“The Humanitarian Response Index is an innovative means of highlighting the Good Humanitarian Donorship Principles in order to encourage best practice and maximise the benefit of assistance to victims of crises and catastrophes.” - Ross Mountain.

In 2009, donors provided over US$11.5 billion to respond to the needs of millions of people affected by conflicts and natural disasters around the world. Ensuring that aid is used correctly is no easy task, with humanitarian crises increasing in number and complexity. Today, humanitarian actors today face daunting challenges to provide protection and assistance to those in need, and often enter into a complex interplay of competing national and international interests related to political, military, security or development concerns. Add tighter budgets to this scenario, and the need for effective and efficient humanitarian assistance becomes more important than ever.

Based on nearly 2,000 surveys on donor performance and more than 500 interviews with humanitarian actors in 14 humanitarian crises (Haiti, Pakistan, Afghanistan, DRC and Sudan, among others), the Humanitarian Response Index seeks to be the reference for donors to assess the quality of their aid. Now in its fourth year, the Humanitarian Response Index is the world’s foremost independent instrument for measuring the individual performance of government donors against Good Humanitarian Donorship Principles. The Humanitarian Response Index provides an objective overview of donor performance, which can assist governments in ensuring that their humanitarian funding has the greatest possible impact for people in critical need of aid.

Founded in 2003, DARA is an independent organisation committed to improving the quality and effectiveness of aid for vulnerable populations suffering from conflict, disasters and climate change. DARA has recognised expertise in providing support in the field of humanitarian aid as well as climate change and disaster risk reduction management. We have conducted evaluations of humanitarian operations in over 40 countries across five continents for a variety of government, United Nations, and European Union agencies, as well as other major international humanitarian organisations, such as the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement.

Cover photo: © Peter Turnley/Corbis
The Humanitarian Response Index 2010

The problems of politicisation
About DARA

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Foreword

António Guterres, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

The ability of humanitarian organisations to provide protection, food, water, shelter and other forms of basic assistance to millions of vulnerable people each year is increasingly at risk. Indeed, while the need for emergency aid continues to grow, the safe space that is required to reach people who are in need of support has been steadily shrinking.

This disturbing situation is the result of several interrelated trends. As we have seen in places as varied as Afghanistan, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Iraq, Somalia and the Darfur region of Sudan, armed conflicts now involve a multiplicity of state and non-state actors, some of whom have little or no respect for humanitarian law and principles.

Small arms and banditry are proliferating. Peacekeepers are increasingly sent to places where there is no peace to keep. At the same time, states are adopting an increasingly assertive approach to the defence of their sovereignty and security, a development that has in certain situations blurred the traditional distinction between humanitarian and military action.

Attacks on humanitarian workers, both local and international, have increased nearly threefold in a little more than a decade. In each of the past four years, more than 200 killings, injuries and kidnappings have been recorded. In the space of six months last year, my own organisation, UNHCR, lost three colleagues who were killed in separate attacks in Pakistan.

Humanitarian organisations and personnel are also increasingly obliged to work in countries with very weak forms of governance, high levels of insecurity and a physical, economic and legal infrastructure that makes the protection of civilians and the delivery of assistance an extremely demanding task.

UNHCR is certainly not the only organisation to be confronted with such challenges. In January 2010, for example, the World Food Programme was forced to take the almost unprecedented step of withdrawing from Somalia in the face of intimidation and extortion from militant groups, a decision that rendered up to a million people vulnerable to even higher levels of malnutrition than they were already experiencing.

While safeguarding humanitarian space is a current preoccupation, it is by no means the only issue that is changing, challenging and complicating the work of aid organizations.

Humanitarians are increasingly working in urban rather than rural areas. More and more, the people we seek to assist live among and alongside other poor people in overcrowded cities, often in slums and shanty towns which lack the most basic of facilities. New thinking, approaches and partnerships will be needed if we are to work effectively and equitably in such contexts.

Migration and mobility are rapidly growing in scale, with people moving from one country and continent to another in order to improve the security and opportunities available to them. Climate change, environmental degradation, as well as the growing frequency and intensity of natural disasters seem certain to reinforce this trend in the years to come.

Finally, many communities around the world are confronted with growing levels of food, water and energy insecurity, as well as volatile movements in the price of essential goods and services. There is a serious risk that these circumstances will contribute to the growth of tensions and conflicts both within and between states, thereby placing additional demands on the humanitarian community.

If we are to enhance the quality and impact of humanitarian action, to support the prevention of man-made and natural disasters, and to promote international stability and development, a number of steps must be taken.

First, we must pursue a vigorous and uncompromising campaign to preserve and expand humanitarian space, arguing the case for such outcomes with all of those actors who have the ability to threaten the principles on which our work is founded.

Second, I believe that UNHCR and other organisations that are engaged in the provision of protection and assistance must strengthen the way in which they evaluate their operations and enhance their efficiency, not least because of the very real risk that humanitarian funding will decline in the current economic climate.
Third and finally, while humanitarian action has certainly become a more professional enterprise in the past two decades, we must ask if there is a risk that these professionals will speak increasingly to each other, rather than with the individuals and communities that they are supposed to serve? In that respect, I share the vision of DARA, which has wisely stated that “affected populations should be placed at the centre of efforts to improve their own situation.”

Innovation is a key challenge in this respect. In a world that has been revolutionized in recent years by technical, social and intellectual change, we must ask ourselves whether the humanitarian community has been too content to adopt a ‘business as usual’ approach. Is there a potential for us to develop new and ‘smarter’ ways of operating, especially in insecure environments?
The Humanitarian Response Index (HRI) is a shared effort that involves the participation of numerous individuals and organisations. DARA is most grateful to all of those who have shared their understanding of good donor practice and worked with us to further our common goal of improving the quality, accountability and impact of humanitarian assistance.

I would like to begin by expressing special gratitude to the over five hundred people working in countries in crises who, despite their busy workloads, kindly agreed to be interviewed for the HRI 2010. Without their help, insight, knowledge and enthusiasm, the HRI 2010 would not have happened.

I would like to especially mention those organisations who provided invaluable logistical and administrative support for our field researchers. Our particular thanks go to representatives of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), the UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) for ensuring the safety of our teams in difficult circumstances.

As we expand our collaboration with partners, DARA would like to thank the International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA) – for collaborating with us on a joint field mission to Haiti – and Dubai Cares – who participated in the HRI field mission to Yemen. The knowledge they brought to analysing these crises and their committed support and helpful suggestions to improve the HRI were invaluable.

At the headquarters level, we are grateful to the many staff from NGOs, the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement and UN agencies who provided valuable data to help construct the quantitative components of the index, as well as providing us with advice, guidance and support in getting the HRI message out.

In our field missions we spoke to over 80 representatives from different OECD/DAC government donor agencies, as well as numerous staff in donor headquarters. Understandably, some donors had expressed misgivings – for, after all, the role of the HRI is to assess performance – but we have been genuinely pleased with the general spirit of donor engagement with the HRI and the many frank and open discussions DARA has had with donor representatives. We look forward to continued engagement with the donor community and to building stronger ties with donors to ensure humanitarian assistance is leveraged to achieve the most impact possible for people affected by crises.

Our Peer Review Committee has worked to ensure the HRI achieves its objectives and becomes an ever more useful humanitarian tool. We would like to gratefully recognise the contributions of Jock Baker, James Darcy, Wolf-Dieter Eberwein, Véronique de Geoffroy, Claude Hilfiker, Eva Von Oelreich, David Roodman and Ed Schenkenberg van Mierop. We would also like to thank Dennis Djikzael for his invaluable advice and support.

HRI’s Advisory Board helps us broaden our horizons and advance policy debate and analysis. I would like to acknowledge Larry Minear, Moisés Naím, S. Iqbal Riza, Mary Robinson and Pierre Schori. We are especially grateful to DARA Board members Aldo Ajello, Emma Bonino, Jan Eliasson, Jose Maria Figueres, Beatriz Iraburu, Jose Manuel Romero and Juliet Pierce for helping refine the vision and advocating for HRI and also to Diego Hidalgo, our President, for his generous support for DARA and the HRI from its inception.

The HRI would not be possible without the generous support of AVINA STIFTUNG, the Dutch Postcode Lottery (Nationale Postcode Loterij) and Agility Logistics.

We are honoured that António Guterres (who also serves as an Advisory Board member), Jakob M. Kellenberger and Margaret Wallstrom have contributed to this year’s HRI and thank them for their support and endorsement.
Finally, I want to express our gratitude to Silvia Hidalgo, the co-founder of DARA and Director General for its first six years. It was Silvia’s insight, conviction, and vision that donor governments can and should do more to ensure aid efforts are better directed that led to the creation of the HRI.

The HRI is a team effort and the entire organisation’s staff contributes to its success. I thank you all for your commitment and enthusiasm.

Short of listing all DARA’s staff, I would especially like to mention Beatriz Asensio, Philippe Benassi, Raisa Bruner, Covadonga Canteli, Fernando Espada, Rebecca Moy, Magda Ninaber, Nnenna Odeluga, Marybeth Redheffer, Daniela Ruegenberg, Philip Tamminga, Frank Vollmer and Nacho Wilhelmi. Working in a collegial spirit, they have all played vital roles organising the logistics of missions and interviews, analysing data to generate indicators and rankings, drafting text, designing and publicising this publication. They have all demonstrated great professionalism and serenity. I would also thank David S. Bassouoni, Anas Bukash – from Dubai Cares – Gilles Gasser, Nahla Haïdar, Ian Hopwood, Matthew Kahane, Ricardo Solé, Manisha Thomas – from ICVA – and Albertien van der Veen for their valuable contribution to the success of our missions to the field. Thanks also to our consultant editor, Tim Morris, for his meticulous work.
It is encouraging to note that when countries and communities are beset by earthquakes, floods or violent combat, the reports and TV images of resultant human suffering almost invariably evoke a broad outpouring of public and private sympathy, virtually irrespective of the country concerned. Often such catastrophes occur in countries with shaky governments, dictatorship, corruption or unchecked militias. Yet the sight of adversity moves citizens, civil society organisations and consequently governments to contribute to the mitigation of the suffering.

Until relatively recently, the response was manifested in contributions of old clothes, food items or expired or inappropriate drugs. Though well-intentioned, such gestures were not only unsuitable, but indeed slowed down and distorted the whole process of providing urgent help to affected populations. We have learned that emergency aid must be quick. Items supplied must be suited to the needs and circumstances of those affected.

There has been much progress to ensure the most effective use of international and national assistance, including in countries where governments are unable or unwilling to provide the support that their citizens have the right to expect. In this context, new initiatives have developed to attempt to make maximum use of resources and to get them to the victims as quickly as possible.

In the wake of the Armenian earthquake in 1988, the UN Disaster Relief Organisation – the forerunner of today’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) – was tasked with ensuring the effective coordination and delivery of humanitarian assistance. Over the years, the World Food Programme (WFP) has moved from being essentially a development agency to a vital source of food in a full range of crises. The UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) has recognised the need for substantial investment in emergency response capacity while the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has broadened its concerns from refugees to also assist substantial numbers of internally displaced persons (IDPs).

A dozen years ago in Security Council debates, the fate of IDPs was regarded by defenders of national sovereignty as an internal issue and not a matter for international scrutiny. Today, the protection of IDPs and other equally vulnerable civilians is recognised as a prime objective of UN peacekeeping missions. Indeed, for many of us in the humanitarian field, the issue of how to offer protection for those caught in the crossfire or those whose vulnerability has been exacerbated by natural disasters through no fault of their own has become at least as important as providing them with food, medical care and shelter.

The importance of humanitarian assistance being available to victims irrespective of the leadership or political regime that governs them is a cardinal principle. It also makes practical sense. Those who deal with the political aspects of conflict hope to bring about reconciliation and peace between warring parties. It follows that they should not seek to deny health care and welfare to those who have the bad luck to be in areas facing a daily struggle for survival. Yet all too often this is not understood and those in a position to provide support to the needy also seek political leverage. The result – as we now tragically see in Somalia – can be whole communities virtually denied any humanitarian assistance.

In 2003, a group of the world’s major traditional donors – the nations belonging to the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD/DAC) – came together in Stockholm. After lengthy negotiations that lasted until the early hours of the morning, they agreed to a set of 23 principles that constitute the Good Humanitarian Donorship initiative.1 The principles are a mixture of policy objectives and technical measures which reaffirm the key principles of impartiality, neutrality and independence of humanitarian assistance. By agreeing to these principles, donor countries committed themselves to supporting efforts to ensure access to and protection of victims of natural disasters and conflicts. The principles remain valid today and are those that all countries reviewed in this report have subscribed to.

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1 See: http://www.goodhumanitariandonorship.org
The importance and significance of donor governments promoting and defending these principles is indispensable for ensuring both that affected populations receive the best assistance possible but also that the now considerable resources allocated to humanitarian aid are most effectively utilised.

The goal of the Humanitarian Response Index (HRI) is to work with the humanitarian community, and in particular OECD/DAC donor governments, to assist them to meet the objectives to which they themselves signed up to as part of their commitment to Good Humanitarian Donorship. This year’s HRI draws primarily on DARA’s carefully designed field interviews with nearly 500 implementing agencies and donor representatives, bringing together the experiences of humanitarian partners. We have, as in previous years, quantitatively assessed responses focusing on key areas such as volume and kind of aid or timeliness of funding. This year we have additionally gathered data on the extent to which donor countries are helping to reduce climate-related vulnerability.

My first awareness of and interaction with the HRI and DARA colleagues was in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), where I served, among other roles, as the UN Humanitarian Coordinator. During the inevitable series of evaluations of the programmes for which I was responsible, I was struck by the novelty of an approach that looked not only at the amount of money made available by donors but also at the way in which these funds were allocated and how other support was provided. This highlighted in my mind the important role that can be played by donors in meeting urgent humanitarian needs beyond the cash component – vitally important though it is and will remain.

In the DRC, the humanitarian operation came to serve as something of a guinea pig for the UN humanitarian reform process launched in 2005. This involved implementation of the cluster system (both in the capital and at regional level), establishing a pooled fund to encourage more pragmatic and prompt response to needs, working with UN military forces to protect civilians and designing comprehensive and transitional strategies that addressed the population’s need for security as well as social services and governance.

While for many these new mechanisms were objectives in themselves, we sought to apply these approaches in a way that put the beneficiary in the centre. Thus, the objective was to find the speediest targeted delivery approaches that could maximise the use of the resources that were always limited in relation to the challenges, notwithstanding the generosity of donors.

In its systematic sounding of key partners in crises countries, the HRI is unique. Some will find the rankings resulting from this independent analysis surprising or even unfair. Yet they should be viewed as a reflection from the field of how governments in their roles as humanitarian donors are regarded by their partners.

The objective of the HRI is not the donor ranking but to provide feedback to those responsible for humanitarian policymaking on how their efforts are seen from the ground with the view of helping to improve aid efficiency for the benefit of those who need to receive it.

Achievement of maximum benefit requires not just coordination but the engagement of all sectors, donors, implementing partners and beneficiary representatives in seeking to maximise the impact of resources available.

In my experience on the ground, such a consensus on maximising impact is not so difficult to achieve. Donor representatives, NGOs and UN agency colleagues on the ground generally share this concern – even in circumstances where the same cannot be said as a result of institutional preoccupations in their headquarters.

I hope that the HRI 2010 will reinforce this process on the ground and lead those in the headquarters of donors, NGOs and UN agencies – and governments in crisis-affected states – to reflect on the measures they may have put in place. I urge them to particularly study our findings on the risks that political instrumentalisation can have by inhibiting the most effective delivery of humanitarian assistance to those in need.

In the course of the compilation of this year’s report, I have had the opportunity to revisit a number of countries – and territories, alas still in crisis – in which I had previously worked, either as Resident Coordinator or during my years with OCHA. I would like to thank the partners and donors on the ground for their commitment and for sharing their perspectives and frustrations as they seek to identify ways in which their work can be more effective. It is encouraging that a number of donor representatives are so well aware of, and committed to, the GHD Principles that they urged DARA to criticise their governments in the hope this would lead to changes in the way they manage humanitarian aid programmes.

Sadly, despite general progress, millions of people are still trapped in the consequences of seemingly intractable political stalemates. These include Somalia, the occupied Palestinian territories and Afghanistan, among others.

Life has also become more dangerous for humanitarian workers: casualties – mostly of national staff – continue to rise. Negotiated access has also become more complicated as the international community seeks to isolate militant organisations that are accused of promoting or perpetrating acts of terrorism. Too often political preoccupations are cited to limit access to victims.
This is the fourth year that DARA has produced the HRI. Throughout the years, our project has undergone considerable changes and transformations based on much valued feedback from humanitarian partners, including donors. This year we have sought to further broaden our analysis while continuing to emphasise the responsibility of each donor for the policy and measures that they apply to bring support in humanitarian crises.

The humanitarian reform process has brought about changes but we can all do better. All certainly includes the UN agencies and NGOs, but also significantly, the donor countries.

This year we highlight a number of important findings regarding increasing politicisation of aid; gaps in the protection of civilians; slow progress in the reform of the humanitarian system; lack of investment in prevention, preparedness and risk reduction; and unsatisfactory accountability towards affected populations.

In a year that has seen two huge natural disasters – in Haiti and in Pakistan – and at a time when there is a growing fear that climate change may well have more of the same in store in the future years, we have seen that many of the lessons documented from previous catastrophes have not been learned. This remains an abiding challenge for all of us in the humanitarian community this year, next year and the years to come. We need to find ways to provide more effective, targeted and quicker assistance to victims of crises, primarily for their sake but also to be able to assure those contributing funds through government and non-government programmes that we are doing the best we can.
Politicisation of humanitarian work?

Jakob M. Kellenberger, President of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)

Aristotelian philosophy attests that an issue is politicised when it becomes an affair of state. Military action is a part of political action. Humanitarian action or support of humanitarian action in important donor countries is also an affair of state. Though it is too narrow today to consider “politics” as being purely state-centred, it is this Aristotelian definition that I use here.

Among humanitarians, the term “politicisation” has predominantly negative connotations – understandable to the extent it suggests a manipulation of humanitarian work for political ends. However, it can also be considered positively. The fact that humanitarian concerns have made it onto the political agenda of states and international organisations is no bad thing. In fact, this has long been the aim of a large number of humanitarian entities. To be “instrumentalised” may be more of a challenge for humanitarian work than to be “politicised” for “instrumentalisation” is a particularly crude form of politicisation.

Analysing politicisation

Traditionally, humanitarian work becomes politicised when it is supported for reasons other than simply to help those in need: to win hearts and minds, in pursuit of military, security and political goals or to project a benevolent image. Humanitarian work can also become politicised when states consider it their sovereign right to control all activities within their borders during and after a humanitarian crisis. This recent trend is set to continue. By doing so, states do not necessarily aim to manipulate humanitarian activities for their own ends, but there is a real risk of undermining the core humanitarian principle of impartiality: those supporting the political forces in power or those of particular relevance for the next local or national elections may have a better chance of receiving protection and aid. History has shown that this is a risk even when it is a non-state actor insisting on controlling humanitarian work. Southern Sudan is a well-known example from the 1990s.

Providing and supporting humanitarian aid is on the political agendas of many governments, with no other pretext other than to protect and help those in need. This is certainly true in the case of emergency humanitarian assistance. Support for humanitarian organisations, however, is not always motivated by humanitarian reasons alone. There may be internal political pressure to respond to a humanitarian crisis. Contributing to humanitarian work may be the only form of involvement that a government feels it can permit itself. It may be seen as an opportunity to broaden the scope of an unpopular foreign policy. The motivation may even be to gain a different perspective on a particularly long-standing or complex issue.

There is increasing interest in “result-based management” which focuses on input, output and outcome. In certain instances, politicians and donors alike seem to place as much importance on declarations of intent as on the actual work carried out. This can be an indicator that action is not the only thing that matters with humanitarian organisations. From the perspective of a crisis victim, the difference between intention and action is obviously huge. However, from a political perspective, it is not always the case. It may be enough simply to announce that something will be done and that the various political actors are part of the plan. Unfortunately, there is often a huge gap between the amount of money pledged at donor conferences and what is eventually given.

Humanitarian agencies can foster politicisation

The politicisation of humanitarian action is often represented as a process whose victims are humanitarian organisations. The extent to which humanitarian organisations make themselves vulnerable to politicisation or outright instrumentalisation is determined largely by their own attitudes and conduct. By insisting on maintaining a presence at almost any cost, humanitarian organisations can exacerbate politicisation of humanitarian action. They may do this in a number of ways: by agreeing not to make their own assessments of needs or monitor the distribution of goods, or by accepting armed escorts provided by a party to a conflict. To yield on matters of principle is, perhaps, to invite politicisation.
The growing competition between humanitarian organisations for money and visibility encourages politicisation. Concessions on principles will be made for the sake of being present. One of the more damaging political consequences of this competition is that humanitarians give away the limited weight they carry to influence host government policies. If all humanitarian organisations in a specific context were to refuse to compromise on certain basic principles they could have a chance, perhaps, of changing the attitude of an apparently intransigent government. Competition among humanitarian organisations rules this out. If a principled organisation were to leave the country or be thrown out, it will be speedily replaced by a so-called more pragmatic one. In such circumstances, humanitarian actors are in no position to make demands—for access, independent assessments or anything else.

I am not suggesting that there is one ideal way of doing humanitarian work: there are, and there must be, different ways. Nor am I complaining about intensifying competition in the field of humanitarian action—even though some rules for regulating it would do no harm—or about the emergence of a wide range of new actors. I see positive sides to this development. What is not possible, however, is to have it all. Choices and trade-offs have to be made.

There may be circumstances in which a humanitarian organisation concludes that participation in an integrated mission is the best available choice, for reasons beyond funding and security. There may even be circumstances in which an integrated mission, pursuing political, security, development and humanitarian goals, seems the most promising or the least desperate approach. I would never criticise a humanitarian actor who chooses this path. It is even possible that, in the short run, such a mission may get better access to those in need than genuine independent humanitarian action might.

However, the consequences of this choice should not be disregarded or underestimated: the humanitarian component of such a mission will not be perceived by all parties to a conflict as being independent and neutral. An integrated mission may even become a party to a conflict. One can think of contexts in which this might be a price worth paying. It must, however, be kept in mind that, in terms of perception, these actions take place within a global context. An organisation’s policy in one part of the world will become known elsewhere too.

To be part of an integrated mission, to be protected by armed escorts, to assist in the implementation of government policies may well improve access and security in one context for a limited time. However, perceptions travel rapidly and it is likely that access and security will suffer elsewhere.

Independent and neutral action is not the only way to do humanitarian work. It is, moreover, not an option available to some humanitarian organisations that do precious work, especially as far as independence is concerned. UN humanitarian agencies are part of a wider system that is also political. This does not prevent them from providing impartial humanitarian assistance. Impartiality in providing assistance and trying to protect those in need of protection is the essential principle of humanitarian action. Impartial humanitarian action that is undertaken without being independent, and without resisting the temptation to take sides politically between parties to a conflict, is a conceptual possibility. However, the scope of such action will be seriously limited owing to limited access and greater security risks.

Independence and neutrality are tools to get the best possible access to those in need of assistance and protection; they have proven their effectiveness throughout the world. “Independence” means having complete autonomy in making decisions that are based solely on humanitarian needs on the ground. “Neutrality” implies not taking political sides in an armed conflict. The character of this concept must be particularly emphasised: it serves to secure the best access possible to protect and assist.

In certain kinds of organised armed violence, independence and neutrality are not assets. Organised armed criminal groups, for instance, are impervious to the virtues of independence and neutrality; partly because they are indifferent to the plight of those in urgent need of protection and assistance. In 2009, the ICRC found in Darfur and Chad that independence and neutrality offer no particular protection from hostage taking in contexts of banditry.

But this is far from being the case in much of the world. Independent and neutral humanitarian action remains an asset in terms of access and security, an asset to the extent it is credible and therefore predictable. It implies a clear rejection of all attempts at politicisation, but it does not imply refusal to cooperate and coordinate with other actors.

**Protection**

Assistance and protection activities are closely linked in many contexts, with the former often serving to open the door to the latter. It is difficult to imagine getting permission for certain protection activities without a credible, well-tested reputation for independence and neutrality. For various activities—especially visits to places of detention and monitoring of international humanitarian law—neutrality probably matters even more than independence. The extent to which the two can be separated remains a matter of doubt: is it possible to remain neutral at all times without also being independent?

The issue of protection deserves attention because there are important humanitarian concerns that can be tackled only by political-military, not humanitarian, actors. The first thing is to be clear about the concept of protection: physical protection (direct or by securing the environment), rights-based protection or protection through political process. Other distinctions may be made. I shall focus on the first two concepts.
Humanitarians can provide no physical protection to people in need of such protection and should never give the impression they can. Humanitarian actors should make careful use of the idea of “protection” for the sake of their credibility and in the interest of those in need of physical protection. This recommendation seems particularly pertinent at a time when a number of humanitarian agencies are passing themselves off as protection agencies, a good selling point to attract funds at present. Humanitarian organisations can provide protection in one form: promoting respect for legal provisions aimed at protecting those affected by armed conflict and other situations of violence, organised armed violence in particular. Mobilisation of states on the basis of Common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions is one of the important means by which to try to achieve this goal. Protection from physical violence by focused specific actions or by establishing a protective environment is a task for military/security actors.

Understanding humanitarian space

Is there a space that is exclusively “humanitarian”, neither political nor politicised? It may be difficult to make a convincing case that such a thing exists. Even so, it is imperative to ensure that humanitarian action based exclusively on humanitarian principles remains possible. The responsibility for this rests primarily with humanitarian actors and with those involved in armed conflict. From the perspective of victims, actions are important, not actors.

This obvious comment seems especially important at a time when distinguishing between declarations of intent and actions in the field is becoming increasingly difficult. Discussions about “humanitarian space” tend to take the wrong direction. Curiously, one simple truth is often disregarded: “humanitarian space” must be earned not least by delivering on promises. At present, the most popular argument is that confusion between humanitarian action by the military and humanitarian action by humanitarians poses the most significant threat to “humanitarian space”. This confusion – promoted by integrated missions with their various components or by the sight of humanitarian actors receiving protection from armed escorts – can indeed endanger “humanitarian space” by spreading doubts about the independence and neutrality of humanitarian actors. It makes no sense to have humanitarian actions undertaken by actors guided by a political security agenda when there are humanitarian actors ready and able to meet the humanitarian challenges.

This confusion is particularly dangerous in armed conflicts. It is far less of a problem in situations of natural disasters even if, as Haiti has shown, military presence once the most urgent phase is over can be perceived with some scepticism. The evident conclusion from all this is: if humanitarians can do the job, let them do the job without adding to the risks they already have to overcome.

Drivers of military engagement in humanitarian action

It is no longer strange to remind ourselves that military forces are created to pursue military/security goals and humanitarian organisations to pursue humanitarian goals. One must be forgiven for sometimes getting the impression the military and their masters would prefer to have humanitarian tasks as their main goal. This would, in many cases, facilitate political acceptance for sending troops abroad. This may also be the reason why some even have difficulty accepting that the military only have a humanitarian role to play as a “last resort”.

This underlying wish may be one of the reasons why the so-called civilian-military debate attracts a degree of attention difficult to justify by the situation on the ground. The ICRC, as a consequence of its primary involvement in armed conflicts, has had a long-standing and intense dialogue and cooperation with the military. Our experience is that the military perfectly understand and accept the different roles. Confusion rather tends to be created by political rhetoric or ambiguous mandates for missions with a military component, or crisis managers’ lack of knowledge of the basic requirements for effective and efficient humanitarian action. Political rhetoric, guided by the wish to leave national or organisational humanitarian footprints, can complicate the humanitarian debate. Dogmatic attitudes on the side of humanitarian organisations, not recognising the obvious, can have a similar effect. There are large-scale natural disasters where there is no alternative to military intervention and there are even contexts of armed conflicts where humanitarians have no access, and it is far better that the military intervenes instead of people dying. This latter situation is however rare.

Humanitarian action by the foreign military has been an issue for years. What sometimes gets lost is the sense of proportion. Humanitarian action by foreign military remains modest compared to the humanitarian activities of humanitarian organisations. Let us take the case of the 2010 floods in Pakistan: the Pakistani army has been by far the most important actor. The military of third countries or regional military organisations have played no significant role. The delivery of some logistical means to the Pakistani army on a bilateral level seems to have been the main contribution.
It is useful to make a distinction between the humanitarian dimension of military action and humanitarian action by the military. Military action with the aim of creating a space of security to make it possible for humanitarian organisations to develop their activities can have an important humanitarian dimension without too much of a risk of confusion between the two actors. The EUFOR Chad/ CAR mission, completed in March 2009, comes to mind as an example. Direct humanitarian action by the military and contribution of military assets to humanitarian agencies or to the authorities affected by a humanitarian disaster are usefully distinguished from security projection as mentioned before.

The most delicate and extreme cases of politicisation of humanitarian work are the cases where humanitarian assistance operations are explicitly presented as serving the pursuit of military and security goals. Statements in this sense have been made in the past in particular related to Afghanistan. They do not however constitute a more general trend. There are even reasons to believe that those who wanted to provide humanitarian assistance in exchange for intelligence have learned that this was not the path to follow.

As far as military involvement in humanitarian assistance in general is concerned, the Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan are the most quoted case, even if most of them have very little or no time for humanitarian action and mandate does not even cover humanitarian activities explicitly. “Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) will assist the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to extend its authority, in order to facilitate the development of a stable and secure environment in the identified area of operation, and enable Security Sector Reform and reconstruction efforts” (ISAF PRT Handbook edition 4)\(^1\). The fact that the PRTs are quoted again and again may be an indicator that the politicisation of humanitarian action can take other forms with less potential for harmful confusion with independent and neutral humanitarian action. It can find expression in earmarking policies largely determined by political considerations, as part of an overall security policy. It can also find expression in the way funds for humanitarian assistance are attributed to different ministries or in the way expenditures are qualified as humanitarian assistance. A sudden increase in humanitarian expenditure by a defence ministry or a spending decline by a development ministry would most certainly be a sign of politicisation. ICRC’s experience in recent years has not followed such a pattern: the share of un-earmarked and loosely earmarked funds is in fact rising and the support by donors with a heavy political and security agenda remains generous.

### Conclusion

The politicisation of humanitarian action is an issue of concern. But it is not a new issue and should not be dramatised. Humanitarian organisations are not condemned to suffer its consequences. Before making judgements on the impact of the politicisation of humanitarian action, distinctions should be drawn between the various forms of politicisation and the environments in which they take place. A “humanitarian space” is not necessarily pure and a political space is not necessarily defiled.

The risk of politicisation of humanitarian work is increasing and taking forms. There is pressure in some states to ensure all activities reflect security policies. There are states tempted to leave a national humanitarian footprint. States hit by humanitarian disasters are increasingly determined to keep all humanitarian actors under control—a salutary reminder that politicisation is not simply a risk posed by the policies of donor states.

There is some evidence that the extent to which politicisation or, worse, instrumentalisation of humanitarian action takes place also depends on the behaviour of humanitarian organisations. The less they stick to basic humanitarian principles, the easier their instrumentalisation becomes. Seen from the perspective of those in need of protection and urgent assistance, there is a bigger risk than the different shades of politicisation: the risk of confusion between declarations of intent and concrete action in the field. It is very much the humanitarians’ responsibility to eliminate this risk by walking their talk or keeping silent in case they are, for whatever reason, prevented from walking. Instrumentalisation for political purposes is a risk but it must not obscure other equally serious or bigger risks.

NB: This article was written in a personal capacity and views expressed here should not be interpreted as necessarily reflecting the policy of the International Committee of the Red Cross.

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Introduction

In July 2010, massive flooding in Pakistan left an estimated 14 million people in dire need of humanitarian assistance. On a larger scale than the Indian Ocean tsunami, the disaster came on the heels of a series of other major humanitarian crises, including the displacement of well over two million people due to a Pakistani military offensive against the Taliban and a major earthquake in 2005.

Pakistan is just one example of how the world is facing multiple and progressively more complicated humanitarian emergencies, and how local and international humanitarian actors’ capacity to deliver aid in a neutral, impartial and independent way is being increasingly challenged. Other examples include the entrenched crises in Afghanistan, Sudan and Somalia, the complex emergency in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and the massive earthquake in Haiti.

In each of these crises, scope to provide effective protection and assistance to crisis-affected people and avoid future crises is too often contingent on a complex interplay between competing national and international political, military, security or development concerns. Politicisation of humanitarian crises and the instrumentalisation of the response mean that access to affected populations is under threat, the security of humanitarian workers is at risk and affected people are not receiving the protection and assistance they need and deserve.

The world economic crisis has led many traditional government donors – those from states belonging to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) – to announce major cutbacks to their Official Development Assistance (ODA) budgets. While several governments have committed to maintaining their humanitarian assistance budgets despite the poor economic climate, there is already ample evidence that the needs of millions of people affected by crises remain unmet even at current humanitarian funding levels. There is growing concern that vulnerability due to climate change or rapid urbanisation is set to increase needs in the immediate future, further stretching the capacity of the humanitarian system to its limits.

In such an environment, there is an understandable concern and debate about the value and effectiveness of humanitarian assistance and how to reform and improve the international humanitarian system so that it can meet these mounting challenges.
The Humanitarian Response Index (HRI) report, published by DARA since 2007, examines responses to crises to assess how the world’s main donor governments – 23 members of the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) – face the challenge of ensuring that their aid money is used effectively and efficiently in order to maximise the benefits for those affected. The HRI assesses and ranks how well these donor governments are meeting their commitment to apply the principles and good donor practice set out in the declaration of Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD). The report aims to identify and promote good donor practice and ensure greater transparency, accountability and impact of humanitarian assistance for the millions of people suffering the effects of crisis – all the more important in these times of increased need and reduced aid budgets.

The HRI is not an index on the volume or quantity of funding provided by Western governments for humanitarian assistance. Instead, it looks beyond funding to assess critical issues around the quality and effectiveness of aid in five pillars of donor practice:

- Are donor responses based on the needs of the affected populations, and not subordinated to political, strategic or other interests?
- Do donors support strengthening local capacity, prevention of future crises and long-term recovery?
- Do donor policies and practices effectively support the work of humanitarian organisations?
- Do donors respect and promote International Humanitarian Law (IHL), and actively promote humanitarian access to enable protection of civilians affected by crises?
- Do donors contribute to accountability and learning in humanitarian action?

The HRI 2010 report is based on extensive field research in 14 countries affected by humanitarian crises: Afghanistan, the Central African Republic (CAR), Colombia, DRC, Indonesia, the occupied Palestinian territories (oPt), Pakistan, the Philippines, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Yemen and Zimbabwe. A preliminary HRI mission to assess the response to the Haiti earthquake also took place – which will be followed up by a more extensive review of donor responses there in 2011. Together, these crises (excluding Haiti) received over 60 percent of the funding mobilised to respond to crises in 2009, and over 50 percent of OECD/DAC humanitarian funding allocations as recorded by the Financial Tracking Service (FTS) of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). They thus provide an excellent representative sample of where donors prioritised their support. The crises selected also represent a good geographic distribution and a mix of natural disasters, conflicts and complex emergencies. The report also includes analysis of extensive quantitative data on donor governments’ policies, funding and practices, and is augmented by analysis and information provided by others in the humanitarian community. This data is used to generate a comparative overall ranking of the OECD/DAC donors. This year’s report also includes a classification of donors into groups based on the statistical similarities in scores against the index’s indicators and formulas. Part 2 of the report offers individual donor assessments showing donors strengths and areas for improvement, and specific recommendations for each donor. Part 3 provides a brief report on each crisis studied as part of the HRI field research that analyzes the response of donors in different crisis contexts.

In the sections that follow, these issues are explored in greater detail. The chapter first provides an overview of the HRI’s scope and methodology, including a summary of the changes and refinements made this year. This is followed by the ranking of the OECD/DAC donors against the HRI’s five pillars of donor practice, and a classification of donors according to their statistical similarities in scores against the index’s 35 indicators. A more detailed analysis of donors’ performance by pillar is provided in this section. This includes examples of how donors score against individual indicators within each pillar, along with examples from the 14 different crises studied to illustrate issues identified from the analysis. This section also includes general recommendations to donors for each of the HRI’s pillars. The HRI 2010 concludes with some general suggestions to donors and other stakeholders as to how to continue progress towards improving the quality, effectiveness and impact of donor governments’ humanitarian assistance. The report also includes a separate chapter on the HRI process and methodology, with a detailed technical annex on the index’s indicators and formulas. Part 2 of the report offers individual donor assessments showing donors strengths and areas for improvement, and specific recommendations for each donor.

Part 3 provides a brief report on each crisis studied as part of the HRI field research that analyzes the response of donors in different crisis contexts.

**Summary of main findings**

This year’s report has five main findings, along with a series of recommendations to assist donor governments to make their aid more effective and more closely aligned with the principles contained in the GHD declaration. In summary, the HRI 2010 findings are:

1. **Increasing politicisation of humanitarian assistance means millions of people are not getting the aid they need.**

   Donor governments need to ensure that aid is prioritised and allocated on the basis of the needs of civilian populations, not on political, economic or military objectives.
2 A lack of political commitment and investment in conflict and disaster prevention, preparedness and risk reduction threatens to intensify the impact of future humanitarian crises.

Donor governments need to invest significantly more resources and political will in conflict and disaster prevention and risk reduction, including addressing climate change vulnerability.

3 Slow progress in reforming the humanitarian system means that aid efforts are not as efficient or effective as they should be.

Donor governments need to work together and with other actors, particularly local authorities and civil society in vulnerable countries, to scale-up efforts to reform the humanitarian system and improve aid effectiveness.

4 Continued gaps in the protection of civilians and lack of continued safe humanitarian access means that vulnerable populations are at risk of harm.

Donor governments need to prioritise protection of civilians and facilitate safe humanitarian access so that crisis-affected populations are not put at risk of harm and receive the support and assistance they need to survive and recover from a crisis.

5 Donor governments are collectively failing to improve their transparency and “downward” accountability towards affected populations.

Donor governments need to significantly increase transparency around their funding and support for humanitarian action, and improve their accountability to help ensure that aid efforts have the greatest possible benefit for crisis-affected populations.

The HRI 2010 report shows that donor governments have collectively made some progress towards fulfilling their commitments to the GHD Principles and addressing some of the challenges identified in previous HRI reports. But there are still too many gaps in actual practice. In many of the crises analysed in this year’s report it is apparent that humanitarian assistance provided by several donor governments is being subordinated to other objectives, thus undermining the GHD Principles calling on donors to ensure separation of aid from other interests. Additionally, many of the governments of crisis-affected countries studied this year, along with non-state actors, have manipulated crises and the international response to meet their own domestic interests and objectives. This is having further negative effects on the ability of humanitarian organisations to provide protection and assistance to affected populations. The complicated and challenging operating environment for humanitarian actors also points to a need to reform the humanitarian system to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of aid and be better prepared to respond to current and future challenges. This includes investing more strategically in prevention and risk reduction efforts. Finally, donor accountability toward crisis-affected populations – and not just domestic stakeholders – needs to be improved to ensure aid is focused on meeting their needs and priorities.

Overview of the HRI scope and methodology

The main focus of the HRI is assessing how OECD/DAC members that have signed the GHD declaration (except the Republic of Korea) are applying the principles and good practice in the way they fund and support the response to humanitarian crises. According to OECD/DAC and FTS figures, these governments together provide between 75 to 80 percent of the funds for humanitarian action. They are thus key stakeholders in the humanitarian system, with the power and capacity to shape and influence humanitarian action at all levels.

By providing an independent assessment and evidence of how individual donors perform and by ranking them against their peers, the HRI helps civil society benchmark the quality of their government’s humanitarian assistance. It also allows governments to improve the effectiveness, impact and accountability of the way they support relief and recovery efforts in crisis situations. The HRI complements other major monitoring tools and assessments used

Table 1. Members of GHD group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The GHD donors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Countries in italics are new GHD members that are not currently covered in the HRI’s analysis. Korea, for example, recently joined the OECD/DAC and has signed the GHD declaration but sufficient information is not available at this time to conduct a full analysis of its performance as a humanitarian donor. DARA is tracking and monitoring these and other donor governments, as well as pooled funds and other funding mechanisms, in order to identify and share emerging trends and examples of good and poor donor practice.
Table 2: HRI pillars and indicators

Pillar 1: Responding to needs (30% of ranking weight)
This pillar assesses the extent to which donor funding and support are allocated in accordance to needs; respect the fundamental humanitarian principles of impartiality, neutrality and independence and ensure humanitarian objectives are not subordinated to political, economic or military objectives. The indicators in this pillar correspond to GHD Principles 2, 5, 6, and 12.

Qualitative indicators (from field surveys)
- Impartiality of aid
- Independence of aid
- Adapting to needs
- Timely funding to partner organisations

Quantitative indicators (from published data sources)
- Funding based on level of vulnerability and to forgotten crises
- Timely funding to complex emergencies
- Timely funding to sudden onset disasters

Pillar 2: Prevention, risk reduction and recovery (20% of ranking weight)
This pillar assesses the extent to which donors support capacity for disaster and conflict prevention, risk reduction, preparedness and response as well as support for recovery and the transition to development. The indicators in this pillar correspond to GHD Principles 1, 7, 8 and 9.

Qualitative indicators
- Beneficiary participation in programming
- Beneficiary participation in monitoring and evaluation
- Support for prevention and preparedness
- Linking relief, rehabilitation and development.

Quantitative indicators
- Funding for reconstruction and prevention
- Funding of risk mitigation mechanisms
- Reducing climate-related vulnerability

Pillar 3: Working with humanitarian partners (20% of ranking weight)
This pillar assesses how well donors support the work of agencies implementing humanitarian action and their unique roles in the humanitarian system. The indicators in this pillar correspond to GHD Principles 6, 10, 12, 13, 14, 17 and 18.

Qualitative indicators
- Flexible funding
- Support for partners and funding organisational capacity
- Donor capacity for informed decision-making
- Support for coordination

Quantitative indicators
- Funding to NGOs
- Un-earmarked funding
- Funding UN and Red Cross/ Red Crescent appeals

Pillar 4: Protection and international law (15% of ranking weight)
This pillar assesses the extent to which donors integrate protection and the application of international humanitarian law and other international guidelines and legal mechanisms into their funding policies and practices and ensure that operational actors apply them. The indicators in this pillar correspond to GHD Principles 3, 4, 8 and 17.

Qualitative indicators
- Support for protection of civilians
- Promotion of international humanitarian law
- Facilitating humanitarian access
- Advocacy towards local authorities

Quantitative indicators
- International humanitarian law
- Human rights law
- Refugee law

Pillar 5: Learning and accountability (15% of ranking weight)
This pillar assesses how well donors support initiatives to improve the quality, effectiveness and accountability of humanitarian action. The indicators in this pillar correspond to GHD Principles 15, 21, 22, and 23.

Qualitative indicators
- Accountability towards beneficiaries
- Transparency of funding
- Appropriate reporting requirements
- Support for learning and evaluations

Quantitative indicators
- Participation in accountability initiatives
- Funding for accountability initiatives
- Funding and commissioning evaluations

1 For a more detailed description of indicators and the index construction, see HRI Process and Methodology.
by the humanitarian community. The major difference between the HRI and these other mechanisms is that it is an independent exercise, and is not funded by any government. HRI analysis goes beyond the collective analysis of the funding trends of the GHD group to explore important issues around the quality and effectiveness of individual donor governments’ aid compared to their peers, and how well the donor respects and applies humanitarian principles in its decisions and actions.

The conceptual foundation of the HRI is the 23 Principles and Good Practice of Humanitarian Donorship contained in the GHD Declaration. The advantages of using the GHD as the basis for measuring donor performance is that it is currently the only existing point of reference agreed to by donor governments on what constitutes good practice in humanitarian assistance. This makes it an ideal framework to assess the depth and extent of governments’ political commitment and accountability to support more effective humanitarian action.

The HRI assesses and benchmarks donors against 35 indicators aligned against the main concepts contained in the GHD Principles. The indicators are organised into five pillars of donor practice, each with a qualitative component based on field survey responses on the perceptions and experiences of humanitarian organisations funded by donor governments and a quantitative component based on publically available data.

The qualitative and quantitative components are weighted equally within pillars to give a balanced overview of donor performance. The pillars are also weighted in the overall index in accordance to the relative priority of the concepts and principles the pillar measures.

Any index has its limitations. In the case of the HRI, the main difficulty is obtaining valid, reliable and comparable data on humanitarian assistance for all of the 23 government donors assessed. For example, despite donor commitments in the GHD to provide timely, accurate and transparent reporting on their humanitarian assistance, the use of tools such as the OCHA’s FTS is inconsistent among donors. The GHD Principles themselves are vaguely formulated in places, allowing donors to interpret and apply them differently. This presents a challenge to define indicators and benchmark performance. DARA has taken a pragmatic approach and has drawn on the expertise and consensus of experts in the humanitarian field as to what constitutes good donor practice, as well as the most appropriate data sources and indicators to measure this.

### Research process

As part of the field research, HRI teams interviewed over 475 senior representatives of humanitarian organisations who work in the 14 crisis-affected countries we studied. Teams asked about the response and the role of donor governments in supporting it. Field research also entailed a survey questionnaire of donor practice, which asked respondents for their opinions and perceptions – based on their direct experience of liaising with donors who support their work – of how well donors are applying good practice in the crisis. This year, nearly 2,000 survey responses were gathered. Teams also interviewed over 75 donor governments’ representatives as well as local authorities and civil society organisations. Insofar as possible, teams also interviewed beneficiaries of humanitarian assistance.

The fact that nearly two-thirds of the interview respondents are male confirms the ongoing male dominance of senior humanitarian management structures in the field. The implications of this gender imbalance on attitudes, perceptions and decision-making processes in humanitarian action are potentially huge – preliminary analysis of the survey responses suggests that gender is a significant factor in determining how donors are scored in survey questions (other factors include the nationality of respondents, level of familiarity with the GHD Principles, among others – see the Technical Annex for more information). The issue will be analysed in greater depth by DARA in future HRI reports.

The results of the field research complement extensive quantitative data collected on donor government funding and policies around humanitarian assistance. This data includes information from sources such as the UN, World Bank, the Red Cross/Red Crescent and others. All data has been statistically analysed and converted into indicators to construct the HRI scores and ranking for each of the donors assessed, and to generate a classification of donors based on their similarities and differences. The HRI analysis helps DARA provide a good overview of how well donors and humanitarian organisations are responding to different types of crises. This information is used to advocate for changes and improvements in the humanitarian sector, as well as to provide direct, bilateral technical assistance to donor agencies to address gaps in their policies and practices.

### Changes to the HRI methodology this year

Each year, DARA reviews the HRI methodology and adjusts it to reflect developments in the humanitarian field and improvements in the index design and analysis. As part of this process of continual improvement, in 2009 DARA consulted with nearly 50 key informants from governments, UN agencies, the Red Cross / Red Crescent Movement, NGOs and academics for their opinions on the core concepts of the GHD and how to best measure them in the HRI. In addition, the HRI’s Peer Review Committee and donors themselves provided valuable inputs on how to improve and streamline the index and

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3 The HRI Peer Review Committee includes experts in the humanitarian field who, in their personal capacity advise DARA on the HRI. Members include: Jock Baker, James Darvy, Wolf-Dieter Eberwein, Veronique de Geoffroy, Claude Hilfiker, Eva von Oelreich, David Roodman and Ed Schenkenberg.
The problems of politicisation

- Statistical calculations and optimal values were revised and improved, and all scores have been harmonised to a 0-10 scale for better presentation and comparability among indicators, pillars and the overall final scores.

- Sophisticated multidimensional statistical techniques were used to test and validate the data and indicator scores, and to allow for a deeper analysis of the interrelations among donors’ performance and the different principles that make up the GHD.

- A new quantitative indicator has been added to Pillar 2 (Prevention, risk reduction and recovery) as a proxy measure for donor governments’ efforts to reduce climate-related vulnerability. This is in line with DARA’s commitment to track and measure the human consequences of climate change.4

The main innovation in this year’s index is to expand the HRI’s analysis beyond the comparative ranking of all 23 OECD/DAC donors by including a multi-dimensional analysis which groups donors according to the patterns of their similarities and respective differences in their performance.

While the ranking provides a useful synthesis of donors’ overall performance, there is a risk that the results can be over-simplified or misinterpreted, and the relationship between individual indicators and overall donor practice can be lost. The advantage of this new approach is that it analyses donors by using a more holistic approach. By categorising donors and grouping them by the patterns of their actions, the HRI can begin to provide a more realistic benchmark of where donors stand in relation to their closest peers rather than the overall OECD/DAC group. The analysis can also offer more details on each donor’s strengths and areas for improvement compared to its peers, which in turn may help decision-makers to refine and improve their humanitarian strategies. The new approach also allows DARA to incorporate new donors (both governments and other funders) into the analysis in future editions as well as carry out a more comprehensive trend analysis of the data compiled over the past five years of the HRI.

- Indicators have been distributed evenly between the HRI’s five pillars. Within pillars, qualitative and quantitative indicators represent 50 percent respectively of the calculation of the overall score by pillar. This helps to ensure that donors’ scores in pillars reflect a more balanced view of their performance.

- The survey design has been revised and a comprehensive statistical analysis of responses was conducted to identify and adjust for any possible social or cultural factors that could impact the pattern of responses. This helps to reduce the effect of possible biases that could favour and/or penalise donors, and to convert the survey responses into more comparable donor scores.

- Table 3. Survey responses by donor and crisis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OECD/DAC donors</th>
<th>Total number of responses</th>
<th>Other funding sources</th>
<th>Total number of responses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AUSTRALIA</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>CERF</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUSTRIA</td>
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<td>INGO</td>
<td>84</td>
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<tr>
<td>BELGIUM</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>MULTILATERAL ORGANISATION</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CANADA</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>OTHER DONOR COUNTRY</td>
<td>32</td>
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<tr>
<td>DENMARK</td>
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<td>POOLED FUND</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>PRIVATE/FOUNDATION</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
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<td>FINLAND</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>RED CROSS MOVEMENT</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRANCE</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>UN AGENCIES</td>
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<tr>
<td>GERMANY</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>Total Non DAC Donors</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>GREECE</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Survey responses by crisis</td>
<td>Total number of responses</td>
</tr>
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<td>IRELAND</td>
<td>29</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITALY</td>
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<td>AFGHISTAN</td>
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</tr>
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<td>JAPAN</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>CAR</td>
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<tr>
<td>LUXEMBOURG</td>
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<td>PAKISTAN</td>
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<td>PHILIPPINES</td>
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<td>SWITZERLAND</td>
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<td>UK</td>
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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ZIMBABWE</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Grand Total</td>
<td>1949</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4 See http://www.daraint.org for more information on the Climate Vulnerability Index, published by DARA.
Central African Republic: Still off the humanitarian radar

This year, DARA selected the Central African Republic (CAR) as a pilot mission. During the field mission (19-26 November 2009), a new survey and other research tools were tested. Below is a summary of the main findings of our field visit to CAR.

The crisis in CAR has for many years been erroneously seen as a spillover from conflicts in DRC, Chad, Sudan and Uganda. Such an analysis overlooks the reality of CAR. In a country of some 4.4 million people, UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reported that in January 2010 there were 197,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) in addition to an estimated 160,000 refugees in neighbouring countries and some 8,500 Chadian and Sudanese refugees. At least a fourth of the population is affected by conflict and food insecurity. Most are dispersed, invisible and very hard to reach. CAR is slipping deeper into chaos.

The international community’s commitment to peacekeeping has been limited, if not tokenistic. Peacekeeping interventions have not primarily focused on restoration of security within CAR but included the country within the context of conflicts in Darfur and Chad. In January 2010, the government of Chad asked the UN to withdraw the UN Mission in Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT), triggering discussions which led to revision of its mandate and a Security Council decision to wind up MINURCAT operations at the end of 2010. This reduction in international engagement is despite access problems to wide areas of the country.

By October 2010, only 44 percent of US$144 million requested by the 2010 Consolidated Appeal (CAP) had been made available. The largest share (21.9 percent) has come from carry-over from 2009. The US has provided 13.6 percent, followed by CERF, the European Commission and the UK. France, which once contributed a larger share of humanitarian aid to CAR, has so far offered only US$2.1 million. There are hardly any donors with permanent representation in Bangui – the US, France and the European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO).

HRI interviewees consistently criticised donors for failing to focus on humanitarian needs and prioritising development programmes in spite of the difficult circumstances in most parts of the country. A typical comment was that “development initiatives currently promoted are premature. Much more work is needed before there is enough local capacity to maintain services at an acceptable level.” Many others lamented lack of support for humanitarian interventions, describing the response as “inadequate, inappropriate and unadapted”. “Donors don’t see CAR as an emergency”. There is concern that funds are channelled mainly to the conflict areas in the north while minimal funding reaches the equally impoverished west and south. The need for better integration of relief and development programmes was constantly reiterated during interviews.

Many of those interviewed also expressed concerns that the Common Humanitarian Fund (CHF) does not provide support for enhancing organisational capacity or meeting operational – and particularly security-related – costs and that it may be biased towards approval of requests from UN agencies. Interviewees generally reported that managers of the CHF were transparent in explaining funding decisions and in providing information, although they lacked a clear strategy during the absence of a Humanitarian Coordinator. Funds are very limited and the competition for CHF support is intense. One interviewee described the process as “a meat market”.

Most of those interviewed described ECHO and the UK Department for International Development (DFID) as the best donors. ECHO’s stable presence in Bangui has been helpful to boost partnership and facilitate coordination. ECHO is also seen as the most coherent of the donors, integrating aid strategies with the development policies of the EC. DFID’s willingness to provide financial assistance to improve capacity of its partners was also welcomed. Some interviewees praised the US and French ambassadors for their consistent pressure for humanitarian access.

Humanitarian actors stress that the main challenge is currently related to protection. Even if elements within the CAR government do agree to prioritise protection, they lack the capacity to do so. Many of those interviewed would like to see much greater donor engagement in advocacy to ensure local authorities effectively address protection issues.

When it comes to explaining donor lack of interest in the CAR, interviewees offered the HRI team several explanations. Many noted that the previous Humanitarian Coordinator was instrumental in placing the humanitarian needs of CAR at the forefront of donor attention. In late 2008, however, he departed and a year’s delay in appointing a successor helps explain the decline in donor contributions. Others, however, spread the blame wider, one arguing that “the reduction in available funding in 2009 is due to poor fundraising and advocacy by the humanitarian community in CAR, not to divergence of funds to other crises.” Others suggest, however, donor attention has moved elsewhere as a result of over-optimism following signing of the Libreville peace accord in 2008.
There are positive developments in CAR. The government and its main opponents have not reverted to full-scale civil war. Some armed combatants are being demobilised. Mechanisms to integrate humanitarian and development work have been established. Relief activities in some parts of CAR are providing assistance and early recovery support to communities severely affected by the conflict. In 2009, the Paris Club cancelled a significant amount of CAR debt. The CAR government has formally undertaken to commit itself to the transparency principles set out in the Paris Declaration and created a mechanism (DAD République centrafricaine) to allow for greater monitoring of aid management and facilitate aid coordination.

However, for the time being, the deterioration of the humanitarian crisis, postponement of presidential elections and the withdrawal of MINURCAT have heightened uncertainties.

It is important for donors to:

- End the funding volatility of recent years by making long-term commitments;
- Build on the potential for timely, strategic disbursements demonstrated by the CHF and ensure it is sufficiently funded;
- Emulate the integrated relief-development approach of ECHO;
- Ensure that all projects have a cross-cutting peace building/protection/human rights component.

As Graph 1 shows, the absolute volume of aid is not necessarily a good predictor of its quality. However, there is a clear relationship between a donor’s humanitarian assistance as a proportion of its Gross National Income (GNI) and the donor’s HRI scores. More generous donors – those that invest a higher percentage of their GNI for humanitarian assistance – tend to score higher overall in the HRI, including in non-financial indicators such as adherence to good practice and international humanitarian law.

At the same time, humanitarian needs have been on the rise. There were several mega-disasters in 2009 and early 2010 and a number of major protracted crises continued to require significant international support and assistance. The response to these crises has shown that progress towards humanitarian reform remains slow: efforts are now lagging behind. The different responses to the crises in Haiti and Pakistan illustrate the continued challenges of ensuring equitable distribution of resources based on needs, engagement and ownership of the response by affected populations, effective coordination between donors, international actors, local authorities and the military.
Along with the economic crisis, another factor influencing donor behaviour has been the high degree of turnover in OECD/DAC governments in the past year (including minority governments in some countries). This has affected the functioning of aid agencies in some countries, as many incoming administrations have yet to define a strategic direction for their humanitarian assistance. Many OECD/DAC countries recently initiated comprehensive policy reviews of their humanitarian assistance, the outcomes of which may or may not be aligned to Principles of Good Humanitarian Donorship. There is a potential risk that leading politicians and policy-makers in donor governments may be unfamiliar with humanitarian principles and good donor practice, or may consider the GHD declaration outdated and irrelevant. DARA will thus be redoubling efforts to monitor and promote good donor practice in humanitarian assistance.

Another, often overlooked factor is that high staff turnover and cutbacks in many donor aid agencies have undermined donor capacity for engaging with partners and providing adequate support and follow-up to humanitarian programming. The pressures of reduced donor capacity were already highlighted in last year’s HRI, and the negative impacts of donor staff cuts appear to be growing according to many of the people interviewed in the field research. The results of the HRI field research over the past four years indicates that most government representatives responsible for humanitarian assistance are attempting to apply good practice in their work to have greater impact but donor agencies still lack guidance and political support to apply good practice. This is particularly apparent in contexts where governments may have competing political, economic or security interests. Given the relatively low priority given by many governments to humanitarian assistance compared to development, trade or security, this makes it even more challenging for donor agencies to apply good practice.

The research findings also show that the majority of senior representatives of donor agencies and humanitarian organisations are not fully aware of or familiar with the GHD Principles. This makes it difficult for donor representatives at the field level to know what their governments are committed to. For representatives of humanitarian organisations it is also difficult to know what they can expect from donors in terms of good practice or whether it is feasible to try to hold their donors accountable for applying the principles and good practices they have committed to (see Graph 2).

**HRI ranking**

The HRI 2010 ranking is calculated by taking a donor’s average scores by pillar and then adjusting the scores according to the weighting assigned to each pillar for the overall index. The resulting scores are ordered into a ranking that gives a composite picture of how well individual donors compare to other donors in the donor group. Nevertheless, the ranking does offer an overview of where individual donors stand in comparison to the overall group of GHD donors.  

Denmark takes top position in the HRI 2010 ranking based on consistently good scores in all of the HRI’s five pillars and many of its indicators. Denmark is one of the better donors in the OECD/DAC group in terms of indicators for Timely funding to complex emergencies and sudden onset disasters, and for Pillar 2 (Prevention risk reduction and recovery) and Pillar 3 (Working with humanitarian partners). It is the best donor overall for Support for learning and accountability. Nevertheless, Denmark’s first place in the ranking should be treated with caution.

Denmark gives proportionally less than many donors to forgotten emergencies as well as funding based on the level of vulnerability of crises. DARA notes with concern that a number of recent Danish media reports and declarations by Danish politicians suggested that aid in response to the Pakistan floods should be contingent on addressing Denmark’s political and security interests, and should not contribute to strengthening the Taliban. This suggests that Danish humanitarian assistance may be susceptible to media and public pressure that appears inimical to the more principled approach outlined in the GHD declaration.  

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5 See for example: http://www.cphpost.dk/news/politics/90-politics/49721-minister-criticised-for-linking-security-to-pakistan-aid.html. Similar debates took place in the US, with the New York times sponsoring an online debate on the US response to the Pakistan floods: http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/18/opinion/18wed1.html?_r=1&ref=opinion. For the most part, these debates missed the point entirely: the objectives of humanitarian assistance are to save lives and prevent suffering, and not contribute to political or security agendas.
Graph 3. HRI 2010 final scores and ranking

- Denmark: 6.87
- Ireland: 6.54
- New Zealand: 6.50
- Norway: 6.42
- Sweden: 6.32
- European Commission: 6.24
- Switzerland: 6.16
- United Kingdom: 6.12
- Netherlands: 6.11
- Luxembourg: 5.88
- Finland: 5.86
- Canada: 5.84
- Australia: 5.65
- Germany: 5.61
- France: 5.54
- Japan: 5.47
- Spain: 5.45
- Belgium: 5.23
- United States: 5.16
- Italy: 4.91

* Austria, Greece and Portugal are not included in the ranking due to insufficient data.
Ireland takes 2nd place in the HRI 2010, reflecting good overall performance against the HRI’s five pillars. Despite cutbacks to its aid budget, Ireland has continued to perform above average in some of the index’s quantitative indicators. It does particularly well in indicators around responding to current needs but is among the poorest performing donors in terms of investing in preparedness, prevention and risk reduction. In addition, many partner organisations funded by Ireland expressed concerns about its capacity to monitor the humanitarian context and support their work in different crises. This is reflected in many of the index’s qualitative indicators, where Ireland receives below average scores.

New Zealand is in 3rd place this year. Despite its small size and limited field presence as a donor, New Zealand has shown a good level of commitment to applying the GHD Principles in the way it supports humanitarian action. It is one of the best donors in terms of timely funding, and in learning and accountability. However, it could improve in terms of supporting Beneficiary participation in programming and Funding to NGOs.

Norway is ranked 4th in the HRI 2010, showing good performance in Pillar 3 (Working with humanitarian partners) and Pillar 4 (Protection and international law), where it is the best performing donor. It is also above average in Pillar 2 (Prevention, risk reduction and recovery) and Pillar 5 (Learning and accountability). Norway does less well overall in Pillar 1 (Responding to needs), with below average scores in indicators for Timelessness of funding to complex emergencies, Funding based on level of vulnerability and to forgotten crises. Norway could also do better in terms of Linking relief, rehabilitation and development (LRRD) in its funding practices, and in Funding for reconstruction and prevention.

The European Commission (EC), ranked 6th in the HRI 2010, is one of the largest humanitarian donors by volume, matched by good overall performance in most areas of the HRI. The EC does especially well at Pillar 1 (Responding to needs), and in the indicators Beneficiary participation in programming and Accountability towards beneficiaries. However, it is also one of the donors with the highest level of earmarking and received low scores from the organisations it funds for Flexible funding and Appropriate reporting requirements.

Sweden is ranked 5th in the HRI 2010. While Sweden has done well overall in Pillar 4 (Protection and international law) and Pillar 3 (Working with humanitarian partners), it is below average compared to other donors in Pillar 1 (Responding to needs). In particular, it could do much better in terms of Timely funding to complex emergencies and Timely funding to sudden onset disasters, though this is somewhat compensated for by its support to the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) and other quick disbursement mechanisms.

Switzerland is in 7th place in the HRI 2010 ranking, with a generally good performance in Pillar 3 (Working with humanitarian partners), Pillar 4 (Protection and international law) and Pillar 5 (Learning and accountability). It also does well in Pillar 2 (Prevention, risk reduction and recovery) but could respond better Pillar 1 (Responding to needs) in indicators, such as Funding based on level of vulnerability and to forgotten emergencies.

The United Kingdom is ranked 8th in this year’s HRI. Compared to other donors, the UK does well in areas such as it Funding based on level of vulnerability and to forgotten crises and in Pillar 2 (Prevention, risk reduction and recovery) and 3 (Working with humanitarian partners). The UK is also a strong supporter of the CERF and other pooled funds, and an advocate for humanitarian reform, transparency and innovation in humanitarian action. It is well regarded by its partners for its support for coordination. However, the perceptions of the UK’s partners are that it could do more to keep its aid impartial and independent of other interests.

Canada, Australia and Germany took 12th, 13th, and 14th place positions respectively in the HRI 2010 ranking. Each of these donors performed slightly above the overall average in areas such as Pillar 1 (Responding to needs) and Pillar 5 (Learning and accountability) but less well in Pillar 2 (Prevention, risk reduction and recovery). Canada does particularly well for its Timely funding to complex emergencies. Compared to other donors, Australia stands out for Funding for reconstruction and prevention, while Germany does well compared to other donors for Funding to NGOs.

Fifteenth-placed France, Japan (16th), Spain (17th) and Belgium (18th) share many similarities. In general, these donors perform below the overall average in areas such as Pillar 3 (Working with humanitarian partners), Pillar 4 (Protection and international law) and Pillar 5 (Learning and accountability). With the exception of France, these donors perform above the overall donor average for the indicator Funding for reconstruction and prevention. None stands out for their active participation in accountability initiatives in the humanitarian sector, though France is among the best donors in terms of Funding and commissioning evaluations.

Despite its size and importance as a humanitarian donor, the 19th ranked United States does not perform as well as it could in the HRI. Although the US does well in many aspects of Pillar 1 (Responding to needs) – such as timeliness of funding and funding to forgotten emergencies – it scores below average in such critical areas as perceived impartiality of its aid and its independence from other interests.

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7 The EC’s unique status as a regional “governmental” body means that several quantitative indicators in Pillar 4, such as ratifications of treaties, are not included in calculating its scores. Thus, comparisons of its scores to other donors should be undertaken with care.
earmarking, aid conditionality and flexibility of funding. It also receives scores well below the overall average in Pillar 2 (Prevention, risk reduction and recovery). The US is one of the poorest performers in the GHD group in terms of respect and support for IHL, human rights law and refugee law, as it has not signed or ratified a number of important international treaties and conventions that impact humanitarian action such as the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty.

**Italy** takes the final position in the HRI 2010 ranking at 20th. It performs below the overall average in Pillar 3 (Working with humanitarian partners), Pillar 4 (Protection and international law) and Pillar 5 (Learning and accountability). In particular, it does poorly in indicators regarding flexibility and earmarking of funding and funding and support to UN and Red Cross/Red Crescent appeals. It does slightly better in Pillar 2 (Prevention, risk reduction and recovery).

**Austria, Greece, and Portugal** are not included in the HRI ranking this year, as there was insufficient data to calculate the qualitative component of the index. In past editions of the HRI, survey responses for these donors were pooled with responses from previous years in order to have a sufficient number for statistical analysis. In the case of Portugal, none of the over 475 humanitarian agency representatives interviewed in 14 different crises received funding from the Portuguese government. Similarly, DARA was only able to obtain five survey responses for Greece and seven for Austria. With such a small number of responses this year, it was considered more appropriate to limit the analysis to the quantitative data and indicators of the index. The low number of responses is an indicator of the very limited capacity of these donors to engage directly with the humanitarian system at the crisis level. Most of their funding is channelled through multilateral agencies, with little monitoring or follow-up. With the exception of Austria, participation in humanitarian forums is also very limited. More details of their performance in the quantitative indicators and their group classification can be found in the following sections.

### Donor classification

This year, the HRI donor ranking has been expanded to include an analysis of donor performance based on their characteristics and similarities with other donors. The donor classification uses a more sophisticated statistical analysis than the one used to generate the ranking in that it looks for relationships and patterns among donors based on their scores against all 35 indicators. The two approaches complement each other and allow for different perspectives from which one can compare and contrast donor performance against the overall group and within a smaller subset of donors. The advantage of this approach is that it allows for a more sensitive comparative analysis among donors in each sub-group than a simple comparison of a donor’s performance against the overall average of the 23 donors assessed in the ranking. It also allows individual donors to compare and contrast their performance against their closest peers in terms of similarities in their scoring (See HRI Process and Methodology chapter for more information).

After collecting all the quantitative and qualitative data gathered in the HRI research process, a number of statistical analyses were conducted in order to classify and group the 23 OECD/DAC donors assessed in the HRI into three categories, based on their performance against the HRI’s five pillars of donor practice and key indicators:

- **Group 1**: donors with a consistently high level of implementation of GHD concepts
- **Group 2**: donors with a mid-range level of implementation of GHD concepts
- **Group 3**: donors with a lower level of implementation of GHD concepts

**Group 1 donors** include Denmark, Finland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway and Sweden. These donors are characterised by scores consistently above the overall OECD/DAC average in most of the HRI’s qualitative and quantitative indicators, and have the highest overall scores in four of the five pillars of the HRI. The exception is in Pillar 1 (Responding to needs), where these donors perform slightly below the overall OECD/DAC average in the quantitative indicators.

The overall average score for these donors is 6.27, compared to the overall OECD/DAC average of 5.89 on the HRI’s 10-point scale.

As a group, these donors tend to do well in qualitative indicators assessing the perceptions of the level of independence, impartiality and lack of conditionality of their aid. They also do well in indicators related to support to their partners, including funding for capacity building, flexibility and non-earmarking of funding as well as respect for and promotion of IHL, human rights law and refugee law.

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**Graph 4. Overall score by group**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Average Score</th>
<th>Minimum Score</th>
<th>Maximum Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>5.89</td>
<td>6.27</td>
<td>5.88</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*This graph does not take Greece, Portugal and Austria into account, as only quantitative information is available.*
Group 2 donors include Australia, Canada, the EC, Germany, Greece (based on quantitative indicators only), Ireland, the UK and the US. Greece also meets some of the characteristics of this group, but as data is incomplete, comparisons should be made with caution. The scores for these donors are generally mid-range, with better than average scores in quantitative indicators, particularly in Pillar 1 (Responding to needs). However, in qualitative indicators from the HRI survey, this group of donors has scores only slightly better than the OECD/DAC average, indicating that there may be somewhat negative perceptions and experience from the humanitarian agencies they fund. In contrast to donors in Group 1, this group has an overall average score of 5.88 in the HRI, compared to the overall OECD/DAC average of 5.89 on the HRI’s 10-point scale. Group 2 donors are characterised by higher scores in indicators assessing the perception of Donor capacity for informed decision-making, Support for learning and evaluations, and Beneficiary participation in programming. However, the perceived independence and impartiality of their aid, along with flexibility of funding and conditionality of aid, are weaknesses. Group 2 donors do reasonably well in Pillar 1 (Responding to needs), although their scores are generally above average in Pillars 1, 3 and 5 but it has below-average scores in Pillar 2. However, when pillars are weighted according to their importance, Ireland’s scores give it second place in the overall ranking.

Group 3 donors include Austria (quantitative indicators only), Belgium, France, Italy, Japan, Portugal (quantitative indicators only) and Spain. Within the group, there is a relatively high range of differences in scores in Pillars 1 and 2. Scores are below the overall average in Pillars 3, 4 and 5 in both quantitative and qualitative indicators. The average overall score for these donors is 5.32 compared to the overall OECD/DAC average of 5.89 on the HRI’s 10-point scale. In terms of specific indicators, Group 3 donors have few examples of above average performance. In some cases, donors in this group perform reasonably well for Timely funding to complex emergencies, and for Funding for reconstruction and prevention. However, these donors (excluding Austria and Portugal) do not do well in terms of the perceived independence, impartiality and non-conditionality of their aid. With the exception of Spain, they also perform below average in terms of promotion of IHL, refugee and human rights law, as well as Support for learning and evaluations and Participation in accountability initiatives.

The following table (Table 4) shows how individual donors’ pillar scores compare to the OECD/DAC donor average as well as their group average. Arrows pointing up indicate that a donor has scored at least seven percent higher than the average, while arrows pointing down indicate when a donor’s scores are at least seven percent below the average. Looking specifically at a donor like Denmark, ranked 1st in the overall HRI 2010, it obtains scores consistently above average pillar scores compared to donors in its group, as well as compared to the overall OECD/DAC average. In contrast, Ireland is classified as a Group 2 donor as its pillar scores are generally above average in Pillars 1, 3 and 5 but it has below-average scores in Pillar 2. However, when pillars are weighted according to their importance, Ireland’s scores give it second place in the overall ranking. Similarly, while the US is classified as a Group 2 donor, it performs consistently below its group average and the overall OECD/DAC average in four of the index’s five pillars.

Overall, all donors continue to do reasonably well in Pillar 1 (Responding to needs). However, there is a significant range between the highest-scored and lowest-scored donors, reflecting differences in the way donors understand and apply core humanitarian principles and GHD concepts around neutrality, impartiality and independence of aid. As previous editions of the HRI have shown, donors uniformly do not perform as well in Pillar 2 (Prevention, risk reduction and recovery), showing that this is an area all donors need to prioritise.

In contrast, Pillar 3 (Working with humanitarian partners) shows a high degree of variance in donors’ scores, reflecting different approaches among donors, and opportunities for significant improvements in the way many donors interact with and support humanitarian actors. Pillar 4 (Protection and international law) shows reasonably consistent donor behaviour, with a smaller range of scores and the second-highest average scores compared to other pillars. However, there are still significant differences among donors in core indicators for this pillar, indicating that there is room for improvement. Finally, Pillar 5 (Learning and accountability) shows the highest variance in donor scores as well as the lowest average scores, indicating that there are vast differences in the way donors are performing in this area and the reality that for several donors, this simply is not a priority.
**Pillar 1: Responding to needs**

Key finding: Increasing politicisation and instrumentalisation of humanitarian assistance means millions of people are not getting the aid they need.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pillar 1</th>
<th>Pillar 2</th>
<th>Pillar 3</th>
<th>Pillar 4</th>
<th>Pillar 5</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td><strong>GROUP 1</strong></td>
<td>Score</td>
<td>Compared to OECD/DAC average*</td>
<td>Compared to the group average</td>
<td>Score</td>
<td>Compared to OECD/DAC average*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DENMARK</td>
<td>6.90</td>
<td>↑</td>
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<td>6.32</td>
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<td>↓</td>
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<td>→</td>
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<td>LUXEMBOURG</td>
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<td>→</td>
<td>5.13</td>
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<td>NETHERLANDS</td>
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<td>5.72</td>
<td>→</td>
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<td>→</td>
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<td>5.81</td>
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<td>SWITZERLAND</td>
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<td>→</td>
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<td>6.27</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Average Group 1</strong></td>
<td>6.36</td>
<td>→</td>
<td>→</td>
<td>5.89</td>
<td>→</td>
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<td><strong>GROUP 2</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Average Group 2</strong></td>
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<td><strong>GROUP 3</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>SPAIN</td>
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<td>→</td>
<td>6.36</td>
<td>↑</td>
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<td>PORTUGAL**</td>
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<td>↓</td>
<td>4.69</td>
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<tr>
<td>AUSTRIA**</td>
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<td>↓</td>
<td>5.53</td>
<td>→</td>
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<td><strong>Average Group 3</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Total Average</strong></td>
<td>6.45</td>
<td>5.78</td>
<td>5.44</td>
<td>6.07</td>
<td>5.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Max</strong></td>
<td>7.71</td>
<td>6.57</td>
<td>7.19</td>
<td>7.96</td>
<td>7.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Min</strong></td>
<td>3.38</td>
<td>3.36</td>
<td>1.54</td>
<td>3.89</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The average scores do not include Greece, Austria or Portugal.

**Scores for Austria, Greece and Portugal are based on quantitative information only.
As stated in the GHD Principles, the objectives of humanitarian assistance are to save lives, alleviate suffering, and maintain human dignity in situations of disaster, conflict and emergency. When they committed to the GHD Principles, donor governments agreed to keep their humanitarian assistance strictly focused on these objectives and free from political, economic, military or security objectives and influences. They also agreed to avoid placing conditions on their funding that could affect the ability of humanitarian organisations to reach victims with live-saving aid, without discrimination and based solely on needs.

This pillar assesses the extent to which donor funding and support meets these criteria, by looking at three related questions:

- Do donor governments distribute their aid where needs are greatest?
- Do donor governments provide aid in a timely manner?
- Do donor governments keep their aid objectives free from other objectives and aims?

Independence, impartiality and conditionality of aid

In line with the GHD Principles, the HRI field research includes survey questions on the perceptions and experiences of humanitarian organisations with regard to how independent from political, economic, security or other interests they feel their donor governments’ support is. The survey also asks questions about the conditionality of funding and whether this conditionality affects the agency’s ability to meet the needs of affected populations.

Unfortunately, in the majority of the 14 crises studied this year, DARA found many different examples of donor governments that did not respect these humanitarian principles but allowed other objectives to take precedence over the aims of saving lives. This has seriously jeopardised the ability of humanitarian organisations to gain physical access and provide assistance to affected populations. It has also put the security and protection of humanitarian workers and civilians at risk.

The politicisation and instrumentalisation of aid can take many different forms such as when OECD/DAC donor governments:

- Link their support for humanitarian assistance to political, military or anti-terrorism objectives;
- Give priority to state-building and economic development programmes at the expense of meeting immediate humanitarian needs;
- Uncritically fund and support the agenda of the host government even when that government is in part responsible for the humanitarian situation;
- Use aid as an instrument to achieve other objectives such as attempting to use aid to build “goodwill” towards the government, or meeting domestic concerns about visibility.

OECD/DAC donor governments are not the only ones responsible for the politicisation and instrumentalisation of aid. DARA also found that many governments and other non-state actors in crisis-affected countries also politicise crises and manipulate the international aid response to serve their own aims. Examples of this include when the governments of crisis-affected countries:

Graph 5: Overview of donor scores in Pillar 1 indicators

![Graph showing donor scores in Pillar 1 indicators](image-url)
Deny the existence of a humanitarian crisis or manipulate assessments of the extent of needs for their own purposes;

Use the discourse of national sovereignty, the War on Terror or the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness to justify their actions and limit external scrutiny of the humanitarian situation;

Impose unreasonable restrictions on international aid agencies and limit their access to populations;

Deliberately use (and abuse) civilian populations and access to humanitarian assistance as part of their tactics in a conflict.

Germany, Finland and New Zealand were the donors perceived as the most impartial by their partners, with above average scores in this indicator. In contrast, Belgium, France and the US all scored significantly below the OECD/DAC average in this indicator. The majority of survey responses for Belgium come from organisations working in the DRC, a country with colonial ties to Belgium, which may partially explain this low score. The highest scores for the HRI indicator around the perceived independence and non-conditionality of aid go to Luxembourg, Finland, Denmark, Switzerland and Sweden, each with scores well above the overall average. The US, Italy and Japan receive some of the lowest scores for this indicator.

The HRI 2010 field missions illustrate how neutral, impartial humanitarian action is under threat:

In Afghanistan, the use of Western military forces to deliver humanitarian assistance as part of so-called “hearts and minds” campaigns has blurred the boundaries between neutral, impartial humanitarian assistance and places humanitarian organisations at risk of being targeted by armed groups. It also means that aid is prioritised to certain areas of strategic interest, leaving needs unmet in other parts of the country.

In Somalia, US anti-terrorism legislation has meant unreasonable restrictions on aid agencies working in areas controlled by Al-Shabaab, a group linked to Al-Qaeda. This is making it extremely difficult for aid agencies – even those not funded by the US – to deliver aid. As a result, hundreds of thousands of people affected by the crisis are not receiving the aid they need. At the same time, uncritical support for the Transitional Government (TFG) by donors such as Norway and the EC has contributed to politicising the crisis, as the TFG is itself a protagonist in the conflict. This stance appears to be undermining efforts by international agencies to preserve their identity as neutral and impartial humanitarian actors who do not primarily serve Western interests.

In the oPt, the Israeli government’s blockade of Gaza and restrictions on aid and lack of respect for IHL has created unprecedented levels of need for the local population. At the same time, Western governments’ “no contact policy” and restrictions on working with Hamas have hampered the ability of aid agencies to deliver aid effectively.

In Sudan, the government expelled several international aid agencies and placed severe restrictions on others. Meanwhile, Western governments’ attention to Darfur has meant needs in other parts of the country are under-funded. The International Criminal Court’s indictment of Sudanese President Omar Bashir has contributed to further politicisation of the humanitarian crisis and fostered mistrust of humanitarian organisations.

