

Progress on the Front Lines

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Introduction

During my years as a member of Secretary-General Kofi Annan's senior management team, I saw first hand how effective multilateral action, in collaboration with important local and regional efforts, helped to build progress and peace in such war-torn societies as Liberia and Sierra Leone, Eastern Congo and Burundi, Angola and South Sudan, Northern Uganda, Kosovo, Timor-Leste, and Nepal.

The United Nations also coordinated massive, life-saving international relief following the Indian Ocean tsunami, the South Asian earthquake, the droughts in the Horn of Africa, the threatening hunger in Southern Africa, the July 2006 war in Lebanon, and the Darfur crisis. In several of these overwhelming emergencies, it was expected that hundreds of thousands of lives would be lost. But in all of these wars and disasters these sombre predictions were averted because multilateral action, building on local capacities, turned out to be infinitely more effective than what is even now recognised by much of world's media and national parliaments. This commitment to multilateralism and improved delivery of humanitarian assistance to save lives and alleviate suffering are at the heart of the Principles and Good Practice of Humanitarian Donorship (GHD), a commitment the Humanitarian Response Index aims to support.

Collective international responsibility for humanitarian action

Humanity fails collectively when multilateral action by member states of the United Nations lacks unity of purpose. We fail, tragically and repeatedly, when the United Nations and regional organisations do not have political will and are not provided with the minimum of economic and security resources needed from their member states. The endless ongoing suffering in Darfur, in Iraq, among Palestinians, and among the growing numbers of

climate-change victims in southern nations is a product of either senseless bickering or passive neglect among those leading nations that could untangle these conflicts.

Back in 2003 and early 2004, I naïvely believed that the growing but forgotten Darfur crisis would be resolved if we managed to bring it to the attention of world leaders. This was, after all not a tsunami, an earthquake, or a natural disaster. The violence and ethnic cleansing was man-made from start to finish. But even after the issue of Darfur was brought to the Security Council in April 2004, and after we did achieve the media attention we asked for, world leaders still did not exert the political pressure or offer the physical protection that were critical to stopping the atrocities. Instead, donor nations responded generously to enable us to bring emergency relief to the peoples of Darfur. As a result, the achievements of close to 14,000 Sudanese and international aid workers in Darfur in undertaking the world's largest humanitarian operation were nothing less than heroic.

Until the summer of 2007, and against all odds, my colleagues in Darfur were able to deliver life-saving relief every month since late 2004 to most of those in dire need. A comprehensive survey undertaken by UN and NGO experts in August 2006 showed that overall malnutrition had been reduced by half since we first obtained access to carry out our large international operation in mid-2004. When relief workers were finally able to get into the country in June of 2004, mortality rates fell to a fifth of what they had been when we did our first survey. Seventy-three percent of all Darfurians had access to safe drinking water. In 2006 alone, 550,000 tons of food had been delivered.

To my intense dismay, by the time of my fourth and final visit to Darfur in late 2006, I was told by the UN, nongovernmental, and Red Cross colleagues who gathered to see me in El Geneina in Western Darfur that all of these humanitarian achievements were "under massive attack." Their elected spokesman summed up

the tragic situation: “Militia attacks and banditry have rendered more than 95 percent of all roads in West Darfur no-go areas for humanitarian operations. As a result, an increasing number of camps are cut off from adequate and reliable assistance; in some instances, all basic humanitarian services have had to be shut down.”

Clearly, without a negotiated and political solution to the bitter conflict in Darfur, humanitarian efforts are rendered impossible or actually regress. I recall a long night from 2 to 3 July 2003 spent in negotiations with the Foreign Minister of Sudan to cement the first agreement on access for humanitarian organisations to Darfur. President Bashir and Secretary-General Kofi Annan then announced the so-called moratorium on aid restrictions at the end of our first visit, which saw the beginning of what was to be one of the largest humanitarian operations ever undertaken. But since then, new walls of administrative obstacles have slowly but surely been erected both in Khartoum and in Darfur, walls which have all but strangled our operations.

