PART TWO

Perspectives on Good Humanitarian Donorship
The Birth of the Good Humanitarian Donorship Initiative

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Introduction

Our everyday actions towards fellow human beings are guided by principles, most of which form part of cultural norms which we inherit and pass on. Some of these become domestic law, and even international law, thereby guiding the actions of states. This is the case when it comes to the protection of civilian populations under armed conflict.

The obligation to help a person in acute need is a norm in almost all cultures, but has only become law in a few countries. At the international level, humanitarian assistance in connection with man-made or natural hazards—funded by governments and carried out by humanitarian organisations—is only partly regulated through soft law, such as resolutions in the UN General Assembly or in the International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent.

The volume of international humanitarian assistance increased dramatically during the decade after the Cold War. Thus, its nature as an unregulated and uncoordinated aid sector—in terms of donor behaviour—became increasingly clear. This had serious consequences for people in need of protection and assistance, living in desperate conditions.

In my role as head of the humanitarian division in one of the government donor agencies, I became part of an effort to do something about what my colleagues and I felt was an unacceptable situation. The initiative was called Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD). What follows is the story of the birth of this initiative. It is a subjective story, written by one who has been in an implementing as well as a donor role for more than twenty years in the international humanitarian system. In this article, I begin by describing donor behaviour at the beginning of the millennium and then present the vision of principled action and the negotiation process that led to the GHD Principles and to the strategy to for action. Following this, I assess the emerging changes in donor behaviour after Stockholm, in part linked to the humanitarian reform process which began in 2005. Finally, I point to the factors that give cause for optimism about the ultimate impact of the GHD process, including the existence of independent initiatives aimed at promoting the GHD Principles, such as the DARA Humanitarian Response Index.

What was wrong?

At the turn of the millennium, my colleagues and I found donor behaviour to be dysfunctional, irrational, and sometimes arrogant. Whether people who were living in desperate conditions because of conflict or natural calamities would be assisted at a level guaranteeing some dignity seemed to depend on no real assessment of what threatened their safety and survival. Some crises received more resources than seemed to be required, while others, particularly those lingering year after year, received a pittance. And although a balance of sustenance, services, and protection must be provided to ensure a dignified life, this was far from the rule. Food was most often there, although not always of the most appropriate kind, while support for reproductive health or livelihoods was not readily forthcoming. In some crises, donors and international agencies were tripping over themselves to find operational space, while in others they were few and far between, if they existed at all.

We found this situation both embarrassing and outrageous. How could we accept to represent a sector which functioned with such anarchy? How could we accept that people living in conditions of desperate adversity were used by donor governments to make grand gestures of generosity, while others in even greater need were ignored? If humanitarian action was impartial and neutral, only motivated by need, how could we accept the political considerations of some donor countries when making their funding decisions? Was there a way of moving humanitarian donors
towards more principled behaviour? Could well-established practices among development donors be adapted to the admittedly more unpredictable humanitarian arena? Were there not already universally accepted customary norms that could provide guidance and structure for our sector?

These deficiencies were criticised, but not in such a way as to reach the public domain. With some exceptions, there seemed to be few politicians or journalists in donor countries with a good grasp of the issues. This lack of public debate insulated donor governments from any serious scrutiny. If anything, what was perceived as life-saving assistance was little questioned while development aid was sometimes struggling to demonstrate the tangible results that would satisfy critics. Only events such as the war in Kosovo in 1999 triggered discussions, when an almost surreal influx of international organisations and NGOs took place in the wake of unprecedented media attention. That discussion, however, was less about donor behaviour and more about competition and lack of coordination between implementing organisations.

Significant initiatives had been taken among implementing organisations in the 1990s to improve their performance and accountability. The Red Cross Red Crescent Code of Conduct, the Humanitarian Accountability Project (later renamed Humanitarian Accountability Partnership International) and the SPHERE project on a Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response grew out of operational experiences, although they did not address donor performance directly. However, many donors introduced conditions stipulating that organisations applying for funding must adhere to specific performance and accountability initiatives.

Several independent and influential voices critiqued the humanitarian “enterprise,” even if they did not reach the public discourse. The series of publications from the Humanitarianism and War Project, led by Larry Minear and Thomas Weiss of Brown University, analysed humanitarian action in a large number of armed conflicts starting in 1990. The Humanitarian Policy Group (HPG) at the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) in London conducted research on humanitarian policy and practice, led by Margie Buchanan-Smith and Joanna Macrae. Following the multi-actor evaluation of the humanitarian response to the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, the Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action (ALNAP), formed in 1997 and led by John Borton for many years, provided regular analyses of reviews and evaluations of humanitarian operations. Its meta-evaluations and annual reports were particularly valuable in analyzing trends in the humanitarian sector. And Development Initiatives, a small British NGO under the leadership of Judith Randel, led the Global Humanitarian Assistance project, analysing flows and trends in humanitarian financing, official aid as well as resources contributed to NGOs by the public.

