OCHA FTS as of May 2008.
- 21 Norwegian Refugee Council, 2007.
- 22 ICRC, 2008.
- 23 Human Rights Watch, 2007; United Nations Secretary General, 2007.
- 24 HRI field interview, April 2008.
- 25 Human Rights Watch, 2007.
- 26 Notably in Chad but also elsewhere, agencies frequently face the ethical dilemma of providing better standards of living to refugee population than those available to the surrounding host population, arousing potential conflict. In response, sometimes substandard aid is provided to refugees in order to avoid inequities with host communities, while in other cases, aid is also directed to host communities. This is one of the unsolved problems of humanitarian interventions.

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