A similar paralysis of collective multilateral action is costing lives in a very different area. If our generation had managed to unite around curbing greenhouse gas emissions—as member states generally agreed in Rio de Janeiro as early as 1992—we might not have seen the relentless increase in natural disasters produced by extreme weather and climate change—as seen in Haiti and Niger. Seven times more livelihoods are devastated in our age by natural hazards as by war and strife. Humanitarian field workers cannot believe their eyes or their ears when some politicians and industrialists still insist on arguing that explosive global economic growth has not changed the climate. For many years we have seen how the lives of increasing numbers of people are destroyed by ever more extreme drought, hurricanes, and floods. In terms of loss of human life, the effects are almost always much greater in poor, developing countries. But even in Europe the great heat wave of 2003 took 71,000 lives. Decades ago, leading scientists on United Nations climate panels had already agreed that policy and behavioural change was urgently needed. If North Americans, Europeans, Chinese, and others had all started the process of change there and then, we would have had earlier positive results, and at a lower cost.

Just as Iraq is the symbol of unilateral impotence in the new millennium, the positive change that has taken place in the worst war zone of our generation, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), is symbolic of a multilateral success story. During six terrible years of war, from 1998 to 2004, nearly 4 million Congolese

died from malnutrition, preventable disease, and violence, according to the International Rescue Service. That loss of human life equals the entire population of Norway, or five Rwandan genocides, or nearly twenty times the human toll in the wars in Bosnia of the 1990s. Nowhere else have so many died from war during the last generation.¹

When I visited the DRC in 2003, a dozen or more armies were still fighting in Eastern Congo. Armed groups and militias roamed the land, made up of hundreds of thousands of ruthless, undisciplined men from neighbouring states, from the main ethnic groups, and from massive organised crime fuelled by illegal exploitation of Congo’s vast natural resources. Among them were some 30,000 child soldiers. In the crossfire of the many parallel armed conflicts was the defenceless civilian population.

But when I visited again in the autumn of 2006, much positive change was taking place. More than half of the 3.5 million displaced people had returned home. A series of militias had been disarmed. In conflict-prone areas of Katanga, Ituri and the Kivus, we met many other fighters who were waiting impatiently for small sums of money and support from the World Bank and the UN for demobilisation and reintegration, men who for more than a decade had preyed on others and lived by the gun, but who now told us they wanted to earn their livelihoods as workers in a peaceful society. For the first time, my humanitarian colleagues had access to nearly all major communities in that huge, conflicted, disaster-prone country. By 2006 and 2007, the death toll of more than one thousand per day during 1998–2004 was finally coming down.

What caused the turnaround in Congo? By 2004, after years of indecision, neglect, and penny-pinching in United Nations operations, a united Security Council finally made a concerted effort to provide a more robust peacekeeping force, and the European Union term pushed for generous funding for the enormous UN-led electoral process, and for our efforts to provide coordinated relief in all parts of the country. On the front lines of this increasingly effective operation were the good efforts of dozens of Congolese and international nongovernmental organisations, all UN humanitarian agencies, and a peacekeeping force consisting primarily of soldiers from the Asian and African nations, which have—with little publicity—helped pacify and secure larger regions of these enormous, lawless territories.

The challenges for humanitarian action

The world is currently witnessing the largest and best network of like-minded intergovernmental, governmental, and nongovernmental organisations acting as a channel for future investments in peace and development. By using highly specialised experts, operating on a large scale, utilising local networks and manpower, continuously building in quality controls and improved coordination mechanisms, humanitarian agencies can feed, vaccinate, and provide primary school education for children for a mere US\$2 dollars a day, even in the remotest crisis areas. Dollar for dollar, the investment is more cost-effective than anything I have experienced in the private and public sector in any society in the North or the West. Moreover, these nongovernmental and UN organisations are speaking out more systematically on behalf of neglected peoples and communities. Throughout my three and a half years as UN Emergency Relief Coordinator, I had a pulpit from which I could advocate more effectively for what I saw as the unvarnished truth than I had dreamed was possible when I took up the job in 2003. Every working week for more than three years, I could speak in the leading international media about unmet relief needs in exploding disasters, forgotten emergencies, and the abuse of civilians.

The several hundred humanitarian and human rights organisations can and will be mobilised to hold leaders around the world accountable both for their failings and for the good things they refrain from doing locally, regionally and internationally. I see four major advocacy campaigns building in the coming years, all of which are linked to and will contribute to strengthening the core features of the Principles of GHD: first, the political leadership in an increasing number of industrialised and affluent nations will have to fulfil the agreed upon United Nations goal stipulating that at least 0.7 percent of gross national income (GNI) should go to foreign assistance. It now stands at a pitiful 0.3 percent among the twenty-two major donors organised in the OECD. The goal of providing 0.7 percent to combat poverty, disease, and hunger has been reaffirmed several times by world leaders in New York, in Monterrey, and, more important, as a legal commitment by the European Union member states. It can hardly be considered an overly ambitious goal. When economies on all continents are witnessing exploding consumption of luxury goods, it is shamefully inadequate that most of these same economies have endorsed no realistic domestic plans to achieve the 0.7 percent goal.