Research by HPG on the bilateralisation of aid was particularly important in analysing the flaws and negative impact of donor behaviour, and had strong influence on the GHD process.

Most of the donor debate occurred in closed rooms between mid-level officials in the humanitarian departments of donor agencies and foreign ministries. Opportunities for open discussion were offered at such occasions as the bi-annual informal meetings of the Humanitarian Aid Committee (hosted by each EU presidency and attended by member state representatives), the annual meetings of the Donor Support Group of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), and the meetings each spring in Montreux, where the donor group met OCHA and other humanitarian agencies to review experiences and discuss improvements to the Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP). As far as their own role in the humanitarian sector was concerned, some in the small travelling circus that met regularly in these forums easily found common ground when discussing weaknesses. Thus, in 2002, eight donor representatives agreed to launch the Humanitarian Financing Work Programme and commissioned three studies to further analyze problems and find solutions.

A vision of principles

Building on the comprehensive and critical analysis that thus became available, and the experience among donor “practitioners,” a vision of what was needed began to take shape, initially among government colleagues in the Netherlands, Canada, and Sweden. In many ways, the vision was the mirror image of the practice we were observing, as summarised by the UN Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator Carolyn McAskie: “Most donor behaviour is rational from a donor point of view. However, the sum total of all donor behaviours doesn’t produce a rational whole.” Thus, the notion of a code of conduct, or principles that would characterise a good donor entered our discussions.
Negotiating the principles

The vision required clarity of objective and principles to guide action, in addition to what constituted good donor practice. A draft document, “Suggested Elements for Conclusions,” was circulated to participants ahead of the meeting to stimulate both discussion and final agreement in Stockholm. A few issues were of particular importance, but were also challenged in the negotiations of the text, both before the meeting and later in Stockholm. As might have been expected, the resulting document was less ambitious than the original draft—the usual price to be paid for a consensus document. The task before us was to bring the feasible, politically and practically, as close as possible to the desirable.

As the important foundation for what was to come, we first needed to articulate what humanitarian action is, its purpose and the actions it entails, starting with the protection of civilians. To evoke its legal foundations and strong roots, we purposely used some well established and accepted language—e.g., that acting impartially means to respond solely on the basis of need—the wording used by the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (GHD, Principles 1, 2, 3, and 4).

Francis Deng, the Secretary-General’s Special Representative for the Internally Displaced, appealed eloquently during the conference to give the same recognition for the politically and operationally highly significant Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement as was already given to international humanitarian law. This was not achieved, even though the Guiding Principles are all derived from existing international and domestic law. However, the Guiding Principles found their place under the less prominent heading “Promoting standards and enhancing implementation” (GHD, Principle 16).

The draft also addressed the problems of disaster preparedness and transition from crisis to recovery, often exacerbated by the strict division between donor humanitarian and other budget lines. It was important for donors to recognise that funds invested in disaster reduction and preparedness would reduce the costs of responding to disasters, and that donor responsibility goes beyond immediate relief and protection, and includes helping to restore lives and livelihoods after an emergency (GHD, Principles 1, 3, 8, and 9).

If donors and agencies are to meet needs, they must know what they are. Humanitarian response must be based on proper needs assessments, carried out as a joint...
and continuous process and involving the different humanitarian actors. This leads to shared problem analysis and a much improved potential for coordination (GHD, Principle 6).

And in order to allow agencies to tailor their programmes to meet evolving needs, and plan with sufficient time frames, funds for humanitarian action must be predictable, sufficient in volume, and given with as few conditions as possible. In the draft document, we used Kapila’s strong recommendation that donors commit to meeting basic humanitarian needs in their entirety. This commitment went too far for some of the governments at the Stockholm conference, and was watered down to “the collective obligation of striving to meet humanitarian needs.” Our ambition to reduce earmarking to a minimum also sounded considerably weaker when donors were encouraged to “explore the possibility of reducing, or enhancing the flexibility of, earmarking” (GHD, Principles 5, 12, and 13).

