


Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC)

The International Community's Funding of the Tsunami Emergency and Relief



Government Funding

Spain

Achim Engelhardt
Silvia Hidalgo
Velina Stoianova
Lucá Fernández
Julia Flores



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Abbreviations and Acronyms

ACCD	Catalan Agency for Development Cooperation
ACH	Action Against Hunger - Spain
AECI	Spanish Agency for International Cooperation
BCPR	Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery
CCAHE	Catalan Committee for Emergency Humanitarian Aid
DARA	Development Assistance Research Associates
DFID	Department for International Development
ECHO	European Commission Humanitarian Office
FAD	Fund for Development Aid
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FEV	Fund for the Feasibility Study
FTS	Financial Tracking System
GTZ	
HAC	Humanitarian Aid Committee
IFRC	International Federation of the Red Cross
LRRD	Linking Relief Rehabilitation and Development
MAEC	Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation
MoCTI	Ministry of Commerce, Tourism and Industry
MoD	Ministry of Defence
MoE	Ministry of the Environment
MoI	Ministry of the Interior
MSF	Médicos Sin Fronteras
OCHA	Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ODA	Official Development Assistance
PARC	Performance Assessment Resource Centre
SIDA	Swedish Agency for International Cooperation
TEC	Tsunami Evaluation Coalition
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
WFP	World Food Programme

Background

This report on Spain's governmental funding in response to the tsunami is part of a series of country studies¹ undertaken in the context of an evaluation of the international community's funding of the tsunami emergency and relief. The subject is one of five thematic evaluations carried out by the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC). This thematic evaluation on funding is led by Danida.

"The Tsunami catastrophe that struck Asia on 26 December 2004 is one of the worst natural disasters in modern history. Although the major impact was felt in India, Indonesia, the Maldives, Sri Lanka, and Thailand, several other were affected by the tsunami including Myanmar and Somalia. More than 250,000 people died and overall, an estimated 1.5 to 5 million people have been directly affected. Damage and destruction of infrastructure devastated people's livelihoods and left many homeless and without adequate water and healthcare services.

The world – governments and people – responded with unprecedented generosity in solidarity with the rescue and relief efforts of the affected communities and local and national authorities. More than \$ 6 billion has been pledged for humanitarian emergency relief and reconstruction assistance Tsunami affected areas. This has been instrumental in reducing or mitigating the consequences of the disaster, and in boosting the recovery and reconstruction efforts."²

In accordance with the terms of reference, the purpose of this thematic evaluation on the international community's funding response is:

- a) To provide an overview of the total volume of financial and in-kind funding of the response by the various actors,
- b) To assess the appropriateness of the allocation of funds in relation to the actual relief and reconstruction needs and in relation to other emergencies,
- c) To contribute to a better understanding of public responses to emergencies,
- d) Provide a basis for follow-up studies after 2 and 4 years.

The purpose of this study on Spain's governmental response is to assess Spanish funding policy and decision-making against Good Humanitarian Donorship Principles and:

- Document the amount and pattern of pledges made by Spain as a state donor in the months following the tsunami. Analyse these pledges commenting on evidence that they

¹ Other state donors reviewed include Canada, Denmark, the European Commission, Japan, Ireland, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

² As stated in the Concept Paper for Evaluating the International Community's Funding of the Tsunami Emergency and Relief, 28 June 2005, Danida File no: 104.a.e.51

represent new funding, or reallocated funding. Seek to comment on the relationship between appeals for assistance on one hand and the nature of pledges on the other.

- Record actual financial commitments made and comment on how these relate to pledges. Where possible show to which agencies and which countries commitments have been made. Comment on where these commitments with to agency and affected-state identified programming.
- Of these commitments, identify what has actually been spent and how well spending in these first six months was prioritised and disbursed in a way that demonstrates impartiality.
- Analyse the flow of goods in kind paying particular attention to military assets and pharmaceuticals. Have unsolicited goods been donated? Has military assistance been charged at cost?

Finally, while focusing on the funding role of state actors, the study recognises that official donors have increasingly far wider, multi-faceted roles and responsibilities in the field of humanitarian action. It is in the context of this broader donor function and the Good Humanitarian Donorship agenda that this study aims to review Spanish state funding policies and decision making processes.

Methodology

DARA, in collaboration with the PARC, throughout the month of August 2005 undertook a desk review of background documentation to develop a reporting format, donor questionnaire, based on good humanitarian donorship principles, and tables for financial data collection. These were then contrasted with other evaluation teams involved in the country studies in a coordination meeting held in Geneva on the 8th of September 2005. For the purposes of the study on the Spanish response, DARA started sending information on the TEC and requesting interviews to Spanish State actors in the course of the month of August 2005. All actors received written information on the questions to be raised by the evaluation team.

In person interviews were carried out with representatives from two different ministries and one Autonomous Community, the *Generalitat* of Catalonia through the Catalan Agency for Development Cooperation. The latter also responded to a questionnaire in written form. Actors were also reached by telephone.³

This information was contrasted and corroborated with that provided by other sources: the ECHO HAC 14 point system, the FTS, private companies, NGOs, decentralised cooperation sources, transcripts of parliamentary commissions, agency press releases and data available on the internet both on agency web sites and others such as the relief web and alertnet.

