The crisis and the response

- Sudan has world’s largest IDP population: at least 4.9 million.
- Protracted displacement has accelerated urbanisation and created an assistance-dependent population with limited capacity for self-sufficiency.
- More people are now being killed by violence in Southern Sudan than in Darfur.
- Slow recovery in eastern Sudan: drought and new refugees from Eritrea and Somalia have increased humanitarian needs.
- In 2009, donors provided more than US$1.65 billion for humanitarian assistance, twice that of second largest CAP.
- Some donors restrict funding to Darfur and Southern Sudan, blaming monitoring and access constraints in the east.
- In early 2010, the UN proposed a comprehensive mechanism to coordinate the protection of civilians in armed conflict settings.

Donor performance

- New initiatives for better coordination have not led to notable successes.
- The failure to improve protection is partly attributable to lack of advocacy by donors and UN officials who are afraid of being declared persona non grata.
- In Southern Sudan, most donors fail to hold regional authorities accountable for aid disappearance and for not providing previously committed resources.
- Most INGOs were dissatisfied with donor efforts to facilitate humanitarian access, especially after the expulsion of several humanitarian organisations from Darfur.

Key challenges and areas for improvement

- Donors must identify qualified partners and staff to avoid a lack of response capacity.
- Effective and consistent systems for information gathering and analysis of threats need to be established.
- The international community must reach consensus on how to interact with the government of Sudan and strengthen efforts to facilitate humanitarian access.
- The roles of peacekeepers and humanitarian actors need to be more clearly differentiated in order to strengthen protection coordination mechanisms.
Sudan

Humanitarian mission without end?

Sudan continues to struggle to cope with conflict, displacement and insecurity. In 2009, humanitarian operations in Sudan were, once again, the world’s most significant – in terms of funding provided and the number of beneficiaries (OCHA 2009a). Analysts fear Sudan may be sliding towards violent breakup (International Crisis Group 2010) as peace accords – between the government and its adversaries in Darfur, southern and eastern Sudan – all appear to be increasingly fragile. Five years have elapsed since the internationally-brokered Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) ended the five decade-long north-south civil war. Essential benchmarks such as border demarcation, agreements on wealth-sharing and citizenship issues remain unresolved. Insecurity and failed harvests have led to an alarming deterioration of humanitarian conditions in Southern Sudan. The World Food Programme (WFP) is providing assistance to 11 million Sudanese, the agency's largest operation in the world (WFP 2010a).

The number of people in Southern Sudan in need of food assistance has more than quadrupled from almost one million in early 2009 to 4.3 million by February 2010 (WFP 2010b). There are concerns that disruptions to the Southern Sudan self-determination referendum scheduled for January 2011 – the lynchpin of the CPA – or northern rejection of its expected vote for independence – could spark renewed north-south conflict.

The extent and duration of displacement in Darfur has created an assistance-dependent population with limited capacity for self-sufficiency. The peace process in Darfur is stalled and the United Nations (UN) warned in July 2010 that bureaucratic impediments to humanitarian access and incidents targeting aid workers are steadily shrinking humanitarian space (OCHA 2009a).

**Operational environment**

During the first Humanitarian Response Index (HRI) mission in 2006, Sudan – Darfur in particular – was receiving high publicity in the international media, but by the next mission in 2007, the crisis was already losing airtime (DARA 2007 and Hererra 2008). Today, the Darfur conflict may no longer attract the headlines it once did but the crisis has not disappeared. Large-scale attacks on civilians are less common but generalised insecurity prevails in most of the region. Displaced communities have been unable to return despite a peace agreement between the Government of Sudan and the main rebel faction – the Justice and Equality Movement – and rapprochement between Sudan and Chad. Peace talks brokered by Qatar continue to drag on inconclusively amid little optimism (Flint 2010). Darfur’s numerous anti-government movements have fractured. Violence has intensified as a result of renewed fighting between the Sudanese army and Darfur’s second largest rebel movement, the Sudan Liberation Movement, as well as intra-tribal violence. In fact, significant numbers of people have now lived in Darfur IDP camps for seven years. Most have, in effect, become urban settlements as conflict has brought about traumatic urbanisation (de Waa 2009).