From our point of view, reduced earmarking and making long-term funding from donors more predictable implied greater respect for the mandates and roles of implementing agencies. Ill-adapted, ill-timed and inappropriate humanitarian response, especially when accompanied by donor micromanagement and conditionality, would be corrected if agencies were provided with the necessary resources and the time, space, and authority to use them in response to actual and evolving needs. As a result, decisions would be taken as close to the ground as possible. The different but complementary roles of the three key humanitarian actors were made explicit by naming the UN, the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and nongovernmental organisations (GHD, Principle 10).

Some years see peaks in the number of severe disasters, while other years are less challenging. Predetermined and finite humanitarian budgets obviously do not take such fluctuations into consideration, so there have to be built-in contingencies. In order not to make humanitarian funding a zero-sum game, the practice of ensuring that new crises would not “adversely affect the meeting of needs in ongoing crises” was introduced (GHD, Principle 11).

The Stockholm conference took place in June, 2003, three months after the invasion of Iraq. At that time, the role of the military in humanitarian operations was intensely debated, and then US Secretary of State Colin Powell was describing NGOs in Iraq as “force extenders” or “multipliers.” However, the humanitarian community viewed the mixed role of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams of international military forces in Afghanistan as highly controversial, blurring the lines between humanitarian and military action. Conventional military doctrine mentioned civil-military cooperation — “winning hearts and minds” — as an integral part of force protection. Although some of the governments present in Stockholm had troops in Iraq and Afghanistan, it was necessary to make a clear statement about the civilian nature of humanitarian action in the GHD Principles.

In this, we were greatly helped by the fact that states had recently negotiated the Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies, building on the so-called Oslo Guidelines for natural disasters, and outlining roles more clearly. The meeting agreed that civilian organisations would have priority and take the lead in humanitarian response, and that any use of military resources would be in conformity with international humanitarian law (GHD, Principle 19).

Improved coordination was obviously embedded in the spirit of the document, but it also specifically mentioned the importance of supporting the formulation of Common Humanitarian Action Plans (CHAP) as the primary instrument for planning, prioritisation and coordination in complex emergencies. Although some significant organisations, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), would never seek funding through the UN Consolidated Appeals, donors still expected them to coordinate with other agencies for the purpose of comprehensive and effective humanitarian action (GHD, Principle 14).

Finally, the document acknowledged the importance of continued reflection, analysis, and learning in order to improve the ongoing performance and accountability of the humanitarian actors, including donors, and their obligation to support such activities (GHD, Principles 21, 22, and 23).

**From principles to practice: a post-conference strategy**

More than agreement on principles was needed to effect real change in donor practice and to ensure that the GHD process would not end with yet another
document. Participating governments agreed on an implementation plan, specifying five measures:

1. Identifying at least one crisis country in which the GHD Principles were to be piloted;

2. Inviting the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) to include donor performance in the humanitarian sector in peer reviews;

3. Harmonising reporting demands on implementing organisations, in the spirit of the Rome Declaration;\(^5\)

4. Beginning the process of finding a common definition of humanitarian assistance for reporting and statistical purposes;

5. Promoting the broad application among all donors of the GHD Principles, with different donor countries offering to take the lead on the various action points.

There was a sense of urgency among the humanitarian agencies present and a hope that there would be fast action. Carolyn McAskie, UN Deputy Emergency Coordinator, asked the donors present to immediately select pilot countries in time for the 2004 Consolidated Appeals Process. Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) were proposed.

Of the different measures planned, the invitation to DAC to join the process was particularly important. The effectiveness of peer pressure and exchange of good practice had been well demonstrated through the DAC peer reviews of development donor performance. If the Principles were to become normative they would have to be built into a performance assessment framework.

In early contacts, DAC was reluctant to add another task to its already full work plan. On the Swedish side, we therefore offered to second a full time staff person to OECD-DAC in Paris to start working on an assessment framework for coverage of humanitarian action in DAC peer reviews, based directly on the GHD Principles. The drafting of an assessment framework could then start a few months after Stockholm.

A new and active DAC role was meant to strengthen donor accountability, using well established checks and balances developed by the donor community itself. But we also felt that it was important for independent and external voices to continue to follow critically the process initiated in Stockholm. The Humanitarian Policy Group (HPG) at the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) in London was therefore encouraged not to drop its analysis of the issues that had triggered the initiative, but to continuously follow the process over the coming years, particularly as pilots and new practices were being rolled out. HPG accepted this proposal, and has published a number of studies on GHD over the past several years.