³ The Basque Government provided information on their overall funding by telephone.

In addition to gathering financial data, the study attempted to draw a timeline to outline and delineate the response so as to shed further light on the decision-making and financial reporting processes.

Summary

A fragmented aid system and deficient humanitarian aid tradition breed a lack of capacity to respond effectively to humanitarian crises...

The Spanish aid system is extremely fragmented across and involves a wide array of both ministerial and regional actors. There are differences among actors but, both in general and in comparative terms, Spain has not played a key role in its funding of the tsunami response and is not a donor that adds any significant value to the international community's relief and humanitarian aid efforts. The state budget committed towards funding the humanitarian and reconstruction response to the tsunami represents 109 million euros. At the level of the Ministries involved and decentralised budgets, humanitarian aid amounts to 15,968,655 million euros (11,505,097 euros and 4,463,558 euros, respectively). Over 8 million euros were spent in covering the costs of the military operation. Spain has not contributed to the Indonesia Multi-donor trust fund. Reconstruction commitments total 88 million euros of which 80 million, over 90% are concessional. Of the 50 million euros in FAD funds which represent soft loans in the form of tied aid, it is unlikely that under existing conditions any of the funding be disbursed in the near future and or that even half the amount be eventually spent.

Spain as a donor is still in the process of struggling to apply its rigid funding mechanisms and instruments in a given scenario, as opposed to funding in accordance to need and contributing positively to international aid efforts. Donor state contributions to the UN system, the IFRC and humanitarian aid agencies are negligible. Direct agency implementation for the purposes of humanitarian aid delivery which has been a favoured option, should be evaluated. This form of implementation is a common response of the aid system at all levels, AECI as in the case of decentralised cooperation (Madrid's SAMUR, the *Generalitat*, etc.). These modalities are often favoured in Spain for visibility purposes and other considerations that are not necessarily compatible with the principles of humanitarian aid. A similar situation occurs regarding the deployment of military assets. The cost effectiveness of military intervention should also be addressed. In all cases, direct agency implementation has entailed the provision of medical teams and supplies. Other principle minded donors following good practice seek to not increase the number of actors on the ground. A general finding of the study is that the Spanish system favours precisely the multiplication of actors.

Spain is not a humanitarian aid donor. There is a need for substantial reform at the level of the AECI in order to promote the principles of Good Humanitarian Donorship in any way. The MAEC has unfortunately limited the full fledged reform process which was initially expected and deemed as a prerequisite to good donorship. Reform is necessary from an institutional

perspective and in terms of revised priorities, new policies, procedures and funding mechanisms. There is a poor understanding of what good donorship implies in general. This possibly stems from the fact that Spain is frequently absent from international forums that seek to promote aid effectiveness, harmonisation alignment, and other good practices; and that there has been a general lack of emphasis on learning and accountability within the aid system. The MAEC's approach has been far more conservative than anticipated towards enabling that AECI become a more independent actor, along the same lines as other bilateral aid agencies such as DFID, GTZ or SIDA.

The same problems are posed at a decentralised level although many autonomous communities such as Catalonia have resorted to establishing development cooperation agencies that are public enterprises, along similar lines as GTZ. Despite the push for reform, the MAEC has opted for passing a law on agencies which will enable AECI mechanisms to prove more flexible. Implementing agencies, however, feel that reform planned has fallen short of expectations and that even in a reformed AECI under new Agency Laws, it will prove difficult for procedures and mechanisms to meet up to standards of good donorship. Humanitarian NGOs therefore expect that agencies like ACCD will prove to be better humanitarian donors.

Finally, there is a problem of accuracy and transparency of information at all levels. A system of improved reporting should be promoted by the MAEC with clear and binding criteria on reported financial amounts. The coordination mechanism should seek to be more proactive in the process of information gathering.

I. Introduction

Overview of the Response

The Spanish governmental response to the tsunami officially involved five different ministries, fourteen autonomous communities and a number of provinces and municipal governments. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, in addition to its own efforts, reported on aid provided by the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of the Environment, the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Industry, Commerce and Tourism which committed a budget line of 50 million euros in humanitarian aid. The Ministry of Defence initiated its operation "*Respuesta Solidaria*" "Supportive Response" which involved the deployment of military assets and a contingent of almost 600 people that remained in Indonesia until the 26th of March.

A fragmented aid system

The Spanish aid system is extremely fragmented. The MAEC in 2004 channelled less than 20% of Spanish ODA. This is the result of not only decentralized government which strives to enlarge its level of competencies, but of a generalized campaign and strong civil society movement known as platform 0.7 which took place throughout Spain in the 1990's to advocate in favour of increased development aid budgets. Promoters of the 0.7 camped out in tents across cities in Spain for several months. The result of the movement was the provision of external aid budgets across different administrative levels that apply their own criteria in allocating aid. Many autonomous communities and local entities took advantage of the opportunity that channeling aid gave them in terms of gaining the possibility of acting at an international level.

