The Media-Driven Humanitarian Response

Public perceptions and humanitarian realities as two faces of the same coin

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Media business is news coverage and distribution in real time. Humanitarian catastrophes are extreme events, characterised by all the attributes of striking news, and capable of mobilising public opinion worldwide within hours.

The problem is that a media-driven humanitarian response focuses only on fresh crises, making it incompatible with Principle 11 of the Good Humanitarian Donorship Practice Code, which says: “Strive to ensure that funding of humanitarian action in new crises does not adversely affect the meeting of needs in ongoing crises.”

This paper reviews how media processes influence humanitarian intervention and the various options for managing that response. In particular, we will look at the future of the relationship between media and humanitarian action, in the context of “new media” and “citizen journalism.” In the words of one contributor to the World Disasters Report, “one must recognize information itself as a form of disaster response.”

Modern communications and the growth of humanitarian aid

The 20th century information revolution paved the way for contemporary humanitarian aid by exposing to the whole world the misfortunes of people living in areas never seen and sharing their suffering in real time with an affluent, protected public. Thus, the humanitarian movement has become a vector of globalisation. Today’s interconnected media networks are the vehicle through which human suffering has become universalised and interventions borderless. In short, the media spurs governments and public opinion into humanitarian action to such an extent that Boutros Boutros Ghali once called CNN the 16th member of the United Nations Security Council.

The 1960s and 1970s saw the increasing solidarity of what Rony Brauman, former President of Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), called “an international morality in action,” characterised by the routeing of emergency care and “media fuss.” There is even a “before” and “after,” marked by the 1967 civil war in Biafra (Nigeria), which killed over 1.5 million people. Following this, the humanitarian aid strategy “moved from explanation to emotion, compassion to pity, quest for justice to complaint, information to communication, meaning to feeling.” As a result, the complexity of political and historical realities has been reduced to sentiment. The active mobilisation of Western public opinion opened the floodgate for funds. This marriage of media and aid supported the development of nongovernmental humanitarian organisations such as Oxfam and Médecins Sans Frontières. Today, humanitarian organisations and the media, in concert, continue to sell tragic events to the public and donor governments. In the words of Bernard Kouchner, founder of Nobel prize-winning MSF, an event in our modern societies “is valued exclusively by the audience rating which it is likely to garner.”

Media and NGOs as “co-producers” of humanitarian events

It is not by chance that some catastrophes create more news than others. Stéphanie Dupont argues that they simply match TV rating criteria; “Media turn humanitarian causes into audience figures.” Rony Brauman has demonstrated that broad press coverage results if events meet four basic conditions:

1. **Continuous flow of images:** Representations of the drama are allowed to accumulate in the collective unconsciousness and reach a polarising critical mass; these images then become part of daily life due to their proximity; they then marginalise other events in the private sphere; according to Brauman, TV news becomes an “open tap with images.”
2. **No competition:** Only one disaster at a time is the rule of the game when communicating about a catastrophe; this reinforces the impact of the story and avoids trivialisation that would push viewers’ emotional tolerance level beyond their limit. As we say, “too many calamities cheapen misfortune.”

3. **Innocence of the victims:** This explains the media’s preference for natural disasters, as opposed to armed conflicts, in which victims—other than children—are often presumed guilty; this is why images of young people dominate television reports.

4. **Presence of a mediator:** These are usually represented by doctors, international or nongovernmental organisations, and peacekeepers, who accompany the suffering with a remedy at hand; the mediator effects “the exchange of money for moral worth.”8 In recent years, the use of celebrities as mediators—labelled “ambassadors”—has developed a glamour version of humanitarian aid. These celebrities are supposed to create greater awareness—that is, more media interest—and therefore attract more donor money.

**Positive complementarities risk exploitation and excess**

No one disputes the fact that it is vital and philosophically reassuring that human beings are moved by images of catastrophes, since it demonstrates our humanity and generates a dynamic of empathy and solidarity. It is easy to agree with Bernard Kouchner when he says that “without images, there is no indignation. The enemy of dictatorships and underdevelopment remains photography, and the outburst of anger which it activates.”