Countries such as Sweden, the Netherlands, and Norway have for decades overshot this goal—despite unmet domestic needs—and enjoy widespread public support for giving 1 percent or more to the poorest and the neediest.

Upon the wise initiative of their British hosts, the G-8 nations, the self-proclaimed group of the world's leading economies, agreed in 2005 to pledge an additional US\$50 billion in foreign assistance by 2010, of which half was to go to Africa. In 2006, these same leaders and countries gave *less*, not more, to the two billion people on the planet who subsist on less than US\$2 dollars a day. Except for the UK, all the others failed to honour their commitments. The OECD reported an overall *decrease* of 5 percent in foreign assistance from 2005 to 2006, and the wealthiest G-8 countries were no exception. The total amount of foreign assistance registered was a mere US\$104 billion—less than the annual US cost of waging the war in Iraq. Many of these “world leaders” now make pitifully small investments to combat poverty, some of them less than 0.2 percent of GNI. Furthermore, it is no surprise to anyone that it is the poorest who suffer most during humanitarian disasters. As recognised by the GHD Principles, prevention is better than cure and investment in disaster risk-reduction strategies and long-term economic and human development are fundamental to humanitarian action.

But it is not only the G-8 nations that must be targeted by aggressive advocacy campaigns. The many newly rich nations in South East Asia, in the Gulf region, and elsewhere should be held accountable for playing their part in the effort to end mass misery. Today we are still far from achieving the goal of predictable minimum levels of support. Each year from 2003 to 2006, I launched global humanitarian Appeals with Secretary-General Kofi Annan on behalf of 25 to 30 million of the most vulnerable war and disaster victims in the world. We did not ask for more than US\$3 to 4 billion each of these years, the equivalent of less than two café lattés per person in the industrialised world, or less than two days' worth of global military spending. We always received less than two-thirds of what we asked for, even in response to these calls for life-saving assistance. With the exception of the tsunami and Lebanon war Appeals, no Emergency Appeal was fully funded. Each year, many places such as Haiti, Somalia, or the Congo, where children died in the thousands for lack of funding, do not receive more than 50 or 60 percent of what our field workers said they needed to save the lives at risk.

The second major campaign that is gaining momentum will be to hold world leaders accountable for their obligation to protect defenceless civilians who are threatened by armed men and violent thugs in lawless places around the world. World leaders from the United States, China, Russia, Europe, the Islamic world, Africa, and from all other continents—some 190 heads of state and governments in all—solemnly swore at the United Nations summit in September 2005 to uphold their “responsibility to protect” vulnerable communities, when their national authorities cannot or will not provide such protection. I was there when it happened. For many months, diplomats from all UN member states had sat in the windowless basement meeting rooms to ponder on the “Millennium + 5” Summit Declaration. For the first time, there was a decisive majority of states who went beyond the medieval principle of “not interfering in the internal affairs of sovereign states,” and the following text was agreed upon by consensus when the kings, presidents and prime ministers met in the General Assembly Hall of the UN:

“...we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII... , should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.”²

This “responsibility to protect” is more revolutionary than many world powers and developing world leaders seem now willing to admit, because they can no longer be passive bystanders to the carnage in Darfur, Chad, Western Ivory Coast, Eastern Congo, Gaza, Lebanon, or Burma. The campaign we must undertake aims to see this responsibility translated into predictable and adequate action to provide protection for all beleaguered and threatened communities, regardless of time, place, or circumstance.

What does this mean? Simply that more countries must allocate more manpower to peacekeeping and peace-enforcing operations undertaken by the United Nations or by such regional organisations as the African Union. These joint forces have to be operationally capable of protecting women and children against armed militias and of disarming those groups when they are not part of legitimate law enforcement units. It also means that more governments, such as those of China, India, Nigeria, South Africa, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Brazil,

and Mexico, will enforce protection by an international security presence in cases where their national elites fail to end the abuse. It means that these and other UN member states will uphold the use of economic sanctions and individual judicial accountability when political and military leaders attack civilian populations. If the new and emerging powers were to do more to defend women and children worldwide, then certain Western powers would have to do less to push such moral causes. More than anything, it means an end to standing by complacently when there is killing, rape, and mutilation of civilians or non-combatants in any crisis area, when they are your neighbours, when they occur in a country with cultural or political links to your own, or when you are simply rich or powerful. You, your government, and your nation have a responsibility to act immediately, forcefully, and coherently with other UN members to end the abuse.

Third, there will have to be a far stronger international campaign to control the proliferation of modern weapons of mass destruction, including small arms and light weapons, in particular military-style automatic guns. Even though there has been a marked decline in full-scale wars and outright genocides since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the number of violent attacks against civilians has increased since the end of the cold war in 1989. In ongoing contemporary conflicts, the contending parties have demonstrated a wilful disregard for the basic tenets of the humanitarian law governing armed conflict. I have seen, first hand, how mass murderers, mafias and terrorists in Colombia, Darfur, Northern Uganda, Eastern Congo, Iraq, and elsewhere in the Middle East never seem to lack the tools to maim, kill, and terrorise civilians. There is an alarming increase in government-sponsored and private illegal armies, ethnic militias, and non-state guerrilla forces. And they are supplied as never before with lethal automatic military weapons, often including the sophisticated overflow from the cold war, from both East and West. In recent years, the arms suppliers from the South are entirely without scruple and rival the traditional warlord-friendly supplier in Eastern Europe. Only when there is a concerted effort to curb production, control and publish all weapons sales, and vigorously prosecute the networks of illegal arms brokers will it be possible to reverse the floodtide of current weapons of mass destruction.

Reform of the UN humanitarian system

An important precondition for effective future multilateral action is true reform of the United Nations system from today's old fashioned model to a much improved operational approach and structure. The UN can no longer continue to reflect the world as it appeared to the victors after World War II.

In all areas where UN reform and restructuring are urgently needed, Secretary-General Kofi Annan provided detailed and well argued proposals to the 2005 General Assembly for approval by the member states. In most of these areas, Northern or Southern member states came together as spoilers and blocked real progress. In many key areas historic opportunities for change were lost. The United Nations is today more often than not an effective tool for the international community not because of, but in spite of its structure and its procedures. Fortunately, the humanitarian area is an exception.

In 2005, given the ample proof of the slow UN and non-UN response to the overwhelming humanitarian needs in Darfur, I initiated an ambitious humanitarian reform process. Our old systems for funding, preparedness, and coordination did not work as they should have. We were simply too slow to come to the rescue of the one million souls displaced in Western Sudan, even after we succeeded, in June 2004, in lifting many of the Sudanese government's immoral restrictions on our access to Darfur. Even with the so called "CNN-effect" working to our advantage and with numerous development ministers attending our fundraising meetings, it took months before we actually received the necessary funds to jump start the large and expensive operation. Even though we had agreement from all the executive directors of the main operational organisations on the critical importance of deploying large numbers of relief workers inside Darfur, for many months we had far too few experienced logistics and protection experts, water engineers, and camp managers on the ground. And even though we agreed on which life-saving services had the highest priority, we were not able to get the organisations to focus cooperatively on first things first.

Realising that it is usually easier to be forgiven than to obtain permission, I decided to start the reform process with humanitarian colleagues immediately and seek formal diplomatic approval later. A Humanitarian Response Review was first undertaken by experienced experts who interviewed operational organisations and field workers. The question was simple: how could we best ensure the provision of a minimum of life-saving

relief and recovery assistance to all those with emergency needs, irrespective of time, place, and cultural background? Through the Inter-Agency Standing Committee—which I chaired as Emergency Relief Coordinator—we came to an agreement that reform should seek to improve the effectiveness of humanitarian response by ensuring predictability, accountability, and partnership. In short, in line with the basic GHD Principles, we aimed to reach more beneficiaries with more comprehensive needs-based relief and protection, and in a more effective and timely manner.

Three key pillars characterised the humanitarian reform programme launched at the end of 2005: first, we agreed through the Inter Agency Committee—consisting of three large NGO federations, the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies as well as the UN agencies—to establish a series of operational partnerships. We called this the "cluster" approach. These clusters were to improve coordination and accountability in providing humanitarian services in the key aspects of emergency relief, including such gap areas as water and sanitation, emergency health, and protection of the civilian population. We asked specific operational agencies to take the lead in each of these clusters and to ensure that materials and expertise were planned, mobilised, and applied to good effect. Before the reform went into effect, our response capacity varied widely from one area and population to the other. More often than not, we succeeded in providing food, largely because the World Food Programme is a highly effective, well resourced organisation, dedicated to this purpose. But tons of corn or lentils are of no use to a mother if her child is dying for lack of clean water. So it was of crucial importance that UNICEF, in partnership with NGOs such as OXFAM, took the lead in providing water supplies and latrines in a more predictable manner.

Slowly but surely, the cluster approach is becoming more effective at assisting more people in more places.³ Some good donors have given funds to the cluster leaders—the UN organisations, the NGOs and the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies—to build preparedness in the key subject areas and in all geographic regions. At the July 2007 meeting of the UN Economic and Social Council, my successor as Emergency Relief Coordinator, John Holmes, concluded that host governments have welcomed the cluster approach in the ten new and ongoing emergencies where it has so far been applied as the new method for bringing about a more coherent response. At the global level, clusters have been able to rebuild emergency stocks of relief supplies and

develop stand-by rosters of technical experts. At a country level, clusters have improved dialogue with government line ministries, by designating clear focal points for all key areas of activity, by defining roles and responsibilities more quickly in emergencies and by focusing on national and local capacity in ‘gap’ areas.

Secondly, as called for in the GHD Principles, we needed more predictable overall funding for this improved response capacity, not only for new emergencies such as Darfur in 2004, but equally in the neglected emergencies where there was no “CNN-effect.” We had an old UN Central Emergency Revolving Fund, launched in 1992 after the Kurdish refugee crisis, but even a decade later, it consisted of a modest US\$50 million and could only provide loans to relief organisations, which, in turn, were afraid to become indebted themselves. For this reason, I suggested to the Secretary-General that he include in his ambitious reform agenda to the Millennium + 5 Summit the proposal for a new Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF), with US\$500 million in voluntary contributions from UN member states. We secured important allies for this through the British Minister for Development, Hillary Benn. In addition, Sweden, Norway, and Luxemburg all expressed willingness to invest in and campaign for a fund that could guarantee that, in Benn’s words, we would have “water in our hose when a fire was detected.”

When the proposal to dramatically upgrade the Emergency Fund was brought to the General Assembly in late 2005, it was already an uncontroversial *fait accompli* and the first element of the reform package to be agreed upon. All regional groups had been consulted, donors had promised sufficient money to move forward, and humanitarian organisations had been included in the planning process. Only four months later, the CERF was launched with an impressive initial US\$260 million from 48 governments and private sector groups, representing all continents and as many traditional as non-traditional donors. In the first four months of activity, we allocated more than US\$100 million for 130 relief projects in nineteen war- and disaster-stricken countries. From the beginning, the fund provided two-thirds to jump start operations in sudden-onset emergencies and one-third for neglected and severely underfunded continuous crisis areas. Since 2006, from Timor-Leste and Somalia to the Congo and Côte d’Ivoire, the CERF has helped make humanitarian relief more predictable where it is most needed. Further fundraising progress was made in 2007, and by July, commitments

for that year already stood at US\$346 million, with a threshold of US\$133 million in multiyear pledges.

Of course, there will be neither successful operational clusters nor efficient use of early and additional funding if there is no guarantee of effective leadership on the ground. The third element of the humanitarian reform, therefore, became a systematic effort to recruit and train a standby pool of highly qualified “Field Marshalls” for emergency relief operations. For many years, there has been a system of Humanitarian Coordinators to facilitate the work of relief groups and to stimulate cooperation among humanitarian agencies. The work done by these key representatives has often been enormously impressive, and carried out under extremely difficult circumstances. But these individuals have varied widely in terms of their leadership qualities and creativity. Too often, a UN Resident Coordinator would continue business as usual when given additional responsibilities for humanitarian intervention. The roster of experienced candidates from inside and outside the UN system of experienced leaders is now ready for immediate deployment and can replace those coordinators who are not up to the challenge.

Humanitarian action: A joint effort

Finally, we began a process of broadening partnerships in an effort to be less “UN-centric” and less “Northern” in a world that is rapidly changing. The United Nations system is engaged in larger and more numerous relief and recovery operations than ever before. However, its relative share of the total humanitarian response is shrinking. The UN is needed for standard setting, coordination, and facilitation, and for seeing that political, security, and humanitarian efforts come together coherently. Most of the actual delivery of assistance on the ground is undertaken by the dramatically growing number of non-UN public and private actors in humanitarian response, including NGOs from the North and increasingly, and impressively, from the South. A total of some 400 international relief groups converged on Aceh in Indonesia and Sri Lanka in the first month of the tsunami relief effort. This was clearly too many—perhaps even 200 to 300 too many—for the local communities to bear, given that many of their own organisations and authorities were pushed aside and not consulted in the course of recovery and reconstruction planning and operations.

The conclusions reached in the voluminous set of evaluation reports from independent experts, and published under the name of the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition⁴ make for interesting reading. They confirmed that “generous relief provided affected populations with the security they needed to begin planning what to do next. Large amounts of funding allowed rapid initial recovery activities... Within a few months there was palpable evidence of recovery. In all countries, children were back in school quickly and health facilities and services were partly restored and, in some cases, much improved... The international response was most effective when enabling, facilitating and supporting (local and national) actors, and when accountable to them. Overall, international relief personnel were less successful in their recovery and risk reduction activities than they were in the relief phase.”⁵

The tsunami aftermath witnessed the most rapidly and generously funded disaster response in history, yet many of the GHD Principles, already in existence, were largely ignored. The global total of US\$13.5 billion represented an astonishing US\$7,100 for every affected person, in stark contrast to the meagre US\$3 per person spent on those affected by floods in Bangladesh in 2004. Sadly, however, the evaluators found that, in four key areas, the colossal tsunami effort represented a “missed opportunity,” and offered the following key recommendations:

1. The international humanitarian community requires a fundamental reorientation from supplying aid to supporting and facilitating communities’ own relief and recovery priorities;
2. All actors should strive to increase their disaster response capacities and to improve the linkages and coherence between themselves and other actors in the international disaster response system, including those from the affected countries;
3. The international relief system should establish an accreditation and certification system to distinguish agencies that work to a professional standard in a particular sector;
4. All actors need to make the current funding system impartial, more efficient, flexible, transparent, and better aligned with the GHD Principles.

In summary, we must think more strategically and more locally in the way we undertake our long term efforts to make societies resilient to hazards and strife. As stated in the GHD Principles, we must work more closely with local governments and civil society to strengthen *their* capacity for handling crisis and exercising good governance. We must find better ways to forge coordination and partnerships internationally, nationally, and locally. In this way we will be better able to tap local resources and local expertise. Time and again, we see that more lives are saved in earthquakes, floods, and tsunamis by local groups than by any expensive airborne fire brigade. Similarly, it is usually local and regional actors who are most committed to peace-building efforts and reconciliation. In July 2006, in Geneva, recognising the need to discuss a new approach to forging effective partnerships beyond borders and artificial organisational barriers, we called a first meeting of executive leaders of leading humanitarian organisations from the North and the South and from UN and non-UN agencies with the aim of forming a “Global Humanitarian Platform.” A second successful meeting of this broad platform took place in July 2007.

The growth in high quality civil society movements, especially within third world societies, is probably the single most important trend in global efforts to combat poverty and conflict. They are vastly more important than the governments and intergovernmental organisations which the UN tends to recognise. All over Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East, I could see how religious organisations, and groups of women, peasants, students, and trade unions stand up for humanitarian principles, for local development, and for peace and reconciliation. Their existence offers the greatest hope for those who shoulder the weighty responsibility for ending overwhelming human misery and preventing conflict and disasters.

References

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United Nations General Assembly. 2005. “2005 World Summit Outcome.” New York: United Nations. Available at: <http://www.responsibilityto-protect.org/>

Notes

- 1 Editor's note: As illustrated in Chapter 9, the victims of the crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo received scant donor funding and attention in comparison with many other crises across the globe, contrary to the principles of impartiality and needs-based funding central to GHD.
- 2 United Nations World Summit Outcome, 2005, Paragraph 139, available at: <http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/>
- 3 Editor's note: see the crisis reports used as case studies by DARA for the Humanitarian Response Index, which include: Colombia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Haiti, Lebanon, Niger, Pakistan, Sudan, and Timor-Leste.
- 4 Editor's note: DARA was a member of this coalition.
- 5 Telford et al., 2006.