It is now customary for municipalities, provinces and autonomous regions to have an aid budget of their own. In turn to be eligible for decentralised funding, NGOs have had to open offices at the local level. The system tends to be extremely inefficient as it heavily burdens NGOs and diverts funding to small local NGOs that don't necessarily have the capacity to deliver aid effectively. Certain humanitarian NGOs have however stated their marked preference for channeling decentralized cooperation budgets in comparison to national state AECI aid. This is due to the fact that, in many instances, the procedures developed by these decentralised agencies are better adapted to humanitarian action. Also, organizations, such as MSF,⁴ claim that the possible political interests that decentralized governments may have in a given crisis are in most cases negligible and that these do not manage to compromise the impartiality and independence of an NGO's operation.

⁴ MSF Spain, with the exception of project assistance provided in the context of the crisis in Darfur in 2004, has never received aid from AECI and will not seek any funding in 2006. The organization receives 6% of its funds from ECHO and other bilateral donor agencies such as DFID and CIDA. It has refrained from signing a framework agreement with AECI but has acceded to partnerships with 13 autonomous governments and cities. The latter sources represent 6% of the funds channeled by MSF Spain.

Not a humanitarian aid donor

Following years of stagnating and meager aid budgets, the current Spanish government has committed to increasing the ODA to 0.5% of GNI by 2008.⁵ Humanitarian aid has accounted for less than 4% of Spanish ODA. The AECI Spanish Agency for International Cooperation has yet to develop procedures and funding mechanisms that prove compatible with humanitarian aid funding. Its Humanitarian and Emergency Aid unit has a poor track record in channelling aid. Implementing agencies correctly point out that AECI could not have started to fund tsunami relief and recovery projects before June 2005 when the agency issues its official call for proposals. Other autonomous governments have developed procedures that, according to implementing NGOs, will be – even in a reformed AECI- far more compatible with humanitarian aid.

Present an overview on *how* donor(s) acted and reacted with their funding in this emergency and *why*.

Timeline

President Zapatero only decided on the 6th of January – 11 days after the tsunami – that he wanted Spanish troops to be deployed in the region and be an active part of Spain’s response to the disaster.⁶ The cost of the operation was estimated at 7.8 million euros and ended up costing 8 million euros.

The Council of Ministers approved 50 million euro FAD loan.

Limitations and particularities

In addition to the labyrinth of the aid system, it should be underlined that Spain is not accustomed to evaluation. Transparency has proved a problem in many instances throughout the research process. Other international reviews, such as the Humanitarian Response Review, seldom include Spain in their analyses. Public administration does not seem to feel that it has a responsibility or duty to respond in a timely manner to requests for interviews or information. Exceptions to this were the *Generalitat* of Catalonia which proved extremely cooperative and the Ministry of Defence. The evaluation team also managed to meet with the Head of the Emergency and Humanitarian Aid Unit at the AECI who provided the information that was readily available. It should be mentioned that DARA started requesting meetings and information in writing by certified mail in the end of August 2005 and supplemented

⁵ In Spain, ODA as a percentage of GDP has been declining since 1993. In 1992, the Parliament had recommended a plan for ODA to reach 0.35% of GDP by 1995 and 0.7% of GDP by 2000.

⁶ A similar time delay occurred on occasion of the Mozambique floods in early 2000. The Spanish government announced its participation in operation “India-Mike” on March 1st, 2 weeks after the Mozambican government’s appeal for assistance.

these appeals by e-mail and telephone. This process was in sharp contrast with that experienced in other countries and agencies.

There is also a level of double counting and an excessive readiness to include large amounts in pledges especially at the early stage. It should be noted that 50 million euros from the FAD (Fund for Development Aid) were initially included in the HAC 14 point system as humanitarian aid and cited in ECHO's funding decision of 18 January 2005 page 18. In this document, based on the HAC 14 point reporting system for Member States, Spain is by far the largest donor with 52.95 million euros more than double the second largest amount indicated by France of 20.88 million euros. Other discrepancies occur due to the fact that both ministries and regional governments receive funds from private sources (both companies and individuals) and include them as part of their public funding responses. Finally, certain agencies when covering transportation costs choose to add the estimated value of the goods transported – which they have not paid for and is privately funded – to their funding allocation.