However, people are seldom informed about why the calamities which make them cry occur. What is worse, they do not know why the crises repeat themselves year after year. Unfortunately, the universal presence of digital images leads to excess on the part of both media and humanitarian actors: “the weight of words is ridiculously light compared to the shock of shots.”9

Since the 1980s, humanitarian communication strategy has not refrained from capitalising on visual emotion and, as a consequence, has neglected the need for reason. The emotional strategy eliminates analysis, questioning, and political engagement. In time, this has led humanitarian aid organisations to focus on what I call “hopeless cases,” to cohabit with the military, and to lend themselves to being used as good will insurance by politicians. Thus, in October 1984, international public emotion was at a peak in the face of distressing images from more than 400 television channels of the Ethiopian famine. Tragically, this charitable smoke screen facilitated the massive displacement of the population towards the south of the country by the totalitarian government in power. These deportations left more than 200,000 dead, while, at the same time, Western youth, with the best of intentions, called for international solidarity with local authorities by singing “We Are the World”!

Today, modern technologies make it possible for journalists to transmit images from isolated and devastated sites in real time. But once on the ground, they often remain dependent on NGOs or soldiers to facilitate their logistics. This “embeddedness” compromises their independence of movement and coverage, and their capacity for analysis of the crisis. This is all the more the case since the majority of them are foreign correspondents, deposited suddenly in the country for a few days, often having landed only a few hours prior to the shoot.10 The pervasive sense of critical emergency generated by these “salesmen of hot news” interferes with humanitarian aid and its genuine mission, namely to provide the most urgent medical assistance, anticipate the needs for rebuilding and implement prevention programmes.

Today, however, experts know that an immediate presence at the heart of the drama often gives only the illusion of effectiveness. Nonetheless, it remains a cornerstone of humanitarian aid marketing techniques. NGOs seen as the first on the battle field by their donors demonstrate they are more operational than their competitors. Answering questions in front of TV cameras, NGO spokespersons are becoming true “special media correspondents” in the eyes of spectators. Thus, on today’s medical assistance missions, the “stethoscope and the microphone are two essential pieces of emergency equipment.”11

The commercial pressure to show stereotypes of misfortune to viewers worldwide is so demanding that journalists even seek elsewhere what they cannot find on the spot. Thus, many photos of Rwanda victims were, in fact, shot in Zaire.12 Some reporters even manipulated images to give them a more dramatic character by means of such techniques as cleaning, changing colours, correcting the level of saturation, modifying the landscape, amplifying smoke and fire, and even re-setting the entire scene—for example, by adding children’s
toys—all of which contributed to the creation of new legends.

Corpses are central to media stories. The ethical problem stems not so much from the statistics—which, after all, aims to give an indication of the horror and scale of a catastrophe—but, rather, the “reality show” of dead bodies. To report death “live” can even make journalists liable for the crime of not assisting people in danger. Everyone still remembers the little Colombian girl caught in moving sand and dying on air in November 1985. “The cameraman was desperate. He did not know what to do. The first-aid workers hopelessly awaited a wrecking crane to release the child whose legs were blocked under a concrete beam. But the crane never arrived. Between two shots, the TV team tried to release the child but in vain.”

Not all deaths carry the same weight. “There are those which elicit more compassion than others.” For example, in its coverage of the Indian Ocean tsunami, the Daily Mail, carried front page headlines on the tiny percentage of British casualties. Thus, for many local readers and viewers in Europe, it was not the 300,000 local people killed by the tsunami that had the shock value, but the plight of their own nationals who had the misfortune to be caught in the disaster.

The representation by the media of an imaginary risk that corpses represent for the living creates public anxiety that generates irrational security requirements, cultural, religious, economic, political and social tensions, even civil disorder and panic. Indeed, one of the rumours most difficult to manage after a catastrophe is the assumed health hazard of corpses. This myth leads to hurried collective burials or cremations, which seriously disturb the normal mourning process, and later pose painful and delicate problems for the identification of victims by their families.

On the contrary, it has been known for a long time that corpses do not represent a tangible medical risk. Sometimes, despite assurances from international organisations experienced in managing natural disasters, the physical anguish at the sight of the corpses, which inspire revulsion, fear, and a sense of guilt among survivors, and which provide an unending reminder of the misfortune that struck the community, has an impact on local official declarations in the media. The real risk is the precarious living conditions of survivors.