In Colombia, the government has tried to deny the existence of an armed conflict and discourage international attention to the humanitarian crisis. It has successfully used the discourse of the War on Terror and the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness to pursue its own strategic agenda with donor governments, including trying to negotiate free trade agreements with the European Union, the US and Canada, and obtaining development cooperation and military assistance. Government actions have severely compromised humanitarian space and access to affected populations and accentuated problems of protection and displacement. With some exceptions, donor governments have largely accepted this situation uncritically.

In Zimbabwe, the restriction of humanitarian space due to the government ban on NGO activities was a major issue preventing a timely response to a cholera outbreak. The ban’s negative impact was amplified by the risk-averse behaviour of donors and international organisations reluctant to challenge the government’s position.

Distribution of aid according to needs

The HRI 2010 assesses the extent to which donors allocate funding based on the level of vulnerability and to forgotten crises and ones with low media coverage. This helps to understand if donors are basing their funding decisions on objective criteria rather than being unduly influenced by the media, lobbyists or foreign policy objectives.

The HRI 2010 average score for this indicator is among the lowest in this pillar. The Netherlands, Luxembourg, Canada and the US are among the better performers in terms of distributing their aid more equitably according to needs. In contrast, Australia, Portugal, Norway and Denmark all score significantly below the overall OECD/DAC average, indicating that aid distribution is likely influenced and determined by other factors, such as regional interests in the case of Australia.

In comparison, GHD indicators (developed by donors to measure their collective progress in applying the GHD Principles) relating to distribution according to needs show that in 2008 only 31 percent of funding needs were covered in the five least-funded UN Consolidated Appeals (CAPs), compared to 70 percent for all appeals. The same data shows that several crises received more funding than their proportional share of the overall requirements.8

8 See: http://www.globalhumanitariansistance.org/reports
Together, the HR1 and GHD data suggest that donors are still not living up to their commitments to distribute aid in accordance to needs. This is partly a consequence of the problem, highlighted in previous HR1 reports, of obtaining consistent, comparable and reliable needs assessments data. HR1 field research this year shows that this is still a major gap in the humanitarian system. Donors must address this shortcoming if they want to make the GHD Principles of needs-based funding a reality. Many field missions highlighted this issue. For example, the HR1 crisis reports show that:

- In Afghanistan, the inability to access conflict zones means that needs assessments are either done by proxy or generally estimated, with little or no implementing support by donors for carrying them out. In addition, aid tends to be focused on areas where donor governments already have a presence, through Provincial Reconstruction Teams, or in conflict regions, leaving needs in other less-publicised areas uncovered.

- In the Philippines, donor governments largely accepted the Philippine government’s assessments of needs following a series of cyclones, even though needs were likely inflated. Donors also channelled their aid disproportionately toward food aid, leaving gaps in critical areas like shelter. At the same time, domestic political interests interfered in the equitable distribution of aid. Meanwhile, the government has under-estimated or under-reported the extent of humanitarian needs arising from the unresolved internal conflict in southern Mindanao.

- In Indonesia, two earthquakes, one in West Sumatra and the other in West Java, received hugely different levels of response. For West Sumatra, 90 percent of emergency needs were met; however, for West Java, the government did not request international aid and donors respected the government’s stance, despite obvious needs there.

- In Haiti, accurate and reliable needs assessments were delayed, and not always used by donors, who in some cases were influenced by the massive media coverage of the earthquake. For example, the IASC rapid needs assessment did not appear to be known or used by many humanitarian actors. The prioritisation of costly foreign search and rescue teams at the expense of meeting other immediate needs was also questioned by some organisations.

- In Zimbabue, the initial unwillingness by the government and – according to some respondents also some UN agencies and donor governments – to acknowledge the severity of the cholera outbreak and severe restrictions imposed on NGOs and other actors meant that the response was delayed and the death toll was considerably higher than in recent cholera epidemics elsewhere.

- In DRC, donors are disproportionately channelling funding to eastern conflict areas and thus not responding sufficiently to equally serious needs elsewhere: 65% percent of the Humanitarian Action Plan (HAP) funding was allocated to four provinces, leaving the rest of the country without adequate humanitarian aid.

- In Pakistan, donor response to the 2008-2009 displacement crisis addressed immediate relief needs appropriately but fell short on early recovery or community restoration needs. For instance, the agriculture sector has so far been only 16 percent funded and early recovery and education also remain underfunded.

**Timeliness of funding**

A key component of meeting the needs of crisis-affected populations is ensuring that humanitarian agencies have timely access to funding in order to provide assistance rapidly and when it is needed. The HR1 looks at the percentage of donor funding allocated to sudden onset crises within the first six weeks of an appeal launch, and the percentage of funding allocated to complex emergencies (where needs typically continue beyond a one-year period) within the first three months of the calendar year. These HR1 indicators are not limited to UN appeals but also incorporate donor response to appeals by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC). In addition, the HR1 establishes thresholds for optimal donor behaviour: the best performing donors disburse at least 75 percent of funding with the first six weeks of a sudden onset disaster. The rationale for these indicators is that rapid and secure funding allows humanitarian organisations to better plan their programming, which in turn means beneficiaries are more likely to get the right aid at the right time.

In terms of complex emergencies, collectively, donors did not perform well in this indicator. Less than half (10 of the 23 DAC donors) provided more than 37.5 percent of their funding (half the optimum threshold of 75 percent) within the three month timeframe. Ireland and Portugal were the best performing donors, with an optimal score of ten. Belgium was among the poorest performing donors, along with Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and Austria, who all performed significantly below the overall OECD/DAC average (This does not take into account donor contributions to the CERF and other quick disbursement funding mechanisms, which is included in a different indicator).

- In Indonesia, funding for the West Sumatra earthquake arrived quickly and was considered flexible and generous, while in West Java, funding generally arrived too late or not at all. Many agencies considered the response there to represent a collective failure of the humanitarian community. The funding process of the European Commission Humanitarian Office (ECHO) reportedly took a minimal 72 hours to finalise, which was seen as an example of good practice by humanitarian organisations responding to the crisis.

- In Pakistan, donors responded to the displacement crisis in a generally timely manner, although delays were experienced by some agencies. However, the existence of CERF funds and organisations reserve funds eased the process and provided a starting point from which agencies like the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) could begin project implementation.
What can donor governments do to address these issues?

Politicisation and instrumentalisation of humanitarian assistance can have devastating consequences for those affected by crises. Donor governments can support neutral, impartial humanitarian action and needs-based approaches to their funding and support by:

- Allocating humanitarian assistance on the basis of needs alone and ensuring that humanitarian assistance is not subordinated to other priorities or objectives. To do this, governments should support ongoing efforts to develop more integrated and objective needs assessment tools and methodologies. This may also require donors to revise their policies and procedures to ensure that funding and decision-making processes are based on clear, transparent and publically accessible criteria.

- Ensuring government’s foreign, trade and development policies complement and reinforce the independence, neutrality and impartiality of both government donor agencies and the humanitarian organisations they fund. Donor governments should explicitly ensure that in cases of a crisis, neutral, impartial humanitarian action should take precedence over all other concerns. This requires governments to integrate and increase awareness of, and respect for, humanitarian principles into other policy areas.

- Advocating more forcefully in situations where governments (either donors or host countries) and other parties are not respecting neutral, impartial and independent humanitarian action. Better coordination at the field and headquarters level can ensure that donors governments can use their access, influence and collective voice with host governments to more effectively address issues of access and protection and remind states of their obligations to respect IHL. Donors should consider other high-level mechanisms to monitor and take collective action in cases when donor governments’ crisis responses contravene the spirit and intent of the GHD Principles.

- Disseminating and applying the Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief (the Oslo guidelines) and reviewing donors’ visibility requirements to ensure that humanitarian organisations are clearly distinguished from non-humanitarian actors. In a climate of growing mistrust and misunderstandings about the objectives of humanitarian action, donor governments should review the guidelines for collaboration between their military and humanitarian actors. Governments should also consider reviewing how they give visibility to their humanitarian assistance – including such requirements as “branding” with donors logos and national flags – to help reinforce that humanitarian aid and personnel are independent from governments.

- Reviewing and reducing unnecessary aid conditionality and other donor requirements to ensure that humanitarian organisations have sufficient flexibility and independence to carry out their work effectively. While governments should be concerned that their aid funding is not used for non-humanitarian purposes, legitimate, professional humanitarian organisations have developed working procedures that preserve their independence and impartiality and ensure quality and accountability in the use and distribution of resources. Donors should therefore review and reduce any restrictions that could hamper access and the provision of assistance and protection to affected populations.

Donor governments recognised the importance of prevention, risk reduction and recovery as a key component of humanitarian action when they established the GHD Principles. The GHD Principles state that the objectives of humanitarian action are in part to “prevent and strengthen preparedness” for situations of crisis and to “facilitate the return to normal lives and livelihoods.” The principles are also clearly oriented towards strengthening local capacities for prevention and preparedness, mitigation, working towards restoring sustainable livelihoods and the “transition from humanitarian relief to recovery and development activities.” This pillar examines the extent to which donors are meeting their commitments to prevention, risk reduction and recovery in their funding allocations and practices. As the HRI 2009 report stressed, donors can do much more to support prevention and preparation for both disasters and conflicts. Emerging trends, such as increased risk in urban areas and climate-related vulnerability threaten to increase the impact of disasters unless significantly more attention is given to better integrating relief and development efforts with prevention, preparedness and risk reduction. The indicators in this pillar try to address the following questions:

- Do donor governments work to strengthen local capacity by supporting beneficiary participation in programming?

- Do donor governments invest in prevention, preparedness and risk reduction?

- Do donor governments ensure their aid supports long-term recovery of affected communities?
In this indicator, Denmark, Norway and the EC stand out for above average scores for promoting and encouraging beneficiary participation in all aspects of programming. For example, ECHO specifically asks its partners to show in funding proposals and reporting how beneficiaries are engaged in programming, and actively monitors this in the field. According to many of the humanitarian organisations surveyed, the majority of donors state they are committed to beneficiary participation, but most do not actively monitor, follow up or support this. The donors with the lowest scores for these indicators are New Zealand, France and Japan.

Prevention and preparedness for future conflicts and disasters continues to rate poorly in the HRI survey and interviews. Despite many expressions of commitment for this area, donors – and the UN system – are still not investing consistently or sufficiently in building local community capacity to prevent and minimise the effects of disasters and conflicts. Nor are they investing in enhancing the operational capacity and contingency planning of humanitarian actors, particularly local NGOs, to respond quickly and effectively to such new challenges as the politicisation of aid and reluctance of host governments to acknowledge a humanitarian crisis and to accept international assistance.

Beneficiary participation in programming

The involvement and engagement of crisis-affected populations in programme design, implementation and monitoring have long been recognised as a good humanitarian practice. Beneficiary participation is seen as a means to build and strengthen local capacity to prevent, prepare for and respond to potential crises. Most humanitarian actors include provisions for beneficiary participation in their programmes – some with a greater commitment to and level of ownership of programmes by affected populations than others. The HRI survey questions that make up the indicators for this area ask humanitarian organisations about the extent to which their donors prioritise and are committed to supporting beneficiary participation, as suggested in the GHD Principles.

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The HRI field research provides examples of donor practice in this area:

- In Sri Lanka, beneficiaries were not at all involved in all stages of the humanitarian response: this was largely the result of the Sri Lankan government’s denial of access to humanitarian agencies and donors.
In Colombia, donors such as ECHO, Canada and Sweden required partners to show how beneficiaries were involved in programming as part of their contractual arrangements. Most humanitarian organisations appreciated their commitment and determination to use subsequent monitoring to verify whether needs are being met and to work with their partners to overcome challenges to wider participation.

Support for prevention and preparedness

In many disasters or conflicts, needs continue long after the emergency phase is over. Many of the humanitarian organisations surveyed over the past four years for the HRI have consistently criticised their donors for not providing either sufficient funding or support for long-term recovery or to enhance preparedness for future conflicts and disasters. The results from this year’s research show little change in the two qualitative indicators related to prevention and preparedness and linking relief, rehabilitation and development (LRRD). Only the Netherlands and Luxembourg have above average scores in both these indicators, while Italy and France are well below the overall average scores. Sweden and the EC score above average in Support for prevention and preparedness, while Switzerland and Finland score above average in LRRD. Ireland, however, receives above average scores for Support for prevention and preparedness but is among the lowest scored for its support to LRRD. In general, support for preparedness and contingency planning tends to focus on natural disasters and epidemics. Conflict prevention is less of a focus and receives less advanced planning.

The HRI field missions showed several examples of this:

- In Haiti, despite a long-standing international presence in the country, and the recent experiences dealing with four back-to-back hurricanes in 2008, capacity-building efforts to strengthen preparedness, prevention and response capacities of vulnerable communities and local authorities appear to have had little impact. As an example, internationally funded civil protection bodies such as the DPR and UPC were largely absent or sidelined in the immediate response. There is great concern that the pledges made by donor governments to support long-term recovery may not be honoured.

- In Indonesia, donors like Australia had a large disaster risk reduction (DRR) programme but countries like the US consider DRR to be outside the scope of humanitarian action and even asked some partners to remove it from funding requests. There is a general trend for donor governments to support long-term recovery rather than respond.

- In Zimbabwe, support for preparedness and risk reduction varied depending on the donor and their mandate. For instance, ECHO, the Office of US. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) and the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID) emphasised preparedness and DRR. But CERF and funds provided by embassies of donor states in Harare did not include it in targeted activities.

- In Pakistan, donor governments performed poorly across the board in terms of prevention. Many acted with an attitude that often supported the efforts of the Pakistani Army in their War on Terror, thus doing little to prevent further displacement and violence or reduce risk. Donor governments acquiesced in military control of protection efforts, raising questions about their prioritisation of security concerns over commitment to advocate for protection of civilians.

Funding for risk mitigation, prevention and reconstruction

Donor investment in risk reduction mechanisms, prevention and reconstruction can contribute to reducing vulnerability towards disasters and conflicts, and the impact of crises. The level of funding provided to these areas as a proportion of overall humanitarian funding helps to show how much importance donors give this. The HRI uses 2008 data from the OECD database to determine donor governments’ humanitarian funding allocations to Reconstruction, relief and prevention (VII.3) and Disaster prevention and preparedness. There are significant variations in donors’ scores: Belgium allocates just over 40 percent of its humanitarian funding to these areas, while Greece allocates only 1.1 percent and Sweden only 3.7 percent. Other donors that provide more than the average are Japan, Spain, the EC and Australia. This is clearly an area that requires further attention by the GHD donor group.

Donors tend to do slightly better overall in terms of support for international disaster risk reduction mechanisms, but there is wide variance among donors. In this indicator, Sweden is the best performing donor, with above average scores for Finland, Canada, Denmark, Luxembourg and Switzerland. Donors that could improve the most in this indicator are the US, Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain.
What can donor governments do to address these issues?

Donors’ continued lack of attention to and investment in risk reduction, prevention and preparedness strategies means that millions of people are unnecessarily affected by crisis each year. Governments can contribute to redressing this by:

- **Ensuring that beneficiary participation and “ownership” of humanitarian programmes are integrated as a requirement into a donor’s funding decisions, monitoring and reporting.** Despite the emphasis in the *GHD Principles* on beneficiary engagement in programming, surprisingly few donors make this a requirement for funding, monitoring and reporting.

- **Allocating a percentage of humanitarian assistance funding to conflict and disaster risk reduction, preparedness and for local capacity building.** Some donor governments already dedicate part of their humanitarian budgets to these areas, while others see this falling within the realm of development cooperation. Regardless of the funding model, donors could establish clearer and more transparent criteria to show how they will support this. They could consider integrating risk reduction and capacity building as an explicit requirement for partners that they fund and obliging partners to include local capacity building as an outcome of their humanitarian activities.

- **Investing in greater capacity building and contingency planning for local actors and the wider humanitarian system.** Donor governments need to prepare for a future of increased and changing humanitarian needs. The humanitarian system is hardly able to cope with existing needs and is ill prepared to anticipate and prepare for future needs. This is why an investment in preparedness, response and risk reduction at the local level and with governments in vulnerable countries is so important. Donors should set aside funding to strengthen the capacity of all components of the humanitarian system, particularly local actors.

Pillar 3: Working with humanitarian partners

**Key finding:** Slow progress in reforming the humanitarian system means that aid efforts are not as efficient or effective as they should be.

A central thrust of *GHD Principles* is improving the quality of the relationship between donor governments and the humanitarian organisations they fund. The principles establish where donors have a responsibility to ensure that their policies and practices facilitate effective humanitarian action and do not impede the work of their partners. This includes respecting the different roles and competencies of the various components of the humanitarian system (UN, Red Cross/Red Crescent and NGOs) and of national governments and local actors, promoting flexible funding arrangements and un-earmarked funding, support to partners and promoting coordination among all actors. This pillar assesses how well donors are supporting the work of humanitarian organisations, not only in terms of funding but also other critical issues where donors can exert a positive influence on the effectiveness of humanitarian response. The indicators in this pillar gather information on questions such as:

- **How do donor governments have flexible funding arrangements that allow their partners to better respond to needs?**

- **How do donors allocate their funding among the different components of the humanitarian system?**

- **Do donor governments support efficient functioning of the humanitarian system?**
The Humanitarian Response Index 2010

The problems of politicisation

In Zimbabwe, ECHO and DFID were cited as positive practices for their flexibility and responsiveness to changing needs.

In the oPt, some donors were praised for providing multi-year commitments and flexible or un-earmarked funding, while others were criticised for the conditionality put on their aid.

Funding to partners

While the GHD does not specifically set out how donors should channel their aid, there is an implicit message that donors should recognise that all components of the humanitarian system have an equally important contribution to make to ensure responses to crises are as effective as possible, and that donors should fund and support the UN system, Red Cross/Red Crescent and NGOs. The GHD Indicator Report 2009 provides an overall percentage of how the total amount of OECD/DAC donor aid is channelled, estimating that in 2007 over half (51.4 percent) was allocated to UN agencies, almost one-fifth (17.8 percent) to NGOs and civil society organisations, and 7.4 movement percent to the Red Cross/Red Crescent.

Flexible funding arrangements

The GHD Principles call for donors to provide more predictable and flexible funding for their partners, including reducing earmarking. Flexibility in funding allows humanitarian organisations to better plan and allocate resources based on priority needs as well as adapting to changing situations in a crisis. These concepts were integrated into the humanitarian reform agenda, and in part led to the establishment of pooled funds like the CERF so that UN agencies had access to rapid, timely and flexible funding to meet priority needs. The GHD Indicator Report 2009 suggests that according to 2007 OECD/DAC data, donors collectively provided just under ten percent of overall humanitarian funding under flexible terms, with another seven percent available through flexible funds such as CERF and in-country pooled funds.

The HRI looks at the issue from several different perspectives: un-earmarked funding as reported by the UN, IFRC and the ICRC, as well as OCHA’s FTS and the perception of humanitarian organisations on how flexible their donors are. According to the HRI data, Portugal, New Zealand and the Netherlands provide the greatest percentage of un-earmarked funding, while the US, the EC, Japan, Italy and Germany are the donors with the greatest level of earmarking. At the crisis level, these same donors are considered the most inflexible in terms of their funding arrangements. In contrast, humanitarian organisations funded by Luxembourg, New Zealand, Finland and Ireland considered their donors the most flexible.

The HRI field missions provide several examples:

- In Somalia, donors such as Australia, Finland, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden were commended for flexibility to fill funding gaps. However, donors were reluctant to fund extra overhead costs and provide contingency funds required in this difficult operating context, thus hampering the response.

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10 See: http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/reports
The HRI uses a similar approach but provides more detailed analysis of donor funding channels by looking at funding to NGOs and adding a component for funding to non-national NGOs (this could include local or international NGOs engaged in the response). The HRI also includes donor funding of UN, IFRC, and ICRC appeals, funding for the CERF and other pooled funds and UN coordination. Together, these appeals offer a more complete assessment of how well donors are covering needs. Finally, the HRI introduces the concept of “fair-share” in calculating the scores for donors. This implies that donor funding to appeals and pooled funds should be in proportion to their GDP compared to the overall DAC group. In other words, the optimal value for a donor’s funding is based on the size of the country’s economy so that the burden is shared equitably among donors.

Based on this data, Denmark, Germany, and the EC come out well above the overall average in terms of their support and funding to NGOs. Italy, Spain, Greece, and Belgium are the donors with scores well below the overall average. In the case of Spain, this reflects a clear policy orientation to support multilateral funding channels such as the UN system.

Using the fair share criteria, Norway, Sweden, and Ireland are the best donors in terms of funding UN, IFRC, ICRC appeals, and CERF and other pooled funds in proportions that are well above their fair share – over 150 percent in the case of Norway and Sweden. The Netherlands, the UK, Finland, and Denmark also meet or exceed the “fair share” criteria. By contrast, Italy, France, Greece, and Portugal contribute significantly less than their “fair share.” Also of note, the US is one of the largest donors in terms of absolute volume of aid, yet it performs well below the OECD/DAC average in terms of funding appeals in proportion to its corresponding “fair share.”

Supporting coordination and reform efforts

Recent UN and ALNAP reports paint a cautiously optimistic view on the progress of reforms and performance of the different components of the humanitarian system11. However, the HRI field research underscores that there is a significant need for improvements, particularly in the areas of leadership, coordination and integration of disaster and conflict prevention, preparedness, and capacity building in humanitarian action.

As the key funders of humanitarian assistance, donor governments can shape and influence the direction and functioning of the humanitarian system. When the GHD declaration was developed, it was an excellent example of how donors can exert positive peer pressure to support reforms. Subsequently, many of the ideas and concepts in the GHD declaration have found their way into the humanitarian reform debate. Many GHD donors have actively contributed to the development of clusters, pooled funds, and other elements of the reform agenda, including strengthening the capacity of the components of the system to respond more effectively to humanitarian challenges.

As the GHD predates the humanitarian reform agenda, the HRI does not currently include direct indicators to assess how donors are contributing to improving the system. However, as part of the field research process, DARA asks senior representatives of humanitarian organisations about how well their donor government support coordination and building organisational capacity. They are also asked about their perceptions of the capacity of their donors for informed decision-making in the crisis context, based on their experiences working with donors. As part of the HRI field research, DARA also asks several open-ended questions around the effectiveness of humanitarian reform in each of the crises studied.

Luxembourg, Finland, and New Zealand were generally rated well by their partners for supporting organisational capacity building. Finland also rated above average for support for coordination along with Norway, Australia, the EC and the UK. The EC, the US, and the UK were the top-rated donors in terms of donor capacity for informed decision-making, along with Norway. However, donor capacity can be both a strength and weakness. Many humanitarian organisations welcomed that capacity to engage with partners and work with them to resolve operational issues. However, many also remarked that donors with good capacity also overstepped their boundaries by, for example, intervening in programming decisions or imposing unnecessary additional reporting requirements.

At the field level, several issues consistently emerged in HRI interviews. These resonate with evidence from recent evaluations at the crisis level and globally:

**Humanitarian Coordinators (HCs)** are a key element of the reform agenda, responsible for providing effective leadership and coordination in crises. In the crises studied, however, few of the organisations interviewed felt that HCs provide such leadership. Concerns were frequently raised by all actors, particularly NGOs, about “double-hatted roles”, when a UN Resident Coordinator (RC) is also an HC. Many fear this means humanitarian issues get subordinated to other UN priorities and that the close relationship between a host government and an RC/HC can impede forceful advocacy on humanitarian issues.

- **In Zimbabwe**, many humanitarian organisations felt the RC/HC was too closely aligned with the government, subordinating humanitarian concerns to other interests. A formal complaint was made by NGOs and UN agencies about the RC/HC’s performance, leading to a tense and mistrustful relationship between the RC/HC and the humanitarian community.

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11 See: http://www.alnap.org/forum/post/60.aspx
In CAR, coordination of the response to the ongoing crisis – and advocacy to ensure it is not forgotten by international policy makers – has been weakened by the absence of an HC for the past two years. Many argue this helps explain funding shortfalls.

In Colombia, many NGOs considered the R/HC too passive, unwilling to forcefully challenge the government in its propaganda to deny the existence of an armed conflict and the applicability of IHL or advocate against government measures that jeopardise neutral, impartial humanitarian action.

Clusters were in place in most of the crises studied but results have been mixed, pointing to a need to continue to strengthen and consolidate technical expertise, coordination and most importantly leadership in different clusters. WASH (water, sanitation and hygiene) and food and nutrition clusters were consistently mentioned as examples of effectively utilising the cluster concept for more efficient and effective use of resources. However, other clusters were often critiqued as inefficient and burdensome, particularly for smaller NGOs.

In CAR, clusters did not function far beyond the capital city of Bangui, in part due to limited operational capacity and reach. At the same time, because of the small number of humanitarian actors involved, coordination mechanisms like clusters have been praised – especially the protection cluster, which is considered a success.

In the Philippines, the capacity of clusters and even their legitimacy was thrown into question by competition with a parallel cluster system used by the government to address the same needs.

In Zimbabwe, food cluster cooperation between the World Food Programme (WFP), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and UNICEF yielded positive results, partly due to effective cluster leadership.

In Afghanistan, clusters suffered from problems with management, staff turnover, and regularity of meetings. Progress was hampered due to the predominance of military and security coordination instead of humanitarian coordination. There was a common perception in the humanitarian community that funds are not being equitably distributed among all actors and the clusters. Food aid receives most funding, while sectors such as health receive hardly any support. Tensions between NGOs and UN agencies have damaged and undermined cluster effectiveness and created an atmosphere of resentment and distrust among actors.

In Indonesia, many informants thought the cluster system developed in response to the 2009 earthquakes needed better leadership and organisation. Some clusters like education and health performed markedly better than others such as shelter.

In Haiti, clusters lacked strong political leadership, essential in the complicated working environment. Many meetings were held in hard to access venues and in English, creating barriers to the engagement and participation of Haitian government and NGO actors. The multiplication of actors, many inexperienced in humanitarian response, and high turnover of staff made coordination next to impossible in the first phase of the emergency. Coordination with the different military present in the operation was also a real challenge, despite CIMIC guidelines. To their credit, donor governments maintained a coordinated approach to the initial response. However, the massive private funding available to some INGOs meant that they were less dependent on donor government funding, and donors therefore had less direct influence and coordination with these actors.

Pooled Funding such as the UN’s CERF and in-country pooled funds are increasingly being used. Respondents appreciate the existence of flexible gap-covering mechanisms. However, a frequent comment from NGOs and many UN agencies was that HCs, who normally manage such funds, prioritise funding for UN agencies over NGOs, and that disbursement procedures are unnecessarily bureaucratic and time-consuming.

In Indonesia, funding from the CERF took six weeks to arrive at the scene after the earthquake had destroyed large tracts of Padang – a delay that was simply too long to address the emergency at hand. Organisations working on earthquake relief also found the CERF to be less flexible than other funding sources. The Emergency Response Fund (ERF), on the other hand, was considered to be an effective response mechanism for NGOs.

In Zimbabwe, UN agencies were given preferential treatment and received 93 percent of the contributions from pooled funds like the CERF while international NGOs only received seven percent. One of the biggest criticisms levelled at the CERF by many INGOs is that it does not coordinate well enough, or directly support the work of, many local or international NGOs, even though they are often the quickest responders to emergencies.

In Afghanistan, CERF funds did not always go for emergency responses but instead for the purpose of sustaining normal, ongoing UN operations. This is a violation of its intended purpose, to fill immediate funding needs.

In CAR, CERF assistance is channelled mainly towards UN agencies, losing some of its impact due to administrative and transaction costs. However, many credit the CERF for helping to mobilise efforts in the field. The locally-managed CHF is the main source of funding for the over 75 international organisations currently operating in the country.

In DRC, the CHF has been applauded as a positive practice. Collaboration of humanitarian partners through the use of this fund is seen as one of the successes of the response.
What can donor governments do to address these issues?

Strengthening and improving the effectiveness of the humanitarian system is essential to meet current and future needs effectively and have greater impact for people affected by crisis. Donor governments can support greater effectiveness and efficiency in the humanitarian system by:

- Continuing to actively promote reforms of the international humanitarian system, not just UN reform. Donors can continue to sponsor reviews and evaluations of efforts so far, such as the reviews of CERF and clusters. They must ensure that these mechanisms are accessible to more actors, particularly national NGOs and, when appropriate, national authorities. Donors can also invest in looking for new, innovative approaches to emerging issues and challenges.

- Supporting and promoting more active leadership by the recently-appointed UN Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC) and Humanitarian Coordinators. Donors can jointly advocate for better-qualified leadership in the humanitarian system by insisting on a merit and experience-based approach to finding candidates for senior leadership posts in humanitarian crises. They need to encourage the organisations that they fund to engage fully with the HC. At the same time, donors can channel the concerns of their partners to the highest level to ensure that the ERC takes action to resolve outstanding issues.

- Looking for means to harmonise and improve needs assessments to achieve more objective allocations of resources to crises. Donor governments need to continue to support efforts for more accurate and reliable needs assessments as the best means to ensure resources are allocated in line with actual needs at the global and crisis level – and then use these mechanisms as the basis for transparent and objective decisions on where to allocate resources.

Pillar 4: Protection and international law

Key finding: Continued gaps in the protection of civilians and safe humanitarian access means that vulnerable populations are at risk of harm.

The GHD Principles call on donor governments to respect and implement international laws, guidelines and other legal mechanisms that sustain neutral, impartial and independent humanitarian action and ensure access, protection and assistance for crisis-affected populations. The principles also call on donor governments to facilitate humanitarian access and advocate for local governments and other actors to fulfil their responsibilities to respond to humanitarian crises. Pillar 4 assesses to what extent donor governments respect, promote and apply the legal instruments related to humanitarian action, by asking:

- Do donor governments adhere to, respect and apply international legal frameworks that support humanitarian action?

- Do donor governments actively advocate for and promote safe humanitarian access and protection of civilians?

- Do donor governments advocate to governments and other parties to respect humanitarian principles?

Protection of civilians from harm is one of the fundamental international humanitarian law (IHL) principles. But in too many of the crises studied this year, protection of civilians from harm was not given enough priority in the international response. Of particular concern is the deliberate targeting of civilian populations, particularly women and children for sexual and gender-based violence. This happens both in conflict situations where sexual violence is a frequently deployed tactic but also occurs after disasters where populations are often exposed to risks of rape and violence. All states have an important responsibility to ensure respect for and implementation of IHL and related legal frameworks to protect civilians (See special box text on the next page).

At the same time, increasingly high-risk operating environments are making it difficult for humanitarian actors to have safe access to affected populations to provide assistance and protection. Recent UN reports suggest that over 260 humanitarian workers were killed, kidnapped or seriously injured in 2008, with similar numbers for 2009. Understanding of, and respect for, the neutrality and impartiality of humanitarian action is being steadily eroded. Increasingly – and particularly in crisis-affected states in the Muslim word – local populations and armed groups often see aid workers as part of a Western political agenda. This reinforces the need for humanitarian actors to engage with local communities and other actors to build confidence and respect for their work around protection and assistance. Governments need to advocate more strongly for access and protection. There is an urgent need to continue to develop and implement professional protocols and common approaches among aid agencies on how to protect civilians and minimise security risks to their own personnel.

Support and respect of humanitarian legal frameworks

The HR1 quantitative indicators on respect for International humanitarian law, Human rights law and Refugee law all look at the extent to which donor governments have ratified international treaties and related conventions that facilitate effective and principled humanitarian action, protection and assistance of crisis-affected population. This includes, when appropriate, actions to support the implementation of these legal instruments, such as support to the ICR, C and the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), or domestic policies to promote IHL or honour the principles set out in the Refugee Convention and the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement.

Several donors received above average scores for their support to International humanitarian law; Human rights law and Refugee law. These include Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Luxembourg, governments which have taken measures to ratify IHL instruments and to comply

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In terms of protection, Denmark and Norway stand out for above average scores in this indicator. New Zealand and Luxembourg also receive above average scores but this should be interpreted with caution as their funding and field presence are much more limited and therefore the number of survey responses collected is much less than other donors. France and Spain received below average scores in this indicator. Advocacy towards local authorities is another qualitative indicator with a low overall average score. Norway and Sweden were the donors that did best in this area, with above average scores.

Findings from the HRI field missions provide several examples of the challenge of facilitating access and providing protection:

- In CAR, protection is one of the main concerns. The presence of a UN peacekeeping mission in the country (MINURCAT) has helped to provide some security for humanitarian operations in the northeast but armed groups and bandits have made access to other areas risky for humanitarian agencies.

- In DRC, recent reports of mass rapes by militias have raised serious concerns about the ability of the UN peacekeeping mission to provide effective protection to civilians and about donor willingness to invest in security sector reform to enable DRC military and police to do so.

- In Somalia, donors funded only 28 percent of funds requested for protection activities. Few donors are actively engaged in advocating for safe humanitarian access. Due to security concerns and restrictions of working in Al-Shabaab areas, many organisations are managing operations remotely, making it difficult to actively support protection with a physical presence in the field. Some donors actually hampered humanitarian access by paying ransoms without coordinating with other stakeholders in the humanitarian community.

- In Sri Lanka, the government’s tight control over access to military-run camps for those displaced by the conflict with the Tamil Tigers has created near insuperable constraints to meeting protection and assistance needs.

Access and protection

Donor governments can play an important role in supporting and facilitating access by humanitarian organisations to affected populations and advocating among all actors for protection of civilians. At the crisis level, the qualitative indicator for Facilitating humanitarian access has one of the lowest average scores in the HRI. The US, EC and Australia were among the donors with below average scores for this indicator. However, both the US and the EC were criticised in some crisis contexts like Somalia and the oPt for policies and procedures that in fact restricted access to populations. For example, the US has placed restrictions on aid agencies preventing them from working in areas controlled by entities judged to be terrorist groups, yet this is precisely where needs are often greatest.

Graph 8. Overview of donor scores in Pillar 4 indicators

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<th>Qualitative Indicators</th>
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<td>Support for protection of civilians</td>
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<tr>
<td>Promotion of international humanitarian law</td>
<td>Promotion of international humanitarian law</td>
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<td>Facilitating humanitarian access</td>
<td>Facilitating humanitarian access</td>
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<td>Advocacy towards local authorities</td>
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[Graph showing donor scores in Pillar 4 indicators]
In Afghanistan, donors are blamed by many humanitarian agencies for being silent about constant violations of human rights by state actors and their supporters, and for not advocating for the rights of women and children.

In the oPt, the EC was praised for advocating for protection and security of humanitarian workers. However, many other donors advocated at the political level for the lifting of the blockade only if it related to the projects they were funding. Donors did not speak out with one common voice, demanding that the Israeli authorities provide unrestricted access for all humanitarian goods and workers.

In Pakistan, protection was not prioritised by donors, nor was the implementation of IHL. Pakistan considers the displacement crisis a law enforcement issue, not a military operation or a conflict, and therefore rejects the use of the term internally displaced person (IDP), further causing donors and agencies difficulties in engaging in dialogue with state actors. Humanitarian space and access are major problems because the people most in need of humanitarian assistance are also often those living in areas of fighting, to which the Pakistani military denies agencies access due to safety and operational concerns. This lack of free access has been a recurring difficulty since displacement in northwestern Pakistan began in 2007.

In Yemen, donors were criticised for failing to advocate more proactively for protection. Some respondents described donors as gender blind when it comes to protection. On the other hand, some donors felt that when UN agencies are challenged to make a clear stand for human rights, they tend to hide under the “umbrella of neutrality and impartiality”. Many NGOs are afraid that they might be expelled from the country if they are too outspoken.

What can donor governments do to address these issues?

Respect for IHL, protection of civilians and safe humanitarian access are vital to minimise the devastating consequences for the people affected by crises. Donor governments can support this by:

- Using every possible and appropriate means to advocate for the protection of civilians in situations of risk. Donor governments have been silent in too many crises. They have not spoken out with one voice in other situations where access and protection are issues. Donor governments can exert pressure on parties through the Security Council and other channels but also work through mechanisms like the office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) on Sexual Violence in Conflict.

- Continuing to fund and support agencies with a dedicated mandate for protection, such as the ICRC and UNHCR and ensuring better cooperation and coordination of protection among all actors. Donors should not neglect the important role of NGOs and local civil society organisations in monitoring and responding to protection issues. They should invest in building their capacities at the same time as those of larger multilateral agencies. Donors can also promote the development and implementation of operational guidelines on protection within the humanitarian sector.

- Signing and ratifying international legal frameworks to protect and safeguard humanitarian personnel. Donors can demonstrate their commitment to improving access and protection by signing and ratifying legal frameworks such as the UN Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel and support the development of other legal mechanisms that could contribute to better protection and assistance.

Special contribution

Ending sexual violence: From recognition to action

By Margot Wallström, Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict

Despite its horrifying prevalence, sexual violence in conflict was left off of the agenda of global policy-makers for too long. In 2000, the breakthrough UN Security Council Resolution (SCR) 1325 was first to recognise the impact of war on women and to emphasise the importance of their contributions to conflict resolution and sustainable peace. It was not until 2008, however, that SCR 1820 specifically recognised sexual violence as a “tactic of war” and brought security policy into alignment with international criminal justice standards. In 2009, SCR 1888 established my mandate as SRSG on Sexual Violence in Conflict and set out to translate SCR 1820 into practice.

During my second official visit to DRC, where part of the east is described as the “rape capital of the world”, a 70-year old woman told me how she had tried – in vain – to convince the rapists to leave her alone, pointing out to the perpetrators that they could be her own grandchildren.

In the DRC alone, more than 200,000 rapes have been reported since the protracted series of conflicts began. In July - August 2010, an additional 300 rapes were reported in the Walikale region of North Kivu province. For each rape reported, it is likely that as many as 20 are unreported (The Economist 2009). Why does sexual violence in conflict and post-conflict situations keep taking place? What can be done to prevent similar atrocities in the future?

Historical phenomenon

Sexual violence in conflict is often described as unavoidable, collateral damage or as “nothing new”. While no other human rights violation is routinely dismissed as inevitable, the latter is certainly true. Homer in the Iliad described Trojan women being treated as war prizes, the most famous of whom is Briseis who was given to Achilles for leading the assault on that city during the Trojan War. Within the Bible, Moses tells military officers to kill everyone in a recently pillaged town except for virgin females and to keep them for themselves.
There are also numerous examples of rape and sexual violence in more recent history from the Thirty Years War, the US Civil War, colonial wars in Africa and the Second World War. We currently hear of horrible accounts in the Western Balkans, Rwanda, Timor Leste, and DRC.

Thus, rape and sexual violence may seem unavoidable, as if it were something to be accepted as part of any conflict. However, we must recognise that sexual violence in conflict is neither cultural nor sexual, but criminal. SCR 1820 acknowledges it is a matter of international peace and security and therefore, within the Security Council’s mandate.

The changing nature of armed conflict

Modern warfare is predominantly intrastate, waged by non-state actors and triggered by issues of identity, ethnicity, religion and competition for land or resources, particularly oil and minerals. Those who are primarily affected by hostilities have also changed. In contemporary, low-intensity wars, rebel groups and government forces often kill civilians and defy international law (Human Security Group Project 2009). It has been said that most civilians tend to die from war rather than in battle (Shim 2008). Women have ended up on the front-line – not as soldiers but as victims.

Sexual violence in conflict has become the weapon of choice because it is cheap, silent, effective and only requires individuals and cruel intent. It maims victims mentally and physically and can destroy entire communities. Survivors can become pregnant, be infected with sexually-transmitted diseases, develop incontinence and are regularly rejected by their families. The perpetrators often walk free while their victims walk in shame.

Sexual violence as an obstacle to sustainable peace

In addition to long-term psychological injuries, sexual violence is also an obstacle to sustainable peace:

- Long-term, sexual violence undermines social safety through the destruction of families and societies.
- The fear of assaults is an impediment to women’s participation in economic activities and girls’ school attendance.
- If impunity reigns, the faith in a country’s judicial system and its ability to protect its citizens is seriously undermined.

Women must be active participants during peace processes and decision-making. No peace agreement engineered solely by men will ever be legitimate so long as wars affect the lives and livelihoods of women. Unfortunately, many in power continue to see women as merely victims rather than agents of change and despite active engagement in informal efforts to build peace, women are often excluded from any formal peace-building efforts.

What has been done?

We must look at what has already worked well and how these actions can be further strengthened. The UN Action network has attempted to capture good practice in Addressing Conflict-Related Sexual Violence – An Analytical Inventory of Peacekeeping Practice (UNIFEM 2010). Evidence from the inventory shows the need for:

- Community liaison officers who can build trusting relationships with communities, including with women; ideally, with both women and men serving in these liaison positions;
- Mobile patrols – both by day and night – that actively engage the population, are trusted, accessible and approachable;
- Peacekeepers that are trained to recognise and report sexual violence;
- Early warning/distress call systems;
- UN patrols that include local military and security forces.

The primary responsibility for protecting citizens from violence is held by the state, and neither the UN nor any number of peace keepers can be substitute. The role of the SRSG is to help build government capacity to meet its obligations and includes improving data collection, statistics, monitoring, evaluation, and reporting mechanisms that make it safer and easier to report crimes. The data, once available, must also be widely publicised in order to educate communities. In some countries, building capacity can have a more comprehensive reach and include overhauling an entire judicial system – not a small challenge.

Donor governments must impose tougher terms when providing assistance to countries in such a situation. Donors, and parts of the UN system, must also be better coordinated. In DRC, for example, there are military and police officers who have received excellent but unharmonised support from donors and neighbouring countries, which risks that these two groups will have a different understanding of how their jobs should be carried out.

Although women’s participation must go much further in efforts to prevent and address sexual violence, some achievements have been made in the last two decades. The Beijing Platform for Action in 1995, with 189 signatory countries, aims to strengthen the participation of women in national reconciliation and reconstruction and to investigate and punish those who perpetuate violence against women in armed conflict.

In 2000, the UN Security Council established SCR 1325. For the first time, the Security Council mandated that the UN and its Member States monitor enforceable protection from such violence. SRC 1820 demands nothing less than the ‘immediate and complete cessation by all parties to armed conflict of all acts of sexual violence against civilians’, and was a historic response to a horrific reality. Finally, SCR 1888 established the position I am the first to hold, to act as an advocate, coordinator and leader within the UN system to address the issue. It also requested that the UN Action against Sexual Violence in Conflict – a network of 13 UN entities – assist the SRSG in this task.

The road ahead

The stories survivors tell of the mass rapes in DRC are indescribable. The terror, violence and cruelty these individuals endured is unimaginable. Journalists who accompanied me often asked how I reacted to the stories I was told. The answer to that question is, I think, very human; I wept. We all wept. Then I experienced an extreme sadness, followed by anger, and a fierce urgency to act.
One glimpse of hope during that visit was the arrest of Lieutenant Colonel Mayele, a commander of the Mai Mai militia believed to be responsible for the mass rapes in Walikale. Only a few days later, the International Criminal Court (ICC) announced the arrest by French authorities of Callixte Mbarushimana, the alleged Executive Secretary of the FDLR’s (Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Rwanda) Steering Committee and as such, the force behind a plan to intentionally create a human catastrophe through attacks against civilians. These arrests sent a strong message: these atrocities are not going unnoticed, and that justice will ultimately prevail.

The first point in the agenda I outlined to the Security Council is to end impunity, i.e. ensuring that perpetrators do not remain at the helm of security institutions and that amnesty is not an option. If women continue to suffer sexual violence, it is not because the law is inadequate, but because it is enforced inadequately.

Secondly, women must be empowered to become agents of change. A ceasefire is not synonymous with peace for women if the shooting stops, but rapes continue. Women activists should never have to risk their lives to do their work.

The third point is to mobilise political leadership. Resolutions 1325 and 1820 are tools in the hands of political leaders, and should be used as such. Both traditional and non-traditional stakeholders need to feel accountable for the success of this agenda.

Fourth is increasing recognition of rape as a tactic and consequence of conflict. Those who tolerate sexual terror should be notified that they do so in defiance of the Security Council, which holds the power to enact enforcement measures. The Council should not underestimate the tools it has at its disposal and should be ready to use them.

Finally, I will drive and empower efforts to ensure a coordinated response from the entire UN system, which means having more resources, and utilising the strengths of the individual entities for one common goal – to stop rape now. My vision includes ensuring that the UN system is attuned to early-warning indicators. Crimes on this scale are no accident. They are often strategic, planned and therefore predictable – the painful reminder of the Walikale atrocities is an example.

Women have no rights if those who violate their rights go unpunished. Many women in conflict, such as those in the DRC, are not safe under their own roofs or in their own beds when night falls. Our aim must be to uphold international law so that women – even in war-torn corners of our world – can sleep safe and sound.

Sexual violence is part of a larger pattern. Rule by sexual violence is used by political and military leaders to achieve political, military and economic ends, and this presents a security crisis that demands a security response. Much more must be done to promote actions that have real impact, as we move from recognition to action and from best intentions to best practice. The journey has only begun.

References


The GHD initiative was a positive step by donors to take action to improve their own accountability for the quality, effectiveness and impact of their humanitarian assistance. The underlying message of the GHD is that donors have a role and specific responsibilities to support more effective humanitarian action. This includes promoting and applying good practices and supporting humanitarian principles in their own practices. Several principles specifically call on donors to support accountability initiatives and evaluations in the sector, to ensure timely, accurate and transparent reporting on donors’ assistance.

This pillar assesses how committed donors are to learning and accountability, asking such key questions as:

- Do donors consistently support accountability and learning at both the crisis level and the system level?

- Are donors transparent about how and where their humanitarian assistance funding goes, and for what purposes?

Accountability to affected populations (and to the humanitarian agencies that donors fund) is largely missing from the national policies and debates on improving accountability in humanitarian action. A cursory review of policies and procedures of the 23 different donor governments assessed in the HR1 shows that while accountability (or similar concepts) are mentioned by the majority of donors, virtually none make any direct mention of any specific commitment – or responsibility – to meet the needs and priorities of the people that their aid intends to help.
At the same time, there is little transparency about governments’ funding commitments or decision-making processes. Governments often make announcements of large pledges for support in the aftermath of a crisis like the Haiti earthquake. But beyond the public announcements and press releases, there is frequently little effort by governments to report and track their aid commitments and disbursements to common and publically accessible databases, such as OCHA’s FTS. Worse yet, many pledges are not fulfilled – as the recent failure to deliver highly publicised recovery funds promised to Haiti shows – or are diminished by factoring in of debt relief or already-delivered humanitarian assistance. The result is unmet needs and frustrated recovery plans and failure in donors’ accountability towards affected populations.

**Transparency and accountability**

Despite the importance of accountability in the GHD declaration, Pillar 5 receives the lowest average scores of all pillars. The EC, the UK, Ireland and Denmark were among the donors with above average scores. Italy, Portugal, Greece and Austria all received low scores in this indicator, with little evidence that they are actively engaged in the many different accountability initiatives in the humanitarian sector. Funding to support accountability initiatives is another way to show donor’s commitments to accountability. However, in this indicator, there is some of the greatest variance between donors’ scores. Denmark and New Zealand both reach close to optimal values, at 10, while several donors do not fund any accountability initiatives and therefore receive marginal scores in this indicator. These include Austria, Greece, Luxembourg, Australia, Finland and Canada.

At the crisis level, donors’ actions to support greater accountability towards beneficiaries are limited. Most humanitarian organisation interviewed stated that such initiatives were, by and large, developed at their own initiative or as part of their own internal procedures and commitments. Few donors actively monitor and follow-up on these issues through field visits or other mechanisms. Norway, the EC, Denmark and Germany all received above average scores for their support for accountability towards beneficiaries. Many organisations interviewed mentioned these donors as having specific reporting and funding requirements in place to ensure partners implement measures to improve accountability to beneficiaries. France, Australia, Spain and Ireland were the donors that had below average scores for this indicator.
The qualitative indicator for donor transparency in funding and decision-making demonstrates that, in general, donors are perceived similarly by humanitarian organisations. The EC, Norway and Luxembourg are the only donors with above average scores, while the rest of donors are close to average. The HRI also examines the appropriateness of the reporting requirements donors impose on their partners. Here, the EC, the US and the UK, three of the largest humanitarian donors and with the greatest crisis level engagement, receive scores significantly below the overall average, along with Japan, Italy and Spain. Donors with higher than average scores are New Zealand, Finland and Luxembourg.

HRI field missions gathered field evidence of this:

- In Somalia, some donors were praised for their insistence on maintaining standards such as monitoring, beneficiary involvement and incorporating recommendations from previous evaluations. Specifically the EC, the US, the UK, Germany, Ireland and Denmark were mentioned.

- In Afghanistan, despite the fact that donors expect agencies to be accountable and provide accurate information on their activities, the UN and the Afghan government have criticised the lack of transparency of donors funding. Tracking aid funding invested in Afghanistan is a huge and persistent problem. Corruption, mismanagement, and poor targeting all contribute to the apparent lack of progress. As a result, actors harbour resentment and fight against each other instead of engaging in constructive debate.

- In the oPt, several donors imposed extensive reporting and other administrative requirements on already overstretched NGOs.

- In Colombia, efforts to increase accountability towards beneficiaries and awareness of quality and accountability initiatives in the humanitarian sector were largely absent from the discourse of both donors and humanitarian organisations.

Evaluations
The HRI’s assessment of donor support for evaluations and learning, as called for in the GHD, is partly based on a qualitative indicator around donor support for learning and evaluations. It includes funding for monitoring and evaluation and support to implement evaluation recommendations. With the exception of the EC, which received above average scores, and Ireland and Italy, which received below average scores, all donors are close to the average. The quantitative indicator for evaluations looks at donor funding and commissioning of evaluations. Here, France is one of the best donors, with the highest number of evaluations commissioned and funded, followed by New Zealand.

Examples from the HRI field missions include:

- In Afghanistan, although donors require accountability, currently there is no system to monitor the involvement of beneficiaries in the humanitarian response. Donors do not always assist humanitarian actors in instituting positive changes based on evaluation.

- In DRC, the concept of internal evaluation as a means to improve organisational systems has not registered on the radar of most organisations. There is thus a need for improving in-house evaluation awareness and capacity.

- In Haiti, the enormous number of evaluations of previous crises, along with the multitude of evaluations currently underway, appear to have had little influence in terms of applying lessons learned, particularly around building and sustaining local capacity for prevention, preparedness and response.

- In Zimbabwe, although donors were rated highly for supporting evaluation and monitoring, implementation of evaluation results was one of the lowest rated survey questions. This shows that although the concept of review was supported, the act of instituting change based on recommendations was rare. There are hardly any independent evaluation reports of responses to the cholera crisis that are publicly available.

What can donor governments do to address these issues?
With the global economic crisis, there is an important and legitimate pressure on governments to show their citizens how and where taxpayers’ money has been spent for humanitarian assistance and with what results. But donors also need to collectively address the issue of increasing transparency towards partners and stakeholders. Accountability towards beneficiaries should be the foundation for any discussion on aid effectiveness. Donor governments can support increased transparency, accountability and effectiveness by:

- Integrating concepts of downward accountability to beneficiaries into humanitarian assistance strategies, policies and procedures. Donors should integrate more explicit definitions of accountability to beneficiaries and their own responsibilities in monitoring and implementing accountability into their policy frameworks. This could include, for example, specific requirements in funding proposals and reporting requirements from partners to show how quality and accountability are integrated into programming, as well as mechanisms for donors to report back to partners and beneficiaries on how they have fulfilled their obligations.

- Ensuring that all relevant information on humanitarian funding, programming priorities and decisions is transparent and publicly accessible. Donor governments can demonstrate their commitment to accountability by facilitating access to information for citizens and stakeholders. Appropriate and relevant information should be made available in formats that are easily understood by all stakeholders, including partners and affected populations.

- Committing to report consistently and to share information on funding pledges, commitments and
disbursements to common international databases like OCHA’s FTS. In order to facilitate more effective planning and avoid duplication of effort, donor governments should report their humanitarian assistance in a timely fashion, using standardised reporting formats, as called for in the GHD Principles. The data reported should be entirely consistent with data reported domestically or through other channels.

- Supporting and participating in initiatives to increase aid accountability and transparency. In addition to existing accountability forums such as ALNAP, donors can also support new initiatives such as the International Aid Transparency Initiative13 or Transparency International’s Corruption Fighters’ Tool Kit.

- Reviewing GHD approaches and indicators to update them and align more coherently with advances in the UN-led humanitarian reform process. The GHD was a significant breakthrough in promoting the collective responsibility and accountability of donor governments to ensure their aid contributes to more effective humanitarian action. However, the collective indicators agreed to by the GHD group do not capture the advances and complexities of the humanitarian system today. The GHD group is a powerful platform to advocate for positive changes in the system. Collectively, donors could take on more of a leadership role in promoting those changes, as they did when the GHD declaration was created.

**Conclusion**

Providing humanitarian assistance responsibly and in ways that show maximum results for people affected by crisis remains an important, but difficult, challenge for donor governments.

To their credit, OECD/DAC donor governments have maintained their commitments to applying the Good Humanitarian Donorship Principles. Yet, as the HR1 2010 findings show, donors still need practical guidance and political determination to apply the concepts of GHD in the way that they fund and support humanitarian action. There is a need for an independent review of their performance and accountability against their commitments in the GHD declaration.

Our evidence shows that donors are still not acting in a coordinated and coherent manner when it comes to applying core concepts of good practice in different crisis situations. While each individual member of the GHD group of donors has strengths, the sum of the parts does not necessarily add up to a better whole. This is true when looking at different crisis contexts, where donors are acting in a disjointed manner, resulting in aid efforts not having the impact they could.

The growing politicisation of aid and the instrumentalisation of responses – where donor governments subordinate humanitarian objectives to achieving other aims – are growing concerns with serious implications for people affected by crisis. This hampers efforts of humanitarian organisations to access populations and provide protection and assistance. It puts crisis-affected people and humanitarian workers at risk by undermining the perception that the sole objective of humanitarian assistance is to impartially prevent and alleviate suffering, based on needs alone. Donors must look at means of ensuring their aid policies are not undermined by other interests and that other areas of government understand and respect the need for neutral, impartial and independent humanitarian action. At the same time, a more concerted effort is needed by donors to promote and uphold international humanitarian law and humanitarian principles by all parties. This may require publicly criticising one of their peers, for this is an implicit aspect of the commitments they agreed to in the GHD.

Donors can work together in other areas, too. After many years of acknowledging the importance of risk reduction, prevention and preparedness and recovery, it is discouraging to note the continued lack of donor government investment and the lack of coherence between humanitarian action and other policy areas such as development cooperation. Similarly, donor support for ambitious reforms of the humanitarian system require much more coherence about how donors can collectively positively pressure the UN and other actors to integrate approaches, use resources efficiently, and focus on addressing the needs of people affected by crisis. Leadership is needed, and donors can demonstrate this by working together to ensure that the system works for the benefits of crisis-affected populations. A first step would be for donors to universally adopt policies and procedures that place accountability towards affected populations at the centre of their funding and decision-making processes, as well as the core of their relationships with partners. Sadly, this is currently largely absent from most donors’ policies and practices.

For its part, DARA intends to continue its efforts to work more closely with donors and partners to utilise the findings as an entry point for discussions on how to make aid more effective, more transparent and more accountable. As part of those efforts, DARA will conduct a retrospective study on the trends and tendencies in donor behaviour against key concepts of good humanitarian donorship over the first five years of the HRI. DARA will thus try to determine the influence the HRI has had, and could have, in shaping and influencing understanding of good donor practice. Part of this analysis will also include the role and influence of new donors and funding sources, such as the CERF. DARA will also look at the social and cultural factors that influence how humanitarian workers and government donor representatives look at and understand good donor practice. As part of our determination to make the HRI ever more effective and contribute to more impact in humanitarian action, DARA welcomes suggestions from our colleagues in donor governments and the humanitarian community.

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13 See: http://www.aidtransparency.net/
The HRI research process and methodology

Introduction

This chapter explains the key elements in the Humanitarian Response Index (HRI) research process to generate the annual assessment of donor governments’ respect of the Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) Principles. It begins with an overview of the HRI’s conceptual foundation. An outline of the HRI data collection process is then followed by a description of how quantitative and qualitative indicators are developed. Finally, information is presented on more sophisticated multidimensional techniques used in 2010 to identify donor groups based on the extent of their application of the GHD Principles.

Purpose and foundation of the HRI

The HRI is a collaborative research process that examines donors’ role in supporting more effective responses to humanitarian crises. Donor governments are still the main funders of humanitarian assistance. Therefore, understanding how they contribute to meeting humanitarian objectives is key to achieving reforms and comprehensively improving the humanitarian system. The raison d'être of the HRI is to provide the humanitarian sector with an empirical evidence base to assess donor’s commitment and application of the GHD Principles.

When DARA developed the HRI in 2006, an index and a ranking system was chosen as the most appropriate means of tracking government donors’ progress in applying recognised good practice in funding and supporting humanitarian action. The HRI is analogous to such other annual ranking assessments as UNDP’s Human Development Index,1 the Center for Global Development’s Commitment to Development Index2 or the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA)3 of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Each of these other indices has become an acknowledged portal for informed and balanced debate. The HRI is taking its place alongside them – evaluating whether state-provided humanitarian assistance contributes to meeting the current needs of the millions of people affected by crisis, conflict and disaster and promoting preparedness for future disasters.

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2 See: http://www.cgdev.org/section/initiatives/_active/cdi/
3 See http://www.pisa.oecd.org/pages/0,2987,en_32252351_32235731_1_1_1_1_1,00.html
An important difference between the HRI and other composite indices is the use of qualitative indicators, which measure how field humanitarian staff assesses the quality of the support provided by government donors and quantitative indicators. Perceptions are gathered through personal interviews during field missions using a standardised questionnaire on donor practice. In a second stage, a statistical analysis is conducted to convert the survey responses into qualitative indicators providing comparable donor scores. Thus, qualitative indicators containing humanitarian workers’ views at a micro-level (crisis-level), serve to complement the quantitative indicators, which summarise public data describing at a macro-level. A new approach has also been adopted this year: the HRI aims to be not only an index, but a scorecard of humanitarian donorship practices. There is added emphasis on the entire set of indicators measuring different aspects of donors’ actions, providing more interpretative analysis of what the implications are for individual government donors and the wider humanitarian system. The application of various multidimensional techniques to understand the underlying structure of the data and the simultaneous interrelations among donors’ behaviour and the GHD Principles, has allowed the construction of a complete and coherent indicator system. This system seeks to be of use in determining similarities and differences in donors’ actions, strengths and areas of improvement, thus providing an evidence-based tool for donors to refine their humanitarian strategies.

As with any performance measurement framework, the design and selection of indicators is never an exact science, rather a process of building consensus on what constitutes the best possible measure of practice using the data available and time and resources required to gather it. An HRI consultation process in 2006-2007 defined the set of indicators that best captured the GHD Principles. In 2009, another expert consultation process was initiated to identify other concepts of good donor practice that have now been incorporated into HRI 2010. Throughout the entire research process, the HRI’s Peer Review Committee has provided expert advice and validated the findings.

The HRI research process

This section presents the HRI research process, from its design and extensive data collection, to the conversion of the data into contextualised and useful knowledge. The HRI research process is graphically represented in Figure 1.

Figure 1. HRI Research process
Quantitative data collection

The quantitative indicators that make up the HRI scores come from a variety of sources. Much of the data on humanitarian financing and donor funding comes from databases of the Financial Tracking System (FTS) of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development’s Development Assistance Committee (OECD/DAC) and the World Bank. Data on donor coverage of UN Consolidated Appeals (CAPs), Flash Appeals, and appeals issued by the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) are also used to assess indicators such as the timeliness of funding, the distribution of funding in accordance to needs and support of coordination. Other quantitative indicators examine how consistent donor governments’ policies are with key elements of the GHD Principles, such support for recovery and livelihoods. The HRI also determines if donor governments are complying with international humanitarian law (IHL) and other legal conventions and instruments aimed at ensuring humanitarian action is based on principles of neutrality, impartiality and independence. Sources include the World Bank, the UN, OECD/DAC, the Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action (ALNAP) and the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement.

More information on the mathematical formulation and conceptual definition of these indicators, the different variables included, the selected optimal values as well as the sources for each of them can be found in the Technical annex at the end of this chapter.

Qualitative data collection

Crisis selection

Each year, the HRI conducts field research in a representative sample of different crisis contexts to assess how GHD Principles are being applied in practice. Crises are selected on the basis of the type of crisis (natural disasters, conflicts, and complex emergencies), geographic and regional distribution, scale and nature of the international response and whether there is adequate presence of GHD donors to ensure a sufficient sample size. The selection process also attempts, when possible, to include crises where the nature of the crisis or its response is unique, thereby allowing an opportunity to learn how the humanitarian system can best adapt to different situations.

For 2010, the crises selected were: Afghanistan, the Central African Republic (CAR), Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Haiti, Indonesia, the occupied Palestinian territories (oPt), Pakistan, the Philippines, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Yemen and Zimbabwe. Several of these crises have been in previous versions of the HRI, an opportunity to assess how the international community’s response has evolved over time. Once the crises are selected, DARA contacts all humanitarian responders – including UN agencies, the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement, international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) and local organisations – that have received donor government funding. DARA requests their participation in the data collection, and, whenever possible, to provide logistical or operational support. DARA also attempts to contact donor agencies headquartered and field offices to inform them of the mission and to invite them to participate in the interview process.

Field team members are selected based on their knowledge of the crisis country, language, and experience, and often include external experts who can provide additional insight and analysis of the situation and context. A pre-mission briefing is conducted with teams to review documentation about the crisis and to hone research protocols.

Field interviews

Once in the field, the teams begin the process of interviewing humanitarian organisations and conducting surveys of how humanitarian organisations see donor behaviour. In most cases, HRI teams are able to meet with 80 percent or more of the organisations funded by OECD/DAC donors as well as government officials, local authorities, civil society organisations and donor representatives. Whenever possible, teams also visit affected areas to speak to field staff and beneficiaries. This gives teams an unprecedented overview of the overall crisis response. This year, field missions took place between November 2009 and August 2010. While in the field, interviews were conducted with nearly 500 representatives of humanitarian organisations and donor agencies.

HRI questionnaire on donor practice

One of the key research tools used in the HRI is a standardised questionnaire which allows field teams to systematically gather the perspectives of humanitarian organisations on how donors are applying GHD Principles. Subsequently, in-depth survey analysis enables conversion of respondents’ opinions into comparable scores, referred to as qualitative scores. (The HRI questionnaire is available in the Technical annex).

Surveys are targeted to senior field representatives of humanitarian organisations who have a direct knowledge and experience dealing with the donor governments that fund their programmes in the crisis. Survey respondents are asked to answer a series of 32 questions and statements on how well they feel each of their donors support their work and if they believe donors are applying key concepts of good practice from the GHD, using a 0 to 10 scale. Each question is linked to core concepts contained in the GHD. Additionally, the survey includes several open-ended questions allowing the interviewee and respondents to clarify and expand on any answers. Survey responses are confidential to ensure more candid answers and in order to protect the often delicate relationship between funders and appealing organisations.

5 Not including the field mission to Haiti
Representativeness and validity of responses

DARA conducted an analysis of the representativeness of the responses gathered for each OECD/DAC donor by reviewing the total number of partners receiving funding from each of these governments against the numbers of surveys gathered in the field missions. This was used to establish the minimum threshold necessary to conduct a statistical analysis of the responses. The survey sample size was sufficiently representative to be considered valid for most donors, though the limited number of responses for New Zealand and Luxembourg means that both donors’ scores should be treated with caution. However, it was difficult to obtain a sufficient number of survey responses on the humanitarian aid provided by Portugal, Greece and Austria. DARA thus decided it would not be appropriate to include these donors in the ranking.

Construction of HRI indicators

Generating quantitative indicators

In addition to the desk research and the quantitative data collection process, a methodological review was carried out to produce a more comprehensive indicator system balanced by pillars. This has led to some improvements in the indicator formulas, as well as a more balanced aggregation method.

Formulation of some indicators has been simplified to facilitate interpretability:

- Complex concepts like variance or the adjustment coefficient of a regression ($R^2$) have been avoided in the indicator construction, and left for later analysis of the indicator behaviour and cross-country comparison;
- The 0 to 10 scale has been used in all scores (qualitative or quantitative indicator scores, pillar scores and final HRI scores);
- Normalisation also has been conducted in a simpler manner when possible;
- Comparability over time is a priority for the HRI 2011. It has been integrated in the indicator construction and especially in the normalisation process in which optimal values (10) have not necessarily been given to maximal scores in a sample, as this can prevent comparisons over time. They have most frequently been determined by asking: “what threshold would assure donor excellence in humanitarian action?”
- In order to facilitate interpretability, the minimal score (0) has not been fixed to the minimal sample value. This implies a certain loss of donors’ scores’ variation, but it can be overcome by using the Principal Component Analysis technique for the comparisons among different donors’ humanitarian action.

Qualitative indicators construction

Once the HRI questionnaire responses were collected, reviewed and validated, a number of careful analyses were undertaken to arrive at comparable scores for donors on all the assessed aspects.

1 For each mission, a preliminary summary descriptive analysis with basic information on trends in the responses is prepared to share with the field team. This is used during a field debriefing with all the organisations that participated in the process. This is an opportunity to get on-the-spot validation from humanitarian actors, and begin to interpret and contextualise the reasons behind the trends detected. This information is also used to help prepare the crisis report.

2 Once all field missions are completed and the entire survey data base has been constructed and revised, a sound analysis is conducted of the responses obtained. Patterns of answers are searched for, as well as factors that determine them. To avoid any kind of systematic biases in the responses, it is essential to search for hidden social or cultural factors having an influence on interviewees’ answers, such as gender, country of origin of respondent, years of experience, type of organisation s/he is working for and position held. This search becomes especially relevant in the case of international surveys of people from different cultures and backgrounds as a way to understand all the information collected through the survey. Analyses include:

- Univariate analysis of 32 survey questions;
- Correlation analysis to find patterns of answers to the 32 questions included in the survey. A qualitative – geometrical approach – Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA) – is used. It serves to identify the interrelation among survey questions, determining the most frequent patterns of response and factors influencing them;
- Intra-class/inter-class variance analysis complements the previous steps and helps in the selection of questions included in the qualitative components of this year’s completed HRI and also those that can be put aside for the HRI 2011 survey in order to have a streamlined questionnaire.

After the analysis is completed and the cultural factors most determinant of survey scores are identified, the needed adjustments are applied. Thus, the region of origin of the respondent, together with the characteristic of being a citizen of the crisis-affected country were taken into account when calculating HRI qualitative indicators. Average survey scores were weighted by origin of respondent, assuring that the percentages of respondents from different regions, and from the crisis-affected country, are controlled for in each donor’s sample and qualitative scores are therefore comparable.

Most questions were included in the analysis. Those for which the interviewees were not informed enough to answer were excluded. Additionally, some question scores were regrouped into a single indicator, so the number of qualitative indicators by pillar would be balanced. (See Table 1 in Technical Annex).
Box. 1 Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA) results

Correlation among survey answers

The application of a MCA in a survey analysis serves to find the patterns of response that most frequently appear in the sample, as well as supplementary factors (including social or cultural) that may condition those patterns.

The first identified pattern is that interviewees tend to show either a general satisfaction with donor’s actions, no matter the aspect being asked, or a general dissatisfaction.

Moreover, respondents tend to share their views on Pillars 1 and 2, showing a generally positive perception of how most OECD/DAC donors respond to current needs but a less positive perception of how donors are contributing to efforts to prevent and minimise risks and address future humanitarian needs. Questions where responses show a larger variation in respondents’ opinions are in Pillars 3, 4 and 5.

Therefore, the most significant donor differences in performance seem to be found in issues around coordination, protecting civilians and humanitarian staff, and learning and accountability.

The set of questions that are most frequently given either simultaneously high or low scores are detailed in Table 1.

In the questions listed in Table 1. Particularly good scores were given to the EC, Sweden, and to a lesser extent, to the US, the UK, Australia and Norway. Italy, Spain, France and Ireland are scored below average.

The MCA and analysis of results also sheds light on the relationships among survey questions and the social or cultural characteristics of respondents. The analysis indicates a correlation between generally higher scores for OECD/DAC donors and whether the respondent is resident of the crisis-affected country, is from Africa or South – East Asia or is a woman.

Factors that appear to influence the patterns of response (listed in order of relevance) are:

- Origin of respondent: Respondents from less developed regions tend to give higher scores in all HRI survey questions. This becomes especially relevant if they are from the country in crisis.

---

Table 1. Positively correlated survey questions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question number</th>
<th>HRI SURVEY QUESTION SHORTNAME</th>
<th>PILLAR</th>
<th>HRI SURVEY QUESTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Donor capacity for informed decision-making</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>The donor’s capacity and expertise for informed decision-making in this crisis were… (completely inadequate 0 - completely adequate 10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>Implementing evaluation recommendations</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>To what extent did the donor work with you to implement recommendations from evaluations into your programming? (not at all 0 - completely 10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Transparency of funding</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>The funding and decision-making information provided by the donor for this crisis was… (completely inadequate 0 - completely adequate 10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Promotion of international humanitarian law</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>For the donor, advocating for the human rights of affected populations and the implementation of international humanitarian law in this crisis was… (not a priority 0 - a high priority 10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Monitoring of good practice</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>To what extent did the donor request and monitor that your organisation fully apply good practices and quality standards in your programming? (not at all 0 - completely 10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Accountability towards beneficiaries</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>To what extent did the donor support initiatives to improve accountability towards affected populations in this crisis? (not at all 0 - completely 10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Advocacy towards local authorities</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>The donor’s advocacy for governments and local authorities to fulfil their responsibilities in responding to humanitarian needs was… (completely negligible 0 - completely effective 10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Requirements for evaluations</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>For the donor, regular evaluations on the efficiency and effectiveness of your programmes were… (not part of its requirements 0 - an important part of its requirements 10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Facilitating humanitarian access</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>The donor’s contribution to guaranteeing safe humanitarian access and protection of humanitarian workers in this crisis was… (completely negligible 0 - completely effective 10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Level of support to organisation</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>The support your organisation received from the donor throughout your involvement in this crisis has been… (completely unsatisfactory 0 - completely satisfactory 10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Support for protection of civilians</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Regarding the protection of affected populations, the support provided by the donor in this crisis was… (completely negligible 0 - completely effective 10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Respecting roles and responsibilities of actors</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>To what extent did the donor respect the roles and responsibilities of the different components of the humanitarian system (UN, Red Cross/Red Crescent and NGOs)? (not at all 0 - completely 10)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The only exception is respondents from Latin America, who, if not from the crisis-affected state, expressed general dissatisfaction with donors respect for *GHD Principles*. This is an interesting result that should be further investigated. Respondents from Sub-Saharan Africa, South – East Asia, the Middle East and North Africa give significantly higher scores to all HRI survey questions. Interviewees from members of OECD/DAC countries belonging to the EU tend to be more critical of donors’ adherence to *GHD Principles* than those from other OECD/DAC countries.

- **Type of organisation**: Respondents from local NGOs and the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement give better scores (possibly because they are often nationals of the crisis-affected country). UN staff tend to be more critical of OECD/DAC donors’ actions.

- **Crisis country in which respondents work**: Generally speaking, crises in Africa or East Asia are given better scores in all survey questions. Crises in the Middle East or South Asia receive lower scores (See Graph 2).

- **Sex**: Women tend to give higher scores than men.

- **Years of experience**: The less experienced the respondent, the higher the score given to all HRI survey questions.

- **Donor**: Particularly highly-rated was the EC and Sweden and to a lesser extent the US, Australia, the UK and Norway. Particularly low scores were given to Italy, Spain, France and Ireland.

- **GHD Awareness**: In a less relevant manner, awareness of the existence of the *GHD Principles* appears to be determinant too. Respondents who were less familiar with the GHD tended to give better scores to donors.

In Graphs 1 and 2, provided by the MCA, donors and crises are positioned according to the pattern of responses they most frequently received. Those receiving good scores, generally speaking, are situated on the right, and those receiving poor scores are found on the left. Those we describe as “typical” donors and crises, those receiving average scores in most questions, are placed in the centre of the graphs.

Donors (or crises) placed close to one another represent similar patterns of responses: they are regarded as similar by humanitarians in terms of respect for GHD. If they are distant, humanitarians have very different perceptions of their humanitarian practices.

We can see from Graph 2 that the crises in Sudan, CAR and DRC are most similar in terms of the perceptions expressed by humanitarian staff. Yemen, Somalia, Pakistan and Afghanistan are the crises where significantly higher degrees of dissatisfaction were expressed by humanitarian partners.
In-depth data structure study

Multivariate all HRI indicators analysis (principal component analysis)

Once the qualitative and quantitative indicators are constructed and organised by pillars, multivariate techniques are applied to analyse the interrelations existing among them and to verify their validity as an indicator system. Several principal components analyses (PCA) – including different indicator sets (in terms of number or pillar distribution) – have been carried out. The best option – in terms of statistical significance, balance and theoretical coherence, and graphical representativity and interpretability – was selected and used subsequently.

PCA provides us with interpretable graphical representations (see Graph 3) allowing for insight in the structure of data – a requisite preliminary step in the composite indicator construction. PCA is a multivariate technique that allows a set of individual indicators to be summarised while preserving the maximum possible proportion of the total variation in the original data set. The method assigns a greater importance to the individual indicators that have the largest variation across countries, a desirable property for graphical representation facilitating cross-country comparisons, as individual indicators that are similar across countries are of little interest and cannot explain differences in performance.

Weighting discussion

In other indices, a PCA is often used for determining composite indicator weightings based on the factor loadings. The Peer Review Committee and DARA’s quantitative team have considered the use of PCA weightings in the construction of the HRI. After rigorous discussions, it was agreed that HRI pillar weights, as determined by humanitarian experts and used in previous HRI editions, would be maintained, and the PCA results would be used as a complementary analysis technique, allowing the validation of the indicator system, the comprehension of the data structure and a further donor classification in terms of the HRI individual indicators on humanitarian action. Furthermore, DARA decided to balance indicator weights in each pillar (all pillars would have the same number of quantitative and qualitative indicators, while 50 percent of each pillar weight would be given to each quantitative/qualitative component). The reasons for keeping “traditional” HRI weights are:

- They grant greater importance to pillars humanitarian experts considered a higher priority in humanitarian action.
- HRI weights are simpler to comprehend for all involved in humanitarian work. This is important for an index that aims to be a generally useful assessment tool, not only comprehensible for those with a solid statistical background.
- PCA’s statistical relevance is not assured when the number of indicators is larger than the number of observations (in this case, donor countries).
- PCA weights are highly dependent on sample data. Their use and interpretability is restricted when cross-year comparability is required, as well as when new donors come into the scene.

For a better understanding of the aggregation method, see the following table with HRI final weights by pillar, component and indicator.

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Table 2. HRI 2010 pillar and indicator weights

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PILLAR</th>
<th>NUMBER OF INDICATORS</th>
<th>NUMBER OF INDICATORS</th>
<th>PILLAR WEIGHT</th>
<th>WEIGHT PER COMPONENT</th>
<th>WEIGHT PER INDICATOR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>QUALITATIVE INDICATORS</td>
<td>QUANTITATIVE INDICATORS</td>
<td></td>
<td>QUALITATIVE COMPONENT</td>
<td>QUANTITATIVE COMPONENT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Identifying strengths and areas for improvement**

**Donor classification**

Complementing the PCA, an additional exploratory technique was used to identify groups of donors with similar patterns of humanitarian action according to the HRI indicator system. A hierarchical clustering technique was applied to a systematic, all-indicator-based determination of groups of donor governments, verifying that donors classified under the same group are as similar as possible and donors in different groups are as different as possible in terms of HRI indicators.

The determination of three donor groups allows for a more realistic identification of each donor’s strengths and areas for improvement by taking into account how other similar donors are doing. The application of this descriptive technique gives a more detailed view of the humanitarian world, leading to a clearer picture of each donor’s performance.

The classification identified the existence of three different groups of donors. A geographical component emerged from the analysis – with mostly Mediterranean countries in Group 3, Scandinavian states in Group 1 and some of largest donors in Group 2 (the EC, the UK and the US.)

Donors in Group 1 outperform their peers at all HRI pillars, except for Pillar 1 (Responding to needs), at which they would be better if the timeliness of their assistance was assured, especially in complex emergencies, but also in sudden onset disasters. Donors in Group 2 are slightly better than others at responding to needs, while presenting a mid-range performance in all other pillars. The weakest aspects of this group are in Pillar 2 (Prevention and risk reduction). Group 3 donors perform generally below average in all pillars, except for Pillar 2, at which they receive mid-range scores.

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**PCA results**

As intended, PCA provides an image of donors’ respect of *GHD Principles*, mapping their commitment to the *GHD Principles* regrouped into the different HRI pillars (See Graph 3).

Pillars 4 and 3, as well as the qualitative component of Pillar 1, are those that best indicate donors’ commitment to GHD. They are the HRI’s main drivers, the shifting pillars of HRI final scores for donors in which the most statistically relevant differences in donors’ performances can be found. In other words, protection and international law, coordination, impartiality, independence from political, economic or military interests and timeliness of aid delivery are the main factors that affect a donors’ overall score. Donors showing a good performance in one tend to perform well in all other HRI pillars.

As concluded from the PCA, Table 3 shows the correlation among Pillars 3, 4 and the qualitative component of Pillar 1. (In a less pronounced manner, Pillar 5 appears to be correlated to these pillars as well). This means that donors showing a commitment to international law, protection and humanitarian coordination tend to be perceived by humanitarian workers as better donors, more impartial and independent from geopolitical interests. This interpretation should be treated with caution as respondents may be unaware of the reasons behind donors’ funding decisions. It could be that donors seen as human rights and international law defenders on the international stage are perceived as more independent, impartial and needs response-oriented by humanitarians.

### Table 3. Pillar correlations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pillar 1 Qualitative Component</th>
<th>Pillar 1 Quantitative Component</th>
<th>Pillar 2</th>
<th>Pillar 3</th>
<th>Pillar 4</th>
<th>Pillar 5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pillar 1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qualitative</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Component</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pillar 1</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quantitative</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Component</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pillar 2</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>-0.48</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pillar 3</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>-0.12</td>
<td>-0.14</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pillar 4</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>-0.38</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pillar 5</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8 This technique was applied on donors’ coordinates in the space determined by the PCA main factors.
The difference between donor Groups 1 and 2 are better scores for indicators Funding and commissioning evaluations, Appropriate reporting requirements (Pillar 5); Un-earmarked funding, Flexible funding (Pillar 3) in the case of Group 1, and for indicators Adapting to needs (Pillar 1); Donor capacity (Pillar 3); Transparency of funding, Support for learning and evaluations, Participation in accountability initiatives (Pillar 5) in the case of Group 2 (See Figure 2).

Donors in Groups 1 and 2 show a better performance at Pillar 3 (Working with humanitarian partners), Pillar 4 (Protection and international law) and impartiality, independence and flexibility and non-conditionality of aid, that make up the qualitative component of Pillar 1, while Group 3’s performance is not as satisfactory as the above-mentioned (See Figure 2).