There were a number of implicit assumptions which, although not articulated in the GHD Principles or implementation plan, nevertheless had to be addressed if improved donor practice was to translate into action and meet real needs “everywhere and every time.” Since donors were actors in a humanitarian system, these assumptions required reciprocal measures from other actors. If donors reduced earmarking, increased flexible multilateral funding, and offered more support to the Consolidated Appeals, underlying humanitarian strategies, and action plans, this would potentially lead to—and was intended to lead to—a stronger coordinating role for the UN in crisis countries. This, in turn, required that the UN be able to field humanitarian coordinators who would not only have the requisite high-level competence, but who would have institutional support and enjoy the confidence of both the UN country teams and the wider group of humanitarian organisations in the country in question.\(^6\)

Moreover, critics of the humanitarian system had pointed to another fundamental flaw that was not within the purview of donors to influence directly. Donors were criticised for not basing their funding decisions on accurate information. However, there was, in fact, little evidence-based data about needs, and since there was no baseline, there was little relevant information about the outcomes and impact of humanitarian programmes.\(^7\) Any action plan and appeal for resources rested on shaky ground. There were also questions as to whether organisations appealing for funds tended to describe needs in terms of the resources and services they were able to provide. In other words, there were potential conflicts of interest that could lead to doubts about the objectivity of needs assessments. Mukesh Kapila had proposed that needs be assessed by independent organisations which were not implicated in implementation.

To address this problem, humanitarian organisations had to jointly agree on methodologies and procedures that would provide an accurate image of the threats and risks faced by a particular population in crisis. The picture had to be not only comprehensive and
multidimensional, but provided at regular intervals and agreed upon and trusted by the majority of implementing organisations. This was not an easy task, but if it could be achieved, there would be significant additional indirect benefits. If humanitarian organisations engaged in a joint analysis and shared these findings and conclusions, then relationships of trust could begin to grow among them during the strategic phase which would, in turn, facilitate coordination and cooperation as operations got under way. Despite the obvious methodological challenges, it was understood that the effort was worthwhile and that it would have a positive impact on the functioning of the system as a whole.

Two organisations, UNICEF and the World Health Organization (WHO), took the lead and decided to focus on the two pilot countries (Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo) proposed by the donor group in order to test a broad needs assessment framework for use by all organisations active in these two countries.

**After Stockholm**

In early February, 2005, after my active involvement in the process leading up to the Stockholm conference and the ensuing efforts at starting to change donor practice, I left the Swedish International Development Agency to lead the tsunami operation of the IFRC in Geneva—certainly a crisis situation in which good donorship principles were thoroughly tested! Therefore, I am not in a position to judge the results and impact of GHD from an insider perspective after Stockholm. But it is, indeed, interesting to witness changes in some of the specific areas which were identified as being in need of improvement in 2003. As with any external observer, I will have to take a long distance snapshot. And from this vantage point, I do see a great deal of improvement, both in evident donor policy change and in a number of recent studies and evaluations of new practices and funding models.

Some recent results are especially encouraging, along with new issues and unforeseen problems which have also emerged. First, it is very satisfying to note that humanitarian action is now firmly placed within the mainstream of DAC analysis and identification of good donor practice. This was viewed by some critics as a rather bureaucratic and humdrum objective, but it means that humanitarian assistance is now judged against a set of codified norms and principles, like other forms of aid, as endorsed at the OECD-DAC ministerial level in 2006. Since the Stockholm conference, peer reviews of humanitarian assistance from thirteen OECD members have been carried out, all publicly available on the DAC website. As the reader can plainly see, reviews are clear in identifying areas where individual donors are in need of improvement. Although shortcomings are still evident, such as the common absence of explicit humanitarian policies, the fact that they are being addressed in open discourse where good practice is shared means that there are opportunities for speedy correction.

A number of initiatives have been taken to make funding more flexible and allow for a more needs-based response in the spirit of GHD. Then UN Emergency Relief Coordinator Jan Egeland, with strong political backing from the British and other governments involved in GHD, took the initiative to substantially increase the volume of the UN’s Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) and to change the criteria for its use. With a target at US$500 million, the CERF is now aimed at immediate response to emergencies—before donors make their funding decisions—and at humanitarian emergency actions that tend to be neglected and receive insufficient funding. In the first allocation for 2007, little-publicised emergencies in fifteen countries received funding from the new CERF.

The British government is also responding to the GHD call for donors to prevent and strengthen preparedness for the occurrence of man-made crises and natural disasters, by investing 10 percent of its spending on emergency disaster response, setting an example for other donor governments.