Unfortunately, the media all too often prefer to present macabre scenes of mass graves rather than the continued suffering of the survivors. In fact, when journalists describe survivors, they tend to dismiss them as “virtual living” because they are “socially dead.” They are portrayed as “deaths forgotten by destiny,” that is, those who should have died in the catastrophe, but who are still alive. In fact, most of the survivors do not understand why God saved their lives, and often feel guilty that they are still among the living.

The media and a new global culture of risk

By selecting which catastrophic events are worthy of being seen and remembered, the media is one of the cornerstones of our collective memory and therefore contributes to building a new global culture of risk. By showing all kind of anonymous “heroes” in action, in circumstances of emergency or physical danger, the media divides humanity into “God’s people”—worthy of being cared for—and the “Devil’s people”—condemned to become collateral damage, as in a video game.

In the chaos of disasters, both local people and decision-makers become victims capable of functioning only in the immediate present. Their minds are not able to design future scenarios in the vacuum left by the disaster. “Many of those who survived the tsunami were left without a recognizable world… they became ‘strangers,’ their estrangement coming not from leaving home, but from having their homes leave them.” Such extreme situations can generate irrational behaviour, which adds to the difficulties in managing the crisis effectively. This is why the intervention of external actors who are capable of identifying risks, applying immediate concrete solutions and communicating hope for the future is so essential. “This is the role of international organisations and NGOs. Journalists cannot play such a part, as their professional objective is not crisis management, but the narration of the stories of people’s misfortune.”

Nevertheless, the media has become more proactive and engaged, particularly in documenting and exposing leadership responsibilities as well as failures in the face of catastrophic events. Journalists not only identify delays and drawbacks in rescue operations, but are quick to criticise official declarations which deny the severity of a crisis, or the refusal of foreign assistance for political reasons. The reluctance of the Indian and Thai governments to call for international humanitarian aid after the tsunami was described by the national media as evidence of their incompetence and incapacity to cope with such an event. Today, global public opinion will not accept half-hearted efforts in humanitarian assistance to the
victims of disasters, whoever they are and wherever they may be—as President George W. Bush learned, to his chagrin, after the disastrous crisis management after Hurricane Katrina.

Nevertheless, the question remains whether the media can act as a watchdog for the accountability and effective governance of states and NGOs regarding risk management, transparency in the funding of operations, the reconstruction of livelihoods, the evaluation of local populations’ real needs, ethnic discrimination, and other humanitarian issues. In 2005, roundtable meetings bringing together government officials, civil society representatives, tsunami victims, and journalists were held in Hyderabad and Kerala by the Asian Media Information and Communication Centre of India, with the support of UNESCO and the Friedrich Ebert Foundation. The outcome was a call for “more investigating reporting probing the needs and conditions of ordinary people and communities… whose stories remain untold, in addition to the fishermen who already had made headlines.”

Victims who are not making news may be forgotten.

Memory lapse, the cornerstone of media stories

Do the media have a memory? When reporting certain cases the media will not fail to point out the long list of similar past events. However, in other situations, history will be buried in the tomb of silence. The tsunami of 26 December 2004 was regarded by the media as “extraordinary,” “unique,” and “of a quasi unequalled significance.” “While it is true that the death of 300,000 victims represents a terrible tragedy, it is no less true that, in strictly scientific terms, this tsunami was an event of average proportions. The wave hardly exceeded ten meters in height, not as high as other waves seen in the past and in other parts of the planet.”

The history of tsunamis began in Lisbon, in November 1755, events which caused deaths in the hundreds of thousands. No one had done anything to prevent these phenomena from happening again and again. Two months after the tragic days of Christmas 2004, none of the international media was speaking about Sumatra and its tsunami. The media will recall the disaster only on annual anniversaries, but probably not for more than five years.

Proper funding means institutional independence, but also marketing techniques

Humanitarian aid organisations cannot be completely independent from states if they are not able to raise funds separately. With this in mind, it is therefore necessary for them to be able to both mobilise public opinion and provoke a donor response. Marketing studies demonstrate that “it is not so much the magnitude of the catastrophe and the number of deaths, but the breadth of the press coverage which makes donors react.”