Humanitarian access to populations remains a challenge in all three states of Darfur. The kidnapping of humanitarian staff, vehicle hijacking and banditry have continued to curtail activities and delivery of humanitarian aid. Humanitarian response capacity is further reduced by a shortage of qualified partners and staff.

Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir is the first sitting head of state ever indicted by the International Criminal Court (ICC). The Government of Sudan reacted to the March 2009 ICC announcement of an arrest warrant by expelling 13 international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) and three national NGOs from northern Sudan. There was additionally a clampdown on activities of independent human rights organisations (African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies 2009). Humanitarian organisations reported considerable evidence of the ongoing operational and protection consequences of the expulsion of some of the largest and most experienced agencies. Cooperation between the international community and the government’s Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC) – which accused the expelled INGOs of “violating their humanitarian mandates and threatening National security” (HAC 2009) – has been significantly reduced. Oxfam GB, one of the expelled agencies, has noted that with fewer operational agencies information on needs in much of Darfur is now harder to obtain. Fourteen of the 16 agencies expelled from Darfur had projects working to support victims of sexual violence and many of the trauma counseling projects, women’s health centers and support networks that were shut down have not been adequately replaced (Oxfam 2010).
Nation-wide legislative, local and presidential elections held in April 2010 were the first multi-party polls since 1986. While the Carter Center described the process as “highly-chaotic, non-transparent and vulnerable to electoral manipulation” (Carter Center 2010), the international community accepted the results. In circumstances which bore ill for prospects of good governance, the two dominant parties – Bashir’s National Congress Party and the Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Movement (SPLM) – reinforced their hold on power in the two regions. “The hasty way in which elections have been put aside by those Western governments which had actively supported them – actually imposing them on the parties during the CPA negotiations – is due to the fact that the vote had a predictable but equally disappointing outcome: instead of giving birth to one, democratic Sudan, the elections have ratified the emergence of two authoritarian Sudan(s).” (Musso 2010).

In 2010, the autonomous Government of South Sudan abandoned the strategy of seeking reform at the federal level in Khartoum and its leader, Salva Kir, now openly urges secession. There has been no progress on resolving fundamental issues left unresolved by the CPA – provisions on power and wealth sharing, demarcation of the north-south border and resolution of the conflicts in Southern Kordofan, Blue Nile and Abyei. The regimes in Khartoum and in the southern capital, Juba, have, in effect, stopped trying to resolve the numerous issues which divide them, perilously entrusting the African Union to mediate following the expected southern vote for independence in January 2011 (IRIN 2010a).

In Southern Sudan, humanitarian needs have intensified due to ongoing violence, drought and food insecurity. Many agencies had been aligning their activities towards recovery and development in 2007–2008, expecting a smooth post-conflict transition. Most have been slow to respond to conflict and drought-induced needs. In June 2009, the UN reported that the number of people killed by violence in Southern Sudan had surpassed the number killed in Darfur. Intra-South violence killed over 2,500 people and displaced 370,000 more in 2009 (OCHA 2009b). Recent research dispels the standard explanation for post-CPA violence – alleged destabilisation by Khartoum and manipulation of tribal tensions – and reports that efforts by the SPLM-led autonomous government to build governance institutions are themselves fuelling new conflict (Norwegian Refugee Council 2010).

In eastern Sudan, there has been less conflict since the Government of Sudan signed an agreement with an opposition coalition in 2006. However, recovery has been slow and drought and the arrival of new refugees from Eritrea and Somalia have increased humanitarian needs.

**International dilemmas**

The international community has been unable to reach consensus on how to interact with the Government of Sudan. It is also now increasingly unable to agree on how to work with the Government of Southern Sudan and to address the crisis in the region and the likely consequences of the self-determination referendum.

The UN’s operational structure in a complex and divided country is itself, unsurprisingly, complex. There are two separate missions with a peacekeeping mandate: The first, the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), was established by the UN Security Council (UNSC) in 2005 and is primarily charged with implementation of the CPA. It is headed by a Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG). The Deputy SRSG – who is also Resident Coordinator and Humanitarian Coordinator (R.C./HC) – is based in Khartoum. He has two deputies for humanitarian affairs, in Khartoum and in the Southern Sudan capital, Juba. The second, the African Union (AU) – United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) is a joint AU/UN peacekeeping mission, established by the UNSC in 2007. Charged with ensuring safe provision of humanitarian assistance and humanitarian access in Darfur, it reports both to the UNSC and to the AU Peace and Security Council. It is led by a UN/ AU Joint Special Representative (JSR) and in June 2010 had around 22,000 uniformed personnel. Its mandate was extended for a year in August 2010, prompting the Government of Sudan to impose further restrictions on movement of UNAMID personnel.
The HRI team was told of inherent tension, within the UN and the donor community, between political agendas and commitment to humanitarian assistance in accordance with the Principles of Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD). Agenda and approaches differ between peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance and development. Funding for recovery is affected by the failure of the UN and the donor community to reach agreement on the best way to prevent further conflict in Darfur.

Protection

The Sudanese crises continue to be characterised by brutalities against civilians and a climate of nearly complete impunity. In 2005, the UN Security Council asked UNMIS peacekeepers to protect civilians but failed to give the mission sufficient or appropriate staff and resources. The role of donors with regard to promotion of protection and international humanitarian law is limited to bilateral discussions with government officials on the occasion of high official’s visits to the country. There is no concerted strategy. UNAMID has continuously failed over the course of its deployment to protect itself, let alone the people it military personnel have been dispatched to protect.

As an INGO representative noted, “UNAMID has no staff in the rural areas, only in big towns. The villages are abandoned. What kind of peacekeeping is this?”

While the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has been able to assist and protect IDPs in other countries, it cannot do so in Sudan. For many years UNHCR’s activities have been severely restricted by the Sudanese authorities. UNHCR has only been allowed to operate in certain areas and to only provide protection to refugees – although in late 2009, the refugee agency was granted access to IDPs in Nyala in Darfur. The government of Sudan insists that it is its responsibility to protect IDPs and for many years has discouraged the international community from assisting and advocating for the millions of IDPs who live in and around Khartoum. The government entrusted the

International Organisation for Migration (IOM) to assist IDPs in Al Fasher and Al Geneina. IOM is not a UN agency and does not have a legal protection mandate. The agency told the HRI team that its activities contribute to protecting human rights as registration, verification and assistance implicitly provide IDPs with a form of protection. Despite its repeated claims the government clearly lacks protection capacity. This was further demonstrated by an upsurge in violence in Darfur in May-June 2010 which left over 800 dead.

Protection coordination mechanisms have several weaknesses. There is a lack of permanent staff in many of the regions where their presence is most required. The HRI team learned that about one third of protection civilian posts are vacant and neither UNMIS nor UNHCR have permanent staff in three of the ten states of the South. A large number of UNAMID’s dedicated protection posts are also vacant. Both in Southern Sudan and Darfur there is widespread confusion regarding the respective roles of peacekeepers and humanitarian actors with regard to protection. It is unclear which entity, if any, currently coordinates protection and where. Many of those who are manifestly in need of protection are neither IDPs nor returned IDPs and refugees.

“Three decades later there is a dependency syndrome, with the number of those in permanent need of support showing no sign of decreasing.”
The UN should acknowledge that protection structures are inconsistent, ineffective and complicated by dual reporting to the UN and the AU. There is an urgent need to clarify the responsibilities and reporting lines of UNMIS/UNAMID and policies related to protection of IDPs and other vulnerable civilians. Both UNMIS and UNAMID need to have a mission-wide protection strategy that consolidates existing protection initiatives, builds on current cluster leads and ensures the best use of available military, police and civilian resources to confront actual and potential violence.

There are efforts to raise awareness of government officials who, for the most part, have little notion of the broader meaning of protection. UNHCR has run workshops and since 2004, UNDP has engaged in an ambitious project to bring together government officials, civil society and local communities to raise awareness of basic human rights in Darfur (UNDP 2010). However, considering the size of protection needs over this vast area, these remain modest interventions.

In Southern Sudan, the regional government and the humanitarian community are focusing on strengthening protection activities, especially helping communities protect themselves. Community groups receive training and early warning mechanisms are underway. Radios are provided to enable communication with the authorities and UNMIS when under threat. Following the signing of an action plan between the Sudan People’s Liberation Army – the military force of the autonomous southern government – and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, the release and reintegration of child soldiers is progressing steadily.

A senior UN official told the HRI team that a key challenge is to establish more consistent and effective systems for information gathering and analysis of threats to civilians, including from the staff of UN and non-governmental agencies and communities. Senior UNAMID/UNMIS leaders, together with humanitarian actors focusing on protection, need to ensure a constructive and ongoing engagement and dialogue between peacekeepers and the humanitarian community. In 2010, UNHCHR and UNMIS’s Protection of Civilian (POC) section were tasked with examining future protection challenges and proposing a comprehensive protection coordination mechanism. A proposal for Southern Sudan is under discussion. In early 2010, the UN proposed a comprehensive mechanism to coordinate the protection of civilians in armed conflict settings involving collaboration between the Deputy Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator, the UNMIS Regional Coordinator, the Deputy Police Commissioner of Southern Sudan and UNMIS Sector Commanders (UN Sudan 2009). It remains to be seen whether these interventions will produce more effective protection activities.

**Coordination**

The Darfur expulsion triggered several initiatives for improved coordination. The Humanitarian Donor Group (HDG), a platform for Western donors to discuss humanitarian issues and prepare meetings with the government, UN agencies and INGOs, was reinforced. Initiatives were taken to broaden the group by inviting China, India, South Africa, Egypt, Qatar, South Korea, Malaysia and the United Arab Emirates. However, this extended group has only met once. Many donors have centralised decision-making on humanitarian assistance at headquarter level and there is no special capacity for humanitarian assistance at embassy level apart from, at best, a diplomat responsible for humanitarian matters in addition to other duties. This meant that internal coordination and coordination with humanitarian partners also often fell upon the same people in Khartoum.

Also in response to the Darfur expulsion, donors, the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) and the HAC established a High Level Committee co-chaired by the UN and the Government of Sudan to ensure better coordination. At the highest level – including ministers, ambassadors and the SRSG – the committee has only met twice. At national level, they have met only on a few occasions in Khartoum (the last in November 2009) and Darfur, although the original agreement was to create similar platforms in all states.

The cluster approach was introduced formally in Sudan in December 2008. Many humanitarian organisations reported feeling that in 2009, the United Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) coordination in Khartoum was weak, due to lack of human resource capacity, senior management and delays in filling key posts. An interviewee summarised: “OCHA should really embrace its role, by setting up inter-agency assessments and by sharing insights”. Another said that “even the government wants a stronger OCHA”. In Southern Sudan, agencies report OCHA has started playing a better coordination role.

Results of new initiatives for better coordination have not led to notable successes. The failure to deliver dividends is partly attributed to lack of leadership by donors and United States (US) officials who are afraid of being declared persona non grata. The US is said to have the capacity to provide leadership, but is not doing so. A donor representative told the HRI team that clear terms of reference for the HDG would be beneficial.

**Funding Response**

Data from OCHA’s Financial Tracking System (FTS) indicates that in 2009 donors provided more than US$1.65 billion for humanitarian assistance in Sudan, twice as much as the amount given to the second largest UN Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP) (for the occupied Palestinian territories) and the third largest (for the Democratic Republic of the Congo) combined and more than the entire post-cyclone updated 2010 appeal for Haiti. This represents a significant increase since 2006, when resources available for the humanitarian action component of the Work Plan for Sudan were a little over US$1 billion (OCHA 2010).
The United States (US) has long been the leading international donor to Sudan, contributing over US$8 billion in humanitarian, development, peacekeeping, and reconstruction assistance in Sudan and eastern Chad since 2005 (US State Department 2010). As of August 2010, the US had provided US$533 million, 36.6 percent of the total reported by FTS. The second and third largest donors are the European Commission, providing on average thirteen percent per year and the United Kingdom (UK) contributing seven percent during the last five years.

Most of those interviewed by the HRI team were fairly satisfied with donor financial responsiveness. However, several interviewees mentioned that in 2009 the amount of aid, in particular from donors in Western Europe, had decreased due to the financial crisis. Those mainly relying on funding from the US said they were already feeling the effects of Haiti for their 2010 budgets.

This was linked to media attention which in Sudan had resulted in disproportionate funding for Darfur, from donors but also from agencies’ headquarters. Because of a preference for Darfur, it has been difficult to find funds for projects in other parts of the country. Coverage of the work-plan for Darfur was more than 60 percent while coverage of Southern Sudan was only 40 percent.

Some donors restrict funding to Darfur and Southern Sudan, despite mounting needs in the east. The HRI team learned that donors including the European Commission and the Netherlands have a policy of not providing humanitarian funding for eastern Sudan, as the region has developmental needs which these donors consider the responsibility of the Sudanese government. Several donors told the HRI team that they did not fund humanitarian projects in the east because they said it was impossible to monitor any project as permission to travel is virtually impossible to obtain. Respondents also said that it was very difficult to get funds for development activities in Darfur because no one wanted to implicitly endorse the government’s contention that the humanitarian crisis is under control and needs are satisfied.

Donors lack advocacy strategy

Restrictions on access of humanitarian personnel and materials are nothing new in Sudan and have been in place for decades, and previous editions of the HRI have made mention of these restrictions as well (DARA 2007 and Herrera 2008). During the 2009 mission, those interviewed by the HRI team held a variety of opinions on what donors can or cannot do to advocate for humanitarian access and the protection of humanitarian workers. While several INGOs preferred donors’ role to be restricted to consular support, most were dissatisfied about donor efforts to facilitate humanitarian access. There was strong protest from all Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development / Development Assistance Committee (OECD/DAC) donors after the Darfur expulsions, but their approaches differed. Whereas the EU had a high profile, other donors used silent diplomacy. Some aid agencies praised the US for being outspoken, but others thought that a lower profile would have been more effective, giving the Sudanese authorities an opportunity to change policy without losing face. There is also no agreement on how to best deal with the issue of impunity of kidnappers and armed attackers in Darfur, although all agree this is a major factor limiting humanitarian access. The HRI team was surprised to note that few donors interviewed mentioned the clear politicisation of humanitarian assistance. This is despite the fact that there have been several instances in which representatives from donors’ headquarters have been denied visas for monitoring visits.

Interviewees told the HRI team that the agencies expelled from Darfur were those who were most committed to, and effective, at humanitarian advocacy. Today most NGOs keep a low profile. The government is now targeting individuals, expelling five UN and International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) staff in August 2010 for alleged engagement in advocacy, including forwarding of a petition against hunger (Arab News 2010). In Southern Sudan, donors are also missing opportunities to advocate with local authorities, most failing to hold the regional authorities accountable for the disappearance of aid goods or not providing funds or capacity they had committed to.

The aftermath of the expulsion from Darfur showed that, at the end of the day, there is neither the will nor sufficient common ground for a common pro-active advocacy strategy. “You have to find your own way and resort to your own tools. No one really knows what to do,” an INGO Country Director reported.

Humanitarians’ evaluation of donors

Humanitarian agencies interviewed by the HRI team were relatively satisfied with the support provided by donors. Many OECD/DAC donors were praised for respecting roles and responsibilities of all actors and being flexible in allowing reallocation of funds. Coverage of the Sudan Work Plan funding requirements for coordination, air services and logistics was 98 percent, on average, during the last three years, higher than for any other sector. OCHA was very positive about donors’ financial support and also commended the technical support they received, particularly from the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID). Donors with humanitarian capacity at the field level were singled out as being very supportive and making informed decisions. But these donors were few. Only the European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO) and the US have field offices in both Darfur and Southern Sudan, while DFID has one staff member for humanitarian assistance continuously traveling between Darfur, Khartoum and Juba.