Figure 2. Donor classification based on HRI pillar and indicator scores

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ALL DAC DONORS</th>
<th>Donors with scores over the average in Pillars 3, 4 and in the qualitative part of Pillar 1</th>
<th>Donors with scores below the average in Pillars 3, 4 and in the qualitative part of Pillar 1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SWEDEN NORWAY DENMARK LUXEMBOURG SWITZERLAND FINLAND NEW ZEALAND IRELAND</td>
<td>BELGIUM SPAIN JAPAN ITALY FRANCE AUSTRIA PORTUGAL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Donors with high scores for: Funding and commissioning evaluations, Appropriateness of funding reporting requirements (Pillar 5); Un-earmarked funding, Flexible funding (Pillar 3)</td>
<td>Donors with high scores for: Adapting to needs (Pillar 1); Donor capacity (Pillar 3); Transparency of funding, Support for learning and evaluations, Participation in accountability initiatives (Pillar 5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GROUP 1</td>
<td>SWEDEN NORWAY DENMARK LUXEMBOURG SWITZERLAND FINLAND NETHERLANDS</td>
<td>GROUP 2 AUSTRALIA CANADA EC UK IRELAND GERMANY US GREECE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GROUP 3</td>
<td>BELGIUM SPAIN JAPAN ITALY FRANCE AUSTRIA PORTUGAL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The HRI research process and methodology

Figure 3. Donor groups based on HRI performance

**GROUP 1**
SWEDEN NORWAY DENMARK LUXEMBOURG SWITZERLAND FINLAND NEW ZEALAND NETHERLANDS
AVERAGE FINAL HRI SCORE: 6.27

**GROUP 2**
AUSTRALIA CANADA EC UK IRELAND GERMANY US GREECE
AVERAGE FINAL HRI SCORE: 5.62

**GROUP 3**
BELGIUM SPAIN JAPAN ITALY FRANCE AUSTRIA PORTUGAL
AVERAGE FINAL HRI SCORE: 4.85

*“Typical donor” in the sense that, for all indicators considered, its score is the closest to the group’s average.*

Graph 3. PCA graph: Donor mapping

**Group Interpretation:**

1. Horizontal axis, from left to right, sorts donors from poor to good performances in pillars 4, 3 and 1, generally speaking. Vertical axis separates donors based on specific indicators at which they are especially good (see Boxes A and B).

2. Donors that appear close to one another in the graph are donors with similar scores in the HRI indicators. Donors appearing far from each other are donors with very different HRI scores.

* Low and high scores are in relation to OECD/DAC average value.

** Qualitative aspects of Pillar 1 only.

● Representations of Austria, Greece and Portugal are based on their quantitative scores only.
Table 4. Strengths and areas for improvement by group and pillar

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GROUP 1</th>
<th>GROUP 2</th>
<th>GROUP 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>STRENGTHS (BY PILLAR)</strong></td>
<td>Protection and international law</td>
<td>Responding to needs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working with humanitarian partners</td>
<td>Learning and accountability</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Learning and accountability</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT (BY PILLAR)</strong></td>
<td>Prevention, risk reduction and recovery</td>
<td>Protection and international law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Strengths and areas for improvement for Group 2 donors are not so statistically apparent for donors in Groups 1 and 3.*

Table 5. Strengths and areas for improvement by group and indicator

**GROUP 1**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pillar</th>
<th>Qualitative/Quantitative</th>
<th>STRENGTHS (by indicator)</th>
<th>Pillar</th>
<th>Qualitative/Quantitative</th>
<th>AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT (by indicator)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 QL</td>
<td>Independence of aid</td>
<td>1 QT</td>
<td>Timely funding to complex emergencies (except for Denmark)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 QL</td>
<td>Timely funding to partner organisations</td>
<td>1 QT</td>
<td>Funding based on level of vulnerability and to forgotten crises (except for Luxembourg and Netherlands)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 QL</td>
<td>Impartiality of aid</td>
<td>2 QT</td>
<td>Funding for reconstruction and prevention (except for New Zealand)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 QL</td>
<td>Support for prevention and preparation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 QL</td>
<td>Support for partners and funding organisational capacity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 QL</td>
<td>Flexible funding</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 QT</td>
<td>Funding UN and Red Cross Red Crescent appeals (except for New Zealand)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 QT</td>
<td>Un-earmarked funding (except for Luxembourg and Sweden)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 QL</td>
<td>Support for protection of civilians</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 QL</td>
<td>Promotion of international humanitarian law</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 QT</td>
<td>Refugee law</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 QT</td>
<td>Human rights law (except for Switzerland and Finland)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 QT</td>
<td>International humanitarian law (except for New Zealand and Netherlands)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 QL</td>
<td>Appropriate reporting requirements</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 QL</td>
<td>Transparency of funding (except for Finland)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**GROUP 2**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pillar</th>
<th>Qualitative/Quantitative</th>
<th>STRENGTHS (by indicator)</th>
<th>Pillar</th>
<th>Qualitative/Quantitative</th>
<th>AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT (by indicator)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>QL</td>
<td>Adapting to needs</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>QL</td>
<td>Independence of aid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>QT</td>
<td>Funding for reconstruction and prevention (except for Australia)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>QL</td>
<td>Impartiality of aid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>QL</td>
<td>Beneficiary participation in monitoring and evaluation</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>QT</td>
<td>Reducing climate-related vulnerability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>QL</td>
<td>Support for prevention and preparedness</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>QL</td>
<td>Flexible funding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>QL</td>
<td>Donor capacity for informed decision-making</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>QT</td>
<td>Un-earmarked funding (except for Ireland)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>QL</td>
<td>Transparency of funding</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>QL</td>
<td>Appropriate reporting requirements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>QT</td>
<td>Funding and commissioning evaluations (except for Germany)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>QT</td>
<td>Participation in accountability initiatives</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**GROUP 3**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pillar</th>
<th>Qualitative/Quantitative</th>
<th>STRENGTHS (by indicator)</th>
<th>Pillar</th>
<th>Qualitative/Quantitative</th>
<th>AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT (by indicator)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>QT</td>
<td>Timely funding to complex emergencies (except for Austria, Belgium, Italy and Spain)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>QL</td>
<td>Independence of aid (except for Austria and Greece)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>QT</td>
<td>Funding for reconstruction and prevention (except for Austria, France, Greece and Portugal)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>QL</td>
<td>Timely funding to partner organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>QT</td>
<td>Reducing climate-related vulnerability</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>QL</td>
<td>Impartiality of aid (except for Austria and Greece)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>QL</td>
<td>Adapting to needs (except for Austria)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>QL</td>
<td>Support for prevention and preparedness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>QL</td>
<td>Support for partners and funding organisational capacity</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>QL</td>
<td>Flexible funding (except for Austria and Greece)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>QL</td>
<td>Flexible funding (except for Austria and Greece)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>QT</td>
<td>Funding UN and Red Cross/Red Crescent appeals (except for Belgium)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>QL</td>
<td>Support for protection of civilians</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>QL</td>
<td>Promotion of international humanitarian law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>QT</td>
<td>Refugee law</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>QT</td>
<td>Human rights law (except for Spain)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>QT</td>
<td>International humanitarian law</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>QL</td>
<td>Appropriate reporting requirements (except for Austria and Greece)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>QL</td>
<td>Funding and commissioning evaluations</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>QT</td>
<td>Participation in accountability initiatives</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*QL* qualitative indicators

*QT* quantitative indicators

**References**


Technical annex

Quantitative indicators

Pillar 1: Responding to needs

Funding based on level of vulnerability and to forgotten crises: Donor funding should fundamentally be guided by considerations of need. Thus, donors are scored higher if their humanitarian interventions are reasonably immune from being driven by the media, if they support forgotten crises and allocate aid based on the level of vulnerability in the crisis. In 2009 this indicator considered over 150 emergencies. It classifies donor funding by the extent of media coverage each emergency received, whether it was classified as “forgotten” in ECHO’s Forgotten Crisis Assessment and whether it is characterised by markers of especial vulnerability such as high rates of malnutrition, mortality, HIV-AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria and gender disparities.

Timely funding to complex emergencies: This indicator calculates the funds within an appeal committed or disbursed to complex emergencies in the first quarter after the launch of the appeal as a percentage of the total funds contributed to the appeal during 2009.

Timely funding to sudden onset disasters: Using data on natural disasters from FTS and funding to IFRC flash appeals, DARA judges as timely those funds committed or disbursed within the first six weeks after official declaration of a disaster or, in case is IFRC data, launch of an appeal. These are calculated as a percentage of total funding inside or outside an appeal up to six months after the declaration of a disaster.

Pillar 2: Prevention, risk reduction and recovery

Funding for reconstruction and prevention: Integrating relief and development is essential to ensure sustainability of the outcomes of humanitarian action. Returns to investment in humanitarian assistance will be higher where long-term development issues have been addressed in a comprehensive manner during the emergency phase. However, donors often lack mechanisms for funding recovery and reconstruction work. This indicator looks at funding of reconstruction relief and rehabilitation, on the one hand, and disaster prevention and preparedness, on the other, as a percentage of bilateral humanitarian assistance.

Funding of risk mitigation mechanisms: This indicator uses the amount of funding GHD donors contribute to leading risk mitigation mechanisms as a proportion of total ODA:
DARA also considers whether or not donors provide funding to the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPC) and to the IFRC’s International Disaster Response Laws, Rules and Principles Programme (IDRL).6

Reducing climate-related vulnerability: Good donorship by a government entails consistency with its domestic policies. As CO₂ emissions have an impact on climate related vulnerability across the entire globe, this indicator measures per capita emissions using latest available data.

Pillar 3: Working with humanitarian partners

Funding to NGOs: Donor support and recognition of the key role of NGOs in delivering humanitarian aid, is measured in this indicator by weighing up the amount of donor funding to NGOs in relation to total humanitarian assistance in 2008 and 2009. DARA also considers the proportion of NGO assistance which each donor provides to NGOs which are not headquartered in their country.

Un-earmarked funding: Principle 13 calls on donors to “enhance the flexibility of earmarking, and of introducing longer term funding arrangements”. This indicator gives credit to donors who provide a greater share of their humanitarian assistance in un-earmarked form by considering un-earmarked funds to a set of agencies – OCHA, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), IFRC, ICR.C, the World Food Programme (WFP), the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) – as a percentage of total humanitarian assistance to these agencies in 2009.

Funding UN and Red Cross Red Crescent appeals: This indicator combines different aspects of donor support to humanitarian partners. It calculates an average of donor funding to:

- UN appeals, using a “fair share” concept, which considers the donor’s contribution to total appeal needs (budget requirements) as a proportion of the each donor’s GDP compared to the total GDP of the OECD/DAC – in other words, donors contribution to overall needs should be equitably distributed in proportion to the size of each donor’s economy.
- IFRC and ICR.C appeals, both annual and emergency, as a share of total needs with a fair share criterion.
- Funding to major flexible funding mechanisms: the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF); the IFRC’s Disaster Relief Emergency Fund (DREF); the Common Humanitarian Funds (CHFs) and Emergency Response Funds (ERFs). Funding levels are averaged and divided by total humanitarian assistance. Scores are allocated based on a country’s size, i.e. its share of total OECD/DAC GDP.
- Funding to UN coordination mechanisms and common services as a share of total requirements, using a fair share criterion.

Pillar 4: Protection and international law

International humanitarian law: Principle 4 calls for donors to “respect and promote the implementation of international humanitarian law, refugee law and human rights”. This indicator captures three dimensions of implementation. It registers the total number of these 25 key international instruments actually signed and/or ratified by individual donor countries:

- Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Geneva, 12 August 1949;
- Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts. Geneva, 8 June 1977;
- Declaration provided for under article 90 AP I. Acceptance of the Competence of the International Fact-Finding Commission according to article 90 of AP I;
- Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts. Geneva, 8 June 1977;
- Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Adoption of an Additional Distinctive Emblem (Protocol III), 8 December 2005;
- Convention on the prohibition of military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques, New York, 10 December 1976;
- Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and Warfare, Geneva, 17 June 1925;

1 See: http://www.undp.org/cpr/whats_new/framework.shtml
2 See: http://gfdrr.org/
3 See http://www.undp.org/gef/
4 See: http://www.undr.org/english/about/donors/trustfund/
5 See: http://www.gppac.net
7 See: http://cefr.un.org/
Protocol on Explosive Remnants
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (Geneva, 10 April 1972);
Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects (Geneva, 10 October 1980);
Protocol on non-detectable fragments (I);
Protocol on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of mines, booby-traps and other devices (II);
Protocol on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of incendiary weapons (III);
Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices as amended on 3 May 1996 (Protocol II to the 1980 Convention);
Amendment to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects (with Protocols I, II and III), Geneva 21 December 2001;
Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, Oslo, 18 September 1997;
Implementation requires that states adopt domestic laws and regulations as well as spread knowledge of the relevant Conventions and Protocols as widely as possible. The indicator gives additional credit to countries that have created national commissions aiming at effective application of IHL, as advocated by the ICRC. The indicator includes total donor funding in relation to GDP for the work of the ICRC.

**Human rights law:** This indicator also captures three dimensions of implementation. First, it gives credit to donors in proportion to the number of principal legal instruments on human rights and accompanying protocols they have signed or ratified. This includes the:

- Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide;
- International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination;
- International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights;
- International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and its protocols;
- Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity;
- Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women and its protocols;
- Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and its protocols;
- Convention on the Rights of the Child and its protocols;
- International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families;
- Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and its protocols;
- International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance.

It additionally gives credit to donors that have national human rights institutions given accreditation grades determined by the OHCHR: “A” means compliance with the Paris Principles; “A(R)” is accreditation with reservations; “B” indicates not fully compliant and C indicates non-compliance. A third dimension included is core funding (in relation to GDP) for the work of UNHCR.

**Refugee law:** This indicator is based on whether the state in question is a party to the principal legal instruments of international refugee law:

- the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 protocol;
- the two Protocols on Transnational Organized Crime;
- the 1954 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons;

The indicator gives credit to the relatively small number of countries that accept refugees under UNHCR’s resettlement programme and also reflects the degree of funding (in relation to GDP) provided to UNHCR.

**Pillar 5: Learning and accountability**

**Participation in accountability initiatives:** Principle 21 commits donors to “support learning and accountability initiatives for the effective and efficient implementation of humanitarian action”. There are a number of initiatives which do so. Those taken into account in this indicator are:

- The Sphere Project;
- The Humanitarian Accountability Project;
- Quality COMPASS;
- People in Aid Code;
- ALNAP;
- Good Humanitarian Donorship;
- International Aid Transparency Initiative - IATI.

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9 See: http://www.sphereproject.org/
10 See: http://www.hapinternational.org/
12 See: http://www.peopleinaid.org/code/
13 See: http://www.alnap.org/members/full.aspx
14 See: http://www.goodhumanitariandonorship.org/gns/home.aspx
15 See: http://www.aidtransparency.net/get-involved
This indicator seeks to reflect donor support for and commitment to these initiatives by capturing various dimensions of their participation. The indicator assigns different weights to each initiative, based on experts’ consultations reflecting their relative importance in terms of impact on humanitarian action.

**Funding for accountability initiatives:**
This indicator seeks to measure donor support for accountability initiatives by computing the proportion of funding assigned to ALNAP, HAP, Quality Compass, Sphere, as well as to those projects that support learning and accountability and are listed in OCHA’s FTS. Scores are calculated in relation to total humanitarian assistance funding for the years 2008 and 2009.

**Funding and commissioning evaluations:**
Principle 22 encourages donors to make “regular evaluations of international responses to humanitarian crises, including assessments of donor performance”. Evaluations assess humanitarian interventions according to defined criteria such as relevance, efficiency and impact, and are useful to assess lessons learned to enhance the effectiveness of future donor interventions. Donors can evaluate their own performance, commission evaluations of activities carried out by organisations funded by them, or engage with other agencies and donors in joint exercises. This indicator counts the number of publicly available individual evaluations carried out, or funded, by donors in the last four years (2004–2009). It also includes a measure of joint evaluations, given their broader scope. The indicator also takes into consideration the existence of evaluation guidelines, viewed as another means of promoting the practice of evaluations.

**Checking indicator: Generosity of humanitarian assistance:**
This indicator was introduced in HRI 2008 and is calculations as total humanitarian aid in relation to GNI. For this year’s index it was taken out of the final calculus but kept in the analysis because it shows interesting results.

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**Box 1: Mathematical formulation of the HRI 2010 quantitative indicators**

**Pillar 1: Responding to needs**

**H1.1. Funding based on level of vulnerability and to forgotten crises**

Indicator H1.1 = 0.5* Part A + 0.5* Part B

\[ \text{Part A} = \frac{\sum (FC_j \times X_j)}{\sum X_j} \]

Where,
- \( X_j \) = Funding to crisis j
- \( FC_j \) = Forgotten crisis subindicator for crisis j;
  \( FC_j = 1 \) if either \( FI=0 \) and \( MI<4 \), or \( MI<2 \)
  = 0 otherwise
- \( MI= \) Number of media reports of the crisis during the year (published by AlertNet), re-scaled as follows:
  - More than 5000 media reports 6
  - From 1000 to 4999 media reports 5
  - From 500 to 999 media reports 4
  - From 100 to 499 media reports 3
  - From 10 to 99 media reports 2
  - From 1 to 9 media reports 1
  - 0 media reports 0
- \( FI = \) Forgotten Crisis Index, which is obtained as follows,
  \( FI = 0 \) if \( a+b>0 \)
  = 1 otherwise

Where,
- \( a= \) Forgotten Crisis Assessment, ECHO 2008/09
- \( b= \) Crisis Index, ECHO 2008/09

Optimal value: The highest score in part A is reached when 53% of funding, is committed to forgotten emergencies. 53% is twice the percentage of funding that overall DAC donors commit to crises classified as forgotten.

\[ \text{Part B} = \frac{\sum (X_j \times C_j)}{\sum X_j} \]

Where,
- \( X_j \) = Funding to crisis j
- \( C_j = 1 \) if \( CI+VI>4 \)
  = 0 otherwise
- \( CI= \) Crisis Index, ECHO 2008/2009
- \( VI= \) Vulnerability Index, ECHO 2008–2009

Optimal value: The highest score in part B is reached when 75% of funding is committed to crises classified as vulnerable.

Source: FTS, ECHO and AlertNet
**H1.2. Timely funding to complex emergencies**

Indicator H1.2 = \( \frac{F1Q}{FY} \times 100 \)

Optimal value: 75%, which is twice the percentage of overall funding from OECD-DAC donors committed during the first quarter of the year in 2009.

Source: FTS

**H1.3. Timely funding to sudden onset disasters**

Indicator H1.3 = \( \frac{F6W}{F6M} \times 100 \)

Optimal value: 100% of the funds are committed during the first 6 weeks after the emergency appeal

Source: figures are the result of summing up data from FTS (inside and outside an appeal) and IFRC

**Pillar 2: Prevention, risk reduction and recovery**

**H2.1. Funding for reconstruction and prevention**

Indicator H2.1 = \( \frac{RRR + DPP}{BHA} \times 100 \)

Optimal value: 41.4%, as for Belgium

Source: OECD Stat

**H2.2. Funding of risk mitigation mechanisms**

Indicator H2.2 = 0.8\* Part A + 0.2\* Part B

Part A = \( \frac{(UNDPTTF + GFDRR + DIPECHO + GEF + UNTFDR)}{ODA} \times 100 \)

Where,

- UNDPTTF = Funds to UNDP Thematic Trust Fund for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (2009)
- DIPECHO = Funds to DIPECHO (2008–2009)
- GEF = Funds to Global Environmental Facility Trust Fund (2008–2009)
- UNTFDR = Funds to UN Trust Fund for Disaster Reduction (2008–2009)
- ODA = Total official development assistance

Part B = Average of two dummy variables that capture funding to the GPPAC and IDRL, re-scaled to a 0 to 10 scale.

Sources: OECD Stat, World Bank, Preventionweb, DIPECHO, UNDP, GEF, IFRC, and GPPAC

**H2.3. Reducing climate-related vulnerability**

Indicator H2.3 = \( \frac{CO_2}{Pop} \times 100 \)

Where,

- \( CO_2 \) = Carbone dioxide emissions, in metric tons (2007)
- \( Pop \) = Population (2007)

Optimal Value: In this case, 0 metric tons of \( CO_2 \) is the optimal value. The poorest score is given to Luxembourg, which emitted 24.9 tons in 2007, that is the threshold for this indicator.

Source: MDG data
Pillar 3: Working with humanitarian partners

H3.1. Funding to NGOs

Indicator H3.1 = 0.8* Part A + 0.2* Part B

Part A = \( \frac{\text{NGO}}{\text{THA}} \)

Where,
- NGO = Total humanitarian assistance through NGOs by donor
- THA = Total humanitarian assistance by donor

Optimal value: Part A's optimal value is reached when 34% of total humanitarian assistance is channeled through NGOs. This percentage is double of what overall OECD-DAC donors channel through NGOs.

Source: FTS and HRI 2010 survey

H3.2. Un-earmarked funding

Indicator H3.2 = \( \frac{\text{UHA}}{\text{HA}} \)

Source: ICRC, UNHCR, WFP, OHCHR, UNICEF, IFRC, OCHA, UNRWA, WHO.

H3.3. Funding UN and RC/RC appeals

Indicator H3.3 = 0.25* Funding UN appeals + 0.25* Funding coordination + 0.25* Funding R.CM + 0.25* Funding pooled funds

Funding UN appeals = \( \frac{\text{UNCIAA}}{\text{GDP}} * \frac{\text{TOTAL UNCIAA}}{\text{TOTAL GDP}} \)*100

Optimal value: 150% Fair share

Funding coordination = \( \frac{\text{UNCOORD}}{\text{GDP}} * \frac{\text{TOTAL UNCOORD}}{\text{TOTAL GDP}} \)*100

Optimal value: 150% Fair share

Funding R.CCM = \( \frac{\text{ICRC} + \text{IFRC}}{\text{GDP}} * \frac{\text{TOTAL ICRC} + \text{TOTAL IFRC}}{\text{TOTAL GDP}} \)*100

Optimal value: 150% Fair share

Funding Pooled Funds = \( \frac{\text{QDM}}{\text{GDP}} * \frac{\text{TOTAL QDM}}{\text{TOTAL GDP}} \)*100

Optimal value: 150% Fair share

Part B = \( \frac{\text{FNGO}}{\text{TNGO}} \) where,
- FNGO = Number of foreign NGOs interviewed on the HRI survey receiving funds from the donor
- TNGO = Total number of NGO's interviewed on the HRI survey receiving funds from the donor

Optimal value: Part B's optimal value is 100%

Where,
- UHA = Un-earmarked multilateral humanitarian aid
- HA = Total multilateral humanitarian aid

Optimal value: 100%

Where,
- UNCIAA = Funding to UN Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeals
- TOTAL UNCIAA = Funding to UN Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeals by all donor countries
- UNCOORD = Funding to UN coordination mechanisms
- TOTAL UNCOORD = Total funding to UN coordination mechanisms by all donor countries (2008-09)

GDP = Gross domestic product (2008-09)
TOTAL GDP = Gross domestic product of all donor countries (2008-09)

ICRC = Funding to ICRC (2009)
IFRC = Funding to IFRC (2009)

TOTAL ICRC = Funding to ICRC by all donors (2009)
TOTAL IFRC = Funding to IFRC by all donors (2009)

QDM = Actual funding to quick disbursement mechanisms
TOTAL QDM = Total funding to quick disbursement mechanisms by all donors.

Source: FTS, IMF, ICRC, IFRC: CERF, DREF, ERF and CHF
**Pillar 4: Protection and international law**

**H4.1. International humanitarian law**

Indicator H4.1 = 0.5* Part A + 0.5* Part B

Part A = 0.5* \( \left( \frac{X}{50} \right) \) + 0.5* Y

Where,

\( X \) = Variable that measures the number of ratifications of international treaties on humanitarian law by the donor, assigning the value 0 when not signed, 1 when signed but not ratified, and 2 when ratified. The maximum score possible (when all treaties are ratified) is 50.

\( Y \) = Dummy variable that takes the value 1 when the Donor country has created a National Committee on IHRL.

The list of international treaties on humanitarian law considered includes seven on protection of victims of armed conflicts, one on the International Criminal Court, three on Protection of Cultural Property, one on the environment and thirteen on weapons.

**H4.2. Human rights law**

Indicator H4.2 = 0.66* Part A + 0.33* Part B

Part A = \( (0.5* \frac{X}{X_{\text{MAX}}} + 0.5* \frac{Y}{2}) *10 \)

Where,

\( X \) = Variable that measures the number of ratifications of international treaties on human rights law by the donor, assigning the value 0 when not signed, 1 when signed but not ratified, and 2 when ratified.

\( X_{\text{MAX}} \) = the maximum score possible (when all treaties are ratified) varies depending on the type of donor:

- Members of the European Council: 33 treaties to be considered (Maximum score= 66)
- Other donors: 18 treaties to be considered (Maximum score=36)

\( Y \) = Variable that takes the value 2 when the donor has an A accreditation status regarding its national institutions on human rights, 1 for B, and 0 for not accredited.

Part B = \( \frac{\text{ICRC}}{\text{GDP}} *1000 \)

Where,

\( \text{ICRC} \) = Funding to ICRC

Optimal value: 0.1

Sources: ICRC, IMF

Part B = \( \frac{\text{OHCHR}}{\text{GDP}} *1000 \)

Where,

\( \text{OHCHR} \) = Core Funding to OHCHR

Optimal value for part B: 0.02

Sources: UN treaties database, Council of Europe, OHCHR and IMF
H4.3. Refugee Law

Indicator H4.3 = 0.4* Part A + 0.2* Part B + 0.4* Part C

Part A = \( 10^* \frac{X}{X_{\text{max}}} \)

Where,
- \( X \) = Variable that measures the number of ratifications of international treaties on refugee law by the donor, assigning the value 0 when not signed, 1 when signed but not ratified, and 2 when ratified.
- \( X_{\text{max}} \) = The maximum score possible (when all treaties are ratified) which is 12.

Sources: UNHCR, FTS and UN Treaties Database

H5.3. funding and commissioning evaluations

Indicator H5.3 = Part A + Part B

Part B = Number of people received as part of UNHCR resettlement programmes (per million of inhabitants) in the donor country

Part B's optimal value: 506.5, as for Australia

Part C = \( \frac{\text{UNHCR} + \text{RL}}{\text{GDP}} \) *100000

Where,
- \( \text{UNHCR} \) = Funding to UNHCR
- \( \text{RL} \) = Funding to protection/human rights/rule of law
- \( \text{GDP} \) = Gross Domestic Product

Part C's Optimal value: 100

Pillar 5: Learning and Accountability

H5.1. Participation in accountability initiatives

Indicator H5.1 = Weighted average of Participation in accountability initiatives

Source: ALNAP, GHD, HAP, Groupe URD, Sphere, IATI, and People in Aid.

H5.2. Funding for accountability initiatives

Indicator H5.2 = \( \frac{\text{FLAI}}{\text{HA}} \)

where,
- \( \text{FLAI} \) = Funding directed to humanitarian accountability and learning initiatives (ALNAP, HAP, Quality Compass, Sphere) and projects on learning & accountability (listed in OCHA - FTS)
- \( \text{HA} \) = Total Humanitarian Aid (2008-2009)

Optimal value: 1.5% of total humanitarian aid.
Source: ALNAP, HAP, Groupe URD, Sphere and FTS

H5.3. Funding and commissioning evaluations

Indicator H5.3 = Part A + Part B

Part A = \( \frac{\text{E}}{\text{THA}} \)

Where,
- \( \text{E} \) = Number of self and joint evaluations of humanitarian assistance interventions (publicly available on relevant websites and humanitarian activities evaluated based on standard criteria) for the period 2004-2010.

Optimal values: 0.07 which is two standard deviations above DAC average. In other words, optimal value is achieved when seven evaluations are conducted for every 100 USD million of humanitarian aid.

Checking indicator: Generosity of humanitarian assistance

Generosity = \( \frac{\text{THA}}{\text{GNI}} \) *100

Optimal values: 10%
Source: OECD Stat, ICRC, UNHCR, WFP, OHCHR, UNICEF, IFRC, OCHA
Note: This indicator is not taken into account for the index calculation

Part B = \( G * 10 \)

Where,
- \( G \) = Dummy variable scoring 1 when the donor has evaluation guidelines in the field of humanitarian aid

Sources: DAC Evaluation Resource Centre (DEReC) (it includes TEC), ALNAP (it includes ECHO), individual donor websites and OECD Stat

Where,
- \( \text{THA} \) (Total humanitarian aid) = MHA + CERF + BHI
- \( \text{GNI} \) = Gross National Income
- \( \text{MHA} \) = Multilateral humanitarian aid (own calculations, based on core un-earmarked funding)
- \( \text{CERF} \) = Funding to CERF
- \( \text{BHI} \) = Bilateral humanitarian aid (data from OECD)
Humanitarian Response Index 2010
Field mission questionnaire

1. The donor proved with its decisions in this crisis that meeting humanitarian needs, saving lives, alleviating suffering and maintaining human dignity were…
   (not at all proportional) 0 - 1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 - 6 - 7 - 8 - 9 - 10 (the top priority) / don’t know / not applicable

2. The donor’s decisions on humanitarian aid in this crisis were...
   (biased and partial) 0 - 1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 - 6 - 7 - 8 - 9 - 10 (neutral and impartial) / don’t know / not applicable

3. To what extent did the donor’s funding decisions systematically exclude groups or individuals within the affected populations?
   (not at all) 0 - 1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 - 6 - 7 - 8 - 9 - 10 (fully met) / don’t know / not applicable

3.b If applicable, could you provide specific examples of exclusion? (Open answer)

4. Regarding the interference of political, economic or military interests on humanitarian aid, the donor’s decisions in this crisis were...
   (completely dependent) 0 - 1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 - 6 - 7 - 8 - 9 - 10 (completely independent) / don’t know / not applicable

4.b What non-humanitarian interests could influence the donor’s funding decisions in this crisis? (Open answer)

5. For the donor, responding to needs in this crisis was…
   (completely neglected) 0 - 1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 - 6 - 7 - 8 - 9 - 10 (fully undertaken) / don’t know / not applicable

6. According to the needs identified in this crisis, the donor’s funding was...
   (not at all proportional) 0 - 1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 - 6 - 7 - 8 - 9 - 10 (completely proportional) / don’t know / not applicable

7. For the donor, funding your needs assessments was...
   (totally neglected) 0 - 1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 - 6 - 7 - 8 - 9 - 10 (fully met) / don’t know / not applicable

8. To what extent was the donor’s support for your programmes negatively affected by other crises?
   (completely affected) 0 - 1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 - 6 - 7 - 8 - 9 - 10 (not at all affected) / don’t know / not applicable

8.b Which crises? In case of decreased funding not due to other crises, were funds allocated to other sectors/programmes/organisations? (Open answer)

9. For the donor, the engagement of beneficiaries in the design and implementation stages of your programming was...
   (not a requirement) 0 - 1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 - 6 - 7 - 8 - 9 - 10 (a fundamental requirement) / don’t know / not applicable

9.b For the donor, the engagement of beneficiaries in monitoring and evaluation of your programming was...
   (not a requirement) 0 - 1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 - 6 - 7 - 8 - 9 - 10 (a fundamental requirement) / don’t know / not applicable

9.1 If relevant, what were the specific requirements of the donor in this respect? (Open answer)

10. Did the donor verify that you adapted your programmes to meet changing needs?
   (never) 0 - 1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 - 6 - 7 - 8 - 9 - 10 (on a regular basis) / don’t know / not applicable

10.b How did the donor verify that adaptation? Were the beneficiaries involved in that process? (Open answer)

11. To what extent did the donor undertake actions integrating risk reduction measures, improving prevention and strengthening preparedness for future crises?
   (not at all) 0 - 1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 - 6 - 7 - 8 - 9 - 10 (completely) / don’t know / not applicable

12. To what extent did the donor provide support for the transition between relief, early recovery and/or development in your programmes?
   (not at all) 0 - 1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 - 6 - 7 - 8 - 9 - 10 (completely) / don’t know / not applicable

13. The support your organisation received from the donor throughout your involvement in this crisis has been…
   (completely unsatisfactory) 0 - 1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 - 6 - 7 - 8 - 9 - 10 (completely satisfactory) / don’t know / not applicable

13.b How would you characterise that support? (Open answer)

14. The donor’s activities in facilitating coordination among all actors in this crisis were…
   (completely negligent) 0 - 1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 - 6 - 7 - 8 - 9 - 10 (completely decisive) / don’t know / not applicable

14.b What did the donor do? How could donors improve coordination in the field? (Open answer)

15. The donor’s advocacy for governments and local authorities to fulfill their responsibilities in responding to the humanitarian needs was…
   (completely negligent) 0 - 1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 - 6 - 7 - 8 - 9 - 10 (completely decisive) / don’t know / not applicable

16. The donor’s capacity and expertise for informed decision-making in this crisis were...
   (completely inadequate) 0 - 1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 - 6 - 7 - 8 - 9 - 10 (completely adequate) / don’t know / not applicable

17. To what extent did the donor respect the roles and responsibilities of the different components of the humanitarian system (UN, Red Cross/Red Crescent and NGOs)?
17.b In your opinion, what were the criteria used by the donor to allocate funding among the different organisations? (Open answer)

18 To what extent did the donor's conditions on its funding compromise your ability to carry out your work?

18.b Please, provide specific examples of good and bad practices (Open answer)

19 The donor's funding to your organisation was…

- (completely adequate) / don't know / not applicable
- (completely inadequate) 0 – 1 – 2
- (not at all) 0 – 1 – 2 – 3 – 4 – 5 – 6
- (not part of its requirements) 0 – 1
- (completely negligible) 0 – 1 – 2 – 3 – 4 – 5 – 6
- (very poor) 0 – 1 – 2
- (not very poor) 0 – 1 – 2
- (not applicable)

19.b What level of flexibility would be desirable? (Open answer)

20 The donor's funding for your programmes in this crisis arrived…

- (completely adequate) / don't know / not applicable
- (completely rigid) 0 – 1 – 2 – 3
- (too late) 0 – 1 – 2 – 3 – 4 – 5 – 6
- (an excessive burden) 0 – 1 – 2
- (completely inadequate) 0 – 1 – 2
- (not very late) 0 – 1 – 2 – 3 – 4 – 5
- (not applicable)

20.b What does 'timely funding' mean? (Open answer)

21 The donor's funding to maintain and strengthen your organisational capacity in areas like preparedness, response and contingency planning, was…

- (completely adequate) / don't know / not applicable
- (completely inadequate) 0 – 1 – 2
- (too late) 0 – 1 – 2 – 3 – 4 – 5 – 6
- (not applicable)

21.b How could donors help your organisation to be better prepared to respond? (Open answer)

22 Regarding the protection of affected populations, the support provided by the donor in this crisis was…

22.b What could donors do to be more proactive in the protection field? (Open answer)

23 For the donor, advocating for the human rights of affected populations and the implementation of the international humanitarian law in this crisis was…

- (not at all) 0 – 1 – 2 – 3 – 4 – 5 – 6 – 7 – 8 – 9 – 10 (completely inadequate) / don't know / not applicable
- (not at all familiar) 1 (not at all familiar) 2 (somewhat familiar) 3 (very familiar)
- (very poor) 0 – 1 – 2 – 3 – 4 – 5 – 6
- (not part of its requirements) 0 – 1
- (completely adequate) 0 – 1 – 2
- (completely adequate) / don't know / not applicable

24 To what extent did the donor request and monitor that your organisation fully apply good practices and quality standards in your programming?

- (completely adequate) 0 – 1 – 2 – 3 – 4 – 5 – 6 – 7 – 8 – 9 – 10 (completely adequate) / don't know / not applicable
- (completely inadequate) 0 – 1 – 2
- (completely adequate) 0 – 1 – 2
- (completely adequate) / don't know / not applicable

25 The donor's contribution to guarantee safe humanitarian access and protection of humanitarian workers in this crisis was…

- (completely inadequate) 0 – 1 – 2 – 3 – 4 – 5 – 6 – 7 – 8 – 9 – 10 (completely adequate) / don't know / not applicable
- (completely adequate) 0 – 1 – 2
- (completely inadequate) 0 – 1 – 2
- (completely adequate) / don't know / not applicable

25.b What did the donor do in order to facilitate the humanitarian access and protection of humanitarian workers? (Open answer)

26 To what extent did the donor support initiatives to improve accountability towards affected populations in this crisis?

- (completely inadequate) 0 – 1 – 2 – 3 – 4 – 5 – 6 – 7 – 8 – 9 – 10 (completely adequate) / don't know / not applicable
- (completely inadequate) 0 – 1 – 2
- (completely inadequate) 0 – 1 – 2
- (completely adequate) / don't know / not applicable

27 The funding and decision-making information provided by the donor for this crisis was…

- (completely inadequate) 0 – 1 – 2 – 3 – 4 – 5 – 6 – 7 – 8 – 9 – 10 (completely inadequate) / don't know / not applicable
- (completely inadequate) 0 – 1 – 2
- (completely inadequate) 0 – 1 – 2
- (completely adequate) / don't know / not applicable

28 For the donor, regular evaluations on the efficiency and effectiveness of your programmes were…

29 The funds provided by the donor to your organisation for monitoring and evaluation were…

- (completely inadequate) 0 – 1 – 2
- (completely adequate) / don't know / not applicable

30 To what extent did the donor work with you to implement organizations from evaluations into your programming?

- (completely inadequate) 0 – 1 – 2 – 3 – 4 – 5 – 6
- (completely adequate) / don't know / not applicable

31 For your organisation, the donor's reporting requirements were…

- (completely adequate) / don't know / not applicable
- (an excessive burden) 0 – 1 – 2
- (not a priority) 0 – 1 – 2 – 3 – 4 – 5 – 6
- (completely appropriate) / don't know / not applicable

32 How would you rate each of your donors in terms of their response to the crisis?

- (very poor) 0 – 1 – 2 – 3 – 4 – 5 – 6
- (not applicable)
- (not very poor) 0 – 1 – 2 – 3 – 4 – 5
- (excellent) / don't know / not applicable

33 Can you give any specific examples of good or poor donor practice in this crisis? (Open answer)

34 Are there cases where you have refused offers of support of funding from a donor? If yes, which donors and why? (Open answer)

35 How would you characterize the response to this crisis? Is there anything that makes this crisis unique or different from other crises? (Open answer)

36 How familiar are you with the Good Humanitarian Donorship Initiative?

- 1 (not at all familiar) 2 (somewhat familiar) 3 (very familiar)

37 How familiar are you with the Humanitarian Response Index?

- 1 (not at all familiar) 2 (somewhat familiar) 3 (very familiar)
Table 1. Qualitative indicators' construction from HRI 2010 questionnaire

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pillar</th>
<th>Question name</th>
<th>Question Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pillar 1</td>
<td>Impartiality of aid</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Independence of aid</td>
<td>4 and 18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Adapting to needs</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Timely funding to partner organisations</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pillar 2</td>
<td>Beneficiary participation in programming</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Beneficiary participation in monitoring and evaluation</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Support for prevention and preparedness</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Linking relief, rehabilitation and development</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pillar 3</td>
<td>Flexible funding</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Support for partners and funding organisational capacity</td>
<td>13 and 21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Donor capacity for informed decision-making</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Support for coordination</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pillar 4</td>
<td>Support for protection of civilians</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Promotion of international humanitarian law</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Facilitating humanitarian access</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Advocacy towards local authorities</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pillar 5</td>
<td>Accountability towards beneficiaries</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Transparency of funding</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Appropriate reporting requirements</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Support for learning and evaluations</td>
<td>24, 28, 29 and 30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Technical annex

Quantitative indicators
Donor assessments
In the following section, an assessment of each of the 23 OECD/DAC donors is provided. Donor scores are based on the 35 quantitative and qualitative indicators that make up the HRI and are grouped into the “five pillars of practice”. The indicators themselves are based on core concepts found in the 23 Principles of the Good Humanitarian Donorship declaration, signed by all of the OECD/DAC members. Data is collected through various means, including a questionnaire of donor practice and extensive secondary sources such as the OECD/DAC, UN, the World Bank and others. Donors receive a score for each of the indicators, which are combined for a global score by pillar.

The assessments contain information regarding each donor’s humanitarian aid programme and the policies that guide them. An additional section contains an overview of aid distribution, supported by a pie chart illustrating the breakdown of each donor’s funding by the type of organisation, and a bar chart showing funding by sector, compared to the sectoral needs in the 2009 UN appeal budget allocation.

This is followed by a summary of the most prominent characteristics of the donor’s performance in 2009. After the donor’s HRI 2010 ranking is provided, each donor is categorised into one of three groups based on the patterns of their performance within the pillars. In Group 1, donors tend to have performed better in Pillar 3 (Working with humanitarian partners), Pillar 4 (Protection and international law), and Pillar 5 (Learning and accountability). Donors in Group 2 tend to perform around average in all pillars, with slightly better scores in Pillar 1 (Responding to needs), and somewhat poorer in Pillar 2 (Prevention, risk reduction and recovery). In Group 3, donors were generally found to perform poorly in Pillar 3 (Working with humanitarian partners), Pillar 4 (Protection and international law) and in Pillar 5 (Learning and accountability). Each donor’s performance by pillar and by indicator is explained. A spider web chart illustrates donor performance by pillar in comparison to its peers. Next, a table demonstrates the indicators where each donor did the best compared to other OECD/DAC donors, as well as the indicators with the greatest room for improvement.

Finally, each donor assessment provides donor-specific recommendations based on the data analysis.
Australia

HRI 2010 ranking: 13th

Policy framework

Australia’s humanitarian aid is managed by the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID), an autonomous agency within the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. AusAID’s 2005 Humanitarian Action Policy increasingly integrates humanitarian action with the broader goals of development, conflict prevention, peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction. A new or updated policy paper is expected before the end of 2010. Its May 2008 policy statement, *Future Directions for Australia’s International Development Assistance Program*, confirms plans to substantially scale up all types of aid. Issued in 2009, *Investing in a Safer Future: A Disaster Risk Reduction policy for the Australian Aid Program* seeks to integrate risk reduction in development programmes and supports implementation of the Hyogo Framework for Action. Humanitarian aid is part of the country’s development budget, which in 2009 was below the OECD/DAC donors’ average with an ODA/GNI ratio of 0.29%. Humanitarian assistance represented 9.78% of Australia’s ODA and 0.027% of its GNI.

Performance

Australia ranked 13th in the HRI 2010. Based on the patterns of its scores, Australia is classified as a Group 2 donor. Donors in this group tend to perform around average in all pillars, with slightly better scores in Pillar 1 (Responding to needs), and poorer in Pillar 2 (Prevention, risk reduction and recovery). Other donors in this group are Canada, European Commission, Germany, Greece (based on quantitative scores only), Ireland, the United Kingdom and United States.

Australia scored close to the OECD/DAC average but below the Group 2 average in Pillar 1. It scored below the OECD/DAC and Group 2 averages both in Pillar 3 (Working with humanitarian partners) where it received its lowest pillar score. On the other hand, it scored close to the OECD/DAC and above its group average in Pillar 4 (Protection and international law), while it scored close to the OECD/DAC and to its group average in Pillars 2 and 5 (Learning and accountability).

Compared to the OECD/DAC average scores, Australia did best compared to its peers in the indicators on *Funding for reconstruction and prevention, Participation in accountability initiatives, Refugee law, Timely funding to complex emergencies and Support for coordination.* It scores were relatively the lowest in the indicators on *Funding for accountability initiatives, Reducing climate-related vulnerability, Un-earmarked funding, Funding based on level of vulnerability and to forgotten crises and Funding to NGOs.*

Aid distribution by type of organisation

*The OECD/DAC average does not include scores for Austria, Greece or Portugal.*

Source: OCHA/FTS October 2010.
**Donor assessments**

**Australia**

Australia’s partners consider it an average donor in terms of flexibility. It was below average, however, in the quantitative indicator Un-earmarked funding. Of Australia’s humanitarian aid, 19% was provided without earmarking, compared to the OECD/DAC average of 35%.

- Australia should engage in dialogue with its partners to discuss their perceptions of its performance in this area.

Australia is highly supportive of UN agencies, but allocated 7 percent of its funding to NGOs, while Group 2 allocated an average of 18% to NGOs.

- Australia should consider finding ways to increase support to NGOs, in particular in those emergencies where it does not have any presence.

For more information, please see www.daraint.org.

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**Strengths**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Donor score</th>
<th>OECD/DAC donor average</th>
<th>% over average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Funding for reconstruction and prevention</td>
<td>7.54</td>
<td>4.12</td>
<td>83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation in accountability initiatives</td>
<td>7.28</td>
<td>4.73</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugee law</td>
<td>7.32</td>
<td>5.74</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timely funding to complex emergencies</td>
<td>5.04</td>
<td>4.35</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for coordination</td>
<td>6.14</td>
<td>5.56</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Areas for improvement**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Donor score</th>
<th>OECD/DAC donor average</th>
<th>% below average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Funding for accountability initiatives</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>2.75</td>
<td>-97%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reducing climate-related vulnerability</td>
<td>3.06</td>
<td>7.19</td>
<td>-57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Un-earmarked funding</td>
<td>1.90</td>
<td>3.45</td>
<td>-45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding based on level of vulnerability and to forgotten crises</td>
<td>3.72</td>
<td>6.11</td>
<td>-39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding to NGOs</td>
<td>3.22</td>
<td>4.40</td>
<td>-27%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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* Distribution of donor funding to these sectors includes flows within and outside an appeal that has been reported to OCHA/FTS. This is compared to the “distribution of needs” based on the 2009 UN appeal budget allocation.

*Source: OCHA/FTS October 2010.*
Austria

Policy framework
Austria’s humanitarian aid is coordinated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Austrian Development Agency (ADA) is the operational arm of the Austrian Development Cooperation (ADC), created by the Federal Ministries Act of 1986 and the Federal Act on Development Cooperation of 2002. The Ministry of the Interior manages emergency response and disaster relief, in consultation with the ADA and ADC. The Armed Forces Disaster Relief Unit in the Ministry is trained for deployment in the case of humanitarian emergencies. Austria does not have a comprehensive humanitarian policy framework, but a Three-Year Programme on Development Policy. ADC’s humanitarian budget is intended mainly for priority and partner countries, but can also be used to respond to humanitarian crises in other places. Its Foreign Disaster Aid Fund allows Austria to respond to humanitarian emergencies for which funding had not been sufficiently budgeted. In 2009, Austria’s ODA decreased substantially in volume and its ratio to GNI went down from 0.43% to 0.30%. Humanitarian aid represents 7.36% of Austria’s ODA and 0.010% of its GNI.

Austria adopted a humanitarian policy in 2007—including disaster risk reduction and response, rehabilitation and recovery—in line with the Principles of Good Humanitarian Donorship, but it does not provide clear guidance how to meet the commitments and policy objectives.

Performance
Austria is not included in the overall ranking, as insufficient survey responses were obtained to calculate the qualitative indicators that make up the index. Based on the patterns of its scores in quantitative indicators, Austria is classified as a Group 3 donor. Donors in this group tend to perform poorly in Pillar 3 (Working with humanitarian partners), Pillar 4 (Protection and international law) and Pillar 5 (Learning and accountability). Other donors in this group are Belgium, France, Italy, Japan, Portugal and Spain.

Austria’s overall scores in the HRI’s quantitative indicators were far below the OECD/DAC and the lowest in Group 3. Like other Group 3 donors, Austria reached its highest score in Pillar 2 (Prevention, risk reduction and recovery) where it was close to the OECD/DAC average, but below the Group 3 average. Its scores in Pillar 1 (Responding to needs), Pillar 3 and Pillar 5 were below both the OECD/DAC and Group 3 averages. Its lowest score was in Pillar 5. In Pillar 4 its scores are close to the Group 3 average but below the OECD/DAC average. It should be noted that the scores for Austria have not been taken into account in the calculation of the overall and average scores for Group 3.

Compared to the OECD/DAC average scores, Austria did best compared to its peers in the indicators on Reducing climate-related vulnerability and Funding based on level of vulnerability and to forgotten crises. It scores were lowest in the indicators on Participation in accountability initiatives, Funding for accountability initiatives, Timely funding to sudden onset disasters, Funding UN and Red Cross Red Crescent appeals and Funding and commissioning evaluations.

HRI 2010 scores by pillar

Aid distribution by type of organisation

*Graph includes only quantitative pillar scores as sufficient survey responses were not obtained for Austria.

Source: OCHA/FTS October 2010.
Austria's humanitarian response is currently rather fragmented among a large number of departments.

- **Austria should consider establishing a single humanitarian entity in Vienna and a degree of delegated authority to field representations on the basis of clearly-defined strategic guidance.**

Timely funding in response both to complex emergencies and sudden onset disasters is one of Austria's weaknesses. In response to complex emergencies, Austria provided 21% of its funding during the first quarter of the year compared to the OECD/DAC average of 34% and the Group 3 average of 40%. In response to sudden onset disasters, Austria provided 8% of its funding within six weeks, while the OECD/DAC average is 70% and Group 3 average 47%.

- **Austria should consider looking into ways to increase funding for the Foreign Disaster Relief Fund or other budget lines for emergency response. This would allow for more predictable core funding to multilateral partners and a more timely response to sudden onset disasters and complex emergencies.**

In Pillar 3, Austria was below average in Funding UN and Red Cross Red Crescent appeals. Austria channeled only 14% of its fair share to the UN, compared to the OECD/DAC average of 135% and the Group 3 average of 42%. With regard to funding to the Red Cross/Red Crescent, Austria provided 18% of its fair share, compared to the OECD/DAC average of 128% and the Group 3 average of 22%.

- **Austria should consider finding ways to increase its support of UN and Red Cross Red Crescent appeals.**

Austria scored below average in the indicator for Funding for reconstruction and prevention, a marked contrast to the other members of its group. Its share of bilateral humanitarian aid devoted to reconstruction and prevention was 12%, compared to the Group 3 average of 25%. Austria fell just below the OECD/DAC average of 17%.

- **Austria should consider increasing its support for reconstruction and prevention.**

For more information, please see www.daraint.org.

### Strengths

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Donor score</th>
<th>OECD/DAC donor average</th>
<th>% over average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reducing climate-related vulnerability</td>
<td>8.29</td>
<td>7.19</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding based on level of vulnerability and to forgotten crises</td>
<td>6.52</td>
<td>6.11</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Areas for improvement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Donor score</th>
<th>OECD/DAC donor average</th>
<th>% below average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Participation in accountability initiatives</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>4.73</td>
<td>-100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding for accountability initiatives</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>2.75</td>
<td>-100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timely funding to sudden onset disasters</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>6.97</td>
<td>-89%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding UN and Red Cross Red Crescent appeals</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>5.05</td>
<td>-88%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding and commissioning evaluations</td>
<td>2.49</td>
<td>4.25</td>
<td>-41%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Belgium
HRI 2010 ranking: 18th

Policy framework
Belgium's humanitarian aid is managed by the Directorate-General for Development Cooperation (DGDC) and distributed among multiple DGDC directorates within the Department of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade, and Development Cooperation. Its 2006 Strategic Plan for Humanitarian Aid is the main policy framework to guide its humanitarian funding. It designates the Great Lakes region as a priority. Belgium has continued to face critical challenges in responding in a timely manner to sudden onset emergencies due to the constraints imposed by a 1996 Royal Decree. This regulation requires all humanitarian funding to be subject to an extensive approval process, to be project-based and generally of limited duration. These restrictions were partially overcome by the creation of the Belgian First Aid and Support Team (B-FAST), a rapid response structure aimed at sending emergency aid teams to crisis-affected countries. Belgium has more than doubled its development and humanitarian aid budget since 2004 with an additional increase of its ODA in 2009. Its ODA/GNI ratio also increased from 0.48% in 2008 to 0.55% in 2009, and Belgium intends to reach the UN target of 0.7% by the end of 2010. In 2009 humanitarian assistance represented 8.83% of its ODA and 0.031% of its GNI.

Belgium has endorsed the Principles of Good Humanitarian Donorship and incorporated them in its 2006 Strategic Plan for Humanitarian Aid. It has not yet developed a domestic implementation plan.

HRI 2010 scores by pillar

Performance
Belgium ranked 18th in the HRI 2010. Based on the patterns of its scores, Belgium is classified as a Group 3 donor. Donors in this group tend to perform poorly in Pillar 3 (Working with humanitarian partners), Pillar 4 (Protection and international law) and Pillar 5 (Learning and accountability). Other donors in this group are Austria, France, Italy, Japan, Portugal and Spain.

Belgium’s overall score was below the OECD/DAC and the peer group’s average. In line with the overall Group 3 pattern, its score in Pillar 2 (Prevention, risk reduction and recovery) was both above the OECD/DAC average and the highest of all donors. It also scored above the Group 3 average, but below the OECD/DAC average, in Pillar 3 and above the Group and close to the OECD/DAC average in Pillar 4. Its lowest score was in Pillar 5 (Learning and accountability), which was close to the Group 3 and below the OECD/DAC average.

Belgium did best compared to its peers in the indicators on Funding for reconstruction and prevention, Funding for accountability initiatives, Funding UN and Red Cross Red Crescent appeals, Funding based on level of vulnerability and to forgotten crises and Linking relief, rehabilitation and development. It scores were relatively the lowest in the indicators on Timely funding to complex emergencies, Funding and commissioning evaluations, Timely funding to sudden onset disasters, Participation in accountability initiatives and Funding to NGOs.

Aid distribution by type of organisation

* The OECD/DAC average does not include scores for Austria, Greece or Portugal.

Source: OCHA/FTS October 2010.
**Recommendations**

Pillar 1 is an area where Belgium’s performance is weaker compared to its peers. In particular, Belgium scores below average in the indicators related to timeliness. Belgium received the lowest score of OECD/DAC donors in *Timely funding to complex emergencies*. It provided 4% of its funding within the first three months after the launch of an appeal, while Group 3 averaged 40% and OECD/DAC donors 34%. It was also below average in *Timely funding to sudden onset disasters*, providing 15% of its funding within the first six weeks, while the Group 3 average was 47% and the OECD/DAC average was 70%. The qualitative indicator supports this, as Belgium’s partners ranked it below average in *Timely funding to partner organisations*.

- Belgium should review the timeliness of its funding and engage in dialogue with its partners to discuss their perceptions of its performance in this area.

Also within Pillar 1, Belgium’s partners consider it to be below average in terms of the impartiality of its aid.

- Belgium should engage in a dialogue with partners to discuss their perceptions of how it is performing in the area of aid impartiality.

Belgium scored below average in *Funding and commissioning evaluations*, the indicator which measures the number of evaluations and the existence of evaluation guidelines. Belgium does not have evaluation guidelines and has commissioned only one evaluation.

- Belgium should consider developing evaluation guidelines and commissioning more evaluations to promote learning.

For a more detailed analysis, please see www.daraint.org.
Canada

HRI 2010 ranking: 12th

Policy framework

Canada's humanitarian aid is managed by the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), within the Ministry of International Cooperation. The Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) is responsible for developing its humanitarian aid policy, and the International Humanitarian Assistance Directorate (IHA) for managing Canada's response to international humanitarian crises. The 2008 Development Assistance Accountability Act requires all humanitarian aid to prioritise poverty relief, international humanitarian law and beneficiary engagement. It also requires aid in crisis situations to be distributed rapidly, efficiently and transparently. It is Canada's policy to reduce earmarking at the country level, support pooled funding mechanisms, such as the CERF and in-country pooled funds, and provide funding in proportion to the size of appeals. Canada also stresses the importance of evaluating its response to major crises. In 2009, Canada's development cooperation budget dropped by about 18%, resulting in a lower ODA/GNI ratio of 0.30% compared to 0.33% in 2008. Humanitarian assistance represented 12.01% of Canada's ODA and 0.031% of its GNI.

Canada continues to play a central role in the Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) group and adheres to its GHD domestic implementation plan, adopted in 2005 and revised in 2006.

Performance

Canada ranked 12th in the HRI 2010. Based on the patterns of its scores, Canada is classified as a Group 2 donor. Donors in this group tend to perform around average in all pillars, with slightly better scores in Pillar 1 (Responding to needs), and somewhat poorer in Pillar 2 (Prevention, risk reduction and recovery). Other donors in the group include Australia, the European Commission, Germany, Greece, (based on quantitative scores only) Ireland, the United Kingdom and the United States.

Overall, Canada's performance is close to the OECD/DAC averages in all pillars. It also scored close to the Group 2 average in all pillars, with the exception of Pillar 5 (Learning and accountability) where it scored below average. Canada followed the pattern of other Group 2 donors in Pillar 1, receiving its highest pillar score here with marks close to the OECD/DAC and Group 2 averages. It departed from other Group 2 donors in that it received its lowest pillar score in Pillar 5, where Group 2 donors tend to perform well.

Canada did best compared to its OECD/DAC peers in the indicators on Funding of risk mitigation mechanisms, Timely funding to sudden onset disasters, Funding UN and Red Cross Red Crescent appeals, Participation in accountability initiatives and Funding based on level of vulnerability and to forgotten crises. It scores were lowest in indicators on Funding for accountability initiatives, Un-earmarked funding, Timely funding to complex emergencies, Reducing climate-related vulnerability and Funding for reconstruction and prevention.

Aid distribution by type of organisation

* The OECD/DAC average does not include scores for Austria, Greece or Portugal.

Source: OCHA/FTS October 2010.
Donor assessments

Canada's partners in the field consider it an average donor in terms of flexibility. However, it receives a very low score for the quantitative indicator Un-earmarked funding. Of all Canada's humanitarian aid, only 15% was not earmarked. The OECD/DAC average for un-earmarked funding is 35%.

Canada should review the flexibility and consider reducing the earmarking of its funding.

Canada is above the OECD/DAC average in its participation in accountability initiatives. It received its lowest score of the index, however, for its funding of them as Canada allocated only 0.09% of its humanitarian aid to support them. The OECD/DAC average, in contrast, was 0.46% and the Group 2 average, 0.36%. Group1, which performs the best in this indicator, allocated an average of 0.71%.

Canada should consider finding ways of increasing its support for accountability initiatives.

For more information, please see www.daraint.org.

Recommendations

Of all pillars, Canada performed best in Pillar 1. However, it also received one of its lowest scores in Pillar 1, for the quantitative indicator Timely funding to complex emergencies. Canada provided 14% of its humanitarian funding in the first three months following the launch of the appeal, while the OECD/DAC average was 34% and the Group 2 average, 41%. Canada, does, however do exceptionally well in the timeliness of its funding to sudden onset disasters. Together, with Greece and Japan, Canada is one of the best donors in this indicator.

- Canada should review the timeliness of its funding to complex emergencies.

Canada is an average donor in Pillar 2, yet was below average in Funding for reconstruction and prevention. Canada allocated 14% of its humanitarian aid to this area, slightly below the Group 2 average of 15%. The best performing group in this area, Group 3, allocated an average of 25%.

- Canada should look for ways to increase its support of reconstruction and prevention.

Strengths

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Donor score</th>
<th>OECD/DAC donor average</th>
<th>% over average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Funding of risk mitigation mechanisms</td>
<td>8.52</td>
<td>5.49</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timely funding to sudden onset disasters</td>
<td>10.00</td>
<td>6.97</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding UN and Red Cross Red Crescent appeals</td>
<td>6.92</td>
<td>5.05</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation in accountability initiatives</td>
<td>6.33</td>
<td>4.73</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding based on level of vulnerability and to forgotten crises</td>
<td>7.24</td>
<td>6.11</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Areas for improvement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Donor score</th>
<th>OECD/DAC donor average</th>
<th>% below average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Funding for accountability initiatives</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>2.75</td>
<td>-76%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Un-earmarked funding</td>
<td>1.52</td>
<td>3.45</td>
<td>-56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timely funding to complex emergencies</td>
<td>1.91</td>
<td>4.35</td>
<td>-56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reducing climate-related vulnerability</td>
<td>3.63</td>
<td>7.19</td>
<td>-50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding for reconstruction and prevention</td>
<td>3.52</td>
<td>4.12</td>
<td>-15%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Distribution of donor funding to these sectors includes flows within and outside an appeal that has been reported to OCHA/FTS. This is compared to the “distribution of needs” based on the 2009 UN appeal budget allocation.

Source: OCHA/FTS October 2010.
Denmark

HRI 2010 ranking: 1st

Policy framework

Denmark’s humanitarian aid is managed by the Danish International Development Agency (Danida) and the Department of Humanitarian Assistance and NGO Co-operation, which both fall under the umbrella of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Danish foreign policy highly prioritises humanitarian assistance. Its 2002 Strategic Priorities for Humanitarian Assistance demonstrates strong commitment to the Principles of Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD). In June 2010, Denmark adopted a new development strategy Freedom from Poverty - Freedom to Change, also calling for greater integration between humanitarian relief and development activities. While policy is set in Copenhagen, regional and country offices are increasingly involved in monitoring project implementation. Through the Humanitarian Contact Group, Denmark includes representatives of Danish ministries and NGOs in the planning of humanitarian assistance and discussions of thematic and crisis-specific issues. Denmark prioritises responding to the needs of the most vulnerable people in the first and most acute phase of new crises. Gender, vulnerability and climate change are the main themes of Denmark’s 2009 and 2010 strategy papers. Denmark allocated 0.88% of its 2009 GNI to ODA, making it one of the most generous OECD/DAC donors. Humanitarian assistance comprised 9.67% of its ODA and 0.06% of its GNI.

Denmark has a GHD domestic implementation plan and actively promotes the GHD at field level, particularly with regard to donor coordination and harmonisation of reporting requirements for humanitarian agencies.

Performance

Denmark ranked 1st in the HRI 2010. Based on the pattern of its scores, Denmark is classified as a Group 1 donor. Donors in this group tend to do better overall in Pillar 3 (Working with humanitarian partners), Pillar 4 (Protection and international law) and Pillar 5 (Learning and accountability). Other donors in this group include Finland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Sweden and Switzerland.

Denmark scored above the OECD/DAC average in all pillars. Denmark also scored above the Group 1 average in all pillars with the exception of Pillar 4, where it was close to its group average. Denmark received its highest score in Pillar 5 and its lowest in Pillar 2 (Prevention, risk reduction and recovery).

Denmark did best compared to its OECD/DAC peers in the indicators on Funding for accountability initiatives, Funding to NGOs, Participation in accountability initiatives, Funding and commissioning evaluations and Funding UN and Red Cross Red Crescent appeals. It scores were lowest in the indicators Funding for reconstruction and prevention, Funding based on level of vulnerability and to forgotten crises, Facilitating humanitarian access, Donor capacity for informed decision-making and Linking relief, rehabilitation and development.

Aid distribution by type of organisation

* The OECD/DAC average does not include scores for Austria, Greece or Portugal.

Source: OCHA/FTS October 2010.
Denmark should review its policy for responding to emergencies and take forgotten emergencies into special consideration.

Denmark allocated 13% of its humanitarian aid to reconstruction and prevention. This is an area in which Group 1 donors do not do as well, allocating an average of 11%. The best performing group, Group 3, spent an average of 25%.

Denmark should look for ways to increase its support for reconstruction and prevention.

For more information, please see www.daraint.org.

Denmark is one of the best donors in Pillar 3 and is the best donor in Pillar 5. It also performs well in timeliness. However, it has room for improvement in Pillar 4, particularly in the qualitative indicators on Promotion of international humanitarian law, Facilitating humanitarian access and Advocacy towards local authorities.

Denmark should engage in dialogue with its partners to discuss their perceptions regarding its performance in promotion of international humanitarian law, facilitating humanitarian access and advocacy towards local authorities.

Denmark provides 61% of its funding to crises with high levels of vulnerability, above both the OECD/DAC and Group 1 averages. However, of all OECD/DAC donors, Denmark allocated the smallest proportion of its funding to forgotten emergencies: 11%. The OECD/DAC, in comparison, allocated an average of 27% and Group 1, an average of 30%.

### Strengths

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Donor score</th>
<th>OECD/DAC donor average</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Funding for accountability initiatives</td>
<td>10.00</td>
<td>2.75</td>
<td>264%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding to NGOs</td>
<td>9.75</td>
<td>4.40</td>
<td>121%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation in accountability initiatives</td>
<td>8.56</td>
<td>4.73</td>
<td>81%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding and commissioning evaluations</td>
<td>6.79</td>
<td>4.25</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding UN and Red Cross Red Crescent appeals</td>
<td>7.99</td>
<td>5.05</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Areas for improvement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Donor score</th>
<th>OECD/DAC donor average</th>
<th>% below average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Funding for reconstruction and prevention</td>
<td>3.19</td>
<td>4.12</td>
<td>-23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding based on level of vulnerability and to forgotten crises</td>
<td>5.10</td>
<td>6.11</td>
<td>-16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilitating humanitarian access</td>
<td>4.76</td>
<td>5.22</td>
<td>-9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donor capacity for informed decision-making</td>
<td>5.96</td>
<td>6.33</td>
<td>-6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linking relief, rehabilitation and development</td>
<td>5.97</td>
<td>6.32</td>
<td>-6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Distribution of donor funding to these sectors includes flows within and outside an appeal that has been reported to OCHA/FTS. This is compared to the “distribution of needs” based on the 2009 UN appeal budget allocation.

Source: OCHA/FTS October 2010.
European Commission  

HRI 2010 ranking: 6th

Policy framework

The European Commission’s (EC) humanitarian aid is managed by the Directorate-General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (DG ECHO). ECHO is supported by contributions from 27 EU member states. It is complementary to the individual countries’ contributions. Humanitarian aid provided by ECHO accounts for about half of all humanitarian aid provided by EU members. DG ECHO operates under a mandate laid out in European Council Regulation No. 1257/96, through EC Budget Title 23. Additional humanitarian funding comes both from the budget line for emergency aid to African–Caribbean–Pacific countries within the European Development Fund and from an Emergency Aid Reserve, which allows funds to be rapidly allocated to unanticipated crises. DG ECHO has developed a Vulnerability Assessment Methodology (GNA) and Forgotten Crisis Assessment as a tool to allocate its funding, which are also used to form one of the HRI indicators under Pillar 1 (Responding to humanitarian needs). DG ECHO maintains six regional and 37 country offices.

Donor performance

The EC ranked 6th in the HRI 2010. However, based on the patterns of its scores, the EC is classified as a Group 2 donor. Donors in this group tend to perform around average in all pillars, with slightly better scores in Pillar 1 (Responding to needs), and somewhat poorer in Pillar 2 (Prevention, risk reduction and recovery). Other donors in the group include Australia, Canada, Germany, Greece (based on quantitative scores only), Ireland, the UK and the US.

Like other Group 2 donors, the EC received its highest average scores in Pillars 1 and 5. In Pillar 1, the EC scored above the OECD/DAC average and close to the Group 2 average. In Pillar 2, it scored close to the OECD/DAC average, and above its group average. The EC received its lowest average score in Pillar 3 (Working with humanitarian partners), yet was close to the OECD/DAC and Group 2 averages. Similarly, it was also close to the OECD/DAC and Group 2 averages in Pillar 4 (Protection and international law). In Pillar 5 (Learning and accountability), the EC scored above the OECD/DAC and Group 2 averages.

The EC did best compared to its OECD/DAC peers in the indicators on Participation in accountability initiatives, Funding for reconstruction and prevention, Timely funding to complex emergencies, Funding to NGOs and Funding for accountability initiatives. Its scores were relatively the lowest in the indicators on Funding UN and Red Cross Red Crescent appeals, Un-carmarked funding, Funding of risk mitigation mechanisms, Flexible funding and Appropriate reporting requirements.

Aid distribution by type of organisation

* The Pillar 4 score for the EC only includes qualitative indicators scores. The OECD/DAC average does not include scores for Austria, Greece or Portugal.

Source: OCHA/FTS October 2010.
Donor assessments

European Commission

Flexibility comes out as a weakness in the EC’s funding. The EC is the second-to-last donor for un-earmarked funding, at 3%. The OECD DAC average is 35%. The EC is perceived by its partners as the donor with the least flexibility. The EC is perceived by its partners as one of the donors with the least appropriate reporting requirements.

The EC should review the degree of flexibility of its funding and engage in dialogue with its partners to discuss their perceptions of its performance in this area.

For more information, please see www.daraint.org.

Recommendations:

The EC scored above average in the qualitative indicator Prevention and preparedness. However, the EC was below average in the quantitative indicator Funding for risk mitigation mechanisms. Most donors in Group 1, which performs the best in this aspect, allocated between 1.1% and 1.9% of their ODA to the various risk mitigation mechanisms included in the indicator. The EC has its own risk reduction mechanism, DIPECHO, yet allocated only 0.68% to these mechanisms.

- The EC should consider finding ways to increase its support for risk mitigation mechanisms.

Strengths

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Donor score</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Participation in accountability initiatives</td>
<td>10.00</td>
<td>4.73</td>
<td>111%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding for reconstruction and prevention</td>
<td>7.79</td>
<td>4.12</td>
<td>89%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timely funding to complex emergencies</td>
<td>7.60</td>
<td>4.35</td>
<td>75%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Funding to NGOs</td>
<td>7.27</td>
<td>4.40</td>
<td>66%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Funding for accountability initiatives</td>
<td>4.52</td>
<td>2.75</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Areas for improvement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Donor score</th>
<th>OECD/DAC donor average</th>
<th>% below average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Funding UN and Red Cross Red Crescent appeals</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>5.05</td>
<td>-100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Un-earmarked funding</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>3.45</td>
<td>-90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding of risk mitigation mechanisms</td>
<td>3.52</td>
<td>5.49</td>
<td>-36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flexible funding</td>
<td>5.65</td>
<td>6.91</td>
<td>-18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appropriate reporting requirements</td>
<td>6.53</td>
<td>7.48</td>
<td>-13%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Distribution of donor funding to these sectors includes flows within and outside an appeal that has been reported to OCHA/FTS. This is compared to the “distribution of needs” based on the 2009 UN appeal budget allocation.

Source: OCHA/FTS October 2010.

Sectoral distribution of funding to UN appeals, 2009 (%)

* Distribution of donor funding to these sectors includes flows within and outside an appeal that has been reported to OCHA/FTS. This is compared to the “distribution of needs” based on the 2009 UN appeal budget allocation.

Source: OCHA/FTS October 2010.
Finland
HRI 2010 ranking: 11th

**Policy framework**
Finland’s humanitarian assistance is managed by the Unit for Humanitarian Assistance within the Ministry for Foreign Affairs–Department for Development Policy. Finland’s main policy framework, the 2007 Humanitarian Assistance Guidelines, prioritises the most vulnerable communities in least developed countries. Humanitarian assistance falls within its development budget and is allocated by the Minister for Development Cooperation. Finland relies on its humanitarian assistance monitoring and evaluation (M&E) mechanisms to improve aid effectiveness and implement the Principles of Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD). It promotes close coordination between humanitarian and development aid initiatives and the flexible use of funds to improve the transition between relief, rehabilitation and development. Finland allocates 70% of its funding early in the year, allocating remaining funds in the final quarter to respond to humanitarian needs assessed by Finland’s field representatives or humanitarian agencies in the respective countries of crisis. Finland also retains a small reserve to respond to sudden onset emergencies. In 2009, Finland spent 0.54% of its GNI on ODA, a substantial increase from 2008. Humanitarian assistance represented 17.41% of Finland’s ODA and 0.061% of its GNI. With a relatively limited capacity both at the headquarters and country levels, Finland supports and relies on UN and EU coordination mechanisms.

**Performance**
Finland ranked 11th in the HRI 2010. Based on the pattern of its scores, Finland is classified as a Group 1 donor. Donors in this group tend to do better overall in Pillar 3 (Working with humanitarian partners), Pillar 4 (Protection and international law) and Pillar 5 (Learning and accountability). Other donors in this group include Denmark, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland.

Similar to other Group 1 donors, Finland received its highest pillar scores in Pillars 3 and 4. In Pillar 3, it scored above the OECD/DAC average and close to the Group 1 average. In Pillar 4, it was close to the OECD/DAC average, but below its group average. In contrast to other Group 1 donors, Finland received its lowest score in Pillar 5, below the OECD/DAC and Group 1 averages. It also scored below the OECD/DAC and Group 1 averages in Pillar 1 (Responding to needs). In Pillar 2 (Prevention, risk reduction and recovery), Finland was close to the OECD/DAC and Group 1 averages.

Finland did best compared to its OECD/DAC peers in the indicators on Funding UN and Red Cross Red Crescent appeals, Funding of risk mitigation mechanisms, Refugee law, Funding and commissioning evaluations and Un-earmarked funding. Its scores were relatively the lowest in the indicators Funding for accountability initiatives, Timely funding to complex emergencies, Participation in accountability initiatives, Transparency of funding and Funding to NGOs.

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*The OECD/DAC average does not include scores for Austria, Greece or Portugal.

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Source: OCHA/FTS October 2010.
Donor assessments

Finland

Finland should review its participation in and funding of accountability initiatives.

Finland was close to, or above, the OECD/DAC average in all qualitative indicators in Pillar 5, with the exception of Transparency of funding.

Finland should engage in dialogue with its partners to discuss their negative perceptions regarding the transparency of Finland’s aid.

For more information, please see www.daraint.org.

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**Recommendations:**

Finland’s lowest scores are concentrated in the quantitative indicators of Pillar 1 and Pillar 5. In Pillar 1, timeliness seems to be an area in which Finland could improve. Finland’s partners consider it an average donor in terms of the timeliness of its funding. However, the quantitative indicators on timeliness place it well below average. Finland provided only 16% of its funding in the first three months following the launch of an appeal, placing Finland among the five-slowest donors. For sudden-onset disasters, Finland provided 55% of its funding within six weeks, while the OECD/DAC average is 70%.

- Finland should review the timeliness of its funding.

In Pillar 5, Finland’s participation in and funding of accountability initiatives are among its lowest scores. Finland does not participate in most humanitarian accountability initiatives. It did provide 0.07% of its humanitarian aid to finance them, but came in below the OECD/DAC average of 0.47%.

- Finland should review its participation in and funding of accountability initiatives.

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### Sectoral distribution of funding to UN appeals, 2009 (%)

* Distribution of donor funding to these sectors includes flows within and outside an appeal that has been reported to OCHA/FTS. This is compared to the “distribution of needs” based on the 2009 UN appeal budget allocation.

*Source: OCHA/FTS October 2010.*

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### Strengths

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Donor score</th>
<th>OECD/DAC donor average</th>
<th>% over average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Funding UN and Red Cross Red Crescent appeals</td>
<td>8.62</td>
<td>5.05</td>
<td>71%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding of risk mitigation mechanisms</td>
<td>8.67</td>
<td>5.49</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugee law</td>
<td>8.53</td>
<td>5.74</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
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<td>Funding and commissioning evaluations</td>
<td>5.96</td>
<td>4.25</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Un-earmarked funding</td>
<td>4.05</td>
<td>3.45</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Areas for improvement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Donor score</th>
<th>OECD/DAC donor average</th>
<th>% below average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Funding for accountability initiatives</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>2.75</td>
<td>-82%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timely funding to complex emergencies</td>
<td>2.19</td>
<td>4.35</td>
<td>-50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation in accountability initiatives</td>
<td>3.33</td>
<td>4.73</td>
<td>-30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transparency of funding</td>
<td>4.71</td>
<td>6.24</td>
<td>-25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding to NGOs</td>
<td>3.34</td>
<td>4.40</td>
<td>-24%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
France
HRI 2010 ranking: 15th

**Policy framework**

France’s humanitarian action is overseen by the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs through three separate agencies. The Crisis Centre (CDC) assesses the need for and organises the initial response and follow-up to sudden onset emergencies, having access to the Humanitarian Emergency Fund. It also channels funds to French NGOs and for government-implemented interventions. The United Nations and International Organisations Department (UNIO) provides funds to UN agencies as well as to the ICRC and IFRC. The Development Policy Department (DPDEV) coordinates contributions for food aid. France has recently adjusted the target date for reaching the UN target of providing 0.7% of its GNI in ODA from 2012 to 2015. Despite major budgetary challenges, its ODA/GNI ratio has improved from 0.39% in 2008 to 0.46% in 2009 with a 14% increase in absolute terms. However, humanitarian assistance represented only 0.84% of its ODA and 0.002% of its GNI.

France endorses the Principles of Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD). It is preparing a GHD domestic implementation plan, but lacks an overall policy framework to guide the humanitarian action of the various components of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other government departments.

**Performance**

France ranked 15th in the HRI 2010. Based on the patterns of its scores, France is classified as a Group 3 donor. Donors in this group tend to perform poorly in Pillar 3 (Working with humanitarian partners), Pillar 4 (Protection and international law), and Pillar 5 (Learning and accountability). Other donors in this group are Austria, Belgium, Italy, Japan, Portugal and Spain.

France scored above the Group 3 average in Pillar 1 (Responding to needs) and close to the OECD/DAC average. It scored lower than both averages in Pillar 2 (Prevention, risk reduction and recovery). Its score in Pillar 3 was above the Group 3 average, but below the OECD/DAC average. In Pillar 4, France scored close to its group average but below the OECD/DAC average, while in Pillar 5, it scored close to the OECD/DAC average and had the highest score of the group.

France did best compared to its OECD/DAC peers in the indicators on Funding and commissioning evaluations, Timely funding to complex emergencies, Funding to NGOs, Un-earmarked funding and Reducing climate-related vulnerability. Its scores were relatively the lowest in indicators on Funding UN and Red Cross Red Crescent appeals, Participation in accountability initiatives, Funding for accountability initiatives, Funding for reconstruction and prevention and Support for coordination.

**Recommendations:**

France scored above average in the quantitative indicators on timeliness and was close to average in Funding based on level of vulnerability and to forgotten crises. France’s partners scored it below average in the qualitative indicators Impartiality of aid and Adapting to needs.

- France should engage in dialogue with partners to discuss their perceptions about the impartiality of its humanitarian assistance.

**Aid distribution by type of organisation**

Source: OCHA/FTS October 2010.

* The OECD/DAC average does not include scores for Austria, Greece or Portugal.
France scored below average in most of the indicators that constitute Pillar 2. France received its lowest score in this pillar in Funding for reconstruction and prevention. This represented only 11% of its aid, compared to the Group 3 average of 25% and the OECD/DAC average of 17%.

- France should consider finding ways of increasing its support for reconstruction and prevention.

Also within Pillar 2, France scored below average in the qualitative indicators on Beneficiary participation in programming and Beneficiary participation in monitoring and evaluation.

- France should engage in dialogue with partners to discuss their perceptions of its performance in the area of supporting beneficiary participation.

In Pillar 3, France received high marks for its support to NGOs. It was below average, however, in Funding UN and Red Cross Red Crescent appeals. France provided 11% of its fair share to UN appeals, compared to the OECD/DAC average of 135% and Group 3 average of 42%. It provided 14% of its fair share to Red Cross/Red Crescent appeals, compared to the OECD/DAC average of 128% of fair share and the Group 3 average of 22%.

- France should consider exploring options to increase its support to UN and Red Cross Red Crescent appeals.

France received the lowest score of OECD/DAC donors in the qualitative indicator: Support for coordination. It received the second-lowest score in Donor capacity for informed decision-making.

- France is encouraged to engage with partners to discuss their perceptions regarding its support for coordination and its capacity for informed decision-making.

In Pillar 5, France received the highest score of all OECD/DAC donors in Funding and commissioning evaluations. It was below average, however, in Funding for accountability initiatives and Participation in accountability initiatives. France allocated 0.22% of its humanitarian aid to accountability initiatives, compared to the OECD/DAC average of 0.47% and Group 3 average of 0.29%. France currently only participates in or supports two (ALNAP and Quality COMPAS) of the seven accountability initiatives included in the Participation in accountability initiatives indicator.

- France should consider finding ways of increasing its funding support of, and participation in, accountability initiatives.

For more information, please see www.daraint.org.
Germany
HRI 2010 ranking: 14th

**Policy framework**

Germany's humanitarian assistance falls under the overall responsibility of the Federal Foreign Office. The Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) handles food aid and transitional assistance. Within the Federal Foreign Office the Federal Commissioner for Human Rights and Humanitarian Aid is the focal point for coordination of humanitarian aid. Germany does not have a formal and comprehensive humanitarian policy, but *Twelve Basic Rules of Humanitarian Aid Abroad* were set out in 1993 by the Humanitarian Aid Coordinating Committee – the platform for inter-ministerial coordination of humanitarian aid. Germany recently established a crisis response centre to speed up response to sudden onset crises. Germany’s humanitarian aid prioritises rapid response to the needs of refugees and internally displaced persons and aims to allocate between 5% to 10% of its annual aid budget to disaster risk reduction. Despite the overall size of its development budget, Germany’s ODA/GNI ratio is relatively low and decreased by 3% in 2009 to 0.35%, bringing it only halfway to the UN target of 0.7%. Humanitarian assistance represented 4.44% of its ODA and 0.010% of its GNI.