II. Overall Allocation and Disbursement

Donor	Country	Pledged in thousands of euros	Committed Humanitarian Aid in thousands of euros		Disbursed					Reconstruction amounts committed In thousands of euros		
			28/2/05	30/9/05	28/2	30/9	In kind %	Grant %	Tied Aid %	2005	2006	2007
			AECI	Indonesia								
	Sri Lanka											
	Regional											
	Not specified											
MoD	Indonesia	7,800	7,800	8,086	8,086							
MoCTI	Not specified	50,000							100 %	50,000		
MoE		1.553										
MoI	Not specified	20	20	20	20	20						
Total												

Decentralised Cooperation by autonomous community including regional and municipal funding


(Excludes budgets managed by AECl)

Decentralised cooperation by autonomous community			Committed Humanitarian Aid in euros		Disbursed		Type of Aid			Reconstruction
Donor	Total reported in euros	Country	28/2	30/9	28/2	30/9	In kind %	Grant %	Tied Aid %	2005
Aragon	100,000	Not specified	100,000				-	100%	-	
Asturias	295,000	India	80,000				-	100%	-	
		Sri Lanka	125,000				-	100%	-	
		Regional	90,000				-	100%	-	
Balearic Islands	150,000	Not specified	150,000				-	100%	-	
Basque Country*	798,558	India	548,630				-	100%	-	
		Sri Lanka	249,928				-	100%	-	
Canary Islands	223,000	Sri Lanka	176,000				-	100%	-	
		Regional	47,000				-	100%	-	
Castilla la Mancha	250,000	India	100,000				-	100%	-	
		Sri Lanka	50,000				-	100%	-	
		Regional	100,000				-	100%	-	
Catalonia	1,539,000	Sri Lanka	85,000	85,000	50,000	50,000	-	100%	-	
		India	50,000	50,000	50,000	50,000	-	100%	-	
		Indonesia	374,000	244,000	244,000	244,000	-	100%	-	
		Other	30,000	30,000	30,000	30,000	-	100%	-	
		Not specified	1,000,000					-	100%	-
Ceuta	1,000	Not specified	1,000				-	100%	-	
Extremadura	469,000	Not specified	469,000				-	100%	-	
Galicia	400,000	India	190,000				-	100%	-	
		Sri Lanka	210,000				-	100%	-	
La Rioja	60,000	Not specified	60,000				-	100%	-	
Madrid	50,000	Indonesia	50,000				-	100%	-	
Navarra	-	-	-				-	100%	-	
Valencia**	1,446,557	Not specified	150,000				-	100%	-	1,236,057
Total	5,694,048	-	4,463,558							1,236,057

* includes a BBK donation of 400,000 euros and a Vitoria-Gasteiz municipality donation of 88,067 euros to UN-HABITAT

** includes a Bancaixa donation of 600,000 euros

Direct Decentralised Funding by Region



Out of 13 regions reported, only two regions have provided over 1 million euros. These regions, Catalonia and Valencia, with funds totalling almost 3 million euros account for over 50 % of the aid. It should be noted that several regions also rely on the funds provided by their local savings and loans banks.⁷

Differences in official reporting

As mentioned earlier in ECHO's funding decisions of 18 January 2005 and 23 February 2005, Spain is stated to have committed 52.9 million euros.

The AECI reported on the relief web on the 26th of January 2005:

AECI	FAD	Autonomous Communities	Ministry of Defence	Total
9,3 (1)	50	2	7,8	69.1

(1) 4,3 million euros in transport, teams and in kind goods, 3 million for NGOs and 2 million for UN agencies.

The HAC 14 points reporting system updated on the 16th of September 2005 stated that Spain had committed/allocated the following (**in euros**)

⁷ Both Bancaixa and the Caja de Ahorros del Mediterraneo (Savings and Loans of the Mediterranean) are members of the Community of Valencia's Permanent Committee on Humanitarian and Emergency Aid which is the organ that is intended to coordinate assistance provided by Valencian institutions.

Indonesia	Sri Lanka	Regional	Total	Total actual spending (as of 13/5/05)
9.362.900	415.000	8.515.001	18.292.901	13.292.699

Main Actors:

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation (MAEC) and the Spanish Agency for International Cooperation (AECI)

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation manages aid through the **Spanish Agency for International Cooperation (AECI)**. In contrast to other agencies, AECI resorts primarily to covering the cost of air freight for a variety of actors and directly implementing its humanitarian aid. Figures provided by the agency on its humanitarian aid include double counting of certain items and are not exclusively limited to state funding. This is specifically the case in relation to the items transported by AECI funded flights and which mainly involve commodities provided by NGOs and purchased with other means but that AECI chooses to add to the value of its own assistance. In the case of the tsunami, AECI estimated⁸ the value of the 64 MT of goods it helped transport at 600,000 euros and added this amount to its contribution. For the purposes of this study, 600,000 euros should be deducted from the amount indicated by the AECI.


AECI accepts funds from other sources than its own budget and administers a system which very much resembles that of an NGO, whereby it calculates the cost of its contribution, programmes implementation and actually deducts the amounts it receives from other sources to what it has covered with its own funds. In response to the tsunami, AECI has only utilised 463,548.07 euros of its own humanitarian aid budget, 34% of the emergency tsunami funding it has channelled. The amount could even be less if it ends up receiving an amount that now appears unlikely but that was initially pledged by the autonomous government of Andalusia of 120,000 euros. Decentralised cooperation provided by regional and local governments has granted 661,202.63 euros in tsunami funding to the AECI, covering close to 47% of total costs. The Spanish Agency has a bank account available for private donation purposes.⁹

⁸ Figures are based on “rough estimates” and there is no formula available for calculating the value of goods.

⁹ In the aftermath of Hurricane Mitch and as a reaction to NGO disapproval, the AECI chose to no longer advertise its accounts and not actively campaign for funding.

Origin of funds managed by the AECI	
AECI	463.548,07 €
Senate	110.000,00 €
Government Presidency Security Department	9.655,00 €
Autonomous Community of Cantabria	10.500,00 €
Autonomous City of Ceuta	50.000,00 €
Autonomous Community of Galicia	120.000,00 €
Autonomous City of Melilla	50.000,00 €
Polytechnical University of Madrid	50.000,00 €
Municipalities and local corporations	430.702,63 €
Companies	62.500,17 €
Private individuals	14.351,45 €
In kind humanitarian aid – estimated value of 64MT sent	600.000,00 €
TOTAL	1.971.257,32 €

**Origin of funds managed by
the Spanish Agency for International Cooperation AECI**



Over 99% of AECI's humanitarian aid was provided to cover the costs of air freight. Humanitarian actors in Spain commonly refer to this practice as the "Hercules model" of Spanish humanitarian aid which is very much driven by visibility considerations.

AECI's humanitarian aid expenditure in response to the tsunami		
Concept	Observations	Amount (€)
Airfreight to Sri Lanka and Indonesia (Airbus 310, Boeing 707, Hércules C-130, and 3 Boeing 757)	Departure dates of planes: December 28th, December 31st (2 planes), January 10th, January 21st and February 1st.	1.359.514,62
Transportation of 400 kgs of water sanitation material to Torrejon air base	Destination: Banda Aceh, 21 January 2005 flight.	123,56
Ordinary costs	Costs of AECI personnel dispatched in the area, food, medicine, working tools, driver, interpreters, renting of a vehicle and buses, repayment of advance funding provided by Spanish Embassy in Indonesia, etc.	11.619,14
TOTAL		1.371.257,32

In his statement before the Parliamentary Commission on Cooperation on February 3rd 2005, the Minister claimed that the AECI had committed 9.3 million euros in humanitarian aid and indicated that the cost the 6 airplanes and material sent by the MAEC and the AECI had accounted for 3 million euros.

In addition, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation reported a 3 million euro contribution via the HAC 14 point system as "core humanitarian aid" to be channelled via NGOs and local authorities. AECI however includes this amount in its reconstruction spending.

AECI's Humanitarian Aid Department has in the past basically functioned with resources from two budget lines: humanitarian aid (line 496.02) and food security and food aid (line 496.01). The latter budget line is primarily devoted to funding WFP and FAO. Limited resources can also be drawn from budget foreseen for "payments in-kind" (line 486.09). There are, in addition this year, 10 million euros foreseen for additional grants to international agencies. The latter budget conditions grants to specific project requests by international agencies and is regarded as very inflexible. In addition, there is an NGO budget line and AECI has started signing agreements with a number of humanitarian NGOs... (CAP: Open and Permanent Call for Appeals)

AECI's 2005 humanitarian aid budget in euros is as follows:

Budget line	2005	2004	Increase
Humanitarian Aid	24,857,780		
Food Aid	5,990,000		
In kind payments	2,688		
Total HA budget	30,850,468		
Total AECI budget			

AECI has utilised an estimated 463,548 euros for the tsunami operation out of the 24,857,780 euros available under the humanitarian budget line. This represents less than 2%.

The MAEC's Plan for Spanish Cooperation 2005-2008 recognises the dire need for institutional reform in the field of humanitarian aid. The plan foresees drastic changes in this area which includes the establishment of a humanitarian aid office and a dramatic budget increase in humanitarian spending- which would represent 7% of ODA by 2008. As the current Spanish government has committed to ODA reaching 0.5% of GDP by 2008, up from 0.3%, the budget increase is all the more significant. The plan was published in January 2005 and despite its short existence, it is already anticipated that the process of reform will not be as far reaching.

Have committed funds increased overall spending? (I.e. were new funds allocated or was the emergency relief funding reallocated from other budget lines?). If other budget lines were affected, which? What was the immediate impact on other planned interventions? Was all funding provided in the form of grants and untied aid?

- What role, if any, did the Flash Appeal and the FTS play in terms of the donor funding?

The Flash Appeal and the FTS and other mechanisms play no role in Spanish State funding. In terms of funding UN agencies, AECI has only funded the FAO and has managed to do so because one of the two main budget lines it utilises for humanitarian aid funding is earmarked for food aid and food security.

- Has there been a concentration of funds in a few organizations/institutions or have funds been distributed more widely? (How does this compare with percentages of allocations committed in other disasters?)
- Did funds flow to private companies for implementation purposes?
- Were military assets employed?
- Were any donations in kind? If so, what types of goods were provided?
- What implementation mechanisms were foreseen and utilized? Have different partnerships developed?

The Ministry of Defence

Representatives from the Ministry of Defence feel that there is a social demand on the part of Spaniards for the military to intervene in humanitarian crises. Deploying military assets in disaster scenarios is regarded as an essential tool of State action. It is up to the government to make a political decision and give the order which triggers deployment. The MoD then considers three main issues:

- Information on the area
- Capacity of Spanish armed forces and of other actors,
- Time span and duration

On the January 7th 2005, the President's crisis cabinet decided to contribute military assets to Tsunami relief efforts. Three officials were immediately dispatched to Indonesia. The MoD then took into account three main requirements:

- Concentration of efforts and involvement in a single area,
- the need for rapid action,
- the sustainability of the military's intervention.

In addition, MoD representatives stressed the importance of providing what is needed as opposed to what one wants to give. In this instance, the Indonesian government was clear on the fact that they did not want doctors or medicines but transport and a reconstruction unit to improve access to affected areas. Much of the information the MoD used in deciding its involvement came from the Spanish Embassy in Jakarta. Spanish military assets in the tsunami relief operation involved aerial means and an amphibious maritime vessel, *Buque Galicia*.¹⁰ A hospital, reconstruction unit and three helicopters were included in the vessel. It is the presence of the *Buque Galicia* that enabled the military to be fully self-reliant and sustainable. Two CN 235 planes were destined for Medan. The planes were redirected towards Pekanbaru at a 180 mile distance, because the Medan airport was saturated. The planes returned a month before the *Buque Galicia*. Military support was also provided to Spanish agencies with the use of 6 military flights and assistance at the Torrejon airbase. The cost of a one way flight between Spain and Indonesia is estimated at 30,000 euros.

The 7.8 million euros foreseen for the military operation *Respuesta Solidaria* came from the budgetary provision 228 which has an initial expandable allocation of 10 million euros. The use of the budget and its increase is approved by the Council of Ministers. The 7.8 million euros was an initial forecast of expenses. The operation ended up costing 8,086,090 euros.

This military intervention in support of the tsunami disaster relief effort was not unique, nor was its relatively limited duration. On occasion of the floods in Mozambique in the year 2000, military assets were deployed for a month and a half and in the aftermath of Hurricane Mitch, deployment in Central America lasted two and a half months.

Contrary to what has been stated in different sources, it is clear that the decision to commit Spanish military assets was largely supply driven and a Spanish presidency initiative. The decision itself was taken at a rather late date when the Indonesian government had already decided that it wanted to limit the deployment and length of stay of foreign military troops to a maximum three month period after the tsunami. MoD decision-making and deployment was as rapid as could be expected considering that means were immediately made available and that the amphibious boat would have to travel all the way to Indonesia. It should be recognised that at the Spanish level, no other agencies can deploy the logistic means and provide the type of assistance which was provided by the Spanish military in Banda Aceh. While in Indonesia, the Spanish military worked alongside Australian and German military forces. Representatives claim that it is preferable that NGOs have direct contact with the local population. The MoD however, feels that Spanish NGOs should work in those areas where national military assets are

¹⁰ *Buque Galicia* is one of two amphibious boats that Spain possesses.

deployed. This was not the case in Banda Aceh but occurs in other crises such as Haiti. Humanitarian agencies have expressed concern regarding these provisions as they believe it may compromise the independence and impartiality of their action.

Spanish humanitarian agencies have expressed concern regarding the systematic and increasing use of military assets in humanitarian scenarios. Very little independent evidence based research has been undertaken to assess the efficiency, effectiveness, appropriateness, and opportunity cost of military involvement. It is not clear whether the Spanish presidency ever considered the appropriateness or potential risks involved in military deployment. In addition, considering that in many instances this represents Spain's most important contribution, the Spanish government should evaluate this form of intervention and consider all options available.

Other Ministries: the Ministry of Commerce, Tourism and Industry, the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of the Environment

The MoCTI is responsible for the management of FAD funds. The department handling the FAD was previously, before the government changed in 2004, located in the Ministry of the Economy. The FAD are tied aid funds which have been utilised in numerous occasions in funding humanitarian aid. In fact they became the main instrument with which the Spanish state funded humanitarian aid with. On this occasion, in the aftermath of the tsunami disaster, the Council of Ministers decided to commit 50 million euros in FAD funds

The Ministry of the Interior plays a minor role in emergency responses in terms of funding but is a traditional AECI partner in the provision of disaster assistance.

The Ministry of the Environment

Decentralised Cooperation: the Generalitat¹¹ of Catalonia through ACCD

In addition to the 661,202.63 euros of decentralized cooperation funds which are channeled through AECI, autonomous regions and local entities have committed approximately 6 million euros to the Tsunami response.

The government of Catalonia through the activity of the ACCD illustrates what decentralised cooperation represents within the Spanish aid system. The ACCD is constituted as a public company which enables it to circumvent many of the administrative and legal obstacles which agencies like AECI face and that are not suited to the provision of international aid. ACCD representatives consider that it is because of they are established as a company that they are able to act rapidly and in a flexible manner and guarantee the availability of funds within a few days.

¹¹ *Generalitat* is the term in Catalan for Government.