Respondents generally reported the idea that donors uncritically prioritise Darfur. The HRI team was told by interviewees that “there is overfeeding in Darfur. Appeals are inflated”; “there is very good response to the Darfur crisis. Gaps are quickly filled” and that “allocation of resources is very unbalanced between Darfur and the rest.”
There have been positive developments in donors’ willingness to fund emergency preparedness, risk reduction and recovery activities. The amount of funding available for these activities has doubled over the past four years from US$119 million to US$243 million. Humanitarian organisations noted that timely donor support enabled agencies to pre-position food and medicines in time for the rainy season. In Southern Sudan, the US funded WFP to pre-position food, while ECHO has funded two NGOs for emergency preparedness and response, which included stockpiling. Some NGOs told the HRI team that Norway and Canada provided support to build disaster preparedness and the response capacity of communities in Southern Sudan. The US Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) funded preparedness for disease outbreak (including logistics and medicine stocks) and capacity building at the village level throughout Sudan. The mission learned that the UK and Japan do not have separate allocations for humanitarian aid and development in Sudan, allowing for flexible disbursements.

Despite disappointment about the lack of donor advocacy for access and maintaining humanitarian space, most actors generally approve the overall response of their donors. OFDA, DFID and, to a lesser extent, ECHO – donors with a humanitarian field presence both Darfur and Juba – are well rated. This could indicate that field presence contributes to a good reputation. However, the UN, which had the most extensive field presence of all donors was not awarded a particularly high score for overall response. Merely being present is apparently not enough.

There is considerable criticism of the Common Humanitarian Fund (CHF) – a pooled funding mechanism established for humanitarian activities in Sudan in 2005. The CHF – intended to allow for speedy response to new life-threatening needs – was described by aid organisations as “bureaucratic”, “UN-focused” and “simply a bank”. The mission was told that UN agencies that are unable to get money directly from donors get priority access to the CHF; one interviewee telling us “we have all become beggars. How can small NGOs compete with the UN?” Research from the Overseas Development Institute revealed similar concerns, also noting that UN management costs meant that less money was available to cover NGO overheads and that efficiency was compromised (Fenton and Philips 2009).

Many humanitarian organisations shared with the HRI team their disappointment that after so many years of humanitarian assistance to Sudan so little has been achieved in terms of peace-building. As a result of the expulsions from Darfur and new crises in southern Sudan, peace-building initiatives – already few to start with – have been further marginalised. Initiatives to build local capacity for reconciliation continue to remain underfunded.

Lessons learnt and recommendations for the future

Sudan’s immediate prospects look grim. The International Crisis Group has expressed concern widely shared by analysts: “Unless the international community, notably the US, the UN, the AU Peace and Security Council and the Horn of Africa Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), cooperate to support both CPA implementation and vital additional negotiations, return to North-South war and escalation of conflict in Darfur are likely” (International Crisis Group 2010).

After almost three decades of massive humanitarian assistance, the international community has to acknowledge the reality that there is now a dependency syndrome, with the number of those in permanent need of support showing no sign of decreasing. Much more can be done to strengthen the coping mechanisms of the most vulnerable. In a highly political context such as contemporary Sudan, it is hard to see how to guarantee the neutrality of humanitarian assistance. Without achieving a proper political settlement of Sudan’s myriad disputes, humanitarian assistance will become a mission with no end. Humanitarian assistance cannot endlessly be provided along a linear scheme from emergency aid to (occasional) recovery and back to emergency aid.

There are a number of key issues which donors need to address:

1 Donors, together with the UN, should affirm the principle that humanitarian and early recovery programming must always be based on needs.

2 Donors need to provide flexible funding for early-recovery and rehabilitation.

3 They should recognise their lack of humanitarian capacity in Sudan and extend and consolidate collaboration with non-traditional donors.

4 Donors should encourage and support humanitarian actors to develop practical contingency plans for the referendum / post-referendum period and anticipated additional displacement, conflict and food insecurity.

5 Donors and the UN could do more to coordinate different financing instruments (including the CHF, Work Plan and development funds) and to work to speed up CHF disbursements.

6 Donors must do more to support local peace building processes and community coping mechanisms.

7 Finally, the Humanitarian Donor Group needs to specifically establish a policy which includes advocacy for Principles of Good Humanitarian Donorship.
Crisis reports

Sudan

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The HRI team, composed of Lucia Fernández, Nahla Haidar (co-Team Leader), Manuel Sánchez-Montero, Albertien van der Veen (co-Team Leader) and Frank Vollmer contributed to this report. They express their gratitude to all those interviewed in Sudan.