Germany was active in the creation of the *European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid* during its EU Presidency in 2007 and subscribes to the *Principles of Good Humanitarian Donorship* (GHD). However, it has not developed a GHD domestic implementation plan nor indicated an intention to do so.

**Performance**

Germany ranked 14th in the HRI 2010. Based on the patterns of its scores, Germany is classified as a Group 2 donor. Donors in this group tend to perform around average in all pillars, with slightly better scores in Pillar 1 (Responding to needs), and somewhat poorer in Pillar 2 (Prevention, risk reduction and recovery). Other donors in this group are Australia, Canada, European Commission, Greece (based on quantitative scores only), Ireland, the United Kingdom and the United States.

Germany scored overall close to the OECD/DAC and Group 2 average marks. Its average score in Pillar 1 exactly matched the OECD/DAC average and was close to the Group 2 average. Its overall score in Pillar 2 was close to the OECD/DAC and above the Group 2 average. However, it scored below the OECD/DAC and Group 2 average in Pillar 3 (Working with humanitarian partners) and in Pillar 5 (Learning and accountability). Its score in Pillar 4 (Protection and international law) was close to the group’s but below the OECD/DAC average.

Germany did best compared to its OECD/DAC peers in the indicators on *Funding to NGOs*, *Funding for accountability initiatives*, *Timely funding to sudden onset disasters*, *Accountability towards beneficiaries* and *Impartiality of aid*. Its scores were lowest in indicators on *Un-earmarked funding*, *Funding UN and Red Cross Red Crescent appeals*, *Funding and commissioning evaluations*, *Timely funding to complex emergencies* and *Facilitating humanitarian access*.

**Recommendations**

Germany’s rapid response instruments have proven to be effective for sudden onset disasters. It is important to achieve the same capacity for timely funding for complex emergencies, aiming at the transfer of funds within the first three months following the launch of an appeal. Germany provided 16% of its funding within this time period, compared to the OECD/DAC average of 33% and Group 2 average of 41%.

**Aid distribution by type of organisation**

*The OECD/DAC average does not include scores for Austria, Greece or Portugal.*

*Source: OCHA/FTS October 2010.*
Germany is encouraged to include response to complex emergencies in its rapid response instruments. Lack of flexibility is a weak point in Germany’s funding. Germany’s partners perceive it to be below average in the qualitative indicator Flexible funding. It also scored below average in the quantitative indicator Un-earmarked funding. Germany provided 10% of its funding without earmarking, while the OECD/DAC average is 35%.

Germany should consider decreasing the degree of earmarking of its contributions and supporting country-based pooled funding mechanisms. It should also engage in a dialogue with its partners to discuss their perceptions regarding the flexibility of Germany’s funding.

Also within Pillar 3, Germany scored below average on the indicator Funding UN and Red Cross Red Crescent appeals. Germany provided 36% of its fair share to UN appeals compared to the OECD/DAC average of 135% and the Group 2 average of 117%. Germany provided 20% of its fair share to Red Cross Red Crescent appeals, compared to the OECD/DAC average of 128% and Group 2 average of 61%.

Germany should consider finding ways to increase its support to UN and Red Cross Red Crescent appeals. In Pillar 4, Germany’s partners consider it below average when it comes to promoting international humanitarian law. Although Germany should be praised for signing and ratifying all international humanitarian treaties, its funding of the ICRC, as a guardian of international humanitarian law, was particularly low with only 0.001% of every billion dollars of its GDP compared to the OECD/DAC average of 0.005%.

Germany should look into ways to increase its support to the ICRC and promotion of IHL.

In Pillar 5, Germany’s partners consider it an average donor in regard to Support for learning and evaluations. It received one of its lowest scores, however, in Funding and commissioning evaluations, which measures the number of evaluations and the existence of evaluation guidelines. Germany participated in four joint evaluations and one individual evaluation, but does not have evaluation guidelines.

Germany should consider developing evaluation guidelines and increasing the use of evaluations.

For more information, please see www.daraint.org.

### Sectoral distribution of funding to UN appeals, 2009 (%)

* Distribution of donor funding to these sectors includes flows within and outside an appeal that has been reported to OCHA/FTS. This is compared to the “distribution of needs” based on the 2009 UN appeal budget allocation. Source: OCHA/FTS October 2010.

#### Strengths

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Donor score</th>
<th>OECD/DAC donor average</th>
<th>% over average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Funding to NGOs</td>
<td>8.13</td>
<td>4.40</td>
<td>85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding for accountability initiatives</td>
<td>4.17</td>
<td>2.75</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timely funding to sudden onset disasters</td>
<td>8.48</td>
<td>6.97</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accountability towards beneficiaries</td>
<td>5.83</td>
<td>5.38</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impartiality of aid</td>
<td>7.89</td>
<td>7.30</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Areas for improvement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Donor score</th>
<th>OECD/DAC donor average</th>
<th>% below average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Un-earmarked funding</td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td>3.45</td>
<td>-71%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding UN and Red Cross Red Crescent appeals</td>
<td>1.53</td>
<td>5.05</td>
<td>-70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding and commissioning evaluations</td>
<td>1.44</td>
<td>4.25</td>
<td>-66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timely funding to complex emergencies</td>
<td>2.26</td>
<td>4.35</td>
<td>-48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilitating humanitarian access</td>
<td>4.19</td>
<td>5.22</td>
<td>-20%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Greece

Policy framework
Greece’s development and humanitarian assistance falls under the overall responsibility of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Hellenic Aid, the ministry’s international development cooperation department, coordinates and manages the Greek humanitarian response. The Inter-Ministerial Committee (EOSDOS) determines the form and volume of an emergency response. Delivery of humanitarian aid is provided by the health and agriculture ministries and now, to a lesser extent, also by the armed forces. Although Greece depends on its implementing partners for needs assessments, it frequently dedicates staff to follow aid flows and actual delivery. In 2009, Greece encountered major financial problems which are reflected in a decrease of 15% in ODA volume and from 0.22% to 0.19% in the ODA/GNI ratio compared to 2008. This has also resulted in a substantial decrease in the humanitarian aid budget in absolute terms: it now represents 5.7% of ODA, or 0.005% of GNI.

Greece endorsed the Principles of Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) in 2004. Although no formal aid strategy exists, GHD Principles are included for reference in the guidelines for implementing partners.

Performance
Greece is not included in the overall ranking, as insufficient survey responses were obtained to calculate the qualitative indicators of the index. Based on the patterns of its scores in quantitative indicators, Greece has been classified as a Group 2 donor. Donors in this group tend to perform around average in all pillars, with slightly better scores in Pillar 1 (Responding to needs), and somewhat poorer in Pillar 2 (Prevention, risk reduction and recovery). Other donors in this group are Australia, Canada, the European Commission (EC), Germany, Ireland, the United Kingdom and the United States.

Based on its quantitative indicators, Greece scored below the overall OECD/DAC and the Group 2 average in all pillars with the exception of Pillar 1, where it reached its highest score, above the OECD/DAC and Group averages. It reached a low score in Pillar 2, in line with the overall Group 2 performance. Greece’s lowest average scores were in Pillar 5 (Learning and accountability) and Pillar 3 (Working with humanitarian partners). It performed slightly better in Pillar 4 (Protection and international law).

Greece did best compared to its OECD/DAC peers in the indicators on Timely funding to sudden onset disasters, Timely funding to complex emergencies and Reducing climate-related vulnerability and was average in Funding based on level of vulnerability and to forgotten crises. It scores were lowest in the indicators on Participation in accountability initiatives, Funding for accountability initiatives, Funding and commissioning evaluations, Funding for reconstruction and prevention and Funding UN and Red Cross Red Crescent appeals.

Recommendations
As the number of field surveys obtained for Greece was limited, the recommendations focus on the results of the data analysis for the quantitative indicators.

Aid distribution by type of organisation

* Graph includes only quantitative pillar scores as sufficient survey responses were not obtained for Greece.

Source: OCHA/FTS October 2010.
Donor assessments

Greece also received a low score for Funding to NGOs, providing less than 1% of its humanitarian aid to them. Group 2 allocated an average of 18% of humanitarian aid to NGOs.

- Greece is encouraged to look for ways to increase its support of NGOs.

Greece does not participate in or support any of the humanitarian accountability initiatives included in the indicators, according to the public data sources used for the HRI.

- Greece should consider supporting and participating in humanitarian accountability initiatives.

Greece also scored very poorly in Funding and commissioning evaluations, which measures the number of evaluations conducted and the existence of evaluation guidelines. Greece did not conduct any self or joint evaluations between 2004 and 2010 and does not have evaluation guidelines.

- Greece should consider developing evaluation guidelines and commissioning a self or joint evaluations to promote learning.

For more information, please see: www.daraint.org.

* Distribution of donor funding to these sectors includes flows within and outside an appeal that has been reported to OCHA/FTS. This is compared to the “distribution of needs” based on the 2009 UN appeal budget allocation.

Source: OCHA/FTS October 2010.

In Pillar 2, Greece received a very low score on Funding for reconstruction and prevention and a low score for Funding of risk mitigation mechanisms. Greece devoted 1.1% of its humanitarian aid to reconstruction and prevention, compared to the Group 2 average of 15%. Group 3 performs the best on this indicator, allocating 25%. Greece allocated 0.58% to risk mitigation mechanisms, while most Group 2 donors spent somewhere between 0.6% and 1.3% of their ODA on these mechanisms.

- Greece should consider finding ways to increase its support for reconstruction and prevention and for risk mitigation mechanisms.

In Pillar 3, Greece received its lowest scores in Funding UN and Red Cross Red Crescent appeals. Greece provided 18% of its fair share to UN appeals, compared to the OECD/DAC average of 135% and the Group 2 average of 117%. It provided 7% of its fair share to Red Cross Red Crescent appeals, compared to the OECD/DAC average of 128% and Group 2 average of 61%.

- Greece should look for ways to increase its support for UN and Red Cross Red Crescent appeals.

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**Strengthen**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Donor score</th>
<th>OECD/DAC donor average</th>
<th>% over average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Timely funding to sudden onset disasters</td>
<td>10.00</td>
<td>6.97</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timely funding to complex emergencies</td>
<td>5.13</td>
<td>4.35</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reducing climate-related vulnerability</td>
<td>7.62</td>
<td>7.19</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding based on level of vulnerability and to forgotten crises</td>
<td>6.12</td>
<td>6.11</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Areas for improvement**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Donor score</th>
<th>OECD/DAC donor average</th>
<th>% below average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Participation in accountability initiatives</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>4.73</td>
<td>-100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding for accountability initiatives</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>2.75</td>
<td>-100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding and commissioning evaluations</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>4.25</td>
<td>-100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding for reconstruction and prevention</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>4.12</td>
<td>-94%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding UN and Red Cross Red Crescent appeals</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>5.05</td>
<td>-90%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Ireland

HRI 2010 ranking: 2nd

Policy framework

Ireland’s humanitarian aid is managed by Irish Aid, which falls under the Development Cooperation Division of the Department of Foreign Affairs. Irish Aid coordinates an Emergency Humanitarian Assistance Fund (EHAF), an Emergency Preparedness and post-Emergency Fund (EPPR) and a Sierra Leone and Liberia Fund. Through its Rapid Response Initiative (RRI), Irish Aid has prepositioned humanitarian relief supplies and experts are on stand-by to respond rapidly to humanitarian emergencies. Irish Aid updated its humanitarian policy in May 2009, emphasising the importance of disaster risk reduction and linking relief, rehabilitation and development. Its Operational Plan 2008-2012 and 2007-09 strategy are intended to improve aid effectiveness. The 2009 Management Review recommended greater integration of Irish Aid into the Department of Foreign Affairs. While Ireland has made a commitment to meet the UN target of providing 0.7% of its GNI in ODA, financial challenges have led to a slight decrease from 0.59% in 2008 to 0.54% in 2009. Humanitarian aid comprises 17.35% of ODA and 0.078 of its GNI.

The 2009 OECD/DAC Peer Review praised Ireland for its strong commitment to the Principles of Good Humanitarian Donorship and high standards of good practice. The key components of its 2005 GHD Implementation Plan are also included in its overall humanitarian policy. Irish Aid’s Evaluation and Audit Unit participates in joint evaluations on humanitarian assistance. Ireland co-chaired the GHD initiative with Estonia in 2009-2010.

HRI 2010 scores by pillar

Performance

Ireland ranked 2nd in the HRI 2010. Based on the patterns of its scores, Ireland is classified as a Group 2 donor. Donors in this group tend to perform around average in all pillars, with slightly better scores in Pillar 1 (Responding to needs) and somewhat poorer in Pillar 2 (Prevention, risk reduction and recovery). Other donors in the group include Australia, Canada, the European Commission (EC), Germany, Greece (based on quantitative scores only), the United Kingdom and the United States.

Ireland received its highest average score in Pillar 1, scoring above the OECD/DAC and Group 2 averages. Ireland received its lowest score in Pillar 2, with marks well below the OECD/DAC and Group 2 averages. In fact, its score was lower than most Group 3 donors. Ireland scored well above the OECD/DAC average in Pillar 3 (Working with humanitarian partners) and also above its group average. In Pillar 4 (Protection and international law), Ireland’s score was very close to the OECD/DAC average and above its group average. Like other donors in its group, Ireland scored above the OECD/DAC average in Pillar 5, also scoring above the Group 2 average.

Ireland did better than its OECD/DAC peers in the indicators on Funding for accountability initiatives; Timely funding to complex emergencies; Funding UN and Red Cross Red Crescent appeals; Participation in accountability initiatives and Funding to NGOs. It scores were relatively the lowest in the indicators on Funding of risk mitigation mechanisms; Linking relief, rehabilitation and development; Beneficiary participation in programming; Accountability towards beneficiaries and Facilitating humanitarian access.

Aid distribution by type of organisation

* The OECD/DAC average does not include scores for Austria, Greece or Portugal.

Source: OCHA/FTS October 2010.
Ireland

With the exception of Pillar 2, Ireland scores at or below average for all qualitative indicators. In particular, Ireland’s partners consider that Ireland does not verify sufficiently that partners include beneficiaries in all stages of programming and establish mechanisms for accountability toward beneficiaries. (It received two of its lowest qualitative scores in Accountability toward beneficiaries and Beneficiary participation in programming.)

Ireland should engage in dialogue with its partners to discuss their perceptions regarding its support for beneficiary participation and accountability towards beneficiaries.

In 2008, Ireland allocated 17% of its humanitarian aid to reconstruction and prevention, while Group 3, the best donor group for this indicator, spent an average of 25%.

- Ireland should consider finding ways to increase its funding of reconstruction and prevention.

Most donors in Group 1 allocated somewhere between 1.1% to 1.9% of their ODA to risk mitigation mechanisms. Ireland, on the other hand, allocated only 0.38%. Ireland was the donor with the lowest score for the indicator Funding of risk mitigation mechanisms.

Ireland should look into ways to increase its funding of risk mitigation mechanisms.

With the exception of Pillar 2, Ireland scores at or below average for all qualitative indicators. In particular, Ireland’s partners consider that Ireland does not verify sufficiently that partners include beneficiaries in all stages of programming and establish mechanisms for accountability toward beneficiaries. (It received two of its lowest qualitative scores in Accountability toward beneficiaries and Beneficiary participation in programming.)

- Ireland should engage in dialogue with its partners to discuss their perceptions regarding facilitation of humanitarian access and advocacy towards local authorities.

Ireland scored above, or close to, average in all indicators that make up Pillar 4, with the exception of two qualitative indicators, Facilitating humanitarian access and Advocacy towards local authorities.

With the exception of Pillar 2, Ireland scores at or below average for all qualitative indicators. In particular, Ireland’s partners consider that Ireland does not verify sufficiently that partners include beneficiaries in all stages of programming and establish mechanisms for accountability toward beneficiaries. (It received two of its lowest qualitative scores in Accountability toward beneficiaries and Beneficiary participation in programming.)

- Ireland should engage in dialogue with its partners to discuss their perceptions regarding facilitation of humanitarian access and advocacy towards local authorities.

For more information, please see www.daraint.org.
**Italy**

**HRI 2010 ranking: 20th**

**Policy framework**

Italy’s development cooperation and humanitarian assistance programme falls under the responsibility of the Directorate-General for Development Cooperation (DGCS) in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The DGCS Office VI (emergency operations and food aid), one of 13 DGCS departments and two units, is in charge of food aid and emergency humanitarian action. DGCS currently operates according to the 2010-2012 three-year plan which highlights the importance of the timeliness of humanitarian response, building response capacities and strengthening partnerships with NGOs and local partners. Law 49/1987, the legal foundation of Italy’s foreign assistance, maintains in Article 1 that humanitarian action should be an integral part of Italian foreign policy. Italy’s ODA/GNI ratio has fluctuated in recent years and has fallen back in 2009 to 0.16% compared to 0.22% in 2008. Humanitarian assistance represented 12.93% of ODA and 0.005% of GNI in 2009.

Italy formally endorsed the Principles of Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) in 2007 through the adoption of the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid – a 2007 EC policy agreement – on which its humanitarian action is based. However, Italy does not have a national policy, a clear mission statement or a definition of its humanitarian aid programme. While it attaches great importance to disaster risk reduction, one of the GHD Principles, it is usually supported by the development budget. Italy has indicated its intention to develop a GHD domestic implementation plan.

**HRI 2010 scores by pillar**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pillar 1: Responding to needs</th>
<th>Pillar 2: Prevention, risk reduction and recovery</th>
<th>Pillar 3: Working with humanitarian partners</th>
<th>Pillar 4: Protection and international law</th>
<th>Pillar 5: Learning and accountability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>OECD/DAC average</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The OECD/DAC average does not include scores for Austria, Greece or Portugal.

**Performance**

Italy ranked 20th in the HRI 2010. Based on the patterns of its scores, Italy is classified as a Group 3 donor. Donors in this group tend to perform poorly in Pillar 3 (Working with humanitarian partners), Pillar 4 (Protection and international law) and in Pillar 5 (Learning and accountability). Other donors in Group 3 are Austria, Belgium, France, Japan, Portugal and Spain.

Italy’s overall score was below the OECD/DAC and the Group 3 scores. It scored below the OECD/DAC and close to the Group 3 average in Pillar 1 (Responding to needs), while in Pillar 2 it reached its highest score, which was also close to the Group 3 average but above the OECD/DAC average. In Pillar 3 (Working with humanitarian partners) where it had its lowest score, in Pillar 4 and in Pillar 5, its scores were below the averages of both the OECD/DAC and Group 3.

Italy did best compared to its OECD/DAC peers in the indicators on Funding for accountability initiatives, Funding for reconstruction and prevention, Reducing climate-related vulnerability and Funding of risk mitigation mechanisms. Its scores were lowest in the indicators on Funding and commissioning evaluations, Participation in accountability initiatives, Funding UN and Red Cross Red Crescent appeals, Un-c earmarked funding and Funding to NGOs.

**Recommendations:**

Italy is close to the OECD/DAC average in Timely funding to sudden onset disasters. However, it scored below average in Timely funding to complex emergencies. Italy provided 26% of its funding within three months of the launch of an appeal, while the OECD/DAC average was 34%, and the Group 3 average 40%. Italy’s partners also consider it below average in terms of Timely funding to partner organisations.

- Italy should review the timeliness of its funding and engage in dialogue with its partners to discuss their perceptions in this area.

**Aid distribution by type of organisation**

- Government: 61.3%
- UN Agencies: 26%
- Intergovernmental orgs.: 0.5%
- NGOs: 0.2%
- Red Cross / Red Crescent: 11.8%
- Private Orgs. & Foundations: 0.2%
- Other: 0.2%

* The OECD/DAC average does not include scores for Austria, Greece or Portugal.

Source: OCHA/FTS October 2010.
Donor assessments

Italy

In Pillar 4, Italy received a very low score for Human rights law, which measures signature of human rights treaties, accreditation of national human rights institutions and funding to OHCHR, the primary guardian of international human rights treaties. Italy has signed the majority of the human rights treaties included in the indicator, yet provided only 0.01% of every million dollars of its GDP to OHCHR, while the OECD/DAC average is 0.67%. Italy’s National Human Rights Institution is not currently accredited by OHCHR.

- Italy is encouraged to attempt to meet the requirements for OHCHR accreditation, and consider increasing its funding to human rights organisations like OHCHR.

For more information, please see www.daraint.org.

The flexibility of Italy’s funding appears to be a weakness. Italy received one of the lowest scores for Un-earmarked funding: Italy provided only 7% of its funding without earmarking, compared to the OECD/DAC average of 35% and the Group 3 average of 37%. Italy’s partners echoed this finding, as Italy scored below average in the qualitative indicator Flexible funding.

- Italy should review options to reduce earmarking and increase the flexibility of its funding and engage in a dialogue with its partners to discuss their perceptions in this area.

Italy’s funding to NGO partners was very limited; it received the lowest score of the OECD/DAC donors on this indicator. Less than one percent of its funding went to NGOs, and it supports only one UN in-country pooled fund. The OECD/DAC average is 13%.

- Italy should consider finding ways to increase its share of funding through NGOs directly or through pooled funds.

### Sectoral distribution of funding to UN appeals, 2009 (%)

*Distribution of donor funding to these sectors includes flows within and outside an appeal that has been reported to OCHA/FTS. This is compared to the “distribution of needs” based on the 2009 UN appeal budget allocation. Source: OCHA/FTS October 2010.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Italy</th>
<th>UN appeal budget</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordination</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recovery and infrastructure</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mine action</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi-sector</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection/ Human rights</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safety and security of staff</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sector not yet specified</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shelter and NFI</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WASH</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Distribution of donor funding to these sectors includes flows within and outside an appeal that has been reported to OCHA/FTS. This is compared to the “distribution of needs” based on the 2009 UN appeal budget allocation. Source: OCHA/FTS October 2010.*

### Strengths

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Donor score</th>
<th>OECD/DAC donor average</th>
<th>% over average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Funding for accountability initiatives</td>
<td>5.64</td>
<td>2.75</td>
<td>105%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding for reconstruction and prevention</td>
<td>6.98</td>
<td>4.12</td>
<td>69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reducing climate-related vulnerability</td>
<td>8.76</td>
<td>7.19</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding of risk mitigation mechanisms</td>
<td>5.89</td>
<td>5.49</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Areas for improvement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Donor score</th>
<th>OECD/DAC donor average</th>
<th>% below average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Funding and commissioning evaluations</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>4.25</td>
<td>-100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation in accountability initiatives</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>4.73</td>
<td>-96%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding UN and Red Cross Red Crescent appeals</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>5.05</td>
<td>-87%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Un-earmarked funding</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>3.45</td>
<td>-81%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding to NGOs</td>
<td>1.04</td>
<td>4.40</td>
<td>-76%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Japan
HRI 2010 ranking: 16th

Policy framework

Japan’s humanitarian assistance is managed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), notably through the new Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA). JICA was restructured in 2008, merging with part of the Japanese Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) to streamline humanitarian and development activities. The legal basis for Japanese humanitarian assistance in response to disasters is the 1987 Japan Disaster Relief Law, while assistance for conflict situations or complex emergencies is covered by a law on UN peacekeeping operations. Japan does not have a formal strategy on the objectives of humanitarian action in conflict situations but has issued an Initiative for Disaster Reduction, allowing JICA to dispatch rescue and relief teams and emergency supplies to respond to natural disasters. In cases of major unforeseen disasters, Japan can draw on its annual supplementary budget. JICA has approximately 100 offices abroad, most focusing on development. Contributions to projects implemented by Japanese NGOs come both from MFA and JICA and are coordinated through the Japan Platform which was established in 2000 to promote prompt and effective response to humanitarian emergencies.

Although Japan belongs to the top ten OECD/DAC donors in terms of its overall development and humanitarian budget, its ODA/GNI ratio was 0.18% in 2009, a 10% decrease from 2008 due to the recession, and far below the UN target of 0.7%. Humanitarian assistance represented 3.62% of its ODA in 2009 and 0.004% of its GNI.

Performance

Japan ranked 16th in the HRI 2010. Based on the patterns of its scores, Japan is classified as a Group 3 donor. Donors in this group tend to perform poorly in Pillar 3 (Working with humanitarian partners), Pillar 4 (Protection and international law) and in Pillar 5 (Learning and accountability). Other donors in this group are Austria, Belgium, France, Italy, Portugal and Spain.

Japan’s overall score was below the OECD/DAC average in line with the overall Group 3 performance. However, its overall score was close to the Group 3 average. In Pillar 1 (Responding to needs), it scored largely above the OECD/DAC and peer group’s average, ranking second of all OECD/DAC donors. It also scored above the OECD/DAC and close to the Group 3 average in Pillar 2 (Prevention, risk reduction and recovery). Its lowest score is in Pillar 3. In Pillar 4, it scored below the OECD/DAC and the Group 3 averages. Like other Group 3 donors, it scored below the OECD/DAC average in Pillar 5, its results closely matching the average group score.

Japan did best compared to its OECD/DAC peers in indicators on Funding for reconstruction and prevention, Timely funding to complex emergencies, Timely funding to sudden onset disasters, Funding of risk mitigation mechanisms and Funding based on level of vulnerability and to forgotten crises. Its scores were lowest in the indicators on Un-earmarked funding, Funding UN and Red Cross Red Crescent appeals, Human rights law, Funding for accountability initiatives and Participation in accountability initiatives.

Aid distribution by type of organisation

* The OECD/DAC average does not include scores for Austria, Greece or Portugal.

Source: OCHA/FTS October 2010.
Donor assessments

Also in Pillar 3, Japan received low scores for Funding to NGOs and Funding UN and Red Cross Red Crescent appeals. Japan provided less than 2% of its funding to NGOs, compared to the OECD/DAC average of 13%, and the Group 3 average of 7%. Japan provided only 50% of its fair share to UN appeals. While above the Group 3 average of 42%, the OECD/DAC average was 135% of fair share. For Red Cross/Red Crescent appeals, Japan provided only 14% of its fair share compared to the OECD/DAC average of 128% and the Group 3 average of 22%.

Japan should consider increasing its support to NGOs and to UN and Red Cross Red Crescent appeals.

For more information, please see www.daraint.org.

Strengths

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Donor score</th>
<th>OECD/DAC donor average</th>
<th>% over average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Funding for reconstruction and prevention</td>
<td>9.54</td>
<td>4.12</td>
<td>131%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timely funding to complex emergencies</td>
<td>6.37</td>
<td>4.35</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timely funding to sudden onset disasters</td>
<td>10.00</td>
<td>6.97</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding of risk mitigation mechanisms</td>
<td>6.55</td>
<td>5.49</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding based on level of vulnerability and to forgotten crises</td>
<td>6.69</td>
<td>6.11</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Areas for improvement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Donor score</th>
<th>OECD/DAC donor average</th>
<th>% below average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Un-earmarked funding</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>3.45</td>
<td>-88%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding UN and Red Cross Red Crescent appeals</td>
<td>1.22</td>
<td>5.05</td>
<td>-76%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human rights law</td>
<td>1.79</td>
<td>6.25</td>
<td>-71%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding for accountability initiatives</td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>2.75</td>
<td>-60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation in accountability initiatives</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>4.73</td>
<td>-58%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Distribution of donor funding to these sectors includes flows within and outside an appeal that has been reported to OCHA/FTS. This is compared to the “distribution of needs” based on the 2009 UN appeal budget allocation.

Source: OCHA/FTS October 2010.
Luxembourg
HRI 2010 ranking: 10th

Policy framework
Luxembourg's humanitarian assistance is managed by the Department of Humanitarian Aid, which is under the umbrella of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Development Cooperation Directorate. Its humanitarian action is carried out under the authority of the Minister for Cooperation and Humanitarian Action. The development and humanitarian policy is based on the 1996 development law. Its 2009 Strategies and Guidelines for Humanitarian Assistance stresses the importance of local capacity building and funding for transition, disaster prevention and preparedness. In view of the size of the population of Luxembourg, its representations abroad are limited to regional capitals. Luxembourg strongly prioritises development and humanitarian aid. Since 2000, it has exceeded the target of spending 0.7% of GNI on ODA. In 2009, it allocated 1.01% of its GNI to ODA. Humanitarian assistance represented 17.21% of its ODA and 0.127% of its GNI.

Luxembourg has not yet developed a Good Humanitarian Donorship domestic implementation plan, but its humanitarian policy stresses commitment to GHD Principles.

Performance
Luxembourg ranked 10th in the HRI 2010. Based on the pattern of its scores, Luxembourg is classified as a Group 1 donor. Donors in this group tend to do better overall in Pillar 3 (Working with humanitarian partners), Pillar 4 (Protection and international law) and Pillar 5 (Learning and accountability). Other donors in this group include Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland.

Luxembourg performed well in Pillars 3 and 4, but had difficulties in Pillars 2 (Prevention, risk reduction and recovery) and 5. In Pillar 1 (Responding to needs), Luxembourg scored close to the OECD/DAC and Group 1 averages. Its performance in Pillar 2 was more like a Group 2 donor, scoring below the OECD/DAC and Group 1 averages. In Pillars 3 and 4, Luxembourg scored above the OECD/DAC average and close to its group average. Its lowest performance overall was in Pillar 5, scoring below the OECD/DAC and Group 1 averages.

Luxembourg did best compared to its OECD/DAC peers in the indicators on Funding UN and Red Cross/Red Crescent appeals, Funding of risk mitigation mechanisms, Funding to NGOs, Refugee law and Support for prevention and preparedness. It scores were relatively low in the indicators Reducing climate-related vulnerability, Participation in accountability initiatives, Funding for accountability initiatives, Timely funding to complex emergencies and Un-earmarked funding.

Aid distribution by type of organisation

Source: OCHA/FTS October 2010.
Donor assessments

**Luxembourg**

Forums. Similarly, the indicator for Funding for accountability initiatives measures the percentage of humanitarian aid allocated to these same initiatives and Luxembourg does not provide any funding to them. Group 1, which performs the best in this indicator, allocated an average of 0.71% of aid.

- Luxembourg should consider increasing its participation in and funding of humanitarian accountability initiatives.

Luxembourg performed well in the qualitative indicators that comprise Pillar 5, yet below average in all of the quantitative indicators. Luxembourg received a 0.00 out of a possible 10.00 in Participation in accountability initiatives and Funding for accountability initiatives. The former indicator measures membership of, and attendance, at humanitarian accountability and learning initiatives. According to the public data sources used to calculate this indicator, Luxembourg apparently does not participate in any of these initiatives. Similarly, the indicator for Funding for accountability initiatives measures the percentage of humanitarian aid allocated to these same initiatives and Luxembourg does not provide any funding to them. Group 1, which performs the best in this indicator, allocated an average of 0.71% of aid.

- Luxembourg should consider increasing its participation in and funding of humanitarian accountability initiatives.

Luxembourg's partners consider it an average donor in terms of Support for learning and evaluations. However, it scored below average in the quantitative indicator Funding and commissioning evaluations. This indicator looks at the number of self and joint evaluations compared to the total amount of humanitarian aid and the existence of evaluation guidelines. Luxembourg has conducted four evaluations for every US$100 million of humanitarian aid, above the Group 1 average, but it still does not have evaluation guidelines.

- Luxembourg should consider developing evaluation guidelines to promote learning.

For more information, please see www.daraint.org.

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**Recommendations**

In Pillar 2, Luxembourg performed above average in the qualitative indicators, yet below average in two of the three quantitative indicators. In the quantitative indicator **Funding for reconstruction and prevention**, Luxembourg scored below the OECD/DAC average. Luxembourg allocated 13% of its humanitarian aid to reconstruction and prevention, compared to the OECD/DAC average of 17%. It was, however, above the Group 1 average of 11%, yet below the Group 3 average of 25%.

- Luxembourg should look for ways to increase its support of reconstruction and prevention activities.

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**Strengths**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Donor score</th>
<th>OECD/DAC donor average</th>
<th>% over average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Funding UN and Red Cross Red Crescent appeals</td>
<td>7.93</td>
<td>5.05</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding of risk mitigation mechanisms</td>
<td>8.00</td>
<td>5.49</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding to NGOs</td>
<td>5.75</td>
<td>4.40</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugee law</td>
<td>7.22</td>
<td>5.74</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for prevention and preparedness</td>
<td>7.07</td>
<td>5.71</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

**Areas for improvement**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Donor score</th>
<th>OECD/DAC donor average</th>
<th>% below average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reducing climate-related vulnerability</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>7.19</td>
<td>-100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation in accountability initiatives</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>4.73</td>
<td>-100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding for accountability initiatives</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>2.75</td>
<td>-100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timely funding to complex emergencies</td>
<td>2.51</td>
<td>4.35</td>
<td>-42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Un-earmarked funding</td>
<td>2.03</td>
<td>3.45</td>
<td>-41%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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* Distribution of donor funding to these sectors includes flows within and outside an appeal that has been reported to OCHA/FTS. This is compared to the “distribution of needs” based on the 2009 UN appeal budget allocation. Source: OCHA/FTS October 2010.
**Netherlands**

**HRI 2010 ranking: 9th**

**Policy framework**
The Netherlands’ humanitarian assistance is managed by the Humanitarian Aid Division (DMV/HH) of the Human Rights and Peacebuilding Department (DMV), which is part of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Its 2008 humanitarian aid policy distinguishes between acute and chronic crises. Sudden onset disasters qualify for emergency aid, while response to chronic crises is limited to specific crisis zones in developing countries and sectors. By law, the Netherlands can only provide humanitarian assistance to countries that have officially requested aid. The Netherlands has been one of the front runners in the establishment of pooled funding structures. In 2009, it spent 0.82% of its GNI on Official Development Assistance (ODA). Humanitarian assistance represented 9.10% of its ODA and 0.063% of its GNI. The 2010 humanitarian aid budget is expected to be similar to that of 2009 despite sizeable budget cuts and challenges posed by the global financial crisis.

The Netherlands was instrumental in the development of the Principles of Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) and has had a GHD domestic implementation plan since 2005. It co-chaired the GHD group with ECHO in 2008-2009, and attempted to establish a GHD implementation group in the occupied Palestinian territories in 2009.

**Performance**
The Netherlands ranked 9th in the HRI 2010. Based on the pattern of its scores, the Netherlands is classified as a Group 1 donor. Donors in this group tend to do better overall in Pillar 3 (Working with humanitarian partners), Pillar 4 (Protection and international law) and Pillar 5 (Learning and accountability). Other donors in this group include Denmark, Finland, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland.

The Netherlands scored close to the OECD/DAC average in all pillars, with the exception of Pillar 3, in which it was above average. The Netherlands received its highest average score in Pillar 1 (Responding to needs), in which it was close to the Group 1 average. The Netherlands received its lowest average score in Pillar 2 (Prevention, risk reduction and recovery), where it was below its group average. In Pillar 3, it received its second-highest score, and was close to the Group 1 average. It scored below its group average in Pillar 4. In Pillar 5, the Netherlands scored close to its group average.

The Netherlands did best compared to its OECD/DAC peers in the indicators on Un-earmarked funding, Funding UN and Red Cross Red Crescent appeals, Participation in accountability initiatives, Refugee law and Funding based on level of vulnerability and to forgotten crises. It scores were lowest in the indicators on Funding for reconstruction and prevention, Funding to NGOs, Timely funding to complex emergencies, International humanitarian law and Funding of risk mitigation mechanisms.

*The OECD/DAC average does not include scores for Austria, Greece or Portugal.*

**Aid distribution by type of organisation**

Source: OCHA/FTS October 2010.
The Netherlands channeled only 5% of its funding to NGOs, compared to the Group 1 average of 15%.

- The Netherlands is encouraged to increase its support to NGOs.

While most Group 1 donors perform particularly well in the indicator on International humanitarian law, the Netherlands scored below its group and the OECD/DAC averages. The Netherlands is one of four OECD/DAC donors without a national committee to ensure respect of ratified treaties. Furthermore, the Netherlands allocated only 0.005% of every billion dollars of its GDP to the ICRC, while Group 1 donors provided an average of 0.011%.

- The Netherlands is encouraged to create a national committee to ensure respect of ratified treaties and to consider increasing its support of the ICRC and promotion of IHL.

For more information, please see www.daraint.org.
New Zealand
HRI 2010 ranking: 3rd

Policy framework
New Zealand’s humanitarian assistance is managed by NZAID, a semi-autonomous department within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Responsible for implementing aid programmes and developing humanitarian policy, NZAID focuses on preparedness, response and recovery in the Pacific region. NZAID defines its overarching humanitarian policy in conjunction with the International Development Advisory Committee (IDAC) and based on consultations with the Council for International Development, the umbrella organisation for New Zealand NGOs. NZAID currently operates under the Five-Year Strategy 2004/5 – 2009/10. Its decision to respond to humanitarian emergencies depends on the scale and human impact of the crisis, other resources available, and whether assistance has been requested. In the Asia-Pacific Region, NZAID works in partnership with national and international NGOs registered in New Zealand or their implementing partners via the Humanitarian Response Fund, which in 2009 replaced the Humanitarian Action Fund. In crises beyond its region, NZAID channels its assistance through UN agencies and the Red Cross / Red Crescent Movement, also contributing to their core funding. New Zealand’s 2009 ODA represented 0.29% of its GNI, a slight decrease from the previous year due to the financial crisis. Humanitarian assistance comprised 12.17% of its ODA and 0.027% of its GNI.

HRI 2010 scores by pillar

Performance
New Zealand is ranked 3rd in the HRI 2010. Based on the patterns of its scores, New Zealand is classified as a Group 1 donor. Donors in this group tend to do better overall in Pillar 3 (Working with humanitarian partners), Pillar 4 (Protection and international law), and Pillar 5 (Learning and accountability). Other donors in the group include Denmark, Finland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland.

In Pillar 1 (Responding to needs), New Zealand scored above the OECD/DAC average and the Group 1 average. In Pillar 2 (Prevention, risk reduction and recovery), the country scored close to the OECD/DAC and Group 1 averages. It differs somewhat from its group in that its lowest average scores were in Pillar 3, a pillar in which Group 1 donors tend to do well. It received scores close to the OECD/DAC average and below its group average. New Zealand received its second-highest score in Pillar 4, well above the OECD/DAC average and close to its group average. New Zealand received its highest average score in Pillar 5 where it was the second best-scoring donor, well above the OECD/DAC and Group 1 averages.

Aid distribution by type of organisation

* Distribution of donor funding to these sectors include flows inside and outside an appeal that had been reported to OCHA/FTS. This is compared to the “distribution of needs” based on the 2009 UN appeal budget allocation.
Source: OCHA/FTS October 2010.
New Zealand should consider finding ways to increase its support to NGOs.

New Zealand’s partners consider it a good donor in terms of Advocacy toward local authorities, Facilitating access and Promotion of international humanitarian law. However, it receives a low score in the related quantitative indicators. New Zealand channeled only 0.0021% of every billion dollars of its GDP to the ICRC, compared to the Group 1 average of 0.011%.

New Zealand should look into ways to increase its support of the ICRC and promotion of IHL.

New Zealand is perceived in the field as particularly weak in supporting beneficiary participation (it received two of its lowest scores in Beneficiary participation in programming, Beneficiary participation in monitoring and evaluation and Funding of risk mitigation mechanisms).

New Zealand should look into ways to increase its support of risk mitigation mechanisms.

New Zealand provided only 3% of its funding to NGOs, compared to the Group 1 average of 15%.

Recommendations:

- New Zealand should consider finding ways to increase its support to NGOs.
- New Zealand should look into ways to increase its support of the ICRC and promotion of IHL.
- New Zealand should engage in dialogue with its partners to discuss their perceptions regarding it support for beneficiary participation.

For more detailed information, please see www.daraint.org.

### Strengths

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Donor score</th>
<th>OECD/DAC donor average</th>
<th>% over average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Funding for accountability initiatives</td>
<td>9.14</td>
<td>2.75</td>
<td>233%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding and commissioning evaluations</td>
<td>9.90</td>
<td>4.25</td>
<td>133%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Un-earmarked funding</td>
<td>7.91</td>
<td>3.45</td>
<td>129%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Facilitating humanitarian access</td>
<td>7.78</td>
<td>5.22</td>
<td>49%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Funding for reconstruction and prevention</td>
<td>5.99</td>
<td>4.12</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
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</table>

### Areas for improvement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Donor score</th>
<th>OECD/DAC donor average</th>
<th>% below average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Funding UN and Red Cross Red Crescent appeals</td>
<td>2.53</td>
<td>5.05</td>
<td>-50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding to NGOs</td>
<td>2.73</td>
<td>4.40</td>
<td>-38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beneficiary participation in programming</td>
<td>3.86</td>
<td>5.71</td>
<td>-32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beneficiary participation in monitoring and evaluation</td>
<td>4.32</td>
<td>5.54</td>
<td>-22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding of risk mitigation mechanisms</td>
<td>4.32</td>
<td>5.49</td>
<td>-21%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Distribution of donor funding to these sectors includes flows within and outside an appeal that has been reported to OCHA/FTS. This is compared to the “distribution of needs” based on the 2009 UN appeal budget allocation.

Source: OCHA/FTS October 2010.
Norway
HRI 2010 ranking: 4th

Policy framework
Norway’s humanitarian aid is managed by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), with the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad) operating as a technical directorate. The Department for UN, Peace and Humanitarian Affairs and the Department of Regional Affairs and Development are the two main departments involved in overseeing humanitarian action. Most development and humanitarian decisions are made in Oslo. As a result, field offices may be unaware of the various funding channels for their respective countries. Norway updated its humanitarian policy in 2009, including a five-year strategy with focuses on protection, adaptation to climate change, disaster risk reduction, gender issues, and linking humanitarian efforts more closely with peace and reconciliation, human rights, development and climate change endeavours. The 2008 OECD/DAC Peer Review praised Norway for its “principled but pragmatic approach” to effective humanitarian aid. It continues to play a lead role in promoting humanitarian disarmament, the Convention on Cluster Munitions, coordination between civil / humanitarian and military partners and protection and support for internally displaced persons. It is one of the most generous donors: in 2009 its ODA represented 1.06% of its GNI, a significant increase from 0.88% in 2008. Humanitarian aid represented 12.11% of its ODA and 0.11% of its GNI.

Norway does not have a Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) domestic implementation plan, but includes GHD Principles in its humanitarian policy. To improve funding predictability, it has multi-year funding arrangements with selected humanitarian organisations for priority countries and themes.

Performance
Norway ranked 4th in the HRI 2010. Based on the patterns of its scores, Norway is classified as a Group 1 donor. Donors in this group tend to do better overall in Pillar 3 (Working with humanitarian partners), Pillar 4 (Protection and international law) and Pillar 5 (Learning and accountability). Other donors in the group include Denmark, Finland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden and Switzerland.

Like other Group 1 donors, Norway’s highest average scores were in Pillars 3, 4 and 5. Norway received its lowest average score in Pillar 1 (Responding to needs), scoring lower than the OECD/DAC and Group 1 averages. In Pillar 2 (Prevention, risk reduction and recovery) Norway scored close to the OECD/DAC and Group 1 average. Norway scored well above the OECD/DAC and Group 1 averages in Pillars 3 and 4. In Pillar 5, it was above the OECD/DAC average, and close to the Group 1 average.

Norway did best compared to its OECD/DAC peers in the indicators on Funding UN and Red Cross Red Crescent appeals, Un-earmarked funding, International humanitarian law, Refugee law and Funding to NGOs. Its scores were relatively lowest in the indicators on Timely funding to complex emergencies, Funding for reconstruction and prevention, Funding based on level of vulnerability and to forgotten crises, Impartiality of aid and Timely funding to sudden onset disasters.

Aid distribution by type of organisation

Source: OCHA/FTS October 2010.
Donor assessments

Norway

Norway does well in supporting the crises with highest levels of vulnerability – 52% of its funding, compared to the Group 1 average of 49%. However, Norway was the second-to-last donor in its support of forgotten emergencies. Such support was 12% of its humanitarian aid compared to the Group 1 average of 30%.

Norway should look into ways to increase its support to forgotten emergencies.

Norway received its second-lowest score of the HRI for Funding of reconstruction and prevention. Norway spent 8% of its aid on this, while Group 1 donors, who generally performed poorly in this indicator, allocated an average of 11%. Group 3, which performs the best in this indicator, allocated an average of 25%.

Norway's field partners gave it an average score on the related qualitative indicator for Linking relief, rehabilitation and development.

Norway should consider finding ways to increase its support of transitional activities, recovery and reconstruction and prevention.

For more information, please see www.daraint.org.

Strengths

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<th>Donor score</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Funding UN and Red Cross Red Crescent appeals</td>
<td>10.00</td>
<td>5.05</td>
<td>98%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Un-earmarked funding</td>
<td>6.06</td>
<td>3.45</td>
<td>76%</td>
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<td>International humanitarian law</td>
<td>9.90</td>
<td>6.16</td>
<td>61%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Refugee law</td>
<td>9.13</td>
<td>5.74</td>
<td>59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding to NGOs</td>
<td>6.71</td>
<td>4.40</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Areas for improvement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Donor score</th>
<th>OECD/DAC donor average</th>
<th>% below average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Timely funding to complex emergencies</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>4.35</td>
<td>-66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding for reconstruction and prevention</td>
<td>1.98</td>
<td>4.12</td>
<td>-52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding based on level of vulnerability and to forgotten crises</td>
<td>4.63</td>
<td>6.11</td>
<td>-24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impartiality of aid</td>
<td>7.26</td>
<td>7.30</td>
<td>-1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timely funding to sudden onset disasters</td>
<td>6.93</td>
<td>6.97</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Distribution of donor funding to these sectors includes flows within and outside an appeal that has been reported to OCHA/FTS. This is compared to the “distribution of needs” based on the 2009 UN appeal budget allocation.

Source: OCHA/FTS October 2010.
Portugal

Policy framework
Portugal's humanitarian assistance is coordinated by a unit in the Portuguese Institute for Development Support (IPAD) within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This small unit with limited capacity and humanitarian expertise is also responsible for relations with NGOs and the multilateral system. Portugal's financial problems have greatly affected its development budget, which includes humanitarian assistance. Its ODA/GNI ratio has gone down from 0.27% in 2008 to 0.23% in 2009, with a decrease in volume of over 22%. Humanitarian assistance represents 1.23% of ODA, a similar percentage to 2008 and 0.002% of Portugal's GNI.

Portugal formally endorsed the Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) Principles in 2006, but has not developed a GHD domestic implementation plan or a humanitarian policy. Most of its participation in the GHD initiative is through its membership of the Humanitarian Aid Commission of the European Commission rather than directly, in view of its limited capacity at the capital and field levels.

Performance
Portugal is not included in the overall ranking, as a sufficient number of survey responses were not obtained to calculate the qualitative indicators of the HRI. Based on the patterns of its scores in the HRI's quantitative indicators, Portugal is classified as a Group 3 donor. Donors in this group tend to perform poorly in Pillar 3 (Working with humanitarian partners), Pillar 4 (Protection and international law) and Pillar 5 (Learning and accountability). Other donors in this group are Austria, Belgium, France, Italy, Japan and Spain.

In quantitative indicators Portugal scored below the OECD/DAC and the Group 3 average in Pillars 1 (Responding to needs), 2 (Prevention, risk reduction and recovery), 4 and 5. The exception was in Pillar 3 where its score was close to the OECD-DAC average and above its group average. Its highest score was in Pillar 2. Its scores for Pillar 4 and Pillar 5 were considerably below the OECD/DAC and the Group 3 averages, while its lowest score was in Pillar 5. It should be noted that the scores for Portugal have not been taken into account in the calculation of the overall and average scores for Group 3.

Portugal did best compared to its OECD/DAC peers in the indicators on Un-earmarked funding, Timely funding to complex emergencies, Reducing climate-related vulnerability and Human rights law. It scored were relatively the lowest in the indicators on Timely funding to sudden onset disasters, Funding for accountability initiatives, Participation in accountability initiatives, Funding UN and Red Cross Red Crescent appeals and International humanitarian law.

HRI 2010 scores by pillar

Aid distribution by type of organisation

* Graph includes only quantitative pillar scores as sufficient survey responses were not obtained for Portugal.

Source: OCHA/FTS October 2010.
In Pillar 5, Portugal received low scores in **Funding accountability initiatives** and **Participation in accountability initiatives**. Of the seven accountability initiatives included in the indicator, it seems that Portugal has attended only one ALNAP meeting and did not financially support any of them. This is generally a weak point for Group 3 donors, who provide an average of 0.29%, while the OECD/DAC average is 0.46%.

- Portugal is encouraged to increase its participation in, and support of, humanitarian accountability initiatives.

Portugal has limited engagement with other donors and with the humanitarian system.

- Portugal should explore options for increasing its capacity to engage more actively with the international humanitarian system.

For more information, please see www.daraint.org.

### Strengths

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Donor score</th>
<th>OECD/DAC donor average</th>
<th>% over average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Un-earmarked funding</td>
<td>10.00</td>
<td>3.45</td>
<td>190%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timely funding to complex emergencies</td>
<td>10.00</td>
<td>4.35</td>
<td>130%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reducing climate-related vulnerability</td>
<td>9.84</td>
<td>7.19</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human rights law</td>
<td>6.37</td>
<td>6.25</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Areas for improvement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Donor score</th>
<th>OECD/DAC donor average</th>
<th>% below average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Timely funding to sudden onset disasters</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>6.97</td>
<td>-100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding for accountability initiatives</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>2.75</td>
<td>-100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation in accountability initiatives</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>4.73</td>
<td>-96%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding UN and Red Cross Red Crescent appeals</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>5.05</td>
<td>-95%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International humanitarian law</td>
<td>2.32</td>
<td>6.16</td>
<td>-62%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Spain
HRI 2010 ranking: 17th

Policy framework
Spain’s humanitarian assistance is coordinated by the Humanitarian Aid Office of the Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation (AECID) in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation. The 2009–2012 Cooperation Master Plan is the main policy framework for Spanish aid. The Humanitarian Action Strategy Paper focuses on humanitarian aid, and also integrates risk reduction, preparedness and reconstruction. Since 2007, AECID has opened Offices for Technical Cooperation in several countries, giving priority to sub-Saharan Africa. About half of the humanitarian budget falls under the responsibility of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with the other half coming from several ministries, in particular the Ministry of Defence. In 2009, Spain increased its ODA/GNI ratio from 0.45% in 2008 to 0.46% despite a decrease in absolute terms of 4.5% as a result of the financial crisis. Humanitarian assistance represented 9.3% of its ODA and 0.031% of its GNI.

Spain endorsed the Principles of Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) in 2004. Although it has not developed a domestic implementation plan, the GHD Principles are incorporated in the Humanitarian Action Strategy. By strengthening its response and preparedness capacity, Spain aims to improve the delivery of humanitarian assistance, including prevention and risk reduction.

Performance
Spain ranked 17th in HRI 2010. Based on the patterns of its scores, Spain is classified as a Group 3 donor. Donors in this group tend to perform poorly in Pillar 3 (Working with humanitarian partners), Pillar 4 (Protection and international law) and Pillar 5 (Learning and accountability). Other donors in this group are Austria, Belgium, France, Italy, Japan and Portugal.

Spain’s overall score was below the OECD/DAC average and close to the average of Group 3. It scored close to the OECD/DAC and Group 3 average in Pillar 1 (Responding to needs), while in Pillar 2 (Prevention, risk reduction and recovery), where it reached its highest score, it scored above the OECD/DAC and close to the Group 3 scores. Consistent with the pattern of Group 3 donors, its scores in Pillar 3 and in Pillar 4 were below OECD/DAC scores. However, they were above Group 3 scores. Although its score in Pillar 5 was also below the OECD/DAC score it was close to the overall Group 3 score.

Spain did best compared to its OECD/DAC peers in the indicators on Funding for reconstruction and prevention, Human rights law, Reducing climate-related vulnerability, Beneficiary participation in monitoring and evaluation and Beneficiary participation in programming. Its scores were relatively the lowest in the indicators on Funding to NGOs, Funding of risk mitigation mechanisms, Funding for accountability initiatives, Participation in accountability initiatives and Facilitating humanitarian access.

Recommendations
Spain’s performance in Pillar 1 was close to the OECD/DAC and Group 3 average. It was below average, however, in indicators related to timeliness. In the indicator Timeliness of funding to complex emergencies, Spain provided only 25% of its funding within three months of the appeal, while the OECD/DAC average was 34% and Group 3, 40%. Its funding was more timely for sudden onset disasters. Spain

Aid distribution by type of organisation

* The OECD/DAC average does not include scores for Austria, Greece or Portugal.

Source: OCHA/FTS October 2010.
Spain provided 64% of its funding within six weeks, compared to the OECD/DAC average of 70%, and the Group 3 average of 47%. Spain’s partners also expressed concern about the timeliness of its funding, giving it a below-average score.

- **Spain should review the timeliness of its funding and engage in dialogue with its partners to discuss its performance in this area.**

Spain should be praised for its support of CERF and in-country pooled funding mechanisms, and for the UN system. It received its lowest score however in **Funding to NGOs**, as this represented less than one percent of its total aid, significantly below the OECD/DAC average of 1.3% and the Group 3 average of 7%.

- **Spain is encouraged to find ways of increasing the share of funding and support it provides to NGOs.**

Spain would also do well to focus on accountability, as it scored below average in the three related indicators. In terms of **Participation in accountability initiatives**, Spain has attended three ALNAP meetings and has signed IATI, but according to publicly available data sources used for the HRI, it does not apparently participate in GHD, HAP, Quality COMPAS, Sphere, or People in Aid. Its financial support of these initiatives was just below its group average – 0.23% of humanitarian aid compared to 0.29%, and the OECD/DAC average of 0.46%. Spain’s partners support the findings of the quantitative indicators, giving it a below-average score on the qualitative indicator **Accountability toward beneficiaries.**

- **Spain should review its policies for humanitarian accountability and consider increasing its support of and participation in humanitarian accountability initiatives.**

Spain was close to average in the qualitative indicator **Support for learning and evaluations.** Spain scored below average, however, in the quantitative indicator **Funding and commissioning evaluations**, which measures the number of self and joint evaluations and the existence of evaluation guidelines. Spain has evaluation guidelines, but according to publicly available data source used for the HRI, it did not commission any evaluations between 2004 and 2010.

- **Spain is encouraged to explore options to increase its support and utilization of evaluations for learning.**

For more information, please see [www.daraint.org](http://www.daraint.org).

### Strengths

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Donor score</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Funding for reconstruction and prevention</td>
<td>8.34</td>
<td>4.12</td>
<td>102%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human rights law</td>
<td>7.69</td>
<td>6.25</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reducing climate-related vulnerability</td>
<td>8.60</td>
<td>7.19</td>
<td>20%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Beneficiary participation in monitoring and evaluation</td>
<td>6.62</td>
<td>5.54</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beneficiary participation in programming</td>
<td>6.63</td>
<td>5.71</td>
<td>16%</td>
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</table>

### Areas for improvement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Donor score</th>
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<tr>
<td>Funding to NGOs</td>
<td>1.33</td>
<td>4.40</td>
<td>-70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding of risk mitigation mechanisms</td>
<td>2.79</td>
<td>5.49</td>
<td>-49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding for accountability initiatives</td>
<td>1.52</td>
<td>2.75</td>
<td>-45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation in accountability initiatives</td>
<td>3.28</td>
<td>4.73</td>
<td>-31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilitating humanitarian access</td>
<td>3.84</td>
<td>5.22</td>
<td>-26%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Sweden

HRI 2010 ranking: 5th

Policy framework

Sweden’s humanitarian assistance is managed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Swedish International Development Agency (Sida). The Department of Human Security in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is mainly responsible for establishing Sweden’s humanitarian policy, while Sida manages the disbursement of humanitarian aid. The Swedish Government’s 2004 Humanitarian Aid Policy remains the principal policy framework for Swedish humanitarian action. It is complemented by Sida’s 2008-2010 Strategy for Humanitarian Work. The aid policy and structure are currently under review and the outcome is expected to include recommendations to simplify the policy framework and to adjust to the changing humanitarian response environment. The 2009 OECD/DAC peer review of Sweden described the country as a reliable donor both in terms of the size and quality of its aid package. It is the most generous OECD/DAC donor with 1.12% of its 2009 GNI allocated to ODA. Humanitarian aid represents 16.7% of its ODA and 0.136% of its GNI.

Sweden is one of the founders and key supporters of the Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) initiative, and has adopted a GHD domestic implementation plan. It has consistently followed up on critical issues and co-chaired the GHD initiative with the United States in 2003-2004 and 2007-2008.

Performance

Sweden ranked 5th in the HRI 2010. Based on the pattern of its scores, Sweden is classified as a Group 1 donor. Donors in this group tend to do better overall in Pillar 3 (Working with humanitarian partners), Pillar 4 (Protection and international law) and Pillar 5 (Learning and accountability). Other donors in this group include Denmark, Finland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand and Switzerland.

Like other Group 1 donors, Sweden received its highest average scores in Pillars 2 (Prevention, risk reduction and recovery), 3 and 4. In Pillar 1 (Responding to needs), Sweden received its lowest average score, below the OECD/DAC and Group 1 averages. In Pillar 2 (Prevention, risk reduction and recovery), Sweden scored above the OECD/DAC and Group 1 averages. Sweden scored above the OECD/DAC average in Pillar 3, and was close to its group average. Sweden received its best score in Pillar 4, scoring above the OECD/DAC and its group averages. In Pillar 5, Sweden scored above the OECD/DAC average and was close to its group average.

Sweden did best compared to its OECD/DAC peers in the indicators on Funding UN and Red Cross Red Crescent appeals, Participation in accountability initiatives, Funding of risk mitigation mechanisms, International humanitarian law and Refugee law. Its scores were lowest in the indicators on Funding for reconstruction and prevention, Timely funding to complex emergencies, Un-earmarked funding, Timely funding to sudden onset disasters and Funding for accountability initiatives.

HRI 2010 scores by pillar

![HRI 2010 scores by pillar graphic]

Aid distribution by type of organisation

![Aid distribution by type of organisation graphic]

* The OECD/DAC average does not include scores for Austria, Greece or Portugal.

Source: OCHA/FTS October 2010.
Overall, Sweden received high scores on Pillar 2 compared to other Group 1 donors. However, it received a very low score on Funding for reconstruction and prevention, allocating only 4% of its humanitarian funding while on average, Group 1 donors allocated 11%. Group 3, which is the group that performs the best here, allocated an average of 25%.

- Sweden should explore options to increase its support for reconstruction and prevention.

Sweden received a high score for its participation in accountability initiatives, yet a very low score for funding accountability initiatives – a mere 0.34% of its aid, compared to the Group 1 average of 0.71%.

- Sweden should look into ways to increase its support of accountability initiatives.

For more information, please see www.daraint.org.

### Recommendations

Like other Group 1 donors, Sweden could make its funding more timely. Group 1 donors on average provide only 21% of their funding to complex emergencies during the first three months after an appeal launch. In contrast, Sweden gives only 9% during this same period making it the slowest donor in the group and the second-slowest OECD/DAC donor. Sweden committed 55% of its funding within the first six weeks of sudden-onset disasters, placing it among the slowest donors to respond with funding. The best performing group, Group 2, committed 84% in this timeframe. This is somewhat compensated, however, by its strong support for the CERF and other quick disbursement mechanisms. Sweden scores close to average in the qualitative indicator Timely funding to partner organisations, indicating that Sweden’s partners perceive that the timeliness of its funding is better than what the data from publically available sources used to calculate the quantitative indicators would suggest.

- Sweden should review the timeliness of its support to complex and sudden onset emergencies and engage in dialogue with its partners to discuss their perceptions in this area.

### Strengths

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<td>8.39</td>
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<tr>
<td>Funding of risk mitigation mechanisms</td>
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<td>60%</td>
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<tr>
<td>International humanitarian law</td>
<td>9.80</td>
<td>6.16</td>
<td>59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugee law</td>
<td>8.83</td>
<td>5.74</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Areas for improvement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Donor score</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Funding for reconstruction and prevention</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>4.12</td>
<td>-77%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timely funding to complex emergencies</td>
<td>1.13</td>
<td>4.35</td>
<td>-74%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Un-earmarked funding</td>
<td>2.68</td>
<td>3.45</td>
<td>-22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timely funding to sudden onset disasters</td>
<td>5.47</td>
<td>6.97</td>
<td>-22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding for accountability initiatives</td>
<td>2.29</td>
<td>2.75</td>
<td>-17%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Switzerland
HRI 2010 ranking: 7th

Policy framework
Switzerland’s humanitarian aid is provided by the Swiss Humanitarian Aid Unit of the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) — which is part of the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs. The Swiss Federal Law of International Development Cooperation clearly separates the objectives of humanitarian aid and development and their budgets. Switzerland’s humanitarian policy, outlined in the 2009-2014 Humanitarian Action Strategy, is grounded in both international humanitarian law and the Principles of Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD). The strategy calls for a restructuring of SDC to strengthen bilateral cooperation and Swiss presence in partner countries. The Humanitarian Aid of the Swiss Confederation: Strategy 2010 positions Swiss humanitarian action as an investment in sustainable development. The Humanitarian Aid Bill established a five-year (2007-2011) framework for Swiss humanitarian action, and sets a target of ensuring 20% of SDC’s budget is spent on humanitarian aid. Switzerland has a Swiss Rescue Team, a Rapid Response Team and a Humanitarian Aid Unit available for rapid deployment in emergency humanitarian and disaster relief operations. In 2009, Swiss ODA represented 0.47% of its GNI. Humanitarian aid comprised 13.7% of Swiss ODA and 0.05% of GNI.

Switzerland has been engaged in the GHD initiative since its inception and continues to play an active role with regard to donor coordination and cooperation with humanitarian actors. It convenes an annual retreat in Montreux which brings together major donors and humanitarian representatives. Switzerland is chairing the GHD group for 2010-2011. Switzerland was one of the first donors to have humanitarian assistance included in its OECD/DAC Peer Review in 2005 as part of the enhanced review process. Although Switzerland does not have a GHD domestic implementation plan, GHD commitments have been integrated into legislation and provide a solid basis for principled humanitarian action.

Performance
Switzerland ranked 7th in the HRI 2010. Based on the pattern of its scores, Switzerland is classified as a Group 1 donor. Donors in this group tend to do better overall in Pillar 3 (Working with humanitarian partners), Pillar 4 (Protection and international law) and Pillar 5 (Learning and accountability). Other donors in this group include Denmark, Finland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway and Sweden.

Switzerland received its highest average score in Pillar 1 (Responding to needs), where it was close to the OECD/DAC and Group 1 averages. In Pillar 2 (Prevention, risk reduction and recovery), Switzerland was above the OECD/DAC average and close to its group average. In Pillar 3 and Pillar 4, it scored close to the OECD/DAC average and below the Group 1 average. In Pillar 5, it was above the OECD/DAC average and close to its group average.

Switzerland did best compared to its OECD/DAC peers in the indicators on International humanitarian law, Participation in accountability initiatives, Funding of risk mitigation mechanisms, Un-earmarked funding and Reducing climate-related vulnerability. Its scores were lowest in the indicators on Funding for reconstruction and prevention, Timely funding to complex emergencies, Human rights law, Funding to NGOs and Advocacy towards local authorities.

Aid distribution by type of organisation

Source: OCHA/FTS October 2010.
Donor assessments

Switzerland

to NGOs, and Group 1 donors an average of 15%. Denmark led the way in this indicator, with 34%.

Switzerland should consider finding ways of channeling a greater percentage of its funding to NGOs.

Switzerland received the highest score of all OECD/DAC donors for International humanitarian law. However, it was among the lowest scored donors, and well below the OECD/DAC average, for Human rights law, an indicator measuring signature and ratification of human rights treaties, accreditation of national human rights institutions and funding to OHCHR, the primary guardian of international human rights treaties. Furthermore, its support of OHCHR, as guardian of international human rights treaties is 0.55% of every million dollars of its GDP below the Group 1 average of 1.36%.

Switzerland should review the human rights treaties it has signed and consider ways of increasing its support of human rights organisations such as OHCHR.

For more information, please see www.daraint.org.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strengths</th>
<th>Areas for improvement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indicator</strong></td>
<td><strong>Donor score</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International humanitarian law</td>
<td>9.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation in accountability initiatives</td>
<td>7.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding of risk mitigation mechanisms</td>
<td>8.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Un-earmarked funding</td>
<td>4.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reducing climate-related vulnerability</td>
<td>9.90</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Distribution of donor funding to these sectors includes flows within and outside an appeal that has been reported to OCHA/FTS. This is compared to the “distribution of needs” based on the 2009 UN appeal budget allocation.

Source: OCHA/FTS October 2010.
United Kingdom
HRI 2010 ranking: 8th

Policy framework
The United Kingdom’s (UK) humanitarian assistance is managed by the Department for International Development (DFID). The 2006 Humanitarian Policy and the 2009 White Paper Eliminating World Poverty: Building our Common Future constitute its policy framework. DFID has an extensive regional and country level presence, in many locations with humanitarian staff. When a sudden onset crisis occurs, DFID can call on its stand-by capacity and is able to participate in coordination structures for rapid support. Its Conflict and Humanitarian Fund, created in 2006, helps provide NGOs with two- to five-year funding agreements, contingent on performance evaluations. DFID also has multi-year institutional strategies with a number of UN agencies and the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement. It regularly sets aside ten percent of its humanitarian budget for disaster risk reduction and continues to play a central role in promoting humanitarian reform components, such as pooled funding (CERF and CHF), the cluster approach, improved CAPs and strengthening the Humanitarian Coordinator system. DFID has also actively advocated for improved needs assessments, surge capacity for rapid response and donor coordination. In 2009, it spent 0.52% of its GNI on ODA, aiming to reach the 0.7% UN target by 2013. Humanitarian assistance represented 10.49% of its ODA and 0.040% of its GNI.

As a strong supporter of the Principles of Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD), the UK follows a GHD implementation plan. DFID chaired the GHD group in 2006–2007 and in Sudan has taken the lead in initiatives to improve coordination among GHD donors.

Performance
The UK ranked 8th in the HRI 2010. Based on the patterns of its scores, the UK is classified as a Group 2 donor. Donors in this group tend to perform around average in all pillars, with slightly better scores in Pillar 1 (Responding to needs), and somewhat poorer in Pillar 2 (Prevention, risk reduction and recovery). Other donors in the group include Australia, Canada, the European Commission, Germany, Greece (based on quantitative indicators only), Ireland and the United States.

The UK received its highest score in Pillar 1, close to the OECD/DAC and Group 2 averages in this pillar. In Pillar 2 and Pillar 3 (Working with humanitarian partners) it scored close to the OECD/DAC averages but above the Group 2 averages. In Pillar 4 (Protection and international law), its score was similar to the OECD/DAC and Group 2 averages. Finally, in Pillar 5 (Learning and accountability) the UK scored above the OECD/DAC average and close to its group average.

The UK was best among its OECD/DAC peers in the indicators on Participation in accountability initiatives, Funding UN and Red Cross Red Crescent appeals, Funding of risk mitigation mechanisms, Funding based on level of vulnerability and to forgotten crises and Timely funding to complex emergencies. Its scores were relatively the lowest in the indicators on Funding for reconstruction and prevention, Funding for accountability initiatives, Un-earmarked funding, Refugee law and Appropriate reporting requirements.

Aid distribution by type of organisation

* The OECD/DAC average does not include scores for Austria, Greece or Portugal.

Source: OCHA/FTS October 2010.
The UK supports the CERF and country-based pooled funding mechanisms.

Un-earmarked funding comprised 25% of the UK’s aid, while the OECD/DAC average is 35%. Similarly, the UK scored well below the OECD/DAC average in the survey questions related to flexibility, conditionality of funding, and appropriateness of reporting requirements.

The UK should review the flexibility of its funding and engage in dialogue with its partners to discuss their perceptions of its performance in this area.

The UK received one of the lowest scores of all OECD/DAC donors for the qualitative indicator on protection of civilians, indicating that its partners would like to see the UK more engaged in protection.

The UK should engage in dialogue with its partners to discuss their perceptions regarding its support for protection.

For more information, please see www.daraint.org.

Of all pillars, the UK performs the best in Pillar 1, but within this pillar it could improve its performance by ensuring the independence and impartiality of its aid. The UK received one of the lowest scores of OECD/DAC donors in both the independence and impartiality indicators, which could indicate that partners do not generally perceive UK’s aid to be impartial and independent.

The UK should engage in dialogue with its partners to discuss their perceptions regarding the independence and impartiality of the UK’s aid.

The UK’s performance in Pillar 2 was close to the OECD/DAC average and above the Group 2 average. However, it scored very low on the indicator of Funding for reconstruction and prevention, receiving its second-lowest score of the index. In 2008, the UK allocated 7% of its humanitarian aid to reconstruction and prevention. Group 2, in contrast, spent an average of 15% on this, while the best performing group, Group 3, allocated an average of 25%.

The UK should consider finding ways to increase its support of reconstruction and prevention.

The UK is highly supportive of the CERF and country-based pooled funding mechanisms. It also has multi-year funding arrangements with a number of UN agencies, the IFRC and ICRC. However, there are some issues related to flexibility. Un-earmarked funding comprised 25% of the UK’s aid, while the OECD/DAC average is 35%. Similarly, the UK scored well below the OECD/DAC average in the survey questions related to flexibility, conditionality of funding, and appropriateness of reporting requirements.

The UK should review the flexibility of its funding and engage in dialogue with its partners to discuss their perceptions of its performance in this area.

The UK received one of the lowest scores of all OECD/DAC donors for the qualitative indicator on protection of civilians, indicating that its partners would like to see the UK more engaged in protection.

The UK should engage in dialogue with its partners to discuss their perceptions regarding its support for protection.

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### Strengths

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Donor score</th>
<th>OECD/DAC donor average</th>
<th>% over average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Participation in accountability initiatives</td>
<td>9.50</td>
<td>4.73</td>
<td>101%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding UN and Red Cross Red Crescent appeals</td>
<td>8.25</td>
<td>5.05</td>
<td>63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding of risk mitigation mechanisms</td>
<td>7.28</td>
<td>5.49</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding based on level of vulnerability and to forgotten crises</td>
<td>7.19</td>
<td>6.11</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timely funding to complex emergencies</td>
<td>5.11</td>
<td>4.35</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Areas for improvement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Donor score</th>
<th>OECD/DAC donor average</th>
<th>% below average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Funding for reconstruction and prevention</td>
<td>1.63</td>
<td>4.12</td>
<td>-60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding for accountability initiatives</td>
<td>1.57</td>
<td>2.75</td>
<td>-43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Un-earmarked funding</td>
<td>2.47</td>
<td>3.45</td>
<td>-28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugee law</td>
<td>4.90</td>
<td>5.74</td>
<td>-15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appropriate reporting requirements</td>
<td>6.93</td>
<td>7.48</td>
<td>-7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
United States
HRI 2010 ranking: 19th

Policy framework

The United States (US) provides humanitarian assistance through the USAID Office for Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), the Food for Peace Program (FFP) and the State Department’s Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM). OFDA coordinates disaster relief, operating with the smallest budget of the three departments and working mostly through NGOs. FFP handles nearly half of the humanitarian budget, while PRM is responsible for assistance to refugees and others affected by conflict. In addition, the Department of Defense established a Commander Emergency Response Program (CERP) to support US military commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan to “respond to urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction requirements”. Its budget now surpasses OFDA’s. With its last White Paper dating back to 2004 and no single policy strategy currently existing, OFDA has been tasked with reforming the US approach to humanitarian aid to more effectively meet broad foreign policy priorities. The reform will build on the 2006 Strategic Framework for U.S. Foreign Assistance, which reoriented US humanitarian action towards a stronger integration of relief and development. In 2010, the US released a new development policy, but the humanitarian policy remains under review. An inter-departmental Working Group on

Performance

The United States ranked 19th in the HRI 2010. Based on the patterns of its scores, the US is classified as a Group 2 donor. Donors in this group tend to perform better overall in Pillar 1 (Responding to needs) and Pillar 5 (Learning and accountability), but poorer overall in the other pillars. Other donors in this group are Australia, Canada, European Commission, Germany, Greece (based on quantitative scores only), Ireland and the United Kingdom.

The US overall score was below the OECD/DAC and the Group 2 averages. However, it scored above the OECD/DAC and slightly above the Group 2 average in Pillar 1 where it reached its highest score. It scored below the OECD/DAC and group’s average in the other four pillars. Its lowest score was in Pillar 2 (Prevention, risk reduction and recovery), with higher scores in Pillar 3 (Working with humanitarian partners), Pillar 4 (Protection and international law) and Pillar 5.

Aid distribution by type of organisation

Source: OCHA/FTS October 2010.

* The OECD/DAC average does not include scores for Austria, Greece or Portugal.
United States

The US allocated 5% of its humanitarian aid to reconstruction and prevention, while Group 2 allocated 15%, and Group 3, 25%. In addition, the US was the OECD/DAC donor that allocated the least to risk mitigation mechanisms, with 0.4% of its ODA. Most Group 2 donors’ allocations range from 0.6% to 1.3%.

The US should consider finding ways of increasing its support for risk mitigation, prevention and reconstruction. US partners consider it a good donor in terms of facilitating humanitarian access. However, the US scores at or below average in the other indicators that comprise Pillar 4. The US received a low score in support for international humanitarian law. OECD/DAC donors allocated 0.005% of every million dollars of its GDP to the ICRC, the primary guardian of international humanitarian law. The US contributed only 0.002%. Among OECD/DAC donors, the US has also signed or ratified the least number of international humanitarian treaties. The US additionally received low scores in human rights law and refugee law.

The US should review its policy on the signature of international humanitarian law, human rights and refugee treaties and consider finding ways of increasing its support of the ICRC and promoting IHL.

For more information, please see www.daraint.org.

**Strengths**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Donor score</th>
<th>OECD/DAC donor average</th>
<th>% over average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Participation in accountability initiatives</td>
<td>6.83</td>
<td>4.73</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timely funding to complex emergencies</td>
<td>5.64</td>
<td>4.35</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding to NGOs</td>
<td>5.36</td>
<td>4.40</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding based on level of vulnerability and to forgotten crises</td>
<td>7.26</td>
<td>6.11</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timely funding to sudden onset disasters</td>
<td>7.96</td>
<td>6.97</td>
<td>14%</td>
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</table>

**Areas for improvement**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Donor score</th>
<th>OECD/DAC donor average</th>
<th>% below average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Un-earmarked funding</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>3.45</td>
<td>-96%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding and commissioning evaluations</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>4.25</td>
<td>-94%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human rights law</td>
<td>1.90</td>
<td>6.25</td>
<td>-70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding for reconstruction and prevention</td>
<td>1.29</td>
<td>4.12</td>
<td>-69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reducing climate-related vulnerability</td>
<td>2.69</td>
<td>7.19</td>
<td>-63%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Distribution of donor funding to these sectors includes flows within and outside an appeal that has been reported to OCHA/FTS. This is compared to the “distribution of needs” based on the 2009 UN appeal budget allocation.

Source: OCHA/FTS October 2010.
Crisis reports
Crisis reports

Introduction

Crisis reports are at the core of the Humanitarian Response Index (HRI). This research assesses donor application of the Principles of Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) in different crises. The crisis reports specifically illustrate the constraints and challenges that humanitarian actors face within the context of each crisis studied, with the inherent goal of identifying where improvements are needed in the global provision of humanitarian aid.

This year, DARA completed a total of 14 field missions: Afghanistan, the Central African Republic (CAR), Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Haiti, Indonesia, the occupied Palestinian territories (oPt), Pakistan, the Philippines, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Yemen and Zimbabwe. These countries were selected as a representative sample of the diverse global crises faced in 2009, including sudden-onset disasters, internal and regional conflicts, protracted crises and complex and forgotten emergences.

Several of these crises have been included in past editions of the HRI, allowing for a broader and improved ability to observe donor trends and changes in their provision of humanitarian aid over the years. The crises in Colombia and DRC, have been studied each year since the first publication of the HRI in 2007, lending to an evolutionary illustration of each crisis and aid within these contexts. Appearing in the HRI for the first time this year are Indonesia, the Philippines, Yemen and Zimbabwe.

1 DARA selected the mission to CAR to pilot a new questionnaire. The main findings can be found in Part 1.
2 As the response to the Haiti earthquake took place in 2010, the questionnaires were not included in the calculation of the index. A crisis report assessing the response is included however.
HRI research teams examine donor performance across the selected crises through the systematic collection of data relating to how humanitarian organisations view donors’ performance and compliance with their commitments to good practice as outlined in the GHD Principles. Such data collection involves interviews with the heads of different humanitarian organisations present in a crisis, as well as with government authorities, civil society organisations and donor representatives. The HRI conducts a survey on donor performance with those organisations that receive external funding for their response operations. Survey questions are related to specific concepts contained in the GHD Principles and provide many of the qualitative indicators used to construct the overall HRI scores and rankings. This year, 411 organisations were interviewed,\(^3\) and 1,949 survey responses (1,384 for OECD/DAC donors)\(^4\) were gathered.

The resulting crisis report reflects information collected through these surveys and extensive field interviews, along with data from secondary sources, such as assessments and evaluations of the response. The reports are meant to highlight strong donor performance as well as areas in which challenges have been met, or remain within the crises, which will inform the international community of where and how the overall response can be improved.

Overall, donor performance across the five pillars was above average for Indonesia, the Philippines, Zimbabwe and Sri Lanka. Donor scores were middle range in Afghanistan, CAR, DRC, Colombia, oPt and Sudan. Scores were the below-average in Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen.

Donor performance across crises found that this year, donors have generally received their higher scores in Pillar 1 (Responding to needs), Pillar 3 (Working with humanitarian partners), and Pillar 5 (Learning and accountability). Their lower scores were generally found in Pillar 2 (Prevention, risk reduction and recovery) and Pillar 4 (Protection and international law).

Recurrent throughout this year’s crisis reports are the themes of politicisation of aid and the protection of civilians. For example, in Afghanistan, Pakistan and oPt, protection has become a critical issue due to restrictions in humanitarian access and space. In these highly politicised crises, government and military interests have often taken priority over humanitarian needs such as protection, especially for women and children. In several other crises, protection was also found to be of central concern due to a general lack of funding, of authoritative control and a lack of integration of protection strategies into contingency planning. In certain crises, such as those in Colombia and the Philippines, governments have often diverted attention from humanitarian needs, which has hindered the humanitarian response, namely in protection.

\(^3\) 487 including interviews with donor agencies.
\(^4\) Figures do not include Haiti.
Afghanistan at a glance

The crisis and the response

- Several key actors are reluctant to acknowledge evidence of the extent of the humanitarian crisis: increased insecurity, high displacement (at least 297,000 IDPs and 2.89 million refugees), growing food insecurity and disrespect for human rights, especially of women and girls.

- 2009 was the worst year for civilian casualties since the overthrow of the Taliban in 2001.

- Accessing the needs of affected populations is difficult, as more areas become no-go zones.

- All major OECD/DAC donors (with the exception of Switzerland and Ireland) have shaped their aid support on the flawed assumption Afghanistan is a post-conflict country.

- Donors funded 76 percent of the 2009 HAP target of US$665 million. Outside the appeal, donors provided an additional US$145 million.

- OCHA reopened in Afghanistan in 2009 and set up an Emergency Response Fund.

- Many humanitarian organisations were frustrated by continued use of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), which compromise impartiality and neutrality.

Donor performance

- Politicisation of the crisis has violated principles of impartiality and neutrality and made humanitarian intervention difficult and dangerous.

- The least funded cluster is health followed by nutrition, an inadequate response to protection in a country with some of the world’s worst health and nutrition indicators.