In order to provide flexible and non-earmarked funding and allocate financial resources in the field, pilot efforts are being conducted in Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo, where a group of donors that were part of launching the GHD initiative have pooled resources into a Common Fund. Allocation decisions are vested in the UN Humanitarian Coordinator, supported by an advisory group consisting of major agencies and donors. A recent evaluation found that the Common Fund has improved the planning, prioritisation, and coordination of humanitarian response. While strengthening the position of the Humanitarian Coordinator, it has created strong incentives for coordination.

However, the review found that some important organisations with specific roles and mandates, but which do not take part in the UN strategic planning process—such as the ICRC and MSF—risk receiving less support from donors, although they coordinate at...
the field level with other organisations. Application procedures for NGOs were cumbersome and donors did not make their funding decisions early enough to improve the predictability of available funds.

Although this first attempt at pooled funding may have become too UN-centred, there was still strong support among organisations for the ethos and objectives of the Common Fund, whose flaws were found to be significant, but reparable. As pilots, the results from Sudan and the DRC are encouraging.

Another recent review has analysed the impact of OCHA Emergency Response Funds (ERF) in five crisis countries. ERFs have been in use for several years, aimed at providing rapid and flexible funding to organisations at the country level, mainly NGOs, to address unforeseen humanitarian needs. They prove particularly valuable for filling a range of gaps in humanitarian response, increasing humanitarian access, and enabling NGOs to scale up their activities, not least in the transition from emergency to early recovery. The role of the OCHA in coordinating response has been strengthened through its ability to both identify needs and solicit NGOs to submit funding applications. It appears that this role is close to the independent and impartial non-implementing actor that Kapila proposed for the carrying out of needs assessments.

Work has also continued, based on the early pilots in Burundi and the DRC, to develop multi-sector Needs Assessment Frameworks (NAF) which provide a consolidated understanding of needs. Most of the Consolidated Appeals in 2007 will be based on NAFs, and the OCHA has accepted to review its own role in managing future needs assessments.

In addition to these encouraging results, the public and the aid community can track progress made by donor countries through a set of indicators presented on the GHD website. It is also clear that the GHD initiative was able to influence as part of a system spurred them to action. Realising that binding agreements between donor governments in this area would not be feasible, they set a process in motion whereby a set of principles was codified through its ability to both identify needs and solicit NGOs to submit funding applications. It appears that this role is close to the independent and impartial non-implementing actor that Kapila proposed for the carrying out of needs assessments.

One thing is certain: we tend to declare success or failure much too early when assessing social processes. What makes me somewhat optimistic in the case of GHD are some additional factors. Some were part of our strategy, while others evolved as part of the larger, unpredictable social and political processes in which humanitarian action occurs. First, the GHD initiative was able to feed its ideas into a process of more comprehensive humanitarian reform. Energised through political leadership, the reform has had strong momentum and continues. Contributing to a broader and more forceful stream has been beneficial for the translation of the basic premises of GHD into action.

Second, as this account intends to illustrate, the GHD process has been accompanied by a constructive commentary from independent policy research bodies and individuals, including the yearly publication of DARA's innovative Humanitarian Response Index, which will undoubtedly build on these efforts. Open and public discourse is fundamental for making governments accountable, not least in an area which has been

Conclusion

The deep frustration felt by various individuals concerning donor practice was one of the triggers leading to the GHD initiative. What staff felt accountable for and able to influence as part of a system spurred them to action. Realising that binding agreements between donor governments in this area would not be feasible, they set a process in motion whereby a set of principles was codified through the articulation of good practice and its institutionalisation as a performance framework. This represents a kind of “seeping upwards” normative process. Was it successful, or was the meeting in Stockholm in June 2003 just one more conference “for powerless bureaucrats” with “almost no agreement on anything that extended beyond a platitude and a vague undertaking to strive to do better”?

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largely protected from scrutiny and where public perception has been so far from reality.

But even as we acknowledge that donor practice is improving, much remains to be done. There are still insufficient resources to meet the needs for the protection of all the men, women, and children who face the terrible adversity brought about by natural hazards and man-made crises. If we are to meet the challenges now on the horizon, we must get the humanitarian system right.

Bibliography


Good Humanitarian Donorship, available at: www.goodhumanitarian-donorship.org


Notes

1 Australia, Canada, the European Community, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

2 Darcy and Hofmann, 2003; Development Initiatives, 2003; Smillie and Minear, 2003, a report later developed into a book, The Charity of Nations, which included a critical and ironic review of the Stockholm conference and its outcomes.

3 Smillie and Minear, 2003, p. 5.