The total budget foreseen for the Tsunami relief operation is 689,000 euros. 539,000 of which are from the ACCD and 150,000 were provided by the Department of Social Welfare. The budget allocated for humanitarian aid for 2005 only amounts to 700,000 euros. Already, 400,000 euros, almost 60% of the budget available, has been spent in the Tsunami operation. The Catalan government has however, expressed its intention of increasing humanitarian funds by 400,000 euros if necessary.

As in the cases of AECI and the MoD, the ACCD resorted to providing direct medical assistance. In fact over 45 % of the assistance funded by the ACCD is in the medical sector. It is the first time that the Catalan Agency has intervened directly in the field. Starting from this first experience the ACCD hopes to further develop its response in humanitarian crises and is coordinating efforts in this direction with the different governmental departments. Observers claim that this form of assistance provides for high visibility in Europe. This view was shared by ECHO that claimed that health assistance was an attractive sector that was far more covered than other basic sectors such as water and sanitation.



The perception among humanitarian NGOs in Spain is that Catalonia managed to capitalise on the Tsunami response by acting rapidly and communicating its intervention effectively.

The ACCD has two ways of funding humanitarian aid. The first is defined as “direct” and involved the funding of one NGO (ACH), the *Generalitat’s* Medical Mission in the field alongside *Generalitat* personnel, the *Generalitat’s* Forensic Mission in Thailand, an agreement with UNDP for the BCPR and an additional project which has yet to be identified. The other funding modality, known as “indirect”, is provided in the framework of the *ad hoc* appeal of the Catalan Committee of Emergency and Humanitarian Aid (CCAHE).¹² As a result of this appeal, two NGO projects were funded as well as the provision of medical material and supplies via the Humanitarian Aid framework agreements signed with Farmaceuticos Mundi.

Agency	Country	Sector	Amount Committed	Disbursed	
				2/05	9/05
ACH	Sri Lanka	Water and sanitation	50,000 €	50,000 €	50,000 €
	Indonesia		2,000 €	2,000 €	2,000 €
ACCD	Indonesia	Medical	39,000 €	-	-
Fundación Vicente Ferrer	India	Rehabilitación	50,000 €	50,000 €	50,000 €
Farmaceutics Mundi	Indonesia	Medical	8,000 €	8,000 €	8,000 €
UNDP/BCP	Sri Lanka	Disaster	35,000 €	-	-

¹² The CCAHE is presided by the Secretary of External Cooperation and the vice-presidencies are held by the Director of ACCD and the presidency of the Council for Development Cooperation. In addition there are nine trustee positions which are detained by representatives of the departments of the Interior, Health, the Secretariat of International Relations, the City of Barcelona, Catalan Funds for Development Cooperation, the Presidency of the Catalan Federation of NGOs and three representatives of Humanitarian Action NGOs.

R		Prevention			
ACCD/MDM	Indonesia	Medical	95,000 €	95,000 €	95,000 €
MDM	Indonesia	Medical	100,000 €	100,000 €	100,000 €
Unallocated	Indonesia	-	130,000 €	130,000 €	130,000 €
ACCD/CCCB	Barcelona	Seminar	30,000 €	30,000 €	30,000 €
Total			539,000 €	465,000 €	465,000 €



Timeline

In December the ACCD made an initial contribution of 52,000 euros to the NGO Acción Contra el Hambre for water supply material.

Sector Allocations and Geographic Focus by Donor and Budget

- ◆ Data should *be provided for humanitarian aid*
- ◆ To the sectors defined by OCHA, “logistics” has been added to account for military assets, transportation and emergency teams, etc.

Have donor institutions funded non-traditional areas and sectors?

Information should be provided on whether the donor regularly funds humanitarian aid interventions in the countries that were affected by the tsunami and whether efforts in disaster preparedness and mitigation have been engaged in the past.

III. Good Humanitarian Donorship

Provide an assessment of donor funding policy on the basis of Humanitarian Donorship Principles and Good Practice.

1. Humanitarian principles and objectives

⇒ Was funding guided by principles of *humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence*? Was funding directed towards easing human suffering and provided in a way that did not favour one of the sides in conflict? (Related to point 3).

- How were **international humanitarian law, refugee law and human rights** considered in both the strategy and funding of donors in response to the tsunami?
- What efforts have been engaged in promoting the use of IASC guidelines, RC Code of Conduct and IDP Guiding Principles?
 - Did the donor uphold the principles of humanitarian aid in responding to the tsunami disaster? Was funding explicitly and exclusively channelled only to those institutions that claim to adhere to this code of conduct and aspire to Sphere Minimum Standards in Disaster Response? (Related to needs based funding and choice of independent implementing channels, etc.).

2. Flexibility and timeliness

- How **flexible and timely** was funding? Can intended funding be reallocated to another crisis?
 - ⇒ (see criteria for flexible and timely funding).

3. Needs based funding

- To what extent did tsunami funding follow a **needs-oriented approach** and allocate funding on the basis of needs assessments? What criteria were followed? Was there a shared analysis of needs?
 - How were needs assessed?
 - What sources of information were available? (Local governments, in-country donor staff, humanitarian professionals dispatched, Embassy personnel, media, etc.)