- The same donors who call for greater transparency and accountability are consistently violating their own professed principles.

Key challenges and areas for improvement

- Humanitarian workers must act to distinguish themselves from military personnel.

- Donors must recognise the true scope of the humanitarian crisis and encourage separation of humanitarian response from military activities.

- All conflict protagonists must be encouraged to respect humanitarian principles of independence and neutrality.

- Donors must empower civil society and ensure aid is allocated only after thorough analysis of community needs and capacities.
**Intensified armed conflict**

In 2009, General Stanley A. McChrystal, the then commander of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the United States Forces in Afghanistan (USFOR-A), re-elaborated the US’s traditional counter-insurgency strategy of “winning hearts and minds”, using a new acronym – WHAM. In February 2010, on the eve of ISAF’s Operation Moshtarak in Helmand Province, he talked confidently of military promotion of democratic governance, declaring that “we’ve got a government in a box, ready to roll in” to areas liberated from Taliban control (International Council on Security and Development 2010).

This rhetoric does not appear to impress Afghans. A survey after Operation Moshtarak found 71 percent of Afghans said they wanted foreign troops to leave Afghanistan (International Council on Security and Development 2010). A tribal leader from Kandahar noted that “ten percent of the people are with the Taliban, ten percent are with the government and 80 percent are angry at the Taliban, the government and the foreigners” (Mercille 2010). Afghanistan now hosts more US troops than Iraq, yet analysts doubt that the troop surge will lead to sustainable diminution of the Taliban presence or to achievement of WHAM objectives. Civilian fatalities resulting from US/ISAF military offensives caused increasing resentment in 2009, prompting the US to repeatedly declare a desire to minimise “collateral” damage, but has been unable to do so in several well-publicised incidents.

Insecurity, corruption, poor coordination, under-resourcing and external control of many development interventions all came together to prevent the Afghan government from providing basic services. Afghanistan has been ranked as the second most corrupt country in the world (Transparency International 2009). Almost all those employed by the government, whether in a civilian or security capacity, are judged to be corrupt by Afghans by and most humanitarian organisations the HRI team interviewed in the field. The UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) states that corruption ranks even higher than security as a concern among Afghans (UNODC 2010). Corruption has been described by a senior British official as the “elephant in the room”, the key impediment to development, but rarely talked about during seminars on the country’s future (DNDTalk 2010). US congressional investigators report that funds clandestinely paid by the US to ensure safe passage of military convoys further reinforce corruption and bolster the Taliban (Reuters 2010).

**Afghanistan**

**Militarisation of aid hinders humanitarian efforts**

In 2009, expectations of peace, stability and development were further dashed in Afghanistan. Already appalling humanitarian indicators have worsened since the previous Humanitarian Response Index (HRI) missions in 2008 and 2009 (Marañón & Fernández 2008 and Polastro 2009), and the country slipped further down the Human Development Index to second-to-last place. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) reports that 42 percent of the population live on less than US$1 per day and more than half suffer from chronic malnutrition (OCHA 2010a).

Infant mortality is among the highest in the world and in September 2009, OCHA estimated that 31 percent of the population were food-insecure (UNICEF 2009 and OCHA 2009). There are growing criticisms that the estimated US$36 billion spent on development, reconstruction and humanitarian projects in Afghanistan since the overthrow of the Taliban (Afghan Ministry of Finance, cited in IRIN 2009) has been mismanaged, poorly targeted, corruptly misappropriated and significantly used to support military-led humanitarian responses which continue to violate key Principles of Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD).

**Crisis reports**

Afghanistan

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Many believe there is no alternative to ending the conflict other than by achieving some kind of negotiated settlement with insurgents. With objectives of building democratic institutions being scaled down, most external providers of military assistance to the government are contemplating withdrawal. Fuelled by civilian deaths in military operations and frequent press reports about misallocated aid and profits made by international contractors, there is increasing popular resentment. As Western optimism has faded, there is a considerable sense of unease as well as mistrust and resentment among donors, the UN, international non-governmental organisations (INGOs), Afghan government officials, private contractors and Afghan civil society.

**What humanitarian crisis?**

The HR1 team found once again that key actors, including the government, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and many troop-providing governments, are clearly reluctant to acknowledge the extent of the crisis. 

While some interviewees agreed with the designation of humanitarian crisis, others preferred to speak of “a humanitarian situation”, “vulnerability crisis” or “chronic crisis”. This reluctance to “call a spade a spade” is partly the result of the inability to gather robust data through field evaluations and the resultant dependence on often dubious proxy assessments.

Eight years have passed since the fall of the Taliban regime, and although the international community appears to recognise the importance of humanitarian needs more than was reported in the HR1 2008 and 2009, it is still unable to define clearly the nature and magnitude of these needs. Effective response to immediate vulnerabilities is hampered by continued insistence that the Western military and aid intervention is focused on post-conflict recovery and the building of Afghan military and civilian capacity – not on humanitarian response. Donors continue to frame interventions within the framework of the Afghanistan Compact and the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS), political agreements between the government and the international community which stress the need for reconstruction, development, institution building and achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (UNDP 2010).

As a result of this emphasis and the dire security situation, the UN has reported increasing difficulties in recruiting appropriately experienced staff. Donors like the European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO) and the US Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) are eager to receive project proposals that fit with their humanitarian mandate yet are unable to allocate part of their funds. Most international agencies and their implementing partners are development specialists and there is a growing lack of humanitarian actors.

Large numbers of Afghans remain displaced. The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (2010) reports there are 297,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) and a further 2.89 million Afghans are registered refugees in neighbouring countries. Actual numbers are thought to be considerably higher with analysts suggesting both donors and the government have chosen to overlook the extent of displacement.

In 2009, insecurity, land disputes, unexploded ordnance and lack of livelihoods resulted in a further decrease in the number of repatriating refugees assisted by UNHCR. The UN refugee agency’s 2009 target of assisting 220,000 returns was only 25 percent achieved. Significant numbers of returnees have become IDPs, many becoming undocumented residents of informal settlements in major cities.

Most repatriating refugees have lived for decades, or have been born, in Pakistani or Iranian cities and have little capacity or interest in agriculture. Significant numbers are thought to have returned clandestinely to Iran or Pakistan where there is growing popular and official resentment of their presence and regular threats to forcibly repatriate Afghan refugees and illegal migrants. UNHCR (2010) has warned that Afghanistan has no capacity to absorb more returnees unless donors provide targeted support. Some experts speculate that 70 percent of the population of Kabul – several million people – fall into the overlapping categories of repatriated refugee/IDP. Swollen by IDP and refugee numbers, Afghan cities are experiencing rising poverty, unemployment, criminality and despair. Displaced and unemploymen urban men may be particularly vulnerable to recruitment by the insurgency (ICG 2009).

In 2009, two pronouncements by President Karzai provoked storms of protest: apparent support for a draft law which would have legalised rape within marriage and the granting of a presidential pardon to convicted rapists. Warning that the already dire vulnerability of women and girls could further worsen, Human Rights Watch (2009) has argued the need to “make sure that women’s and girls’ rights don’t just get lip service while being pushed to the bottom of the list by the government and donors”. The massive presence of the international community and theoretical national adherence to international human rights laws have done little to address the lack of protection and impunity for perpetrators of human rights violations. Many humanitarian and human rights agencies accuse donors of remaining silent about human rights. US and ISAF military personnel, the Afghan government and donors all need to do more to protect civilians and encourage wider respect for international humanitarian law.

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1 Under the terms of the Afghanistan Compact, the Afghan government of has assured the international community of its determination “to work toward a stable and prosperous Afghanistan, with good governance and human rights protection for all under the rule of law”.

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1 See 2009 Afghanistan crisis report
The response

The Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) launched, for the first time since 2001, a Humanitarian Action Plan (HAP) – a framework to identify, prioritise and address the needs of the most vulnerable in Afghanistan. The 2009 HAP initially requested US$604 million for 112 projects. The appeal was later revised upwards to US$665 million. Some NGOs and donors argued that the HAP actually has the character of a Development Action Plan, neither addressing chronic vulnerability nor establishing means to save lives imminently at risk. To date, the HAP has received US$507 million (76.4 percent of overall needs), with 93.6 percent allocated to UN agencies, mainly to the World Food Programme (WFP), 5.5 percent to NGOs and a mere 0.02 percent to local NGOs (OCHA 2010b).

The least funded cluster is health, with five percent of the required amount, followed by nutrition with 19 percent. This low response is highly regrettable, given that Afghanistan has among the world’s worst health and nutrition indicators. Donors interviewed by the HRI team explained that health is normally covered by development projects. There is an equally poor response for protection (27 percent funded) – although this is one of the most important needs in Afghanistan. While these clusters have suffered from underfunding, others such as common services, education, and emergency telecommunications met or surpassed the funding requirements. Donors funded 97 percent of food security and agriculture requirements, with most pledges allocated to WFP – which is by far the largest humanitarian recipient of aid in Afghanistan. Other humanitarian actors and donors like ECHO question the quality of WFP food security data and argue the appeal is based on guesstimates. WFP is criticised for distributing assistance through local governments with insufficient monitoring, potentially leading to politicisation of aid, especially as parliamentary elections approach.

It is next to impossible to quantify the extent of international aid provided to Afghanistan. This is because the response continues to be led by multiple overarching layers of players: humanitarian actors, militaries, diplomats and private contractors with various, and sometimes incompatible, agendas. Donors are criticised, both by the Afghan government and the UN, for their lack of transparency. The same donors who call for greater transparency and accountability on the international stage are, when it comes to revealing figures on total aid provided to Afghanistan, consistently violating their own professed principles.

According to figures reported to OCHA’s Financial Tracking System (FTS), the largest donors of humanitarian assistance in 2009 were Japan (US$89.8 million); the US (US$89.9 million); the European Commission (US$52.8 million); Germany (US$39.6 million); Norway (US$26.4 million); Canada (US$25.9 million) and the Netherlands (US$14.8 million). Six new donors funded humanitarian efforts in Afghanistan in 2009, principally the Russian Federation (US$10 million) and India (US$6.4 million).

Donors’ prioritisation of development is evident in their budgets. Donor agencies with a clear humanitarian mandate like OFDA and ECHO, with budgets of US$33 million and US$35 million respectively, have limited budgets compared to development-oriented agencies like USAID, which had a 2009 budget of US$2.15 billion (USAID 2010, ECHO 2009 and USAID Afghanistan 2010).

In 2009, OCHA also set up an Emergency Response Fund (with a target of US$5 million) whose objective is to provide rapid funds to NGOs to initiate life-saving humanitarian activities. Outside the appeal, it is estimated that donors have provided an additional US$145 million, mainly to NGOs and to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).
There is considerable unease about PRTs among the humanitarian community and disappointment that previously expressed reservations have not influenced policy. In January 2010, the UN's Special Advisor on Development in Afghanistan argued that PRTs were set up at a time when there was little state capacity, but that PRT managers should now let Afghans manage more reconstruction projects and funds on their own in order to achieve the declared goal of building government capacity to deliver basic services. Because PRTs often have more funds than local Afghan authorities, they are competing with local Afghans to deliver services. Funding for PRTs diverts greatly needed funds away from Afghan civilian institutions whose weaknesses further prolong the military presence. PRTs thus end up hampering the development of the local government and further confusing Afghan communities and civil servants. Allocation of substantial foreign funding through PRTs, rather than through Afghan ministries, has led to discrepancies in development investments, with far more North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) PRT funding available in southern and eastern Afghanistan where insurgents are most active.

It is not possible to obtain aggregated information on total allocations for PRTs, but it is clear that they are an expensive and inefficient aid conduit. A considerable source of US funding for PRTs is provided by a mechanism also used in Iraq – the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP). US$1 billion was allocated to the Afghanistan CERP fund in 2010 (US House of Representatives 2009). The 2009 US PRT budget of US$200 million exceeded the Afghan national budgets for health and education combined (Oxfam 2009). The predominance of PRTs in the humanitarian landscape is a trend that has continued – if not accelerated – under the Obama Administration (Refugees International 2009).

The Afghan Ministry of Public Health has noted that it has, at times, not been informed about the establishment of health facilities, and that PRTs have not ensured funding to continue their sustainable operation. PRTs have also donated medicines which are not on the government's approved list. Furthermore, the presence of uniformed military personnel in health facilities exposes medical staff and patients to threats from insurgents.

Education provides an additional example of the consequences of the unclear separation between political-military activities and aid. Threats against schools, students, parents and teachers led to the end of schooling in many areas in 2009 and to a decline in female enrolment. The use of educational premises as polling stations during the 2009 presidential elections, and the fact that some schools are constructed by PRTs, provided further incentive for insurgents' attacks on the education system. In the southern provinces it is reported that over two thirds of schools have closed due to insecurity (CARE 2009).

**Humanitarian space disappearing**

Most INGOs are under intense pressure from the donor governments they depend on. A donor told the HRI team that “in Afghanistan humanitarian aid is an integrated element that must accompany military action and cannot be neutral... NGOs have a duty to support our boys. It is regrettable that NGOs are so reluctant to coordinate with our troops. They should be more pragmatic, they have so much to offer”. Little has changed from the HRI missions of 2008 and 2009 when it was noted that military objectives often define humanitarian interventions, putting humanitarian workers and beneficiaries at risk. Staff of humanitarian agencies, particularly those working in areas of southern and eastern Afghanistan, are still endangered by perceptions that their activities are linked to Western military objectives.

Intensification of the conflict has further reduced humanitarian space. In early 2009, the UN Department of Safety and Security considered only 37 percent of the country to be “low-risk” and 20.6 percent “medium-risk”. According to the Afghanistan NGO Safety Office (ANSO), insurgent groups have a presence in over 97 percent of the country. Today, only the ICRC is even attempting to negotiate access to areas held by insurgents. Conflict-affected areas of the country have become virtual no-go zones in which information on humanitarian needs is apocryphal or non-existent. In June 2010, a report from the UN Secretary-General contradicted US assertions of steady counter-insurgency progress by noting that the overall security situation had continued to decline (VOA 2009). As the Taliban have sought “soft” targets, the security of humanitarian aid workers and their ability to work has steadily eroded. Taliban commanders have stepped up their campaign to intimidate or kill Afghan civilians working for the Afghan government and aid agencies. In 2009, 19 NGO workers, all Afghans, were killed. In October 2009, an attack on a UN guesthouse in Kabul forced aid organisations to review security and further reduce visibility and travel.

**Coordination lacking**

Afghanistan roll-out of the cluster approach took place in June 2008 and OCHA reopened an office in Afghanistan in early 2009 after an eight year absence, thanks largely to advocacy by NGOs. While humanitarian actors welcomed the return of OCHA as overdue recognition that Afghanistan remains in the grips of a humanitarian crisis, most report that coordination remains weak and disproportionately Kabul-focused.
Crisis reports

Afghanistan

Multiple donors and INGOs continue to be highly concerned about violations of principles of neutrality, independence and impartiality. ECHO is critical of the current “integrated approach” and according to some interviewees is considering not funding NGOs operating in PRTs. Some NGOs, determined to preserve or recover their impartial status, told the HRI team that they have chosen not to accept US or UN funds. A staffer from a US NGO that had lost its ability to access major parts of Afghanistan explained that rejecting US funding “was the only way to demonstrate the clarity and transparency of our intentions and to have again access to beneficiaries.”

Some donors have imposed “security requirements” on implementing partners, obliging them to use armoured vehicles and employ guards, further causing them to be associated with military actors. It is hardly surprising that Afghans are confused as to who is a combatant and who is an aid worker. A director of a major INGO told us that “when military actors are doing things we normally do, they create confusion about our neutrality. The consequence is immediate: insurgency that normally targets military is now targeting us. This situation also puts in danger those we are intending to help. It obliges us to revise our operation plans and our presence on the field.”

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“When military actors are doing things we normally do, they create confusion about our neutrality. – Director of an INGO

GHD Principles missing in action

Afghanistan is the only complex emergency in which all major OECD/DAC donors (with the exception of Switzerland and Ireland) are also belligerents who have shaped their aid support on the assumption that Afghanistan is a post-conflict country. Donors are, for the most part, unwilling or politically unable to recognise the humanitarian scope of the crisis. According to HRI respondents, with the exception of ECHO, Norway and Switzerland, donors do not defend the principled humanitarian approaches defined by the GHD.
There seems little likelihood of change in donors’ policies to direct aid resources to support their military and political strategies. Many NGOs explained that it is relatively easy to obtain funds in conflict areas where donor nations have troops, but extremely difficult in non-conflict areas. A UN staffer noted that there is “an imbalance between donors spending in insecure and secure provinces that needs to be addressed”. Failure to meet needs in non-conflict regions provides an incentive to return to poppy cultivation.

**Lessons learnt and recommendations for the future**

The international community appears to lack analytical capacity or a clear strategy, and continues to downplay the humanitarian emergency, to pursue post-conflict strategies and to heavily invest in the provision of development assistance through military leadership. Humanitarian action is significantly shaped by military and geo-political agendas. Despite considerable statements of concern from wide sections of the humanitarian community, donors still prioritise security, counter-terrorism, counternarcotics and nation-building. This increasingly diverts attention from the humanitarian crisis by conveying a misleading impression of development and post-conflict recovery. With Afghanistan’s future so uncertain, there is an urgent need for dialogue between donors, international humanitarians, and Afghan state and civil society actors in order to ensure that unmet humanitarian needs are effectively and impartially addressed.

Amid a climate of tension between NGOs, donors, contractors and military personnel there is increasing awareness that the militarised approach to aid is not working. More of the same will not win “hearts and minds”. Some governments such as Canada and the Netherlands are already discussing scenarios for a genuinely humanitarian-led response to the Afghan crisis if and when the current military mission ends. This provides a window of opportunity to reassert GHD Principles, and put a stop to the militarisation of aid, fragmentation of aid delivery, the disastrous post-2001 donor trend to view Afghanistan through a security lens and, above all else, to begin repairing fractured trust between Afghan and international humanitarian actors and local beneficiaries.

It is important that donors:

1. acknowledge the failure of the militarised response to humanitarian needs;
2. promote the separation of military activities from humanitarian aid;
3. heed and promote GHD Principles: all protagonists to the conflicts in Afghanistan must be encouraged to respect humanitarian principles of independence and impartiality;
4. ensure aid is allocated only after thorough analysis of community needs and capacities;
5. provide support to empower national NGOs and civil society;
6. advocate for, and fund, protection activities, particularly targeted at vulnerable women and children;
7. advocate for OCHA to be permitted to play an independent, neutral and impartial role;
8. assuage the anger and fears of the Afghan population by ensuring greater national and international accountability and provision of transparent publicly available information on aid flows.

**References**


Crisis reports

Colombia
Colombia at a glance

**The crisis and the response**

- Colombia has the world’s second highest number of IDPs: around five million have been displaced by conflict.
- Denying the existence of an armed conflict, the Colombian government discourages international attention and rejects applicability of international humanitarian law.
- Humanitarian space further diminished in 2009 despite government success retaking territory from insurgents and restoring some services.
- Presidential Decree 001 forces humanitarian actors to coordinate activities through Acción Social, the state IDP agency.
- FTS figures indicate increased funding to Colombia in 2009 but bilateral aid, notably from the US, remains less transparent.
- The Colombian government mobilises greater resources to assist IDPs than external actors, reducing scope for international humanitarian advocacy.
- There is a sense of fatigue among donors and humanitarian actors and lack of consensus on the best way to move forward.

**Donor performance**

- Donors in Colombia were praised for their capacity for informed decision-making and timeliness of funding.
- High level visits by the heads of ECHO and Swiss Development Cooperation and by the UN ERC helped keep some international attention on the conflict. However, most humanitarians were disappointed by the ERC’s failure to declare the crisis an armed conflict or hold the government accountable.
- Donors tend to be reactive, not taking a long-term approach to the crisis and its root causes.

**Key challenges and areas for improvement**

- Donors should be aware of the risks involved in the Colombian crisis getting forgotten as the government seeks to convey a perception of stability to encourage foreign investment.
- Donors should seek to forge a coherent international approach to ensure access to vulnerable populations.
- Donors should encourage Acción Social and other actors to systematically include affected populations in planning and decision-making.
However, Uribe’s failure to acknowledge and respond to the consequences of the five-decade long humanitarian crisis of mass displacement leaves a tainted legacy. Colombia continues to have the world’s second-largest population of internally displaced persons (IDPs). Successive Humanitarian Response Index (HRI) missions have noted the steady erosion of humanitarian space and respect for international humanitarian law and human rights (Hidalgo 2007 and Espada 2008 & 2009).

Amnesty International (2009) contests the state’s assertion that the impact of the internal armed conflict is abating. FARC is still a potent armed force, adapting to military pressure through guerrilla warfare tactics, aggressive recruitment among rural populations, broadened involvement in drug trafficking and alliances with other armed groups and drug-trafficking organisations (International Crisis Group 2010). Human Rights Watch argues that the substantial increase in new displacement in the last years of Uribe’s presidency is primarily driven by the emergence of successor groups exploiting natural resources, seizing land and targeting human rights defenders, trade unionists and internally displaced persons (IDPs) who seek to recover property. These proliferating “new illegal armed groups” (NIAGs) are allegedly often tolerated by the security forces (Human Rights Watch 2010) and now have armed members in 29 of Colombia’s 32 departments (Instituto de Estudios para el Desarrollo y la Paz 2010).

Santos, the key enforcer of the Seguridad Democrática strategy, seems unlikely to depart from the course set by Uribe. The crisis of internal displacement was almost completely ignored during the 2010 presidential campaign. The change in leadership may represent the best hope in years to break free from the inertia of the past and engage in dialogue on how to best meet the needs of affected and vulnerable populations. It remains to be seen whether donors will take up the challenge or whether the crisis in Colombia will remain invisible and intractable.

**Colombia**

**A country at a crossroads**

In August 2010, former Minister of Defence Juan Manuel Santos assumed the office of President of Colombia, bringing an end to the eight-year tenure of Álvaro Uribe. Uribe’s Seguridad Democrática was a military and political strategy to recover control of national territory from leftist guerrillas, increase economic growth and combat narco-trafficking.

Under Uribe, security improved in Colombian cities and economic growth benefitted the middle class. Uribe’s popularity rests in large measure on a social perception fuelled by official patriotism and a compliant mass media (Petrich 2010). He successfully manipulated discourse around the crisis, exaggerating military successes against the two major leftist groups – the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) and the smaller Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) – while shifting attention to the more politically expedient agendas of security, anti-terrorism, development and trade.

**Scale of displacement**

For decades there has been controversy about the number of IDPs. It is difficult to differentiate economic reasons for migration to cities from those linked directly to conflict, violence and human rights violations (Albuja & Ceballos 2010). In recent years, increasing numbers have been displaced not by large-scale military campaigns, but by NIAGS seeking to clear land for palm oil, ranching or other agro-pastoral enterprises, mineral and oil exploration or hydro-electric installations. According to the Colombian government in March 2009, there were 2.98 million IDPs registered in the Registry of the Displaced Population (RUPD) – the official IDP register. The leading IDP advocacy agency, the Consultoría para los Derechos Humanos y el Desplazamiento (CODHES), estimates that in the past 25 years the total number displaced is some 4.92 million of whom 286,000 were displaced in 2009 (CODHES 2010). IDPs as a proportion of the total national population are generally believed to be between 5.4 percent (Ibáñez & Velásquez 2008) and 8.6 percent (Carrillo 2009).

Many IDPs are either unaware of their rights, do not seek registration or are turned down. Those who flee military operations to eradicate illicit crops or whose livelihoods have been destroyed by aerial spraying are unable to get registered. It is thought that only half the IDP population in Bogotá are registered (Albuja & Ceballos 2010). Given the large number not included in the RUPD, some analysts believe that one in ten Colombians is internally displaced. Many organisations interviewed by the HRI team – including donor government representatives – speculated that official IDP figures were deliberately downplayed during the end of the Uribe administration so as to paint a positive picture of its ‘post-conflict’ achievements and enhance Santos’ election prospects.

Many displaced persons (IDPs) who seek to recover property. These proliferating “new illegal armed groups” (NIAGs) are allegedly often tolerated by the security forces (Human Rights Watch 2010) and now have armed members in 29 of Colombia’s 32 departments (Instituto de Estudios para el Desarrollo y la Paz 2010).

Santos, the key enforcer of the Seguridad Democrática strategy, seems unlikely to depart from the course set by Uribe. The crisis of internal displacement was almost completely ignored during the 2010 presidential campaign. The change in leadership may represent the best hope in years to break free from the inertia of the past and engage in dialogue on how to best meet the needs of affected and vulnerable populations. It remains to be seen whether donors will take up the challenge or whether the crisis in Colombia will remain invisible and intractable.
Plight of the displaced

For many IDPs, access to basic services such as health is irregular. This particularly affects IDP women who bear more children, have less access to contraception and have rates of sexually-transmitted infections greater than those of non-displaced Colombians (Quintero & Culler 2009). There is a high rate of family breakdown in urban places of refuge as unemployed IDP men lose their patriarchal role as family providers (Vélez & Bello 2010). IDPs are victims of crime in environments on the edges of cities with limited police presence and active criminal gangs. Residents of host communities sometimes try to cash in on the assistance received by IDPs, robbing them of cash aid or intimidating them into handing over vouchers and food (Carrillo 2009).

Their low level of education, rural livelihood skills – together with the fact that a significant number are doubly discriminated against as they are Afro-Colombians – make it difficult for IDPs to enter the formal urban economy. If they can find casual employment, male IDPs are often construction labourers, porters, vendors or car washers while women generally work as domestics or street vendors. On average, they earn between a half and two thirds of the legal minimum wage (Carrillo 2009). Women, children and older people often beg. IDPs are generally ineligible for government plans to legalise informal settlements and are forced to live in high-risk areas such as unstable hillside or riverbanks. Many IDPs do not have a financial and credit history and cannot get mortgages to enter the formal land and property market.

There are numerous conflicts between IDPs and the rights of others (Cels 2009). Central and local administrations face the challenge of striking a balance between providing targeted assistance for IDPs and assisting the general urban poor, many of whom resent positive discrimination in favour of IDP incomers. Extreme urban poverty results in many non-displaced people claiming IDP status, thus adding to agencies’ verification burdens. The fact that IDPs are geographically dispersed, frequently move and do not generally participate in local elections – either out of apathy or because of intimidation from armed urban non-state actors – means that few local politicians have any interest in cultivating or supporting them (Ibáñez & Velásquez 2008).

State denies humanitarian crisis

Previous HRI reports have noted the astuteness with which the Uribe administration sought to render the humanitarian crisis invisible (Hidalgo 2007 and Espada 2008 & 2009). The government now asserts that FARC is no longer an organised non-state actor – but simply a remnant band of “narco-terrorists”. Its post-conflict discourse asserts there is no armed conflict, only a security and anti-narcotics situation that the state has the capacity to handle without international intervention, attention or scrutiny. The government cites the example of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan (where the military coordinates and provides “security” for humanitarian and development activities) to argue its approach is in accordance with international norms. The fact that Colombia is a middle-income country with well-functioning public institutions, a judicial system that acts as a counter-weight to the administration and a legislative framework acknowledging IDP rights further reinforces the official position.

The effects of the conflict are largely felt in rural areas – disproportionately affecting Afro-Colombians, indigenous communities and women – and thus, far from the concerns of most urbanites. Though the majority of IDPs are in cities, they often maintain a low profile. Relatively little is known about urban IDPs, making it hard for humanitarian organisations to estimate their numbers, assess their assistance and protection needs or understand whether or how their situation differs from that of the urban poor (Howe 2010). While the legal status of desplazado is a form of positive discrimination (see below) it is also a stigma. Long-term residents of urban areas are often unsure whether to regard IDPs as victims, murderers, criminals or accomplices of armed groups. Invisibility – whether driven by low self-esteem or fear – is often their main survival strategy. As a result, the humanitarian crisis remains largely invisible not only to non-affected Colombians but also to the diplomatic community in Bogotá. This factor – together with Western geo-strategic support for Colombia – regarded as a reliable partner unlike such nearby states as Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador – helps explain why in recent years donor governments have been generally reluctant to openly challenge the government on humanitarian issues.

During its mission, the HRI team was told, with widespread regret, that the needs of IDPs are extremely overlooked in mainstream political discourse. Interestingly, even representatives of the Agencia Presidencial para la Acción Social y la Cooperación Internacional (Acción Social) – the state agency responsible for IDP registration, compilation of official statistics and coordination of assistance to desplazados – lamented the lack of public interest in displacement.

Government response to displacement

Colombia has a substantial corpus of IDP legislation, a legacy of years of civil society activism and painstaking marshalling of evidence which has led the Constitutional Court of Colombia to issue a series of judgements setting out IDP rights and entitlements and to assume a role monitoring state progress in adhering to past court rulings. In 2009, a further Constitutional Court writ linked displacement with the extinction of indigenous peoples and urged the government to end pervasive discrimination and exclusion. Such judicial activism is not welcomed by many politicians and civil servants (Cels 2009).

The legislative framework defines three phases of assistance to conflict IDPs: prevention, humanitarian assistance and socio-economic stabilisation. Acción Social is the lead IDP agency but does not have a substantial presence in many areas where conflict and displacement is greatest. Interviewees told the HRI team that Acción Social rejects a significant proportion of claimants.

Alongside Acción Social are a wide range of other state actors administering diverse mechanisms for prevention, protection, humanitarian response and stabilisation. The high level of mistrust and poor cooperation between them
Crisis reports

Colombia

Strategies to eradicate illicit crops have become tools to support the government’s security objectives. The government’s policy of solely viewing coca cultivation as a financial resource for the guerrillas has led to neglect of the social, economic and political problems affecting coca-growing communities (Vargas Meza 2009). During the HRI mission, there were frequent assertions that the government does not recognise the humanitarian consequences of anti-narcotics policies.

Accelerated erosion of humanitarian space

The security forces’ counter-insurgency strategy is largely based on the premise that those living in conflict areas are part of the enemy, simply because of where they live, labelling whole communities as “sympathetic” to guerrilla forces. The tactics used by the government to achieve recent military successes have demonstrated an increasing disrespect for humanitarian principles. The government remains unapologetic about the July 2008 Operation Jaque which freed 15 hostages, including former Colombian presidential candidate Íngrid Betancourt. It succeeded because the Colombian military posed as International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) representatives, using the Red Cross emblem on military assets in a flagrant violation of international humanitarian law which puts future access to hostages at risk (Uozumi 2008) and threatens to undo the hard-won reputation for impartiality which has given the ICRC and the Colombian Red Cross unique access to populations of concern in conflict areas (Geremia 2009).

In March 2010, the UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Executions presented evidence that “security forces have carried out a significant number of premeditated civilian murders and fraudulently presented the civilians as ‘killed in combat’”, also regretting that the government provides incentives to individual soldiers for combat killings (Human Rights Council 2010). The state’s security agenda, “despite using the language of civilian protection and human rights, has in fact undermined respect for International Humanitarian Law and has failed to reduce levels of forced displacement and violence against civilians,” (Elhawary 2009).

The Colombian government is contributing to increasing displacement, disguising humanitarian needs and making the crisis more invisible.”

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parallels the mistrust between state and civil society and IDPs and host communities (Meertens 2010). Local governments are given responsibilities to assist IDPs but insufficient resources (Ibáñez & Velásquez 2008). Humanitarian assistance is often delayed: it can take up to two years between displacement and receipt of the first humanitarian aid (Albuja & Ceballos 2010). IDPs are regularly forced to resort to court proceedings to claim entitlements (Lari & Teff 2009).

A former Constitutional Court justice has put achievement of the IDP-friendly legal framework in perspective, regretting that “permanent migration of the newly displaced population into most of the country’s municipalities has provided a significant reminder of the law’s inherent limitations in the face of a complex and protracted armed conflict. Regardless of how strongly IDPs’ constitutional rights are protected by the country’s activist judges, the persistence (and, in some instances, the intensification) of the conflict in Colombia will continue to generate masses of uprooted citizens” (Cepeda-Espinosa 2009).

The Colombian state – in contrast with most nations facing mass displacement crises – accepts the reality that local integration in urban environments is IDPs’ preferred option. However, Uribe also promoted returns and made efforts to provide social support to returnees in programmes – substantially funded by the US – intended to demonstrate that conflict is definitively ended. There are no accurate overall figures, but it has been estimated that around 30,000 people have returned – less than one percent of the IDP population (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre 2009). The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has listed three, seemingly insuperable, key challenges to durable solutions for IDPs and the several hundred thousand Colombian refugees in neighbouring states: imperfect registration; failure to resolve land disputes and the need for public policies to recognise the differentiated protection risks and needs of women, men, children, youth, indigenous, Afro-Colombians, older people and those with disabilities (Peace Brigades International 2010).
Protection concerns

As a result of mistrust between the government and human rights defenders – and little advocacy from the international community – there is limited dialogue on integrating human rights protection and security in rural areas where the government’s early warning system to prevent human rights violations is judged to be useless (International Crisis Group 2009) and seriously underfunded (Human Rights Watch 2010). Kidnappings, disappearances and crimes of sexual violence often go unreported especially those perpetrated by armed groups. Survivors of sexual violence lack confidence in judicial systems infiltrated at local level by illegal armed groups (Lari & Teff 2009). It is highly dangerous to lead an urban IDP association.

Donors: fatigued and unsure

As a result of acceptance of the government’s campaign to discourage international engagement in the displacement crisis, Colombia does not have a Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP). In 2009, the UN Humanitarian Coordinator acknowledged the limited international presence on the ground and the need to do more to strengthen the protection of civilians (Moro 2009). Very few of those interviewed by the HRI team mentioned the needs of the chronically vulnerable displaced and do not have any long-term vision of how their needs can be addressed. The fact that many of their counterparts came from political affairs or development backgrounds hampered efforts to develop a common stance towards the Uribe government. In the words of one donor representative, “Most of them have little knowledge or understanding of humanitarian action, making it difficult to engage in meaningful conversations with my counterparts in other embassies or agencies.”

The government’s discouragement of humanitarian programming means that donors and humanitarian agencies have had to disguise and repackgage humanitarian assistance under different programme and budget lines. Much of the funding that, in other contexts, would be considered humanitarian is packaged in Colombia as post-conflict and development assistance. This has led to a fragmentation of donor funding and makes it next to impossible to fully assess the extent of humanitarian action in Colombia. Figures provided by the Financial Tracking System (FTS) thus present only a partial picture.

Nevertheless, according to reported to FTS, there was an increase in humanitarian funding in 2009 (from US$41.4 million to US$54.8 million). There are relatively few humanitarian donors and most have provided consistent long-term support. ECHO was by far the largest FTS-recorded donor in 2009 (28.5 percent of the total), followed by Norway (12.1 percent), Germany (11 percent), the US, Netherlands, Canada, Switzerland and Sweden. 9.3 percent came from the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF).

Both donor representatives and humanitarian agencies interviewed said that it was a constant struggle to get publicity and funding. Thus, the fact that key donors have maintained support is somewhat of an achievement. High level visits by the heads of ECHO and the Swiss Agency for Development Cooperation (SDC), as well as a 2009 visit by the UN Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC) helped to keep some international attention on the conflict.
The US, like many other donor governments, is not primarily focused on humanitarian needs but rather wider geo-political interests. The US is believed to have spent US$400 million in 2009 on military and police assistance and US$240 on economic and social assistance (Center for International Policy 2010). The US Agency for International Development (USAID) acknowledges a policy objective to “strengthen the credibility and legitimacy of the Government of Colombia (GOC) in post-conflict areas…” and “to increase the willingness and capacity of communities to cooperate and interact with the GOC” (2010). FTS figures indicate that only US$5.3 million of US assistance in 2009 was registered as humanitarian assistance (OCHA 2010b).

The fact that Colombian government allocations for humanitarian activities are greater than the total provided by external donors limits possibilities for leverage and advocacy. In 2009, Acción Social’s budget was approximately US$42.7 million. The Santos administration has pledged to double the budget, pushed to do so by a Constitutional Court ruling (Espada 2009).

Switzerland and Spain were singled out by many humanitarian organisations interviewed for not accepting the government’s stance and for explicitly framing their humanitarian assistance as a response to armed conflict. Other donors preferred not to openly disagree with the government. In the words of one donor representative, “What’s the point of arguing over the terminology? Is this an armed conflict or not? At the end of the day, our aim is to meet humanitarian needs, and antagonising the government puts that at risk. So it’s better to keep a low profile rather than jeopardise our programming.”

This stance is deeply disappointing for the overwhelming majority of the humanitarian organisations interviewed. There is a near universal demand for more action from donors. One non-governmental organisation (NGO) representative summed up the prevailing mood: “we need them to stand up to the government and let them know that Presidential Directive 001 is unacceptable as it is compromising our work!” The HR1 team was told by UN and international non-governmental organisation (INGO) representatives of great disappointment at the failure of the ERC during his visit to publicly declare the crisis an armed conflict and to hold the government to account for its role in continuing it. Donors that were mentioned for taking a stronger advocacy role included Spain, Switzerland and Sweden.

ECHO, Canada and Sweden were also praised by many of their partners for carrying out monitoring visits in the field and accompanying humanitarian actors and affected populations. “We need them with us in the field to let the government and military know we have political support from donor governments,” said one NGO representative. “It also helps them to counter-balance the arguments presented by Acción Social and others.”

**Poor coordination of humanitarian response**

All the actors interviewed by the HR1 team expressed concern about the lack of effective coordination. Government insistence on trying to channel and coordinate humanitarian assistance through Acción Social and the military is the major impediment for coordination. The few humanitarian actors interviewed during the HR1 mission who had accepted government conditions were extremely negative about working through Acción Social and complained of constant political interference.

The UN Resident Coordinator (RC) is “double-hatted”, also serving as Humanitarian Coordinator (HC). Most organisations interviewed by the HR1 team report the RC/HC is far too diplomatic and fails to vigorously pursue advocacy or coordination opportunities. Others, however, do credit him with some discreet advocacy successes. Given the weak position of OCHA and the disincentives for coordination amongst actors, ECHO attempted to facilitate “underground coordination” by sponsoring technical roundtable discussions with their partners on specific programming issues, such as water and sanitation and tried to share information and analysis. OCHA and other actors, including donors, were often invited. This was well appreciated by ECHO’s partners. But even ECHO recognised this as an inadequate and improvised mechanism for coordination, and called for more coordination. UNHCR and the ICRC used briefing meetings with donor government embassies as another informal mechanism for information sharing. The Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) has also established technical working groups (not clusters) in different regions of Colombia.

Considering that some actors have had an operational presence for many years – in the case of OCHA and ECHO for over a decade – there is surprisingly little evidence of mid - to long-term planning or incorporation of lessons learned into donor strategies or plans. ECHO’s planning and financing is still done on a one-year cycle, despite the obvious need for continuity in programming in order to meet the recovery needs of the long-term displaced. This position is partly the result of EC policies. To its credit, according to its partners, the ECHO office in Bogotá has tried to maintain maximum flexibility.

Switzerland was one of the few donors reported to have a clear strategy of linking its other programming under a humanitarian umbrella (and not the other way around). It stands out for having a mid-term plan, two to three year funding commitments and plans to develop exit strategies and to sustainably build local capacity to continue interventions it supports. Switzerland was also one of the few donors to reference more recent developments in programme quality and humanitarian accountability, integrating “Do No Harm” into its policies and actively attempting to integrate mid-term reviews and evaluations.

OCHA has steadily cemented its position as a focal point for the multiple UN agencies present in the country. However, OCHA has to walk a delicate tightrope. Most UN agencies work directly with the government on longer-term development programmes. They are – with the exception of UNHCR and the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) – reluctant to accept OCHA’s lead role in coordination and wary of assertive UN advocacy on humanitarian issues.
Learning from experience:

Colombian government strategies are contributing to increasing displacement, disguising humanitarian needs and making the crisis more invisible and harder to resolve. There is a palpable sense of fatigue and resignation among donors and humanitarian actors and division about how to challenge the government agenda. For many, it is easier to acquiesce – without regard to the needs of vulnerable populations. The end result is that there is no coherent international approach to ensuring access to vulnerable populations and addressing the root causes of the crisis.

There is an urgent need for:

1 Dialogue: All actors, including the Colombian government, need to reach agreement to allow humanitarian space and recognise the rights of those affected conflict and displacement.

2 Focus on IDPs: It could be argued there is too much detailed analysis on the nature of the conflict, counter-terrorism strategy and the drugs trade, yet not enough understanding of the needs and concerns of the displaced. Their voices and perspectives are missing from the discourse of almost all actors.

3 Accountability: Colombia seems isolated from development of good practice elsewhere. There is little concern around accountability to beneficiaries. International actors must redouble efforts to encourage Acción Social and other Colombian actors to systematically include affected populations in planning and decision-making.

4 Learning from experience: It is disturbing that after decades of humanitarian response – in a context where there has been relatively low staff turnover compared to most crises – that there have been so few lessons learned and such continued short-term focus.

5 Long-term strategies: Most planning and interventions seem to be reactive, with little long-term analysis or investment in development-focused programmes to provide durable solutions for IDPs. The new patterns of conflict and displacement have created further protection and assistance challenges. The Colombian government, donors and humanitarian actors need to work together to understand and address them.

6 Coordination: The UN and donor governments must assume leadership and create a unified form to bring humanitarian issues to the forefront of political life. Coordination must meaningfully engage with government agencies such as Acción Social, but on the basis of respect for humanitarian principles.

References


Information based on field interviews with key humanitarian agencies in Colombia from 2 to 8 May 2010, and 87 questionnaires on donor performance (including 77 OECD/DAC donors).

The HRI team, composed of Eva Cervantes, Inaki Martin-Eresta, Ana Martiningui and Philip Tamminga (Team leader), contributed to this report. They express their gratitude to all those interviewed in Colombia.
Crisis reports

Democratic Republic of the Congo
The crisis and the response

- Limited progress in finding durable solutions for 1.8 million IDPs and 440,000 refugees displaced by protracted conflict.
- Humanitarian crisis continues due to slow progress on security reform, restoration of state authority in conflict areas and delivery of basic services.
- While in 2008 the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) was the second largest recipient of humanitarian assistance, the 2009 CAP was only 66 percent covered and as of October 2010, the 2010 appeal is only 52 percent covered.
- Contributions to the pooled fund declined in 2009.
- Following a government request, the UN agreed in July 2010 to rename the UN Mission to the DRC (MONUC), clarify its stabilisation mandate and begin a process of reducing the number of peacekeepers.
- Launch of the Congolese government's Stabilisation and Reconstruction Plan for Eastern Congo (STAREC) has sparked concerns at a potentially premature transition from humanitarian assistance to recovery and development. Some fear rushed repatriation of refugees and failure to resolve land disputes could retrigger ethnic conflicts.

Donor performance

- There is a disproportionate focus on conflict-affected eastern regions, rather than a needs-based approach to equally impoverished regions of DR.C.
- Donor support for enhanced coordination mechanisms has improved ability to identify needs and expand assistance.
- Lack of media attention is diverting donor interest as new high-profile crises in Haiti and Pakistan capture headlines.

Key challenges and areas for improvement

- Donors should recognise the state's currently limited capacity to guarantee security and provide greater funding for protection interventions and long-term support for conflict victims.
- Donors should fund more equitably across DRC: this could both promote national stability and improve the local image of donors.
- Donors need to offer more support to build government, civil society and local capacity.
the role of the UN by revising the mandate of the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), initiating a phased, but still indeterminate, withdrawal of UN peacekeepers.

However, the crisis is far from over. For several years, DRC has not resembled a classic humanitarian emergency but, rather, a series of localised and inter-acting humanitarian crises within a broader context of a crisis of state legitimacy and authority. Stability is returning in some areas but conflict and significant human rights violations continue mainly, but not exclusively in the eastern provinces. Although some internally displaced persons (IDPs) have returned home there are still approximately 1.8 million – the vast majority in North and South Kivu (OCHA 2010). There are around 440,000 DRC refugees in neighbouring countries. Extreme poverty is endemic throughout a country which ranks 176th of 182 countries on the Human Development Index.

If this giant country, the size of Western Europe with nearly 70 million inhabitants, were to relapse into instability there would be wider destabilising effects as DRC borders on nine countries. Extreme poverty is endemic throughout a country which ranks 176th of 182 countries on the Human Development Index. Military gains as a result of joint FARDC/MONUC operations are hard to consolidate in a situation of ever-changing rebel configurations and shifting alliances. With the state unable to ensure security, some communities have resorted to establishing self-defence militias, thus further adding to the proliferation of armed groups. Most eastern Congolese, including civil society representatives, perceive the process of integrating CNDP fighters and the assisted return of Tutsi Congolese, who had fled to Rwanda, as political victories for Rwanda. These developments further exacerbate an already explosive socio-political situation in the eastern provinces.
Uncertainty around MONUC withdrawal

Established in 1999 with a Chapter VII mandate entitling it to use armed force, MONUC has been the largest and most expensive peacekeeping intervention in history. It has more than 20,000 personnel and an annual budget of US$1.3 billion. The contradiction inherent in its dual mandate of protecting civilians while also helping the FARDC to disarm rebel groups and restore state authority has been a fundamental challenge. MONUC has its critics but most observers agree “its presence has helped avoid implosion in eastern Congo,” (Berwouts 2010).

Immediate fears of a premature withdrawal have been allayed by the Security Council’s decision to maintain the mission until 30 June 2011. The change in MONUC’s mandate was accompanied by a name change in June 2010. The new UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) has been “authorized to use all necessary means to carry out its mandate relating, among other things, to the protection of civilians, humanitarian personnel and human rights defenders under imminent threat of physical violence and to support the Congolese government in its stabilization and peace consolidation efforts,” (MONUSCO 2010). There are doubts, based on past experience, about the government’s commitment to this UN-formulated agenda, as well as the ability of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) and his team to mobilise resources to implement it, especially at a time of changing UN leadership with the departure in mid-2010 of the SRSG and the UN Force Commander.

Protection: the ultimate challenge

An April 2010 survey of the experience of those caught up in military operations in North and South Kivu indicated appalling protection failures. In three quarters of communities, respondents were against continuing military offensives against rebels, preferring political reconciliation. Almost all those interviewed had experienced looting and individual or gang rape at the hands of both rebels and the FARDC. Three quarters of women said insecurity had increased (Oxfam 2010). In September 2010, Human Rights Watch called on the government and the UN to do far more to protect IDPs, noting that many have been coerced into returning home against their will without adequate UN follow-up of their subsequent fate in highly insecure areas of return (Human Rights Watch 2010).

There are many misgivings about a post-MONUSCO future. Many feel only the presence of UN peacekeepers contains additional violence and provides any element of protection for civilians (Refugees International 2010). There are fears that humanitarian space in the east would once again be closed off given the apparent reluctance of the Congolese government to reform DRC’s “weak and abusive security sector,” (Oxford Analytica 2010). There are doubts about the DRC’s capacity to implement recently-introduced mechanisms to effectively combat child soldiering Roberts 2010). In the current political climate in DRC, MONUSCO would be well advised to greatly reduce its visibility in Kinshasa and most of the west and to redouble its efforts to control and to support, and not replace Congolese services and institutions.

The UN’s 2010 Humanitarian Action Plan (HAP) has an ambitious protection strategy. It includes advocacy, prevention, early warning, assistance, rehabilitation, resettlement, demobilisation and legal redress. There is a welcome attention to the reinforcement of capacities and systems. Headed by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the protection cluster is composed of diverse actors with different mandates and modes and means of intervention. The protection cluster is responsible for the protection and prevention pillars of DRC’s national strategy to combat sexual violence. Despite the government’s “zero-tolerance” policy for the security forces, sexual violence persists. There have been an alarming number of cases now reported outside the zones of conflict. Congolese NGOs say that numerous cases of assassination, torture and harassment of human rights advocates are going unpunished (Chaco 2010).

International agencies with a protection mandate are often forced into uncomfortable alignment with MONUC/MONUSCO’s military and political arms, undermining their perceived neutrality and impartiality. It is impossible in the vastness of eastern Congo, with its shifting combat lines, to ensure the regular on-the-ground presence necessary for the adequate protection of civilians. Flights provided by the European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO) and the UN Humanitarian Air Service (UNHAS) have facilitated humanitarian access to larger centres, but insecure and remote zones are mostly only accessible by using MONUC air transport. For many non-governmental organisations (NGOs), this compromises their neutrality and impartiality. Limited access makes it very difficult to conduct investigations, monitor and assess needs, and deliver assistance while rendering it virtually impossible to maintain a regular humanitarian field presence in locations where protection needs are greatest.
It is thus vital to develop local response capacities and to mainstream protection into all humanitarian interventions, especially considering that populations have suffered retaliation from rebel combatants simply because they have accepted assistance. In North Kivu, returning IDPs have often been targeted for attack by FARDC elements who accuse them of supporting the Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR) – a Hutu militia containing many perpetrators of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. Returning refugees are equally, if not more, vulnerable. The anticipated repatriation of refugees currently in Rwanda, Congo and DRC needs to be closely monitored and their rights protected.

Many of those interviewed by the Humanitarian Response Index (HRI) team expressed regrets that protection is not a donor priority. Only 12 percent of the sum sought in the 2010 HAP has been covered. This is despite the fact that it is a MONUSCO priority. The team was told that for a year the cluster did not have an NGO co-lead.

**Premature transition from humanitarian assistance to recovery and development?**

STAREC is designed to improve security and support restoration of state authority in former conflict zones, while facilitating the return of IDPs and refugees, and initiating socio-economic recovery and reconstruction. To be implemented primarily through the UN system, but with government approval, it has no clearly defined role for Congolese NGOs. STAREC faces the constraints of weak capacities in its five target provinces and potential politicisation. Many fear it is based on political, rather than humanitarian, needs. Congolese civil society warns that STAREC was initially designed to facilitate the return of Congolese refugees from Rwanda and thus addresses a Rwandese, rather than a Congolese, political problem. Donors have not heeded this critique. They focus disproportionately on STAREC components addressing sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) but show little interest in supporting peace-building and reconciliation.

There is a rush to implement STAREC repatriation programmes without building the consensus needed in a region which has been so crippled by 15 years of ethnic and land conflicts. Popular opposition to STAREC and refugee repatriation should not be under-estimated. In October 2009, UNHCR offices in the northern area of North Kivu were ransacked, forcing UNHCR to leave and to now operate remotely through NGO partners.

Many NGOs assert that it is premature to talk about stabilised areas. While the humanitarian community agrees with the government and donors that agricultural recovery is of paramount importance, they point out that many people have no safe place to cultivate and that little is being done to resolve conflicts over land, especially in areas where in the 1970s the regime of Joseph Mobutu gave land titles to supporters.

**Inadequate donor response**

In 2009, DRC was the second largest recipient of humanitarian assistance in the world. The 2009 HAP mobilised US$623 million, exceeding the US$565 million received in 2008, but was still only 66 percent of the revised HAP budget of US$946 million.

The 2010 HAP retains four strategic objectives from the 2009 HAP (civilian protection; reduction in mortality and morbidity; assisting IDPs returnees and host communities and restoring the means of subsistence) but eliminated the fifth, promotion of short-term community recovery. It thus focuses on “purely humanitarian”, leaving post-crisis and recovery principally to STAREC.

There is now evidence of donor fatigue. In June 2010, two major international NGOs (INGOs) announced cutbacks in programmes in eastern DRC due to lack of funds. As of mid September 2010, the 2010 HAP was only 49 percent covered. Health was 20 percent funded, water and sanitation 18 percent. Lack of adequate and predictable protection is set to have grave consequences for programmes for children formerly associated with armed groups, which if interrupted are difficult to restart because clients disappear and specialised NGO staff move on. Many humanitarian actors expressed their regret to the HRI team that at the time of the mission the logistics cluster had received no support whatsoever from donors.

The United States (US) is the major responder to the 2010 HAP providing 28 percent of total humanitarian assistance. The United Kingdom (UK) has provided 11.5 percent, the European Commission (EC) 11.5 percent, Sweden 6.6 percent and 4.5 percent has come from the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF). Continued dependence on three major emergency donors – the US, the EC and the UK – creates uncertainty. The “big three” have DRC-based staff with humanitarian expertise, decentralised authority and country knowledge that is influential in the Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) group and the other coordination fora. Some prominent donors, such as France, Spain, Denmark and Switzerland, are not pulling their weight. Lack of international media coverage, competing demands from STAREC and massive emergencies in Haiti and Pakistan are having an impact. The US has announced a cut of 40 percent in DRC funding for 2010. Many interviewees told the HRI team that it was now hard to find qualified French-speaking staff as they are all in Haiti.
DRC offers a stark example of the need for longer-term donor funding for protracted humanitarian crises, closer to development timeframes and modalities to ensure continuity of response. A good example of short-term funding is provided by ECHO. The sum it allocated for trucking water in South Kivu (eight million € over 13 years) could have rehabilitated sustainable water supply systems for all urban areas of the province.

The 2010 HAP covers the entire country, but two thirds of the budget allocation is for the crisis-affected provinces of Orientale, Equateur and the Kivus. This disproportionate assistance to the east is the result, as the HRI team was told, of the sad reality that “humanitarian aid goes where there is a camera”. This eastern bias creates widespread resentment in other provinces which receive only limited government and donor development funding to tackle serious structural problems of acute poverty, chronic malnutrition and lack of services.

When Kabila became the first democratically-elected president in 2006, the international community celebrated the election as a milestone, but in recent years the president’s office has curtailed the powers of the parliament and judiciary. Civil liberties are regularly threatened, and key institutional reforms – decentralisation and the security sector – have made no significant progress. Despite this authoritarian trend, the international community has remained mostly silent (International Crisis Group 2010).

### Coordination and cluster assessment

The contribution of all nine clusters is critical in view of the complexities of coordinating the almost 300 partners of the 2010 HAP and the almost 130 funding sources. An interviewee told the HRI team that while “DRC is considered a model of humanitarian reform, the focus is put on the process and not on the outcomes”. Some NGOs report that the cluster system is, in effect, a lobbying forum, rather than a needs-based coordination mechanism. The HRI team was also informed that the quality of a cluster still remains far too dependent on its leader, a comment echoed by humanitarians in many other crisis contexts. Views expressed to the team broadly reflect those in an evaluation commissioned by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC). This pointed to achievements but noted that coordination remains overly Kinshasa-focused and roles and responsibilities between national, provincial and sub-provincial coordination groups and fora are unclear. Sharing of good practices is limited. The Pooled Fund (PF) is negatively impacting cluster efficiency and creating time-consuming meetings. The evaluators found little added value in having dedicated cluster coordinators and noted that the concept of provider of last resort remains very weak. There are systematic frictions among UN agencies (Binder et al. 2010).

### Humanitarian reform process in DRC

DRC has served as a humanitarian reform pilot with innovations such as pooled funding, the cluster approach, inclusive coordination mechanisms, the first country level Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) group and a HAP with objectives and action thresholds in place of the traditional common appeal document. In 2009, the humanitarian coordination architecture was further enhanced by the creation of a Humanitarian Country Team (HCT), comprising key UN, bilateral and INGO actors, and eventually the government and representatives of Congolese NGOs. This has provided a much appreciated and innovative forum for reflection and resolution of strategic response issues.

Supported by Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the UK, the PF was established as a pilot in 2006. It is a funding mechanism made possible by the 2005 humanitarian reform. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) collaborates with the UN Development Programme (UNDP) to manage the fund. In 2009, donors contributed US$139.1 million. By far the largest contributor was the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID) which provided US$77.4 million. Only projects listed in the HAP are eligible for PF contributions. The PF has become the first source of funding of humanitarian programmes in DRC, used by UN agencies and international and national NGOs. In 2009, 81 percent of allocations were provided to nine UN agencies and the International Organisation for Migration. UNDP was the largest recipient, the agency transferring funds to 178 NGO-run projects, which together accounted for 45 percent of all disbursements in 2009 (UNDP 2010). Given the success of the PF, other countries are reportedly considering replicating this model (OCHA 2010).

The concept is widely appreciated in principle, as it helps ensure independence and neutrality, separating humanitarian aid from foreign policy and political considerations, as well as improved transparency in the allocation of humanitarian funds. NGOs are pleased that the proportion of total PF disbursements reaching NGOs has increased. However, in practice, the HRI team learned that NGOs are demanding operational improvements, including streamlining procedures and reporting, increasing the amount and period covered by grants, faster processing of requests and disbursements, better communication of directives and increased transparency regarding eligibility and funding decisions. Contributions to the fund declined in 2009 and the 2010 replenishment is seriously behind schedule.
**Humanitarian’s observations and concerns**

The HRI team learnt that there is a considerable distance between the global articulation of the GHD Principles and the local reality. There are wide variations among donors in regard to institutional incentives to engage and level of awareness of the GHD initiative. Many are primarily focused on development assistance. The HRI 2010 shows an overall improvement in the response since last year and a slight decline in support for protection and international law. Prevention, risk reduction and recovery has improved significantly since last year, but still lags behind and requires close attention from both humanitarian and development donors. Among other areas requiring stronger donor support are strengthening capacities for prevention, preparedness, mitigation and response (Principle 8), and the involvement of, and accountability to, beneficiaries (Principle 7).

UN agencies as cluster leaders exercise considerable influence over response strategies and resource allocations. The HRI team was informed that the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) had declared itself ineligible for PF grants for the water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) cluster that it leads in order to avoid appearances of conflict of interest. While this is laudable, it is, nevertheless, thought that as UN agencies receive the major part of the HAP resources, CERF and PF allocations: the system is too “UN-centric”. Some NGOs complain of slowness and rigidity when accessing funding from the UN, and others assert that their cluster leadership role biases funding decisions in favour of UN agencies.

NGOs report considerable variations in practice among donors (and sometimes by the same donor) in areas such as procedural requirements, accessibility, flexibility, levels of support, costs, funding duration, preferred zones and sectors, field supervision and evaluation. One representative of an aid organisation reflected a common perception: “This is a complex crisis with rapid changes in the context and needs. There should be flexibility to allow programmes to adapt to these changes”.

There is now considerable tension arising from diverging interpretations of legislation and multiple demands on NGOs to comply with labour law, taxation and import duties. INGOs report increased vulnerability to arbitrary exercises of power by poorly-paid local officials. The HRI team was told of many instances of corruption and pilfering of aid by civilian and military personnel. An INGO which fired corrupt staff reported receiving death threats and complained that they received no support from their donors or the UN.

“In DRC the focus is put on the process and not on the outcomes.”
There has been an accompanying increase in violent incidents involving NGO personnel. UNHCR, told the HRI team of 116 attacks on humanitarian personnel in 2010. There are serious doubts about state capacity to investigate and protect humanitarian staff. Numerous NGOs report insufficient support from donors and UN agencies and believe they can do more to advocate for humanitarian worker’s security.

When the authorities in North Kivu Province attempted to impose aid coordination mechanisms, NGOs judged them to be too restrictive and insufficiently attentive to humanitarian principles of independence, neutrality and impartiality. GHD donors and OCHA raised the issue with the authorities, and eventually the government developed a new statute for NGOs in collaboration with the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC), OCHA, UNDP, key NGOs and representatives of the provinces. This process revealed the extent to which some government officials have serious doubts about the quality, cost effectiveness, impact and even the ethics of NGO interventions.

The NGOs and Humanitarian Reform Project – a consortium of six major INGOs and the International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA) – is working in DRC and four other countries to improve humanitarian coordination and promote NGO cluster co-leadership, participation of national NGOs and learning and accountability to beneficiaries (Humanitarian Reform Project 2010). However, much remains to be done. The HRI team was told that “DFID and ECHO are very proactive for improving coordination, whereas donors in general promote coordination within the organisations they finance and not globally. There is a need to put more pressure on UN agencies to improve coordination”.

### Building bridges to national development processes

Many humanitarian actors interviewed by the HRI team regretted that they were not included in the high-profile government-convened and World Bank/UNDP facilitated National Forum on Aid Effectiveness in June 2009. The forum adopted an agenda committing the government to develop a national plan to strengthen government capacities. It is equally important to ensure support to build capacity of Congolese NGOs and civil society. The poor humanitarian response to needs in Equateur province in early 2010 highlighted the need to reinforce capacity in provinces outside the conflict areas (where NGO presence is limited) that should include preparedness, early warning, rapid assessment and a clear structure and capacity for coordinated response.

Reinforcing capacities implies improving accountability, transparency and the good stewardship of resources by all parties, including humanitarian actors themselves. It is especially challenging to ensure transparency and combat corruption in locations where there are no banks, no competitive suppliers, weak supervision and poorly paid or unpaid local officials. Enforcing standards and imposing sanctions can unleash strong social pressures, passive resistance and even threats of physical violence. Although this is a sensitive issue, humanitarian actors should seek to formulate a common strategy, including complaint mechanisms, whistle blowing and sharing names of those guilty of unethical practices.

Some of these changes are occurring but at varying speeds, given resource constraints and high staff turnover rates. Among promising developments, the UK is providing technical support to reinforce monitoring and evaluation for the HAP. This should promote a wider recognition of evaluation as a means to improve performance and learning, rather than an imposed donor requirement. For some NGOs, evaluation is not sufficiently funded, especially when a UN agency is donor, and there is limited commitment to the use of evaluation results.

### Lessons learnt and recommendations for the future

It is important to demand acceleration of donor contributions for 2010, to replenish the PF and to continue to improve donor coordination and alignment of humanitarian and development instruments. It is not simply a question of additional funding, but ensuring that the right kind of funding is provided. It is particularly important to resource civil society and the government to build local capacity and to encourage locally-owned interventions which involve cost-sharing and community contribution.

The HRI team also urges attention to these areas:

1. **Post-MONUC future**: Given the high levels of uncertainty over the future of international engagement in DRC – and the risk that further refugee repatriation will trigger conflict – the HC should lead a contingency planning exercise around MONUSCO withdrawal issues.

2. **Equitable humanitarian funding**: In the interest of national stability and donor image, the “eastern bias” needs to be rectified. There are grave emergency needs in many parts of DRC. The PF could become a way to reorientate aid across all areas in need.

3. **GHD Principles**: The global GHD group should undertake a study on the challenge of putting the principles into practice. They should consider taking the health sector as a pilot case to explore the issues and strategies for a less bumpy transition to recovery.

4. **Protection**: The protection cluster needs to flexibly combine funding with sources such as STAREC and poverty programmes to consolidate and further develop capacities to provide long-term support for victims of conflict, such as survivors of sexual violence and former child combatants. Donors must support the cluster to strengthen data quality and needs assessment, and continue to press for penalties for perpetrators. It is also important to recognise the dangers of excluding men from programmes.
5 **Security sector reform:** It is hard to envisage post-MONUSCO stability unless credible security forces are put in place. There is an imperative need for security sector reform, improved monitoring and investigation of incidents and regional collaboration to combat groups operating in remote border areas. Donors and MONUSCO should use all channels to promote a coherent sector strategy with common coordination and monitoring mechanisms and agreed benchmarks. This seems to be emerging for the police and judiciary but not yet for the defence forces.

6 **Building Congolese capacity:** It is critically important to rebuild state institutions and national capacities so that policies and programmes can be effectively implemented both for the conflict-affected populations in the east and the impoverished majority in the rest of the country. Donors should support the UN to develop a plan for including national capacity building in HAP-funded interventions. The UN should strengthen provincial early warning and rapid assessment and response capacity in non-conflict affected provinces, strengthen government involvement in the humanitarian response, and improve the authorities’ understanding and application of humanitarian principles. INGOs and UN agencies should promote local expertise through partnerships with NGOs and community actors and consider locating technical staff in national and provincial institutions.

7 **Improving information flow and coordination:** There is a need for cluster leadership to improve “downward” accountability to beneficiaries. It is necessary to ensure: a) improved information sharing between humanitarian actors and their government partners about evolving needs and programmatic responses, as well as the principles of humanitarian assistance and their operational implications; b) enhanced government participation in the humanitarian coordination mechanisms and c) joint monitoring of NGO performance against agreed quality standards.

**References:**


Information based on field interviews with key humanitarian agencies in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Bukavu, Goma and Kinshasa) from 28 March to 10 April 2010, and 267 questionnaires on donor performance (including 166 OECDDAC donors).

The HRI team, composed of Philippe Benassi, Covadonga Canteli, Ian Hopwood (Team leader), Pierre Leguéné and Alba Marcellán, contributed to this report. They express their gratitude to all those interviewed in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
Crisis reports

Haiti
The crisis and the response

- The US military’s post-earthquake management of entry to Haiti prioritised US flights and expensive search and rescue missions and delayed the response of experienced actors.

- An influx of small, often in-experienced, INGOs reduced the quality of the humanitarian response.

- It has proven uniquely challenging to determine the number of humanitarian actors, the total level of funding and to prepare accurate 3W (who does what, where) information.

- OCHA’s ability to undertake basic post-emergency tasks was undermined by low capacity and sidelining of the HCT.

- The cluster system was weakened by the number of actors and failure to sufficiently involve the Haitian state or civil society.

Donor performance

- Funding decisions were largely made at headquarter level and not based on needs assessments.

- Donor failure to insist on UN and national government leadership of the response exacerbated frustrations and duplication of effort.

- Donors have funded INGOs to provide basic services and paid little attention to building the capacity of the Haitian state or civil society.

- There is an unprecedented mismatch between reconstruction pledges (US$5.3 billion promised in March 2010) and actual disbursements (US$509 by early October 2010).

- Looking prematurely towards recovery, donors have been slow to acknowledge the ongoing humanitarian crisis and mounting evidence of failure to provide adequate shelter or protection for the 1.3 million homeless displaced.

Key challenges and areas for improvement

- Donors should encourage simpler, compatible reporting formats.

- Quicker pooled fund disbursement is imperative.

- Donors must require greater accountability to beneficiaries and the Haitian government from INGOs they fund.

- Donors must acknowledge the pressing need to provide permanent housing for the displaced. They should only fund actors committed to sustainable and equitable urban development and transparent land allocation and registration procedures.
The scale of the disaster, and the international response, was comparable to the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004. Amid the ongoing response, comprehensive evaluation and analysis is not yet possible. The answers to key questions remain unclear: Were there too many response actors? Are evaluation lessons from the tsunami being heeded? Has the international community shown it can respond effectively to a mega crisis in an urban environment? Will the post-earthquake promise made by Bill Clinton and other key actors to “build back better” be fulfilled? Or will Haitians feel let down by donor promises to a nation accustomed to aid dependency and unpredictable funding? It should be stressed this is a preliminary crisis report, based on a rapid mission to Haiti. A more considered analysis of how donors responded will be presented in Humanitarian Response Index (HRI) 2011.

**The initial response**

Haiti was a media-driven emergency. Harrowing images compelled action. Many donors attempted – insofar as possible in the immediate aftermath of such a major disaster – to base their funding on needs assessments. At the same time, many feel that major donors felt impelled to act before they necessarily had sufficient information.

The massive outpouring of international solidarity and the rapid, initially United States (US)-led response, helped avoid the potential further deaths and epidemics that were initially feared. Within a day of the disaster, the US military had arrived – the first of a contingent which grew to 22,200 personnel (US Southern Command 2010). Taking over the Port-au-Prince airport, the US military handled over 150 flights a day. US decisions on which flights to prioritise caused controversy, particularly when Hollywood star John Travolta was allowed to land his own Boeing 707 – carrying ready-to-eat rations and fellow Scientologists – while there was a backlog of 800 flights awaiting a landing slot (CBS News 2010a). Médecins sans Frontières (MSF) – which had been working in Haiti for 19 years – protested delays in aid delivery due to diversion of several initial flights to the neighbouring Dominican Republic (MSF 2010).

Brazil – which lost 18 of its soldiers serving in the military component of the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) which it leads – was indignant when three of its aid flights were denied landing permission and joined France in formally complaining. A World Food Programme (WFP) officer noted that US military priorities “are to secure the country. Ours are to feed,” (Carroll & Nasaw 2010). There was concern about the US military’s undue focus on “security”. A US medical non-governmental organisation (NGO) found “an element of racism in believing that Haitians were going to riot and they had to be controlled,” (Bhatt 2010).

Many humanitarian representatives interviewed by the HRI team stressed the difficulties of coordination with military contingents, particularly those from the US. Cooperation between the incoming US military and the long-established MINUSTAH military contingent was problematic. This indicates that there is still significant effort needed to implement the Oslo guidelines – a framework for the use of military assets in response to natural disasters drawn up in 2004 and updated in 2007 (OCHA 2007). However, despite the frustrations expressed by many, there is general agreement among humanitarians that soldiers saved lives and enabled access by rapidly repairing the airport and port.

**Doubts about search and rescue**

The despatch of dozens of search and rescue (SAR) teams – six from the United Kingdom (UK) alone (Department for International Development 2010) – saved 134 lives and was hailed by the UN as the “highest number of lives” ever saved after an earthquake disaster (Inter-Agency Standing Committee 2010). More than 1,900 SAR staff were deployed. Coordination was difficult in a crowded urban space and SAR teams lacked counterparts as Haitian civil protection teams were initially absent. French and Chinese SAR teams were criticised for prioritising the location of their own nationals, while Cuba and Israel were among those reported not to have kept records of where they had searched.
International teams got the publicity, but far more people were rescued by Haitians. One donor representative told the HR1 team that the cost of each life saved by the SAR teams it supported was around US$1 million. The donor community should reflect on the costs of SAR teams compared to the benefits of investing in local response capacity. It is inevitable that SAR teams will be despatched after disasters, but dialogue is needed to determine appropriate numbers and to ensure better coordination.

**Needs assessments**

Some humanitarians expressed concerns about the timeliness and accuracy of needs assessments in such a major disaster. Others argue the UN did as well as it could have been expected, given the tragic reality that UN staff and their dependents were among the dead. The HR1 team was also told of concerns that the results of a Rapid Inter-Agency Needs Assessment for Haiti were only published in mid-February. Reportedly, its results were not seen by many donors before funding decisions were made. Some actors did not know it took place. An Inter-Agency Standing Committee report lamented that “assessments in the early stages of the Haiti response followed different standards, methods, and focuses, thereby hampering efforts to create an overview of cross-cluster needs” (IASC 2010).

The Post-Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA) has been criticised on several grounds, including lack of a gender perspective. In a submission to the March 2010 donors conference in New York, a coalition of women’s groups highlighted failure to consult with women earthquake victims, the absence of gender concerns in Haiti – as mandated by UN Security Council Resolution 1325 – and failure to acknowledge, or seek to remedy, past gender inequalities in Haitian public institutions and access to state services (Haiti Gender Equality Collective 2010).

**Haiti aid hard to track**

The HR1 2009 noted that donor response to hurricanes in 2008 was disappointing (Gasser 2009). This was not the case after the earthquake. A massive influx of funding – probably 80 percent of it from the general public – left many humanitarian actors with more resources than anticipated. As with the tsunami, the challenge is for all actors to use resources effectively to meet immediate and long-term needs.

The exact amount of money donated to the Haiti response will never be known. According to OCHA’s Financial Tracking System (FTS), as of 9 October 2010, over US$3.5 billion had been raised. However, significant donations have not been reported to the FTS. By far, the largest response has been from the US – according to the FTS, 34.7 percent of the total – far ahead of Canada (4.1 percent). As of 9 October 2010, 70 percent of the funds sought in the 2010 Revised Humanitarian Appeal had been provided. So widespread was international sympathy that numerous non-traditional donors – many themselves major recipients of humanitarian assistance such as Afghanistan, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo – contributed funds.

A factor further complicating quantification is the significant role played by states such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Cuba, Mexico and the Dominican Republic who were among the first to send medical and rescue teams and have subsequently provided substantial bilateral aid. These non-traditional donors have largely worked outside established coordination mechanisms. Cuba’s substantial humanitarian presence – as with its 2004 post tsunami and 2005 Pakistan earthquake missions – has gone largely unreported (Fawthrop 2010). FTS data suggesting that private donations total US$1.24 billion, 36.8 percent of the total humanitarian assistance, is generally believed to be an under-estimate. Many INGOs reported an unprecedented response from their supporters. By July 2010, the American Red Cross had received US$468 million (CNN 2010). MSF reported receiving 91 million euros in private donations (MSF 2010) and in the UK, the public provided £101 million for the work of major NGOs (Disasters Emergency Committee 2010).
There is a major mismatch between reconstruction pledges and actual disbursements. In March 2010, 59 donors at the Haiti Donor’s conference pledged US$6.04 billion in support of the Action Plan for Recovery and Development. However, by late September, only US$538.3 million had been delivered (Office of the Special Envoy 2010). The US has not delivered anything towards its US$1.15 billion pledge. Analysts warn that US procrastination in delivering on its pledges is setting a negative precedent for other major donors (IRIN 2010a).

The separately-administered Haiti Reconstruction Fund was pledged US$509 million, but by early October 2010 had only received US$66.8 million. Over 80 percent has been provided by Brazil, with no delivery of significant pledges made by the US, Spain, Qatar, Saudi Arabia or France (Haiti Reconstruction Fund 2010).

In October 2010, the Haitian prime minister lamented that many aid pledges subsequently factored in debt forgiveness or money already spent on the humanitarian emergency (Reuters 2010). A network of Haitian civil society actors notes that the process of securing funding “is characterised by a near-total exclusion of Haitian social actors and a weak and non-coordinated participation by representatives of the Haitian state,” (Bell & Field 2010).

There is uncertainty about how and where public and private funding will be used. An Associated Press study of US federal government documents found that 33 cents in every US$ of immediate post-earthquake US aid went to the military and one cent to the Haitian government (The Grio 2010). The International Peace Operations Association (IPOA) – the trade body of private military companies (PMCs) – held a post-earthquake sales fair in Miami to showcase their expertise – pledging to donate profits to the Clinton-Bush Haiti Relief Fund (Fenton 2010). This prompted complaints from US activists concerned at their increasing influence and disregard for human rights and national sovereignty (Institute for Justice and Democracy in Haiti 2010). US government funds have been provided to PMCs for damage assessments, security guards, shipping, clean-up, construction and long-term planning (ibid), drawing parallels with “disaster profiteering” of Blackwater in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina (Scahill 2010).

**Should camps have been prioritised?**

A key emerging issue for discussion are the implications of the initial decision to focus aid on makeshift settlements in Port-au-Prince. Failure to provide assistance in the provinces to which many residents had fled caused many to return to the city. Many humanitarians argue that the focus should have been on where people were living when the quake struck, rather than creating camps where, in the words of one informant, people “are putting down roots” as living conditions are often better than they enjoyed prior to the disaster.

Critics point to the insufficient coverage of services and inability to adequately manage the 1,300 informal camps, engage beneficiaries in aid distribution or provide adequate shelter and protection. It is clear that many camps are unlikely to be dismantled as quickly as once anticipated. There is no clear communication from either the government or many international actors as to what services camp residents can expect or what long-term shelter plans are being developed. One critic contends that despite declarations of commitment to recovery “the UN and Haitian government have done little more than move citizens from one set of temporary housing to another,” (Haiti Advocacy Working Group 2010). Some response actors strongly dispute this assessment.

Many urban sites where survivors live have commercial value. A survey in six camps found that coercive attempts to evict earthquake victims are intensifying and alleged that “people are not consulted about their needs and aid has trickled to a halt” (Institute for Justice and Democracy in Haiti 2010). A Canadian-Haitian academic team found that seven months after the disaster, 40 percent of camp residents did not have access to water and 30 percent lacked toilets of any kind (Schuller 2010). Despite the fact that many INGOs talk about empowering residents to select recipients and distribute aid, some commentators argue that committees are unrepresentative, perhaps as a result of INGOs’ lack of local knowledge. Less than a third of people living in camps are reported to be able to name those on “their” committee. Two-thirds of members are men, despite well-documented concerns about gender-based violence (ibid). The shelter cluster lead, the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), has been criticised for not appointing managers in each camp. Others point out it was unrealistic to ask IOM to assume responsibility for so many sites and that many INGOs were reluctant to assume camp management responsibilities, given these challenges.
Clearing debris and allocating land

It has been estimated that only five percent of the 26 million cubic yards of rubble has been removed (Smith 2010). Clearing rubble is clearly a huge technical challenge. The question of who owns the land on which destroyed houses lie and where to take rubble is unresolved and the government is unable to make decisions. In some upmarket neighbourhoods the private sector is shifting rubble, but in general, little is being done and the fleet of available trucks is grossly inadequate. Many donors are unwilling to meet the cost of debris clearance, estimated by the Prime Minister’s office at US$300 million.

Bill Clinton’s many hats

In no other response to a natural disaster has one individual exercised as much influence as former US President Bill Clinton. Wearing various hats, he is UN Special Envoy, co-chair of the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission (IHRC), head of the Clinton Foundation and co-chair of the Clinton Bush Haiti Fund (which has raised over US$50 million). Several people interviewed by the HRJ team acknowledged Clinton’s ability to focus attention on Haiti. He is a vociferous critic of the US politicians who have blocked congressional approval of pledged US reconstruction aid (Katz 2010). However, informants noted the frequent gap between his rhetoric and the actions of both the Clinton Foundation and the Special Envoy’s Office. Some interviewees reported that the Foundation does not properly coordinate with either the Haitian Department of Civil Protection (DPC) or clusters. Clinton’s relationship with the US State Department remains unclear. Many complained of the arrogance of Clinton Foundation staffers – described by one informant as a “bunch of 24-year-olds” running around telling government officials and humanitarian workers what to do.

The IHRC is co-chaired by former US President Bill Clinton and Haitian Prime Minister Jean-Max Bellerive. Half of its directors are from multilateral financial institutions, the others members of Haitian elite families. After a stormy parliamentary session, the IHRC was given controversial emergency powers to make land use decisions without the need for any public consultation. Critics argue that landowners and the IHRC are more interested in developing sweatshop factories, offices and upmarket housing than providing land for sustainable housing and livelihoods for the displaced (Albert 2010). It is reported that there are disagreements among donors about how the IHRC approval structure should work, who is authorised to sign off disbursement of funds from the World Bank-administered trust fund and how much discretion should be given to the IHRC secretariat (IRIN 2010b).

Inclusion of Haitians in recovery planning

For decades, the capacity of the Haitian state has been weakened by the “brain drain” from the Haitian government to internationally-funded NGOs and INGOs. The UN Assistant Secretary-General of Peacekeeping Operations has sympathised with the government’s post-earthquake frustrations, noting that the international community has a long history of weakening the national government by working with outside organisations: “we complain because the government is not able to (lead), but we are partly responsible” (Katz 2010). Decades of funneling aid through NGOs has left state institutions weak and made Haitians look to NGOs for basic public services in a country described by the US Institute of Peace as “a republic of NGOs” (Kristoff & Panarelli 2010). An INGO director reflected the reality of the frequent lack of state presence by telling the HRJ team that “by default we are taking on state responsibilities.” Haitians appear to increasingly resent the relative affluence of foreign aid workers (Salignon & Evrard 2010). Many critics note the limited formal avenues for either the Haitian government or civil society to shape recovery programming (Bell 2010).