By emotionally engaging people with the victims of a disaster and refusing to portray the catastrophe as an inevitable accident of fate, humanitarian action becomes an act of empathy and economic engagement. Public emotion is directed and shaped by the global media. Humanitarian aid becomes a player on the stage and is part of the spectacle which aims to attract the generosity of small, rather than institutional, donors. Regrettably, this transforms citizens into consumers of tragedies, even voyeurs. In fact, there exists a “televised dramaturgy of humanitarian aid, with its emblematic characters, its scenic conventions, its linguistic rules… the victim/first aid worker “couple” are made to dance ad nauseum to the music of our feelings.”

Since the 1980’s, one can even see the development of a new form of aesthetics in the photographic representations of misfortune, often exhibited and awarded international prizes.

Competition in the field of humanitarian aid is intense and driven by the need to protect and/or enlarge an organisation’s market share and its presence in the media. This is why actors increasingly position their services by using what is known in the trade as a USP (Unique Selling Proposition) such as hunger, disability, or child adoption. Some develop broadly universal discourses; others denounce political responsibilities and failures; still others defend the duty of governments to intervene. The result of this humanitarian market segmentation has been the creation of a congestion of myriad organisations and messages working on the ground after any spectacular disaster.

The development of local media and the sustainability of humanitarian aid

UNESCO’s Belgrade Declaration, adopted in 2004, emphasises both “the responsibility of the international community in making reliable information available during times of crisis, as well as the necessity of
strengthening local media and ensuring its independence throughout transition processes.”

In the field, there is, indeed, an interaction between peacekeeping forces, humanitarian organisations, and the local media, but in many situations it is hard to differentiate information from public relations, or worse, from strict censorship. In countries where the humanitarian situation is severe, freedom of speech is often virtually non-existent, and, at times, even the physical safety of journalists is uncertain. The local media, particularly in conflict zones, is condemned to work not only under the direct control of local authorities but, increasingly, under threat from insurgent groups. In these circumstances, international peacekeeping forces often choose to communicate primarily with global media representatives, because relationship-building with the local media remains delicate and sometimes counterproductive, particularly when considering the poor working standards. As a result, local access to information, one of the fundamental pillars of democracy and sustainable peace, is seriously hampered.

As it is sometimes hard for local populations to believe that a humanitarian organisation is truly neutral, it is crucial to provide accurate information to the local media “in order to raise awareness about what assistance they [NGOs] can provide, secondly, to win trust and enhance security for the staff and the chance of success in their work, and thirdly, to raise awareness about international law.”

In remote areas, broadcast or non-print media is the medium of choice for reaching people who live with the threat of natural hazards. “Radio in particular is a very accessible medium for poor people, especially women in their homes. Apart from radio’s usefulness in supplying information after the sudden onset of disasters, skilfully produced radio dramas can be used to help reduce ongoing disaster risks... In Cuba, for example, a high public awareness of disasters has ensured that death tolls from hurricanes are far lower than in neighbouring countries. Cubans understand the warnings issued by their meteorologists and relayed by the media. They know what to do and where to go. Vulnerable communities keep in close contact with government at all levels—unlike in Haiti which... suffers many more disaster deaths. Cuba’s success shows that scientific knowledge alone isn’t enough; information only becomes useful when it is shared with people at risk.”

These issues raise a number of questions for donors on how best to approach the challenge of local media development. Access to free media on the ground, i.e., strengthening local media capacity, should in fact be one of the criteria used to evaluate the success of a humanitarian intervention. For example, Novicki states that, “in Liberia, Charles Taylor persecuted the media and at the time of his departure the media was in a poor state, with only a few functioning print and broadcast outlets. One year on from the start of the UN mission, there were 10 radio stations in Monrovia, 30 newspapers, and two TV stations.”

Traditional and new media convergence

Access to information is decisive in life-threatening situations. In this context, new information technology is seen as a vital component of natural hazard Early Warning Systems (EWS), although many have yet to be implemented in the zones most at risk.