- What role did appeals play (Flash appeals, Governments, UN, NGOs)?
4. Beneficiary participation
- Was funding directed in a manner that supported **beneficiary participation**? Provide criteria for forms of funding that favour beneficiary participation.
5. Disaster preparedness and mitigation
- What efforts if any have been undertaken in **disaster risk reduction, mitigation, preparedness**? Including efforts engaged prior to the disaster and tsunami funding committed for this purpose: amount and percentage. Does the donor have a specific budget line for this purpose?
6. Linkages to recovery and development
- What measures have been undertaken to provide humanitarian assistance in ways that are **supportive of recovery and long-term development**?
 - ⇒ List support measures (coordination with development departments, % of social budget foreseen in reconstruction phase)
7. UN Coordination and ICRC/IFRC mandate
- To what extent and how has the donor supported **OCHA's and other key humanitarian UN agency coordinating and ICRC/IFRC specific roles** in the tsunami disaster? How has the flow of funds been coordinated internationally and nationally?
 - Provide the level of funding provided for UN coordination and ICRC/IFRC mandate.
 - Describe what measures if any are undertaken by the donor to promote that organizations and other actors funded respect UN and RC roles.
8. Effect on other crises
- How and with what resources has the response to the tsunami been funded? Have funds that were intended for other crises been diverted? Has the generous response to the **Tsunami affected funding of other emergencies** in 2005? If emergency budgets were used or depleted how these budgets have been allocated in 2004 and 2003?
9. Predictability and flexibility
- Has the donor engaged efforts to ensure **predictability and flexibility in funding to support key humanitarian organization**?
 - Which agencies have been funded? Are they regarded as *key* and what have been the selection criteria?
 - How flexible and predictable have funding mechanisms proved? ⇒ Definition of **key (agency competence), flexibility and predictability**.
 - Could key organizations rely on donor for funding?
10. Appeals and Action Plan

- Has the donor contributed responsibly, and on the basis of burden-sharing, to **United Nations Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeals and to International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement appeals**, and actively supported the formulation of **Common Humanitarian Action Plans**?
 - What do we consider to be a responsible contribution to appeals? (% of coverage of appeals in this emergency).
 - Does the percentage of coverage of the appeal differ from that of other emergencies?

11. Response capacity

- Has the donor supported mechanisms for **contingency planning** by humanitarian organisations, including, as appropriate, allocation of funding, to strengthen capacities for response?

⇒List contingency planning mechanisms and types of funding that strengthen response capacity (i.e. training, professionalisation of staff, disaster preparedness, emergency stocks, contingency funds, disaster response teams). (Target: specific budget line allocating 5-10% of annual funding for preparedness activities of the organizations). ⊗ See on page 61 of August 2005 Humanitarian Response Review.

12. Civilian humanitarian action

- What efforts have been engaged in **affirming primary position of civilian organisations** in the implementation of humanitarian action?
 - If military assets were provided, did the donor ensure that civilian organisations had an overarching role over the military in the humanitarian response? And if so, list measures that were undertaken.

13. Evaluation

- Has the donor supported the **evaluation** of the tsunami response?
 - Is the donor supporting the TEC with funds?
 - Is the donor carrying out its own evaluation processes? (type, amount)
 - Did the donor cooperate with the evaluation (agree to the interview, provide necessary data and information)? Is the donor interested in the results of the TEC?
 - Will the donor participate in its dissemination and in the implementation of evaluation results?

14. Financial transparency and accountability

- What efforts have been engaged to ensure **accuracy, timeliness and transparency in donor reporting** on official humanitarian tsunami response spending? How has the donor reported its contributions?

IV. Decision making criteria

- Have past experiences had an influence on decision-making processes and if so what are the principles and criteria?
- Have these criteria been developed in collaboration with others or are they part of a top down approach?
- Was specific criteria utilized for decision-making or were decisions taken on an ad hoc basis?
- Did agency competence (organizational capacity, experience, ability to raise funds, quality of proposal) or needs assessments play a role in decision making?
- To what extent were responsibilities assigned and how were personnel needs addressed? Were additional means provided? Were responsibilities to manage these funds delegated adequately? Did donors provide support to staff in order to administer, distribute and allocate funds in an effective manner?
- What efforts, if any, were engaged to ensure professional humanitarian staff at donor and implementing actor level?
- How much of the funding allocated was supply driven?

V. Response strategy

- Provide an overview and appraisal of standing donor state disaster response for the tsunami.

Visibility considerations

- Was there a specific strategy being implemented and if so what are the main features of this strategy?
- To what extent did the donor take into account the conflict situations in Indonesia and Sri Lanka and carry out conflict mapping and analysis?
- Was a risk analysis or ex-ante evaluation undertaken prior to specific intervention and if not how was a risk assessed?
- Have funding strategies been adapted over time to the needs of the affected countries, and if so what are the external influences that caused these changes.
- Has the donor state engaged in efforts to facilitate donor agreement on common operational objectives?