OCHA struggles to fulfil basic roles

OCHA, like many organisations, has had high staff turnover. A Head of Office was only appointed in August 2010, following several interim appointments. The basic “who, what, where” information that OCHA tried to gather relied on people providing information, instead of OCHA staff actively going out and obtaining it. Information systems were mostly Internet-based, which – in the words of one informant is “sexy, but doesn’t necessarily work” in circumstances where many organisations had problematic Internet access. Most interviewees did not rate positively the Haitian one response, info website. Stressed with OCHA’s system, several clusters resorted to using Google Groups and Google Docs, with one person describing Haiti as “a Google response”. An incoming cluster lead noted that it would have been better to use old-fashioned Excel sheets, rather than fancier Internet-based systems. Managing and monitoring the Emergency Relief Response Fund (ERRF), a pooled funding mechanism established in Haiti in 2008, has been challenging for OCHA. In the early months of the response, there was only one OCHA staffer in Haiti to deal with proposals for ERRF support, so the vetting process was passed to clusters. Clusters with strong coordinators submitted more projects than those with weaker leadership. In principle, the ERRF offers a rare opportunity for Haitian NGOs to access international funds. Several submitted projects to the protection cluster only to get no reply for several months. Some informants note its positive elements but others criticise the ERRF for its lack of transparency. It is not yet clear whether efforts to support national NGO access to the ERRF will bear fruit.
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Humanitarian Country Team sidelined

At the beginning of the crisis, the pre-existing Comité Permanent Inter-Organisations (CPIO) – later restyled the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) – did not meet for over two weeks. It was convened only after NGOs on the CPIO wrote to the UN Haiti Humanitarian Coordinator and the Emergency Relief Coordinator in UN headquarters. Failure to assert the primary strategic decision-making role of the HCT enabled the emergence of a Coordination Support Committee (CSC) which brought together the government, certain parts of the UN, some donors and the US and Canadian militaries. The CSC, while probably one of the more functional coordination mechanisms, did not involve non-UN actors. The HRI team was told that several HCT meetings simply became occasions to provide information on what the CSC was doing. As the US and Canadian military presence declined, so too did the role of the CSC. However, an important issue remains to be addressed by donors – why did they allow the functions of the HCT to be usurped?

Clusters: the same old problems?

The cluster approach was introduced in Haiti in 2008. An evaluation completed just before the earthquake found it had improved coordination but was weak on ownership and accountability; had been implemented in a top-down fashion without regard for existing national coordination structures; did not sufficiently engage with national NGOs; was held back by OCHA’s limited capacity and that the link between the cluster approach and the Humanitarian Coordinator remained unclear (Binder & Grünewald 2010). All these shortcomings became further manifest after the disaster. At the outset of the crisis almost all cluster meetings took place at MINUSTAH’s Logistics Base (Logs Base). The inaccessible venue, strict security procedures and the use of English deterred Haitian attendance. Only the water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) cluster was co-chaired by the government from the outset. Only WASH and the education cluster exclusively used French (Global Education Cluster 2010). Cluster leads had a hard time identifying local NGOs to invite and those who did attend reported the meetings were often irrelevant. The government was only peripherally involved at the outset. Those appointed to attend cluster meetings were often businessmen without links with relevant ministries. The government was insufficiently represented and it took a long time to re-establish relationships with relevant line ministries. Donors could have done more to promote government co-leadership of clusters.

Several HRI mission interviewees reported disappointment with the calibre of cluster leaders. One noted that Haiti was “an opportunity to showcase what had been built in the last few years. The people they had initially were maybe very technically savvy, but they did not have the skills to run a cluster. In terms of getting the ‘A team’ there, quickly, it didn’t happen.” To make matters worse, there has been a high turnover in cluster coordinators. Only the camp coordination camp management (CCCM) cluster has had the same coordinator since February 2010.

“The exact amount of money donated to the Haiti response will never be known.”
When it comes to protection, the Haiti experience highlights the inadequacies of the concept of “provider of last resort”. It is widely acknowledged that the international community is incapable of protecting the inhabitants of many camps against sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV), theft and forced evictions. It has to be asked whether in the aftermath of a massive natural disaster in a country already facing massive protection problems – and with no immediately identifiable government partner to work with – it is realistic to expect a protection cluster to substitute fully for gaps left by the state.

Questions are also being asked about the early recovery cluster. The HRI team was told that the UN Development Programme (UNDP) shut down the cluster in August without apparent consultation or explanation.

Coordination frustrations

The huge number of newly-arrived and generally inexperienced INGOs greatly complicated early coordination. One interviewee told the HRI team that “UN initial coordination was a circus: 250 people, under a tent without a microphone!” Some major INGOs were suspicious of donor attempts to promote coordination but given the enormous influx of privately donated funding, many INGOs no longer really needed large support from public donors. Some, the HRI team was told, were so well-resourced that they saw little need to co-ordinate. In any case, many had other priorities: finding new office space, assisting their own staff affected by the disaster and hiring new staff. Many were reluctant to spend time in traffic to attend Logs Base meetings which they found ineffective and thus stopped attending. The result was that there were no effective forums in which the government, donors, the UN, IOM, the Red Cross and NGOs could come together to discuss strategy.

For the first six weeks of the response, a number of major government donors, together with representatives from OCHA and the office of the Haitian Prime Minister, met each day to share information. This was appreciated by many in the humanitarian community. However, the mission was told that some major actors did not know about the meetings. Several informants noted that the group’s work was not adequately communicated to other response actors.

Cash for work programmes highlighted the inadequacies of coordination and information sharing. Through the early recovery cluster, UNDP used one rate for those recruited while another donor and its partners used a different wage based on the government’s legal minimum wage. The health cluster provided another example. The Clinton Foundation helped the Ministry of Health set up a complicated registration system that gathered information in different formats from those being used by the health cluster.

Challenges

At least 1.3 million people – both earthquake-displaced people and pre-quake urban homeless and slum-dwellers – remain displaced in around 1,300 camps in Port-au-Prince. Several hundred thousand others are sheltering with host families and some half a million are thought to have been displaced outside the city. A few have been provided with transitional housing, but in general camps are overcrowded, lack sufficient lighting, and tents and tarpaulins offer scant protection. As funding dries up, there is likely to be an exit of INGOs and UN agencies and withdrawal of vital INGO-provided health, education and livelihoods support. Many of those interviewed by the HRI team are still understandably focused on immediate issues. However, some are expressing concerns about the slow pace of recovery planning. The Brookings Institute warned in September 2010 that “the recovery process is not going well and reconstruction has barely started... recovery efforts on the ground have been slower than usual – slower than for the 2004 tsunami or the 2005 Pakistan effort” (Ferris 2010). There does not appear to be a concerted plan to meet the sustainable housing needs of either camp residents or those living with host families. There are reports that armed gangs are regrouping (Berg 2010) and that displaced women are increasingly vulnerable to crimes of theft and sexual violence. Arguing that the humanitarian response “appears paralyzed,” Refugees International reports an increase in gang rapes (Teff & Parry 2010). The Women’s Refugee Commission fears that reproductive health services made available by the influx of new agencies will close unless donors fund the Haitian authorities to take over (Tanabe 2010).

Aid pledges are not being honoured and there are reported tensions between the World Bank, the IHRC, the Obama Administration and Congress over aid management (Clark & Charles 2010). Médecins du Monde has warned that “in 2011, aid to Haiti is likely to fall significantly. Aid agencies will start to leave and their local employees will lose their jobs, mobile clinics will close and the range of health services available to the poorest will be reduced. By 2012, there may well be nothing left to show for the unprecedented humanitarian response” (Salignon & Evrard 2010).

Lessons learnt and recommendations for the future

It is disappointing that many relevant recommendations from the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition and those in the last HRI report on Haiti appear to have not been heeded in the earthquake response.
Areas for further analysis and dialogue between donors and other humanitarian stakeholders include:

1 **Leadership and coordination:** Lack of clarity about the initial response role of the US military vis-à-vis UN peacekeepers, the confusing role of Bill Clinton, the uneven coordination provided by many clusters and the relatively minor engagement of the Haitian authorities and civil society in long-term recovery planning points to the need to discuss how to improve civil-military coordination of immediate response and clarify responsibilities during recovery from natural disasters.

2 **Transparency and accountability:** There is evidence that there have been too many actors, unclear communication, different priorities, lack of transparency on total disbursements, little emphasis on participation and fostering ownership of Haitians in response planning and little promotion of a culture of accountability towards beneficiaries. These major gaps in adherence to GHD Principles require discussion.

3 **Clusters:** Convening of cluster meetings in accessible locations, the over-use of English, the limited engagement of government and civil society and the quick turnover of coordinators highlight the need to discuss how to make the cluster system more effective.

4 **Long-term dependence on external actors:** Changed power dynamics and access to considerable sources of funding have made many response actors less dependent on traditional donors. Haiti demonstrates the risk that if NGOs become major service providers they may undermine state capacity. Governments need to discuss how to ensure greater accountability of international actors and take a coordinated approach to building greater state response capacity, perhaps drawing on relevant experience from Central and Latin America.

5 **Land:** Discussion is needed on how the international community can help address unresolved issues of access to land and develop transparent land allocation procedures to enable permanent shelter for the homeless. Funding land registration schemes which do not recognise informal tenure will only exacerbate tensions.

6 **Developing an exit strategy:** It is not sustainable to expect international actors to continue to raise funds to provide key services. The donor community should initiate discussion about an exit strategy and how to attract recovery and development actors when emergency response agencies depart.

**References**


Information based on field interviews with key humanitarian agencies in Haiti from 24 August to 4 September 2010.

The HRI team, composed of Philippe Benassi, Lucia Fernandez and Manisha Thomas (Team leader), contributed to this report. They express their gratitude to all those interviewed in Haiti.
Crisis reports

Indonesia
Indonesia at a glance

The crisis and the response

- Indonesia suffered two devastating earthquakes (in West Java and West Sumatra) in September 2009, triggering drastically different responses.

- As the government did not welcome assistance for West Java, feeling that it could handle the response on its own, the international response was extremely limited and needs still remain.

- Subsequently recognising its failure to provide adequate support in West Java, the government “welcomed” aid following the West Sumatra disaster.

- The multiplicity of organisations arriving in West Sumatra created coordination challenges. OCHA coordinated international organisations while the Indonesian government worked with national counterparts. Communication with the government was often imperfect.

- Coordination shortcomings led to duplication of effort and tensions. Over-interviewed survivors were forced to repeatedly answer the same questions.

- Lack of standardised procedures and methodologies resulted in inconsistent damage assessments and problems sharing data between response actors.

Donor performance

- Donors were generally criticised for not doing enough to integrate disaster risk reduction, prevention and preparedness into emergency assistance and for not funding organisational capacity for contingency planning and preparedness.

- Failure to integrate a DRR approach into relief efforts reduced prospects for long-term sustainable recovery.

- International media frenzy provoked a “contest for profile” among donors and led to only the most visible early recovery needs being met.

Key challenges and areas for improvement

- Donors must avoid overlapping funding and do more to coordinate and align their responses.

- Standardised needs-assessment processes should be implemented for all actors to reference and use.

- More efforts should be made to bolster protection of disaster-affected people, using a gender-based approach to help the most vulnerable.

- Donors should encourage the integration of local capacity building into humanitarian aid.
Indonesia

A tale of two crises

Lying on the Pacific Ring of Fire, Indonesia has been described by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) as the most disaster-prone country in the world. More than a million Indonesians were affected by natural hazards in 2009, including volcanic eruptions, flooding, landslides and earthquakes. 2009 saw 469 earthquakes with a magnitude of over 5.0 on the Richter Scale (OCHA 2010a).

After the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, and a massive international investment in evaluation of the response through the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC), many humanitarian actors pledged that lessons learn would help improve future responses. Five years later, two devastating earthquakes struck Indonesia in the same month, displacing nearly 200,000 people, killing approximately 1,300 and damaging or completely destroying almost 300,000 homes. The initial responses were not encouraging. Those affected by the West Java earthquake watched as their government struggled to respond to their needs and the international community observed in silence. People affected by the West Sumatra earthquake, on the other hand, saw a flood of international actors arrive. After the well-publicised destruction caused by the 2004 tsunami in Banda Aceh, the media was keen to cover a further natural disaster in Sumatra. Their coverage inflated a medium-scale disaster into a large one. Both Principles of Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) and the many recommendations made by the TEC highlighted best practices and lessons donors should apply in supporting responses to natural disasters. These recent Indonesian earthquakes show there is still considerable room for learning, improved coordination and investment in preparedness.

The quakes

The first earthquake, measuring 7.0 on the Richter Scale, struck West Java on September 2, 2009. It was followed by aftershocks of 5.1 and 5.4 (USGS 2009a). Information regarding the effects of the earthquake was initially scarce, which was a factor in the minimal involvement of international actors. OCHA cited government figures that the quake had left 81 dead, 47 people missing, 1,248 injured, 178,490 displaced and 65,643 houses severely damaged. With its epicentre 142 kilometres south of the Tasikmalaya district, the earthquake had a widespread impact, affecting 16 districts and municipalities in West Java (OCHA 2009a).

On September 30, a 7.5 earthquake (USGS 2009b) occurred off the coast of West Sumatra, with its epicentre 45 kilometres from the city of Padang. There were two significant aftershocks. Three villages in the Padang Pariaman district were levelled by resultant landslides. Unlike the West Java earthquake, the West Sumatra events were more concentrated in urban areas, especially in the city of Padang (OCHA 2009b). The West Sumatra government reported that 1,195 people died and 1,798 were injured (IFRC 2009a). Depending on the source, the number of displaced ranged from 4,000 (IFRC 2009b) to 8,000 (OCHA 2009c). A total of 231,395 homes were damaged to some degree, with reports that 121,679 homes had been severely damaged, 52,206 moderately damaged and 57,510 lightly damaged (OCHA 2009b). Uncoordinated needs assessments meant that figures varied substantially.

West Java: forgotten but not gone

The Indonesian government decided not to request international assistance following the West Java quake. West Java is among Indonesia’s most prosperous provinces and the national authorities assumed that with their support, the local authorities could handle the response. The government also believed that the logistics would be simple, as supplies could be despatched from Jakarta within four or five hours. The Indonesian government seemed keen to demonstrate to its citizens that five years after the tsunami, it could respond efficiently and effectively.
It was initially difficult for international humanitarian actors to obtain clear and transparent information on damage and needs assessments undertaken by the Indonesian authorities. The large scale and wide impact of the damage across an area twice the size of the affected area in West Sumatra, entailed delays in gathering data. A major donor noted that “no assessments were published until after the end of Ramadan,” 17 days after the disaster. This lack of data hindered external emergency intervention but does not in itself excuse the lack of action from most international actors.

Most donors respected the Indonesian government’s stance that external support was not needed, despite knowing this was not the case. Only the European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO) and the Emergency Response Fund (ERF), a locally-managed pooled fund for non-governmental organisations (NGOs), provided financial support for the approximately 15 organisations that responded. Some international NGOs (INGOs) became operational using their own funds, but the vast majority left after a few weeks in order to respond to the West Sumatra disaster where donor funding was more forthcoming. Many quickly forgot West Java.

The Indonesian government focused its response on initial emergency needs. Organisations interviewed in the field reported success although there were major gaps related to shelter, water, sanitation, hygiene and early recovery. Responses were delayed both by general bureaucratic inertia and the fact that the quake occurred at the end of the Indonesian financial year, thus complicating mobilisation of necessary resources.

Seeing that help did not arrive, many earthquake survivors self-repaired damaged housing and do not expect to receive reimbursement promised by the government. At the time of the field mission many others continued to live in tents.

The minimal response from the international community has resulted in little information on the quality of the response, thus preventing rigorous assessment of the Indonesian government’s humanitarian assistance and further decreasing the likelihood that those with remaining needs will receive the external assistance they require.

**Sluggish call for assistance in West Sumatra**

After the experience in West Java, the government realised it could not handle the response to West Sumatra on its own and decided to “welcome” international assistance. The term “appeal” was not used, lest it was seen as indicating some sense of incapacity. Consequently, there was no formal West Sumatra flash appeal but, instead, a Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP). Government deliberations were time-consuming, the Indonesian government eventually realising it could not fund two earthquake responses in the same month. Prevarication meant that many United Nations (UN) agencies could not apply for funding and thus did not engage in the emergency response.

Once the HRP was launched, international attention quickly shifted to West Sumatra despite the fact that needs remained in West Java. Principle 11 – enjoining donors to “strive to ensure that funding of humanitarian action in new crises does not adversely affect the meeting of needs in ongoing crises” – was not heeded. To make matters worse, many organisations also reported that other natural disasters in the region – including typhoons in the Philippines, flooding in Vietnam and a tsunami in Samoa – also affected their funding.

**Once again, the “CNN effect”**

In stark contrast to the extremely weak international response to West Java, the earthquake in West Sumatra captivated the attention of the international community. News teams began broadcasting images of the earthquake within hours. The initial news sparked fears the disaster would be on the same cataclysmic scale as the 2004 tsunami. The fact that Padang is more than 900 kilometres from Banda Aceh was lost on TV anchors and viewers. For many, the timing of the Padang earthquake was “perfect”— almost five years since the tsunami. The fact that destruction was mostly in a large city allowed for visually striking imagery. Rumours that the death toll was rising further stoked interest. The Health Minister reported to CNN that she expected a greater number of casualties than the 2006 Yogyakarta earthquake which had killed some 5,000 people (CNN 2009). The media fuelled speculation there would be thousands of fatalities.

Such media hype invariably provoked an emotional response from the public and donors. Search and rescue teams were despatched and a flood of NGOs poured in. No fewer than 189 INGOs and 111 local NGOs arrived in Padang within days of the disaster. Some had no previous disaster response experience, no funds and limited knowledge of the city. A significant number of the incoming INGOs were agencies whose operations in Banda Aceh were being wound down. Many conducted needs assessments, took up space and facilities and added to the chaos before quickly leaving when they did not receive funding. At the time of the Humanitarian Response Index (HRI) field mission in late January 2010, approximately 50 organisations were still engaged in the response.
The quest for visibility

Fearful of being perceived as neglecting the disaster, donors tended to fund the most visible needs, leading to a scramble to compete for visibility. The contest for profile had absurd consequences. According to one humanitarian organisation, at one point there were 700 people and 70 dogs searching for survivors. They arrived three days after the earthquake, by which time all survivors had already been rescued by Padang locals. So many donors rushed to set up mobile hospitals that one complained that no space could be found to erect the one they were funding. This donor eventually had to set up far from the disaster area, treating some 600 patients a week, of whom only two were injured earthquake survivors. A further farce was caused by a branding squabble between agencies when two different logos were placed on the same truck, leading to the non-departure of a convoy. As these and other unfortunate incidents played out, less visible needs received significantly less donor support.

Chaotic assessments and unconvincing appeals

The first assessment in Padang was by the local government’s Padang District Antenna for Crisis Management (SATKORLAK). Many donors and international responders felt that it over-estimated the quake’s impact. SATKORLAK used methodology developed by the US Geological Survey (USGS) to provide a rough-and-ready immediate assessment in the densely populated area around the epicentre. The local authorities were particularly keen to quickly release assessment results following criticisms of delays and lack of transparency in providing information on the impact of the West Java earthquake. Two days later, the local government followed up this rapid estimation by sending field teams, primarily to regional health centres, but also to conduct direct surveys. Government figures were consistently higher than those of international actors.

To some extent, this discrepancy is understandable. Local administrative capacity had been greatly diminished by the quake, with four fifths of government buildings ruined or damaged. Such was the impact that it was not initially clear whether the primary Indonesian responder would be the local or national government. Eventually it was decided that SATKORLAK would be in charge. The governor invited OCHA to install its coordination centre in his official residence.

The day after the disaster a multiplicity of international assessments began. Many actors undertook their own. The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) conducted a joint assessment as did the UN in conjunction with the Emergency Capacity Building Project (ECBP) – a consortium of seven major INGOs. Due to unexpected problems, they found themselves reliant on government figures which they supplemented with their own analysis. On the third and fourth days after the earthquake, newly-arrived INGOs began conducting their own assessments, but many soon left when funding proved unavailable.

The assessment chaos had several consequences. The multiplicity of assessments created tension with affected communities as survivors were forced to repeatedly answer the same questions. Lack of standardised procedures and methodologies resulted in inconsistent statements of what was “very” or “slightly” damaged. Organisations that shared their needs assessment findings found it hard to use others’ data. Despite the clear TEC recommendation, many needs assessments were never shared.

Donors were presented with contrasting figures in different appeals. Some said this caused them to have no confidence in figures cited by the HRP which may explain its low coverage. According to the Financial Tracking Service (FTS), only 38 percent of HRP requirements have been covered (OCHA 2010b). Tellingly, despite such low coverage, OCHA and many other agencies report that over 90 percent of needs have actually been met. Many informants suggest that the Indonesian authorities engaged in game-playing. Fearful of not obtaining sufficient external support, the list of requirements set out in the HRP grew. Donors with already strong relationships with the Indonesian government, such as the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAid), tended to use official figures. The damaging impact of faulty needs assessments and the subsequent impact for future disaster responses is a cause for concern as it may lead to donors losing confidence in appeal figures.

DARA conducted a field survey of organisations that received funding in order to capture how well donors had followed the Principles of Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD). Principle 18 calls on donors to support mechanisms for contingency planning. This issue was also raised by the final TEC report which stressed the need to invest in contingency planning. Prior agreement on needs assessments is crucially important. The survey data is revealing. The UN receives by far the lowest score on the related survey question. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development / Development Assistance Committee (OECD/ DAC) donors also scored below the overall average for Indonesia, as do all donors generally. Agencies generally assume humanitarian funding cannot be used for contingency planning or preparedness, many reporting they had not applied for such support. When asked how donors could help them prepare better, many mentioned training and capacity building in emergency preparedness and support for pre-positioning of stocks and development of surge capacity.
Needs overlooked?

Donors attended to certain needs while neglecting others. Their prioritisation was not necessarily on needs that were most pressing, but on those which were most visible. Thus, donors favoured search and rescue teams, mobile hospitals and food supplies, and not support for water, sanitation and hygiene, shelter, early recovery, protection and disaster risk reduction (DRR). The HRJ team found that early recovery was particularly neglected.

The fact that some donors were preoccupied with funding highly visible interventions created problems for many of their implementing partners. They reported that donors seemed to ignore whole sectors, despite receiving detailed cluster-by-cluster recommendations, and were incapable of taking a holistic view of post-disaster needs.

DRR should be a major donor priority in disaster-prone countries like Indonesia. It is an area of focus for New Zealand and for Australia, which supports a US$60 million programme. However, many donors to Indonesia consider DRR entirely separate from humanitarian assistance. They are not supportive of efforts to integrate DRR into emergency response even though they have committed to do so by agreeing to the GHD Principles. Organisations interviewed by DARA reported difficulties in obtaining funding for risk reduction, prevention and preparedness. UN agencies who act as donors were the most unsupportive in this regard, with OECD/DAC donors also scoring well below average.

The TEC recommended that donors provide flexible, proportional funding, allowing for greater investment in DRR, early recovery and forging linkages between relief, rehabilitation and development (LRRD). Principle 9 calls on donors to “provide humanitarian assistance in ways that are supportive of recovery and long-term development...and transitions from humanitarian relief to recovery and development activities”. Unfortunately, the recent Indonesian experience indicates that donors generally focus on the emergency phase and continue the traditional practice of considering each phase in isolation. Donor support for LRRD one of the lowest scores of the survey. The same is true of early recovery, which began very late and at the time of the field mission had received little funding. Many donors place a three-month time limit on their funding, and humanitarian organisations commonly reported difficulties obtaining funding for early recovery, particularly transitional shelter.

Coordination: a work in progress

Effective coordination is fundamentally important in a country like Indonesia, which has hosted many international organisations over the past five years. In the immediate aftermath of the West Sumatra earthquake, there was an informal agreement between the international community and the government that OCHA would manage international organisations and the Indonesian government their Indonesian counterparts. OCHA served as the link between the two, with a representative from OCHA regularly attending government meetings to update them on the “international” coordination system. This “divide and conquer” technique was seen by some as the best way to manage such a large number of organisations, especially at the beginning. However, many field agencies reported that communication with the government was often imperfect, especially just after the earthquake. Many attributed this to the “language barrier” between the government and international agencies, but this explanation is somewhat contradicted by the fact that INGOs are primarily staffed by Indonesians.

Transition to democracy has left Indonesia with a complex decentralised political system. This provides further challenges for coordination, both between Indonesians and the international community, and among national, provincial and local authorities. The central and regional government were at odds over who should lead responders. Many donors and field humanitarian organisations felt this complicated the response but also noted that Indonesia has made major progress since the tsunami. One told us: “the Indonesian government was better prepared because of the tsunami. There was a command post in every town. Perhaps they weren’t as functional as they could have been but the local people knew who should be in charge. I think that’s because of the tsunami.”

The effectiveness of clusters as forums for coordination was variable. Education and health were reported to have worked well while shelter was weak. Many insisted on the need for experienced people to staff the clusters. Others pointed out that too many organisations attend cluster meetings merely to listen but not to provide information. “If you want clusters, you need to invest in them, otherwise they are not relevant,” an NGO worker told the HRJ team.
Coordination among donors could also be improved. In the absence of a formal donor coordination mechanism, some of the larger donors (ECHO, AusAid, the US Agency for International Development (USAID), the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) met informally to share information. While some applaud this effort, others believe that donors should share their deliberations with “official” coordination channels. According to some interviewees, too many donors fund the same things and they could do more to align their plans. There is, according to one, “too much coordination for the sake of coordination – it could be more meaningful. Donors could all meet and decide who is going to fund what and help decide partners.” Some donors do regularly coordinate with their traditional implementing partners. Organisations in the field felt, however, that donors should align their decisions to the needs identified in the clusters. They should not stipulate that their funding can only be used for certain sectors or activities. Realising this objective would require a joint needs assessment which enjoys the confidence of both donors and the government.

Given the numerous problems that arose regarding needs assessments, prior to the next disaster it is vital to reach agreement on a common format and procedures for needs assessments and to incorporate these into contingency planning. The attempt to conduct a UN-Emergency Capacity Building Project joint needs assessment was incorporated into contingency planning and is praiseworthy. Efforts should be made to find simple and practical measures to ensure that, in the future, the common template can be used by all and the right procedures are in place to avoid a repetition of sudden onset emergency chaos. A suggestion from the field was for donors and cluster leads to take the lead on this: “Trying to merge all the formats is a nightmare – donors could agree on a common format and indicators. Cluster leads can also do this by forcing everyone in the cluster to use the same indicators.”

**Budding national capacity**

A key TEC recommendation was the need to strengthen national disaster response capacity. Bilateral and multilateral donors have been very supportive, funding various capacity-building programmes and providing technical assistance to Indonesian agencies such as the Badan Rehabilitasi dan Rekonstruksi (BRR) (BRR, UNDP & GoI 2005). This investment is beginning to bear fruit. While there is room for improvement, the Indonesian government should be commended for its DRR efforts and its capacity to manage disasters, especially in rapid response. Following the 2004 tsunami and the 2006 earthquake in Yogyakarta, in 2007 the government enacted a Disaster Management Law (Law 24/2007) which led to the creation of the National Agency for Disaster Management, or BNPB (Badan Penanggulangan Bencana Nasional). Prior to the law, BAKORNAS (BNPB’s predecessor), or ad hoc ministerial groups, came together following a disaster. BNPB, however, goes beyond simply managing disaster response, seeking to be much more comprehensive and to include prevention, preparedness and recovery (World Bank 2009). The law also creates mechanisms to ensure financial accountability and regulate the participation of international agencies and national NGOs.

“Donors tended to fund the most visible needs. The contest for profile had absurd consequences.”
Like other state institutions, disaster management mechanisms in Indonesia now follow the recently rolled-out decentralisation model. At the provincial level, SATKORLAK is in charge of all aspects of disaster management while SATLAK coordinates at the district level. Both of these structures are ad hoc in nature. Just as BNPB replaced BAKORNAS, both SATKORLAK and SATLAK are expected to be replaced with permanent structures according to the 2007 law (Willitts-King 2009). The implementation of the 2007 law is still ongoing, but capacity certainly seems to have improved since the tsunami. Although still a work in progress, things are headed in the right direction.

On a regional level, efforts have been made within the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) to integrate preparedness and emergency response. The Indonesian government has played a leading role, hosting conferences in Bali and Jakarta that led to the signing of the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (ASEAN 2005). The agreement provides for “effective mechanisms to achieve substantial reduction of disaster losses in lives and in the social, economic and environmental assets of the Parties, and to jointly respond to disaster emergencies through concerted national efforts and intensified regional and international co-operation” (Ibid). It includes provisions for an ASEAN disaster relief fund and operational procedures to expedite collective responses to disasters.

Humanitarian organisations note that investment in national and local capacity is having an impact. They report that the government was clearly committed to being the lead emergency responder and set the time limits for each phase. While the early warning system did not work properly, and the system of local command posts was not functional at the time of the earthquake, it is, nevertheless, clear that the Indonesian government is genuinely committed to improving its disaster management capacity.

A further example of good practice has been the creation of locally managed funding mechanisms. The frequency of natural disasters in Indonesia and the bureaucratic difficulties that the government faces when responding to concurrent disasters make such mechanisms extremely useful. While they differ in form and function, the ERF, rapid funding mechanisms of donors and the Multi-Donor Trust Fund are examples of good practice.

OCHA Indonesia has managed an ERF since 2001. The ERF is exclusively for NGOs and provides up to US$100,000 to kick start emergency programmes within hours of a disaster. It is designed to provide rapid, flexible funding to meet priority emergency needs for up to six months. Sweden is currently the main ERF donor, but this changes from year to year. Interviewed field staff generally agreed that the ERF had been effective.

Other positive examples of rapid funding mechanisms include those provided by the Japanese embassy, the Danish embassy, and ECHO’s primary emergency decision (PED). ECHO’s Indonesia office provided 3 million through this fund after the earthquake. The entire process including the call for proposals, decision and receipt of funding was generally completed within three days (although some agencies reported a few extra days). Field organisations were highly appreciative of this mechanism, as it allowed them to intervene quickly and efficiently.

The Multi-Donor Trust Fund for Disaster Response in Indonesia, which was announced in early 2010, follows the pattern of the Multi-Donor Trust Fund set up by 15 donors, the World Bank and the Indonesian government for recovery and reconstruction of Aceh and Nias after the tsunami and earthquakes of 2004 and 2005. Details are still under discussion, but it is clear it will allow for disbursements in response to disasters anywhere in Indonesia. It is hoped that this mechanism can both prevent recurrence of the kind of disproportionate responses recently seen in West Java and West Sumatra and offer support to under-funded, non-visible sectors, particularly early recovery. Interviewees reported that these locally-managed funding mechanisms were far more efficient and timely than the funds provided from outside the country. Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) funds, for example, are reported to have arrived as late as six weeks after the disaster. Donors would do well to consider expanding these and similar mechanisms.

Lessons learnt and recommendations for the future

More than five years after the tsunami, Indonesia has seen definite improvements in disaster management. By nearly all accounts, local capacity has vastly improved. At various tiers of government, authorities are increasingly able to coordinate and respond to disasters and to draw on local funds and international funds managed in Indonesia.
In a country that experiences natural disasters so frequently, learning from the past is key in ensuring that local authorities and local communities are better prepared to respond to disasters. In an ideal world, the Indonesian government would have the capacity to manage the response itself. With appropriate support from donors this could become a reality. If this is to happen, donors need to:

1 **Incorporate needs assessments into contingency planning.** The chaos surrounding the numerous needs assessments following the Sumatra earthquake shows the need to agree on a highly practical common template and procedure before the next disaster. Donors should not need to conduct their own assessments. They should support organisations’ efforts to be better prepared and inform their partners of the importance of contingency planning, and their willingness to support it.

2 **Allocate funding solely on a sober assessment and prioritisation of needs.** This recommendation is, of course, sadly far from new, but it remains highly relevant. Donors preferred to fund the most visible needs, while neglecting less tangible ones. In the absence of a reliable needs assessment, donors should follow recommendations made by clusters.

3 **Integrate risk reduction and preparedness in humanitarian action.** It is encouraging that there is such Indonesian commitment to disaster risk reduction and preparedness. Donors need to support their integration as a part of humanitarian action, instead of insisting on their separation.

### References


Information based on field interviews with key humanitarian agencies in Indonesia from 16 January to 3 February 2010, and 90 questionnaires on donor performance (including 41 OECD/DAC donors).

The HRI team, composed of Philippe Benassi and Marybeth Redheffer, contributed to this report. They express their gratitude to all those interviewed in Indonesia.
Crisis reports

 Occupied Palestinian territories
The crisis and the response

- Gaza remains in chronic humanitarian crisis. Closed borders mean extreme difficulty in obtaining food and basic supplies.
- Gazan population is now even more dependent on humanitarian aid.
- Conditions in the West Bank improved slightly in 2009 but the separation wall further limited Palestinians’ access to land and livelihoods.
- Despite intensive shuttle diplomacy there is limited hope for either inter-factional reconciliation or results from direct Palestinian-Israeli negotiations.
- Generous donor response to the 2009 CAP resulted in world’s highest per capita assistance: 22 new donors contributed.
- Only a limited share of the US$4.5 billion pledged for humanitarian and reconstruction needs in Gaza was disbursed as funds remained unspent due to political constraints.
- Donors shifting from general budgets to the high-profile Gaza crisis created emergency funding shortfalls elsewhere in the oPt.

Donor performance

- Donors’ ban on contact with Hamas authorities in Gaza affected effectiveness of aid delivery and compromised basic humanitarian principles of impartiality, neutrality and independence.
- Donors (with the exception of the European Commission) were generally criticised for allowing political interests to take precedence over the humanitarian need to jointly advocate for access and protection.
- Operation Cast Lead caught many donors by surprise.
- Donors were criticised for not doing more to fund organisational capacity, contingency planning and preparedness.

Key challenges and areas for improvement

- Other donors should emulate the EC and jointly advocate for access and protection.
- Donors should recognise that the blockade and the “no-contact policy” further isolates the Hamas authorities, increases their suspicion of aid workers and thus further shrinks humanitarian space.
- Donors must reevaluate their excessive focus on projects to assist displaced Gazans, instead ensuring that all in need throughout the oPt receive aid.
- Donors need to strive to maintain the independence, neutrality and impartiality of humanitarian aid.
The blockade of Gaza was initiated in June 2007 following several years of rocket attacks on neighbouring Israeli communities and takeover of the enclave by Hamas. Rigorous enforcement of the blockade in 2009 permitted only a trickle of the most basic food, non-food and medical supplies to enter Gaza. Gaza remains in the grip of a chronic humanitarian crisis characterised by shortages of food, potable water and medicine. Continued salinisation of the coastal aquifer and inability to repair damaged water treatment and transport networks have made large numbers of Gazans dependent on expensive trucked water of dubious quality. The population is still heavily affected by the trauma of inter-factional violence during the Hamas takeover. The human misery caused by the blockade is rarely mentioned in the political debate around Gaza.

The blockade of imports and exports is causing shortages of basic products, impeding maintenance and repair of basic infrastructure (including water and sanitation facilities and medical equipment), eroding livelihood opportunities, decreasing purchasing power, undermining efforts of moderate Palestinians, entrenching extremists and enforcing dependence on humanitarian aid. The blockade and international boycott of contact exacerbate the feeling of isolation of the Hamas authorities and their suspicions of aid workers. Hamas’ occasional interference with their work, and persistent restrictions on human rights workers having contacts with those whose rights have been abused – many of them inflicted by the local police or Hamas militants – indicate the shrinking humanitarian space.

The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) reports that 60.5 percent of Gazan 15-19-year-old Gazans are unemployed and that total unemployment in Gaza rose from around 30 percent in 2007 to 40 percent in December 2009. Several thousand people still live amid the rubble of their former homes. With entry blocked by Israel, Gaza’s huge need for construction materials – in particular cement – can only be met by the network of tunnels from Egypt on which the enclave has become reliant.

Gaza has, in effect, become a “humanitarian welfare” state, almost fully dependent on foreign aid. This poses a great risk for further instability. As standards of education, culture and living decline, Gaza has become a classic example of “de-development”.

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In the West Bank, movement east of the barrier – the separation wall erected by Israel inside the Green Line which the international community recognises as the boundary between Israel and the West Bank – slightly improved in 2009. However, limited access to land and livelihood opportunities continues to prevent development. While the world’s focus in 2009 was on the post-Cast Lead humanitarian crisis in Gaza, there was some hope for resumption of the political process and a temporary improvement in the situation in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem. However, continuing restrictions on Palestinians’ access to land and other sources of income, together with illegal expansion of Israeli settlements on occupied territory, and evictions and demolitions of Palestinian houses, particularly in East Jerusalem, have continued to negatively affect the Palestinians.

Assistance in the West Bank is focused on the most vulnerable areas and groups such, as residents of refugee camps, Bedouins and other Palestinian populations in Area C – the part of the West Bank which under the terms of the 1993 Oslo Accords has remained under full Israeli military control. Area A consists of urban areas under the control of the Palestinian Authority (PA), and in Area B, security is shared between the PA and Israel.

The aid community has shifted from provision of material assistance to – generally unsuccessful – efforts to ensure protection and access to jobs and markets. In 2009, in the West Bank, 56,000 jobs were created (Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 2009). Some investments were seen and life slightly improved, largely thanks to donor support. While the number of obstacles operated by the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) was reduced from 630 in September 2008 to 550 in February 2010, this has not brought about fundamental change in the human rights situation. The lives of West Bank Palestinians continue to be shaped by an often violent military occupation, restrictions on movements of people and goods and an increasingly militant settler population determined to exact a price for any Israeli concessions to international opinion.

The Fatah–Hamas conflict – dubbed by Palestinians wakseh (self-inflicted ruin) – shows no sign of abating. Negotiations between Fatah and Hamas have stalled. Hopes for reconciliation have been dashed despite intensive external diplomacy. Efforts by the United States (US) Special Envoy, as well as the Representative of the Quartet, to start indirect (“proximity”) talks as a prelude to direct negotiations failed. The Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) leadership refused to enter talks unless Israel froze all new settlements. The assassination in Dubai in January 2010 of a Hamas commander, allegedly perpetrated by Israeli security forces, has heightened tensions between Israel and a number of Western countries, as the plotters used forged passports of their nationals. Commencement of the first round of proximity talks in May 2010 produced little results.

Israeli settlement expansion has been denounced as illegal at the highest level. US-Israeli relations were challenged by the announcement in March 2010, during the visit of US Vice-President Joe Biden of plans to build 1,600 new homes in occupied East Jerusalem. Subsequent expressions of dismay at the consequences of ongoing settlement construction were made by both the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General and the European Union’s (EU) foreign policy chief. A statement following a Quartet meeting in Moscow in March criticised the housing announcement as an impediment to resumption of peace negotiations. The Quartet called for the lifting of the blockade on Gaza, cancellation of all new settlement plans and adherence to the 2003 Road Map, under which Israel had agreed to dismantle settlement “outposts” and the PA to disarm militants, curb terrorism and take steps toward a democratic, accountable government. Neither side has followed up on all benchmarks set out in the plan.

In April 2009, the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) established an independent international fact-finding mission to investigate violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law (IHL) in the oPt, with focus on Gaza. The resultant Goldstone report accused the IDF and Palestinian militants of war crimes and possible crimes against humanity, and recommended that both sides transparently investigate their actions. The report noted evidence that Palestinian armed groups committed war crimes and, possibly, crimes against humanity by repeatedly launching attacks on southern Israel, but was particularly critical of Israel, calling its assault “a deliberately disproportionate attack designed to punish, humiliate, and terrorize a civilian population, radically diminish its local economic capacity both to work and to provide for itself, and to force upon it an ever increasing sense of dependency and vulnerability.” The UNHRC endorsed the report and, in November, the UN General Assembly resolution 64/10 called for independent investigations of war crimes allegations by both sides.

Donor support

In response to Operation Cast Lead, in February 2009 the UN issued the Gaza Flash Appeal, requesting US$613 million for immediate life-saving needs and essential repairs for nine months. The largest share of the funds requested was to address urgent needs for food, shelter and other non-food items. A number of projects in the Flash Appeal had already been included in the annual (CAP) for 2009, bringing the total funds required for 2009 to US$873 million, later revised down to US$804.5 million. Donors responded rapidly and generously and, at the end of the year, 78.79 percent of funds requested were covered.
Donors made pledges of close to US$4.5 billion for humanitarian aid and early recovery during a conference in the Egyptian resort of Sharm el-Sheikh in March 2009. The PA, UN agencies, the World Bank, the EC and local and international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) cooperated to prepare a Palestinian National Early Recovery and Reconstruction Plan for Gaza 2009-2010. The plan was ambitious, requesting US$1.33 billion for early recovery and reconstruction, including US$502 million to repair essential infrastructure and US$315 million to rebuild basic social services. It was not clear how much represented new money. It is now apparent that only a small share of the pledges and proposed projects have been realised due to the near complete blockade imposed on Gaza. With no prospects of Israel lifting its embargo, several organisations – notably the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) – have decided it is premature to finalise any reconstruction plans.

While CAP requirements increased by US$378 million between 2007 and 2009, donors funded a higher percentage of the funds requested and additionally provided considerable support outside the appeal. This includes in-kind contributions from Arab states.

In 2009, 22 new donors pledged support to the appeal. Kuwait was a significant new major donor, becoming one of the top five. The US was the top donor and also the largest donor to the general fund of the UNRWA, which is not included in this summary. Together the top five donors contributed together 60 percent.

The 2010 CAP requests US$644.5 million, US$635.2 million is sought for high priority needs, of which US$370 million is required for Gaza. While UNRWA’s requirements amount to US$323.3 million (not including its general fund) and the World Food Programme (WFP) requires US$50 million, there is also considerable involvement of, mostly international, NGOs. UNRWA and WFP’s Operation Lifeline are however the main actors. UNRWA feeds registered refugees (representing approximately two thirds of the population of Gaza and around a quarter of the population of the West Bank) and WFP meets the principal food needs of the remaining vulnerable population.

### Quality of response

The response to the 2009 revised appeal was rapid and generous, but there were several impediments to programme implementation. It has been a significant challenge to incorporate new donors to the Consolidated Appeal into coordination and consultation mechanisms. Several Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development / Development Assistance Committee (OECD/DAC) donors shared information on assistance provided, but better joint strategic planning of their appeal response would have ensured greater impact.

Several donors allocated all their oPt aid to Gaza and did not necessarily increase their traditional annual support. Shifting contributions from flexible use throughout the oPt for immediate Gazan needs led to underfunding of a number of ongoing projects in the West Bank where several NGOs had to restrict or halt activities. Some agencies complained that they were blocked from reallocating pledges made for Gazan reconstruction to meet needs of vulnerable West Bank populations.

The humanitarian response in Gaza has been only partial and short-term. There is concern about the continued intrusion of seawater into the coastal aquifer, the inability to repair the sewage and water supply systems, and widespread dependence on expensive and often unsafe trucked water.

The operational environment in Gaza is complicated not only by the stringent Israeli blockade but also by donor and UN security protocols which require international staff to travel in armed vehicles and wear bulletproof gear. This limits direct contacts with beneficiaries, complicates establishment of relations of trust and adds to the burdens faced by UNRWA’s 10,000 local staff. Both Palestinians and the aid community see the blockade as destroying hope and strongly urge donors to speak out and more forcefully pressure Israel to respect international law by lifting the blockade, halting the construction of the barrier and adhering to the 1967 General Assembly Resolution No. 242.
The blockade of Gaza has substantially added to the cost of delivering aid. Due to closure of the Karni crossing, UNRWA and WFP reported having to spend an additional US$5.1 million on transport, storage and handling of food supplies in 2009.

The ultimate effectiveness of donor assistance is dependent on the selective and unpredictable goodwill of the Israeli government to allow certain shipments and categories of aid into Gaza. Many donors are forced to intercede at the highest level to obtain trifling results, such as clearance of a small truckload of glazing glass. Needs identified in East Jerusalem and in Area C of the West Bank are not being addressed due to Israeli pressure, leaving a significant proportion of the population unprotected.

The entry of 22 new donors and the fact they collectively provided US$61.2 million, 11.6 percent of the CAP response, is encouraging and should be built upon. The largest contributions came from three Gulf countries and the Islamic Development Bank. Besides their generous, and mostly un-earmarked, cash support, Arab donors expedited transit through Egypt of some of the most needed construction materials. The monetary value of these and other in-kind contributions is not clear. Arab donors additionally supported the reconstruction of schools, hospitals and some 100 houses in Gaza. Despite their generosity, Arab donors lack well-developed methodologies or strategies. They did not consult about priorities, nor coordinate their in-kind response, thus contributing to an overloading of warehouses and causing congestion and delays at the Rafah crossing point with Egypt.

In general, private contributions given in the immediate aftermath of Operation Cast Lead were spontaneous, for immediate relief purposes and mostly given without any restrictions on end beneficiaries. However, donor governments were frequently led by political and media-driven considerations. One donor representative interviewed said that public shock at the extent of death and damage had put her government under pressure to act swiftly, leaving insufficient time for assessment and coordination. Given the reality of the blockade, needs assessments were inadequate and often more shaped by donor politics and restrictions on the utilisation of aid than identified needs. Although there was general agency satisfaction that donors allocated funds according to assessed needs, there was concern that protection and early recovery activities were not well supported. Several donors stressed cross-cutting concern for protection and adherence to humanitarian principles and insisted that these should be included in all initiatives they fund.

Impact of the “no contact with Hamas” policy

Several donor governments have implemented global anti-terrorism measures which preclude any contact with Hamas – acknowledged by international observers to have won 2006 parliamentary elections. Those refusing contact include some of the most prominent Western donors. This severely compromises delivery of humanitarian assistance along agreed principles of international humanitarian law. It excludes some of those in Gaza requiring need and also significantly adds to transaction and implementation costs through the requirement to channel funds through non-Hamas-affiliated agencies and restrictions on procurement in Gaza. Major donors permit INGOs to work only in five municipalities considered outside Hamas control. They thus impede provision of assistance on the basis of need, disregarding a key Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) principle. The prohibition of other than “technical” contact with Hamas officials prevents establishment of effective relationships with de facto authorities and institutions providing water, health, sanitation, solid waste removal and other basic services.

This policy has resulted in extremely detailed and time-consuming reporting requirements and protracted procurement processes. Amid suspicions that Hamas benefits from the tunnel economy, donors insist that funds are not used in any way which might conceivably strengthen the Islamic movement. A major donor has set a local procurement limit of US$1,000 for implementing agencies if it funds. One interviewee mentioned how a donor requested exhaustive technical specifications for a shipment of pencils. The burden of suspicion falls on implementing agencies, forcing them to great lengths to demonstrate they are not bolstering Hamas. The prohibition on dialogue with Hamas puts humanitarian workers under further stress as beneficiaries may regard them as partial in their delivery of aid. They also face the additional risk that they as individuals, or their agencies, may be accused of “supporting terrorism”.

Implementation of humanitarian reform

Donors participating in the GHD initiative have pledged support for the cluster approach. Sector coordination was already in place in the oPt in 2008. The cluster approach was applied for the first time in response to the 2009 Gaza crisis. Preliminary findings of the evaluation of the cluster approach in November 2009 indicate the need for more inter-cluster coordination and clarity of mandates and reporting lines within clusters. The evaluation confirmed that the approach covered most basic needs. The logistics cluster was initially effective in moving goods which Israel permitted to enter Gaza, but did not subsequently go beyond information-sharing as UNRWA, with its considerable operational experience, did not need to rely on logistical assistance from new partners. The education, health and water-sanitation clusters were considered to have worked slightly better. The decision of the early recovery cluster to cooperate with the PA, rather than Hamas, seriously impeded its effectiveness.
In the aftermath of Cast Lead, the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) was activated with the participation of the UN, NGO coordinating bodies and the Red Cross / Red Crescent Movement. The HCT is chaired by the UN Humanitarian Coordinator, who is also the UN Deputy Special Coordinator within the UN Special Coordinator’s Office. In other contexts, the combination of humanitarian and political functions is considered by a number of NGOs and the Red Cross/Crescent Movement as a blurring of responsibilities to the detriment of the independence of humanitarian action. Some have expressed such reservations also in the oPt, but generally, the arrangement is seen as providing a way to bring humanitarian issues to the attention to the Special Coordinator and to draw on his advocacy capacity on issues such as access.

**Application of GHD Principles**

Agencies and donor representatives described good and poor donor behaviour. Most donor representatives interviewed were aware of GHD Principles and tried to apply them when appropriate. Few agency representatives had deep knowledge, but during discussions acknowledged scope for GHD Principles to positively influence donor behaviour and humanitarian action.

While several donors advocated at the political level for the lifting of the blockade in order to expedite projects they funded, donors did not coordinate robust calls on Israel to permit unrestricted access of humanitarian goods and workers. The EC was the only donor advocating for protection and unimpeded access to Gaza for all humanitarian workers. In 2009, donors established a Humanitarian Donor Group (HDG) which should to be used as the forum for common advocacy and not just for information sharing, for which purpose several other mechanisms are already in place.

There is clear evidence that in many cases, donor political interests have overridden the humanitarian principle that support should be impartially provided on the basis of need.

One major donor went as far as setting up its own “humanitarian pipeline” outside the logistics cluster, thus undermining coordination efforts. By not allowing local procurement in Gaza, on the basis that Hamas might be imposing “taxes” on goods arriving through tunnels, donors continue to support the Israeli economy. Implementing agencies are sometimes forced to pay as much as four times the amount they would otherwise pay in Gaza.

Several donors were cited as examples of good donorship as they provide multi-year commitments, remain flexible and offer un-earmarked funding. One donor had found a way between a politically-driven driven agenda at home and prioritising humanitarian programmes in the oPt. Informants urged donors to learn from those who are realistic about what can be achieved, have good local knowledge and support genuine needs assessments. Agencies welcomed the switch by some donors from project funding to a programmatic approach, reducing administrative and management costs for both donors and implementers and indicating trust in the implementing capacity of partners. This was contrasted with the practice of those donors who impose onerous administrative requirements on already overstretched NGOs.

“As standards of education, culture and living decline, Gaza has become a classic example of de-development.”

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Continued support to the Humanitarian Emergency Response Fund (HERF) made it possible to allocate funding directly to NGOs for modest projects in the immediate aftermath of Cast Lead. Most donors have continued to be guided by the CAP in their humanitarian funding decisions. Agencies are generally concerned about donors who have allocated all or part of their annual oPt budgets to respond to the Gaza crisis at the expense of support for ongoing programmes in the rest of the oPt. Many point to the paradox that while donors are aware of the unacceptable human and financial costs of the Gazan blockade, and are globally committed to promoting aid effectiveness, they have failed to coherently intercede with the Israel government, thus continuing to pay the increased costs caused by the blockade.

**Lessons learnt and recommendations for the future**

1. Advocacy should focus on ensuring that all parties to the armed conflict respect the norms and principles of IHL governing the protection of humanitarian personnel and civilian populations, as well as the right of free movement and unhindered access for humanitarian workers and supplies, including basic construction materials.

2. Donors and implementing partners must act strategically to use limited openings for negotiations most effectively.

3. Donors should endeavour to undertake field visits and participate in monitoring and evaluation of the projects and programmes.

4. Assistance should primarily meet the identified needs of vulnerable minorities, not the priorities of the Palestinian Authority and Hamas who favour development over humanitarian aid out of fear that the latter will be at the expense of longer-term cooperation.

5. Methods must be found to address psycho-social trauma and mental health problems in Gaza.

6. While it is true that humanitarian assistance initiatives cannot exist in a de-politicised vacuum, it is imperative to do the utmost to retain the independence, neutrality and impartiality of humanitarian aid. Humanitarian principles must not be overruled by political or economic interests.

7. Having apparently been taken by surprise at the intensity of Operation Cast Lead, the international community needs to be better prepared to prevent and reduce risk to civilian populations. Donors should be involved in preparing contingency plans which should include best, worst and most likely scenarios. Reserves must be created to allow for a rapid and appropriate response. Donors and agencies need to consult with political analysts and develop an early warning system to mitigate the potential humanitarian impact of any new crisis.

**A way forward?**

The oPt crisis is unique because of its duration, politically-induced nature, the generosity of the humanitarian and aid response and the active engagement of the international community. It is a crisis of protracted and constant violations of human dignity in which the psychological and mental strength of the occupied population is being tested beyond limits. The prospect of a solution is made more remote by a stand-off between an internationally recognised government (Israel), an authority seeking to build a state (the PA) and an Islamic movement (Hamas) controlling Gaza. In the words of one interviewee, the region is “one country, three governments”. In this ambiguous political situation, the international community is confused, unsure how to prioritise assistance in terms of time, location, implementing partners and beneficiary populations. As the conflict goes on and on, key questions need to be asked: does the current pattern of international assistance prolong the humanitarian and political crisis, rather than work towards a durable solution? Has international aid become an expensive sticking plaster, effectively sustaining the increasing poverty of the Palestinian population and absolving the occupying authority of its obligations under the Geneva Conventions to provide services to those under occupation?

It can be argued that unless there is inter-Palestinian dialogue and rapprochement, the oPt should be seen as being afflicted with two crises. If the international community viewed the oPt through this lens it might be able to adjust its response to the requirements specific for each of the crises in a balanced manner. The international community will need to show strong determination to force all parties to respect international humanitarian law, human rights and humanitarian principles. What is needed on all sides is restraint, an end to provocative behaviour and cycles of retaliation, and commitment to serious efforts to find ways towards a realistic solution allowing civilians to live side-by-side in peace enjoying the same rights.
References

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The HRI team, composed of Belén Camacho, Lucia Fernández, Magda Ninaber van Eyben (Team leader) and Soledad Posada, contributed to this report. They express their gratitude to all those interviewed in the occupied Palestinian territories.
Crisis reports

Pakistan
Pakistan at a glance

The crisis and the response

- Military operations against Islamic militants caused the world’s largest displacement in over a decade: some 1.5 million IDPs have not returned.
- International engagement in the crisis response has been limited due to government access restrictions and UN security procedures.
- Military leadership of the response has created a dilemma: protest closure of humanitarian space or advocate for GHD Principles?
- The response has often not been transparently needs-based: entitlements have not reached many female-headed households and some communities branded as terrorist sympathisers.
- The government has downplayed the crisis and denied the applicability of international humanitarian law.
- The cluster system has been misused to allocate funds, rather than coordinate. Meetings have been time consuming and often unproductive.
- UN leadership has been disjointed: there are three senior officials with overlapping mandates.

Donor performance

- There was a 72 percent response to the revised Pakistan Humanitarian Response Plan 2008–2009. As of October 2010, the 2010 PHRP is only 46 percent covered, with poor responses for protection, WASH and agriculture.
- Many donors remain silent about human rights violations by state agents, coerced IDP returns and government reluctance to use established international humanitarian terminology.
- Donors generally follow Pakistani policy by refusing to fund national NGOs.
- The US and UK have funded non-transparent Pakistani military-led humanitarian and recovery operations.

Key challenges and areas for improvement

- Donors must do more to collectively advocate for safe humanitarian access, protection of conflict-affected civilians and humanitarian workers.
- Donors need to understand the root causes of Islamic militancy, especially poor governance and landlessness. Generous support for early recovery – transparently delivered by civilian state actors – is imperative to secure local support for the War on Terror.
- Donors could play a role in forging development of guidelines for civil-military cooperation.
The international community generally accepts the need to re-establish Pakistani sovereignty and confront fundamentalists who grossly violate human rights, deny girls access to education and disrupt delivery of basic services by intimidating, murdering or expelling civil servants. However, the means by which this objective has been pursued has created unprecedented dilemmas for international actors.

Humanitarians do not generally find themselves forced to follow the rules of a strong, functioning state with a confident, professional and non-corrupt army. It has been hard to establish productive relationships between international non-governmental organisations (INGOs), United Nations (UN) agencies and Pakistani civilian and military authorities and to provide assistance based on mutually-recognised humanitarian principles. The fact that the Pakistan army is simultaneously a military protagonist (bearing ultimate responsibility for triggering the largest humanitarian crisis in 2009), the key player in the response to it, the driver of most large-scale returns of IDPs as well as the gatekeeper generally blocking – but occasionally permitting – humanitarian access to zones of conflict has created ongoing dilemmas and controversies for donors and humanitarian agencies. There have been intense frustrations as humanitarians find themselves dealing with nominally “civilian” national and provincial government agencies, while the real decision-makers are military personnel. They have faced a conundrum: to observe the Principles of Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD), and thus risk being denied operational access or expelled from the country, or to pragmatically tailor GHD Principles to the exigencies of the situation.

Many donors have remained quiescent with regard to human rights violations despite evidence that civilians have been caught between the abuses by the Taliban and the government’s often indiscriminate and disproportionate military operations (Amnesty International 2010). They have generally not spoken publicly about the impunity enjoyed by government-recruited militias and the government’s failure to “bring the region out of this human rights black hole and place the people of FATA under the protection of the law and constitution of Pakistan” (IRIN 2010).

Pakistan

Donor dilemmas around response to conflict-induced displacement

During its second mission to Pakistan, the Humanitarian Response Index (HRI) team found the country at the forefront of the War on Terror. In April 2009, Pakistan suffered the world’s largest and fastest displacement for over a decade as the army launched determined operations against Islamic militants which, in many cases, caused almost all civilian populations to flee. Between 2.7 million and three million Pashtuns were displaced (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre 2010) in North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) – the collective name for 13 administrative entities – most of which abut the Pakistan-Afghanistan border and in which a number of Pakistani constitutional rights and justice procedures do not apply. Despite extensive return movements, there were still 1.5 conflict-induced internally displaced persons (IDPs) in July-August 2010 when – after the HRI mission – Pakistan was devastated by a flooding crisis of even greater magnitude. A further 3.7 million ‘stayees’ – those who did not flee military operations but who often suffered just as much as those who did – may require support for the restoration of critical services (OCHA 2010).
Causes and patterns of displacement and return

The Pakistani military launched operations to oust fundamentalist groups, initially in Bajaur Agency in FATA in August 2008, and thereafter in Mohmand Agency. When the Pakistani government entered into a ceasefire agreement with the Tehrik-e-Taliban-e-Pakistan (TTP) in February 2009, under which it was agreed to enforce shari’a law in Swat, there was widespread concern both within Pakistan and abroad. It soon became clear that the TTP was trying to extend its reach beyond Swat, resulting in a decision in May 2009 to eliminate the militants and re-establish government control.

The approach in Swat and during subsequent offensives has been similar: to warn the local people of impending operations, to urge them to leave and in some cases to shepherd civilians onto army-provided lorries and buses and to then unleash aerial bombardment, artillery strikes and infantry attacks. There has been an implicit assumption that any males remaining in a conflict zone are “terrorists” or “miscreants”.

Over 80 percent of IDPs have taken shelter with host families or rented accommodation (OCHA 2010). The concept of melmastia (hospitality) is, together with honour and revenge, a core tenet of paktunwali, the code of ethics governing relations among the estimated 40 million Pashtuns in Pakistan and Afghanistan. While there has been much reference in official Pakistani government statements to the “traditional hospitality” demonstrated by the host families, there are also many cultural complications to accepting it and the needs of host families have been generally ignored.

There have been substantial return movements but it is not clear if they have always been voluntary and sustainable. Those who have returned to NWFP and Bajaur in northern FATA may see returning home or local integration in urban environments as their preferred solution. Further south in FATA, where IDPs have been pushed away from buffer border zones, tribal and religious tensions are important obstacles and could provoke secondary displacements. Proximity to the Afghan border and the firing of United States (US) drones into Pakistani territory is an impediment to return. The greatest concern expressed by those who have returned is further conflict. The limited field presence of the international community and lack of humanitarian and media access make it hard to evaluate difficulties facing returnees or stayees.

The decision to return has often been led by political or military considerations, as part of a state strategy to indicate the apparent conclusive nature of victory against militants. Decisions on closures of IDP camps have been taken in Islamabad while the humanitarian community was still in the process of drawing up operating procedures for camp closures. Interviewees confirmed to the HRI team the reports from the UN Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) and protection cluster that there have been consistent instances of camp closures that do not respect the principles of voluntary, informed, safe and dignified returns. Information on return or relocation options was not widely available and key consent forms were only in English. Camp authorities rushed or coerced IDPs into making decisions; and local authorities in some instances cut off camp utility supplies to pressure people to move on (Young 2010). The Pakistani army often coerced people onto trucks despite their misgivings and fears – which in many cases proved to be well-founded – that they would receive insufficient support on return and would confront ongoing insecurity. Major decisions around IDP entitlements have been made at the highest level of the federal government without the apparent engagement of designated agencies, or much, if any, consultation with the humanitarian community. Much advice from humanitarian actors not to rush return and to ensure it is voluntary has been ignored.

It is premature to speculate about durable solutions for those displaced. The displacement crisis in northwestern Pakistan is ongoing, further localised conflict is likely to continue and government capacity to respond to displacement is now further limited by the flood crisis. People are still being displaced from, and within, areas across the region.

Government terminology blurs crisis and distorts response

The Pakistani military seeks to avoid mention of “conflict” or “crisis”, depicts its offensives as “law enforcement operations” and denies the applicability of IHL. No government policy statement is based on the internationally-recognised Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement and the government does not generally refer to “displacement”. The term “IDP” is widely used by the media, civil society, IDPs themselves and Pakistani charitable organisations. It is used informally by political and military leaders and is found in some government reports. However, the federal authorities and military generally use the official term “dislocated people” and occasionally “affectees”. Pakistan has successfully insisted that the Guiding Principles are barely mentioned in joint government-UN documentation. Driven by their wider commitments to the War on Terror, few donors have publicly questioned the Pakistani government’s approach and terminology, despite their formal adoption of GHD Principles. With their focus on “post-conflict recovery”, major development donors echo government rhetoric that the conflict is over. As an example, the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank worked with the government to rapidly develop a Conflict Early Recovery Initial Needs Assessment (CERINA) in jihadi-affected areas (World Bank/Asian Development Bank 2009) despite the reality that conflict was ongoing.
The government recognised that the primary need of IDPs was cash to pay for food, rent and utilities and that they were living in an urban environment with no shortage of cash machines and banks. After discussion with the UN, it was agreed to issue Smart Cards for NADRA-registered IDPs. There was quick uptake as cash was withdrawn, shopkeepers recognised them for a fee and middle-men started helping those unfamiliar with the technology. Against UN advice, a populist decision was made to load each card with 25,000 rupees (c. US$300), substantially more than after the earthquake. This led both to some people claiming displacement status without due reason and to the government running out of funds. After 400,000 cards were issued, further IDP registration was then blocked without warning and only resumed on receipt of US funding. Newly-registered IDPs do not receive as much.

Pakistan has not only prevented access of international humanitarians and donors to conflict zones, but has discouraged engagement by non-approved Pakistani charitable societies, human rights organisations and the media. Many reported to the HRI team that most donors have followed this Pakistani policy by refusing to provide funding for national NGOs.
International donor response

Numerous INGOs, 25 UN agencies and the International Organisation for Migration operate in Pakistan. Despite this considerable presence, the international community’s engagement in the response to those displaced by the armed conflict has not involved substantial direct field involvement. The UN’s stringent security mechanisms, combined with government access restrictions, has greatly limited access to conflict zones and areas of return. The limited role of international humanitarian assistance reflects a lack of capacity and influence, exacerbated by controversy around the way in which humanitarian aid is perceived and disagreement among humanitarians on whether to engage and support government programmes or to primarily advocate for humanitarian principles (Humanitarian Policy Group 2009). Few of the international staff in humanitarian agencies have extensive experience working in Pakistan. Donors and the UN seem to lack analytical capacity to understand and address the root causes of displacement. A real-time evaluation (RTE) of the response commissioned by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) concluded that the HCT was not “as effective a forum for leading the international humanitarian response as it should have been,” (Cosgrave et al. 2010).

Traditionally, apart from the very extensive bilateral military cooperation, aid to Pakistan has been concentrated on development issues, much of it through budget support. The formal coordination mechanism has been the Pakistan Development Forum, which last met in 2007. At the federal level, the Pakistani government’s priority remains traditional development assistance, in particular budget support, rather than humanitarian assistance.

Downplaying the extent of the displacement crisis, Pakistan was initially hesitant to work on an appeal with the UN. After difficult negotiations, a Pakistan Humanitarian Response Plan (PHRP) was approved, initially for six months, but later extended. By the end of December 2009, 72 percent of funds requested in the revised PHRP 2008–2009 had been obtained, the fourth-highest level of funding globally: US$490 million against total PHRP requirements of US$680 million. As of mid-September 2010, a further US$188 million has been contributed to the displacement crisis response outside the PHRP, including through the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, Médecins sans Frontières (MSF) and a large number of other international NGOs. The major contributors to the PHRP have been the US (43.5 percent), the European Commission (7.9 percent), the United Arab Emirates 5.7 percent, Japan 4.7 percent, Germany 4.3 percent, Australia and Norway (both 3.2 percent). The United Kingdom (UK) – the former colonial power – contributed only 2.9 percent. The 3.3 percent provided by the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) proved invaluable in providing rapid funding for life-saving activities. Pakistan itself contributed 4.9 percent of the total.

There was markedly divergent response by sector. Nutrition was almost fully covered and camp coordination and camp management was 96 percent covered, but responses to early recovery, agriculture and education were only four, 19 and 36 percent respectively. This clearly indicates serious lack of appreciation of the importance of restoring livelihoods and failure to learn from experience elsewhere, demonstrating that such activities must start in parallel with the immediate provision of shelter and food aid. In August 2010, OCHA (2010) warned that “the vast majority of those not receiving support for restarting agricultural and non-agricultural livelihoods will find it difficult to identify new income sources or non-harmful ways of sustaining themselves and their families”.

A number of Pakistan’s leading donors, including the US and the UK, work with Pakistan’s military on recovery and reconstruction projects in NWFP and FATA. The US and UK have developed a “non-kinetic stabilization” strategy for Malakand, the district which has seen the largest displacement (US State Department 2010). Funds provided by such interventions do not form part of donors’ humanitarian budgets. They resemble Afghanistan/Iraq models of Provincial Reconstruction Teams, with the difference that activities in Pakistan are nationally-led. There is apparent tension within UK agencies – with the Department for International Development (DFID) reportedly not pleased with direct Ministry of Defence/Foreign and Commonwealth Office assistance to the Pakistani military for “reconstruction”.

Funding for the 2010 PHRP has fallen significantly behind needs and is now likely to be overshadowed by the August 2010 flood catastrophe. Launched in February 2010, it sought US$538 million for the first six months of 2010, and the possibility of US$254 million for the second half of 2010. By mid-September 2010, the PHRP had only been 44.6 percent covered, with only food (60 percent) and CCCM (60 percent) even half funded.

Non-OECD/DAC donors

As in other recent disaster contexts, the extent of funding provided by Gulf states is not readily quantified and pledges have not necessarily been honoured. Saudi Arabia pledged US$100 million to the PHRP in October 2009 but up until the 2010 floods, discussions were still under way to turn this into an actual disbursement, with the HCT unsure how best to pressure Riyadh. Such inability to turn a pledge into a payment highlights the general difficulty in Pakistan, and elsewhere, of how to effectively and transparently engage with non-traditional donors.
Difficult choices for humanitarians

Whether to cooperate or to protest is a choice faced by most operational agencies genuinely committed to upholding GHD Principles in Pakistan. There are no easy answers. The representative of one INGO told the HRi team of the need for “pragmatic impartiality”. Several INGOs reported “you are damned if you do and damned if you don’t”. Respondents reported that in general, “donors accepted conditions and limitations imposed... probably they didn’t have any other option”.

Some international humanitarians have expressed principled concerns about military closure of humanitarian space, while others argue the pragmatic need to align with the military agenda, despite apparent contradiction with core humanitarian principles. Humanitarian actors continue to debate the pros and cons of alignment and proximity with military actors. Oxfam has noted that “efforts to uphold and promote humanitarian principles (including the need to distinguish humanitarian action from military or political agendas) have suffered from a disjointed approach and the lack of a common strategy for engagement with government and other actors,” (Bennett 2009). Despite their reservations about military intrusions into humanitarian space, there is often a grudging recognition among the UN and INGOs that they are more bureaucratic and sluggish as responders to displacement than the Pakistani army.

Cluster and coordination confusion

It is difficult, in a strong state such as Pakistan, for donors to combine development and humanitarian assistance while respecting the GHD Principles. It has not been easy for in-country donor staff to shift from long-standing development approaches to learning to respond to a massive sudden-onset humanitarian emergency. Donor and UN agencies’ reliance on “surge capacity” resulted in the arrival of staff with little or no knowledge of the country, often to the annoyance of more experienced humanitarian workers with experience stretching back to the 2005 earthquake. Dependence on surge capacity led to frequent turnover of staff, as those provided under “surge” arrangements are often only available for short periods. Donors and UN agencies need to address this long-standing problem.

The swift re-establishment of a fully-staffed OCHA office in early 2009 was instrumental in ensuring rapid and regular compilation and dissemination of information. In the second quarter of 2009, the UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs designated the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) Representative in Pakistan as Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) to lead the response to the displacement crisis. In August 2009, the UN Under-Secretary-General also appointed a Special Envoy (SE) for Assistance to Pakistan to “promote a strategic, coherent and comprehensive approach to supporting the humanitarian, recovery and reconstruction needs of crisis-affected areas.” The UN asserts they work closely together but the Resident Coordinator (RC) and HC have little contact and the SE only comes to Pakistan occasionally. The SE’s function seems uncertain as he has no Security Council mandate – to which Pakistan would not agree anyway. The designation of a separate HC and SE indicates how difficult it has been for the UN to promote a comprehensive response strategy and to mobilise funds. The complications arise from both the Pakistani government’s desire to downplay any humanitarian issues and the UN’s internal structure. The result – three senior officials with overlapping responsibilities – lacks clarity and efficiency. The future of this tripartite structure remains uncertain.

Many actors interviewed by the HRi team thought that an HC selected for the most significant new humanitarian crisis of 2009 should be able to devote all his efforts to the HC function and should not also be expected to continue to manage the large programme of a major development and humanitarian UN agency.

In response to the displacement crisis, donors established a fortnightly informal donor breakfast, hosted by different donors in turn, at which the HC, the head of OCHA and one or two other selected representatives of humanitarian implementing agencies briefed donors. The HRi team was informed that this mechanism was particularly useful for the smaller embassies.

The coordination mechanisms put in place following the earthquake in October 2005 included the first major trial of the cluster system (Street & Parihar 2007). This was reactivated for the PHRP in 2009. Twelve clusters have been created: agriculture, camp coordination and camp management, coordination, community restoration (elsewhere known as early recovery), education, emergency shelter, food aid, health, logistics support services, nutrition, protection, and water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH).
A number of problems with the cluster system were identified during the response to the earthquake and there continues to be dissatisfaction. Many expressed concern over the use of the cluster system to allocate funds, rather than just coordinate activities and coverage. This has led to the impression that funds do not reach all implementing agencies proportionately, with the UN cluster lead agencies’ own programmes, and those of the well-established INGOs, receiving preferential funding. It seems that the cluster leads, rather than being the “funder of last resort” as foreseen in the cluster guidelines, have become the “channel of first resort.” The International Rescue Committee has described the use of clusters to provide project funding as an “administratively dysfunctional” perversion of their intended function which has “exacerbated the worst kind of negative competition between humanitarian actors.” (Young 2010). Humanitarian organisations also shared their frustration over the extensive amount of time it takes for funds allocated to NGOs through the cluster system to actually reach the implementing agency. Respondents also reported to the HRI team that there is a perception that in some cases, representatives of newly-arrived and non-experienced INGOs, enjoying strong donor political support, took up time at cluster meetings, distracting senior staff from major operational agencies from their duties. Others reported that too many issues were referred to the agency heads on the HCT for decision because those attending cluster meetings did not have the seniority, authority, or experience to ensure cluster members reached agreement.

**Governance and mal-development**

There seems to be limited understanding of the socio-political tensions and local power dynamics which helped give rise to Islamic militancy. NWFP/FATA will again become a sanctuary for insurgents unless the government and the international community address the underlying conditions of poverty, absence of state services, poor education and feudal control of land that allowed militancy to flourish. Many, if not most, Pakistani IDPs primarily regard themselves as Pashtuns, rather than Pakistani citizens. Delegitimisation of the authority of Islamic militants is not possible without programmes to develop national identity that recognise the contributions of all ethnic groups. The US military has acknowledged that imposing Western legal institutions on Pashtun communities, directed by a central government perceived as corrupt and dominated by non-Pashtuns, invites resistance (Haring 2010). Delivery of reconstruction aid through unaccountable local institutions not only limits aid effectiveness, but may also impede, rather than encourage, democratisation. A post-conflict recovery approach based on development-focused “business as usual” is not conducive to post-conflict stability.

The International Crisis Group (2009) argues that the greatest obstacle to durable solutions in FATA is malgovernance resulting from “short-sighted military policies and a colonial-era body of law that isolates the region from the rest of the country, giving it an ambiguous constitutional status and denying political freedoms and economic opportunity to the population”. In recent years, Taliban militants have murdered hundreds of tribal elders, destroying traditional forms of authority. The vacuum created by the militants and military offensives may lead to more sectarian violence. Extremist groups appear to be exploiting relief efforts to advance their agenda. Communities displaced by a poorly planned war may be especially vulnerable to *jahadi* indoctrination. Media coverage is tightly restricted but there have, nevertheless, been reports that returnees are frustrated, hearing themselves frequently praised as heroes by the government, yet still waiting for key services and livelihoods support (Hussain 2010).

**Lessons learnt and recommendations for the future**

Neither the government nor the international community are doing enough to protect and assist those caught up in the titanic struggle against Islamic fundamentalism in Pakistan. Pakistan needs a clear national policy and set of practices to safeguard the lives, basic rights, well-being, and livelihoods of the large number of civilians caught up in the armed struggle.

1. **Humanitarian access and respect for IHL:** Donor and humanitarian access to conflict and return areas is essential to verify the conditions of displacement and return. The government’s main long-term development partners, particularly the US and UK, need to discuss humanitarian issues directly with the government, stop providing funds for military reconstruction and advocate for channelling of humanitarian relief through genuinely autonomous civil agencies. They must realise that “victory over terrorists” cannot be obtained by coerced IDP returns and military-driven hearts-and-minds “reconstruction” projects.

2. **Needs-based assistance:** Donors should engage with the Pakistani authorities on the criteria and procedures by which those affected by the displacement crisis are registered by NADRA. Assistance should reach all those actually in need, specifically those who do not have, or have lost, their identity cards, families headed by women, and those from regions not officially “notified” as being affected by the conflict. Individuals from “loyal” tribes should only be eligible for assistance if they are shown to be personally in need.
3 Civil military code of conduct needed: Many argue that popular support for the struggle against extremism hinges on asserting accountable civilian control over counter-insurgency policy, relief and reconstruction. Humanitarians would like a joint understanding between the Pakistani military, provincial and federal authorities, Pakistani NGOs, donors and international humanitarian agencies specifying how the international community can work with Pakistani authorities and civil society to protect the lives, rights, and livelihoods of civilians. Humanitarian INGOs and the HCT have started to develop a set of Basic Operating Rules, akin to the Basic Operating Guidelines – a set of benchmarks issued by the UN and development and humanitarian agencies – which proved useful during the conflict in Nepal between the former royalist government and Maoist insurgents. These need to be finalised and donors should subsequently pressure the government to accept and conform to them.

4 Early recovery: It is vitally important that the early recovery clusters which were woefully underfunded in the PHRP 2009 are better funded in the PHRP 2010.

5 Addressing cluster system inadequacies: Cluster lead responsibilities in a crisis of this scale, cannot be met by simply adding to the workloads of existing staff. The cluster approach can only work if agencies have additional senior staff with the time, authority, experience and personal skills to understand the issues and prepare and chair meetings. Cluster heads have to be seen as acting in the interests of the vulnerable, not their own agency.

6 Clearer UN and donor strategy: Donors, together with the HCT, need to act on a significant recommendation made by the IASC RTE: to “develop an active strategy of humanitarian diplomacy to work toward a more principled approach and a less constrained humanitarian space in Pakistan, including putting the issue on the agenda for donors.” (Cosgrave et al. 2010).

References


Information based on field interviews with key humanitarian agencies in Pakistan from 2 to 13 March 2010, and 171 questionnaires on donor performance (including 120 OECD/DAC donors).

The HRJ team, composed of Fernando Espada, Matthew Kahane (Team leader), and Nacho Wilhelmi, contributed to this report. They express their gratitude to all those interviewed in Pakistan.
Crisis reports

The Philippines
The crisis and the response

- In 2009, typhoons in Luzon affected 8.2 million people.
- The impact of unresolved conflict in Mindanao left hundreds of thousands displaced.
- The Luzon response was rapid: resources arrived within days as the US Army helped reach isolated communities.
- Post-typhoon needs assessments were uncoordinated: lack of standardised formats complicated information exchange.
- The government has been both an ally and a hindrance in crisis response: while it rapidly called for international assistance in Luzon, it has continued to downplay the Mindanao humanitarian crisis and rejected the need for robust international engagement.
- The cluster system and national coordination systems were not well aligned.

Donor performance

- Humanitarian agencies generally praise the Luzon donor response as timely and flexible.
- However, initial support quickly peaked, leaving the Flash Appeal only 43 percent covered by October 2010. Coverage of shelter, education and is below ten per cent, with no response to livelihoods and early recovery needs.
- Donors over-relied on government declarations of post-typhoon needs and there was insufficient subsequent monitoring.
- CERF disbursement procedures were slow and bureaucratic; many would-be applicants could not meet deadlines and conditions.
- Donors have been insufficiently engaged in Mindanao.

Key challenges and areas for improvement

- Donors should diversify funding to support the work of local tiers of government and Philippine civil society.
- Donors should advocate more strongly for government adherence to international humanitarian law in Mindanao.
- Partners must be encouraged to genuinely involve beneficiaries in needs assessment and evaluations.
- There is a need for additional funding for both emergency and reconstruction needs in Mindanao.
- Frequency of natural disasters is likely to increase due to climate change: more substantial DDR investment, especially at community level, is imperative.
The Philippines

Perils of politisisation of donor response to crises

The Philippines is considered a reliable and stable partner by the international community. A middle-income country in mid-table in the Human Development Index, the government projects an image of a well-governed, liberal democracy. However, responses to two major crises in 2008-2009 – typhoons which devastated the island of Luzon and particularly the capital, Manila, and a renewed upsurge of mass displacement caused by the long-running armed conflict in the island of Mindanao – produced markedly different responses. The Humanitarian Response Index (HRI) team found that while the international community mobilised in initial response to the Luzon storms – but then failed to effectively support recovery – it has done relatively little to alleviate the suffering of those who remain affected by conflict in Mindanao.

Operational environment

The Philippines archipelago is highly susceptible to floods, earthquakes, volcanoes and climate change. Over half of the population lives in areas prone to natural disasters and/or conflict (UNICEF 2010). In September 2009, tropical storm Ondoy (international name Ketsana) was quickly followed by cyclone Pepeng (international name Parma) inundating 80 percent of Manila, home to some 12 million people. This was followed by another typhoon, Santi (international name Mirinae) in late October. The impact was primarily felt in urban areas where preparedness capacity was woefully inadequate. As a result of the storms, almost a thousand people died and 220,000 houses were damaged or destroyed. Damage was estimated at US$4.4 billion, or 2.7 percent of Gross Domestic Product (World Bank 2009). 680,000 people were displaced and took shelter in evacuation centres. In a city where half the population lives in informal settlements, the disaster disproportionately affected already marginalised populations, including the indigenous and the urban poor, aggravating existing long-term vulnerabilities and inequalities. Several million people are still living within affected areas (flooded or affected by landslides) with irregular access to assistance. Exacerbating the Ondoy-Pepeng damage to agricultural production in Luzon, the El Niño phenomenon affected rice cultivation, the World Food Programme (WFP) warning of “a slow onset emergency” (WFP 2010).