In the space of a few years, the Internet has not only become a privileged media channel to access and share life-saving information, but it has also created a virtual global space where isolated people and those under state control and censorship can have a voice. It has also become an extremely powerful tool through which to collect “new money” from people who are “younger than traditional donors.” Today, one third of donations received come through the Internet.

The mobile phone is also becoming an essential instrument in the event an emergency, particularly through the use of Short Message Service (SMS). In 2004, “Operation SMS for Asia in France made it possible to collect more than 3 million SMS in one week according to telecommunication operators.” SMS were also used by the French authorities to contact isolated tourists in Asia during the tsunami, thus informing them in real time of the developing situation and to locate the missing. Another example, from the IFRC’s World Disasters Report: “After Gujarat’s 2001 earthquake, the local women’s union Self-Employed Women’s Association (SEWA) distributed 200 handsets to its staff, enabling them to communicate without returning to headquarters. SEWA also used satellite TV to conduct video conferences with its field staff and to broadcast public interviews with government officials.”

The birth and multiplication of mobile phone paparazzi and video-bloggers is a perfect example of how new communication technology has created an epistemological explosion in the media coverage of catastrophes. Citizen journalism has become a flourishing business.
“Some of the most striking film of the tsunami was taken not by professionals, but by amateurs. They used relatively cheap, relatively simple digital video cameras to shoot the footage. They then put their video images up on the Internet… The clips are short, grainy and jumpy, and the sound is marginal. It took only hours for videos like this to make it from Thailand, Sri Lanka, and Indonesia to the Internet… Some did get their videos to the websites of mainstream news outlets such as The Washington Post and Britain’s Guardian newspaper. Some of the amateur footage appeared on broadcast outlets such as CNN and the BBC.”

Such “citizen journalism” represents a gold mine for the media. The BBC has set up teams of full-time journalists to collect amateur video and photographic material. The agency “Scoopit” is the first of its kind to act as intermediary between amateur photographers and the professional media. Television outlets now send journalists with cash on the ground to buy amateur material, often for an exorbitant price, and then make it available to television viewers around the world.

This proliferating amateur footage intensifies the emotional dimension of already tragic events. The primitive techniques used by frontline witnesses add to the feeling of chaos and highlight the fragility of our lives. Violent and hideous realities are seen in the rough, no longer filtered through professional eyes.

Media business is incompatible with Principle 11 of Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD)

The key questions for donors are: how much, why, and to whom. There are no easy answers to these questions, which have become more complex because perception has increasingly become reality, often driven by media “logic.” The business of media is news coverage and distribution in real time. Humanitarian catastrophes are extreme events, capturing all attributes of striking news, and capable of mobilising public opinion worldwide within hours. Television coverage and NGO marketing efforts thus operate hand in hand to target the general public. Broadcasting triggers the attention of 33 percent and direct mailing another 37 percent of potential donors.

The problem is that a media-driven humanitarian response focuses on new crisis only, which makes it incompatible with the Principle 11 of the GHD, namely, “Strive to ensure that funding of humanitarian action in new crises does not adversely affect the meeting of needs in ongoing crises.” In fact, the December 2004 tsunami washed out other crises, such as the famine in Somalia or the spread of AIDS in Africa. It took three years to rebuild public awareness about the humanitarian tragedy in Darfur!

Lessons from the controversy created by the over-abundance of resources available in response to the 2004 tsunami should be taken into consideration when marketing humanitarian aid in future disasters. Eight days after the tragic event, Pierre Salignon, managing director of MSF—which had collected €40 million from donors around the world—decided to close their appeal for funds, arguing that their capacity to use this money in the affected regions was overburdened. He said they were acting transparently and honestly with respect to the donors. Nevertheless, this decision triggered much criticism. Through the response to the tsunami, many donors discovered the heterogeneity of the NGO world, as well as the wide variety of the missions and mandates of these agencies and their sometimes limited capacity to act on the ground. Financial evaluations following the relief effort, investigating how funds were used, illustrated that the concerns raised by MSF should have been taken more seriously. Operational capability and accountability, not media publicity, should be the main criteria by which donors fund NGOs.

Prime Minister Tony Blair accurately observed that there are emergencies equivalent to a tsunami each week across Africa, and that it is possible to prevent these because many are man-made. How refreshing it was to hear this honest appraisal. Indeed, governments should adopt a more rational and sustainable approach when allotting humanitarian aid. Unfortunately, they are too often under the spell of the media. Equally problematic is the fact that government promises of humanitarian aid are frequently driven by national public opinion or foreign policy interests. At the time of the tsunami, the secondary benefits for the United States of helping the Muslim world were obvious, as were those for Japan in counterbalancing the power of China in Asia. Even Blair was accused of using this opportunity to improve his public image at home vis-à-vis his political rival Gordon Brown.

Media-driven humanitarian aid strengthens international civil society

It is difficult not to agree with Zsuzsa Ferenczy when she says that, “NGOs no longer limit their activities to
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humanitarian aid development on the ground. Their engagement implies also powerful testimonials which are able to create awareness and mobilize public opinion through communication strategies. Thanks to this new expertise and power, some NGOs are often seen as more capable of managing misfortunes than governments; they are not only active on the ground, but are an important source of information for the media and the state. As a result of this new awareness, NGOs are increasingly influencing international debates and negotiations.

This situation raises even more fundamental questions about the functioning of our present model of democracy. Elected leaders appear more and more to be unable to address and solve crises in a complex and fragile world. Who then decides what issues are worthy of our attention and which ones warrant mobilising citizens? The answer is straightforward: on the one hand, there are nongovernmental organisations—representing only themselves and speaking on behalf of a limited number of stakeholders—who advocate their viewpoints or beliefs and defend their interests; on the other hand, there is a global media hub—controlled increasingly by a few powerful individuals.

What is the future of the media/humanitarian action relationship?

The media industry is under heavy economic pressure for market shares and advertising revenue. This pressure will, no doubt, reinforce the present global trend to hook audiences with cut-and-paste news clips, popular local “soap” stories, and the occasional global event that floods viewers with violent emotion. As a consequence, it is highly unlikely that media treatment of humanitarian catastrophes is going to change in the near future.

The Internet, blogs, and citizen journalism are often idealised as the hoped-for transparent and free global communications network. However, it must be pointed out that it is still difficult to be sure of the credibility, much less the relevance of much information currently on the Internet, even in a social and political environment scanned by watchdogs. Needless to say, it is virtually impossible to detect misinformation or rumour in conflict situations, especially when dealing with countries under dictatorial control or disconnected from the rest of the world. Grassroots digital information is often purely emotional and self-centred and therefore lacking the necessary strategic relevance regarding community needs and action priorities.

In humanitarian situations, international organisations, no doubt, have a role to play in ensuring that global and local media work in cooperation with humanitarian actors and in harmony with the Good Humanitarian Donorship Practice Code. Having said this, international bodies do not have sufficient budgets or enough trained communication experts on the ground to implement this worthy goal. Nor, it must be said, does this important function even figure as part of their core mandate.

Conclusion

Following are two recommendations for improving the information interaction among all stakeholders in humanitarian crises:

• Journalists and NGOs must acknowledge that information alone is a form of humanitarian response. Therefore, as part of their ethical code of conduct, they must accept to be fully transparent in coordinating their coverage of disasters.

• Donors should always be aware that they are manipulated emotionally by both media and NGOs. When making decisions, they must remember that public perceptions and humanitarian realities are two faces of the same coin—the very coin that first-aid workers ask for and collect on behalf of victims. Donors should then take time to consider carefully and dispassionately before giving money and ask whether their chosen NGO fully represents the victims’ interests, or those of the organisation. In order to answer this delicate but crucial question, it must be realised that information supplied by the media is often not very useful. Rather, reading reports from agencies which specialise in evaluating humanitarian aid—much the same way that institutional investors study the recommendations of financial analysts—is probably the best approach.

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35 See Website at: http://www.masternewmedia.org/2005/01/02/full_tsunami_video_footage_pictures.htm
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40 For example, 80 percent of the French media is owned by two private groups, both of which are global leaders in the armaments business; this illustrates the well known fact that humanitarian crises and wars are two sides of one coin.