The Philippines is also home to a conflict that caused the world’s greatest displacement in 2008-2009. As many as 750,000 people in Mindanao abandoned their homes, an event which went virtually unnoticed (Amnesty International 2009 and Norwegian Refugee Council 2009). At the heart of the conflict in the southern Philippines is the problematic integration of the Muslim minority and their resentment of decades of state-supported migration of Christians. In the impoverished Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) – which contains most of the country’s majority Muslim provinces – WFP reports that half of the population live below the national poverty line of 60 cents per person per day, 30 percent of under-fives are stunted and only a third complete primary education. Of those living in conflict areas in Mindanao, 30 percent are food insecure and an additional 40 percent are putting their livelihoods at risk by borrowing at prohibitive rates to meet household food needs (WFP 2010). Recurrent armed conflict over four decades has caused the deaths of 120,000 to 160,000 people and has displaced up to two million people at least temporarily (Lara et al. 2009). In the conflict-affected areas of southern Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago, violence is frequent, unpredictable and often highly localised. Muslim separatist insurgencies dominate media attention, particularly the conflict between the government and the internationally-designated terrorist group, the Jama’ah Abu Sayyf which, unlike the larger Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), is unrelenting in its jihadist commitment to armed struggle. Government attempts to depict the conflicts to the outside world as pitting Moro “rebels” and “terrorists” against state “security” forces simply do not reflect the facts on the ground (Hedman 2009). There are multiple insurgent movements. Substantial displacement has additionally resulted from conflict with the Maoist-inspired New People’s Army (NPA), political party rivalries, tensions between Christians and Muslims and between settlers and non-Islamised indigenous peoples and clan-based vendettas (rido). Currently the primary cause of ongoing displacement in Mindanao is rido (IRIN 2010a).
In August 2008, an MILF-government agreement to expand the boundaries of the ARMM was overruled by the Philippines Supreme Court, causing renegade MILF elements to attack Christian villages, thus provoking a major military offensive and extensive displacement. The intense fighting ended inconclusively and the MILF retains substantial military capacity. Talks in Malaysia brokered by the international community are set to resume in October 2010 and both President Benigno Aquino, who took office in June 2010, and the MILF have pledged to find a peaceful solution. However, relations on the ground remain tense and there seems little immediate prospect of resolution of the four decade-long conflict. Many regard the conflict as intractable, seeing the only solution as a referendum on the right to self-determination under United Nations (UN) supervision of the kind conducted in Timor-Leste. A survey undertaken by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), which sampled opinion across the Philippines, found 56 percent of respondents in favour of deployment of international peacemakers (ICRC 2009). This will not happen given the government’s robust opposition to internationalisation of the conflict and the support it receives for this stance from key Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development/Development Assistance Committee (OECD/DAC) countries with which it has strategic partnerships.

Disparate government response
The key government body for disaster preparedness, planning and emergency response is the National Disaster Coordinating Council (NDCC). The government is reportedly decentralised but in reality, central government agencies are relatively well-resourced while lower tiers of government – known as Local Government Units (LGUs) are not. The state gives the impression of being able to cope with disasters but in practice is often found wanting, especially in rural areas and informal urban settlements where there is little state presence. This greatly impeded the initial response to the Luzon typhoons, as those living in informal urban settlements were the most affected.

As soon as the scale of damage from Ondoy, the first typhoon, was apparent, the government appealed for international support. The first request came just two days after the first typhoon although disaster-affected areas were still mostly inaccessible and humanitarian technical teams had done no assessments. A number of nations immediately provided bilateral support to the government.

By contrast, the government sought to avert attention from the conflict in Mindanao and the pivotal role played by its security forces in expanding the impact on civilians. Many humanitarian actors confirmed to the HRRI team the consistent government attempts to downplay talk of humanitarian crisis in Mindanao. International agencies continue to operate under severe security and political constraints. In June 2009, the Philippine government discouraged aid agencies from providing large quantities of food to internally displaced persons (IDPs) in an effort to prevent its alleged diversion to the MILF. WFP distributions have been hampered by similar tension, and access to IDP locations remains problematic. There are reports that aid workers and local journalists visiting IDP settlements have been monitored by security personnel (Amnesty International 2009). The government has often unilaterally closed evacuation centres without consulting IDPs or international agencies, often resulting in IDPs being further displaced to remote areas out of reach of assistance (International Displacement Monitoring Centre 2009).

The government has, since the July 2009 ceasefire, started doing more to assist IDPs but not enough to ensure that they are offered sustainable livelihood opportunities and recovery assistance upon return, or to support alternative settlement options. The response has been hampered by the absence of a clear and coherent return and rehabilitation strategy, and insufficient resources. Seeking to minimise IDP numbers, the government refuses to recognise many displaced people in informal settlements as IDPs and prematurely declares people to be no longer displaced. Entire municipalities affected by the conflict are simply ignored (International Displacement Monitoring Centre 2010). IDP statistics produced by the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) – the government’s IDP focal point – usually contradict those provided by other agencies. Announcing an ambitious plan to end displacement and rehabilitate all conflict-affected communities the government reported in September 2010 that there were only 60,000 IDPs remaining. Analysts point out that the number of “invisible” unregistered and untracked IDPs is undoubtedly greater (IRIN 2010b).

Rapid, but unsustained international response to typhoons
On October 6th 2009, the United Nations (UN) launched a Flash Appeal for the Luzon typhoons which was subsequently revised upwards to US$144 million. There was a rapid initial response, but after a few weeks this quickly tailed off, leaving the appeal only 43 percent funded. However, some reported that inaccurate needs assessments led to an exaggeration of the needs. The main donors were the United States (US) (21.3 percent, the European Commission (EC) (19.9 percent), Japan and Australia (7.3 percent each). Eleven percent came from the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF). Response to coordination, logistics and food needs was good but only eight percent of protection needs were covered and there was zero response to funding requests for livelihoods and early recovery interventions.
Operational agencies responded promptly. Over 60 non-governmental organisations (NGOs) deployed teams to help with the three back-to-back emergencies. Because it was logistically easier, many focused on the needs of those in evacuation centres. By the time of the HRI field mission in January 2010, many organisations had already left, even though needs remained, particularly for shelter, water and sanitation. The HRI team found a general lack of disaster preparedness and post-disaster coordination. The government's inaccurate needs assessments were accepted uncritically by donors and UN agencies. Many organisations shared with the HRI team their frustration over the mismatch between needs expressed in the Flash Appeal and those their teams encountered in the field. They criticised the UN and donors for relying on government declarations of needs and trusting the NDCC to respond without sufficient monitoring and follow-up. There is also general regret that needs assessment were done sectorally with little effort to integrate sectors and obtain a realistic overall picture of basic needs.

Muted international response to Mindanao crisis

When it comes to the little-known Mindanao conflicts, the international response to the 2008-2009 displacement was limited. The government prevented any Flash or Consolidated Appeal, preferring contributions to be channelled discreetly through CERE, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) – long operational in Mindanao – and the International Organisation for Migration (IOM). The European Union (EU) has been by far the largest humanitarian donor in Mindanao, contributing some US$30 million between August 2008 and November 2009 to assist those affected by conflict (International Displacement Monitoring Centre 2010).

Considering that the southern Philippines has some of the worst social, educational and economic indicators in the country and that a substantial number of people are made vulnerable by recurrent ongoing displacement, it is surprising there are so few operational international agencies. The response to the 2008-2009 displacement has “at times appeared to lack leadership, coordination and an overall coherent strategy” (International Displacement Monitoring Centre 2009).

International staff are often unable, for security reasons, to travel extensively in conflict zones. The overall impact of international interventions is palliative and fails to address the structural causes of the conflict.

Most donors channelled their resources through the ICRC, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and IOM. The ICRC especially enjoys stable financial support from a diverse range of donors, which allows the organisation to operate consistently in most parts of Central Mindanao. Also, international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) benefit from regular funding from donors such as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation (AECID), and the European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO). The open grants or multiple-year conventions provided by these donors give the INGOs enough stability to maintain a permanent operational presence. The constant presence of these humanitarian partners means that they are generally accepted by the key players in the crisis, except for some of the more violent groups.

WFP returned to the Philippines in response to the Mindanao displacement and has been providing aid to 1.5 million people, yet a relatively small number of international actors have provided services to IDPs or promoted peace and reconciliation projects. There are instances in which the community-based organisations INGOs have sponsored (or formed) have averted potential crises from spilling over into bloodshed and displacement. At the same time, there often appears to be an element of exaggeration of success, perhaps driven by funding imperatives? Christian NGOs hold many seminars in Cotabato City – where urban IDPs are concentrated – but cannot operate and have little credibility in Muslim majority rural areas.

Consequences of aid politicisation

Political aid clearly affected responses to both crises. The Luzon flooding reinforced the position of presidential election candidates in Manila slums where political clientelism is rife. At the LGU level, there were similar reports of aid politicisation as many politicians saw to it that only their supporters received aid. In Mindanao, the operational methods of some donors are distorted by political or security agendas. For example, USAID deploys field teams to isolated areas in a “hit and run” strategy, accompanied by US military escorts because they lack regular access and are not necessarily accepted by the local communities. In Manila, however, US army logistical support was effective in evacuating, assessing needs and distributing relief to isolated slum communities.

A consequence of the political decision to accept Philippine government needs assessments at face value was subsequent difficulty in changing tactics. An Oxfam evaluation of the typhoon response noted that it proved very “hard to revisit very early decisions in terms of staffing, programme direction and size, partnership models and assessment findings… There was a perceived lack of flexibility to adapt programme plans as scenarios, needs and operating realities changed,” (Tinnemans et al. 2010).
Protection: national and international silence

The humanitarian community did not report major protection shortcomings in response to the Luzon storms. However, some INGOs highlighted the lack of consideration of the needs of women, people with disabilities and older people. A real time evaluation echoed this concern, stressing the “urgent need to enhance camp committee structures, including IDP participation, (particularly women), incorporate protection measures for vulnerable groups in the displaced population, and facilitate the development of adequate exit strategies,” (Polastro et al. 2009).

In Mindanao, human rights groups have long drawn attention to evidence of death squad killings and state complicity in Mindanao. Powerful clans have deployed militias with full knowledge of the government who value their ancillary role in conflict with insurgents. Almost all cases of extra-judicial killings and other human rights violations remain unreported and uninvestigated (Amnesty International 2009). It was hoped that national and international outrage over the November 2009 Maguindanao massacre of civilians and journalists – the single deadliest event for journalists in history – would lead to exemplary prosecution of its elite perpetrators. However, impunity has continued as before. Implicated security personnel have not been investigated and witnesses are being intimidated and murdered as the government ignores recommendations from the UN Special Envoy on Extrajudicial Executions to establish witness protection programmes (Human Rights Watch 2010).

The International Crisis Group (2009) notes that Mindanao is a place for the military to “let off steam”, a place to win promotion, even if intimidatory acts further alienate local populations and prevent IDPs from returning. International agencies operating in Mindanao “have shown little eagerness to engage the government on sensitive human rights issues,” (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre 2009). Most donors remain silent, expressing whatever concerns they have informally to agencies such as the ICRC. Humanitarian organisations interviewed by the HRI team reported that Norway is the sole donor directly engaging in advocacy towards all parties in the Mindanao conflict.

Clusters and coordination

The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid (OCHA) established a country office and sub-office in Mindanao in response to the escalation of conflict in Mindanao in 2008 and the 2009 storms. Both offices were understaffed and OCHA largely managed coordination of the Luzon response remotely from its regional office in Bangkok.

The concept of clusters is nothing new in the Philippines and the term was being used within government circles prior to its adoption by the UN as part of the humanitarian reform process. In response to the natural disasters, the government established cluster systems in both Luzon and Mindanao, coordinated by the NDCC and the UN set up a parallel international cluster system. Many considered that the clusters have mainly been involved in information-sharing, with no emphasis on priority-setting and collective decision-making. This confirmed other reports that the cluster system in the Philippines is not working as intended (International Displacement Monitoring Centre 2010).

Coordination in Mindanao is plagued by political interference from the government. Whereas donors used to regularly hold meetings with partners to discuss issues around access, protection and coordination, frankly, they are now forced to sit through meetings attended by the government, a protagonist to the conflict with political interests in shaping the response. To achieve real results, humanitarian agencies have had to hold parallel coordination meetings without government representatives.

Root causes of crises unaddressed

Land rights and housing issues pose significant constraints to early recovery and durable solutions for both typhoon- and conflict-affected IDPs. In urban areas, land administration and planning is inadequate. Most local governments are unable to provide accurate information about land ownership, boundaries and land value. In Manila, there is ongoing recrimination over why the typhoons were so devastating.

A Catholic cardinal described the government’s urban recovery and land use policies as a “a structure of sins” for prioritising shopping malls, upmarket residential developments and golf courses over providing safe dwellings for the urban poor. Defending slum dwellers from the accusation they were responsible for the extent of 2009 flooding, the church apportions blame to politicians, property developers and loggers and warns of future flooding (Philippine Daily Inquirer 2009). In the absence of long-term solutions –from either the Philippine authorities of the international community – and with no other option available to them (Baldwin 2009) – people have returned to regions prone to flooding and are rebuilding poor, informal housing structures that may again put their lives in danger, especially if there is no investment in disaster preparedness (IRIN 2010c).
In Mindanao, international actors seem to have limited understanding of the local dynamics, particularly around access to land, which drove Islamic radicalisation, conflict and displacement. They wrongly assume, like the government, that most want to return to place of origin. Observers note that a large number of urban IDPs are landless and have no reason to return home if they have no prospects of establishing agricultural livelihoods or regaining land taken from them at gun-point. International Alert notes that “the core of the problem is the exclusionary political economy that is developed and sustained through a complex system of contest and violence… Muslim Mindanao continues to be excluded from the fruits of national growth… growth in the region itself is unsustainable and mainly dependent on election and reconstruction-related consumption spending.” (Lara et al. 2009).

The international community seems to have washed its hands of Mindanao and provides only minimal support to reconciliation processes, which are of crucial significance. In the aftermath of the Maguindanao massacre, donors are wary of committing reconstruction funds, seeing an endless cycle of impunity, violence and revenge. The ICRC notes with regret that the conflict in Mindanao rarely gets media attention (AlertNet 2010).

Assessing donor performance

Many donors responded quickly to the typhoons’ Flash Appeal. Humanitarian organisations highlighted the prompt response of the US and Japan. Especially slow to respond were Australia, the CERF, and ECHO, reportedly requiring long negotiations with implementing partners that deterred some agencies from working with them. Similarly, CERF disbursements took excessively long to deliver, and then imposed unrealistic spending deadlines. This was less problematic for UN agencies able to advance their own funds, but for some INGOs, these conditions meant that they were unable to use CERF funding. Feedback on the timeliness of Spain’s funding varied. While it was slow to respond to the Flash Appeal, Spanish NGOs with framework agreements with the AECID received funding quickly.

Donors did not always channel their resources to the best placed organisations to meet the needs. In general, donors provided little support to either LGUs or the many community-based organisations found throughout the Philippines. They instead preferred to work with traditional international partners with slower deployment capacity and with early withdrawal strategies. Japan, for example, channelled the vast majority of its funding bilaterally through the Philippine government, also supporting Japanese NGOs.

Responding to needs proportionally is a challenge for many donors. Many prioritised food, despite gaps in other sectors. The US and Japan are both reported to have engaged in food dumping, which was highly inefficient and missed more isolated areas. Japan, on the other hand, is highly involved in rehabilitation and reconstruction through the World Bank’s Post Disaster Needs Assessment. Similarly, Australia is renowned for its efforts toward early recovery, which was neglected by many other donors.
Disaster risk reduction (DRR) is essential in such a disaster-prone country and this is increasingly reflected in donors’ priorities for the Philippines. ECHO has been investing in long-term DRR for the past few years and Australia has established a large programme for the Philippines. The US considers DRR a priority for its future country strategies, yet some field organisations considered that the US needs to do more to ensure that risk reduction is incorporated earlier in emergency response.

The response of key donors to the Mindanao crisis is characterised by inconsistent efforts or biased agendas. The US is regularly involved in this crisis. Some attribute this to the US’ security agenda to support the Philippine government and their military operation stationed there. ECHO’s presence in Mindanao has been intermittent, but they recently released a new funding line for Mindanao. Australia also has a conflicting agenda in Mindanao, as a result of their security agreement with the government. They are known in the Philippines, however, for helping with coordination and engaging in advocacy, as compared to other donors. Spain is also involved in Mindanao through the Mindanao Trust Fund, a mechanism for development partners to pool resources and coordinate support for the reconstruction and development of conflict-affected areas.

**Lessons learnt and recommendations for the future**

The responses to the typhoons and conflicts in Mindanao offer opportunities to learn from the past, in the hope of improving current and future responses. The HRI team urges the international community to provide additional funding for emergency and reconstruction needs in Mindanao and to focus on key issues which have constrained the response to recent disasters in a nation which is already one of the world’s most hazard-prone and is now increasingly vulnerable to climate change.

1 **Investment in disaster preparedness:** The severity of damage and loss of lives and livelihoods in Luzon should not have come as a surprise, for experts and donors have long lamented the Philippines lack of coordination and preparedness (IRIN 2010d). This is compounded by a low level of public awareness of climate change issues (IRIN 2010e). Some donors invest significantly in disaster risk reduction (such as Australia) but far more effort is needed, especially in community preparedness.

2 **Needs assessment:** Needs assessments were often carried out individually, without a coordinated analysis and common approach. This is a recurrent problem that the humanitarian system fails to address. Recent experience in the Philippines again highlights how important it is to use – and share the results of – common assessment templates and standardised needs assessments when planning responses to rapid onset natural disasters.

3 **Supporting local capacity:** Donors must stop uncritically channelling assistance through central government. While humanitarian agencies should not bypass national authorities, they need support from donors to clearly define national and local level state responsibilities. All must work together to enhance the preparedness and response capacity of LGUs and civil society.

4 **Supporting early recovery:** Much more needs to be done to support early recovery, especially around shelter and livelihoods issues. As the HRI team was told by an implementing agency: “we need more support after the ‘euphoria’ is over, four to five months after the disaster, for mid-term projects.”

5 **Transparency:** Preventing future climate-change disasters will require transparent, accountable and results-based recovery and reconstruction programmes that will monitor activities, track funds, evaluate interventions and report these to the public.

6 **Making the cluster system work:** The cluster system needs stronger UN leadership to improve coordination with the government in order to mitigate the, generally negative, impact of government domination. Future responses should not again be based upon parallel coordination systems – one for national coordination and the other to coordinate the international effort.

7 **Humanitarian access:** In Mindanao, the most powerful donors do not do enough to advocate for access and respect for human rights and international humanitarian law in their bilateral talks with the government. It is essential that donor governments raise these issues, make genuine efforts to separate security and humanitarian agendas when liaising with the government and do more to promote to the authorities the importance of adhering to Principles of Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD).

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For a more comprehensive list of recommendations arising from the response to the Luzon storms, and more background information and analysis, see the DARA-led real time evaluation report (Polastro et al. 2010).
References


Information based on field interviews with key humanitarian agencies in the Philippines from 16 to 22 January 2010, and 103 questionnaires on donor performance (including 74 OECD/DAC donors).

The HRI team, composed of Philippe Benassi, Marybeth Redheffer and Manuel Sánchez-Montero (Team leader), contributed to this report. They express their gratitude to all those interviewed in the Philippines.
Crisis reports

Somalia
The crisis and the response

- Prolonged drought, increased insecurity, further displacement, worsening restrictions on humanitarian access and high food prices have resulted in the worst food security situation since 1992.


- The operational environment worsened: extortion and insecurity led a further reduction in international staffing, forcing more INGOs to operate remotely from Nairobi through Somali partners.

- Approximately two-thirds of those in need of food were reached in the first half of 2009, but only 44 percent in the second half.

- The humanitarian response is generally insufficient, ineffective in most sectors, often provided too late, based on inaccurate data and not provided uniformly and impartially to vulnerable populations.

Donor performance

- By October 2010, the 2010 CAP is 60 percent covered.

- Frustrated at politicisation of the response and uncritical donor support of the transitional government, many humanitarians want an end to UN ‘double-hatting’ and a separate HC post to advocate for more impartial addressing of humanitarian needs.

- Humanitarians criticised donors for not robustly advocating for humanitarian access and GHDP Principles.

- Some donors are commended for understanding the need for programme flexibility in a volatile environment.

- There are concerns about OCHA’s role as both coordinator and allocator of funding

Key challenges and areas for improvement

- Donors should heed calls to support internally-driven reconciliation processes, rather than those which reflect regional and international political interests.

- More donors should fund preparedness, maintenance of contingency stocks and building capacity of Somalis.

- There is a need to clarify whether UN Security Council resolutions targeting terrorism are – as the US argues – applicable to humanitarian aid.
None of the many protagonists in the myriad conflicts engulfing Somalia, including the TFG, has made serious efforts to hold those responsible accountable, or to end the climate of impunity. Donors’ political interests — shaped by the War on Terror — have influenced aid decisions and have had serious implications for the provision of neutral, impartial humanitarian assistance. As a result, the response continues to be too little, too late, mostly ineffective in many parts of the country, not provided impartially and not based on the needs of vulnerable populations.

**Operational environment**

Al-Shabaab, which emerged following the Ethiopian military intervention against the Islamic Courts Union in 2006, and Hizbul Islam are the main Islamist groups engaged in combat against the TFG and the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) which supports it. Despite the election of a moderate, former member of the Islamic Courts as President in January 2009, fighting between the TFG and Islamist fundamentalists has continued unabated. Since early 2009, the balance of power, particularly in southern and central areas, has shifted. By the end of 2009, al-Shabaab controlled most southern regions and most of Mogadishu, except for northern areas and the international airport (International Crisis Group 2010). Some analysts fear that as long as the TFG remains indecisive, an effective presence only in parts of Mogadishu, al-Shabaab will continue to gain ground.

As in previous years, the situation in the north (the de-facto state of Somaliland) and the north-east (the de-facto state of Puntland) was far better than in southern and central Somalia. In Somaliland, successes in conflict resolution, peace-building and creation of governance structures have resulted in an environment conducive to longer-term development. Despite Puntland’s relative stability, it is increasingly difficult to carry out development work. Piracy continued, with 29 ships seized in 2009 (OCHA 2009b). There is evidence that al-Shabaab has coerced pirates into sharing their profits. In southern and central Somalia, conflict severely limited humanitarian access and response.

**Increasing humanitarian needs**

The Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit (FSNAU) – which is funded by the United States (US) and the European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO) and given managerial support by the United Nations (UN) Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) – worked with the Famine Early Warning Systems Network to assess conditions after the April-June 2009 rains (the go). The results confirmed that Somalia faced its worse humanitarian crisis in 18 years.

The 2010 Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP) launched by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in December 2009 called for assistance for 3.64 million people, noting that 1.1 million were facing an acute food and livelihood crisis (OCHA 2009). In many areas, 20 percent of under-fives were malnourished — more than 75 percent of those in need were concentrated in southern and central Somalia (FSNAU 2009a). In addition, 25 percent of under-fives assessed had suffered from acute respiratory infections and 21 percent from diarrhoea during the two weeks preceding assessment. Acute malnutrition levels in Somalia are among the highest in the world. The under-five crude death rate is nearly 30 percent higher than in the rest of sub-Saharan Africa. Half of all deaths of under-fives are attributable to malnutrition. FSNAU reported that 19 percent of the population was acutely malnourished and 4.5 severely malnourished in mid-2009. There are only 0.3 medical doctors and 1.7 nurses or midwives for every 10,000 people (FSNAU 2009b).
Displacement has assumed massive proportions. Data is unreliable but it is thought that since early 2008, the number of Somali refugees in neighbouring countries has increased by nearly 40 percent. In January 2010, some 678,000 Somali refugees were officially registered by governments and the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Yemen, Eritrea, Uganda and Tanzania (UNHCR 2010). Actual numbers are undoubtedly higher. In early 2009, 524,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) were thought to be settled in the Afgooye Corridor – the strip of land between Mogadishu and the town of Afgooye – one of the world’s largest IDP concentrations (OCHA 2010a). In the final quarter of 2009, drought, flooding and/or lack of livelihood opportunities accounted for approximately 40 percent of new displacement. Fighting in southern Somalia caused a new wave of internal displacement and movement across the Kenyan border in December 2009. The 2010 CAP reported 1.55 million IDPs at the end of 2009 (OCHA 2009b). Displacement is still continuing, with more IDPs fleeing to already congested areas where they do not have the right to own land.

Declining donor response

The overall level of funding was less in 2009 than in 2008, with 64 percent of the CAP funded in 2009 as compared to 72 percent in 2008 (OCHA 2010b). This was mainly due to a sharp decrease in funding of food, which is by far the largest sector and absorbs more than two thirds of the total available amount. There was considerable differentiation in donor response per sector.

The decrease in funding in 2009 was primarily the result of significantly reduced US funding. While US funding was US$237 million in 2008, it declined to US$99 million in 2009 and only US$27 million had been allocated in the first five months of 2010. The United Kingdom (UK) has followed suit, its contribution of US$40 million in 2008, declining to US$18 million in 2009. Other donors who provided less included Norway, Italy and France. By contrast, Spain’s contribution has risen from US$4 million in 2008 to US$36 million in 2010. As of mid-October 2010, 60 percent of requirements set out in CAP had been met, much of it a late funding carry-over from 2009.

Enormous difficulties were encountered in the attempt to assist the severely malnourished under-five population in 2009. The objective to stabilise the level of malnutrition was not achieved in many areas, particularly where fighting was intense. The World Food Programme (WFP) was unable to meet monthly distribution in terms of quantities and numbers of beneficiaries. In the second half of the year, distribution targets were reduced due to pressure from local authorities to reduce general food distributions during harvests, incomplete access and weak food pipelines. The WFP monthly average case-load of food aid beneficiaries was 1.74 million in 2009, an increase of more than 50 percent from 2008. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) (2009) provided food to 464,118 beneficiaries. Some two thirds of those in need of food were reached during the first half of the year, but a mere 44 percent were reached in the second.

Due to funding limitations, health sector objectives were also not met. However, more than 50 outbreaks of communicable diseases were investigated, and in most cases, an appropriate response was provided. An innovative new approach – called “child health days” – allowed more than two million children and an estimated 380,000 women of child-bearing age to be aided (Morooka 2009).

Education needs also remained unmet. Only 20 percent of IDP children in the Afgooye Corridor received any education. In the South, only 100,000 people were provided with formal or informal schooling. School-feeding was largely discontinued and school attendance decreased dramatically. The level of funding earmarked for education in 2009 was a mere US$4.5 million, half the allocation for 2008 (OCHA 2010b).

Funding to strengthen local service delivery preparedness and response capacity continued to be insufficient. Humanitarians interviewed by the Humanitarian Response Index (HRI) team generally expressed disappointment at donor failure to adopt a holistic approach to building local capacity, some arguing that this played into the hands of the Islamists. There was also considerable disappointment in donor prioritisation of life-saving activities over addressing long-term needs. One respondent to the HRI noted that “funding goes to emergency relief first... and last to food security”.

In regard to livelihoods support, funding increased by 16 percent in 2009, but the US$19.7 million was only 34 percent of the sum required. There is a general regret that, in the words of one respondent: “donors are only interested in saving lives, not in saving livelihoods”. Another wryly observed that for donors “the sexiest term is emergency”.

Over a third of humanitarians who were interviewed noted that the 2009 donor response was negatively affected by the global financial crisis. Rising global food prices, particularly in the first half of 2009, seriously impacted food delivery agencies. Fluctuation in the value of sterling and the US dollar affected funding availability. Some respondents noted that withdrawal of international staff generated doubts among donors as to whether programmes could be implemented.
In February 2010, the UN’s Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordination (RC/HC) called US aid rules impossible to follow (BBC News 2010). Many aid actors complain that the TFG is manifestly incapable of improving security, delivering basic services, or seeking an agreement with clans and opposition groups that might encourage accountable governance. It has been argued that if the international community is serious about addressing the reality of failed states, it should eschew the polarising rhetoric of the War on Terror and instead begin engaging in earnest with a multitude of “uncomfortable” actors involved in “ugly birth-processes” of re-configurations of political authority (Verhoeven 2009). Yet, most Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development / Development Assistance Committee (OECD/DAC) donors continue to support the TFG. Some, including Norway and the European Commission (EC), are trying to convince agencies to focus more on TFG-controlled areas.

Another cause of concern is reports that USAID tenders have attracted for-profit contractors and private security companies to operate in Somalia as they have in Iraq and Afghanistan. There are fears that their presence and lack of interest in humanitarian principles could further affect the often negative image of established humanitarian actors (Bradbury 2010).
Incidents targeting Somalis and humanitarians included improvised explosive devices, kidnapping, abduction, assassination and piracy. In 2009, 10 aid workers were killed compared to 34 in 2008, a reduction explained both by less targeting of humanitarian workers and their assets and the reduced profile of the humanitarian community in many areas. In the second half of 2009, the number of UN international field staff dropped from 66 to 28 and international staff of international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) from 168 to 67 (OCHA 2009d). The vast majority of international staff in southern and central areas.

Access problems and insecurity have further increased reliance on Somali national staff and national NGOs. Day-to-day supervision is typically via lengthy calls to Nairobi using Somalia’s well-functioning mobile networks. Humanitarian agencies report that access to nutrition and health interventions is barely affected by the absence of international staff. However, response to new crises is highly problematic due to constraints around establishing new logistical mechanisms and staff hiring and firing. An unfortunate consequence of insecurity-driven remote management is that INGOs are effectively becoming donors for national implementing agencies. This inevitably increases overhead - an additional burden which many donors are unwilling to meet.

Activities related to security, protection and shelter were only 28 percent funded. Donors who contributed to protection included ECHO, Denmark, Ireland, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, UNHCR and the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF). Lack of funding led to non-implementation of programmes addressing IDP/child protection and gender-based violence. Australia, Belgium and Ireland contributed to the creation of the UN’s Security Information and Operation Centre, which collects data on the access and security situation in the country. Information on security and access is published in OCHA Somalia’s Humanitarian Access Analysis.

Funding air transport for movement of humanitarian goods and personnel is seen as vital to ensure access to areas in dire need. Donors funding UN/WFP flights included Canada, Denmark, Germany, Ireland and Spain. The Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) and WFP also provided funds for air services. Agencies are concerned at the high charges for passengers - currently US$800 per person - and want to see improvements in air transport logistics.

Despite mounting problems in 2009, donors did not generally advocate for access. There were some exceptions. Sweden was very outspoken about the need to facilitate humanitarian access, but was said to have done little. The EC was circumspect, but helped to facilitate access by informally providing medical evacuations. ECHO undertook a considerable amount of political lobbying.

A major challenge in 2009 was the lack of field presence and the resultant inability to conduct field missions and assessments. Several strategic towns, which had previously served as significant UN operational hubs, are now in the hands of anti-TFG forces, with which humanitarian access has had to be negotiated anew.
Coordination

Coordination of interventions in southern and central Somalia was undertaken in Nairobi, primarily through the cluster system. Field coordination further declined in 2009 and is now largely limited to Somaliland and, to a lesser extent, Puntland. Instability has prevented coordination from humanitarian hubs such as Gaalcayo, Belet Weyne and Baidoa.

Agencies interviewed generally reported that most Nairobi-based clusters effectively coordinated CAP activities and reporting, contingency planning and prioritisation of projects funded by the Humanitarian Response Fund (HRF) – a pooled fund at the disposal of the humanitarian community established in Somalia in 2004. In some clusters, however, coordination was confined to unfocused information exchange. Major contributors to OCHA’s coordination in 2009 included ECHO, the Netherlands and Spain; while Canada, Italy and Switzerland made smaller amounts available. Some concerns were expressed at OCHA’s role as both coordinator and allocator of funding. There is a perception that cluster effectiveness is reduced as national NGOs seek funds from OCHA. There was little coordination between clusters and within the UN. Agencies operating in central and southern Somalia were said to be reluctant to share information, lest this compromise their capacity to work. Geographical coordination was largely limited to assistance for IDPs in the Afgooye Corridor.

The Somalia NGO consortium, established in 1999, now has over 50 international and 20 national NGOs. It has facilitated information exchange and produced a position paper on operating principles. At a meeting in Naivasha, Kenya in November 2008, the Somali Donor Group (SDG), consisting of seven OECD/DAC donors (including Canada, the US, the UK and several other European countries), the EC, the UN and several multilateral agencies, agreed on a framework for improving coordination, monitoring and accountability and undertook to regularly review progress.

The Coordination of International Support to Somalians Executive Committee (CISS ExCom) brings together representatives from the SDG, the clusters/sectors, the NGO consortium and the UN country team and is co-chaired by the Resident Coordinator (RC) / Humanitarian Coordinator (HR) and the World Bank. Several informants noted that coordination through the NGO consortium and the CISS ExCom was effective. However, agencies were not impressed by coordination among donors in the SDG, particularly their inability to forge a common position on the US-driven ban on funding activities in al-Shabaab-controlled areas. In retrospect, the commitments made in Naivasha were too ambitious, a participant noting “this was presented as a window of opportunity...I have seen many windows, but very little improvement”.

Humanitarian agencies report considerable barriers to effective coordination. NGOs and UN agencies are in competition to be viewed as in charge of coordination, a reality most donors do not address. Some respondents urged donors to be stricter with NGOs at an early stage of relationship-building, specifying who should do what. One noted that “each NGO has its own mandate, and fighting for funding is going on”. It was suggested that donors should set a better example for each other in order to promote coordination, acquire Somalia-specific expertise and improve their technical capacity.

Respondents’ reflections on donors

Humanitarians interviewed by the HRI mission noted marked divergences in the capacity of individual donors and UN agencies to make informed decisions. Some cited positive examples of donors – including ECHO, the US Office for Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), USAID, and the Netherlands – who have staff familiar with field realities in Somalia. Others are reported to have little capacity or expertise. The UK Department for International Development (DFID) and Canada each had only one dedicated regional officer, and most of their time was spent on other countries.

ECHO received more positive remarks than any other donor. Those praised for flexibility included the Netherlands and Sweden. Managers of the HRF were praised for willingness to fill general funding gaps and DFID and ECHO were praised for plugging gaps in food aid funding. Norway had emergency funds available for minor funding gaps. Most interviewees acknowledged greater awareness among donors of the need to operate outside the box. Donors cited as more transparent included DFID, the EC, Sweden and USAID.

Lack of timely provision of funding was frequently mentioned as a poor donor practice. Donors whose funding arrived late in 2009 included ECHO and the US Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA). The HRI team learned through respondents that some donors prefer to fund their own national agencies (e.g. Norway); to focus on particular sectors (e.g. US emphasis on food aid and UK prioritisation of health) and that they prefer particular agencies (e.g. the UK’s disproportionate funding for the ICRC and UN agencies).

Humanitarians reported that donors had little way to verify whether flexibility was justified due to limited, and at times completely impossible, scope for field monitoring. Donors rely on reports and feedback from UN agencies and international NGOs which are sometimes significantly dependent on input from national implementing partners.

Some donors were praised for their attention to maintaining standards, learning lessons from evaluations and promoting beneficiary involvement in programming. These included ECHO, USAID, and DFID. In 2009, there were several examples of donor support of learning and accountability, including a Danish-funded project to improve the quality of humanitarian action. In 2008 and 2009, donors were severely criticised for their failure to work with their humanitarian partners to ensure evaluation-derived recommendations are incorporated into future programming. OECD/DAC donors’ 2009 performance was even worse in this regard than in 2008. Some donors who actually visited projects and gathered information included Finland, Japan and DFID.
Humanitarian agency representatives told the HRI mission they were reasonably satisfied with donors’ reporting requirements. Some mentioned that donors generally understood their operational constraints, not insisting on unrealistic monitoring and evaluation requirements. Others, including ECHO, were criticised for imposing procurement and rendering standards which are not practical in Somalia.

Many agencies want donors to realise the value of funding for preparedness and contingency planning. They would welcome having the freedom a block grant would provide to preposition and store stocks, fund security measures and allow capacity building, particularly to boost the technical and operational capacity of Somalis. Norway and ECHO were commended for permitting agencies to keep a part of the funding to maintain contingency stocks. Some agencies said that donors should, in general, better analyse strengths and weaknesses of agencies before providing funds for strengthening organisational capacity.

Several agencies expressed concern about an increasing number of donors who, when asked for a quick response, instead referred them to the HRF. They noted that HRF funding was generally restricted to emergency IDP assistance.

Nearly all donors have separate budget-lines and departments for development and humanitarian departments. Hardly any development aid is available for southern and central Somalia. Donor policies regarding flexibility and reallocation of pledged funds vary widely. Larger actors – including UN agencies and bigger INGOs – appeared better informed about these variations and possibilities for flexible funding and reallocation of non-earmarked funding for under-funded activities. Humanitarian organisations generally thought the CAP priority to strengthen the protective environment for civilians was unrealistic. Even the ICRC, despite its extensive protection experience in southern and central Somalia, is now restricted to the promotion of international humanitarian law (ICRC 2010).

Services for those who have experienced fundamental human rights violations do not exist. Some of those people interviewed suggested UN agencies stressed protection in order to compete for donor funds. Protection activities focused on improving data collection and mostly depended on Somali UN and INGO staff. Informants reported that there is no evidence that improved data collection has led to more effective UN advocacy.

Some humanitarians criticised donors for not doing more to advocate for humanitarian access. It was noted that while countries like Sweden were very outspoken, they did little to actually promote better humanitarian access. Donors were also criticised for refusing to acknowledge how insecurity greatly increased operational costs and for failure to fund security mitigation measures, communication networks, air transport and war risk insurance.

**Lessons learnt and recommendations for the future**

So grave are operational constraints in Somalia that one INGO is reported to have changed their approach from “needs-based programming” to “constraints-based programming” – only responding to those needs which can feasibly be addressed (Bradbury 2010). The concerns expressed by many of those interviewed by the HRI team are echoed by the conclusion of a study of the inherent tensions between stabilisation and humanitarian goals in Somalia: “State-building efforts that insist humanitarian relief be channelled through the nascent state in order to build its legitimacy and capacity undermine humanitarian neutrality when the state is a party to a civil war. Counter-terrorism policies that seek to ensure that no aid benefits terrorist groups have the net effect of criminalising relief operations in countries where poor security precludes effective accountability,” (Menkhaus 2010).

There are fundamental differences of opinion among humanitarian agencies and donors on the way forward. Most INGOs would like donors to push for inclusive, internally-driven reconciliation processes, and some wish to bring Islamist groups, including al-Shabaab, into a national reconciliation process. Many humanitarian workers, including some UN staff, criticise donors and the R/C/HC for primarily supporting externally-driven mediation efforts reflecting. Some want an end to “double-hatting” and have demanded a separate post for an HC able to act more impartially to meet humanitarian needs. Many are highly critical of donor and UN support to the TFG, particularly the European Union’s training of Somali troops in Uganda (ReliefWeb 2010), and find little evidence that the TFG has any interest in assisting those it claims to govern. They argue that the international community should be neutral and acknowledge the transitional nature of the TFG. There was much criticism of the international tolerance for the TFG’s shortcomings, one noting that the international community indulgently “treats the TFG as a toddler… and does not hold it accountable”.

Looking ahead, donors could do much more to:

1 **Advocate for IHL**: Donors must defend the human rights of affected populations and argue for adherence to humanitarian law and guarantees for safe humanitarian access, including with the TFG, al-Shabaab and the authorities in Somaliland and Puntland

2 **Defend a needs-based approach**: It is essential to protect humanitarian assistance from political and security objectives and challenge pressures on humanitarian organisations to work only in TFG-controlled areas. Donor should foster a common approach towards all parties to the many conflicts in Somalia, including the examples of Canada and Sweden – the only donor governments that were consistently praised for being scrupulously non-political.
3 Go beyond lifesaving:
Humanitarian programming must expand to foster capacity-building of Somali communities and civil society, support livelihoods and provide health and education services. The wider donor community should follow Sweden in funding education services, and France in contributing to livelihoods.

4 Defend humanitarians: Donors can provide more support to enable greater protection for humanitarian workers, both international and Somali.

5 Allow flexibility: The constraints of remote management cannot be overcome, and the challenge of building implementation, monitoring and evaluation capacity of Somali partners cannot be achieved unless donors simply procedures and welcome innovative programming.

References


Information based on field interviews with key humanitarian agencies in Nairobi from 14 to 23 February 2010, and 209 questionnaires on donor performance (including 155 OECD/DAC donors).

The HRI team, composed of Fernando Espada, Daniela Rüegenberg, Albertien van der Veen (Team leader) and Frank Vollmer, contributed to this report. They express their gratitude to all those interviewed in Nairobi.
Crisis reports

Sri Lanka
The crisis and the response

- IDPs face multiple difficulties: destroyed homes, the danger of returning to areas not yet cleared of mines and challenges regaining land.
- By August 2010, 90 percent of the 280,000 Tamils forcibly interned after victory against the LTTE had been released from government-controlled camps.
- Assistance includes immediate shelter cash grants of US$220 per family, supplied by the UN, NGOs and the Sri Lankan government.
- CHAP 2010 initially called for US$337,688,785, but was revised down to US$287,799,870 in June 2010 due to low implementation capacity, staff security issues and funding shortfalls.
- There are significant gaps in funding for some clusters: economic recovery and infrastructure (one percent funded); WASH (seven percent); mine action (22 percent) and agriculture (23 percent).
- Overall response is limited by government’s micromanagement, lack of access and a diminishing number of humanitarian staff.

Donor performance

- Donor coordination was perceived as more active and effective.
- There is widespread concern that donors are now prioritising northern Sri Lanka, with severe consequences for eastern areas where humanitarian needs remain following 20 years of LTTE occupation.
- Donors were criticised for not more highly prioritising the involvement of beneficiaries in the design and implementation of programmes.

Key challenges and areas for improvement

- The government robustly leads the response, has an antagonistic relationship with the international community and seeks to convey a negative image of aid agencies and disparage their efforts.
- The government restricts access, controls reporting of the crisis, manipulates language used to describe it and continues to reject the CHAP.
- Agencies generally lack access to resettlement areas and/or are unable to directly approach communities and vulnerable people.
Crisis reports

Sri Lanka

Antagonistic
Relations imperfect response

In May 2009, government forces won a decisive military victory over Tamil secessionists – the Liberation Forces of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) – following 26 years of fluctuating conflict which had already displaced some 200,000 people (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre 2010). In the final months of fighting, grave violations of human rights were committed by both sides and around 300,000 Tamil civilians were displaced, most finding themselves helplessly trapped between combatants. The humanitarian consequences were, and remain, enormous. Most of those forcibly interned for months after the conflict have now been released but durable solutions to displacement – particularly for the old cohort of internally displaced persons (IDPs) – remain elusive. While much of Sri Lanka is relatively prosperous, and there is now extensive investment in infrastructure in northern and eastern areas, most communities in war-affected former LTTE-controlled regions are chronically poor. Humanitarian indicators are markedly worse in former conflict areas: for example, 40 percent of under-fives are underweight (World Food Programme 2010). The humanitarian response and post-war reconstruction has been government-led with hardly any international engagement. Relations among the government, the United Nations (UN) and traditional donors are fraught with tensions, misunderstanding and accusations while the increasingly autocratic government of President Mahinda Rajapaksa has forged new alliances with regional powers.

The sequence of events which follows most humanitarian disasters has not happened: no independent needs assessments; no international conference; no government-UN appeal for donor assistance; no international peacekeepers; no protection monitoring; no consultations with those in humanitarian need; no monitoring to ensure the resettlement of IDPs meets international standards for safe and dignified returns and a modest and virtually impotent UN presence. In short, both a major apparent violation of Principles of Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) and a challenge for international humanitarians not used to a confident national government insisting on taking care of humanitarian needs. During its mission the Humanitarian Response Index (HRI) team was repeatedly told by donors and humanitarian agencies that many questions they asked were simply inapplicable to the situation in Sri Lanka.

Disenchantment with traditional donors

Since the 2004 tsunami, and particularly since protracted Norwegian-brokered attempts at peace between the LTTE and the government conclusively broke down in 2008, the government has become increasingly estranged from traditional donors. The post-tsunami influx of large numbers of aid agencies heightened national concerns over sovereignty and prompted moves towards greater state scrutiny and control of international non-government organisations (INGOs). Often classifying INGOs as “neo-colonial”, operational agencies were required to regularly meet government administrators for lectures on national sovereignty and to provide details of their programmes. It became increasingly difficult for international staff to obtain permission to work. HRI 2009 reported how state agents harassed national staff of INGOs, but managers were unable to protest due to fears for the safety of their colleagues. INGOs were thus forced to increasingly rely on expatriates who then found that their movements were increasingly restricted and visas and residence permits harder to obtain (Hidalgo 2010). Over time, many INGOs became frustrated and left the country (Gowrinathan & Mampilly 2009).
The government consistently protested at contacts between Western governments and Tamil diaspora associations which it alleged were LTTE front organisations. It felt irked by criticism of its efforts to pursue a military solution to restore national unity and defeat an internationally-proscribed terrorist organisation. The government perceived double standards, rebuked by the same donors who themselves vigorously prosecuted the War on Terror in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan – despite “collateral” damage to civilians – yet urged a political settlement in Sri Lanka. The West’s determination to promote pro-peace objectives tarnished its humanitarian engagement as humanitarian endeavours became perceived as an extension of Western geopolitical objectives (Harris 2010).

Relations deteriorated further in the final months of the conflict when traditional donors called for a cessation of hostilities to enable assistance to civilians trapped by a beleaguered LTTE. Tensions escalated after the war’s decisive climax when donors criticised the mass internment of Tamil civilians along with surviving LTTE cadres. Sri Lanka argued that its security policies – designed to separate Tamil civilians, hard-core LTTE cadres and those who were unwillingly pressed to take up arms – were standard international practice. In October 2009, the government reacted with fury when a US State Department enquiry found “credible and well substantiated” evidence that government forces abducted and killed civilians, attacked no-fire zones and hospitals and killed senior rebel leaders with whom they had brokered a surrender (US State Department 2010a). There was further anger in June 2010 when the UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, appointed a three member panel (who are thought to have international business interests) to advise him on ensuring accountability for the alleged abuses during the war. There is concern that the panel – which held its first meeting with the Secretary-General in September (UN New Centre 2010b) – could result in restrictions on key government figures. In August 2010, the US State Department alleged no progress on improving accountability, noting there had been no effective investigation into laws-of-war violations (US State Department 2010b). The government is further irritated by international criticism of the trial of Sarath Fonseka, the former commander of the Sri Lankan military who unsuccessfully opposed Mahinda Rajapaksa’s re-election.

**New donors and regional contestation**

Since re-commencement of military efforts to recapture the northern and eastern territories under LTTE control, the Sri Lankan government has markedly increased its foreign relations with a number of Middle Eastern and Asian states – notably Pakistan, India, China and Iran. The new donors have no interest in the global humanitarian agenda – in the words of a respondent: “they are very different animals in this setting and can’t be compared. Far less principle-driven”. The Asian states competing for influence share Sri Lanka’s vehement rejection of Western “interference” in their internal affairs and have provided powerful support at the UN. India is the major provider of funding for reconstruction of housing in war-affected areas and has committed to rebuild 50,000 of the 160,000 houses in conflict-devastated areas which need to be repaired or rebuilt (IRIN 2010a). China’s investment and provision of soft loans is highly significant – building a new airport, power plant, oil refinery, and bunkering, ship, and container repair facilities as part of a strategic drive to secure a string of assets across the Indian Ocean between China and its oil and mineral extraction interests in the Horn of Africa and the Middle East. China is substantially assisting the government to restore transport links in war-ravaged eastern and northern areas. China’s growing influence in Sri Lanka also serves its objective of containing India, which has been providing Sri Lanka with assistance for much longer.

**Displacement resolved? Government assertions disputed**

After proclaiming victory on 19 May 2009, President Rajapaksa announced formation of a Presidential Task Force (PTF) to oversee humanitarian assistance, rehabilitation and reconstruction. He appointed a Minister for Resettlement who pledged that all displaced families would be resettled within six months. The government has consistently cited its capacity to respond effectively to displacement, saying it has learned lessons from the tsunami and previous waves of conflict-induced displacement. The president has said that his visit to observe post-earthquake operations in China further enhanced his government’s competence to implement resettlement programmes.

The exact numbers of those trapped in the final weeks of fighting is contested by the PTF, the UN and human rights groups and the true figure is unlikely to ever be determined. There has been no official recognition that very large numbers of people are still missing (Fonseka 2010). What is clear is that some 280,000 IDPs were forcibly interned, the majority in a massive military-run camp known as Manik Farm. Denial of international access was justified on dubious grounds – NGO vehicles would cause environmental pollution, international humanitarians would not respect the privacy of IDPs and would treat camps as “photo opportunities”. Access to the “surenderee” population was initially denied to the International Committee of the Red Cross. Rebutting critics, the government asserted that IDPs could live with dignity as “no other IDP camps elsewhere in the world had playgrounds, cooperatives, waste management projects, libraries, health centres, ayurveda, schools, hospitals, recreation facilities and farms” (Amarasinghe & Kahandawarachchi 2010). Most humanitarians regarded such statements with derision. The HRW team was told that at very short notice the government asked the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) to transport IDPs to new locations. While IOM then informed the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) there was no opportunity for rigorous IDP registration.
In the run-up to presidential elections in January 2010 there was a sudden policy shift, – apparently driven with a view to win votes and to assuage international criticisms. In October 2009, the government unveiled a Crash Resettlement Programme and by mid-November over 100,000 IDPs were said to have returned to their places of origin. In August 2010, the government claimed that 90 percent of those displaced by the post-2008 fighting had been resettled (Daily Mirror 2010).

Government IDP data is disputed by international observers and Sri Lankan civil society. Many who the international community would regard as IDPs are not officially registered. Sri Lankan officials use the terms ‘return’ and ‘resettlement’ interchangeably without regard to international standards such as the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. This has resulted in a situation where upon returning to the district of origin, regardless of whether a person has returned to his/her own home and land, there is an erroneous assumption by the state that return is complete. Knowledgeable local government officials, many with extensive experience working with tsunami- and conflict-displaced populations, have been sidelined by officials in PTF headquarters in Colombo who make all decisions, including on IDP numbers and deregistration of individual IDPs (Fonseka 2010). IDPs are returning to areas that have been heavily damaged and completely emptied of population for long periods. The majority of houses in return areas are completely destroyed, heavily mined and lacking in water. As a result, many ex-detainees are living with host families and there are reports of some seeking to return to places of origin, some find their land appropriated by the army for a High Security Zone (HSZ). The destruction of housing and property due to conflict, secondary occupation of private lands by actors including the security forces and police and creation of numerous HSZs have all adversely affected IDP’s ability to access their human rights to adequate housing, return and restitution. The lack of policies consistent with human rights obligations has left many marginalised and vulnerable communities no remedy to defend their housing, land and property rights in the face of the larger security and development interests of the government and the military (Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions 2009). In September 2010, there are reports that some freed IDPs have to regularly report to the army and cannot move without military permission (Fonseka 2010). Forgotten in the aftermath of the latest displacement crisis are “old IDPs” – the hundreds of thousands displaced by decades of conflict – Muslims expelled by the LTTE, Sinhala IDPs from northern Sri Lanka and IDPs from all communities in the east. Many suspect that the government is set to declare displacement to have ended, thus denying all responsibility to provide ongoing assistance to those who are often even more vulnerable than recent IDPs and returnees. The return of “old IDPs” is significantly lagging behind that of the new with humanitarian agencies strongly pressured by the government only to support the latter. Most old IDPs who are returning are doing so spontaneously and are chronically vulnerable (Raheem 2010).

Particularly ignored by government and non-government actors are Muslims who have been living in a state of protracted displacement for two decades (Norwegian Refugee Council 2010). Prospects of their return to former homes in northern Sri Lanka are uncertain (IRIN 2010c).

War widows – particularly those whose husbands were LTTE combatants – are another vulnerable group whose needs are being insufficiently addressed. Save the Children notes that there are over 26,000 war widows in the Jaffna peninsula alone (Calyaneratne 2010). Insufficient support for livelihood recovery support, agriculture and de-mining creates a risk of long-term food dependency. The majority of Sri Lanka’s 160,000 amputees – most of them war victims – lack prosthetic limbs (IRIN 2010d). 1.2 million people are thought to be in need of food assistance (World Food Programme 2010).

**Protection, war crimes and human rights**

There is broad agreement among traditional donors and Western observers of the need for a thorough investigation of violations of international humanitarian law in Sri Lanka. As most of the LTTE perpetrators are dead, this must focus on alleged encouragement of, or complicity in, war crimes, at the highest level of the Sri Lankan military and political establishment. The International Crisis Group reflects the broad liberal consensus by arguing that “an international inquiry into alleged crimes is essential given the absence of political will or capacity for genuine domestic investigations, the need for an accounting to address the grievances that drive conflict in Sri Lanka, and the potential of other governments adopting the Sri Lankan model of counter-insurgency in their own internal conflicts”. Less comforting is The International Crisis Group’s observation that “much of the international community turned a blind eye to the violations when they were happening. Many countries welcomed the LTTE’s defeat regardless of the cost of immense civilian suffering and an acute challenge to the laws of war. The United Nations too readily complied with the government’s demands to withdraw from conflict areas,” (International Crisis Group 2010).
The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillai, has been a rare UN voice when it comes to talking about war crimes, with the rest of the UN opting for a quiet approach to “keep the doors open” (Philp 2009). In effect, UN staffers in Sri Lanka had little choice because the numbers were against them. In May 2009, human rights advocates were appalled when the UN Human Rights Council backed a Sri Lankan resolution – strongly supported by Asian and Muslim states – welcoming the defeat of the LTTE and describing the conflict as a “domestic matter that does not warrant outside interference”. A critic has argued that the UN thus gave “carte blanche to armies to use whatever means available to achieve victory”, endorsing the view that “victory in civil war is paramount, and that any incidental abuses are no one else’s business,” (Binyon 2009).

Protection issues have long been a bone of contention between the government and traditional donors. The Minister of Economic Development (a brother of the president) has declared that IDPs are “given the best protection, not left vulnerable to exploitation, their privacy protected and their interests safeguarded,” (Amarasinghe & Kahandawaarachchi 2010). In May 2010, the government established a Commission on Lessons Learned and Reconciliation. Run by the Ministry of Defence, it has a mandate to “find out the root causes of the terrorist problem,” (Sri Lankan Ministry of Defence 2010). Few observers believe it is impartial as all eight members have previously worked for the government. Amid a climate of ongoing intimidation of local and international media, the BBC was banned from attending evidence-gathering sessions (BBC News 2010). The International Crisis Group warns that the commission is likely to simply perpetuate a culture of impunity (IRIN 2010e). Human Rights Watch (2010) notes that Sri Lanka has a long history of establishing ad hoc inquiries to deflect international criticism over its poor human rights record and widespread impunity, none of which have produced any significant results.

### Donor dilemmas

At the height of the humanitarian crisis in 2009 – as they observed with much frustration the dominance of state actors and inability to respond to calls for help from those in Manik Farm who could get heard – traditional humanitarian actors in Sri Lanka faced a major dilemma: “should they stay silent but involved, or speak out and be expelled?” (Salignon 2009). There has been no consensus answer and there is ongoing division among donors on how rights and protection issues should be approached.

In order to receive permission from the PTF to carry out projects, agencies report they have been forced to adopt the government’s preferred terminology. There is debate on whether to placate the government by using the terminology it prefers to use. The HRI team received several comments: “clusters is a dirty word”; capacity building, psychosocial… are not terms that can be used in Sri Lanka”; “we also had to drop or stop advocating for the Guiding Principles because the government started using the language against us and to its benefit.”

### Response of traditional donors

International response capacity was limited by the post-tsunami winding down of engagement and the subsequent frustrated withdrawal, or reduction in staff numbers, of agencies whose efforts to work with conflict-affected IDPs were not welcomed. The UK Department for International Development was among those who had wound up operations in Sri Lanka after the tsunami – not wanting permanent engagement in a middle-income country – but deployed humanitarian experts in early 2009. It has been difficult for some donors to accept that they are not in the driving seat and also frustrating that the UN has not been in a position to provide leadership or even to gather comprehensive information on what was disbursed and who did what in the turbulent period leading up to and following the LTTE defeat.

Responding to needs has been challenging. Many donors have humanitarian and development programmes but nothing in between to link the different types of interventions. With no peace agreement or UN-government cooperation framework the government has been able to retain complete control over the humanitarian response. The HRI team was told of several attempts by donors to fund needs assessments which never happened due to prohibition of access. Needs were thus never formally identified and humanitarian aid was largely limited to the relatively small numbers who managed to flee the conflict area.

The 2009 Common Humanitarian Action Plan (CHAP) sought US$155.5 million, revised upwards to US$270 million in the mid-year review. It was 73.5 percent funded. Requests for food aid and protection were met, but sectors which attracted insufficient response included education (36 percent), health (32 percent), agriculture and food security (18 percent) and economic recovery and infrastructure (six percent).

A further CHAP was prepared in early 2010 but the government refused to endorse it in protest at UN investigation of alleged war crimes. It sought US$337.7 million, a figure reduced downwards to US$287.8 in June 2010 as a result of restricted implementation capacity, time-consuming NGO-approval processes and safety issues associated with ongoing mine/unexploded ordnance contamination (OCHA 2010). By mid-October 2010, 47 percent had been covered. The food cluster has been best supported (81 percent covered), while economic recovery and infrastructure has received only eleven percent of the amount requested and water and sanitation ten percent.
Given the extensive amount of support from non-traditional donors, data from the Financial Tracking Service (FTS) of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) is not comprehensive. (Indeed, donors from the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development’s Development Assistance Committee who were interviewed in Colombo said they had prepared their own, more accurate database). According to FTS data, by late September 2010 the largest providers of humanitarian assistance in 2010 have been the US (19.7 percent of the total), Australia (15.7 percent), Canada (5.7 percent), the European Commission (4.5 percent) and Norway (4.5 percent). 9.1 percent has come from the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) – to which India has contributed.

The HRI team found evidence of donor fatigue and reluctance to support reconstruction initiatives which it is believed the government is able to afford. There is widespread concern that humanitarian needs and livelihood support are being overlooked, the UN calling on donors in August 2010 to “stay the course” and provide funding to ensure durable solutions to displacement (UN News Centre 2010).

**Coordination**

Despite the realities that the humanitarian response in Sri Lanka is largely operating without a real framework and that donors have markedly different policies regarding cooperation with the government, the HRI team was told that coordination has improved. Despite official disdain for the cluster system it is reported that in general it works well in Colombo and elsewhere and PTF representatives attend meetings.

Donor coordination was perceived as more active and effective. There are several donor coordination groups and sub-groups which most of those interviewed during the HRI mission regarded as useful sounding boards and fora for gauging the positions of other donors. However, donors’ expectations of coordination are extremely divergent. While donors such as the European Commission and Switzerland argue for strong leadership, countries such as Japan are uncomfortable with the idea of participating in a decision-oriented platform. Many donors adopt the position that if the government wishes to take over responsibilities that it should do so and should use its own resources.

**Humanitarians’ evaluation of donors**

The HRI team was repeatedly told that many questions they asked were simply not relevant to the situation in Sri Lanka. Lessons learnt from the numerous evaluations of the tsunami response are also regarded as inapplicable. There is a general comment that while the Principles of Good Humanitarian Donorship may be of relevance to informing responses to other crises, they are inapplicable in Sri Lanka.

The HRI team learned that the reputation of ECHO – previously considered one of the best donors in Sri Lanka – has suffered. UN agencies resented being pressured by ECHO on humanitarian principles, especially since they believed that the European position was ineffective and un-nuanced. ECHO was criticised for inflexibility, one respondent complaining that “in the midst of a crisis, ECHO becomes too bureaucratic and unrealistic”, another saying it cannot “think out of the box and is stuck in its procedures.”

“The humanitarian consequences of the final fighting were, and remain, enormous.”
In general, agencies interviewed by the HRI team felt they received funding in a timely manner for those actions that they were able to carry out. Australia was praised for quickly supporting initiatives – such as UNHCR’s shelter cash grant programme – but it was also noted that its humanitarian agenda in Sri Lanka is shaped by geopolitical considerations and desire to prevent Sri Lankan asylum seekers reaching Australia. Japan was also criticised for allowing its humanitarian allocations to be influenced by national political considerations. Switzerland is commended for its principled advocacy of human rights. Canada, the Netherlands, the UK and Sweden were complimented for flexibility in reallocating funds as needs changed.

There is widespread concern that donors are now prioritising northern Sri Lanka, with severe consequences for eastern Sri Lanka where humanitarian needs remain following 20 years of LTTE occupation.

Lessons learnt and recommendations for the future

Recent experience in Sri Lanka “provides international humanitarian actors with a cautionary tale of the sensitivities surrounding operations in a conflict affected environment beset by opposing constructs of nationalism and a state determined to maintain control over the nature and direction of humanitarian response”. Humanitarian agencies need to be aware of the ways in which nationalist agendas can shape perspectives of humanitarianism (Harris 2010).

Key implications for donors committed to humanitarian principles are that:

- Donor (and UN) pressure to allow humanitarian access and space is unlikely to be effective if alternative donors are readily available.
- Non-traditional donors are likely to be more attractive because of their lack of conditionality and interest in domestic affairs
- Once lost, donor and UN/aid agency influence may be difficult to regain and avenues for effective engagement with humanitarian issues may be lost for ever.

Despite the general pessimism about the effectiveness of humanitarian advocacy, there are those who think that decreased post-conflict and post-election tensions could provide opportunities to move away from past tensions and find common ground with the government of Sri Lanka. Some of those interviewed by the HRI team urged the humanitarian community to be patient, to understand government nervousness and sensitivities, to show greater respect for Sri Lankan security concerns and to find avenues to enter into dialogue about how to avert the risk of long-term aid dependency and to agree on development priorities in impoverished conflict-affected areas of the country.

Key areas of concern which traditional donors must address include:

1. Lack of a consistent and comprehensive policy on IDP resettlement. Donors need to work with the UN, INGOs and Sri Lankan civil society to persuade the government of the need to ensure IDP returns are voluntary and informed and to provide assistance to ensure returns lead to durable solutions for all displaced and conflict-affected populations.

2. Avoiding excessive aid conditionality: Donors should bear in mind that non-traditional donors present a viable and willing alternative to Western assistance.

3. Dialogue: It is important to reach out to non-traditional donors and assimilate them into donor consortia.

4. Equality of response: Donors must ensure that humanitarian assistance is not simply focused on areas which were last to be liberated from the LTTE. The large number of war widows must be included in resettlement and rehabilitation programmes.

5. Implementors’ capacity: Donors should be more cautious about supporting international agencies to take on activities for which they have no mandate or expertise when there are qualified Sri Lankan implementing partners.

References


Crisis reports

Sudan
Sudan at a glance

The crisis and the response

- Sudan has world’s largest IDP population: at least 4.9 million.
- Protracted displacement has accelerated urbanisation and created an assistance-dependent population with limited capacity for self-sufficiency.
- More people are now being killed by violence in Southern Sudan than in Darfur.
- Slow recovery in eastern Sudan: drought and new refugees from Eritrea and Somalia have increased humanitarian needs.
- In 2009, donors provided more than US$1.65 billion for humanitarian assistance, twice that of second largest CAP.
- Some donors restrict funding to Darfur and Southern Sudan, blaming monitoring and access constraints in the east.
- In early 2010, the UN proposed a comprehensive mechanism to coordinate the protection of civilians in armed conflict settings.

Donor performance

- New initiatives for better coordination have not led to notable successes.
- The failure to improve protection is partly attributable to lack of advocacy by donors and UN officials who are afraid of being declared persona non grata.
- In Southern Sudan, most donors fail to hold regional authorities accountable for aid disappearance and for not providing previously committed resources.
- Most INGOs were dissatisfied with donor efforts to facilitate humanitarian access, especially after the expulsion of several humanitarian organisations from Darfur.

Key challenges and areas for improvement

- Donors must identify qualified partners and staff to avoid a lack of response capacity.
- Effective and consistent systems for information gathering and analysis of threats need to be established.
- The international community must reach consensus on how to interact with the government of Sudan and strengthen efforts to facilitate humanitarian access.
- The roles of peacekeepers and humanitarian actors need to be more clearly differentiated in order to strengthen protection coordination mechanisms.
Sudan

Humanitarian mission without end?

Sudan continues to struggle to cope with conflict, displacement and insecurity. In 2009, humanitarian operations in Sudan were, once again, the world’s most significant – in terms of funding provided and the number of beneficiaries (OCHA 2009a). Analysts fear Sudan may be sliding towards violent breakup (International Crisis Group 2010) as peace accords – between the government and its adversaries in Darfur, southern and eastern Sudan – all appear to be increasingly fragile. Five years have elapsed since the internationally-brokered Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) ended the five decade-long north-south civil war. Essential benchmarks such as border demarcation, agreements on wealth-sharing and citizenship issues remain unresolved. Insecurity and failed harvests have led to an alarming deterioration of humanitarian conditions in Southern Sudan. The World Food Programme (WFP) is providing assistance to 11 million Sudanese, the agency’s largest operation in the world (WFP 2010a).

The number of people in Southern Sudan in need of food assistance has more than quadrupled from almost one million in early 2009 to 4.3 million by February 2010 (WFP 2010b). There are concerns that disruptions to the Southern Sudan self-determination referendum scheduled for January 2011 – the lynchpin of the CPA – or northern rejection of its expected vote for independence – could spark renewed north-south conflict.

The extent and duration of displacement in Darfur has created an assistance-dependent population with limited capacity for self-sufficiency. The peace process in Darfur is stalled and the United Nations (UN) warned in July 2010 that bureaucratic impediments to humanitarian access and incidents targeting aid workers are steadily shrinking humanitarian space (OCHA 2009a).

Operational environment

During the first Humanitarian Response Index (HRI) mission in 2006, Sudan – Darfur in particular – was receiving high publicity in the international media, but by the next mission in 2007, the crisis was already losing airtime (DARA 2007 and Hererra 2008). Today, the Darfur conflict may no longer attract the headlines it once did but the crisis has not disappeared. Large-scale attacks on civilians are less common but generalised insecurity prevails in most of the region. Displaced communities have been unable to return despite a peace agreement between the Government of Sudan and the main rebel faction – the Justice and Equality Movement – and rapprochement between Sudan and Chad. Peace talks brokered by Qatar continue to drag on inconclusively amid little optimism (Flint 2010). Darfur’s numerous anti-government movements have fractured. Violence has intensified as a result of renewed fighting between the Sudanese army and Darfur’s second largest rebel movement, the Sudan Liberation Movement, as well as intra-tribal violence. In fact, significant numbers of people have now lived in Darfur IDP camps for seven years. Most have, in effect, become urban settlements as conflict has brought about traumatic urbanisation (de Waal 2009).

Humanitarian access to populations remains a challenge in all three states of Darfur. The kidnapping of humanitarian staff, vehicle hijacking and banditry have continued to curtail activities and delivery of humanitarian aid. Humanitarian response capacity is further reduced by a shortage of qualified partners and staff.

Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir is the first sitting head of state ever indicted by the International Criminal Court (ICC). The Government of Sudan reacted to the March 2009 ICC announcement of an arrest warrant by expelling 13 international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) and three national NGOs from northern Sudan. There was additionally a further clampdown on activities of independent human rights organisations (African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies 2009). Humanitarian organisations reported considerable evidence of the ongoing operational and protection consequences of the expulsion of some of the largest and most experienced agencies. Cooperation between the international community and the government’s Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC) – which accused the expelled INGOs of “violating their humanitarian mandates and threatening National security” (HAC 2009) – has been significantly reduced. Oxfam GB, one of the expelled agencies, has noted that with fewer operational agencies information on needs in much of Darfur is now harder to obtain. Fourteen of the 16 agencies expelled from Darfur had projects working to support victims of sexual violence and many of the trauma counseling projects, women’s health centers and support networks that were shut down have not been adequately replaced (Oxfam 2010).
Nation-wide legislative, local and presidential elections held in April 2010 were the first multi-party polls since 1986. While the Carter Center described the process as “highly-chaotic, non-transparent and vulnerable to electoral manipulation” (Carter Center 2010), the international community accepted the results. In circumstances which bode ill for prospects of good governance, the two dominant parties – Bashir’s National Congress Party and the Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Movement (SPLM) – reinforced their hold on power in the two regions. “The hasty way in which elections have been put aside by those Western governments which had actively supported them – actually imposing them on the parties during the CPA negotiations – is due to the fact that the vote had a predictable but equally disappointing outcome: instead of giving birth to one, democratic Sudan, the elections have ratified the emergence of two authoritarian Sudan(s),” (Musso 2010).

In 2010, the autonomous Government of South Sudan abandoned the strategy of seeking reform at the federal level in Khartoum and its leader, Salva Kir, now openly urges secession. There has been no progress on resolving fundamental issues left unresolved by the CPA – provisions on power and wealth sharing, demarcation of the north-south border and resolution of the conflicts in Southern Kordofan, Blue Nile and Abyei. The regimes in Khartoum and in the southern capital, Juba, have, in effect, stopped trying to resolve the numerous issues which divide them, perilously entrusting the African Union to mediate following the expected southern vote for independence in January 2011 (IRIN 2010a).

In Southern Sudan, humanitarian needs have intensified due to ongoing violence, drought and food insecurity. Many agencies had been aligning their activities towards recovery and development in 2007–2008, expecting a smooth post-conflict transition. Most have been slow to respond to conflict and drought-induced needs. In June 2009, the UN reported that the number of people killed by violence in Southern Sudan had surpassed the number killed in Darfur. Intra-South violence killed over 2,500 people and displaced 370,000 more in 2009 (OCHA 2009b).

Recent research dispels the standard explanation for post-CPA violence – alleged destabilisation by Khartoum and manipulation of tribal tensions – and reports that efforts by the SPLM-led autonomous government to build governance institutions are themselves fuelling new conflict (Norwegian Refugee Council 2010). In eastern Sudan, there has been less conflict since the Government of Sudan signed an agreement with an opposition coalition in 2006. However, recovery has been slow and drought and the arrival of new refugees from Eritrea and Somalia have increased humanitarian needs.

**Humanitarian indicators**

Although in some respects Sudan – thanks to rapidly increasing oil wealth – can be ranked as a middle-income country – enjoying a per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of US$2,086, it ranks in 150th place on the United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) Human Development Index. The United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) reports an under-five mortality rate of 112 deaths per 1,000 live births and a maternal mortality ratio of 1,107 deaths per 100,000 live births. Sixty-eight percent of children have not been fully immunised and less than 20 percent of children complete primary education (UNICEF 2010). All these indicators are significantly worse in Southern Sudan.

Sudan has the highest number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the world. The fact that some have been displaced for several decades – and significant numbers have been born in places of displacement – makes it impossible to reach consensus on the total number of IDPs or the number who have found durable solutions to their displacement. It is generally agreed that there are at least 4.9 million IDPs (UNDP 2009) in Darfur, the greater Khartoum area, South Kordofan and Southern Sudan. The post-CPA return of IDPs has not been as significant as expected. While two million are thought to have returned south, some ten percent of them are believed to have been further displaced by ongoing insecurity (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre 2010). Humanitarian access to the settlements in Khartoum State, where approximately 1.5 million IDPs live, has recently become even more restricted. Food shortages in Southern Sudan are expected to intensify in the run-up to the 2011 referendum as more Southerners, worried about being on the wrong side of the border, are expected to try to return (IRIN 2010b).

**International dilemmas**

The international community has been unable to reach consensus on how to interact with the Government of Sudan. It is also now increasingly unable to agree on how to work with the Government of Southern Sudan and to address the crisis in the region and the likely consequences of the self-determination referendum.

The UN’s operational structure in a complex and divided country is itself, unsurprisingly, complex. There are two separate missions with a peacekeeping mandate: The first, the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), was established by the UN Security Council (UNSC) in 2005 and is primarily charged with implementation of the CPA. It is headed by a Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG). The Deputy SRSG – who is also Resident Coordinator and Humanitarian Coordinator (R.C/HC) – is based in Khartoum. He has two deputies for Humanitarian Affairs, in Khartoum and in the Southern Sudan capital, Juba. The second, the African Union (AU) – United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) is a joint AU/UN peacekeeping mission, established by the UNSC in 2007. Charged with ensuring safe provision of humanitarian assistance and humanitarian access in Darfur, it reports both to the UNSC and to the AU Peace and Security Council. It is led by a UN/AU Joint Special Representative (JSR) and in June 2010 had around 22,000 uniformed personnel. Its mandate was extended for a year in August 2010, prompting the Government of Sudan to impose further restrictions on movement of UNAMID personnel.
The HRI team was told of inherent tension, within the UN and the donor community, between political agendas and commitment to humanitarian assistance in accordance with the Principles of Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD). Agendas and approaches differ between peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance and development. Funding for recovery is affected by the failure of the UN and the donor community to reach agreement on the best way to prevent further conflict in Darfur.

Protection

The Sudanese crises continue to be characterised by brutalities against civilians and a climate of nearly complete impunity. In 2005, the UN Security Council asked UNMIS peacekeepers to protect civilians but failed to give the mission sufficient or appropriate staff and resources. The role of donors with regard to promotion of protection and international humanitarian law is limited to bilateral discussions with government officials on the occasion of high official’s visits to the country. There is no concerted strategy. UNAMID has continuously failed over the course of its deployment to protect itself, let alone the people it military personnel have been dispatched to protect.

As an INGO representative noted, “UNAMID has no staff in the rural areas, only in big towns. The villages are abandoned. What kind of peacekeeping is this?”

While the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has been able to assist and protect IDPs in other countries, it cannot do so in Sudan. For many years UNHCR’s activities have been severely restricted by the Sudanese authorities. UNHCR has only been allowed to operate in certain areas and to only provide protection to refugees – although in late 2009, the refugee agency was granted access to IDPs in Nyala in Darfur. The government of Sudan insists that it is its responsibility to protect IDPs and for many years has discouraged the international community from assisting and advocating for the millions of IDPs who live in and around Khartoum. The government entrusted the

International Organisation for Migration (IOM) to assist IDPs in Al Fasher and Al Geneina. IOM is not a UN agency and does not have a legal protection mandate. The agency told the HRI team that its activities contribute to protecting human rights as registration, verification and assistance implicitly provide IDPs with a form of protection. Despite its repeated claims the government clearly lacks protection capacity. This was further demonstrated by an upsurge in violence in Darfur in May-June 2010 which left over 800 dead.

Protection coordination mechanisms have several weaknesses. There is a lack of permanent staff in many of the regions where their presence is most required. The HRI team learned that about one third of protection of civilian posts are vacant and neither UNMIS nor UNHCR have permanent staff in three of the ten states of the South. A large number of UNAMID’s dedicated protection posts are also vacant. Both in Southern Sudan and Darfur there is widespread confusion regarding the respective roles of peace keepers and humanitarian actors with regard to protection. It is unclear which entity, if any, currently coordinates protection and where. Many of those who are manifestly in need of protection are neither IDPs nor returned IDPs nor refugees.
The UN should acknowledge that protection structures are inconsistent, ineffective and complicated by dual reporting to the UN and the AU. There is an urgent need to clarify the responsibilities and reporting lines of UNMIS/UNAMID and policies related to protection of IDPs and other vulnerable civilians. Both UNMIS and UNAMID need to have a mission-wide protection strategy that consolidates existing protection initiatives, builds on current cluster leads and ensures the best use of available military, police and civilian resources to confront actual and potential violence.

There are efforts to raise awareness of government officials who, for the most part, have little notion of the broader meaning of protection. UNHCR has run workshops and since 2004, UNDP has engaged in an ambitious project to bring together government officials, civil society and local communities to raise awareness of basic human rights in Darfur (UNDP 2010). However, considering the size of protection needs over this vast area, these remain modest interventions.

In Southern Sudan, the regional government and the humanitarian community are focusing on strengthening protection activities, especially helping communities protect themselves. Community groups receive training and early warning mechanisms are underway. Radios are provided to enable communication with the authorities and UNMIS when under threat. Following the signing of an action plan between the Sudan People’ Liberation Army – the military force of the autonomous southern government – and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, the release and reintegration of child soldiers is progressing steadily.

A senior UN official told the HRI team that a key challenge is to establish more consistent and effective systems for information gathering and analysis of threats to civilians, including from the staff of UN and non-governmental agencies and communities. Senior UNAMID/UNMIS leaders, together with humanitarian actors focusing on protection, need to ensure a constructive and ongoing engagement and dialogue between peacekeepers and the humanitarian community. In 2010, UNHCR and UNMIS’s Protection of Civilian (POC) section were tasked with examining future protection challenges and proposing a comprehensive protection coordination mechanism. A proposal for Southern Sudan is under discussion. In early 2010, the UN proposed a comprehensive mechanism to coordinate the protection of civilians in armed conflict settings involving collaboration between the Deputy Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator, the UNMIS Regional Coordinator, the Deputy Police Commissioner of Southern Sudan and UNMIS Sector Commanders (UN Sudan 2009). It remains to be seen whether these interventions will produce more effective protection activities.

**Coordination**

The Darfur expulsion triggered several initiatives for improved coordination. The Humanitarian Donor Group (HDG), a platform for Western donors to discuss humanitarian issues and prepare meetings with the government, UN agencies and INGOs, was reinforced. Initiatives were taken to broaden the group by inviting China, India, South Africa, Egypt, Qatar, South Korea, Malaysia and the United Arab Emirates. However, this extended group has only met once. Many donors have centralised decision-making on humanitarian assistance at headquarter level and there is no special capacity for humanitarian assistance at embassy level apart from, at best, a diplomat responsible for humanitarian matters in addition to other duties. This meant that internal coordination and coordination with humanitarian partners also often fell upon the same people in Khartoum.

Also in response to the Darfur expulsion, donors, the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) and the HAC established a High Level Committee co-chaired by the UN and the Government of Sudan to ensure better coordination. At the highest level – including ministers, ambassadors and the SRSG – the committee has only met twice. At national level, they have met only on a few occasions in Khartoum (the last in November 2009) and Darfur, although the original agreement was to create similar platforms in all states.

The cluster approach was introduced formally in Sudan in December 2008. Many humanitarian organisations reported feeling that in 2009, the United Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) coordination in Khartoum was weak, due to lack of human resource capacity, senior management and delays in filling key posts. An interviewee summarised: “OCHA should really embrace its role, by setting up inter-agency assessments and by sharing insights”. Another said that “even the government wants a stronger OCHA”. In Southern Sudan, agencies report OCHA has started playing a better coordination role.

Results of new initiatives for better coordination have not led to notable successes. The failure to deliver dividends is partly attributed to lack of leadership by donors and United States (US) officials who are afraid of being declared persona non grata. The US is said to have the capacity to provide leadership, but is not doing so. A donor representative told the HRI team that clear terms of reference for the HDG would be beneficial.

**Funding Response**

Data from OCHA’s Financial Tracking System (FTS) indicates that in 2009 donors provided more than US$1.65 billion for humanitarian assistance in Sudan, twice as much as the amount given to the second largest UN Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP) (for the occupied Palestinian territories) and the third largest (for the Democratic Republic of the Congo) combined and more than the entire post-cyclone updated 2010 appeal for Haiti. This represents a significant increase since 2006, when resources available for the humanitarian action component of the Work Plan for Sudan were a little over US$1 billion (OCHA 2010).
The United States (US) has long been the leading international donor to Sudan, contributing over US$8 billion in humanitarian, development, peacekeeping, and reconstruction assistance in Sudan and eastern Chad since 2005 (US State Department 2010). As of August 2010, the US had provided US$533 million, 36.6 percent of the total reported by FTS. The second and third largest donors are the European Commission, providing on average thirteen percent per year and the United Kingdom (UK) contributing seven percent during the last five years.

Most of those interviewed by the HRI team were fairly satisfied with donor financial responsiveness. However, several interviewees mentioned that in 2009 the amount of aid, in particular from donors in western Europe, had decreased due to the financial crisis. Those mainly relying on funding from the US said they were already feeling the effects of Haiti for their 2010 budgets.

This was linked to media attention which in Sudan has resulted in disproportionate funding for Darfur, from donors but also from agencies’ headquarters. Because of a preference for Darfur, it has been difficult to find funds for projects in other parts of the country. Coverage of the work-plan for Darfur was more than 60 percent while coverage of Southern Sudan was only 40 percent.

Some donors restrict funding to Darfur and Southern Sudan, despite mounting needs in the east. The HRI team learned that donors including the European Commission and the Netherlands have a policy of not providing humanitarian funding for eastern Sudan, as the region has developmental needs which these donors consider the responsibility of the Sudanese government. Several donors told the HRI team that they did not fund humanitarian projects in the east because they said it was impossible to monitor any project as permission to travel is virtually impossible to obtain. Respondents also said that it was very difficult to get funds for development activities in Darfur because no one wanted to implicitly endorse the government’s contention that the humanitarian crisis is under control and needs are satisfied.

### Donors lack advocacy strategy

Restrictions on access of humanitarian personnel and materials are nothing new in Sudan and have been in place for decades, and previous editions of the HRI have made mention of these restrictions as well (DARA 2007 and Herrera 2008). During the 2009 mission, those interviewed by the HRI team held a variety of opinions on what donors can or cannot do to advocate for humanitarian access and the protection of humanitarian workers. While several INGOs preferred donors’ role to be restricted to consular support, most were dissatisfied about donor efforts to facilitate humanitarian access. There was strong protest from all Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development / Development Assistance Committee (OECD/DAC) donors after the Darfur expulsions, but their approaches differed. Whereas the US had a high profile, other donors used silent diplomacy. Some aid agencies praised the US for being outspoken, but others thought that a lower profile would have been more effective, giving the Sudanese authorities an opportunity to change policy without losing face. There is also no agreement on how to best deal with the issue of impunity of kidnappers and armed attackers in Darfur; although all agree this is a major factor limiting humanitarian access. The HRI team was surprised to note that few donors interviewed mentioned the clear politicisation of humanitarian assistance. This is despite the fact that there have been several instances in which representatives from donors’ headquarters have been denied visas for monitoring visits.

Interviewees told the HRI team that the agencies expelled from Darfur were those who were most committed to, and effective, at humanitarian advocacy. Today most NGOs keep a low profile. The government is now targeting individuals, expelling five UN and International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) staff in August 2010 for alleged engagement in advocacy, including forwarding of a petition against hunger (Arab News 2010). In Southern Sudan, donors are also missing opportunities to advocate with local authorities, most failing to hold the regional authorities accountable for the disappearance of aid goods or not providing funds or capacity they had committed to.

The aftermath of the expulsion from Darfur showed that, at the end of the day, there is neither the will nor sufficient common ground for a common pro-active advocacy strategy. “You have to find your own way and resort to your own tools. No one really knows what to do,” an INGO Country Director reported.

### Humanitarians’ evaluation of donors

Humanitarian agencies interviewed by the HRI team were relatively satisfied with the support provided by donors. Many OECD/DAC donors were praised for respecting roles and responsibilities of all actors and being flexible in allowing reallocation of funds. Coverage of the Sudan Work Plan funding requirements for coordination, air services and logistics was 98 percent, on average, during the last three years, higher than for any other sector. OCHA was very positive about donors’ financial support and also commended the technical support they received, particularly from the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID). Donors with humanitarian capacity at the field level were singled out as being very supportive and making informed decisions. But these donors were few. Only the European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO) and the US have field offices in both Darfur and Southern Sudan, while DFID has one staff member for humanitarian assistance continuously traveling between Darfur, Khartoum and Juba.

Respondents generally reported the idea that donors uncritically prioritise Darfur. The HRI team was told by interviewees that “there is overfeeding in Darfur. Appeals are inflated”; “there is very good response to the Darfur crisis. Gaps are quickly filled” and that “allocation of resources is very unbalanced between Darfur and the rest.”
There have been positive developments in donors’ willingness to fund emergency preparedness, risk reduction and recovery activities. The amount of funding available for these activities has doubled over the past four years from US$119 million to US$243 million. Humanitarian organisations noted that timely donor support enabled agencies to pre-position food and medicines in time for the rainy season. In Southern Sudan, the US funded WFP to pre-position food, while ECHO has funded two NGOs for emergency preparedness and response, which included stockpiling. Some NGOs told the HRI team that Norway and Canada provided support to build disaster preparedness and the response capacity of communities in Southern Sudan. The US Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) funded preparedness for disease outbreak (including logistics and medicine stocks) and capacity building at the village level throughout Sudan. The mission learned that the UK and Japan do not have separate allocations for humanitarian aid and development in Sudan, allowing for flexible disbursements.

Despite disappointment about the lack of donor advocacy for access and maintaining humanitarian space, most actors generally approve the overall response of their donors. OFDA, DFID and, to a lesser extent, ECHO – donors with a humanitarian field presence both in Darfur and Juba – are well rated. This could indicate that field presence contributes to a good reputation. However, the UN, which had the most extensive field presence of all donors was not awarded a particularly high score for overall response. Merely being present is apparently not enough.

There is considerable criticism of the Common Humanitarian Fund (CHF) – a pooled funding mechanism established for humanitarian activities in Sudan in 2005. The CHF intended to allow for speedy response to new life-threatening needs – was described by aid organisations as “bureaucratic”, “UN-focused” and “simply a bank”. The mission was told that UN agencies that are unable to get money directly from donors get priority access to the CHF; one interviewee telling us “we have all become beggars. How can small NGOs compete with the UN?” Research from the Overseas Development Institute revealed similar concerns, also noting that UN management costs meant that less money was available to cover NGO overheads and that efficiency was compromised (Fenton and Philips 2009).

Many humanitarian organisations shared with the HRI team their disappointment that after so many years of humanitarian assistance to Sudan so little has been achieved in terms of peace-building. As a result of the expulsions from Darfur and new crises in southern Sudan, peace-building initiatives – already few to start with – have been further marginalised. Initiatives to build local capacity for reconciliation continue to remain underfunded.

Lessons learnt and recommendations for the future

Sudan’s immediate prospects look grim. The International Crisis Group has expressed concern widely shared by analysts: “Unless the international community, notably the US, the UN, the AU Peace and Security Council and the Horn of Africa Inter-Government Authority on Development (IGAD), cooperate to support both CPA implementation and vital additional negotiations, return to North-South war and escalation of conflict in Darfur are likely” (International Crisis Group 2010).

After almost three decades of massive humanitarian assistance, the international community has to acknowledge the reality that there is now a dependency syndrome, with the number of those in permanent need of support showing no sign of decreasing. Much more can be done to strengthen the coping mechanisms of the most vulnerable. In a highly political context such as contemporary Sudan, it is hard to see how to guarantee the neutrality of humanitarian assistance. Without achieving a proper political settlement of Sudan’s myriad disputes, humanitarian assistance will become a mission with no end. Humanitarian assistance cannot endlessly be provided along a linear scheme from emergency aid to (occasional) recovery and back to emergency aid.

There are a number of key issues which donors need to address:

1 Donors, together with the UN, should affirm the principle that humanitarian and early recovery programming must always be based on needs.

2 Donors need to provide flexible funding for early-recovery and rehabilitation.

3 They should recognise their lack of humanitarian capacity in Sudan and extend and consolidate collaboration with non-traditional donors.

4 Donors should encourage and support humanitarian actors to develop practical contingency plans for the referendum / post referendum period and anticipated additional displacement, conflict and food insecurity.

5 Donors and the UN could do more to coordinate different financing instruments (including the CHF, Work Plan and development funds) and to work to speed up CHF disbursements.

6 Donors must do more to support local peace building processes and community coping mechanisms.

7 Finally, the Humanitarian Donor Group needs to specifically establish a policy which includes advocacy for *Principles of Good Humanitarian Donorship*.
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Information based on field interviews with key humanitarian agencies in Sudan (Al Fashir, Juba and Khartoum) from 13 to 27 May 2010, and 235 questionnaires on donor performance (including 155 OECD/DAC donors).

The HRI team, composed of Lucia Fernandez, Nahla Haidar (co-Team Leader), Manuel Sanchez-Montero, Albertien van der Veen (co-Team Leader) and Frank Vollmer contributed to this report. They express their gratitude to all those interviewed in Sudan.
The crisis and the response

- There are now at least 340,000 IDPs displaced by conflict in northern Yemen: return prospects are limited as the conflict has become regionalised.
- The international community seems powerless to prevent further closure of humanitarian space as both sides violate international humanitarian law and prevent the free flow of assistance.
- Yemen struggles, with minimal international funding, to cope with the continuing influx of Somali refugees.
- Multiple shocks have exacerbated the vulnerability of families and left millions trapped in hunger and poverty.

Donor performance

- Humanitarian funding has dropped: by October 2010 only 49 percent of the 2010 CAP had been covered.
- Donors are preoccupied with a development agenda despite the humanitarian crisis.
- Less than ten percent of the US$4.7 billion pledged for 2007-2010 at a major donor conference in Yemen has been provided.
- Primarily focused on the al-Qa’ida presence in Yemen, most Western donors have remained silent about government human rights abuses, do not push for humanitarian access and lack knowledge of GHD Principles.
- Substantial Gulf aid to the government and non-state actors is untransparent and unquantifiable – as is US support for the Yemeni military.

Key challenges and areas for improvement

- Donors need to engage more with in-country humanitarian actors, Yemeni civil society and opposition forces committed to democratic transition.
- Donors should see linkages between geostrategic objectives and humanitarian and development assistance: counter-terrorism objectives are best realised through fostering good governance and enabling the Yemeni state to provide basic services.
- Coordination between traditional donors and Gulf donors is essential to build capacity for early warning, contingency planning and recovery.
- The many aid actors who continue to see Yemen primarily through a development lens must acknowledge the scale of immediate life-threatening needs.
Crisis reports

Yemen

Can donors avert state collapse?

Yemen is wracked by a chronic and under-reported humanitarian crisis. There are fears of state collapse in the only Least Developed Country in the Arab World and the most populous nation in the Arabian Peninsula. With an estimated population of 23 million growing at a rate of 3.56 percent per annum, and with one of the world’s most extreme water shortages, analysts doubt whether Yemen, despite its fertility, will ever again be food self-sufficient. Modest oil resources—which have been providing three quarters of national income and which have been grossly misappropriated—are in sharp decline, threatening the informal patronage networks and unrecorded payments to tribal leaders which have held the disparate country together. The increasingly autocratic regime of President ‘Ali ‘Abdullah Saleh—who has been in power since 1978—is threatened on several fronts: by a major conflict in the north against a rebel force known as the Houthis; renewed demands from southerners who wish to reassert independence; al-Qa’ida-inspired terrorism and unrest sparked by the collapse of government services, reduction in state subsidies (especially of petrol), intensifying food insecurity and high youth unemployment. Yemen is thought to have the world’s greatest proliferation of small arms. In addition to a very large population of Somali refugees, Yemen is further destabilised by having to cope with a major internal displacement crisis.

The international community seems powerless to halt Yemen’s slide into anarchy and to assert the right to supervise crucial upcoming parliamentary elections in 2011. The Yemeni government and most of the international community remain committed to a development/security agenda which they insist is the solution to the country’s ills. Members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) — a regional body bringing together oil-rich states in the Arabian Peninsula — are increasingly focusing on what to do about Yemen. However, the GCC is divided, especially by tensions between Saudi Arabia—now a pro-Saleh protagonist in the Houthi war—and Qatar which has sought a mediatory role. The GCC has not responded to suggestions that it should provide a safety valve by easing labour permit restrictions on Yemenis. Western donors, particularly the United States (US) and the United Kingdom (UK)—concerned at the prospect of a lawless Yemen providing a haven for Islamic terror—have been generally quiescent about Saleh’s stalled democratisation, disregard for human rights, censorship of the press, disappearances, the use of live fire against peaceful demonstrators seeking regional autonomy and government transparency and plans to transfer power to his son. The Humanitarian Response Index (HRI) team was repeatedly told of concerns at lack of donor leverage over the Yemeni government which has exploited Western support for counter-terrorism to suppress domestic opposition.

Neither regional states nor the West have managed to coordinate policies to combat arms trafficking, piracy, trafficking of children and women for purposes of economic or sexual exploitation and clandestine migration into Yemen and onwards to Saudi Arabia. After being ignored under the Bush Administration, the Obama Administration—responding to a terrorist act plotted in Yemen in December 2009—has boosted military assistance and aid to Yemen. Donors continue to see Yemen through a developmental lens and have been slow to recognise the extent of the crisis and respond sufficiently. The overall response to Yemen’s needs — both from traditional and neighbouring donors — remains disappointing.
The Houthi conflict
The Houthi insurrection began in 2004 as a local protest against the perceived declining influence in national affairs of Zaidis – a sect with origins in Shi‘ism who dominated Yemen under the Imamate which was overthrown in 1962. The conflict has been punctuated with a series of ceasefires, during which both sides have regathered their forces. Following intermittent clashes between Houthi groups and the Yemeni government in July 2009, the situation in Sa’ada governorate escalated into a sixth round of hostilities. The governorates of ‘Amran, Hajjah and Al Jawf have been particularly affected. A February 2010 ceasefire has been fragile and intermittent violence continues.

It has been suggested that, despite its chronic budget deficit, the Yemeni government may have spent up to a billion dollars in hard currency during the latest episode of fighting (Boucek 2010). Despite deploying the might of the Yemeni armed forces – and using Saudi and American assistance – the Houthi remain resilient, both militarily and – through spokesmen abroad and via the Internet – on the ideological front. Yemenis assert that underpaid soldiers have sold their weapons and ammunition to the Huthis.

The conflict has become regionalised.

The intervention of the Saudi military alongside Saleh in 2009 is deeply destabilising in view of the long history of animosity between the two countries. The Saleh regime claims Iranian and al-Qa‘ida support for the Houthi in an attempt to depict the conflict as an integral part of the War on Terror. This is not credible as Huthis, like other Zaidis, are just as hostile to al-Qa‘ida’s Salafism as they are to Saleh’s regime (O’Neill 2010). Nevertheless, the taint has gained traction: Western media generally depict northern Yemen’s conflict in terms of a Shi‘ite “proxy war” (Salmoni, Loidolt & Wells 2010). Survival at any cost is the Yemeni President’s greatest skill, and he has deftly relied on extremist elements to either confront or placate rivals (Kung 2010). He has also succeeded in imposing a virtual news blackout, preventing international journalists and most humanitarian workers from going to the conflict zone, threatening Yemeni journalists with reprisals if they report on the conflict and disconnecting mobile phone networks.

Unanticipated displacement crisis
The scale of displacement during the most recent round of hostilities took both the Yemeni authorities and the international community by surprise. As of July 2010, approximately 342,000 were registered as internally displaced people (IDPs), and more than 800,000 people had been indirectly affected by the conflict, including communities hosting IDPs and residents who had lost access to basic services. Only about 15 percent of IDPs live in camps or identified informal settlements, the remainder thought to be living with relatives or in rented accommodation. Most IDPs are from poor rural families and for many, of those it was their second or third displacement. The actual number of IDPs may be even greater, as the Yemeni government only registers those who are able to produce a valid identity card and the United Nations (UN) has identified substantial numbers of IDPs who either never had one or lost it during flight.

Widows and orphaned or separated children are particularly likely to fall through the cracks (IRIN 2010a).

IDP returns have been limited to date: the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (OCHA) reports that only 14,000 are confirmed as having returned home (OCHA 2010a), although government figures suggest many more have done so. IDP returns have remained limited due to protection, food and livelihood concerns in places of origin. Many areas are littered with mines and unexploded ordinance and returning IDPs are given no support to reconstruct housing. IDPs are, additionally, very wary of the durability of the ceasefire. The Yemeni authorities have noted that provision of assistance to IDPs in places of displacement creates a ‘stay’ factor and has urged the international community to instead support its own reconstruction plan to enable return (IRIN 2010b). Critics note, however, that the government exaggerates the prospects for safe return as part of its propaganda to insist it, rather than the Houthis, is setting the agenda.

Human rights abuses and access constraints
The international community and UN are seemingly unable to stop the shrinking of humanitarian space. Limited and inconsistent access continues to place obstacles on humanitarian activities, particularly for IDPs in host communities or living in Sa’ada (IDMC 2010). Humanitarian workers are only allowed to provide assistance within a seven kilometer radius of the city of Sa’ada (OCHA 2010c). Both sides in the conflict have disregarded principles of international humanitarian law. Indiscriminate shelling and aerial bombardment by the Yemeni government and the Saudis has targeted civilians. Both the government and the Houthis have politicised delivery of humanitarian assistance by diverting aid to their respective supporters. To put pressure on the Houthis, the Yemeni military has blocked movement of commercial goods, including basic foods and fuel, an act that appears to constitute collective punishment. The Huthis have used captured Yemeni soldiers as human shields and allegedly prevented civilians from leaving to seek medical assistance. The government has taken no steps to investigate or hold accountable those responsible for enforced disappearances (Human Rights Watch 2010). At times, tribesmen not directly involved in the conflict have taken advantage of it, establishing roadblocks to block delivery of aid to pressure the government to provide employment or local services. Many areas affected by the Houthi displacement crisis have never known the rule of law from Sana’a and agencies have had to show patience and diplomacy as tribesmen have expeditiously hijacked vehicles and diverted humanitarian goods from intended beneficiaries (IRIN 2010c).
The human rights abuses suffered by the hundreds of thousands of refugees from the Horn of Africa – both during their, often fatal, passage across the Gulf of Aden or in Yemen – have gone largely ignored by the outside world. Somalis are given prima facie refugee status by the government of the only country in the Arabian Peninsula to have signed the UN Refugee Convention, but receive no support from the government and negligible support from the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and international non-governmental organisations (INGOs). In violation of international law, Ethiopians are tracked down, arrested and deported to face unknown fates at the hands of the Ethiopian regime (Human Rights Watch 2009).

In southern Yemen, the government has responded to massive and largely peaceful protests in favour of secession with unprovoked deadly gunfire on numerous occasions. Though these incidents are well-documented, there has been no effort by the UN, the GCC, the Arab League or major Western donors to press for adherence to international humanitarian law and to urge protection of Yemeni civilians and refugees. United States (US) silence is particularly notable. In a March 2010 visit to Yemen, US Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs said that Washington “consider[s] what is happening in the southern provinces to be an internal affair, for Yemen alone, and we do not believe that any outside party should intervene,” (Wicke & Bouckaert 2010).

**Humanitarian needs**

Yemen is characterised by widespread poverty, food insecurity, malnutrition, unemployment, low levels of education, high gender disparities, rapid population growth and insufficient access to safe water and to land. Multiple and simultaneous shocks have exacerbated the vulnerability of families and left millions trapped in absolute hunger and poverty. Health services have virtually collapsed as basic medications are no longer available. Up to two thirds of Yemenis eligible to attend school are not doing so. Almost half of Yemen’s population lives on less than US$2 a day (King 2010). Yemen continues to rank last in the list of countries assessing the closure of the gender gap (World Economic Forum 2009).

Hunger and malnutrition are widespread. In July 2010, the World Food Programme (WFP) reported that one in three Yemenis is acutely hungry, making Yemen the 11th most food insecure country in the world. Life-threatening levels of hunger and malnutrition are not confined to conflict-affected areas but are often even worse in regions where there is relative stability. Food insecurity and child malnutrition in rural areas are much worse than in cities. WFP has identified 1.7 million people in immediate need of food assistance but lacks the resources to assist them (IRIN 2010d). It has warned that funding shortages mean that over two million residents of Yemen – Somali refugees, IDPs and those in severely food-insecure regions – who need food assistance are being left unaided. Some unassisted IDPs may be able to obtain food by working for farmers in areas of displacement, but widows and persons with disabilities are being left to fend for themselves (IRIN 2010e). As of June 2010, only 14 percent of beneficiaries planned for under the Yemen Humanitarian Response Plan (YHRP) received food rations (OCHA 2010b).

**Funding response**

In September 2009, a Flash Appeal for US$23.75 million was launched and was nearly 88 percent funded. However, the response to the subsequent 2010 Yemen Consolidated Appeal – which has become known as the YHRP – has been disappointing. As of early September 2010, only 43 percent of the revised YHRP total of US$187.5 million had been obtained. The best response has been to food needs (58 percent). Early recovery is only 12 percent funded and education five percent. Providing US$30.4 million, the US has been the largest responder (30 percent), followed by the United Arab Emirates (UAE) (almost 14 percent). Eight percent has come from the Central Emergency Response Fund and approximately six percent from Germany. The United Kingdom (UK), the former colonial power in southern Yemen, joins the US as a major provider of development assistance, but has only provided US$2.7 million (about three percent) for the YHRP.

The US has increased considerably its involvement in Yemen. While the US provided less than US$400 million for the 2002-2009 period, the Obama Administration allocated over US$250 million for 2010 – some two thirds of it in security assistance – and seems likely to earmark over US$300 million for 2011 (King 2010).

Between 2007 and 2010, the European Commission (EC) provided roughly 165 million in financial assistance to Yemen, an amount set to increase by 40 percent annually (Boucke, de Kerchove & Hill 2010). However, its recent response to immediate humanitarian needs has been negligible – as of early September 2010, the EC had provided only US$1.45 million, approximately one percent of total pledges.

Organisations interviewed reported to the HRI team that the poor response to the YHRP and reduction in international funding is partly because donor representatives in Sana’a argue that the GCC states should be helping Yemen in its time of dire need. There is also recrimination among donors after less than ten percent of the US$4.7 billion pledged for 2007-2010 at a major donor meeting in London in 2006 is thought to have actually been provided (IRIN 2010e). Donors differ about prioritisation activities within the consolidated Appeals Process (CAP), with some disputing the assessment process jointly undertaken by the UN and the government, feeling they have been presented with a random shopping list which blurs emergency and recovery needs. Interviewees also confirmed widespread reports that donors feel the Yemeni government has limited absorptive capacity and little commitment to transparency.
The major non-traditional donors contributing to Yemen are GCC members. As with assistance they provide in other regional humanitarian crises, it is impossible to quantify the level of support they provide. It is thought – but there is no evidence – that Saudi Arabia is the largest non-traditional donor. One analyst suggests total Saudi annual disbursements in Yemen reach US$2 billion (Boucek, de Korchove & Hill 2010). Much Saudi assistance goes not to the government, but to tribal leaders and religious institutions. Bahrain undertakes technical assistance in Yemen through the Social Development Fund – the state body which is the main conduit for development assistance – and is emerging as an important investor in Yemen’s under-developed financial sector.

The UAE has consistently pledged large sums of development assistance but has admitted significant problems in disbursing. The UAE is continuing a policy which was criticised in southern Lebanon following the 2006 Israeli invasion of ‘adopting’ particular communities and lavishly bestowing disproportional assistance which it highly publicises. In Mazraq II camp in Haja province – which is supported by the UAE – it is reported that IDPs receive three substantial meals a day, have constant electricity, fans in tents and a resident-to-medical staff ratio of less than 400:1, thus creating an extraordinary disincentive to return (IRIN 2010g and IRIN 2010h).

A number of UN agencies have a significant presence in Yemen, including WFP, UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), UN Development Programme (UNDP) and UNHCR. However, the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR) has no representation. All UN agencies and INGOs follow strict security protocols which generally restrict movement outside Sana’a and sometimes even within the capital.

**Dilemmas of working with the Yemeni government**

Donors seem generally aware of the lack of capacity and accountability within state institutions. The US Agency for International Development (USAID), for example, does not follow general practice elsewhere and declines to work directly with the Yemeni government – apart from funding an anti-corruption agency – instead working with implementing partners such as Save the Children, the National Democratic Institute and UNDP.

The West is understandably concerned both by the increased evidence of al-Qa’ida presence in Yemen and the fact that 40 percent of those detained in Guantanamo are Yemenis. There are also fears that elements of the Yemeni government have, in effect, given a green light to those who have promoted extremist Salafist ideas. Analysts warn these concerns should not prevail over wider foreign policy considerations. One argues “an exclusively military counter-terrorism focus using airstrikes may alienate local allies, as in Afghanistan. One lesson in counter-terrorism from Afghanistan and Pakistan is that armed militant groups thrive when the government does not enjoy the support of its people… Mounting civilian casualties in the fight against al-Qa’ida, along with excessive use of force in the south and indiscriminate attacks against armed rebels in the north, are grist for al-Qa’ida’s publicity mill,” (Wilcke & Bouckaert 2010).

Yemen is ranked by Transparency International (2009) as highly corrupt, exceeded in the region only by Iraq and Sudan. In general, Yemenis are highly skeptical of protestations by the government that development or humanitarian aid reaches those in need. Many analysts note that, in practice, there are no mechanisms to ensure international aid reaches its intended recipients rather than corrupt officials. As part of patronage networks by which the Saleh regime retains support considerable amounts of international aid are funneled to senior tribal leaders.

**Lack of coordination**

Humanitarian organisations reported that there is poor coordination among development and humanitarian actors. A Donor Coordinating Committee – which is co-chaired by UNDP and the World Bank – brings together UN and Yemeni government actors for regular meetings to discuss development issues but there is no such body when it comes to coordinating humanitarian response. The coordination mechanism convened by the UN Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) – which is chaired by the UN’s Resident Coordinator/ Humanitarian Coordinator (RC/HC) – has limited membership and is said to lack capacity for early warning, preparedness, contingency planning and early recovery. The system has suffered from lack of fiscal and human resources, including the failure to appoint an OCHA Head of Office to give leadership and guidance to the humanitarian community. The cluster approach, launched in late 2009, is still in its infancy in Yemen.

Humanitarians generally note that the Yemeni authorities lack capacity for both disaster preparedness and response. The government has established a high-level Inter-Ministerial Committee for Relief Operations and a Technical Relief Committee but lacks a reliable database, data collection and assessment system.

The Friends of Yemen, a group established by UAE, other Gulf countries, Italy and now joined by a number of other Western donors, met in Abu Dhabi in April 2010. An analyst has suggested that its 20 members have some potential to assist the country’s stability and development as a counterbalance to the US, which over-emphasises the security agenda. However, this requires striking a balance between addressing security and developmental concerns. The Friends of Yemen must deliver action and not just talk, and needs to do more to align the expectations of the Yemeni government with those of the international community (Hill 2010).
The HRI team noted a wide range of views regarding timeliness of funding. This indicates a need for agreed time-bound funding, implementation and monitoring of programmes. One donor was commended for quickly responding to the Flash Appeal despite having no in-country presence but another was criticised for deciding to ignore the joint needs assessment and recommendations included in the YHRP.

Most of those interviewed objected to donors attempting to link the level of humanitarian assistance to progress in promoting good governance, accountability and other matters on the political reform agenda. A number of NGOs complained about donors denying funding simply because there are no expatriates to implement interventions.

The HRI team gathered general impressions concerning particular donors. In terms of flexibility of funding, several donors were praised including Germany, Japan, Ireland and Spain. However, the European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO) and the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID) were criticised for procedural inflexibility and conditionality. Sweden and Germany were commended for their focus on refugees, while AusAID was praised for its stance on protection. Italy, however, was criticised for its lack of attention to this area. Several donors were criticised for supporting and engaging with partners: Italy, Japan, Spain, and Australia.

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Based on its findings, the HRI team believes the Yemeni government, the international community, the UN and Yemen’s oil-rich neighbours can do much more to address the root causes and the consequences of Yemen’s myriad crises.

1 **Promoting coordination and more cohesive international engagement:** OCHA needs to appoint a permanent Head of Office to provide decisive leadership for the humanitarian community. The UN should appoint a Secretary-General’s Special Envoy to support peace talks, promote peace-building, protection and human rights and ensure that linkages between the crises in Yemen and the Horn of Africa are better understood. Without a serious international effort at mediation, further intense fighting between the Houthis and the government and ongoing displacement appears inevitable. ECHO could play a larger role advising those embassy staff in Sana’a whose knowledge of development and humanitarian issues in Yemen is limited.

2 **Access:** Donors and the UN must engage in more high-level and consistent advocacy to ensure access of humanitarian actors – and donor representatives – to areas of greatest vulnerability and to end the climate of impunity for those who abuse human rights.

3 **Appropriate balance of humanitarian and development responses:** The many aid actors who continue to see Yemen primarily through a development lens must acknowledge the massive scale of immediate life-threatening needs.

4 **Flexibility:** Donors should approve more substantial amounts of un-earmarked funding, including of operations run by capable national actors in areas where expatriate staff are absent. Donors need to consistently advocate for greater decentralisation of decision-making and budgetary control to district level and consider channelling more development funding through international and national civil society organisations, alongside its direct support to government and parastatal agencies.

5 **Good Humanitarian Donorship:** It is important to ensure that GHD Principles are better known, and consistently adhered to, by the leading traditional and non-traditional donors.

6 **Transparency and participation:** Given the high level of cynicism among the Yemeni public about misappropriation of international support, it is essential: a) that donors stand up to the government and insist on working more closely with Yemeni civil society, especially community-based organisations and women and b) that the Donor Coordinating Committee should establish a system for reporting, recording and accounting for all humanitarian funding including in-kind-contributions.

**References**


Information based on field interviews with key humanitarian agencies in Yemen from 4 to 11 June 2010, and 52 questionnaires on donor performance (including 35 OECD/DAC donors).

The HRI team, composed of David Bassiouni (Team leader), Anas Bukhash, Fernando Espada and Nahla Haidar, contributed to this report. They express their gratitude to all those interviewed in Yemen.
Crises reports

Zimbabwe
Zimbabwe at a glance

The crisis and the response

- From August 2008 to July 2009, over 4,200 Zimbabweans died in one of the worst recorded cholera outbreaks in Africa.
- The high death toll – far beyond the worst case UN scenario – was the result of collapsed water and sanitation infrastructure and state health services rendered dysfunctional by political tension and hyperinflation.
- Zimbabwe continues to face widespread food insecurity. Many lack access to safe water and sanitation.
- The government’s refusal to declare an emergency and restrictions on INGOs delayed international aid and allowed the cholera outbreak to proliferate.
- The cholera crisis caught the UN unprepared. Its capacity to lead – weakened by the resentment of the Mugabe regime towards the west and high turnover of OCHA staff – was further reduced by the apparent unwillingness of the HC to confront the government.

Donor performance

- The OECD/DAC freeze on direct government-to-government links means most funding goes through the CAP framework.
- It is difficult to quantify overall humanitarian funding: FTS data is incomplete.
- There was relatively good coordination among traditional donors: most are praised for responsiveness and flexibility.
- Donors seem fatigued: coverage of the 2010 CAP was 44 percent in October 2010.

Key challenges and areas for improvement

- Contingency planning must be realistic, factoring in the likelihood and potential consequences of further political crisis, state-directed violence and displacement.
- The widespread local perception that aid is untransparent needs to be countered.
- Independent evaluations should be encouraged, beneficiaries should be involved in their design and the results publicised.
- Substantial funding is needed for both prevention and treatment of HIV/AIDS.
- Funding systems should be supported by robust information management systems and a facilitated process to help members agree on clear priorities, roles and responsibilities and accountability.

HRI 2010 scores by pillar
- Pillar 1 Responding to needs
- Pillar 2 Prevention, risk reduction and recovery
- Pillar 3 Working with humanitarian partners
- Pillar 4 Protection and international law
- Pillar 5 Learning and accountability

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Zimbabwe

Not yet out of the woods

The Humanitarian Response Index (HRI) mission to Zimbabwe in May 2010 sought to understand the international community’s evolving role in addressing various humanitarian crises, including the cholera epidemic which broke out in August 2008 and food insecurity, which subsequently became the major focus of humanitarian concern. Since the 2009 cholera crisis, there have been significant, mostly positive, changes in humanitarian indicators, but what has remained constant is the heavily politicised nature of humanitarian response. The international community has had some success in helping to address food security issues that have plagued the country for the past decade, but the cholera epidemic has starkly illustrated the limitations of current humanitarian systems used by the international community in highly politicised contexts.

Precise data for the cholera crisis is difficult to obtain, but it has been estimated that over 4,200 people died in one of the worst recorded cholera outbreaks ever witnessed in Africa (Jongkwe 2009). By the time the former Health Minister declared the end of the epidemic in July 2009, over 100,000 infections had been registered, although actual numbers may well have been greater. The number of recorded infections represents a caseload twenty times larger than the worst case scenario envisaged in United Nations (UN) contingency plans. With timely and effective treatment of cholera, mortality rates are typically under one percent. The death rate in Zimbabwe was more than four times greater. These high mortality rates resulted from the virtual collapse of a health system and water infrastructure which were once models in sub-Saharan Africa.

Rehabilitation of water supply infrastructure and improved health delivery prevented a recurrence of cholera in 2010, but political instability and food insecurity remain. Many commentators note that a nation with high levels of education, arable land and diamond and other mineral resources should be able to recover quickly. However, in August 2010, the UN warned that “the lack of major funding for recovery and development remains one of the key hindrances to moving the country out of a situation of generalised humanitarian need” (OCHA 2010a).

Operational environment

Zimbabwe witnessed substantial economic growth following independence in 1980, as agricultural exports increased and Zimbabwe became a regional breadbasket. Land reform commenced in 2000 in response to long-standing resentment that a highly disproportionate share of the country’s prime arable land was owned by white Zimbabweans, who comprised only around one percent of the total population. Prior to land reform, the agricultural sector provided 45 percent of foreign exchange revenue and livelihoods for over 70 percent of the population (Otto 2009). Abandonment of commitment to a market-oriented economy, ill-managed and often cronistic land confiscations, government price controls, corruption, the HIV/AIDS epidemic, drought and deepening conflict between the ruling party and its opponents resulted in economic collapse, massive population displacement and increasing food insecurity. Hyperinflation reached historic levels as Zimbabwe became the fastest shrinking economy in the world. While the World Food Programme (WFP) had, until 1999, run a procurement programme purchasing Zimbabwean food for distribution elsewhere in the region, by 2009, the agency was distributing free food rations to some seven million people, over half of the country’s resident population.

Despite improved sorghum, millet and maize harvests in 2009, WFP was still assisting around 1.5 million people in the first quarter of 2010. There have been a number of joint initiatives to assess the food situation in Zimbabwe, but it has proved difficult to fully understand the food security situation as much of the information about prices in local markets and illegal importation of food is anecdotal (Otto 2009). This area has also seen several improvements in cooperation since 2008–2009, including a request by the government for the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) and WFP to conduct an independent evaluation of the food security situation. The resulting assessment in June 2010 indicated that 1.68 million people still needed food assistance, mainly due to their lack of resilience after drought and other shocks (FAO & WFP 2010).

While most donors attribute responsibility for food shortages to economic mismanagement, Robert Mugabe and his Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) party have repeatedly blamed Zimbabwe’s problems on drought and Western interference. Mugabe has vociferously accused the European Union (EU) – most notably the United Kingdom (UK) – and the United States (US) of economic sabotage and plotting regime change through channeling funds to non-governmental agencies (NGOs) allegedly allied to the main opposition political party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). In 2007, the government revoked registration certificates for all NGOs in order to sift out “pro-opposition and Western
organisations seeking to force regime change in Zimbabwe from genuine organisations working to uplift the well-being of the poor,” (Mail & Guardian 2007). Legislation in 2007 laid out strict conditions for NGOs, requiring them to seek approval on specific activities and geographic areas of operation or forfeit rights to operate. Zimbabwe joined Myanmar and Sudan in having more than half a million people beyond the reach of any international assistance (UNDP 2009). From June 2008, NGO staff were confined to their offices and rights to operate and to move freely around the country were only fully restored in early 2009. The situation for NGOs has since improved, but political uncertainties encourage caution. NGOs and UN agencies remain unsure about their status and the security of their staff members. Despite improvements, humanitarian agencies face ongoing obstacles in obtaining visas and work permits for international staff, registering vehicles and clearing goods through customs.

Protracted parliamentary and presidential elections from March to August 2008 were accompanied by widespread violence and government restrictions on the press, civil society, human rights activists and the humanitarian community. After drawn-out talks brokered by the Southern African Development Community, ZANU-PF agreed in February 2009 to enter a coalition government with the two factions of the MDC and to pursue a shared reform framework known as the Global Political Agreement (GPA).

Formation of the unity government was swiftly followed by reopening of schools and hospitals. Civil servants were paid and returned to work. Human rights activists reported a significant drop in abuses. Hyperinflation was halted once Zimbabweans were permitted to use foreign currency and goods returned to shelves. Inflation fell from a peak of over 89.7 sextillion (10^27) percent in mid 2008 (Hanke 2010) to an average of six percent during 2009. In May 2010, the International Monetary Fund announced that Gross Domestic Product (GDP) rose four percent in 2009, the first expansion of the economy for eleven years.

However, many observers see the transition as far from assured. Senior figures within ZANU-PF, the army and the police – fearful of losing land, power, and wealth – continue to block economic and constitutional reform, exercising veto power over the transition as they intimidate opposition supporters and officials (International Crisis Group 2010).

Tensions rose further in April 2008, when an Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act was signed into law. It requires all companies operating in Zimbabwe which have more than US$500,000 in assets to arrange for 51 percent of equity to be owned by indigenous Zimbabweans. In January 2010, further regulations required companies to provide the government with specific indigenisation plans. The resulting information will be used to determine required levels of indigenous ownership of companies in various economic sectors and a schedule for achieving them. As with land reform, opinions have been sharply divided. Supporters have applauded the action for righting past wrongs and critics claim it will only serve to deter foreign investment and stifle the slow pace of economic recovery (Hawkins 2010).

Western governments have indicated a willingness to ease sanctions – which target more than 100 senior ZANU-PF members and business supporters – and resume direct government-to-government support. However, they require evidence that the transitional government is fully committed to the GPA and to respect the Hague Principles for International Engagement with Zimbabwe – a set of benchmarks including un-restricted humanitarian access, rule of law, enforcement of contracts, independent judiciary, respect for human rights and commitment to internationally-supervised elections.

Humanitarian indicators
Zimbabwe has slipped from 130th place on the 1999 Human Development Index to 151st in 2009 (UNDP 2009). Rates of chronic and acute malnutrition among Zimbabwean children in early 2010 were estimated at 35 percent and 2.4 percent respectively (OCHA 2009a). Around 4.5 million people have limited or no access to safe water and sanitation. Infant mortality is estimated at 64 per 1,000 births and average life expectancy has fallen to under 44 (UNDP 2009). There are 1.3 million orphaned children (UNICEF 2008).

HIV/AIDS
Zimbabwe has one of the highest HIV/AIDS rates in the world – described as “the most pervasive HIV epidemic on record,” (Navario 2010). The prevalence rate has declined from a peak of some 28 percent in the 1990s to just over 15 percent in 2007 (World Bank 2010). The reduction has been due to a combination of factors, including high mortality rates, some success with condom use, and, ironically, years of economic and social upheaval that ruptured the social networks vital to HIV transmission. An April 2010 report from Zimbabwe’s National AIDS Council showed a 75 percent increase in the number of patients treated for syphilis, gonorrhoea and chlamydia between 2008 and 2009. This seems likely to presage a torrent of new infections, especially if Zimbabweans return en masse from South Africa. There is concern at the recent shift in focus from prevention to treatment, under-funding of a health system already struggling to treat 1.5 million patients, irregular supply chains, a black market in HIV drugs and spread of drug resistant strains (Navario 2010).

Displacement
Large numbers of people in Zimbabwe remain displaced. Their numbers, like those of the Zimbabwean population as a whole, can only be estimated. There may be as many as one million internally displaced persons (IDPs) (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre 2010). It is thought that up to 700,000 people may have been displaced.
NGOs were powerless to act, as they contributed to the epidemic’s spread. Together with strikes by health staff, a dysfunctional health care system, and sanitation infrastructure and a provinces. Poorly maintained water disease spread rapidly to all ten south of the capital, Harare. The first cholera cases were spotted in Chitungwiza, 30 kilometres the first cholera cases were spotted in Chitungwiza, 30 kilometres.
In the absence of state response capacity and specialist agencies, a disproportionate share of the response fell onto one NGO, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) – which has been working in Zimbabwe since 2000. Between August 2008 and March 2009, MSF reported treating some 55,000 cholera patients both by their own staff and by Ministry of Health personnel whose salaries were temporarily paid by MSF (Fournier and Whittall 2009).

Funds channeled through the clusters were slow to be released. Some bilateral donors were relatively quick to provide funding directly to agencies to combat the crisis, but the bulk of the funding was not made available until the Zimbabwean government appealed for international assistance. Attempts to channel donor funds through the clusters during the cholera crisis highlighted well-documented problems of over-reliance on a single funding channel. This approach not only resulted in considerable delays in agencies receiving funds and relief items, but also absorbed considerable amounts of staff time.

**Did the UN downplay the cholera crisis?**

In February 2010, the former head of the OCHA Zimbabwe office complained that his warnings of the likely scale of the cholera epidemic were stifled by UN bureaucrats intent on maintaining good relations with Robert Mugabe. He alleged that the UN Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator (RC/HC) “forced us to put the figure very low. Because the government did not accept that there was cholera, the United Nations was forced to align with that position”. The International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA) has described this as “criminal neglect on the part of the UN” (Dickinson 2010).

In October 2008, NGO heads wrote to the RC/HC, expressing decreasing confidence in OCHA’s leadership and warning that the UN was undermining their already tenuous position with the Zimbabwean government. Interviewees confirmed that the former HC’s tenure had been characterised by tense relationships with donors, NGOs, and UN agencies. The facts behind the breakdown in trust between the RC/HC and the head of OCHA during the cholera crisis were still in dispute at the time of the HRI mission and have been the subject of a UN appeals tribunal.

The situation does not appear to have been helped by a high turnover of OCHA staff. Three OCHA heads came and left within a three-year period. The negative consequences of RC/HC “double-hatting” are, by no means confined to Zimbabwe. As the RC, s/he needs to maintain good relations with the host government while as HC the priority should be upholding of humanitarian principles.

Some UN agencies and donors vigorously attempted to fulfil their humanitarian mandates. As an example, NGO staff interviewed by the HRI team who had been present during the cholera crisis praised efforts by some UN agencies, notably WFP and UNICEF and several donors for their lobbying efforts with the government to ease restrictions on NGOs.

**Current donor response**

A continued freeze on government-to-government funding has meant that the bulk of Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development / Development Assistance Committee (OECD/DAC) donor funding continues to be channeled through international agencies. The Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP) has become the main vehicle for strategic humanitarian response, with donors channeling over 80 percent of their funding to activities within the CAP framework. However, overall funding as of September 2010 stood at 43 percent, lagging in comparison to the previous two years when coverage was an average of 50 percent by the time of the Mid-Year Review in July. The food cluster is the best funded at 91 percent. The lowest are agriculture and nutrition (both 15 percent), education (11 percent) and protection (four percent).

In August 2010, the UN cited “economic and political challenges” and insufficient recovery and development funding in support of an upward revision of CAP 2010 requirements. The revised CAP document said Zimbabwe was at a crossroads, and the humanitarian situation “remains fragile due to the prevailing degradation of infrastructure in the basic sectors of health, water and sanitation, and food security,” (OCHA 2010a).

**Evaluation of donors’ practices**

Needs assessments and targeting of beneficiaries are invariably difficult in such politically-charged environments. However, the HRI team found general agreement that the annual vulnerability surveys led by WFP and the Zimbabwean government have been relatively impartial. The active involvement of NGOs during these assessments contributed in a good level of confidence in the results and consistent application of findings. There have been periodic reports of attempts by politicians on both sides of the political spectrum to use food aid to support their electoral campaigns. However, the combination of pre-agreed beneficiary lists coupled with an effective crisis monitoring system run by WFP has reportedly mitigated this problem.

Donor humanitarian approaches are generally perceived positively by UN agencies and international non-governmental organisations (INGOs). During the HRI mission, the European Commission (EC) and the UK were most often cited as good examples of donors who were both responsive and flexible in supporting changing needs. Approaches to monitoring and evaluation by donors (particularly OECD/DAC donors) were rated highly.

The Swiss Development Corporation piloted seed voucher and cash transfer activities as an alternative to food aid in 2008 and communicated – the largely successful – results to the international community. As a result, WFP’s programme now contains a significant cash transfer component.

Donors appear ready to fund activities that promote greater participation of beneficiaries and community-level accountability systems, but few of the agencies interviewed could think of any examples where donors had proactively suggested enhancing participation or establishing beneficiary accountability systems.

**Is aid untransparent?**

The overall level of satisfaction of INGOs and UN agencies with donors is not necessarily shared by all Zimbabweans. Interviews with Zimbabwean government officials across the political spectrum indicated a widespread notion that there is lack of
transparency on how donor funds are used. Some of this dissatisfaction may be due to frustration at not being able to lift donor restrictions that are preventing channeling of bilateral funds directly to the government. Unhappiness may also stem from the lack of a centralised database for tracking information. Donors and humanitarian agencies readily provided budgetary and other financial information when requested during interviews, but it was impossible to interview all donors as many do not have a permanent in-country presence. The HRI team thus found it challenging to compile a comprehensive picture of the humanitarian funding situation. It soon became evident, however, that a considerable amount of humanitarian funding is not included in OCHA’s Financial Tracking System (FTS).

This appears to be inconsistent with FTS’ defined purpose to be “a global, real-time database which records all reported international humanitarian aid,” (OCHA 2010b). Among examples of programmes that do not appear in the FTS are the C-SAFE programme, which was established in 2002 as a parallel food pipeline funded by the US Agency for International Development’s (USAID) Food for Peace. Operating in Zimbabwe since January 2003, during 2009 it accounted for just over 50 percent of USAID’s US$130 million budget for food aid in the country (OFDA 2009). Funding provided by the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID) for its long-established Protracted Relief Programme is also not included in the FTS.

When the HRI team asked donors why information is not included in the FTS, there were several responses. Some said this was because this category of funding was outside the CAP while others attributed the lack of some information to administrative delays in compiling and uploading data. Others said funding information was not included in the FTS as it fell under the rubric of transition activities that were meant to provide a bridge between relief and future development activities. However, there has been inconsistency. A significant proportion of activities planned under the 2010 CAP, particularly those relating to infrastructure and food security, could be classified as transition activities. The planned addition of the African Development Bank (ADB) -administered multi-donor trust fund – which may, some claim, manage over US$1 billion – will add a further layer of funding complexity and ambiguity.

The challenge of accessing comprehensive donor funding information along with the inconsistent interpretation of the use of the FTS by different donors appear to be creating perceptions that donors are not being fully transparent. UN and international agencies receive large sums for recovery and transition programmes that in other countries would be provided as bilateral government assistance. This makes it doubly important for donors to devise a better way to consolidate and communicate information in a transparent manner.

Coordination and clusters in Zimbabwe

Major donors have formed an effective coordination mechanism – the Friends of Zimbabwe – also known as the ‘Fishmongers Group’ after a Harare restaurant where they initially met. It brings together the US, Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK, the EC, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the ADB and the UN. At their June 2010 meeting in Oslo, the Friends of Zimbabwe acknowledged the important role played by the Southern African Development Community (SADC), particularly South Africa, but expressed concern at a continuing lack of respect for the rule of law, protection of fundamental freedoms and the slow pace of progress in implementing
the good governance aspirations set out in the GPA. They confirmed that they would continue their practice of channeling aid through existing pooled funds and programmes along with a newly-created Multi-Donor Trust Fund managed by the ADB and would not provide direct budgetary support to the government. While critics allege the Fishmonger’s Group was set up to bring about regime change (Eagle 2010), many of those interviewed during the HRI mission noted that it has provided an unusually coherent and consistent approach towards humanitarian action. Specific good practice examples cited by international humanitarian agencies included effective gap-filling by donors, collaborative interventions with groups of donors and consolidated reporting systems.

The cluster approach was formally adopted in Zimbabwe in March 2008 and Zimbabwe was one of five countries reviewed during a DFID-funded NGO and Humanitarian Reform project. The 2009 study found that on average, each INGO attended seven coordination mechanisms. Interviewees felt that the water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) cluster was “action-oriented with a good working atmosphere” whereas other clusters were described as “theoretical” and not very relevant (Otto 2009). The study also found participation of local NGOs to be marginal.

The HRI team learnt that humanitarian reform mechanisms have improved since 2008–2009, with many welcoming increased participation by government representatives in clusters. The UNICEF-led WASH cluster led continues to be highly rated by members, not least for its conscientious efforts to ensure that interests of the cluster come before those of UNICEF (ICVA 2010). ICVA states that the WASH cluster has helped to reduce NGO cynicism about UN dominance of clusters and has “demonstrated how principles of partnership can be operationalised by giving proportional representation to NGOs on decision-making forums,” (ICVA 2010).

A study in 2009 discovered widespread dissatisfaction amongst NGOs regarding the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF), notably around transparency and delays in approval (Otto 2009). The HRI team encountered similar complaints from NGOs about UN-managed pool funds, where priority-setting and allocation of funding was not felt to be particularly transparent. Since significant funds continue to be channelled through the clusters it will be important to address these issues.

Although the 2008 cholera epidemic was one of the largest in history, Oxfam’s Real Time Evaluation (Oxfam 2009) is the sole evaluation posted on Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action’s (ALNAP) Evaluative Resource Database. While some agencies, notably UNICEF and DFID, readily shared independent evaluations with the HRI team, other agencies were reluctant to do so.

**Lessons learnt and recommendations for the future**

One of the main conclusions of the HRI mission is that there is no room for complacency. The HRI team was repeatedly told that the Zimbabwe crisis has not been resolved. There is concern that donors are focusing resources elsewhere. There was evidence that disbursements for Haiti have affectedus elsewhere. There was evidence that disbursements for Haiti have affected funding for Zimbabwe from OFDA and the EC.

It remains to be seen whether the changed political environment in Zimbabwe will enable international agencies to truly prioritise humanitarian principles. There are several issues which need to be addressed by donors and the humanitarian community:

1. Contingency planning must be realistic, factoring in the likelihood and potential consequences of further political crisis, state-directed violence and displacement.
2. The widespread notion that aid is untransparent needs to be countered by developing a system that clearly shows how funds are being used and provides a model for the Zimbabwean government.
3. Evaluation results must be better used. It is commendable that donors have funded evaluations, but it is important to sit down with partners to review and act on recommendations. Independent evaluations should be encouraged, beneficiaries involved in their design and results be publicised and shared with them.
4. Donors need to recognise the real risk that post-recovery plans could be fatally undermined by an upsurge in HIV/AIDS. Substantial funding is needed for both prevention and treatment.
5. Humanitarian funding systems must become more responsive, strategic and timely. Funding through clusters can potentially add considerable value, but only if this is supported by robust information management systems and a facilitated process to help cluster members agree on clear priorities, roles and responsibilities and hold each other to account.

**References**


Information based on field interviews with key humanitarian agencies in Zimbabwe from 20 to 30 April 2010, and 163 questionnaires on donor performance (including 111 OECD/DAC donors). The HRI team, composed of Jock Baker (Team Leader), Fiona Guy and Ricardo Solé, contributed to this report. They express their gratitude to all those interviewed in Zimbabwe.
### Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADA</td>
<td>Austrian Development Agency</td>
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<td>ADB</td>
<td>African Development Bank</td>
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<td>ADC</td>
<td>Austrian Development Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>AECID</td>
<td>Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation</td>
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<td>AI</td>
<td>Amnesty International</td>
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<td>ALNAP</td>
<td>Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action</td>
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<tr>
<td>AMISOM</td>
<td>African Union Mission in Somalia</td>
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<td>ANDS</td>
<td>Afghanistan National Development Strategy</td>
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<td>ANSO</td>
<td>Afghanistan NGO Safety Office</td>
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<td>ARMM</td>
<td>Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao</td>
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<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>AusAID</td>
<td>Australian Agency for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>B-FAST</td>
<td>Belgian First Aid and Support Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>BAKORNAS</td>
<td>Predecessor of BNPB (Indonesia)</td>
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<tr>
<td>BMZ</td>
<td>Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (Germany)</td>
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<td>BNPB</td>
<td>Badan Penanggulangan Bencana Nasional (National Agency for Disaster Management, Indonesia)</td>
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<tr>
<td>BRR</td>
<td>Badan Rehabilitasi dan Rekonstruksi (Indonesia)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAP</td>
<td>UN Consolidated Appeals Process</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAR</td>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCCM</td>
<td>Camp Coordination Camp Management</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDC</td>
<td>Centre de Crise (Crisis Centre, France)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CERF</td>
<td>Central Emergency Response Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>CERINA</td>
<td>Conflict Early Recovery Initial Needs Assessment</td>
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<td>CERP</td>
<td>Commander's Emergency Response Program</td>
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<td>CHAP</td>
<td>Common Humanitarian Action Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIDA</td>
<td>Canadian International Development Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>CISS ExCom</td>
<td>Coordination of International Support to Somalis Executive Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>CNDP</td>
<td>Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple (National Congress for the Defence of the People, DRC)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CNIC</td>
<td>Computerised National Identity Card</td>
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<tr>
<td>CODHES</td>
<td>Consultoria para los Derechos Humanos y el Desplazamiento (Consultancy for Human Rights and Displacement, Colombia)</td>
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<td>CPA</td>
<td>Comprehensive Peace Agreement (Sudan)</td>
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<td>CSC</td>
<td>Coordination Support Committee</td>
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<td>CVI</td>
<td>Climate Vulnerability Initiative</td>
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<td>DAC</td>
<td>Development Assistance Committee (OECD)</td>
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<td>DANIDA</td>
<td>Danish International Development Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>DARA</td>
<td>Development Assistance Research Associates</td>
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<tr>
<td>DCSM</td>
<td>Office for Sectoral and Multilateral Cooperation (Spain)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFAIT</td>
<td>Department for Sectoral and Multilateral Cooperation (Canada)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development (UK)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DGCS</td>
<td>Directorate General for Development Cooperation (Italy)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DGDC</td>
<td>Directorate-General for Development Cooperation (Belgium)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DG ECHO</td>
<td>Directorate-General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (European Commission)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DI</td>
<td>Development Initiatives</td>
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<tr>
<td>DMV/HH</td>
<td>Humanitarian Aid Division of the Human Rights and Peace-building Department (The Netherlands)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPC</td>
<td>Direction de la Protection Civile, (Civil Protection Office, Haiti)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPDEV</td>
<td>Development Policy Department (France)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRR</td>
<td>Disaster Risk Reduction</td>
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<tr>
<td>DSWD</td>
<td>Department of Social Welfare and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
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<td>ECBP</td>
<td>Emergency Capacity Building Project</td>
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<td>ECHO</td>
<td>European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office</td>
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<td>EHAF</td>
<td>Emergency Humanitarian Assistance Fund (Ireland)</td>
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<td>EOSDOS</td>
<td>Inter-Ministerial Committee (Greece)</td>
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<td>ELN</td>
<td>Ejército de Liberación Nacional de Colombia (National Liberation Army, Colombia)</td>
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<td>EPPR</td>
<td>Emergency Preparedness and post-Emergency Fund (Ireland)</td>
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<td>ERRF</td>
<td>Emergency Relief Response Fund</td>
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<td>ERF</td>
<td>Emergency Response Fund</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>FAO</td>
<td>UN Food and Agricultural Organization</td>
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<td>FARC</td>
<td>Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia)</td>
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<td>FARDC</td>
<td>Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo)</td>
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<td>FATA</td>
<td>Federally Administered Tribal Areas (Pakistan)</td>
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<td>FDLR</td>
<td>Forces Democratie de Liberation du Rwanda (Democratic Forces for the liberation of Rwanda)</td>
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<td>FFP</td>
<td>Food for Peace Program</td>
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<td>FSNAU</td>
<td>Food Security Nutrition Analysis Unit for Somalia</td>
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<td>FTS</td>
<td>Financial Tracking Service</td>
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<td>GCC</td>
<td>Gulf Cooperation Council</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<td>GHD</td>
<td>Good Humanitarian Donorship</td>
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<td>GNI</td>
<td>Gross National Income</td>
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<td>GPA</td>
<td>Global Political Agreement</td>
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<td>Humanitarian Aid Commission</td>
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<td>Humanitarian Action Plan</td>
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<td>IASC</td>
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<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
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<td>ICVA</td>
<td>International Council of Voluntary Agencies</td>
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<td>IDAC</td>
<td>International Development Advisory Committee (New Zealand)</td>
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<td>IDF</td>
<td>Israel Defence Forces</td>
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*Note: This is not an exhaustive list and some acronyms might have multiple interpretations.*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronyms</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IDMC</td>
<td>Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDPs</td>
<td>Internally displaced persons</td>
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<tr>
<td>IFRC</td>
<td>International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies</td>
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<tr>
<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Inter-governmental Authority on Development (Horn of Africa)</td>
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<tr>
<td>IHA</td>
<td>International Humanitarian Assistance Directorate (Canada)</td>
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<tr>
<td>IHL</td>
<td>International humanitarian law</td>
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<td>IHRC</td>
<td>Interim Haiti Recovery Commission</td>
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<td>INGO</td>
<td>International non-governmental organisation</td>
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<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organisation for Migration</td>
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<td>IPAD</td>
<td>Portuguese Institute for Development Support</td>
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<td>IRA</td>
<td>Irish Aid</td>
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<td>IRIN</td>
<td>Integrated Regional Information Networks</td>
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<td>ISAF</td>
<td>International Security Assistance Force</td>
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<td>JBIC</td>
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<td>JICA</td>
<td>Japan International Cooperation Agency</td>
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<td>JSR</td>
<td>UN/ AU Joint Special Representative</td>
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<td>LGU</td>
<td>Local Government Units</td>
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<td>LRRD</td>
<td>Linking relief, rehabilitation and development</td>
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<td>LTTE</td>
<td>Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam</td>
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<tr>
<td>MDC</td>
<td>Movement for Democratic Change</td>
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<td>M&amp;E</td>
<td>Monitoring and Evaluation</td>
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<td>MFA-DGA</td>
<td>Ministry for Foreign Affairs – Department of Global Affairs (Finland)</td>
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<td>MINURCAT</td>
<td>UN Mission in Central African Republic and Chad</td>
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<td>MINUSTAH</td>
<td>UN stabilization Mission in Haiti</td>
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<td>MILF</td>
<td>Moro Islamic Liberation Front</td>
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<td>MONUC</td>
<td>UN Mission in Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<td>MONUSCO</td>
<td>UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC</td>
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<td>MSF</td>
<td>Médecins Sans Frontières (Doctors without Borders)</td>
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<td>NADRA</td>
<td>National Database and Registration Authority (Pakistan)</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>NDCC</td>
<td>National Disaster Coordinating Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIAGs</td>
<td>New Illegal Armed Groups (Colombia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NORAD</td>
<td>Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>NPA</td>
<td>New People's Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>NRC</td>
<td>Norwegian Refugee Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>NWFP</td>
<td>North West Frontier Province (Pakistan)</td>
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<tr>
<td>NZAID</td>
<td>New Zealand's International Aid &amp; Development Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>OCHA</td>
<td>UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official Development Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD/DAC</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development/Development Assistance Committee</td>
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<td>Office for Foreign Assets Control (US)</td>
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<td>OFDA</td>
<td>Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>OAH</td>
<td>Office for Humanitarian Action (Spain)</td>
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<tr>
<td>oPt</td>
<td>occupied Palestinian territories</td>
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<td>OTCs</td>
<td>Offices for Technical Cooperation (Spain)</td>
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<td>PA</td>
<td>Palestinian Authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>PCBS</td>
<td>Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics</td>
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<tr>
<td>PDDA</td>
<td>Post-Disaster Needs Assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PED</td>
<td>Primary Emergency Decision (ECHO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PF</td>
<td>Pooled Fund (DRC)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PHRP</td>
<td>Pakistan Humanitarian Response Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>PLO</td>
<td>Palestine Liberation Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POC</td>
<td>Protection of Civilian (UNHCR &amp; UNMIS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRM</td>
<td>US State Department’s Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRT</td>
<td>Provincial Reconstruction Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>PTF</td>
<td>Presidential Task Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>RC</td>
<td>UN Resident Coordinator</td>
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<td>RHC</td>
<td>Resident Humanitarian Coordinator</td>
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<tr>
<td>RRI</td>
<td>Rapid Response Initiative (Ireland)</td>
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<tr>
<td>RUPD</td>
<td>Registro Único de Población Desplazada (Registry of the Displaced Population Colombia)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAR</td>
<td>Search and Rescue</td>
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<tr>
<td>SATKORLAK</td>
<td>Padang District Antenna for Crisis Management (Indonesia)</td>
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<td>SDC</td>
<td>Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation</td>
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<td>SDG</td>
<td>Somali Donor Group</td>
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<td>SE</td>
<td>Special Envoy</td>
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<tr>
<td>SGBV</td>
<td>Sexual and gender-based violence</td>
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<td>Sida</td>
<td>Swedish International Development Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>SRSG</td>
<td>Special Representative of the Secretary-General</td>
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<td>SSG</td>
<td>Special Support Group (Pakistan)</td>
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<td>STAREC</td>
<td>Stabilisation and Reconstruction Plan for Eastern Congo</td>
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<td>SPLM</td>
<td>Sudan People's Liberation Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>TEC</td>
<td>Tsunami Evaluation Coalition</td>
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<tr>
<td>TFG</td>
<td>Transitional Federal Government</td>
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<td>TTP</td>
<td>Tehrik-e-Taliban-e-Pakistan</td>
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<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNAMA</td>
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<td>UNAMID</td>
<td>UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>UN Development Programme</td>
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<td>UN Department of Safety and Security</td>
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<td>UNHAS</td>
<td>UN Humanitarian Air Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNHCHR</td>
<td>UN Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights</td>
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<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>UN High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<td>UNHRC</td>
<td>UN Human Rights Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>UN Children’s Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNIO</td>
<td>UN and International Organisations Department</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNMIS</td>
<td>UN Mission in Sudan</td>
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<td>UNODC</td>
<td>UN Office on Drugs and Crime</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNRWA</td>
<td>UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>UN Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSCCR</td>
<td>UN Security Council Resolution</td>
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<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>USFOR-A</td>
<td>United States Forces in Afghanistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>USGS</td>
<td>United States Geological Survey</td>
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<td>WASH</td>
<td>Water, Sanitation and Hygiene</td>
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<td>WFP</td>
<td>UN World Food Programme</td>
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<td>WHAM</td>
<td>Winning Hearts and Minds</td>
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<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organization</td>
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<td>YHRP</td>
<td>Yemen Humanitarian Response Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZANU-PF</td>
<td>Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
**Glossary**

1. **Accountability**: the means by which individuals and organisations report to a recognised authority or authorities, and are held responsible for their actions.
   

2. **Aid Effectiveness Agenda**: name given to the process initiated at a 2002 conference in Monterey, Mexico — and subsequently leading to the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness — to ensure effective use of aid and promote donor-recipient partnership.
   
   See: [http://www.gdev.org/section/topics/aid_effectiveness](http://www.gdev.org/section/topics/aid_effectiveness)

3. **Beneficiaries**: individuals, groups or organisations designated as the intended recipients of humanitarian assistance or protection in aid intervention. The term has been criticised. Among many alternatives are: people affected by disaster; the affected population; recipients of aid; claimants; clients.

4. **Capacity**: a combination of all the strengths and resources available within a community, society or organisation to reduce the level of risk or the effects of a disaster.

5. **Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF)**: a UN stand-by fund launched in 2006 to enable more timely and reliable humanitarian assistance to those affected by natural disasters and armed conflicts. The fund is funded by voluntary contributions from governments.
   
   See: [www.cerf.un.org](http://www.cerf.un.org)

6. **Civil-military coordination/cooperation (CIMIC)**: dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors in humanitarian emergencies to protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid competition, minimise inconsistency, and, when appropriate, pursue common goals. Basic strategies range from coexistence to cooperation.
   

7. **Cluster approach**: the central component of the humanitarian reform process initiated in 2005, designating coordinators for sectors of humanitarian response involving coordination between UN agencies, NGOs, international organisations, and the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement. There are now eleven clusters: agriculture, camp coordination/management, early recovery, education, emergency shelter, emergency telecommunications, health, logistics, nutrition, protection, and water sanitation and hygiene.
   

8. **Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Response**: developed by eight major disaster response agencies in 1994, over 400 NGOs have signed up to this attempt to devise a common operational approach based on international humanitarian law.
   
   See: [http://www.ifrc.org/publicat/conduct/code.asp](http://www.ifrc.org/publicat/conduct/code.asp)

9. **Common Humanitarian Action Plan (CHAP)**: a strategic plan for humanitarian response in a given country or region. The CHAP provides the foundation for developing a Consolidated Appeal and is thus central to the Coordinated Appeals Process (CAP).

10. **Common Humanitarian Funds (CHFs)**: a pooled-funding humanitarian financing instrument — originally piloted in Sudan in 2005 and subsequently in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and the Central African Republic — to fund priority projects included in a crisis-affected country's Common Humanitarian Action Plan (CHAP). In recent years, donors have provided over $US100 million annual to both the DRC and Sudan CHFs.
   

11. **Complex emergency**: concept used by the UN since the 1980s for a humanitarian crisis characterised by complete or considerable breakdown of state authority.

12. **Communicating with Disaster Affected Communities (CDAC)**: a network promoting two-way communication between the humanitarian community and those they assist.
   

13. **Consolidated Appeal Process**: leading tool for humanitarian coordination, strategic planning and programming. CAPs foster cooperation between governments, donors, UN agencies, NGOs and the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement to determine funding requirements in response to a major or complex emergency.
   

14. **Contingency Planning**: a management tool to ensure adequate arrangements are made in anticipation of a new humanitarian crisis or expected increase in severity of an existing crisis.

15. **Coping capacity**: the means by which people or organisations use available resources and abilities in response to adversity and vulnerability.
16 Delivering as One: 2007 declaration of intent – building on a 2005 report of the same name – to make the UN system more coherent and efficient – to create “One UN”: a key element of the humanitarian reform process.

See: http://www.undg.org/?P=7

17 Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR): essential element of peace processes, involving collection, control and disposal of weaponry; quartering, disarming and discharge of combatants and provision of assistance with intention of enhancing prospects for their sustainable post-conflict livelihoods.

See: http://www.undde.org/whatisdde.php

18 Disaster preparedness: activities and measures taken in advance to facilitate early warning evacuation, rescue and relief in the event of a disaster.

See: http://www.unisdr.org/

19 Disaster risk reduction (DDR): the conceptual framework of elements which minimise vulnerability and disaster risk throughout a society to avoid (prevent) or limit (mitigate and be prepared for) the adverse impacts of hazards, within the broad context of sustainable development.

See: http://www.unisdr.org/eng/library/lib-terminology-eng%20home.htm

20 Do No Harm: the concept of identifying ways to ensure that humanitarian and/or development assistance in conflict settings does not exacerbate vulnerabilities.


21 Double-hatting: a term used in the humanitarian community to describe a UN official with multiple official roles: particularly used for those who are simultaneously Resident Coordinator (RC) and Humanitarian Coordinator (HC).

22 Early warning: ensuring identified institutions provide timely and effective information prior to disasters.

See: http://www.unisdr.org/eng/library/lib-terminology-eng%20home.htm

23 Early warning systems: include a chain of concerns, namely: understanding and mapping the hazard; monitoring and forecasting impending events; processing and disseminating understandable warnings to political authorities and the population, and undertaking appropriate and timely actions in response to the warnings.

See: http://www.unisdr.org/eng/library/lib-terminology-eng%20home.htm

24 Earmarking: a device by which a donor specifies the geographic or sectoral areas in which a recipient agency may spend its contribution. There are different degrees of earmarking: by agency; by country; by sector, or by project.

25 Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC): the head of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC). Also has the title of UN Under-Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs.

See: http://lib-unique.un.org/lib/unique.nsf/Link/R05641

26 Emergency Response Fund (ERF): in-country OCHA-managed mechanisms which primarily enable NGOs to cover unforeseen humanitarian needs. Advisory boards assist the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) to make allocations.


27 Failed state: a state lacking the general attributes of sovereignty: physical control of territory, monopoly on the legitimate use of force and abilities to deliver services or formally interact with the international community.

28 Fair share: the concept that all donors distribute the burden of humanitarian needs equitably, based on the share (or percentage) that a country’s GDP represents compared to the total GDP of the OECD/DAC group.

29 Flash Appeal: a UN tool for structuring a coordinated humanitarian response for the first three to six months of an emergency. Typically issued within a week of the onset of an emergency.

See: http://ochaonline.un.org/OchaLinkClick.aspx?link=ocha&docid=25530

30 Forgotten Crises Assessment (FCA): an annual exercise by the European Commission to identify severe protracted humanitarian crisis situations where affected populations are receiving no or insufficient international aid and where there is no political commitment to solve the crisis, due in part to a lack of media interest.

See: http://ec.europa.eu/echo/policies/strategy_en.htm
31 **Fragile states**: states significantly susceptible to crisis with institutions unwilling or unable to provide basic services and often lacking in legitimacy. Also known as crisis states. Described by the World Bank as low-income countries under stress (LICUs).


32 **Food security**: a concept defined by the 1995 World Food Summit “when all people at all times have access to sufficient, safe, nutritious food to maintain a healthy and active life”.


33 **Gender-based violence (GBV)**: violence directed against a person on the basis of gender or sex: while women, men, boys and girls can be GBV victims because of their subordinate status, women and girls are the primary victims.

See: [http://www.unfpa.org/gender/violence.htm](http://www.unfpa.org/gender/violence.htm)

34 **Geneva Conventions**: four 1949 conventions and two 1977 additional protocols relating to the protection of victims in armed conflict – the lynchpin of international humanitarian law (IHL).

35 **Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD)**: initiative launched in 2003 to work towards achieving efficient and principled humanitarian assistance. 37 donor bodies have now signed up to these principles. The GHD initiative has become the leading framework to guide principled official humanitarian aid and encourage greater donor accountability.

See: [http://www.goodhumanitariandonorship.org](http://www.goodhumanitariandonorship.org)

36 **Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement**: a series of principles articulating standards for protection, assistance and solutions for internally displaced persons (IDPs).


37 **Humanitarian access**: where protection is not available from national authorities or controlling non-state actors, vulnerable populations have a right to receive international protection and assistance from an impartial humanitarian relief operation. Such action is subject to the consent of the state or parties concerned and does not prescribe coercive measures in the event of refusal, however unwarranted.


38 **Humanitarian Accountability Partnership (HAP)**: humanitarian sector self-regulatory body committed to accountability and quality management.


39 **Humanitarian action**: name given to activities involving protection of civilians and those no longer taking part in hostilities; provision of food, water and sanitation, shelter, health services, and other items of assistance for the benefit of affected people and to facilitate their return to normal lives and livelihoods.

40 **Human rights**: the concept that all human beings, whatever their nationality, place of residence/origin, sex, nationality, ethnicity, colour, religion, political affiliation language, or any other status are equally entitled to enjoy his or her rights. The key instruments asserting human rights are the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) together with the 1966 International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).


41 **Humanitarian Coordinator (HC)**: the senior UN humanitarian official at country level. Appointed by the Emergency Response Coordinator (ERC) in consultation with the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) when a situation demands intensive management and/or massive humanitarian assistance. “Double-hatting” is a term applied when the duty of HC is combined with that of Resident Coordinator (RC).

42 **Humanitarian reform**: process launched in 2005 by UN and non-UN humanitarian actors to enhance humanitarian response capacity through greater predictability, accountability, and partnership.


43 **Humanitarian space**: term used to describe the environment in which humanitarian actors can operate without compromising principles of neutrality and impartiality or the safety of aid workers.

See: [http://www.humanitarian-space.dk/](http://www.humanitarian-space.dk/)

44 **Humanitarian system**: name given to the coalition of key crisis response actors: the UN, NGOs and the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement.
45 Hyogo Framework for Action: outcome of 2005 World Conference on Disaster Reduction recognising the interrelated nature of disaster reduction, poverty eradication, and sustainable development and advocating a culture of disaster prevention and resilience through risk assessments, disaster preparedness and early warning systems.

See: http://www.unisdr.org/eng/hfa/hfa.htm

46 Impartiality: one of the seven fundamental principles of the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement, affirming that responses to the suffering or individuals should be guided solely by their needs without any discrimination on the basis of nationality, race, religious beliefs, class or political opinions.

See: http://www.ifrc.org/what/values/principles/impartiality.asp

47 Independence: one of the seven fundamental principles of the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement, affirming that humanitarian actors, while auxiliaries in the humanitarian services of their governments and subject to the laws of their respective countries, must always be autonomous, so that the assistance may be given in accordance with the principles of impartiality and neutrality.

See: http://www.ifrc.org/what/values/principles/independence.asp

48 Instrumentalisation: a post-9/11 term used to describe the risk that humanitarian actors may, inadvertently or consciously, subordinate principles of impartiality and neutrality to serve the political and strategic interests of those who provide them with funding.

49 Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC): the primary mechanism for humanitarian coordination. Chaired by the Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC), it brings together all UN operational humanitarian agencies, the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement, the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) and representatives of three NGO consortia.

50 Internally displaced persons (IDPs): persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to leave their homes or habitual residence as a result of, or in order to avoid, the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalised violence, violations of human rights, or natural or man-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognised state border. The non-binding Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement based on refugee law, human rights law, and international humanitarian law articulates standards for protection, assistance, and solutions for such internally displaced persons.

See: http://www.internal-displacement.org/

51 International Humanitarian Law (IHL): a set of rules seeking to limit the effects of armed conflict on non-combatants. Also known as the law of war or the law of armed conflict. IHL is primarily set out in the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their two Additional Protocols of 1977.

See: http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/section_ihl_in_brief


See: http://www.llrx.com/features/refugee.htm

53 Livelihoods: the capabilities, assets and activities required for a means of living.

54 Local capacity: participation in the programme should reinforce people’s sense of dignity and hope in times of crisis, and people should be encouraged to participate in programmes in different ways. Programmes should be designed to build upon local capacity and to avoid undermining people’s own coping strategies.

See: http://www.sphereproject.org/component/option,com_docman/task,doc_view/gid,12/Itemid,26/lang,English/

55 Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD): a concept urging emergency responders to identify and protect the livelihoods of crisis-affected populations and their coping strategies at the earliest opportunity in order to build on resilience essential for post-conflict recovery.

See: http://www.disastergovernance.net/study_groups/lrrd/

56 Millennium Development Goals (MDGs): set of eight time-bound development goals adopted by world leaders in 2000.

See: http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/

57 Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF): post-crisis recovery frameworks jointly developed by national governments and UN Country Teams intended to involve a broad range of stakeholders, avoiding creating new parallel structures, strengthen aid effectiveness, reduce transaction costs and promote transparency.

See: http://mdtf.undp.org/

59 Neutrality: one of the seven, fundamental principles of the International Red Cross, Red Crescent Movement, affirming that humanitarian actors should not take sides in hostilities or engage at any time in controversies of a political, racial, religious, or ideological nature.

See: http://www.ifrc.org/what/values/principles/neutrality.asp

60 NGO Coordination Mechanisms: three NGO consortia are formally part of the international humanitarian system and represented on the IASC. They are the International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA); InterAction and the Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response.


61 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA): UN body created in 1991 to coordinate UN response to complex emergencies and natural disasters. Headed by the Under Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator (USG/ERC), it is part of the UN Secretariat.

See: http://ochaonline.un.org/

62 Official Development Assistance (ODA): compiled by the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD/DAC), it measures financing flows from bilateral donors and multilateral institutions to promote the economic development and welfare of developing countries.


63 OneResponse: collaborative inter-agency website designed to enhance humanitarian coordination within the cluster approach and support country-level information exchange.

See: http://oneresponse.info

64 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development/Development Assistance Committee (OECD/DAC): the principal body through OECD members and multilateral organisation cooperate with developing countries to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).

See: www.oecd.org/dac


66 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness: 2005 agreement brokered by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) to harmonise aid and enable developing-country governments to formulate and implement their own national development plans.


67 Pooled Funding: an important aspect of humanitarian reform, the term refers to mechanisms seeking to centralise and consolidate funding streams, such as Common Humanitarian Funds (CHFs) and Multi-Donor Trust Funds (MDTFs).

See: http://www.undg.org/index.cfm?P=152

68 Preparedness: activities to minimise loss of life and damage, organise the temporary removal of people and property from a threatened location and facilitate timely and effective rescue, relief and rehabilitation.

69 Prevention: activities to avoid the adverse impact of hazards and means to minimise related environmental, technological and biological disasters.

70 Proportionality: principle in international humanitarian law (IHL) that humanitarian funding be distributed in proportion to needs established by objective assessments.

See: http://www.diakonia.se/sa/node.asp?node=887

71 Protection: activities seeking respect for the rights of the individual in accordance with human rights, refugee and international humanitarian law.

72 Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT): unit of military personnel and seconded civilian experts/INGOs delivering humanitarian/reconstruction assistance in Afghanistan and Iraq.

73 **Quality and accountability initiatives:** major platforms to improve accountability, quality and performance in humanitarian action are:
- Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action (ALNAP)
- Humanitarian Accountability Partnership International (HAP-I)
- People In Aid
- Sphere Project


74 **Quick Impact Projects (QIPs):** small-scale rapidly-implementable post-conflict interventions.


75 **Recovery:** restoring the capacity of national institutions and communities after a crisis: the early recovery phase aims to generate self-sustaining, nationally-owned processes to stabilise human security and address underlying risks that contributed to the crisis.

76 **Red Cross/Red Crescent Seven Fundamental Principles:** the seven Fundamental Principles bond together the National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC). They guarantee the continuity of the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement and its humanitarian work. They are: humanity; impartiality; neutrality; independence; voluntary service; unity and universality.


77 **Refugee Law:** the corpus of law whose principal instruments are:
- the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 protocol
- the two Protocols on Transnational Organized Crime
- the 1954 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons

See: [http://www.refugeelawreader.org/](http://www.refugeelawreader.org/)

78 **Resident Coordinator:** the head of a UN Country Team. In some emergencies the post of RC is combined with that of the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC). RCs are funded and managed by the UN Development Programme (UNDP).


79 **Resilience:** capacity of a system, community or society potentially exposed to hazards to adapt.

80 **Special Envoy of the UN Secretary-General (SESG):** UN appointee designated to deal with a specific issue. For example, Bill Clinton is SESG for Haiti.


81 **Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSR):** UN appointee representing the Secretary-General in meetings with heads of state and negotiating on behalf of the UN.


82 **Timeliness:** providing information and analysis in time to inform key decisions about response.

83 **Un-earmarked:** in humanitarian usage, funds or commitment for which a donor does not require the funds to be used for a specific project, sector, crisis or country. Because there are degrees of earmarking (e.g. to a country or crisis or a sector), the Financial Tracking System (FTS) treats as “unearmarked” any funding that is not earmarked at least to the country level.
The Humanitarian Response Index 2010

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“The Humanitarian Response Index is an innovative means of highlighting the Good Humanitarian Donorship Principles in order to encourage best practice and maximise the benefit of assistance to victims of crises and catastrophes.” - Ross Mountain.

In 2009, donors provided over US$11.5 billion to respond to the needs of millions of people affected by conflicts and natural disasters around the world. Ensuring that aid is used correctly is no easy task, with humanitarian crises increasing in number and complexity. Today, humanitarian actors face daunting challenges to provide protection and assistance to those in need, and often enter into a complex interplay of competing national and international interests related to political, military, security or development concerns. Add tighter budgets to this scenario, and the need for effective and efficient humanitarian assistance becomes more important than ever.

Based on nearly 2,000 surveys on donor performance and more than 500 interviews with humanitarian actors in 14 humanitarian crises (Haiti, Pakistan, Afghanistan, DRC and Sudan, among others), the Humanitarian Response Index seeks to be the reference for donors to assess the quality of their aid. Now in its fourth year, the Humanitarian Response Index is the world’s foremost independent instrument for measuring the individual performance of government donors against Good Humanitarian Donorship Principles. The Humanitarian Response Index provides an objective overview of donor performance, which can assist governments in ensuring that their humanitarian funding has the greatest possible impact for people in critical need of aid.

Founded in 2003, DARA is an independent organisation committed to improving the quality and effectiveness of aid for vulnerable populations suffering from conflict, disasters and climate change. DARA has recognised expertise in providing support in the field of humanitarian aid as well as climate change and disaster risk reduction management. We have conducted evaluations of humanitarian operations in over 40 countries across five continents for a variety of government, United Nations, and European Union agencies, as well as other major international humanitarian organisations, such as the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement.