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Evaluation of FAO's role and work in Disaster Risk Reduction in Asia and in Latin America and the Caribbean

Evaluation report

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For further information on this report, please contact:

Director, OED
Viale delle Terme di Caracalla 1, 00153
Rome, Italy
Email: evaluation@fao.org

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Composition of the Evaluation Team

Core Evaluation Team

Nicolai Steen, Team Leader
Yasemin Aysan, Regional Team Leader for Asia
Allan Lavell, Regional Team Leader for Latin America and the Caribbean
Tim Bene, Agronomist for Asia
Pierre Leguéné, Agronomist for Latin America and the Caribbean

The following experts also contributed to the mission works

Riccardo Polastro, Cambodia, Ecuador and Peru
Belén Camacho, Dominican Republic and Guatemala
María Quispe, Bolivia
Pablo Torrealba, Ecuador
Carlos Alfredo Puac, Guatemala
Sandra Zúñiga, Nicaragua
Ángel Wilson Chávez, Peru
Noemí Araujo, Dominican Republic

FAO Office of Evaluation

Luc Dubreuil, Cambodia and Latin America and the Caribbean
Marta Piccarozzi, Asia

Composition of the Expert Panel

Sanjaya Bhatia, Knowledge Management Officer, International Recovery Platform, UN International Strategy for Disaster Reduction
Tom Hockley, Head, Regional Office Support & Inter-Agency Coordination Unit, UN International Strategy for Disaster Reduction
Michel Matera, Senior Disaster Risk Management Specialist, Urban, Water and Sanitation and Disaster Risk Management Sustainable Development Department, World Bank
Fabrice Renaud, Head, Environmental Vulnerability and Ecosystem Services Section, Institute for Environment and Human Security, United Nations University
Hazel Smith, Professor, Humanitarianism and Security, Cranfield University
Tomoo Ueda, Principal Evaluation Specialist, Independent Evaluation Department, Asian Development Bank

Acronyms

AGA	Animal Production and Health Division
AGD	Office of Assistant Director-General, Agriculture and Consume Protection Department
AGN	Nutrition and Consumer Protection Division
AGP	Plan Production and Protection Division
AGS	Agricultural Support Systems Division
AsDB	Asian Development Bank
BAKORNAS	National Disaster Management Agency
CCA	Climate Change Adaptation
CD	Capacity Development
CGIAR	Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research
CO	Country Office
CPF	Country Programming Framework
CRED	Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters
DRM	Disaster Risk Management
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
ECG	Emergency Coordination Group
ECTAD	Emergency Centre for Transboundary Animal Diseases
EMPRES	Emergency Prevention System for Transboundary Animal and Plant Pests and Diseases and Food Safety hazards
ERCU	Emergency and Rehabilitation Coordination Unit
ESA	Agricultural Development Economics Division
EST	Trade and Markets Division
FCC	Food Chain Crisis Management Framework
FEWS NET	Famine Early Warning Systems Network
FID	Office of Assistant Director-General, Fisheries and Aquaculture Department
FIP	Fisheries and Aquaculture Policy and Economic Division
FIR	Fisheries and Aquaculture Resources Use and Conservation Division
FNS	Food and Nutrition Security
FOM	Forest Assessment, Management and Conservation Division
FP DRR	Resilient Livelihoods - Disaster Risk Reduction for Food and Nutrition Security Framework Programme
FPMIS	Field Programme Management Information System
GAR	Global Assessment Report
GFDRR	Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery
GFIMS	Global Forest Fire Information Management System
GIEWS	Global Information and Early Warning System on Food and Agriculture
HFA	Hyogo Framework for Action
HPAI	Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza
HQ	Headquarters
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee
IDWG	Inter- Departmental Working Group
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
ILO	International Labour Organization
IPC	Integrated Food Security and Humanitarian Phase Classification
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
LAC	Latin America and the Caribbean
LEGS	Livestock Emergency Guidelines and Standards
NAPA	National Adaptation Programme of Action

NFPCSP	National Food Policy Capacity Strengthening Programme
NMTPF	National Medium-Term Priority Framework
NRC	Climate, Energy and Tenure Division
NRL	Land and Water Division
NTT	Nusa Tenggara Timur
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OED	Office of Evaluation
OEK	Office of Knowledge Exchange, Research and Extension
OFDA	Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance
OIE	World Organisation for Animal Health
OR	Organizational Result
PAIA	Priority Areas for Inter-disciplinary Action
PAIA-REHAB	PAIA on Disaster prevention, mitigation and preparedness and post-emergency relief and rehabilitation
PDSR	Participatory Disease Surveillance Response
Plan GRACC	Plan for Risk- and Climate Change Adaptation Management of Agricultural Sector (Peru)
RAP	Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific
REU	Regional Office for Europe and Central Asia
RO	Regional Office
RTE	Real Time Evaluation
SAP	Subregional Office for the Pacific Islands
SEAGA	Socio-Economic and Gender Analysis
SFE	Subregional Office for Eastern Africa
SIDS	Small Island Developing States
SLS	Multidisciplinary Team for South America
SO	Strategic Objective
TAD	Trans-boundary Animal Diseases
TCD	Office of Assistant Director-General, Technical Cooperation Department
TCE	Emergency Operations and Rehabilitation Division
TCI	Investment Centre Division
TCS	Policy and Programme Development Support Division
TRA	Tenure, Rights and Access
UN Women	United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UN-HABITAT	United Nations Human Settlements Programme
UNICEF	United Nations Children’s Fund
UNISDR	United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction
UNU	United Nations University
WB	World Bank
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organization

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Executive Summary

Background and Evaluation Scope

ES1. The Evaluation of FAO's role and work in DRR was carried out during 2012 and covered both the Latin America and Caribbean and the Asia Regions, with visits to 11 countries. The present Evaluation report synthesizes key findings from regional reports prepared by two independent but parallel and synchronised teams and presents main conclusions and strategic recommendations.

ES2. The evaluation was requested by the FAO's Programme Committee in October 2011 and was managed by the FAO's Office of Evaluation. It was commissioned to DARA, an independent non-profit organization specialized in evaluations.

ES3. The purpose of the evaluation is to provide FAO Management, FAO Member Countries and interested stakeholders with: (i) accountability of the Organisation's performance in terms of the Organization's mission, goals and DRR-related objectives and (ii) recommendations based on solid evidence and lessons learnt on FAO's comparative advantages, its role in the international architecture of DRR, its priorities and ways to improve its work in DRR to best serve its member countries in the future.

ES4. The evaluation focuses on the role and work of FAO in DRR in the period from 2006-2011. This means that the period evaluated relate to two Strategic Frameworks (2000-2015 and 2010-2019). The evaluation focuses on prevention, mitigation and preparedness to disasters falling under Organisational Result 1 of the Strategic Objective I of the current Strategic Framework 2010-2019, previously included in the Strategic Framework 2000-2015 under the Strategy A3 (Preparedness for, and effective and sustainable response to, food and agricultural emergencies).

ES5. The evaluation was carried out using mainly qualitative inquiry techniques such as interviews and desk reviews of project documentation and other relevant publications. The 32 projects visited during case studies were selected among a list of 259 projects identified by OED and FAO staff as DRR related in both regions. The evaluation included consultations with stakeholders from within different divisions of FAO at headquarter level, Regional offices in Asia and Latin America and Country offices in the 11 case study countries. Government partners, UN agencies, NGOs and donors were also included in the consultation process. In total, 519 persons were interviewed during the entire evaluation process. These consultations were supplemented by desk reviews of previous evaluations potentially relevant to DRR (27 OED-managed evaluations) and selected normative products (17), as well as key strategic publications.

ES6. Evaluation findings are built on specific examples drawn from the country case studies and analyzed against standard evaluation criteria. Patterns in the findings led the Evaluation Team to draw conclusions and consequently strategic recommendations.

Strategic Relevance

ES7. This evaluation generally recognises that FAO strategically is moving in a coherent and relevant direction in terms of addressing DRR from a more holistic and mainstreamed approach. The number of DRR interventions in the field also suggests that FAO is becoming ever more engaged in DRR. Project documentation, normative products also clearly demonstrate a progressive use of DRR terminology.

ES8. Project documents were generally relevant with regards to national priorities and FAO's strategic frameworks. In some countries FAO's advocacy work has led the government to place greater emphasis on small scale farmers than in the past through interventions that focus on food security and livelihoods. Generally, however, policy influence is a long-term process that, in the case of FAO, arises from field experiences and documented good practices and overall the evaluation found limited evidence that projects yielded the expected results in this sense, for reasons related to project designs and insufficient institutional capacity within FAO, particularly at country and regional levels.

DRR Supported Interventions

ES9. A key concern with regards to FAO's role in DRR is the effectiveness of the Organization's overall performance. The causes are multiple and interrelated such as inappropriate or unrealistic project designs, short duration and limited funding. Additional causes include project management issues and FAO's staff capacities.

DRR Projects

ES10. Two types of interventions characterise FAO's DRR interventions, those addressing DRR explicitly and those that does it more implicitly. The latter relates to the fact that FAO core interventions (i.e. land use management, watershed management and coastal management) implicitly address DRR whereas the first more explicitly describes DRR interventions and objectives.

ES11. Projects were generally implemented without prior analyses and considerations of local contexts and vulnerability assessments – this was however more the case in Central America where projects were typically spin-offs from emergency interventions. In most cases, and across both regions, the effectiveness of interventions was limited to restoration of livelihoods, but failed to address root causes of risks and structural food insecurity. Interventions in Asia also largely failed to address these issues, the main reasons being the design and implementation of projects.

ES12. Funding is clearly a factor setting limits to what FAO can expect to achieve. Many projects are often designed for maximum two-year periods leaving insufficient time for testing, implementation and capacity development.

ES13. Projects were also found to be unrealistically designed, particularly in relation with level of funding and existing implementation capacity, either because they included too many activities or because they were over-ambitious in terms of expected outcomes. More than often, interventions were based on assumptions that certain inputs, such as seeds, tools or training, would per se reduce risks (outcomes). There was limited time to test new methods and tools – questioning the overall effectiveness of interventions. In most projects, there is a lack of thorough causal analysis of how interventions reduce risks.

Monitoring and Evaluation

ES14. DRR projects are generally characterised by weak or even inexistent monitoring and evaluation, which consequently translates into a lack of information within the Organisation of what works, why and under what conditions.

ES15. This not only affects organisational learning, but also FAO's accountability towards member governments, partners, donors and especially target populations. Uncertainty about

causalities and lack of objective evidence of what works and why also affects the effectiveness of FAO's upstream work. Cases of FAO policy support to governments indicated that products were merely based on assumptions than on documented and effective good practice.

Mainstreaming

ES16. Mainstreaming DRR into sector and other medium and long-term development plans is widely considered to be of the most effective means for reducing risks. However, there were very few examples of successful mainstreaming or upstream work. Lack of documented lessons learned from DRR interventions or insufficient institutional knowledge of how FAO most effectively can intervene to reduce risks partly seems to explain this. Under such circumstances it is obviously difficult for FAO to promote relevant DRR interventions and for member states to design proper DRR policies.

ES17. Insufficient institutional capacity also means that FAO Country offices are often more involved in project management than upstream work, as this requires specific technical DRR know-how, which most FAO Country offices do not have. Another explanation is that FAO, by and large, pays limited attention to the absorption capacity of government counterparts. The team has found no document or analysis that guides FAO staff in analysing the existing capacities or needs of counterparts before engaging in providing services or policy support.

Capacity Development

ES18. In both Asia and LAC, capacity development support on DRR has, as in other areas, consisted in assisting developing member country capacities by preparing and disseminating guidelines or training government officials at ministries of agriculture, their extension departments, as well as farmers.

ES19. Again, none of the projects or activities related to capacity development included monitoring components that measured training outcomes. Therefore, in both LAC and Asia, there was limited evidence on the overall outcomes of DRR related capacity development efforts.

ES20. In agricultural demonstration projects that included training of farmers, capacity development was often limited to provision of inputs accompanied either by demonstrations or farmers' field school sessions. The effectiveness of these methods seemed to be mixed.

Early Warning

ES21. The evaluation found that usage of early warning tools was very limited in Asia and LAC. Vulnerability mapping, through the IPC2, is being introduced in Asia and will, if adequately used, provide FAO with essential information in terms of targeting future interventions, particularly those addressing more structural causes of vulnerabilities.

ES22. The most effective contribution of FAO to early warning and preparedness in Asia has been in animal disease control, namely related to the Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI). In all Asian countries visited, FAO supported governments to set up surveillance, reporting and testing capacities.

Gender

ES23. A common feature across the 11 countries visited is that gender issues are not sufficiently factored into the project design and implementation. Furthermore, the evaluation

found that gender sensitive programming was commonly misunderstood or misconceived by project staff. Cases of agricultural related training activities with DRR components, for example, were actually reinforcing the reproductive roles of women and failing to pay sufficient attention to the gender distribution of tasks/time at the household level.

ES24. Some offices have engaged gender focal points with immediate results but generally much can still be done in this area.

FAO's Institutional Capacity

ES25. FAO generally lacks institutional capacity to meet its own strategic objective and ambitions related to DRR. The capacity within FAO is still focused on preparedness and post-emergency recovery and there are few resources in the Organisation with sufficient capacity to guide FAO offices on DRR. This pattern was also the case for Regional offices. As a consequence, most Country offices claimed that they have received limited or no support from Headquarters or Regional offices in terms of DRR programming or strategic guidance. It is also true that, as highlighted in 6.3, human resources devoted to DRR in HQ and in decentralized offices have been limited all over the period evaluated.

ES26. The Resilient Livelihoods - Disaster Risk Reduction for Food and Nutrition Security Framework Programme (FP DRR) needs to be properly disseminated to guide staff on how to do more effective DRR programming and at the moment FAO faces difficulties in moving DRR interventions away from the emergency focus and into development oriented areas.

ES27. While FAO is attempting to change its internal institutional setup, DRR remains to be negatively affected by the 'silo' structure still remaining within the Organisation.

Sustainability of DRR Support

ES28. The multiple DRR projects carried out or supported by FAO face a common challenge, namely sustainability. This challenge is explained by several factors.

ES29. Practically all the projects visited lacked exit strategies or at least indications of how they would be transferred to counterparts, scaled up or serve as demonstration plots informing government policies. In other words, there were no explicit considerations on sustainability for any of the 32 projects visited and while it cannot be discarded that projects may become sustainable if very successful, this tendency clearly indicates that FAO devotes insufficient resources to this.

ES30. This finding is partly explained by the fact that funding for most activities is of a very limited amount and duration, leaving FAO little time to develop the necessary capacities for technical sustainability and ownership among counterparts. Even successful interventions such as Plan GRACC in Peru will have to address the institutional capacities among national counterparts more comprehensively in order to ensure that the Plan will become operational and sustainable over time - local partners reportedly still have insufficient capacity and financial recourses to ensure the Plan's sustainability. A precondition for sustainability is to ensure government ownership and participation in project design and implementation.

Animal Health – HPAI

ES31. FAO's support to HPAI has, by far, been the intervention that was most praised among government officials, beneficiaries and donors. FAO has managed to respond to an emergency,

transition interventions into surveillance and finally develop national capacities that, with varying degree, are capable of taking over key functions in terms of prevention and preparedness to respond to emerging animal diseases.

ES32. Curiously, the HPAI interventions lacked an overall strategic guidance, meaning that interventions in each country were carried out on an ad hoc basis. Again, the HPAI interventions were not supported by a monitoring framework that would have allowed FAO to systematise processes and document outcomes.

ES33. Nonetheless, the relative success of the HPAI is related to the fact that it was a multi-year engagement with significant funding levels that allowed FAO both to adapt over time to changing needs and recruit skilled technical staff to sustain operations, both at Headquarters, Regional and particularly also at Country level. These success criteria stand in contrast to other FAO interventions and are thus worth considering in terms of how the Organisation can improve future performance.

Main Conclusions

ES34. There are few doubts that FAO is undergoing a change process wherein DRR has gained more space and higher prioritization across the Organisation. This process is however moving at slow pace and needs to be sped up if FAO wants to make use of its technical know-how and expertise in linking food insecurity with DRR and climate change adaptation. If the Organisation fails to act fast, other actors, both international and national, will move into this field because it offers significant opportunities for change and has the attention of many donors and governments.

ES35. That said, DRR (including CCA) still constitutes a conceptual and practical challenge for FAO. Despite normative progresses, the Organisation has yet to define its role and place within DRR, and to demonstrate the potential the Organisation possesses in terms of moving DRR out of the emergency-mode and into development oriented and mainstreamed approaches. FAO has fragmented elements within the Organisation that, if used more coherently, could endow it with opportunities to contribute significantly to reducing exposure and food insecurity of vulnerable populations.

ES36. Innovative research-based agricultural interventions, high-level technical inputs, land use and territorial planning formats, environmental service management and up-to-date forecasting tools and methods are some of the more important means FAO possesses for potentially achieving this, rather than explicit DRR and CCA practices per se. Therefore, if FAO focuses on doing what it does well and making sure that sufficient attention is devoted to how DRR and CCA become part of these implicit interventions – and not vice versa - medium and longer-term DRR and CCA outcomes may be achieved more effectively.

ES37. Implicit DRR interventions (i.e. those whose main focus is on agricultural aspects or other core sectors within the mandate of FAO), have had and continue to have the potential to contribute significantly to DRR, as well as to CCA. Such interventions require different and more long-term approaches as they address challenges that aim to improve the overall agricultural systems and create conditions in which populations are less vulnerable and become more resilient over time through improved practices that are adapted to variations in climate.

ES38. FAO has spent more time and resources on reactive DRR interventions aimed at post-disaster livelihood recovery and preparedness of affected populations towards future disasters, without necessarily addressing the root causes of their vulnerabilities. Short-term interventions do

not allow FAO to address the root causes of vulnerability and when the next disaster hits, recovery investments might be lost.

ES39. Therefore, FAO's approach should become more adaptable to change in anticipating scenarios of what may happen – especially considering vulnerabilities that are related to future hydro-meteorological variations affecting livelihoods of most vulnerable populations. Such an approach requires solid analysis and examination of root causes of food insecurity and anticipation of livelihood threats. The evaluation has found limited evidence that FAO gives sufficient attention to such analyses.

ES40. Sector capacities in most countries are still very low and few ministries of agriculture are in a position to promote a more prospective approach. Again, if FAO manages to create the necessary technical skills within the Organisation, there should be multiple options of engaging constructively in promoting and mainstreaming DRR and CCA within national sector programmes and strategies.

ES41. The Resilient Livelihoods - Disaster Risk Reduction for Food and Nutrition Security Framework Programme from 2011 is a first attempt to link DRR and CCA with food security (and resilience) and a clear indication that FAO is starting to consider DRR in a more comprehensive matter. More technical capacities and stronger institutional leadership will be needed if FAO is expected to manage such transition effectively.

Strategic Recommendations

Recommendation 1: To Technical Departments, on DRR mainstreaming within FAO

It is recommended that FAO refocuses its approach to DRR by mainstreaming it through the Organisation's core development activities as this will ensure a more coherent and technically sound contribution to risk reduction and potentially also climate change adaptation in line with the Organisation's Reviewed Strategic Objective 5's focus on resilience.

Recommendation 2: To Technical Departments, on a multi-disciplinary logical framework complementing the FP DRR

It is recommended that FAO develops a multi-disciplinary logical framework that clearly identifies causalities between FAO core interventions, food security, DRR, climate change and resilience.

Recommendation 3: To Senior Management, on institutional capacity

It is recommended that FAO significantly strengthens its institutional capacity in order to conceptually and technically reinforce DRR at headquarter level and key regional and selected Country offices, including a stronger focus on gender sensitive programming.

Recommendation 4: To Senior Management and Technical Departments, on DRR engagement in countries

It is recommended that FAO reduces its DRR interventions to pre-selected countries against clear-cut criteria such as national capacities in DRR, vulnerability to climate variability, exposure towards natural hazards, food security data and national commitments (i.e. demands for services).

Recommendation 5: To Technical Departments and Country office Representations, on intervention areas in selected countries

The evaluation recommends that FAO focuses interventions on geographically defined areas in selected countries that would enable the Organisation to fully implement the suggested comprehensive approach to risk reduction.

Recommendation 6: To Country office Representations, on policy dialogue

The evaluation recommends that FAO broadens its dialogue in the selected countries beyond the Ministries of agriculture to include other strategic counterparts in DRR such as Ministries of environment, finance and planning.

SECTION A: INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

1 Introduction

1.1 The Evaluation report

1. This Evaluation Report reflects the analysis and findings from two parallel evaluations carried out in Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) from May to December 2012, as well as from two desk studies (normative products and review of relevant evaluations). The two evaluations covered 11 countries (Bolivia, Peru and Ecuador in South America; the Dominican Republic, Guatemala and Nicaragua in Central America and the Caribbean; and Cambodia, Nepal, Bangladesh, the Philippines and Indonesia in Asia). The Evaluation Team spent one week in each country, collecting information both in the capital cities and in the field.

2. This Report presents findings from both of these regions in a synthesised way focusing on the broader tendencies and patterns of FAO's role in DRR. Consequently, the findings from specific projects or other interventions, such as policy or technical support, will only be referred to as a case in point related to the broader issues that have come out in the regional reports. Accordingly, the two regional reports (support documents for the Evaluation Report) present more details of FAO support within the countries and are therefore a reference for more specific information.

1.2 Evaluation background

3. The Evaluation of FAO's role and work in Disaster Risk Reduction was requested by the Programme Committee in 2011 with the objective of obtaining a full picture of FAO's engagement in this area, throughout the Disaster Risk Management cycle. The evaluation was therefore included in the OED Work Plan for 2012/2013. It would be complemented by the recent evaluation on the Operational Capacity in Emergencies (2010) and the forthcoming one on Transition. Prevailing security reasons prevented Africa from being subject to evaluation at this stage, and the evaluation therefore covered Latin America and the Caribbean, and Asia.

4. Given the cross-cutting nature of Disaster Risk Reduction, stakeholders include FAO management and staff at all levels, FAO's partners within and outside the UN System and international platforms such as UNISDR, and civil society. The Evaluation Team is aware that the evaluation period covers the initial stages of what can be described as FAO's more explicit positioning towards DRR. Findings must therefore be understood in this context which in other words means that FAO cannot be expected to have a clear-cut approach to DRR, particular at Member State level.

5. The Evaluation of FAO's role and work in Disaster Risk Reduction was managed by the FAO Office of Evaluation (OED), and was informed by a large continuous consultative process with FAO DRR stakeholders both at Headquarters and in the Regions concerned. The work started in February 2012, with a portfolio analysis conducted by OED. The Evaluation Team, led by an external consulting organisation comprising of external independent consultants and OED staff, carried out extensive data-gathering and country visits during the period July – November 2012 in Asia and in Latin America and the Caribbean. Country aide-memoires, the Regional reports, and the draft Evaluation Report were all circulated to FAO stakeholders for comments and suggestions at various stages. The final Evaluation Report and the Management Response will be presented to the Programme Committee in October 2013.

1.3 Structure of the report

6. This report has four main sections: Section A provides a background to the evaluation, its scope and methodology. Section B presents a contextual analysis of DRR for Asia and LAC as well as FAO's strategic and normative publications related to DRR and an overview of human and financial resources. Section C presents synthesised findings from the two regional reports divided into specific topics. Finally, Section D presents synthesised conclusions and recommendations as well as a SWOT[1] diagram summarising the main findings in a schematised manner.

2 Purpose and scope of the evaluation

2.1 Purpose of the Evaluation

7. The purpose of the evaluation is to provide FAO Management, FAO Member Countries and interested stakeholders with: (i) accountability of the Organisation's performance in terms of the Organisation's mission, goals and DRR-related objectives and (ii) recommendations based on solid evidence and lessons learnt on FAO's comparative advantages, its role in the international architecture of DRR, its priorities, and ways to improve its work in DRR to best serve its member countries in the future. In this respect, the evaluation is forward-looking and formative.

2.2 Scope of the Evaluation

8. Until recently, disaster risk reduction was not explicitly dealt with in any depth or breadth within FAO. Before the roll out of Strategic Objective I with the FAO 2010-2019 Strategic Framework, there were no DRR/DRM corporate objectives as such. Nevertheless, the FAO 2000-2015 corporate strategy A.3 (Preparedness for, and effective and sustainable response to, food and agricultural emergencies) already referred to strengthening disaster preparedness and mitigating the impact of emergencies.

9. Disaster Risk Reduction is now defined in FAO by the interventions that support Prevention, Mitigation and Preparedness to Disasters, falling under Organisational Result 1 (henceforth referred to as OR1) of the Strategic Objective I (SO-I).

10. Therefore, the evaluation encompasses the full range of FAO's activities supporting DRR in Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean, including normative and operational services in the two concerned regions, irrespective of the source of funding and whether explicitly or implicitly defined as DRR. Covering organisation-wide initiatives at regional and country levels (regardless of the leading Department), the evaluation aims to address the issues of regional and country concern, as well as FAO internal issues related to DRR work within the overall DRM Framework. This approach takes into consideration longer-term issues of DRR, specifically post-emergency settings, recovery and the more development-oriented aspects of DRR.

11. The evaluation focuses on the 2006-2011 period of time. However, it also considers ongoing and planned commitments and provides forward-looking good practice examples and recommendations on how to improve FAO's role and work in DRR.

[1] Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats.

3 Methodology of the evaluation

3.1 Overall methodology

12. The Terms of Reference established the methodology of the evaluation. The evaluation adopted a participatory approach and consulted with FAO stakeholders at different points in time, namely on the draft ToR, the Inception report, the field visit programme, the Country aide-memoires and Regional reports, and the final draft Evaluation Report.

13. The views of internal FAO stakeholders on their own work, achievements and challenges, were canvassed extensively throughout the whole evaluation process. Equally, the views of beneficiaries of FAO's assistance and partners in DRR were sought and taken into due account, through interviews and questionnaire surveys in FAO HQ as well as in FAO and others' Regional offices and Offices in the visited countries. In total, the Evaluation Team interviewed 519 stakeholders from:

- FAO Offices in Headquarters (in particular those related to SO-I), Regional and Subregional offices (Bangkok, Santiago and Panama) and the Country FAO Representations;
- Relevant Ministries and national institutions in member countries, at decision making and implementation level;
- UN Organizations and Programmes, International Financial Institutions (IFIs), Donors, and international NGOs;
- National NGOs and civil society organisations, as well as ultimate beneficiaries.

14. The internationally accepted evaluation criteria and the UNEG Norms and Standards informed the evaluation process; independence and rigour of analysis were maintained throughout it.

15. The evaluation mainly used qualitative tools and methods. An evaluation matrix guided the data gathering and analytical process, by relating the evaluation questions to the evaluation criteria and themes set out in the ToR (see Annex 1 – TORs of the evaluation). The matrix outlines the key issues identified by the team from the ToR (see Annex 2 – Evaluation matrix) and was used as the core reference for the evaluation process.

16. Findings were validated through a systematic triangulation of the gathered information. Hence, in the analytical process the team cross-validated information as follows: documents against interviews; research/documentary evidence against interviews; observation against interviews. The emerging evidence was triangulated by comparing the information obtained i) from different sources (levels or agencies); ii) from interviews and documents reviews, iii) by geographical area (to verify if the issues found were relevant to a specific context/region); iv) over time (to verify if the issues were specific to a particular time period).

17. In addition, the team members, selected for their complementary skills and backgrounds, applied their own professional experience and technical judgment throughout the whole assessment process and in the formulation of recommendations.

18. Because of the complexity of the evaluation exercise, which covered field visits to 11 countries in two regions, desk studies and surveys, a diagram detailing the evaluation process was designed during the inception phase (see Figure 1 below). The diagram illustrates how different phases of the evaluation process are connected, as well as the outputs that were produced throughout the process.

Figure 1: Evaluation Process



19. The evaluation also made extensive use of past evaluation reports of programmes, projects and thematic areas relevant to DRR. This proved to be a cost-effective approach that allowed canvassing a much larger body of evidence than would have been otherwise possible with available resources. In total, 27 such reports were reviewed through a specific Meta evaluation (see Annex 13 – Meta evaluation). The evaluation took advantage of other technical reports as well (auto-evaluations and reviews).

20. Through a search in the corporate Field Programme Management Information System (FPMIS), the evaluation compiled an inventory of all projects related implicitly or explicitly to DRR between 2006 and 2011 in the two regions. A list of 259 projects, 153 in Asia and 106 in Latin America and the Caribbean, was established by OED in collaboration with project staff (see Annex 7 – Inventory of DRR projects). [2] The scope of the evaluation has posed certain challenges in terms of ensuring that a representative sample of projects has been included in the assessment process. For more than a decade FAO has implemented DRR relevant activities as part of demonstration projects, post-emergency reconstruction efforts or on-going thematic or sectoral programmes. However, many of these interventions have not been branded as DRR despite the fact they implicitly or explicitly contributed to reducing risks. Identifying the right interventions and projects, both during desk reviews and field missions, has been a challenge for the evaluation.[3]

[2] Selected projects in the overall portfolio were classified according to the three components of DRR as set into the overall DRM cycle: i) prevention; ii) mitigation; iii) preparedness. The database of FAO's projects in DRR over the period 2006-2011 has been identified in collaboration with Country Offices and project managers. Only in the absence of a reply, the Evaluation Team proceeded to the identification of DRR projects on its own, based on FPMIS information and project documents. In each country visited, the Evaluation Team considered and had interviews about all the projects included in this list. Once in the countries, the Evaluation Team found out that some of the projects labelled as DRR actually did not have any clear focus on that. Vice versa, some projects were added later as they were found to be DRR relevant.

[3] Relevant FAO official documents, including the FP DRR, consider 'external shocks' that induce food insecurity and hunger, which go beyond those strictly related to physical hazards, including economic, price and fuel crises. FAO's entry point to DRR is therefore wider in its reach and scope than the frameworks of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and the United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR). Such stressors or adverse causal conditions of food insecurity and hunger can exist without the presence of disaster conditions triggered by physical events. On the other hand, food insecurity and hunger may be purely associated with the occurrence of adverse physical events, which is the case when analysing the FAO's DRM continuum diagram (see Figure 2: FAO DRM Cycle in part 5) that clearly privileges a definition of the disaster

21. Equally, OED, with the assistance of the Technical Departments, carried out an inventory of approximately 200 normative products produced by the Organisation (see Annex 5 - Inventory of normative products related to DRR). These include: guidelines and manuals; reports; conferences, workshops and meetings; databases; and policy briefs and brochures. An analysis of such products was carried out by the Evaluation Team and a summary of the Normative study is provided in Annex 6.

22. The evaluation visited selected member countries (11) in order to obtain an insight and opinions from in-country stakeholders at different levels on the whole of FAO's work in DRR, including projects, technical assistance, policy support and normative products. Countries were selected based on a rigorous ranking according to an index established by the Climate, Energy and Tenure Division (NRC) on Vulnerability, Capacities and Donors Quotes relevant to DRR, and completed by OED on relevance to FAO's portfolio, ensuring, at the same time, a balance of regional representativeness and cost-effectiveness within the available budget resources. Selected countries were: Cambodia, Philippines, Indonesia, Nepal, Bangladesh, and Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, Guatemala, Bolivia, Peru and Ecuador.

23. The evaluation assessed in depth a sample of projects in countries visited and at regional and at HQ level, for a total of 32. Projects were selected according to the following criteria: relevance to DRR, innovativeness, catalytic role, budget size, time frame (more recent ones were given priority to facilitate data collection), and accessibility from a logistic point of view. Anyhow, the Team considered and had interviews about all the projects included in the initial project list and related to the countries selected. It found that some projects, though labelled as DRR actually had no clear focus on DRR. Similarly, other projects were identified and added as they were found to be relevant.

24. Inputs, outputs and outcomes of selected projects were assessed in each country and organised hierarchically in relation to regional and global strategic objectives and organisational results.[4] This 'mapping exercise' was used in order to engage in a dialogue with FAO Country office (FAO CO) staff and validate findings of selected activities at country level and in order to examine how interventions were related to FAO's strategic frameworks. Each of the 11 Country aide-memoires produced includes a mapping exercise, also included in the regional reports (see Annexes 14 and 15).

25. The Evaluation Team tried to capture the opinion of FAO staff, government stakeholders and implementing partners in the DRR sector through questionnaire surveys sent out for every country in both regions (see Annex 11 - Survey). Unfortunately, the response rates were too low to be relevant and to be incorporated in the Evaluation Report.

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risk reduction and management problem in terms of the existence of hazardous physical events. The Evaluation Team sees that economic and other such social, cultural and political stressors are seen as important aggravating conditions wherever they exist in the context of physically induced disaster conditions. The model suggests considering vulnerability in the context where physically induced disasters occur. In the paragraph 4.1, there is a short introduction of the relation between disaster risk, disaster and food insecurity. This description helps the reader understand the possible causalities between disasters and food security, considering both in relation to the more historical approach of FAO interventions and the so-called 'corrective' interventions that have come around as means or tools to prevent or mitigate effects from natural hazards.

[4] The Strategic Framework for FAO 2000-2015 addressed DRR-related issues in several of its corporate strategies. Under its corporate strategy A "Reducing food insecurity and rural poverty", there is a strong focus on emergency preparedness and response, particularly under corporate strategy A3 "Preparedness for, and effective and sustainable response to, food and agricultural emergencies". Other corporate strategies with relevance to DRR are C2 and specific areas related to sustainable agricultural management practices; and D, which targeted the conservation and enhancement of the sustainable use of the natural resource base. Under the Strategic Framework 2010-2019, the Organizational Result SO-I/OR1 is specifically dedicated to DRR: "Countries' vulnerability to crisis, threats and emergencies is reduced through better preparedness and integration of risk prevention and mitigation into policies, programmes and interventions".

26. OED ensured the management of the evaluation, including the identification and recruitment of the Evaluation Team. Each team member received individual terms of reference, indicating areas of technical expertise and specific evaluation issues, as well as background material. Extensive communication and cross-fertilization among the two regional teams took place throughout the whole process.

27. The evaluation held extensive meetings in FAO Headquarters at both the initial stage, before travelling to the pilot country (Cambodia), and at the final stage when returning from the Regions (December 2012), to gather information from FAO stakeholders. Debriefing sessions were held in each country and with the Regional offices, to present preliminary findings and conclusions to key stakeholders: comments and suggestions formulated on that occasion were taken into due account by the team during the preparation of the report.

28. Finally, the evaluation was supported by an external panel of experts, composed of representatives of academies and international organizations (AsDB, Cranfield University, UNISDR, UNU, WB) specialised in DRR, revising the TORs and commenting on both the Inception and the final draft Evaluation Report.

3.2 Constraints and limitations

29. The timing of the evaluation posed some challenges and limitations as the evaluation was launched during a strategic revision process which led to the formulation of a new Strategic Objective on resilience before the end of the evaluation process.

30. During most of the evaluation period, FAO did not yet have a programmatic approach to DRR or large field programmes specifically focusing on DRR. DRR had not been institutionalized within FAO until 2010, when it became a corporate priority with the introduction of SOI. Before 2010, DRR was identified as a key issue but the period 2006-2011 represented mostly a pilot phase for FAO in terms of shaping up and mainstreaming the DRR approach and actions within FAO, and for developing the transition from responsive DRM towards proactive DRR approaches.

31. Identifying relevant projects for further analysis was a challenging and time-consuming process. The list of projects related to DRR identified from the FPMIS by the Evaluation Team in close consultation with Country offices and project managers was found to be a limited tool, as some projects, though labelled as DRR, actually had no any clear focus on DRR, and other projects not included in the list were identified and added as they were found to be relevant later. The difficulty in identifying DRR projects and projects to be visited was further compounded by the limited amount of time available in each country and by the projects' geographical dispersion.

32. Finally, the Evaluation Team designed three different surveys for FAO staff, government counterparts and partner organisations. However, due to low respond rate (i.e. insignificant results), the team decided not to include the survey results in the report (see Annex 11 for Survey formats).

SECTION B: FAO AND DRR

4 DRR, Food Security and Contextual Analysis

33. The following sections briefly describe the regional contexts of Asia and Latin America and Caribbean. The purpose of this presentation is to contextualise the evaluations in the current environments where FAO carries out its DRR activities. Both descriptions are a product of the respective regional evaluation exercises.

4.1 Disaster risk, disaster and food insecurity

34. The relationship between disaster and food security can be determined via an examination of the impact of events on the production, distribution or consumption of food. Physical events can decrease the production of food (by destroying or damaging crops and livestock), prevent the movement and distribution of food (by destroying bridges and roads), and lower the consumption of food (due to increased food prices). There is also increased vulnerability to food insecurity as a result of survival strategies (such as indebtedness and migration) developed to address the issues of damages, losses and lack of labour options. These very survival strategies may themselves become impossible due to the effects of a disaster. For example, when a disaster destroys or damages commercial agriculture, this affects rural populations that habitually migrate for work in order to supplement their income.

35. Later sections of this report will consider the relationship between disaster and food security in different areas and among different populations and social groups. In the vast majority of cases, disasters have the greatest impact on the food security of populations that, for structural reasons, are living in poor conditions with diverse levels of food insecurity on a permanent basis. In other words, disasters merely reveal and emphasize pre-existing conditions rather than causing those conditions in the first place. This is equally true for other conditions, such as poverty, the determining factor for many other symptoms of underdevelopment. Where structural conditions of acute or chronic food insecurity prevail, physical threats such as drought can lead to acute disasters, such as famine.

36. It is clear that a permanently undernourished population is less able to cope with stress and an increased scarcity of food associated with a disaster. This has important implications for work in DRR and food security that are of direct relevance to FAO. Disaster risk may be reduced both by the continuous improvement of the conditions of the population, including food security, thus giving it greater strength and resilience to face disasters, and by the introduction of tools and mechanisms of a DRR 'corrective' nature to reduce shock factors that could affect existing food status. Both forms of intervention are necessary, with weight being given to the first due to its structural and permanent nature, along with the fact that it addresses the root causes of the vulnerability related to food insecurity. The first type of intervention, exercised through sectoral or territorial programs and projects, typifies the FAO mission historically. The second type, or DRR 'corrective' intervention, is a more recent development, which has been linked almost entirely to scheduling emergency operations.

4.2 International Agenda

37. This part primarily refers to the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA) as the most important international framework on DRR. At the international level, the HFA is the only agreement on disaster risk reduction, albeit a non-binding one. The HFA makes limited reference to agriculture – in fact it only mentions agriculture once and that is in relation to livelihoods under Priority for Action number 4 – Reduce Underlying Risk Factors. The United Nations

Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is also included as a relevant reference point for climate change and for its recognition of the importance of DRR interventions.

38. The HFA does not consider animal and plant pests and diseases. Nevertheless, the legislative and capacity development aspects, early warning and public awareness building efforts under the Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) programme reflect areas of DRR work that fall under the five priority areas of the HFA.

39. Within FAO there is an awareness of and familiarity with HFA, and more recent FAO normative products refer very specifically to the HFA when addressing DRR-related issues. As a reflection of the general development of DRR issues within FAO, references to the HFA and how FAO complements the priorities have become progressively more visible in FAO's work and publications. The latest and most comprehensive and relevant example is the FP DRR, which builds on the HFA and strives to assist member states to implement its five Priorities for Action in the agricultural sector.

40. While the FP DRR and other publications (e.g. the regional FAO DRR programme in LAC) may provide useful guidance to FAO staff, the general tendency was that staff had limited awareness and even less usage of these products (especially the FP DRR). HQ staff and FAO staff at the Regional offices in Bangkok and Santiago, as well as the Country office in the Philippines, were the only exceptions.

41. International efforts are progressing in terms of linking DRR and climate change. For example, the HFA calls for the development of integrated strategies for disaster risk reduction and climate change. In 2008, the Parties to the UNFCCC acknowledged the link between DRR and climate change in the Bali Action Plan.[5] Finally in 2010, the UNFCCC Cancun Adaptation Framework formally recognised DRR as an essential element of climate change adaptation and encouraged governments to consider linking adaptation measures to the HFA.[6] The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) further emphasised the linkage in its 2012 publication: Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate Change Adaptation.[7]

42. Across the two regions, none of the FAO projects reviewed made an explicit reference to HFA (i.e. how FAO may contribute to its priority actions). Analysing this contribution closer, the LAC evaluation found that implicitly, most interventions were aligned with HFA priority action five (preparedness), followed by number two (knowledge, monitoring and early warning). Few interventions were identified as contributing to priority one (risk governance and institutionalisation). With regard to priority three (use of knowledge, innovation and education to build a culture of safety and resilience), and priority four (reducing underlying risk factors), FAO has done and achieved very little through the explicit DRR interventions assessed in this evaluation. Conceptually, these last two priorities were also the ones where FAO was less articulate.

43. Interestingly, it is under priority action four that the HFA makes its only reference to agriculture and other areas falling close to or within FAO's mandate; i.e. land use management, sustainable use and management of ecosystems, integrated environmental and natural resource management and integrated flood management. It is also under this priority that the linkage to

[5] See http://unfccc.int/documentation/decisions/items/3597.php?such=j&volltext=/CP.13#beg
[6] See http://cancun.unfccc.int/
[7] IPCC, *Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate Change Adaptation*, Cambridge University Press, 2012.

climate work is most obvious; the HFA specifically refers to integrating DRR into climate variability considerations. It is therefore fair to claim that there is significant potential for FAO to promote core activities under its mandate within international frameworks, particularly the HFA and its priority action four. Attaining such relevance will however require that FAO invest more efforts in prospective and multi-disciplinary interventions in alignment with the FP DRR and SO-I/OR1.

44. There is very limited visibility of the agricultural sector in the HFA,[8] but there are indications that the 2013 Global Assessment Report (forthcoming) will give more attention to the relation between agriculture, DRR and food security. If this is the case, FAO must ensure that the Organisation is in a better position to promote such linkage, and hence become a more visible and relevant contributor to the HFA, than most field experiences seems to indicate.

45. Both regional evaluations clearly indicated that there is room for more visibility for FAO and areas pertaining to its mandate. At the national level, it was seldom that discussions on DRR and related commitments had any linkages to concrete FAO interventions. That said, practically all stakeholders consulted during the evaluations in both regions confirmed that FAO has a role to play and that the input FAO can provide in terms of linking DRR with agriculture and related sectors is seen as a welcome input to the debate, especially on the longer term aspects such as slow-onset disasters and climate change adaptation.

4.3 Asia

46. Asia is the most seriously affected area of the world, both in terms of hazard occurrences and the exposure and vulnerability of a rapidly increasing population and economic assets. Asia is very diverse in terms of geographical, climatic, social and economic conditions. Vulnerability derives from the interaction of many factors. It is therefore very difficult to generalise the disaster risk profile of Asia as a region. Nevertheless, there are some trends that are important to understand in informing disaster risk reduction strategies - notably urbanisation, climate change, and demographic shifts which are the drivers for new and changing vulnerabilities to disasters.

47. Earthquakes are the most serious and costly events in Asia including, at times, secondary effects associated with derived events such as the tsunamis in the Indian Ocean and Japan. Extreme hydro-meteorological events such as floods and landslides triggered by heavy rainfall or tropical cyclones are prevalent in the region; they occur more frequently and have greater cumulative effects than earthquakes. Since 2000, more than 1.2 billion people have been exposed to hydro-meteorological hazards alone in Asia.[9] The increased frequency and intensity of droughts will affect food and water security and economic growth, as agriculture and many industries depend on water for production. Already, the heavy dependence of some economies of the region on agriculture has resulted in a water intensity use, which far exceeds the global average.[10] The purported trend towards climatic extremes will probably result in greater severity and number of events, making the region susceptible to greater potential losses. Moreover, the rapidly growing exposure and economic growth throughout the region will place more assets at greater risk under conditions where vulnerability is either constant or growing.

48. Hydro meteorological disasters affect rural livelihoods, especially those of small and marginal farmers. In Lao People's Democratic Republic, 55% of the 58 million USD losses from

[8] UNISDR's two Global Assessment Reports (2009 and 2011) also make limited reference to the sector in their monitoring exercises.
[9] Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters, *EM-DAT, the international disaster database*. Brussels: Université Catholique de Louvain, www.emdat.be
[10] CSIRO and UNEP Asia-Pacific Material Flows database, http://www.cse.csiro.au/forms/form-mf-start.aspx

Typhoon Ketsana (2009) were borne by small and marginal farmers.[11] The devastating floods in Cambodia (2012) and successive droughts in some parts of India all affected the livelihood of small farmers most severely. The extraordinary floods that swept Pakistan in 2010 affecting over 20 million people and flooded agricultural land, at the same time resulting in landslides which damaged the country's infrastructure and destroyed crops. The total damage and losses were estimated at 10.1 billion USD, accounting for about 5.8% of the country's 2009-2010 GDP. The substantial damage in the agriculture sector accounted for about half of the total losses.[12]

49. Generally speaking, in smaller and less diversified low-income economies such as Laos, Cambodia and Nepal, the rural population is more vulnerable to disaster risks, while lower middle income countries like Indonesia and the Philippines have diversified more and invested in increasing agricultural productivity. In this latter type of country, high rural vulnerability still exists in specific climatic and cultural-political areas, such as in Nusa Tenggara Timor (NTT) and Aceh in Indonesia, and Mindanao in the Philippines.

50. Disasters affect food security in urban as well as rural areas. Recent events experienced in Bangkok and Manila indicate the seriousness of urban disaster vulnerability. Around 10% of the region's urban population live in megacities, while the rate of urbanisation continues to accelerate. Around 33% of the region's urban dwellers live in urban slums.[13] In some countries the percentage is much higher, as in Bangladesh, Cambodia, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Mongolia and Nepal; urban slum-dwellers are the most vulnerable to food insecurity due to disaster impact.

51. On the positive side, despite the increases in both physical and economic exposure, the loss of life from hydro-meteorological hazards is decreasing, not only in the most cited example of Bangladesh cyclones, but also elsewhere. This can be largely attributed to the impact of investments made in early warning and preparedness, particularly at the local level, and in operational capacities at the national level. Regional preparedness is also slowly improving. A concrete example is the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER), signed by heads of the ASEAN member states in 2005 (though only enacted in 2010). The AADMER, being the first binding agreement on regional management of disasters, aims to transform the ad-hoc nature of disaster preparedness formerly applied in the region to a more cooperative and preventive approach.

52. There has also been progress in the area of establishing disaster legislation and laws. A number of events had a major impact in the revision of the existing (or the creation of new legislation) policies and institutions for disaster risk reduction in the region. These events include devastating disasters such as the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami and 2005 earthquake in Pakistan and the adoption of the Hyogo Framework of Action (HFA) in 2005.[14]

53. Despite progress with the legal instruments, mainstreaming of DRR into national policies and plans remains weak. Government policies and actions in many countries continue to focus on disaster response. DRR is not evident in the long-term strategies of Nepal and Pakistan, while most progress has been achieved in countries such as Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines.

[11] Lao People's Democratic Republic, World Bank, ADB, ASEAN, FAO, AusAID, GFDRR and ADPC, *Damage, Loss and Needs Assessment: The Ketsana Typhoon in the Lao People's Democratic Republic*, http://gfdrr.org/docs/PDNA_LaoPDR_KetsanaTyphoon.pdf, 2009.
[12] Asian Development Bank and World Bank; *Pakistan 2010 Floods: Preliminary Damage and Needs Assessment,* 2010.
[13] United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, *Statistical Yearbook for Asia and the Pacific* 2011.
[14] For further details on selected national laws, see the Asia Regional Report of this evaluation.

54. Among those governments that address the agriculture sector, Lao PDR regards disaster risk management as one of the components of food security. Hence, in the Strategic Framework for National Sustainable Development Strategy for Lao PDR (2008), reducing the vulnerability of the agricultural sector to disasters is one of the strategic actions proposed in order to achieve food security and eradicate hunger and malnutrition. Similarly, with FAO's assistance, Bangladesh adopted a National Food Policy in 2006, embracing all aspects of food security, followed by a Plan of Action 2008-15 and a Country Investment Plan 2011-15.

55. Decentralising responsibility without adequately addressing funding and legislative authority presents challenges for most Asian countries. Most local (decentralised) governments in the region lack a legislative mandate, fiscal resources or technical capacities to integrate or implement DRR. They are often reluctant to dedicate their own resources to DRR (that is if they have resources), preferring to wait for support from the national level.

56. The Climate Change Adaptation (CCA) policy approach has also been fragmented, with climate change strategies and plans not strongly linked with existing DRR, agricultural, and other relevant policies. This fragmentation is partly driven by a lack of conceptual understanding and an ongoing debate on what constitutes adaptation, and what represents sustainable development. Although a number of countries in Asia have explicitly addressed both DRR and CCA in their respective long-term development strategies, these professional domains have often been considered separately. Nevertheless, there are positive developments, such as Bangladesh's Outline Perspective Plan, which distinguishes itself by effectively integrating DRR and CCA into national development strategies.[15] Similarly, the Philippines Climate Change Act (2009) recognises that "*effective disaster risk reduction will enhance climate change adaptive capacity; the State shall integrate disaster risk reduction into climate change programs and initiatives*" (Act 9729, Sec 2). However, these plans and policies have yet to result in significant adaptation efforts at national, and in particular, local levels. In many cases, only a limited amount of resources have so far been committed to adaptation efforts. There is also still limited understanding at a more local level of what the precise impacts of climate change may be and how communities should adapt. This is largely due to a lack of meteorological data and modelling.

4.4 Latin America and the Caribbean

57. Latin American and the Caribbean countries suffer from significant disaster and disaster risk problems, associated with a wide variety of physical threats such as floods, landslides, storms and hurricanes, cold and frost, earthquakes and volcanoes. When these physical threats occur in areas where there is high exposure and vulnerability, particularly among poor and marginalized populations, they lead to infrequent large-scale disasters, or frequently recurring medium and small-scale disasters. Disasters related to pests, plagues, and plant and animal diseases also exist; however, to a lesser extent than in Africa or Asia according to disaster databases such CRED and OFDA.

58. In the Andes, the most significant impacts are related to El Niño and La Niña and their associated hydro-meteorological events. These macro phenomena, which apparently occur with greater frequency today than historically, are associated with heavy rains and floods, landslides, drought, frost and cold fronts. These types of events have different territorial impacts and are not always the same with each El Niño or La Niña. Moreover, each of them can, and do, occur in periods that do not coincide with El Niño or La Niña, in accordance with normal climatic

[15] Bangladesh Ministry of Planning, *Outline Perspective Plan of Bangladesh 2010-2021, making vision 2021 a reality*, http://planipolis.iiep.unesco.org/upload/Bangladesh/Bangladesh_Final_Draft_OPP_June_2010.pdf, 2010.

variability. Due to the territorial diversity in Peru and Ecuador (coast, mountain and jungle) and in the highlands of Bolivia (plains and jungle), different types of events create distinct impacts in different regions.

59. Drought, often related to El Niño, most acutely affects an area known as the 'Dry Corridor' (*corredor seco*) which covers parts of Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Costa Rica and Panama.

60. Hydro-meteorological phenomena (whose incidence and intensity may increase with climate change) and other non-traditional threats such as the loss of glaciers and their water sources and rising sea levels are not the only risks facing these countries. All countries visited also suffer, in varying degrees, the threat of earthquakes (greater in Guatemala, Nicaragua and Peru than in Ecuador, Bolivia and the Dominican Republic), four have major volcanic activity (Guatemala, Nicaragua, Peru, Ecuador), and four, based on historical evidence, are subject to potential tsunamis of magnitude (the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, Ecuador and Peru).

61. The impacts of natural and socio-natural physical events are among the external 'shocks' which contribute to food insecurity and are at the centre of FAO's work in disaster risk reduction. Malnutrition and food insecurity are, in varying degrees, significant problems in all countries of the region. Among the countries visited, Guatemala is in the most critical position, ranking number one in Latin America and fourth in the world for chronic malnutrition in children under 5, with a rate of about 50%. The other countries' rates of chronic malnutrition in this age group fall in the 20-25% range.

62. The importance of food access and quality and the low levels of productivity among farmers (in particular, small farmers), demonstrate that the root cause of food insecurity is structural, and predominantly related to poverty, marginalization and social exclusion. Given the above, the most obvious way to reduce food insecurity is by reducing poverty and exclusion, raising incomes and improving the health and education of those affected. These changes would correspondingly reduce population's vulnerability to external shocks (from physical threats to price hikes and economic crisis).

63. In general, the agricultural sector accounts for between 7 and 15% of the countries' gross domestic product (GDP). This percentage becomes even greater if the food industry (the processing of the primary product), which accounts for between 20 and 30% of the national economically active population (EAP), is considered. A significant part of the agricultural contribution to GDP is accounted for by agriculture exports. National agricultural production and the ability to import deficit products nationwide are fundamental factors in regard to the availability of food for the national population and, therefore, a potentially important consideration for food security.

64. The total rural population in the country (currently ranging between 25 and 35% of the national total) is steadily decreasing and shows a reduced dependence on income from agricultural production, which has been substituted by income generation through the sale of labour on commercial farms or in other production and service activities. Consequently, there is a growing trend, particularly among the poor, for buying food, instead of producing it for direct consumption. This is of paramount importance considering the impact of disasters on food security.

65. Deforestation is an endemic problem in all countries; overuse of pesticides, fertilizers and other chemicals is common and soil erosion and desertification are increasing. All these

circumstances have potential implications for food security, the incidence of disasters and the relationship between them.

66. In all countries apart from Bolivia (where there are studies that contrast the location of municipalities with high incidence of disasters, with those of particular importance to agricultural production), the relationship between food security and disasters has not been possible to determine. According to those interviewed during the mission, government support for, and national budget devoted to agriculture - and the Ministries in charge of it - has declined in most countries in the last decade (see National Medium-Term Priority Framework (NMTPF) by country and Country aide-memoires for further consideration on this point). Moreover, a large proportion of the investment in infrastructure to support agriculture is dedicated to the export sector in areas such as the coast of Peru, Santa Cruz de la Sierra in Bolivia, Guayas in Ecuador and the Pacific coast in Guatemala.

67. While large-scale commercial producers can invest in their own development and technical and infrastructure needs, this is not the case with the small subsistence farmers or small business. Similarly, in the aftermath of a disaster, a large-scale producer is much more likely than a small producer to be able to rebuild their own resources and claim insurance.

68. Until recently, there was a lack of financial and technical support in most countries for small producers, which was worsened by the dismantling of extension systems. This resulted in low levels of productivity and consequent food insecurity, particularly in areas which were dependent on subsistence farming. However, thanks in part to the advocacy work of FAO, the governments in Guatemala, Dominican Republic and Nicaragua have shown a new interest in smallholder agriculture, investing in pilot projects to reactivate agricultural extension systems, or national programs to support small-scale agriculture.

69. Geological hazards also have a significant potential impact on production aspects (e.g. Tungurahua volcanic ash, and tsunamis in the Ica zone), as well as on loss and damage to communications infrastructure and housing. While there are statistics that take account of the loss and damage associated with major agricultural disasters, this is not generally the case with small and medium-sized recurring disasters. While major disasters create greater problems and larger losses for export agriculture, it is the smaller, recurring disasters that create permanent stress conditions for small producers and that consolidate their food insecurity year after year. Little analysis has been undertaken on the relative contribution of major disasters and small and medium-term recurring disasters on food insecurity. Regardless of the magnitudes and intensities of the threats that exist, all countries have significant risk factors due to the exposure and vulnerability of the population and their livelihoods. Consequently, even threats of a reduced size can have large impacts.

70. Population growth and demand for production space has led to the expansion of agriculture into fragile, low-lying or sloped lands and to over-exploitation causing degradation, increased erosion and threat of landslides. These factors put pressure on the land and its resources and expose populations to historically non-existent threats. Social vulnerability predominately affects the rural, poor, landless (or marginal landholding) population that lack the financial and technical resources to face the challenges of the environment.

71. Climate change increases environmental stress, with potential implications for disaster and food security. The Andes, Caribbean and Central America have been classified by IPCC and the UNFCCC as regions that could potentially be seriously affected by climate change. Changes in the average climate and the increased frequency of extreme events, in addition to the loss of water sources and soil salinisation near the coast, have important implications for populations

dependent on climate for their existence. The impact that disasters have had on food security (augmenting existing situations of food insecurity, or creating new, albeit temporary, food insecure conditions) may be heightened by climate change.

72. The institutional frameworks for DRR and food security are comprised of national constitutions, policies, laws and other regulations such as national, sectoral and territorial plans, and mechanisms, instruments and actions in the field. These elements vary from country to country in expression and intensity, but are always present in one form or another. While both issues are important for the governments concerned, the issue of food security is prioritized in all countries, with a greater number of institutions and funding dedicated to it than to DRR.

73. All of the countries considered have laws pertaining to aspects of DRM (with the exception of Ecuador) and safety laws and/or food and nutritional sovereignty (with the exception of the Dominican Republic, which has a draft law under discussion). The national plans in force in all the countries visited considered food security and disaster risk issues. Disaster risk is commonly associated with other environmental issues, particularly with climate change and adaptation, which increasingly takes ascendancy over the issue of disaster risk and its management, per se. Nevertheless, despite efforts to establish synergies between food security and DRR, in most countries institutional frameworks and funding mechanisms for the two issues remain separated.

74. There are at least two critical factors affecting actions promoting food security. First, there is insufficient coordination between the various organizations and institutions involved, insufficient resources allocated considering the magnitude of the problems and a lack of concrete and achievable goals (particularly in Guatemala). Second, the shallow, reactive nature of the measures taken does not tackle the structural and underlying causes of food insecurity and disaster risk. Instead of taking comprehensive actions organized around concepts such as livelihoods and integral development, actions are taken which address only one symptom of a more complex problem. Consequently, actions suffer from a lack of critical elements necessary for a sustainable solution.

75. Countries' institutional frameworks for risk management, including disaster response and risk reduction, vary considerably. Some countries (such as Peru and Ecuador) have very advanced legislation and place a great importance on risk reduction, which they relate to major developmental planning. Others (such as Guatemala and the Dominican Republic) take a more traditional approach, giving greater emphasis to humanitarian response. Even in countries with more advanced legislation, risk reduction and prevention is not always efficiently executed and is still far from being comprehensive. All institutional frameworks include decentralisation and participation as basic principles.

76. In the establishment of national systems for disaster risk management there is a strong tendency to draw a clear distinction between preparedness and humanitarian response, and risk reduction and reconstruction or recovery in the context of sustainable development. This distinction is most evident in Peru, where the 2010 law puts the Council of Ministers in charge of the central control system, the civil defence in charge of the response component and the risk analysis and prevention centre in charge of the DRR analysis component.

77. Unlike humanitarian response, preparedness and risk transfer is characterised as a reactive or 'compensatory' action. Risk reduction is qualified today in terms of the distinction between corrective risk management (mitigation) and prospective risk management (prevention). This distinction is reflected in various laws and plans in the region, including the 2010 Central American Policy on Integrated Risk Management and the 2012 Risk Management and Climate

Change Adaptation Plan for the Agricultural Sector (Plan GRACC-A) in Peru, and documents of the national food security system in Guatemala, which consider the integration of DRM and food security.

78. Importantly, despite a clear relationship between food security and DRM and the need for further clarification regarding this relationship, laws, policies, organisations and institutional frameworks rarely link the two issues. While the relationship between disaster and cyclical food insecurity receives passing mention, complex scenarios of food insecurity risks and future projections for such risks have so far attracted limited attention from FAO, government counterparts and other national or international organisations.

79. Because of the generally reactive nature of the response to food insecurity (addressed through the distribution of food in times of disaster or by reconstituting livelihoods post impact) it is difficult to establish clear policies and objectives for reducing food insecurity through DRR.

80. There are numerous instruments, actions, plans, etc. dealing with food security or DRR, but rarely is the relationship between these issues made explicit. Where food security work is undertaken in areas where drought is a constant threat such as dry corridors and arid areas, the relationship between these two issues is implicit and requires almost no explanation. However, instruments or actions used to address critical food insecurity and DRR in areas affected by sporadic threats are necessary.

81. The Ministries of Agriculture's absence in the national systems of risk management and lack of involvement in promoting the issue of risk reduction is evident in the almost complete absence of references to the agricultural sector in the country reports submitted to the UNISDR every two years in preparation for the Global Platform on DRR held in Geneva.

5 DRR in FAO's strategic frameworks

82. At the corporate level, recommendations to focus on DRR have come from various fronts, including by the FAO Committee on Agriculture, the Programme and Finance Committee, the Committee on World Food Security and the Committee on Fisheries. FAO projects on DRR contribute to meeting the needs of member countries, as expressed in the Regional Areas of Priority Action and identified by FAO Regional Conferences held in 2010.

83. The Committee on World Food Security in particular referred to DRR in one of its key policy recommendations, with particular focus on enabling policies and institutions and the application of technologies and approaches, such as crop diversification and crop varieties able to withstand hazards, and conservation agriculture, among others. The relevance of FAO projects that demonstrate such approaches to these corporate commitments is high.

84. The Strategic Framework for FAO 2000-2015 addressed DRR-related issues in several of its corporate strategies. Under its corporate strategy A "Reducing food insecurity and rural poverty', there was a strong focus on emergency preparedness and response, particularly under corporate strategy A3 "*Preparedness for, and effective and sustainable response to, food and agricultural emergencies*". Other corporate strategies with relevance to DRR are C2 "*Adoption of appropriate technology to sustainably intensify production systems and to ensure sufficient supplies of food and agricultural, fisheries and forestry goods and services*", which includes the identification and adoption of more efficient and sustainable agricultural management practices, and D "*Supporting the conservation, improvement and sustainable use of natural resources for food and agriculture"*.

85. The FAO Strategic Framework 2010-2019 lists eleven Strategic Objectives (SOs), two Functional Objectives and eight Core Functions. The Strategic Objectives, each comprising between three and six Organisational Results (OR), are the means by which it is intended to achieve the Global Goals (GG) of FAO.

86. With the Strategic Framework 2010-2019, DRR and DRM became a corporate priority for FAO, reflected in the Strategic Objective I (SO-I) "*Improved preparedness for, and effective response to, food and agricultural threats and emergencies*". SO-I is articulated around three Organizational Results (ORs), or outcomes:

- OR1 – Countries' vulnerability to crisis, threats and emergencies is reduced through better preparedness and integration of risk prevention and mitigation into policies, programmes and interventions;
- OR2 – Countries and partners respond more effectively to crises and emergencies with food and agriculture related interventions;
- OR3 - Countries and partners have improved transition and linkages between emergency, rehabilitation and development.

87. SO-I is therefore based on the three inter-connected pillars of DRM: a) prevention, preparedness and mitigation, considered as DRR; b) response and rehabilitation; and c) transition. The focus of this evaluation is on OR1.

88. DRR might not directly contribute much to the food security of rural people vulnerable to a disaster, especially in a situation where food relief, improved seeds and other inputs may be expected in the immediate aftermath of a disaster (e.g. through SO-I/OR2 and OR3, and other sources). It might be relevant at national level, in the short term, in terms of the stability of national food production. However, there is a much clearer link in the opposite direction - which food security contributes, through improving resilience and reducing vulnerabilities, to DRR. In that case, DRR becomes the goal and food security becomes a strategic objective. DRR is understandably not the goal for FAO, but it is for other organisations. Thus FAO becomes an important strategic partner of those organisations through its mandate and achievements in food security. As stated in the Foreword to the FP DRR "*At FAO, disaster risk reduction (DRR) is about protecting people's livelihoods from shocks, and strengthening their capacity to absorb the impact of, and recover from, disruptive events*". This is best achieved through developing resilience, so FAO's true relevance in addressing DRR lies in continuing to make sound progress towards its vision of food security.

89. The resilience perspective focuses on more programmatic interventions and capacity development and brings together development and emergency work. For FAO, the resilience scope is undoubtedly an appropriate way to address DRR (and DRM).

90. Strategically, FAO has also managed to incorporate emergency responses into a broader disaster risk management approach where the Organisation's core mandate has been maintained, namely developing the agricultural sector. This approach potentially gives FAO a significant advantage in terms of contributing to DRR because its mandate is wider than more traditional emergency oriented organisations. The mandate also stipulates that FAO operates with long-term perspectives which enable the Organisation to address root causes or the so-called underlying risk factors in a more integrated manner.

91. The "*TCE Operational Strategy 2000-2013*"[16] points out the key role for FAO in advocating for more emphasis on food security and agriculture in DRR strategies and work. As it explains: "*FAO must expand its focus to ensure that agriculture and food security become key components of national DRM plans. This will be done in strong partnership with line ministries and institutions and will cover national and local DRM planning and activities*". However, while the TCE Operational Strategy clearly relates to SO-I, it remains less evident how it can be now operationally related to the FP DRR and where the responsibilities lie for implementation of activities under the FP DRR's four pillars: 1) Enable the environment: institutional strengthening and good governance for DRR in agricultural sectors; 2) Watch to Safeguard: information and early warning systems on food and nutrition security and trans-boundary threats; 3) Prepare to Respond: preparedness for effective response and recovery in agriculture, livestock, fisheries and forestry; and 4) Build Resilience: Prevention, mitigation and building resilience with technologies, approaches and practices across all agricultural sectors.

92. Most of the projects reviewed by the Evaluation Team predate the 2010-2019 Strategic Framework, although it is evident that some DRR concepts were already present within FAO prior to the adoption of SO-I and the development of the DRR FP.

Figure 2: FAO DRM Cycle



Source: FAO Strategic Objective I (SO I) Briefing Toolkit, 2011

6 FAO's work in DRR over the period 2006-2011

6.1 FAO's normative work related to DRR

93. A desk study assessing FAO's normative work related to DRR was carried out as part of the overall evaluation exercise.[17] This study found clear indications of the ambitions of FAO in the area of DRR and the Organisation's potential in terms of promoting DRR within its mandate

[16] FAO-TCE, *TCE Operational Strategy 2010 – 2013 "Our road map for the next four years"*, http://typo3.fao.org/fileadmin/user_upload/drm_matrix/docs/TCE%20Operational%20Strategy_Mar2010i.pdf, 2010.

[17] The desk study analysed in detail 17 different normative products. For a more detailed analysis of selected normative products, see the Annex 6 – Normative study resume.

and core areas *vis-a-vis* the normative products. The normative work clearly gives FAO ample ground for contributing to key areas of DRR, not only short-term interventions but also those areas that are vital for addressing countries' capacities in terms of preparing for or mitigating risks on a more long-term perspective. The normative review clearly indicated an organisational change in terms of conceptualising how FAO attempts to address DRR from a wider and more long-term developmental approach. Such an approach, that includes general agricultural development approaches, is enriched by specific sector guidelines that are coherent with FAO's mandate.

94. Reviewing normative work also clearly indicates that FAO has managed, strategically, to incorporate emergency responses into a broader disaster management approach where the Organisation's core mandate has been maintained, namely developing the agricultural sector. This approach potentially gives FAO a significant advantage in terms of contributing to DRR because its mandate is wider than more traditional emergency oriented organisations; FAO operates with long-term perspectives which enable the Organisation to address root causes or the so-called underlying risk factors in a more integrated manner.

95. There is a clear opportunity for FAO in defining the relationship between food security, nutrition, agriculture and DRR. A clear advantage for FAO is the technical expertise the Organisation has across these sectors, which, if adequately capitalised on, represents a wealth of resources with which to realize its leadership potential with respect to knowledge management and advocacy. This is of particular relevance with respect to the longer-term DRR efforts, including slow-onset disasters such as droughts. The potential scope of FAO's work is outlined in the FP DRR's four pillars which are all related to HFA's priority actions 1, 2, 4 and 5.

96. A brief description of how different normative products relate to DRR has been summarised from the normative study, see Annex 6 – Normative study resume.

6.2 DRR Funding

97. FAO's work in DRR is funded through two channels: the Regular Programme and Extra-budgetary resources.

98. The Regular Programme budget (RP), or core budget of the Organisation, proceeds from assessed contributions from FAO member countries. It traditionally supports the Organisation's normative work and finances the Technical Cooperation Programme (TCP). Since 2000, the RP is structured according to Strategic Objectives, encompassing Organisational Results (OR), which correspond to what were called 'Programme Entities' (PE) in previous biennia.

99. Extra-budgetary resources are received from multilateral and bilateral donors and are now the largest funding source of FAO's work, including for work undertaken in the DRR sector. Extra-budgetary funding is channelled through the Government Cooperative Programme (GCP), Unilateral Trust Funds (UTFs) and Trust Funds for emergency assistance (OSROs).

100. Over the period 2006-2011, in Latin America and the Caribbean, DRR was funded through 106 projects, for a total amount of 90,344,633 USD. In Asia, 153 projects were funded, for a total of 327,883,898 USD.

101. Out of the 106 DRR projects in LAC, 55 were funded through the regular Programme budget, for a total of 16,080,907 USD (18% of the total). In Asia, out of 153 DRR projects, 42 were funded through the regular Programme budget, for a total of 14,055,502 USD (4% of the total).

102. During the three financial biennia under consideration (2006-2007, 2008-2009, 2010-2011), the funding for FAO's work in DRR in LAC increased from approximately 14 million USD in 2006-2007 to 40 million USD in 2010-2011, as shown in the Table 1 below. In Asia, on the contrary, the trend over the biennia shows a decrease, even though the total funding was generally higher than in LAC.

Table 1: DRR Funding

	LAC		**ASIA**	
Year project started	***DRR projects (#)***	***Amount (in USD)***	***DRR projects (#)***	***Amount (in USD)***
Prior to 2006	5	3,487,780	13	12,399,300
2006-2007	24	14,457,033	51	187,107,443
2008-2009	43	32,001,105	40	74,085,003
2010-2011	35	40,398,715	49	54,292,152
TOTAL	**106**	**90,344,633**	**153**	**327,883,898**

6.3 Human Resources

103. Retrieving figures about human resources dedicated to DRR from FAO's corporate systems is not an easy task. What the Evaluation Team could obtain from the Office of Strategic Planning (OSP) is the number of posts associated to the strategic programmes, entities or Organizational Results, the names changing according to the different financial years.

104. Three major limitations affected this exercise, which therefore needs to be considered as a proxy:

- Data are only available in relation to the Regular Programme, which is the smallest part of funding for DRR;
- There is no indication of the time allocated to DRR for each post, which can be funded by other budget lines as well in variable percentages; and
- For the financial years 2006-2007 and 2008-2009, only part of the programmes and entities are devoted to DRR.

105. Under the Programme of Work and Budget 2006-2007, two programmes include issues related to DRR. These are i) Programme 2.1.1 "*Natural Resources*", which deals with disaster mitigation through water logging and salinity control and rehabilitation; and ii) Programme 2.1.2 "*Crops*" which contribute to disaster preparedness, seed relief and rehabilitation. For both of them, the distribution of posts among Director, Professional and General Service levels is the following:

Table 2: DRR related posts in 2006-2007

DIVISION		**D**	**P**	**G**	**Total**
AGA	Animal Production and Health Division		1		**1**
FOR	Forest Resources Division		1		**1**
SDA	Rural Development Division		1		**1**
SDR	Research, Extension and Training Division		1		**1**
TCD	Office of Assistant Director-General		1		**1**
TCE	Emergency Operations and Rehabilitation Division	1			**1**
TOTAL		**1**	**5**		**6**

106. The Programme of Work and Budget 2008-2009 includes the Programme entity 4DS02 "*Disaster preparedness, Mitigation and Support to Emergency and Rehabilitation Programme*". Under this budget line, the distribution of posts was the following:

Table 3: DRR related posts in 2008-2009

DIVISION		D	P	G	Total
AGA	Animal Production and Health Division		1		**1**
FOM	Forest Assessment, Management and Conservation Division		1		**1**
NRC	Climate, Energy and Tenure Division		3		**3**
TCD	Office of Assistant Director-General		1		**1**
TCI	Investment Centre Division	1			**1**
TOTAL		**1**	**6**		**7**

107. The Programme of Work and Budget 2010-2011 includes one Organizational Result specifically dedicated to DRR which is SO-I/OR1 "Countries' vulnerability to crisis, threats and emergencies is reduced through better preparedness and integration of risk prevention and mitigation into policies, programmes and interventions". The number of posts funded through this Organizational Results increased substantively, as follows:

Table 4: DRR related posts in 2010-2011

DIVISION		D	P	G	Total
AGA	Animal Production and Health Division		6		**6**
AGD	Office of Assistant Director-General		2		**2**
AGP	Plant Production and Protection Division		1	1	**2**
ESA	Agricultural Development Economics Division			4	**4**
EST	Trade and Markets Division		17	12	**29**
NRC	Climate, Energy and Tenure Division		2		**2**
SAP	Subregional Office for the Pacific Islands		1		**1**
TCD	Office of Assistant Director-General		1		**1**
TCD	Office of Assistant Director-General	2	5	12	**19**
TCI	Investment Centre Division		2		**2**
TOTAL		**2**	**37**	**29**	**68**

108. Notwithstanding the limitations mentioned above, it is possible to get some indications from the number of posts associated to DRR.

109. At the Director level, all posts associated to DRR are in the Technical Cooperation Department and it can be noticed an increase from 1 to 2 posts from the biennium 2008-2009 to the biennium 2010-2011.

110. At the Professional level, the biennia 2006-2007 and 2008-2009, have respectively 5 and 6 posts associated to DRR each. The biennium 2010-2011, with 37 posts, brought a substantial increase, probably due to the specific dedication to DRR of one Organizational Results. It is interesting to note that 17 posts are in the Trade and Markets Division of the Economic and Social Department which works, among others, in the reinforcement and rehabilitation of agriculture and food security information systems and networks like GIEWS as well as in the value chain and in the development of inclusive markets. The Animal Production and Health Division and the Technical Cooperation Department passed respectively from 1 to 6 P posts and from 1 to 8 P posts altogether in the biennium 2010-2011. On the contrary, the Climate, Energy

and Tenure Division, which played a major role in the last biennium, experienced a decrease from 3 to 2 P posts in 2010-2011.

111. At the General Service level, no post has been associated to DRR in the biennia 2006-2007 and 2008-2009. The high number of posts in the biennium 2010-2011 is even more surprising for this reason. They are mostly located in the Trade and Markets Division of the Economic and Social Department and in the Technical Cooperation Department.

SECTION C: ASSESSMENT OF FAO'S ROLE AND WORK IN DRR

7 FAO Interventions Related to Disaster Risk Reduction

112. Analysing DRR interventions at field level over time (2006-2011), the evaluation found a development from an almost exclusive focus on emergencies to more inclusive and holistic approaches. Still though, FAO's support to DRR represents a mix of emergency related interventions where DRR activities have been addressed more explicitly (with clear DRR activities and objectives) and cases in which DRR is addressed more implicitly through FAO's more conventional activities. Some of these latter activities were even considered to have potential for significant contributions towards climate change adaptation (see part 7.3).

113. As mentioned in part 5, FAO has made significant strategic progress in terms of placing DRR within organisational objectives and key publications and normative products (see also part 6.1). While this process indicates a clear strategic coherence, the LAC and the Asia regional evaluations, both point to the fact that many of the strategic DRR publications, particularly the DRR FP, were not sufficiently disseminated and hence not used at country level in terms of informing staff regarding DRR programming (for more analysis, see part 8 FAO Institutional Capacity). The evaluation recognises the fact that the DRR FP was only published towards the end of 2011 and proper usage throughout the organisation can therefore not be expected. The strategy does provide FAO with an opportune reference for future country programming (i.e. within the CPFs) as it appropriately puts resilience building at centre stage by linking it to DRR and food security, which remains to be a key challenge for FAO.[18]

7.1 Relevance of Interventions

114. While the evaluation acknowledges the wide number of DRR interventions carried out across the two regions, two broader but not exclusive patterns of DRR interventions were identified; in LAC they were mostly borne out of livelihood recovery interventions originating from post-disaster support, whereas the Asia interventions, with the evident exception of HPAI, were mostly designed as small scale pilot or small scale interventions for demonstration and testing new knowledge and approaches aiming at increasing food security.

115. A common feature related to DRR interventions over the period evaluated was the limited explicit focus on DRR and the non-recognition (or unawareness) of how some projects implicitly support DRR (and potentially also CCA). Generally, it was found that those projects that were more explicit about DRR were less relevant in terms of contributing to FAO's SO-I/OR1, [19] whereas those with a more implicit DRR focus were found to be more relevant as they were more linked to programmes and national policies.

116. Comparing early projects (2006-2007) with later interventions (2010-2011) there is a clear and progressive use of DRR terminology. Nonetheless, the general finding is that most interventions lacked a clear and realistic approach or programme logic as to how interventions would reduce risks of target populations (i.e. how inputs assumedly would produce outputs and how these would be expected to generate or contribute to outcomes). More than often, interventions were based on assumptions that certain inputs, such as seeds, tools or training, 'automatically' reduce risks (outcomes). These causalities often remained undocumented as they were not monitored or evaluated (see also part 8.4).

[18] See Annex 10 - Conceptual considerations and definitions for explanations of some of the technical concepts used in this part.
[19] OR 1 "*Countries' vulnerability to crisis, threats and emergencies is reduced through better preparedness and integration of risk prevention and mitigation into policies, programmes and interventions*".

117. The LAC evaluation often questioned DRR interventions on their appropriateness and relevance in terms of reducing risks and also their dubious effects to food security. Relevance was questioned because many of them were addressing disaster affected areas, which does not necessarily mean that they address most vulnerable populations or are able to make effective gains in terms of addressing more structural causes of vulnerability (i.e. food insecurity). Moreover, these emergency offsprings did not change their scope (i.e. increasing their relevance) to focus on resilience of local populations and remained focused on re-establishing livelihoods. This means that they are less likely to effectively reduce food insecurity in the medium and long-term perspective.

118. Related findings in earlier FAO evaluations support this view. A 2009 post emergency evaluation[20] found that FAO had difficulties in moving interventions beyond the emergency scope, in stating that "*although the project's objective was to reduce vulnerability of people before natural hazards, the focus of some tools was on emergency response rather than prevention, mitigation and monitoring*". The 2012 Pakistan Floods evaluation also points to the need for FAO to work on the underlying causes noting that "*post relief phase, recovery and risk reduction efforts need to shift emphasis towards programme initiatives which will increase resilience and benefit the individual farmers themselves*".[21]

119. Some explicit projects were however found to be relevant in terms of how they contributed to reducing risks. This was often through corrective measures addressing risks of landslides or riverbed erosion, such as the projects in the Membrillo basin in Ecuador or post-disaster interventions in the Dominican Republic, which contributed to DRR through riverbed protection. This latter experience is also one of the few cases where an intervention has been systematised and replicated in another area and through a joint UN programme.

120. The Plan GRACC in Peru (which may also be developed in Nicaragua according to the Ministry of Agriculture), is an example of an intervention where FAO has supported a more sector wide approach, relevantly linking DRR with food security. The Plan, which was developed through a participatory consultation process, also includes disaster management, laws, regulations and specific initiatives to reduce risks. Such an approach was rarely seen in other countries, with the exception of Bangladesh, but clearly exemplifies the added value FAO gives to interventions when using its core mandated areas and then links these to DRR and not vice versa.

121. Other examples from the LAC report where the promotion of good agricultural practices through PESA (i.e. the Special Programme for Food Security), extension systems in Guatemala, forestry interventions in Ecuador or seed projects in Ecuador and the Dominican Republic. The LAC report further highlights the potential that such interventions may have in terms of effectively contributing to mitigation and prevention of disaster risks, especially in areas affected by droughts, or with the post-harvest management of food stock and seeds and diversification of livelihoods. Crop rotation and sheltering techniques have been particularly successful. Applying manure-based fertilizer to ensure that soil is fertile and capable of retaining water even at high altitudes is also effective. [22]

[20] FAO-OED, *Informe de evaluación final del Proyecto "OSRO/GUA/601/SWE, Restauración de activos de las familias vulnerables pobres afectadas por la Tormenta Stan en la Cuenca del Río Coatán y la parte alta de la Cuenca del Río Suchiate"*, FAO, 2009.

[21] FAO-OED, *An Independent Evaluation of FAO's Response to the July 2010 Floods in Pakistan*, 2012.

[22] FAO has distilled lessons and good practice from the Andean community countries on preparedness measures in the agricultural sector; this includes micro-credit measures, specific mitigation activities, improved agricultural practice water management, trade practices. Quispe, M., Tejada, E., Lindemann, T., & Morra, D., *Asistencia a los países andinos en la reducción de riesgos y desastres en el sector agropecuario: Buenas prácticas: abono bocachi* and *Buenas prácticas: cultivo de papas en Taqanas y canchones*, Bolivia, 2010.

122. Recent DIPECHO project proposals in Asia attempt to incorporate a similar holistic and multi-disciplinary approach. This clearly indicates that FAO coherently is moving in a direction that will enable the Organisation to address DRR (and CCA) challenges employing a more comprehensive and possibly prospective approach.

7.2 Effectiveness of Interventions

123. Effectiveness of many projects, independently of whether they are explicit or implicit, was largely determined by the way they were funded, how they were designed and how they were managed. All of these conditions affected the effectiveness of FAO supported DRR projects.

124. Firstly, a challenge for FAO in terms of promoting DRR interventions has been to ensure that projects are devoted the necessary time for planning, preparation, implementation and lesson learning. Part of the explanation behind this challenge is the funding mechanisms; FAO projects are in part channelled through the Organisation's own TCP mechanism and such funding is typically limited to 12 or 24-month implementation cycles. The main purpose of this mechanism is for FAO to test technology or know-how on the ground and consequently promote these experiences among partners for large-scale implementation and/or policy formulation. Both reports found that FAO had limited time to demonstrate relevance through these interventions. In the LAC region there were no examples of preparatory studies that identified specific vulnerable areas and designed intervention according to needs and projected changes, taking into account different risk factors. The lack of such studies may well compromise the relevance of the interventions.

125. Limited time meant that projects might not have been able to sufficiently test the technologies or know-how in the field to ensure that these are fully relevant to the local context and culturally acceptable. An example was the DRMA and LACC projects in Bangladesh, which did not foster new technology, but instead validated existing technologies aimed at locations that are vulnerable to climatic stresses. However, while a total of 90 adaptation options were technically 'validated', their implementation lifespan was too short to test their applicability to the real context.

126. In both regions, the evaluations found cases where local contextual factors were not sufficiently taken into account. In Nepal, local climatic change has meant that varieties that were used earlier in some geographical zones were no longer appropriate. At times, projects failed to take such considerations into account, which affected their effectiveness.

127. Previous evaluations already pointed out the need to ensure adequate participation of national stakeholders so that local knowledge is properly factored in the design of the projects. Inappropriate operational modalities were also identified as a barrier to achieve the restoration of livelihoods in a 2007 FAO-OED evaluation. This evaluation states that due to its complexity, restoration of livelihoods requires adapted operational modalities that "*cannot be standardised to the same extent as in purely humanitarian operations. It takes time and efforts to study complex livelihoods strategies and find the best ways of rebuilding them. Similarly, considerations of equity, economic efficiency and sustainable management of natural resources are much more complex in livelihoods restoration than in humanitarian interventions. Unwieldy FAO programme procedures and insufficient operational capacity were found to be major constraints during implementation but also in adopting innovative rehabilitation approaches*".[23]

[23] FAO-OED, *Real Time Evaluation of the FAO Emergency and Rehabilitation Operations in Response to the Indian Ocean Earthquake and Tsunami*, 2007.

128. A similar tendency was found in projects visited in Asia, where the team found examples of incomplete preparations that consequently affected project effectiveness. Common to these projects were their limited budget frames and short durations. The evaluation also identified projects that were unrealistically designed in terms of number of activities and level of funding and time to implement them. In the case of Nepal, a climate change adaptation project suffered from this challenge, with the result that most activities were not implemented and those that were carried out left much to be desired in terms of concrete results. Thirdly, across most of the activities the evaluation has assessed in the field, there was a general absence of proper monitoring, systematisation of experiences and use of lessons learned. Most projects did not include monitoring beyond output levels, leaving FAO with limited alternatives (except from anecdotal evidence) in terms of documenting outcomes or results. This again affects the effectiveness of FAO's upstream work and the Organisation's ability to promote good practices and advocate for policy changes or up-scaling local level experiences. The LAC evaluation found no examples in the entire region exemplifying how FAO had documented experiences (as opposed to the documentation of others good practice) and brought them to a different level through up-scaling or informing policy formulation.

129. Many FAO activities that are not linked to emergency operations involve standard agricultural extension work, such as in Nepal and the Philippines, and to some extent they could fall under the implicit category of projects with potential contributions to DRR (and CCA – see part 7.3). An example of such implicit interventions and the potential linkages to watershed management was highlighted in a 2010 independent evaluation on FAO's role and work related to water, which found "*noticeable that FAO is starting to implement climate change adaptation plans as high priority within national DRR plans*". The same evaluation points out that "*the growing global attention on climate change and water scarcity issues puts FAO in a unique situation as it has a long history in watershed management and land tenure*".[24]

130. However, according to extension officials in some of the Asian countries, the most important contribution of the FAO projects was the funding, which enabled more inputs to be provided than under government demonstration programmes. In other words, in Asia, FAO has generally not managed to effectively promote relevant DRR or CCA sensitive programmes under the on-going extension programmes (i.e. the implicit interventions have had limited effects). Apart from some of the factors already mentioned affecting effectiveness, other factors influence such perceptions including FAO staff technical capacity (see part 8). This proves a notable challenge of balancing the coherence between strategic considerations and objectives and field level interventions.

131. Effectiveness of FAO interventions has been also considered in the context of increasing technical capacity within the national agricultural services in LAC and Asia, making it more and more challenging for FAO to add specific value to certain processes, including traditional extension work, but increasingly also agricultural research. This is particularly the case in countries like the Philippines and Indonesia, where it was recognised that many of the technologies promoted through FAO projects were already familiar to national and local level government staff. The opportunity in those and most other countries is, however, to raise awareness of practices where the linkages between agriculture and climate change are more evident. This would also mean that FAO could explore options for creating more internal coherence in terms of defining broader multi-disciplinary interventions that cut across food security, resilience, DRR, CCA and traditional FAO interventions.

[24] FAO-OED, *Evaluation of FAO' s role and work related to water*, 2010.

132. An example is a post-tsunami intervention in Banda Aceh in Indonesia. In this case, FAO has supported the construction of fish ponds and diversification of livelihoods within coastal communities. However, these communities remain in the same areas that were devastated by the 2004 tsunami. The Asia evaluation therefore questioned whether such reactive interventions are effective in terms of reducing risks as the community remains exposed to tsunamis and will be exposed again should another wave hit the area. If populations were relocated to higher grounds, a corrective measure, the populations would be less exposed to tsunami threats – hence reducing risks. Another intervention in Nusa Tenggara Timur (NTT) in Indonesia of maize seed supply, labelled as DRR, would be highly unlikely to achieve risk reduction due in part to inappropriate design and limited time for sufficient testing of seed variations.

133. Another challenge with some of the DRR explicit projects is that most of them have been formulated as part of a post-disaster intervention, such as the Banda Aceh intervention or many of the projects revised in LAC, and were often reactive in nature, hence focusing on re-establishing what was there before, while limited or no attention was devoted to the root causes of food insecurity or the so-called underlying risk factors. While such interventions therefore are relevant in terms of addressing post-disaster needs, they become less relevant when it comes to the multi-disciplinary and programmatic dimensions as per SO-I/OR1 after 2010.

134. This means that the so-called reactive interventions would only occasionally address such underlying factors because they are more often designed to restore what was lost during a disaster. These findings were echoed in a 2012 emergency evaluation saying that FAO needs to think beyond the emergency scope as opportunity "*exists to develop a country program framework that not only prioritises emergency preparedness and response, but also works to tackle the underlying causes of vulnerability to the recurrent hazards of floods, drought, and earthquakes* [in Pakistan]".[25]

135. FAO has been engaged in agricultural work for decades and many of these activities have the potential to reduce risks or include measures that aim at adapting agricultural practices to changes in climate. Examples of such practices were many in the Andean Region where some were assessed more in detail (and probably elsewhere as well). The two regional evaluations did find that FAO has significant potential in contributing more effectively to DRR (and CCA) through the Organisation's core activities, including extension work, land use and natural resource and environmental service management and management of watershed areas and coastlines.

136. As FAO does not label these activities as DRR, they were only scarcely included in the evaluation process. However, from a DRR perspective, and in relation to the SO-I/OR1, they may provide the Organisation with a more effective and relevant entry point to DRR than interventions arising from emergency responses. One reason for this is that these interventions were developed to address sector problems or challenges, such as food varieties, recovering traditional agricultural practices (Andean region) or other more autochthonous support mechanisms such as land use management, coastal management, to take but a few examples.

7.3 Climate Change Adaptation

137. There is a wider acknowledgement of the linkage between DRR and climate change, evidenced by increasing literature and scientific evidence, and recently by the IPCC special report (2012), which concludes that "*closer integration of disaster risk management and climate change*

[25] FAO-OED, *An Independent Evaluation of FAO's Response to the July 2010 Floods in Pakistan*, 2012.

adaptation, along with the incorporation of both into local, sub-national, national, and international development policies and practices, could provide benefits at all scales".[26] FAO is progressively moving in the same direction, and this is clearly demonstrated at the corporate level with the publication of the FP DRR. Though CCA receives relatively limited attention in the publication, it represents a first institutional attempt to bridge the two areas. While agricultural research and extension has traditionally addressed adaptation to prevailing constraints related to farming, such as pests, diseases, floods and droughts, a major operational challenge for FAO is the persistent division internally between different departments. This division may have slowed down progress towards conceptualising (at strategic and normative levels) CCA and DRR in more complementary ways (see also part 8).

138. This process is also reflected in FAO's engagement at country level, where CCA is gaining more space in FAO projects and proposals in recent years, as compared to the limited presence it had around 2006. The separation of the two approaches is not something FAO is struggling with alone, as most UNDAF documents assessed in LAC demonstrated the same tendency of separating DRR and CCA. In Nepal, the multi-agency supported Flagship Programme still keeps a focus on DRR, despite the immediate challenges the country faces in terms of climate change.[27] In Indonesia, the major donors and the government focus on climate mitigation, whereas civil defence addresses disaster risk reduction according to their mandate and capacity. This obviously implies disregarding or taking insufficient notice of issues that are more development related and not strictly considered within the realm of emergencies and reconstruction phases. This division leaves a gap in terms of addressing corrective and prospective issues related both to CCA and DRR, particularly factors that generate risks and maintain populations exposed to disasters. Such a division is not uncommon in most countries in Asia and Central America, as these areas have been – and still are – home to recurrent disasters. And while Peru has started to consider DRR and CCA in a more integrated mode, partly thanks to the Plan GRACC, the general tendency from both regions is that FAO has not managed to fill this gap and promote interventions that effectively reduce risks.

7.4 Sustainability and scaling-up of supported interventions

139. Despite the Evaluation Team's inability to exhaustively analyse the DRR interventions (mainly due to the lack of project monitoring data and weak project documentation), there are some clear indications pointing to the fact that most interventions tend to be unsustainable and will only last as long as FAO supports them, technically and financially. The main reason for this is that finance for most activities is very limited and duration is therefore short, leaving FAO little time to develop the necessary capacities for technical sustainability and ownership among counterparts. Even consecutive projects (i.e. those that build on earlier interventions) that at times had significant funding and lengthy time frames, did not pay sufficient attention to sustainability. Examples of these were the EC food facility in Guatemala and Cambodia, which have been not integrated or taken over by existing local organisations or national authorities.

140. Even successful interventions such as Plan GRACC in Peru will have to address the institutional capacities among national counterparts more comprehensively in order to ensure that the Plan will become operable and sustainable over time. In Peru the Evaluation Team found good evidence of capacity being developed among local counterparts, but according to local authorities, the project has not continued as additional funding was not available to finance

[26] See: http://ipcc-wg2.gov/SREX/images/uploads/SREX-All_FINAL.pdf

[27] According to an interview with the UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordination's Office in Nepal, maintaining the focus on DRR is done deliberately by the UN in order not to confuse matters and ensure a focus on DRR relevant issues until these are minimally addressed.

further replication. A similar problem was found in Ecuador and Bolivia, with other projects, where local partners were said to have insufficient capacity and financial recourses that would ensure sustainability. Post Hurricane Felix forest fire control facility on the Atlantic Coast of Nicaragua struggled with high maintenance costs that could not be met by local authorities, with the result that only five of 28 watchtowers are in use today (FAO financed five and USAID the rest).

141. The factors highlighted above also mean that interventions supported by FAO were hardly ever replicated or scaled up. Part of the explanation lies in the fact that FAO devoted insufficient time to ensure government ownership and participation in project design and implementation (see part 10.1.1).

142. Additionally, FAO invested insufficient time and resources to project monitoring and documentation of good practices, which again affected internal learning and knowledge management. The Organisation therefore had limited opportunities to replicate (or advocate for) successful experiences in other places because the intervention logic (i.e. what worked and what did not, and why) has been insufficiently documented (see also part 8).

7.5 Early Warning

143. Evidence shows that FAO has a good track record of setting up early warning systems (EWS) within the agriculture sector.[28] Early warning is an essential part of DRR and falls under the HFA Priority Action 2 "*Identify, assess and monitor disaster risks and enhance early warning*". Timely weather forecasting and early warning of changes in climate is a critical factor in agriculture. The Joint Thematic Evaluation of FAO and WFP Support to Information Systems also pointed out that "*early warning is critical for all food security stakeholders*".[29] FAO started to develop the Information and Early Warning System following the 1981 Ethiopian hunger crisis. Since then, FAO has assisted member countries in establishing food security information, mapping risks to agricultural related livelihoods, vulnerability and risk assessment, food production and markets, data gathering and analysis, statistical baselines and the development of early warning systems. [30]

144. FAO has developed multiple information, monitoring and early warning system tools. For food security FAO developed three major instruments, which are:[31]

- The Global Information and Early Warning System on Food Chain and Agriculture (GIEWS) aiming at providing up-to-date and independent information on agricultural production and commodity markets, food supply and demand, food prices, crop prospects and requirements for external assistance;
- The Emergency Systems for Transboundary Animal Diseases and Food Safety Hazards (EMPRES) of the Food Chain Crisis Management Framework (FCC), aiming at preventing and controlling livestock and plant pests and diseases, and at surveying for newly emerging pathogens;
- The Global Forest Fire Information Management System (GFIMS), providing real-time monitoring of forest fires.

[28] Literature reviewed contained large amounts of information on FAO's work in monitoring rainfall and vegetation, animal pests and diseases, markets, and crops. Little information was captured on monitoring fish disease, wild fires, country statistics, food prices, and crop forecasting.
[29] FAO - WFP, *Joint Thematic Evaluation of FAO and WFP: Support to Information Systems for Food Security*, 2009.
[30] FAO-OED, *Independent Evaluation of FAO's Role and Work in Statistics*, 2008.
[31] FAO - WFP, *Joint Thematic Evaluation of FAO and WFP: Support to Information Systems for Food Security*, 2009.

145. FAO has also developed the Integrated Food Security and Humanitarian Phase Classification (IPC), an inter-agency classification and analysis of food security situations at the national and sub-national levels. A second version of the IPC, designed to capture vulnerabilities over time, is currently being rolled out by FAO in some Asian countries, including Bangladesh and Nepal. Such a tool will, if implemented accordingly and used effectively, provide FAO with data that allow for more prospective programming.

146. The FP DRR indicates that FAO is striving to make early warning systems more integrated, and more focused on prevention and less on response measures. FAO is developing a more holistic monitoring and integrated analysis of environmental threats (e.g. wild fires), climate-related and geological hazards (e.g. droughts and floods) and socio-economic threats (e.g. volatility in agricultural commodity markets).[32] Furthermore, during the briefing, interviewees explained that FAO is creating new tools and is building on previous tools to better integrate information from several monitoring and early warning systems such the GFIMS, GIEWS, FCC EMPRES, IPC mentioned above but also the Fishery Resource Monitoring System (FIRMS) and the Global Early Warning System (GLEWS). This should lead to more inclusive and integrated analysis, if followed by early action, to prevent food chain crises and other emergencies leading to food insecurity. It will however require that FAO manages to integrate these instruments in a more holistic and multi-disciplinary approach to a larger degree than before, as foreseen in the 2010-2019 Strategic Framework and the FP DRR. A 2009 evaluation found that "*food security information is mainly used to inform decisions on response actions to emergency and humanitarian situations, while the application for longer-term development related decisions is much less apparent*".[33]

147. While FAO is recognised for its work on early warning systems in Africa, particularly in the Horn of Africa,[34] the evaluation however found that usage of the tools was very limited in Asia and LAC. In terms of FAO's mandate, early warning and how it links to food security is closely linked to slow-onset disasters (i.e. rainfall patterns and crop surveillance) and surveillance mechanisms related to the spread of animal disease or food prices. Examples from the field were the upstream weather station for an improved early warning scheme for flash floods in Nepal, implemented in collaboration with a local NGO, along with the provision of equipment under the TCP funded project in the Philippines' Bicol Region. In the latter case, effectiveness of the experience was limited by the factors outlined in part 7.2.

148. While FAO is making progress in developing more integrated early warning systems, an evaluation of 2009 stated that "*existing early warning functions still tend to focus on agricultural production*"[35] and less for preventive and prospective planning purposes. A 2011 evaluation recognised the effectiveness of the Food Insecurity and Vulnerability Information and Mapping Systems (FIVIMS) in providing a "*characterisation of the food insecure and vulnerable population groups and improving understanding through cross-sectoral analysis of the underlying causes, and using evidence-based information and analysis to advocate for the formulation and implementation of policies and programmes enhancing food security and nutrition*".[36] The same evaluation also found that "*Systems such as the Global Information and Early Warning System (GIEWS) and products such as FAOSTAT, Food Outlook and the Report on the State of World Food Insecurity in the World (SOFI) are well acknowledged and used by governments, donors, UN agencies and INGOs and present real opportunities to more effectively*

[32] FAO, *Resilient Livelihoods - Disaster Risk Reduction for Food and Nutrition Security Framework Programme*, 2011.
[33] FAO - WFP, *Joint Thematic Evaluation of FAO and WFP: Support to Information Systems for Food Security*, 2009.
[34] See: http://daraint.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/HCT-Somalia_Evaluation_2005-2010_DARA_Report.pdf
[35] FAO - WFP, *Joint Thematic Evaluation of FAO and WFP: Support to Information Systems for Food Security*, 2009.
[36] FAO-OED, *Evaluation of FAO's role and work in nutrition*, 2011.

include nutrition data and analysis into these. There is, however, a demand for such systems and products to be more easily accessed and for concise presentation of the information".[37]

149. The most effective contribution of FAO to early warning and preparedness in Asia has been in animal disease, namely related to the HPAI. In all Asian countries visited FAO supported governments to set up surveillance, reporting and testing capacities. For example, the Participatory Disease Surveillance Response (PDSR) in Indonesia has supported the country in building up a surveillance system for early detection of the disease that can potentially support decision makers in taking more informed decisions and rapid action with regards to HPAI-related issues. In Cambodia, where FAO uses already-existing community agriculture extension workers, they were trained in surveillance of potential virus risks and enabled the government to reach out to numerous local communities. In the Philippines, local agricultural extension workers at district level undertook regular surveillance, coordinated (and paid by) departmental agricultural offices. Surveillance included all entry points of the department (sea and airports and main transport roads). See part 12 for a more detailed analysis of FAO's role in animal disease prevention and in particular in HPAI.

7.6 DRR Mainstreaming and Policy Advice to Member Countries

150. Mainstreaming DRR into national sectoral and territorial policies is considered to be the most effective measure to reduce risks.[38] Effective mainstreaming is done either within sector-specific plans or broader multi-disciplinary strategies. However, as UNISDR's last two Global Assessment Reports have demonstrated, mainstreaming of DRR is a challenge and very much still needs to be done in terms of moving beyond the dominating emergency-led DRM and towards more comprehensive approaches. The evaluation has analysed the role FAO has played in terms of mainstreaming DRR into wider national strategies and also assessing results from the Organisation's policy engagement.

151. As mentioned in part 7 as well as part 8.2, successful DRR interventions require strong staff capacity, especially in mid-income countries like Peru, Indonesia and the Philippines, where existing technical capacity is already strong. This also applies to advocacy and policy dialogue, which are preconditions for successful and effective mainstreaming. However, even in low-income countries, where capacities are inferior, including some Central American and Asian countries, FAO has not managed to leave a clear footprint in terms of mainstreaming DRR into national policies.

152. Exceptions are Peru's Plan GRACC and promotion of the law on Food and Nutritional Sovereignty and Security in the Dominican Republic. Another project that deserves attention is the PESA Guatemala, which has been developed based on validation and systematisation of good agricultural practices, and which may implicitly have positive effects on DRR. The challenge of insufficient monitoring and documentation, which is dealt with in more details in part 8.4, was a general hindrance for measuring effects of FAO interventions, including mainstreaming.

153. In Central American countries, again most prominently in Guatemala, FAO's advocacy work has led the government to place greater emphasis on small scale farmers than in the past through interventions that focus on food security and livelihoods. The so-called *Plan Hambre* (Hunger Plan) and *Programa Agricultura Familiar* (the Agricultural Family Programme) are examples of such engagement. Furthermore, these efforts are highly pertinent as Guatemala represents the region's worst nutrition figures. The Guatemala example is also proof that FAO,

[37] *Ibid.*
[38] UNISDR's Global Assessment Report, 2011.

when capacity and conditions in the partner country are in place, can engage effectively at policy level, drawing on its field experiences.

154. Capacity constraints mean that FAO Country offices are often more involved in project management than upstream work (which also clearly affects the effectiveness of mainstreaming activities). Countries like Bolivia, Nicaragua, Laos, Cambodia and Nepal could benefit more from FAO's policy support in terms of mainstreaming DRR into agriculture. However, in these countries, FAO staff was more focused on project implementation and less on systematising experiences and bringing them into policy dialogue. In the case of Nicaragua, it was the Ministry of Agriculture, and not FAO, that brought up the idea of adapting Plan GRACC from Peru. Policy engagement in Indonesia was also low, whereas in the Philippines FAO collaborates closely with the government on food security related issues from a specific office within the government compound. The example of the Philippines again proved that with the right capacities in place and sound dialogue with the government, processes can be moved forward. It follows, therefore, that more can be done within FAO CO to strengthen the dialogue in countries like Guatemala, Nicaragua, Ecuador, Nepal and the Philippines where DRR is a national priority.

155. From project documents, there are clear expectations that FAO DRR (including CCA) interventions will produce policy outcomes from the disaster risk and climate sensitive demonstrations in the field. Project documents were in general relevant with regards to national priorities and coherent with FAO's strategic frameworks and with the FP DRR. However, policy influence is a long-term process that, in the case of FAO, arises from field experiences and documented good practices. Generally, the field practice of FAO has not yielded the expected results due to the conditions that were outlined earlier in part 7.2.

156. The gap between projects and mainstreaming was exemplified in Nepal. Here FAO has supported the government in developing a national 5-Year Plan of Action (2011-15) on food security. However, it was not clear either to the staff at the FAO CO in Nepal or to national and international counterparts, how the policy was to be implemented (most counterparts had actually never heard about the document). While coherent with the FP-DRR, the document *per se* made no references to existing instruments in Nepal, like the earlier mentioned Flagship Programme. At the time of the evaluation, implementation of the Plan of Action had not yet begun. Finally, while the policy document did make references to local level FAO supported CCA experiences,[39] these were not, however, assessed very positively by the evaluation (see part 7.1), as they were considered to be conceptually too wide and with no or only very limited technical and financial capacity to sustain them. Furthermore, there was no systematisation of the experiences or sufficient documentation of outcomes. It is therefore questionable on what basis or evidence the policy was developed. The lack of ownership towards the Plan within FAO CO in Kathmandu, and limited knowledge among counterparts, questions the overall relevance of the document and its chances for successful (effective) implementation.

157. Another factor that limits effects of mainstreaming is that projects generally pay limited attention to the absorption capacity of government counterparts. The team has found no document or analysis that looks at or guides FAO staff in analysing the existing capacities of counterparts before engaging in different project activities (see also part 9 on FAO's role in capacity development). The risk of this is that governments may not take the necessary ownership of activities after FAO's support to them ends (as seems to be the case in the example from Nepal). Another example from Cambodia further evidences this challenge. A policy component of the EU Food Facility Project in Cambodia was 'maintained alive' by FAO. After project closure, there

[39] The first project was a TCP that was later followed up by two Joint UN Projects.

was no follow up and the policy initiatives faded out (See also part 9 for more analysis on capacity development).

158. Of the countries visited in Asia, FAO has been the most effective in its policy support work in Bangladesh, where the National Food Policy Capacity Strengthening Programme (NFPCSP) has produced policy briefs, resulting from its research grant programme, on topics ranging from safety nets to street food. However the most important contribution has been the development of the National Food Policy, followed by the formulation of the strategy for implementation and monitoring of the policy through the Plan of Action 2008-15 and the Country Investment Plan 2011-15, with DRR mainstreamed into them. Both of these are well known and respected by government, civil society and donor stakeholders.

159. In Indonesia, the evaluation also witnessed several attempts by FAO to develop action plans for DRR in the agriculture sector, either within government departments or in geographically determined areas, both cases however without noteworthy success. For example, the district strategic plans in NTT (Indonesia) supported by FAO, with WFP and UNICEF participation, have in most cases not been implemented and the Provincial BAPPEDA (Indonesian abbreviation for regional body for planning and development) has started to undertake a Provincial FNS Strategic Planning (as part of a national programme supported by WFP and UNICEF, but not FAO) without reference to these district plans. It seems, therefore, that there is no prospect of the district plans being put to use. The development of action plans is promoted by many organisations, and FAO clearly does not have a comparative advantage. On the other hand, FAO is stronger on more mainstream policy formulation and implementation in food and agriculture, which often implicitly include DRR elements.

160. Despite FAO's focus in Asia on DRR demonstrations, capacity development and to some extent on DRR plans and plans of action, donors and other stakeholders expect FAO to use its position as a UN agency for more effective upstream work. This expectation includes influencing member states to integrate DRR (and CCA) into agricultural policy and facilitation of policy dialogue between the government, donors and NGOs.

7.7 Conclusions

161. FAO is undergoing a change process wherein DRR has gained more space and higher prioritisation across the Organisation. Recent strategies and projects, particularly in Asia, also give attention to CCA. This is a positive development that, if supported by the adequate institutional capacity, can place FAO in a central position in terms of bridging the gap and conceptual understanding between disasters, vulnerabilities, food security, resilience and climate change adaptation. All of these areas fit well within FAO's mandate and are concerns that rank high on the international agenda.

162. This evaluation recognises that FAO strategically is moving in a coherent direction in terms of addressing DRR more holistically and mainstreamed. However, DRR experiences in the field still need to adopt this new and different way of understanding DRR, which can potentially increase their effectiveness (see part 7.2) and relevance (see 7.1). Most of the experiences that were assessed in the field were either post-emergency interventions or short duration pilot or demonstration projects often characterised by inadequate design and unattainable objectives in consideration of their prevailing funding and implementation framework. These factors consequently also affected the effectiveness of the interventions and prevented them from generating the expected outcomes (or impacts) and attaining the necessary sustainability (see part 7.4).

163. DRR performance can be significantly improved. This, however, is not strictly related to DRR *per se* but also related to FAO's overall operational performance. Limited funding for too many activities at country level is a constraint for achieving more effective and relevant interventions. Limited funding and capacity constraints also call for a prioritisation of countries where the relevance of implementing a multi-disciplinary approach along the lines of the resilience framework must be documented through in-depth (causal) analyses that allow FAO to address most vulnerable groups and the root causes of their food insecurity.

164. Slow onset disasters and average changes in rainfall or temperatures, accelerated by climate change, are factors that need to be analysed more closely. This is mainly due to the fact that geographical areas affected by such phenomena, and the potential consequences to societies and populations, are less self-evident and causalities less clear, as compared to hurricanes, tropical storms, floods or earthquakes.

165. Early warning tools have so far not been sufficiently used under the DRR framework, with the exception of interventions around emergency responses. However, the anticipated focus, according to the FP DRR, to use these tools more proactively and in relation to prevention and anticipatory analyses related to natural hazards and climate change is a relevant and appropriate step in the direction of designing more coherent and prospective interventions.

166. Globally, FAO is acknowledged for its normative and technical capacity related to agriculture, fisheries and forestry. However, the Organisation often has difficulties in effectively influencing DRR policy at the country level. When FAO is assisting member countries, previous evaluations recommended that the Organisation needs to set clear priorities for its role in country-level policy assistance and that FAO should focus on countries that need FAO policy assistance most, rather than presuming that it can do everything everywhere.[40]

167. From a general perspective, the unsuccessful attempts to mainstream DRR is linked to ineffective interventions failing to clearly document how FAO, through different projects, has managed to reduce risks and food insecurity. The causality between inputs and outputs and outcomes remains to be based on assumptions and not real evidence. On this basis, it is difficult for member states to design proper DRR mainstreaming. However, promoting mainstreaming requires more than project outcome documentation. Factors analysed in this part, combined with FAO's limited institutional capacity (see part 8) and insufficient focus on capacity development (see part 9) adds to the complexity of DRR mainstreaming.

8 FAO Institutional Capacity

168. As mentioned earlier, DRR in FAO arose from emergency responses and consequently the emergency approach and thinking have largely dominated the DRR interventions. Only recently, there have been prompting signs that DRR has become part of more long-term considerations. The ongoing decentralisation within FAO affects the emergency division in particular, with many of its staff members being offered positions outside Rome. At the same time, there are plans to move away from the silo structure that henceforth has characterised the Organisation.

169. It is nonetheless thanks to the emergency operations that FAO has gained valuable emergency preparedness and recovery experience, both through participating in the last decades' major emergencies, but also through small post-emergency interventions. This focus has also

[40] Several evaluations are referenced in FAO-OED, *FAO's Role and Work in Food and Agriculture Policy*, 2012.

been very marked throughout the countries visited by the evaluation mission, particularly in LAC. In this region the vast majority of projects that were either directly evaluated through field visits or assessed through interviews and desk studies originated from emergency responses. Asia has some examples, mostly linked to HPAI and Tsunami recovery interventions. The result of these projects is that only a few of them were focused on the longer-term dimension of DRR and CCA.

170. The capacity within FAO currently reflects this focus on preparedness and post-emergency recovery; there are few resources in the Organisation with sufficient capacity to guide FAO offices on DRR and particularly CCA. The few people (2-3 depending on availability and other tasks) available at headquarter levels are not full-time dedicated to DRR. This pattern is also the case for Regional offices. As a consequence, most Country offices claimed that they have received limited or no support from Headquarters or Regional offices in terms of DRR programming or strategic guidance. This also means that the Organisation lacks a specific qualified unit that guides DRR and CCA implementation and mainstreaming. With the limited resources in place at country level, it is almost unavoidable that DRR support in the countries mirrors the DRR view of Headquarters and therefore to a lesser extent becomes embedded at country level.

171. Until the publication of the FP DRR, there was limited strategic guidance in FAO on DRR and most DRR-related publications were based on sector specific issues or linked to emergency responses. Until the framework is properly disseminated, staff in the countries lacks guidance on how DRR relates to areas such as food security and climate change. Consequently, the Organisation has experienced certain difficulties in moving DRR interventions away from the emergency focus and into development oriented areas.

8.1 Organization and management arrangements

172. FAO considers DRR a crosscutting issue with no single department dedicated to manage and support it. Post disaster asset replacement (i.e. recovery programmes), as extensions of humanitarian assistance, came under the dedicated Operations Management structures at the country and HQ levels. As emergency response in Asia is mostly handled by governments without the assistance of the UN, humanitarian capacities within the FAO offices in Asia is limited, not considering HPAI. The exception among the countries visited was Bangladesh, where a sizable humanitarian structure was in place that was eventually merged with the FAO CO. This arrangement helped to improve synergies between the humanitarian and development programmes and facilitated more efficient use of the resources.

173. Within FAO HQ, preparation of the FP DRR document brought several departments and experts together around a common issue for well over a year. This process helped the various departments understand the multi-disciplinary nature of DRR in agriculture and their respective roles in it. The Evaluation Team believes that although cooperation has improved, programming has remained in 'silos', divided by technical areas and divisions, despite the common SO-I. The most likely reason is the lack of cross-divisional work planning. Limited human and financial resources are also obstacles; for most of the staff the team met, DRR is an add-on, and not core to their work. Collaboration in terms of joint planning, design and implementation of projects is still restricted by the organisational structure and culture. Again, the key explanation seems to be the hitherto sharp division between areas and divisions (i.e. development vs. emergencies), which were also reflected in the strategic frameworks of FAO. Such divisions may have prevented the institution from entering a more regular and structured management and use of system-wide knowledge.

174. In practical terms there is no co-planning and very little co-implementation within FAO HQ and this is mirrored at the country level, even though collaboration is encouraged in project planning documents. The strongest level of collaboration that was observed was between the country programmes and RAP on the HPAI programme, necessitated by the transboundary and zoonotic nature of the disease. A regional coordination centre has been established in Bangkok at this aim.

175. Management of the DRR pilot or demonstration projects followed a less complex but similar top-down structure due to limited human and financial resources dedicated to this area of work. Technical support came from FAO Rome – mostly from NRC. Day to day management of projects remained at the country level. However, national staff regarded the management of projects rather top-down and several of the local staff members felt that it reduced local ownership of their projects. Partners supported this argument indicating that at times it was difficult to collaborate with the Organisation as it is not easy to know who is managing activities and whether they are from the country, regional or HQ level.

176. A challenge within FAO seems therefore to be that the Organisation does not implement many programmes from within the country, which not only affects ownership, but possibly also quality. The decentralisation process is surely a step in the right direction if the right people with the right skills take up positions at country or Regional office levels.

177. An exception in terms of management has been the HPAI interventions across Asia. According to the donors of the HPAI programme, FAO has done a good job in managing a complex programme. For example, in Indonesia, the WHO, which covers the human infection component, is regarded as less successful than FAO by the key donor in tracking budgets. FAO was also commended for communicating well and providing good coordination to the donors and with the Government (this praise was recurrent among donors and governments in various countries in Asia, including Nepal, Cambodia and in particular Indonesia). Furthermore, FAO has been commended for its excellent technical capacity both by the government and donor partners practically in all countries. The HPAI programme was largely managed from the ECTAD coordination centre in Bangkok, and there might be some interesting learning for FAO to document concerning this and other aspects of the programme.

8.2 Technical capacities for DRR (HQ, ROs and COs)

> "*FAO has an absolute comparative advantage. This comparative advantage could nevertheless be endangered by the continuing erosion of technical capacity*" (Independent External Evaluation of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 2007)

178. People interviewed in FAO at all levels recognised that there is currently insufficient capacity on DRR at FAO HQ, RAP and the Country offices to support the development and implementation of DRR/CCA strategies and programmes. A member of RAP staff has recently been given DRR responsibilities, but these are additional to existing duties and leaves only very limited opportunities to attend the vast region. In some ways, the identification of insufficient human resources for DRR as a problem indicates a growing FAO interest and corporate level commitment to the subject.

179. The team found that demands from governments for DRR support from FAO were limited. While there are incipient signs of attention shifting from response to a longer-term approach to DRR, particularly pushed by the CCA agenda and supported by UN agencies through awareness raising, FAO's progress with agriculture is still lagging behind other sectors such as education, health and shelter, despite the clear linkage between agriculture and DRR

mainstreaming. The limited capacities within FAO prevent the Organisation from positioning this linkage more forcefully and clearly, both in terms of documenting experiences from the field and also concrete policy advice and advocacy.

8.3 Visibility and Funding

180. Donor commitment to DRR and CCA is levelling off and it has traditionally been difficult to attract donor funding for the longer-term interventions related to DRR, as has been the case for FAO. While OECD DAC donors recognise the importance of funding DRR (i.e. DFID committed to spend 10% of humanitarian funding on DRR, and recently the Dutch Government has shown interest as well[41]) and talks have been ongoing for years around allocating 1% of ODA to DRR, most donors have largely failed to live up to those commitments. However, recipient governments, the UN and international organisations also have a responsibility of demonstrating outcomes and the usefulness of DRR funding as a way of sensitising sceptic donors.

181. In the case of FAO, demonstrating the effects of DRR investments is a major challenge due to inappropriate (or non-existent) monitoring designs (see also part 8.4). Instead of addressing concerns in terms of where resources are spent most effectively, organisations like FAO have the necessary responsibility to provide clear visibility of the interventions they support and how they contribute to reducing risks. Improved transparency and documentation of results could potentially attract donor and partner government's attention and interest. Furthermore, partner governments have more and more decision-making powers in terms of allocation of donor funding, and it is therefore important that FAO can demonstrate results and added value, particularly for the agriculture sector where capacities, negotiation leverage and experiences are still limited.

182. FAO also needs to give more visibility to DRR as part of the Organisation's overall fundraising efforts. In the countries visited, the Evaluation Team did not identify development investments into FAO DRR programmes. As one FAO Representative said "*FAO is trying to 'imitate' rural development out of humanitarian budgets* [...] *objectives are developmental but funding is barely for piloting*". At the same time, development programmes of FAO do not consider disaster risks systematically. A number of national funds exist for DRM, but are still mainly used for emergency responses. National investment plans hardly address DRR and there is a growing tendency that CCA attracts an increasing share of funds from development.

183. A number of disaster-prone countries in Asia, such as Indonesia and the Philippines, are now lower medium-income countries, meaning they are entering partnership agreements with donors and less so assistance agreements. This also means that most external funding comes through loans. This obviously affects FAO's access to funding and it is unlikely that these countries will ask FAO to manage loans. Combined with the increasing institutional capacities in these middle-income countries (i.e. governance, academic, specific research oriented), FAO needs to ensure that the Organisation still adds technical value in order to access donor funding, which otherwise would go directly to member state's own institutions.

8.4 Monitoring, Evaluation and Knowledge Management

184. Results at the outcome level are not documented and FAO only reports on completed activities. This represents a significant flaw in terms of information management and documentation of results, how they are achieved and how FAO in the end contributes to food

[41] See report from http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/Aid-investments-in-disaster-risk-reduction-rhetoric-to-action-Dan-Sparks1.pdf

security through DRR interventions. Apart from not explicitly knowing the causalities between interventions and effects (outcomes), the general lack of documentation means that interventions are less attributable to medium or long-term outcomes. Intervention logics and causality analysis are needed to inform the strategic direction of FAO support to DRR and CCA and how these interventions may have an effect on longer-term and structural food security. This lack of information basically also means that FAO cannot guarantee its donors (and partner governments) that certain investments (donations) have produced the outcomes that were agreed on (in project/programme proposals).

185. The main reason behind this challenge is that DRR projects are generally characterised by weak or even inexistent monitoring and evaluation, which consequently translates into a lack of information within the Organisation of what works, why and under what conditions. Bluntly, under such circumstances, FAO is ill placed in terms of documenting whether expected outcomes have been attained or not. This poses an additional challenge, which relates to lack of accountability towards FAO's donors, partner governments and their constituents.

186. Monitoring and evaluation also serves learning purposes within the Organisation. For example, differences in effects between FAO supported interventions in Peru and Guatemala (see part 7.1) exemplifies the lack of institutional learning within FAO in terms of applying good practices from concrete interventions. This learning could, at a different and more strategic level, be used for informing how FAO can design more coherent DRR strategies that address root causes of food insecurity, applying well-documented DRR and CCA approaches related to agriculture. However, as Country offices do not systematically produce information on project performance, there is little information flowing upwards in the system to inform FAO's own policy formulation and strategic work. This means that key knowledge remains at country level, and often among individual staff members.

187. However, it is not only the lack of information going from FAO Country offices to Regional offices or Headquarters that is a challenge, flow of information going the other way is also a challenge. The FP DRR is an example of a useful and relevant publication that despite having being published (and apparently also translated) by the end of 2011, staff in most countries was not even aware of its existence (it was sent in English hard copy to the Representations). This example represents a challenge in terms of information sharing and how the Organisation at country level can use knowledge from Headquarters to improve performance. Much of FAO's performance, both present and future, will depend on the Organisation's ability to learn from experiences, document these and disseminate them within the Organisation in an effective manner.

8.5 Conclusions

188. While FAO is widely involved in different DRR activities across the two regions, several institutional factors set limits for FAO's potentials in the area of DRR. There is insufficient staff (and hence expertise) dedicated to DRR and thus ensuring a sharper institutional profile. This transcends into limited guidance and support to Country offices, both from Regional offices and Headquarters. Though insufficient in terms of quantity, the support provided from Headquarters has been widely appreciated, especially in the Asia region where FP DRR inspired programming is slowly gaining grounds. However, some countries raised concern about ensuring that processes were driven from and by the countries themselves.

189. The multiple engagements of FAO in numerous smaller projects in each country makes monitoring and evaluation essential, not only in terms of accountability towards donors and

government partners and their constituencies, but also for FAO to be able to learn more from past experiences.

190. Joint planning between divisions has still not been rolled out despite more integrated organisational results or strategic objectives. The evaluation found that FAO still needs to come across the silo-structure and develop more multi-disciplinary programmes that address the multi-causalities and root causes of food insecurity more holistically and thus more effectively.

191. As FAO, with respect to the DRR (and CCA) challenges still ahead, is moving into fairly unknown territory for many of its staff members, the importance of information sharing and clarity on what FAO can achieve and how is vital. Linking DRR to resilience is highly relevant, but more so if it is done based on what FAO is good at. This can only be tested and proved if the Organisation dedicates resources and time to understanding causalities between agricultural interventions, food security and resilience. Within the Organisation, and among partners, the role of DRR (and CCA) in this logic remains incognito, which is why evaluation, monitoring and knowledge management is so important.

9 Capacity Development

9.1 Introduction

192. Technical support to promote technology transfer and build capacity is one of the core functions of FAO. According to FAO's Corporate Strategy on Capacity Development (2010), FAO's approach to capacity development is intended as a principal 'modus operandi' underpinning FAO's programme of work. All of FAO's technical work at Headquarters and in countries has some capacity development aspect.[42] The capacity development strategy outlines critical success factors, including: attention to national contexts, technical and functional capacities, medium to long-term approaches, networks of knowledge and experience sharing, internalisation of changes (i.e. institutionalisation), on-going strategic budget allocations, incremental approaches building on feedback from previous phases and monitoring and evaluation of outcomes and impact.

193. As part of the FAO corporate strategy on capacity development, the FP DRR supports capacity development to member countries with its three interlinked individual, institutional and policy dimensions. Depending on needs, this may include DRR for FNS technical expertise, technology transfer, practical tools, methodologies, extension training, policy advice, advocacy, education and awareness-raising.[43]

194. FAO's Strategic Framework for FAO 2010-2019 also highlights the need for FAO to reinforce the capacity of member countries and their vulnerable populations.

9.2 Effectiveness of Capacity Development

195. FAO supported DRR interventions includes capacity development at both local and central level, either through direct training activities aimed at strengthening specific skills within certain institutions or by introducing technical skills through projects. In the latter case, FAO has been relatively successful in introducing new technologies under very specific circumstances, such as the introduction of materials and technology that required specific skills. Attempts have

[42] FAO, *FAO corporate strategy on capacity development*, 2010.
[43] FAO, *Resilient Livelihoods - Disaster Risk Reduction for Food and Nutrition Security Framework Programme*, 2011, p.22.

also targeted more general competences in terms of risk management linked to specific projects, such as extension work. The institutional capacity development is linked to policies and guidelines, and dissemination of good practice among government staff. In both LAC and in Asia, staff rotation and non-comprehensive approaches have limited the effects of these efforts.

196. It is however important to note that none of the projects or activities related to capacity development included monitoring components that measured training outcomes. Therefore, in both LAC and Asia there was limited evidence on the overall outcomes of capacity development efforts, which is not only a challenge for evaluators, but also for FAO staff in terms of understanding the effects and relevance of these interventions.

197. In both Asia and LAC capacity development support on DRR has, as in other areas, consisted in assisting developing member country capacities by preparing and disseminating guidelines or training government officials at ministries of agriculture, their extension departments, as well as farmers. Efforts have also included technical capacities to manage technologies related to early warning systems. In most countries, including Peru, Bolivia, the Dominican Republic, Nepal and the Philippines, FAO projects have contributed to increasing local capacities by using the farmer field school approach.

198. Agricultural demonstration projects with DRR focus visited by the Evaluation Team included training of farmers. In such cases, capacity development was however often limited to provision of inputs (notably seeds of stress tolerant varieties) accompanied either by demonstrations or farmers' field school sessions. The effectiveness of these methods was mixed and did not seem to be related to the issues or technologies concerned, but more concerned with the input delivery. The results of the intentions varied widely, with the more successful ones being carried out in Cambodia and Bangladesh. Most projects followed similar design and did not take local or national variations sufficiently into account. Hence a design that worked well in Bangladesh, where there is high coverage of grassroots extension staff, failed in Nepal where there is very low staff coverage. In LAC there was a similar tendency of not adjusting plans to local needs and conditions (i.e. in Ecuador where techniques were introduced that were already known to the local people and did not add value). The LAC report also found that there was a need to include more contextual and social aspects combined with technical issues. Importantly, a closer look at some of the interventions in LAC provided evidence that capacity development efforts did not include risk management practices, questioning the DRR relevance of these capacity development efforts.

199. Effectiveness is also affected by the overall duration of the intervention. Most of the projects visited had durations of 2 years, of which only 1.5 years of field work could be undertaken, and thus the technologies gained sometimes insufficient credibility among the farmers. Clearly if the message is that 'variety A' performs better than 'variety B' during a drought, farmers need the opportunity to compare the varieties during both drought and non-drought seasons; as the weather cannot be predicted, this might require demonstrations over a 4 or 5 years period. There were good examples of such interventions in Peru.

9.3 Institutional relevance

200. At the institutional level, capacity development efforts addressing DRR issues were focused on individual skill development and less on building institutional capacities. In doing so, FAO runs the risk that frequent staff turnover undermines capacity development efforts, hence raises concerns regarding effectiveness and sustainability. Neither the Evaluation Team found examples of more comprehensive capacity development plans that were based on institutional needs assessments linked to mandates and priorities. Most efforts were either linked to short-term

projects (i.e. farmer field schools) or specific demands from national counterparts. While such interventions were often reported to be relevant, they often lacked follow-up plans on replication, support mechanisms after training, particularly at institutional level, and monitoring.

201. A 2011 evaluation highlighted the need for FAO to ensure that training takes place within a wider training strategy. It exemplified this through a project in Sri Lanka where it highlighted that while "*overall the training and other assistance supplied by the project did enhance the knowledge of members of these organisations, the lack of an integrated and inclusive approach to capacity building and problematic relations between the project and GoSL* [Government of Sri Lanka] *affected the full potential of the project in terms of training and capacity building were not realised and the long term sustainability of project outputs was jeopardised*".[44] The lack of suitable institutional frameworks was found to be a factor that threatened the long-term sustainability of certain capacity development aspects. The same evaluation identified other challenges related to FAO's capacity development efforts, including that there were often no guarantee of continuation or plans for support to trainees in the future, and it would not be surprising if lessons learned or skills gained would soon be forgotten. Further, it was questioned whether training objectives could be achieved as projects "*ran out of time*".[45]

202. The institutional weaknesses of the partner organisations and stakeholders have also played a role in terms of achieving expected results with regards to capacity development. For example, some Asian countries decentralised DRR responsibilities to the sub-national level, where capacities are limited and insufficient resources hamper progress. Practically all FAO projects include capacity development at sub-national levels, most often targeting the authorities, departments of agriculture (DAs), agricultural extension system and municipal staff. FAO's approach to capacity development was more or less the same in each country, while the needs seemed to be more varied from country to country and district to district.

203. Capacity development in some of the countries is made challenging by the human resource gap that exists between central and decentralised levels. Some countries have decentralised heavily in recent years, but neither resources nor capacities are sufficient to enable local governments or administrations to tackle the challenges in providing sufficient services (e.g. surveillance). This was the case in both Indonesia and the Philippines. In the latter, the challenge is that regional agricultural authorities, mandated to conduct surveillance, have no capacities or mandate within local level authorities (i.e. districts), preventing them from carrying out their mandate effectively.

204. FAO has supported countries in DRR across the Asian region from the early 2000s. National programmes were gradually developed with sufficient funding and technical support to carry out capacity development at both the central and local government, as well as community levels in a complementary fashion. To give an example, the 2009 independent evaluation of the HPAI programme in Indonesia "*commended the capacity development initiatives of the Information, Education and Communication team, and the high quality of participatory tool trainers*".[46]

205. In most countries assessed in the region, FAO has been able to mount an early response to HPAI outbreaks and in general limited further spread of the virus. While the support has been

[44] FAO-OED, *Evaluation of Emergency Agriculture and Food Security Assistance in Support of Returnees, Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), Host Families and other Vulnerable Families in the Districts of Jaffna, Mannar and Vavuniya in Northern Sri Lanka*, 2011.
[45] *Ibid.*
[46] FAO-OED, *Independent Evaluation of FAO's Participatory Disease Surveillance and Response Programme in Indonesia*, 2009.

highly relevant and appreciated by governments, donors and other stakeholders in the concerned countries, FAO never managed to develop a regional strategic approach to capacity development that takes into consideration the different needs at different stages of each country. Each country seems to have gone through its own learning cycles without appropriate strategic orientation from regional level.

9.4 Conclusions

206. Capacity development is at the heart of FAO's mandate and is one of the primary pillars in the recent FP DRR publication. The Corporate Strategy on Capacity Development underlines that capacity development is FAO's principal 'modus operandi'. Both regional evaluation reports support this strategic statement and found FAO to be generally engaged in transferring knowledge, know-how and providing supervision to its counterparts in the countries visited. The challenge was to link the knowledge transfer to DRR-related contents.

207. However, basically all of these efforts were carried out without being strategically founded or considered within more comprehensive capacity development plans. In fact none of the (eight) examples of success criteria outlined in FAO's Corporate Strategy on Capacity Development (see part 9.1) were found in the projects or activities assessed in Asia and LAC. Most interventions were stand-alone efforts, there was hardly any follow-up and trainings were carried out without reference to the institutional environment of the trainee.

208. Again, the lack of outcome data prevented the evaluation from assessing the effectiveness of CD across the projects and interventions assessed. But based on stakeholder perceptions and measured against FAO's own success criteria, the evaluation considers that FAO's CD interventions have room for considerable and serious improvements. For the most part, there was little sign that effective capacity development had taken place throughout the projects. The core objective of capacity development is strongly believed not to have been achieved in most of these projects assessed.

209. Monitoring of capacity development efforts is generally missing from most if not all projects and interventions assessed in the two regions and it is vital that this area be improved. As a technically based organisation, FAO's main area of intervention is transfer of knowledge and good practice. Without monitoring and assessing capacity development outcomes, FAO lacks an important element in meeting demands and designing interventions that are appropriate in a fast changing sector (see also part 8).

210. While there are many structural explanations behind this, the evaluation considers that the main reason is the short duration of projects, limited preparation and understanding of capacity development across the Organisation, and scarce attention to results and their institutionalisation. This is also reflected in insufficient guidance from Headquarters and limited capacity at Regional and Country offices to conduct CD that meets FAO's own success factors.

211. The capacity development strategy was published in late 2010 and therefore cannot have guided many of the efforts that took place from 2006 to 2011. Nonetheless, if it constitutes the benchmark for good capacity development practice within FAO, there is a need to disseminate its content deeper and wider and to make sure that the necessary capacities within FAO's own Regional and Country offices are in place.

10 Partnerships and Collaboration

10.1 Efficiency of FAO's role with partners

212. The evaluation looks at partnerships and cooperation in order to identify how FAO has carried out its DRR work, under what conditions and if this has been done in relation to a specific demand for services from member government and how FAO manages to respond to such demands.

10.1.1 National authorities

213. FAO generally is praised for its good relationships with governments at central level and for its technical capacity in supporting government plans or specific strategies within ministries. The evaluation on FAO's Role and Work in Food and Agriculture Policy found "*an almost unfailing trust of the ministries of agriculture of developing countries in FAO. This was reflected in many statements by interviewed ministry staff*".[47] A 2011 evaluation on FAO's work through the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF), found that the "*work of FAO in support of both development and disaster risk management over many decades allowed the Organization to forge strong links with perennial institutions and actors*". [48] The same evaluation also found that "*such long-term investment and partnerships with stable organizations proved invaluable to implement short-term disaster prevention or response interventions, as and when need arose*".[49] While these statements relate to FAO's general technical capacity, some ministries, i.e. Ecuador, Nepal and Nicaragua, did claim that a more technical dialogue or support related to DRR was needed. In a few cases, like Bolivia, FAO was criticised by the Ministry of Agriculture for its insufficient coordination with government authorities and implementing projects that were not aligned with national priorities.

214. At the same time there were some indications, particularly from LAC, that FAO's relations with local-level stakeholders could be improved. This, however, may be based on the fact that FAO has limited field presence and few resources to engage with local-level partners.

215. The primary challenge for FAO in most countries is establishing a clear link between food security and DRR. There are two reasons for this. The first one relates to mandates. FAO's almost by default government counterpart, ministries of agriculture, are often weak on DRR and on how DRR relates to food security. Often government entities with mandates in agriculture are under-resourced and under-staffed, and even more so when it comes to resources for DRR. The weakness within the sector poses a challenge for FAO as it translates into limited demand for concrete services, specific policies or strategies. If there is no or only very limited demand for these services, it becomes difficult for FAO to engage with ministries in an aligned and coordinated matter.

216. Furthermore, FAO generally collaborates with government institutions whose mandates traditionally are linked to FNS and different agricultural sectors. However, these entities have habitually been sidelined on matters related to DRR and climate change. FAO's collaboration with ministries that are better positioned in relation to DRM/DRR and climate change, including interior, environment, home affairs and the civil protection offices, is often limited or non-existent. Focal points for climate change and NAPAs are almost exclusively the ministries of environment, meaning that FAO has limited influence on one of the key decision-making

[47]FAO–OED, *Evaluation of FAO's Role and Work in Food and Agriculture Policy*, 2012.
[48] FAO-OED, *Evaluation of FAO's Work through the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF)*, 2011.
[49] *Ibid.*

instruments in terms of climate change adaptation. Furthermore, FAO also has limited collaboration with ministries of planning and finance, which are often pulling the strings in terms of mainstreaming DRR into the different sectors and allocation of financial resources.

217. An exception to this pattern is Bangladesh, where donors value FAO's ability to coordinate outside its normal realm (i.e. Ministry of Agriculture) and engage technically with the Ministry of Environment on natural resource management and climate change and with the Ministry of Health on nutrition. The Bangladeshi Government furthermore praised the contribution of FAO, particularly in relation to Local Consultative Group for Agriculture, Rural Development and Food Security. From the government perspective, FAO's strengths in Bangladesh are coordination of donors and technical know-how.

218. The second factor relates to prioritisation. In some countries, DRR (and climate change) in agriculture is simply not on the government's agenda for reasons related to prioritisation. Indonesia is a good example; here the government prioritises DRR work related to preparedness and early warning systems – primarily related to earthquakes and tsunamis. Climate work in the country is driven by efforts to reduce emissions (mitigation) – which in turn is driven by enormous performance bonuses based on bilateral donations. These two extremes (emergency and response modes vs. emissions mitigation) have so far left FAO with limited room for policy engagement at the government level. Instead, minor projects have been implemented in the field (i.e. in NTT) with limited success, detached from advocacy and policy dialogue at central level. This same pattern of prioritisation was also seen in Nicaragua, Nepal, and Cambodia and even more strongly in the Philippines.

219. Combining these two factors (mandates and prioritisation) puts FAO in a difficult position because the Organisation does not collaborate with the entities that have the right knowledge and leverage on policies and resource allocations for DRR within the countries. This may therefore have consequences for FAO in terms of ensuring that DRR mainstreaming within agriculture is sufficiently prioritised and hence resourced by national governments.

220. Furthermore, in most countries there was an issue with limited capacities within the FAO Country offices to engage technically on DRR and climate-related issues. This has prevented FAO from engaging actively in a policy dialogue with government counterparts on the possibilities in grouping DRR, food security and climate change adaptation together. Additionally, there was also a general tendency regarding the lack of information or studies related to DRR and food security and it was difficult for partners to understand and comprehend the dimensions of the problems and how these are interlinked (see part 7). Bangladesh and Guatemala are, however, clear exceptions to this generalisation. In the latter, FAO has deliberately worked on linking food security and DRR and supported the government in bringing forward initiatives within this area, because food security ranks high on the government's agenda and interventions are facilitated by the relatively high donor attention to the important food security challenges in the country.

10.1.2 NGOs

221. FAO has established a good working relationship with the local authorities in some countries, such as Peru, Guatemala and the Philippines and to some extent also Indonesia, in which sub-national projects and partnerships with civil society organisations to execute small-scale demonstration projects are relatively limited. However, generally speaking FAO has limited capacities both in terms of presence and capacity to reach out to sub-national levels. NGO collaboration in LAC was very diverse and based on the specific conditions of projects and the

need to include a particular skill that an NGO possesses. The general tendency was that NGO collaboration served the purposes of ensuring implementation of local-level projects.

222. Furthermore, FAO has not managed to use this collaboration in its upstream work, with a few exceptions related to HPAI. Under the HPAI programme, NGOs engaged closely with FAO as partners or sub-contractors. For example, CARE in Cambodia pre-tested training material on bio-security at the village level, including village extension worker training. Experiences from the field were later used to build national capacities. In Bangladesh, most NGOs considered FAO's role as particularly useful in terms of its capacity to link local-level experiences with national policy dialogue. This was particularly helpful for NGOs as few of them had access to the government the same way as FAO enjoys.

10.1.3 UN system and its mechanisms

223. FAO has a formal engagement with UNISDR in improving DRR, as is stated in "*FAO's Role in Disaster Risk Reduction*".[50] Other examples of formal engagement with UNISDR and the HFA come from the "*FAO and Disaster Risk Management. Preliminary Baseline Assessment. Focus on Natural Disaster*"[51] and "*Disaster risk management systems analysis. A guide book*".[52] The evaluation of Partnerships and Alliances also noted that FAO has established many global partnerships with UN agencies and many of them are embedded in the Organisation's regular programme of work thus becoming an integral part of FAO 'core' activities. [53]

224. FAO has overall increased its collaboration with other UN partners and has become more active in joint coordination mechanisms (i.e. co-leading the food security cluster in Nepal with WFP), and has become more active in UNDAF processes. This engagement has also translated into DRR-related interventions where some joint programmes have emerged. The collaboration, however, seems to be stronger in Asia – particularly in low-income countries such as Nepal, Bangladesh and Cambodia, where international organisations are also better organised around national strategies, as opposed to middle-income countries such as Indonesia and Philippines.

225. The evaluation in LAC found that coordination outside the formal mechanisms was often lacking and that there were few joint initiatives. However, where they did exist, such as in Peru and Guatemala, they attained a more holistic and multi-disciplinary approach and were thus in a stronger position to address food insecurity issues more comprehensively, including addressing the underlying risk factors more effectively. In LAC, joint funding mechanisms have been useful in terms of fostering better coordination, i.e. the DIPECHO in Peru. Also in Asia, the DIPECHO facility has helped organisations come together in joint proposals, some of them even including climate change.

226. The general impression is, however, that FAO can and should be more active and visible among other UN agencies. In Nepal, for example, FAO has not been actively participating in the National Risk Reduction Consortium that coordinates interventions of the Nepal Flagship Programme. Other UN partners consulted had in fact never seen FAO active in the consortium and could not refer to any activities under the Flagship Programme, though FAO is a co-signatory. The main reason for its invisibility in Nepal rests in the lack of leadership of the FAO Country office (see also part 8).

[50] Battista, F., Baas, S., Rolle, F., *FAO's role in Disaster Risk Reduction*, 2007.
[51] Palombi, L., *FAO and Disaster Risk Management. Preliminary Baseline Assessment. Focus on Natural Disasters*, 2009.
[52] Baas, S., Ramasamy, S., Dey de Pryck, J., Battista, F., *Disaster risk management systems analysis. A guide book*, 2008.
[53] FAO, *Independent External Evaluation of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations*, 2007.

227. Partnerships with UN agencies on a more long-term operational level are also quite limited in number and scope, reportedly due to lack of global institutional agreements. Even where agency level collaborative agreements exist, collaboration at the country level does not necessarily take place. An example is UNDP, which in most countries would be the natural partner to scale-up FAO approaches in DRR. An institutional partnership agreement exists between the two agencies, but at the field level cooperation seems to depend on the country teams and their personal relationships. A joint project with UNDP in Nepal was undermined by poor relationships between the organisations; the Philippines UN Joint Programme with multiple UN agencies resulted in better cooperation, but limited time for implementation prevented the programme from emerging from its initial testing stages.

228. The Asia evaluation specifically found some overlap (or competition) of roles between FAO and both UNDP and WFP. FAO does not have the manpower and the resources of UNDP or WFP and examples demonstrated that the Organisation can easily lose out on opportunities; this was also the case in Ecuador. There is a particular situation with WFP where several countries have been moving into DRM. For example, WFP has recently engaged on CCA in NTT Province of Indonesia where, according to the Ministry of Agriculture, FAO is more suitable in terms of policy work from field application (upstream). Despite being neighbours in the same building, the two organisations seemingly need to strengthen their coordination. Again, the FAO office in Bangladesh stands out for its proactive role and cooperation with relevant UN agencies. In Bangladesh, WFP and FAO have also set their focus on areas like resilience and vulnerability assessments under the new UNDAF.

229. Evaluations in Asia and LAC both found that UNDAF in general provides limited space for DRR and food security, but that there is a tendency towards prioritising DRR and CCA when comparing UNDAFs over time. In Bangladesh, FAO co-leads with WFP the UN and donor coordination in food security through the food security cluster and led until last year the aforementioned the Local Consultative Group on Agriculture, Food Security and Local Development now led by the Government. This forum provides a platform for harmonising the contributions of development partners with government programmes. From the donors' perspective, it provides convening power and facilitation of donor and government coordination. UNDAFs in Asia generally increased their focus on DRR after major disasters such as the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, Typhoon Ketsana and the Yogjakarta and Pakistan earthquake and floods. While earlier UNDAFs emphasised the need for preparedness, there has been a conceptual shift from response to risk reduction and CCA in recent UNDAFs.

10.2 Conclusions

230. In some countries, FAO has been instrumental in advancing local-level priorities to governments, in particular revitalising the extension efforts at the local level. This was particularly the case in LAC, where the importance of local extension work has been revitalised. It is now up to FAO to demonstrate the potential it has in relation to DRR and CCA – this will require strong technical capacities and support from Regional offices. Unfortunately, both of these conditions are more the exception than the rule, not only in LAC but also in Asia.

231. The importance of housing strong capacity within FAO Country offices is evident from the Bangladesh and Guatemalan experiences. In Bangladesh, experiences in recent years are a clear indication that this is possible provided the right conditions are in place, such as technical capacity and close coordination and cooperation with national authorities, as well as pro-activeness among other development partners. The LAC report highlighted that inter-agency operations are more effective in addressing root causes, as they were often more holistic and

integral in their approaches. Added to this is the fact that DRR and CCA are relatively new and complex areas of work for FAO, and the Organisation will have difficulties in achieving lasting outcomes alone.

232. The increasing focus on CCA and resilience, both in the academic literature and global declarations, in UNDAFs and to some extent also among government priorities, provides clear opportunities for FAO to engage and contribute technically across the two regions. This potential is reflected and well-summarised in FAO's own FP DRR publication.

233. Despite the tendency to introduce more DRR, CCA and resilience factors into the UNDAFs, the Evaluation Team found that the share of attention devoted to agriculture has been limited in most UNDAFs, particularly as a sector with the potential to link resilience and CCA. This finding calls for a more active engagement on the part of FAO.

11 Gender mainstreaming

234. At corporate level, the FAO Strategic Framework 2010-2019 represents a turning point for FAO and dedicates a Strategic Objective (SO-K) to gender. According to "*The state of food and agriculture 2010-2011*",[54] gender inequalities are at the core of the underperformance of the agriculture sector, and goals for poverty reduction and food security can only be achieved if gender is fully and adequately considered.

235. Specifically to DRR, FAO's normative products make limited reference to or guidance on how to promote gender-related issues in DRR (or DRM). The "*Disaster Risk Management Systems Analysis*"[55] has limited reflections on gender – three in total – and these are based on basic assessment criteria (using disaggregated data) or remarks on how to avoid gender biased information through assessment. The "*TCE Operational Strategy*"[56] refers briefly to SO-K, but has otherwise very limited reflections as to how the division should address gender-related issues. The training manual "*Assessing and Responding to Land Tenure Issues in Disaster Risk Management*" has more reflections on gender, but these are from a single case in Bangladesh. It does not include gender-related issues explicitly in the training manual, despite drawing on a (few) field examples.[57] The FP DRR furthermore mentions that gender is a crosscutting priority of the framework, aiming at ensuring that gender concerns, needs and capacities in DRR become an integrated part of FAO's work. It further states that 'ensuring a gender perspective' must be a guiding principle.

236. A common feature is that DRR interventions are not based upon any gender analysis, and so issues of gender are not sufficiently factored into the project design and implementation. The evaluation found that the gender concept was commonly misunderstood or misconceived by project staff. Many agricultural related training activities with DRR components, for example, were actually reinforcing the reproductive roles of women and failing to pay sufficient attention to the gender distribution of tasks/time at the household level. This problem is not isolated to DRR interventions but remains to be a generic challenge across FAO, exemplified by two examples.

[54] FAO, *The state of food and agriculture 2010-11. Women in agriculture: Closing the gender gap for development*, 2011.
[55] Baas, S., Ramasamy, S., Dey de Pryck, J., Battista, F., *Disaster risk management systems analysis. A guide book*, 2008.
[56] FAO-TCE, *TCE Operational Strategy 2010 – 2013 "Our road map for the next four years"*, http://typo3.fao.org/fileadmin/user_upload/drm_matrix/docs/TCE%20Operational%20Strategy_Mar2010i.pdf, 2010.
[57] Mitchell, D., *Assessing and Responding to Land Tenure Issues in Disaster Risk Management. Training Manual*, Rome, 2011.

237. An assessment carried out within the Evaluation of FAO's role and work related to Gender and Development,[58] considering the level of competence of FAO emergency staff on gender issues, revealed that the great majority of respondents stated that they were familiar with gender mainstreaming concepts, but reported a number of factors affecting the adequate integration of a gender equality perspective in DRM interventions, namely:

- Lack of specific tools and technical supporting information about possible gender-oriented activities and lessons learned material;
- Insufficient background information and lack of sex-disaggregated data readily available in emergencies to incorporate into response formulation; and
- Lack of gender-sensitive monitoring tools or gender-relevant indicators.

238. In a similar way, the Evaluation of FAO's role and work related to water concluded that FAO responsibilities on gender and water are dispersed across many actors, and, as a whole, FAO at large "*has failed to recognise social inclusion as a foundation of development and to adequately mainstream gender in its work, and outputs and results were short of requirements and expectations*".[59]

239. The actual implementation and integration of gender concerns in the field projects visited was found to have been varied and depended largely on field staff competences and skills in this area.

240. A common feature is that DRR projects do not include explicit gender analysis and therefore gender is not sufficiently factored into the project design. The large female participation at local levels is therefore driven by the idiosyncrasy of the project and not because there has been a deliberate effort to attract female participants and make interventions particularly gender sensitive.

241. The collection of gender-disaggregated data is still limited in most projects. According to the FAO Bangladesh gender focal point no FAO project until now has ever benefited from a gender analysis, including DRR related projects. Some projects, such as the Emergency Cyclone Recovery and Restoration Project in Bangladesh have components designed to target men and women with specific activities and inputs, but this aspect had either not been recognised or was not followed up in implementation. The Bangladesh Country Investment Plan, on the other hand, recognises the importance of women in the development process.

242. Projects in LAC, particularly in the Dominican Republic, benefitted from having more women participating in local-level decision making processes, and while this was properly more a result of the existing local structure, FAO could benefit from learning from such experiences and investigate whether they could be applied as a good practice elsewhere.

243. FAO offices in Nicaragua, Bolivia and Ecuador have incorporated a gender focal point in the staff and this has had an immediate effect in terms of generating more awareness among staff members regarding gender sensitive programming. Most visible has been the work carried out in Nicaragua, where the focal point has initiated work around strengthening FAO staff capacities on gender issues related to FAO activities, including DRR and also launched relevant studies and given technical advice to projects on inclusion of gender.

[58] FAO-OED, *Evaluation of FAO's role and work related to Gender and Development, Annex 10 - FAO's work in Disaster Risk Management and gender issues*, 2011.
[59] FAO-OED, *Evaluation of FAO's role and work related to water*, 2010.

11.1 Conclusions

244. FAO is slowly moving towards strengthening its inclusion of gender issues in programming. In the field there was generally a positive response to issues concerning gender and in particular the inclusion of women in project implementation.

245. The lack of gender sensitive programming in project designs demonstrates that much can still be done in this area, despite the fact that most FAO Country offices in Asia had gender focal points. There was no reference in the Country offices to FAO tools on gender and guidance from Regional offices or Headquarters. The presence of a knowledgeable person on gender within the office is essential given the limited learning culture that exists within FAO as a whole.

12 Animal Health

12.1 Introduction

246. The evaluation has included animal health as an area to be evaluated despite the fact that it is not traditionally linked to DRR. It is worth mentioning that this category of intervention is not included in any international framework. In terms of evaluating animal health and trans-boundary animal diseases (TAD), the LAC evaluation found that limited activities have been carried out at country level. The evaluation in LAC analysed the Central American initiative on TAD, but in general data from the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) clearly demonstrates that TAD is far more recurrent in Asia (and Africa).

247. In 2008, FAO and OIE (World Organisation for Animal Health) developed "*The Global Strategy for Prevention and Control of H5N1 Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza*" in response to the spread of the HPAI pandemic, affecting up to 60 countries globally. The strategy's vision is a "*world with greatly reduced threat of H5N1 virus infection in poultry, leading to reduced public health risk, secured national, regional and global markets and trade in poultry and poultry products, protection of an important element of the livelihoods of poor farming communities and conservation of biodiversity*".[60] While it has global scope, the strategy is specifically relevant for the evaluation's focus on Asia. The 'regional domain' of the strategy outlines: "*The goal in this domain is to enhance cooperation and collaboration among regionally grouped countries through greater engagement and commitment from appropriate regional organizations for a harmonized and coordinated approach to control and eradication of H5N1 HPAI*".[61]

248. The human exposure to hazards has triggered large-scale funding for HPAI across the region, especially as the virus was spreading towards donor countries in the West. The enormous donor interest is reflected in the funding provided to HPAI activities. As of February 2012, the total global donor funding to FAO reached more than 323 million USD,[62] with US funding making up nearly half that amount (161 million USD).[63] With specific reference to Asia, FAO's projects between 2006 and 2011 received 161 million USD.[64]

[60] FAO and OiE, *The Global Strategy for Prevention and Control of H5N1 Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza*, 2008.
[61] *Ibid.*
[62] See: http://www.fao.org/avianflu/en/donors.html (site was last visited on December 18, 2012).
[63] The Evaluation Team did not have access to regional consolidated funding figures from this source.
[64] Source: FPMIS.

249. The FAO guide to preparing for animal health emergencies "*Good Emergency Management Practice*"[65] offers a means to understand how animal disease emergencies are related to disasters and disaster management, and indeed makes a strong case for them to be considered in the same category as a national disaster, requiring the same level of preparedness and planning. The Evaluation Team in Asia however did not find references to the guide among FAO staff or their counterparts, which is surely related to its recent publication. As with other normative products and guidelines, this publication would benefit from a more targeted dissemination.

250. In Asia, due to the direct threat it has on humans, HPAI was implemented across the region with significant funding for over almost one decade. This continuum allowed for an evaluation of FAO's performance from the early emergency stages to the current stages, in which capacities in most countries have been strengthened and there has been a shift from response to prevention and preparedness. Other animal diseases (i.e. rabies and locust) were not included in this evaluation both because of time limitations and the limited direct threats they pose to human beings. On this basis, the following paragraphs focus on HPAI in Asia as an example of FAO's intervention in the area of animal disease.

12.2 Relevance

251. FAO has supported countries across the Asian region since the early 2000s. This support has been highly relevant and appreciated by governments, donors and other stakeholders in the countries concerned. In most countries assessed in the region, FAO was able to mount an early response to HPAI virus and, in most cases, limit further spread of the virus.

252. Some countries, like Indonesia, Philippines and Cambodia, have established laboratory facilities through the support of FAO, allowing authorities to react earlier if there are reported outbreaks or suspicions thereof. Early detection has been enabled through a revitalisation of veterinary services in the Philippines or engaging community volunteers, as was the case in Cambodia. Trainings and capacity development efforts have contributed to building up these capacities.

253. Countries have managed to expand the policy framework to include HPAI considerations (i.e. the National Veterinary Services Programme in Indonesia), while others have included costs related to surveillance and testing (i.e. running of laboratories) in the national budget, hence forging sustainability of systems promoted by FAO.

254. In DRR terms, FAO has contributed to increased awareness of HPAI at the local and central level. Mechanisms to respond to emergencies have also been established, and some countries have managed to establish capacities that enable them to detect risks.

255. FAO has been recognised in all countries for its leadership in this area, along with its ability to provide timely and relevant support to national authorities when requested. This satisfaction extends to donors who are appreciative of FAO's role in supporting countries' efforts in limiting the spread of the HPAI virus.

256. Reducing human exposure to the virus is therefore highly relevant and an area where FAO has contributed significantly in terms of reducing risks. The intervention is also aligned to FAO's SO-I "*Improved preparedness for, and effective response to, food and agricultural threats*

[65] Honhold, N., Douglas, I., Geering, W., Shimshoni, A., Lubroth, J., *Good Emergency Management Practices: The Essentials*, 2011.

and emergencies". FAO's efforts have helped governments to prepare better for ongoing and future HPAI pandemics, early detection of virus and timely response to virus outbreaks. The work could also potentially support FAO's SO-B "*Increased sustainable livestock production"*, as more sustainable practices are promoted through the reduction of HPAI.

12.3 Performance and Effectiveness

257. Interventions by FAO have contributed to limiting the negative impact of HPAI virus in Asia through early detection measures. Responses have been mobilised through local veterinary services and awareness raised among backyard poultry holders.

258. While it was recognised that village poultry was not the only source of the virus, activities were initially focused on understanding and combating virus circulation in the village poultry sector as it was widely believed at that time that household poultry were the key substrate for virus maintenance and spread to humans. One of the key needs identified initially was the need to gain a better understanding of disease incidence and distribution in light of the weak laboratory diagnostic capacity at the time. Much attention was therefore given to conceiving how participatory epidemiology could strengthen existing surveillance systems. The support to veterinary services in Indonesia has been significant under the Participatory Disease Surveillance and Response Programme, and according to an independent evaluation there were "*very positive impacts on revitalising veterinary services in Indonesia"*.[66]

259. The private sector is of growing importance and, while FAO has managed to include it in recent years, the involvement has come too late. For FAO, it has become increasingly apparent that the HPAI problem extends beyond disease outbreaks in backyard poultry environment. For that matter, Indonesia exemplifies a general challenge in the region of the late involvement of private sector actors.

260. Another challenge identified in the region is the lack of monitoring data related to HPAI interventions. Reports mainly relate to outputs and do not include considerations related to outcomes (effects). This means that there is limited evidence of what works, what does not and why. Assessments in all countries in the region are therefore largely based on anecdotal data and site-visits.

261. The 2010 RTE pointed to the same problem and furthermore emphasised that the lack of monitoring data (and outcome information in general) indicates that there is little exchange of information and lessons learned between countries at regional level.[67]

262. According to the same RTE, challenges are related to FAO performance as the Organisation has not exploited multidisciplinary opportunities (i.e. the One World One Health initiative) and instead has pursued a more narrow approach focusing on emergency responses at country level. The evaluation highlights the following issues:

- Lack of strategically applicable tools, situation analysis, passive and active surveillance, guidelines and policy tools, value chain analysis and impact assessments;
- Insufficient incorporation of private sector and other related disciplines;
- Lack of cross fertilisation and learning lessons, and;

[66] FAO-OED, *Independent Evaluation of FAO's Participatory Disease Surveillance and Response Programme in Indonesia*, 2009.
[67] FAO-OED, *Second Real Time Evaluation of FAO`s work on the Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza*, 2010.

- The narrow emergency scope of operations focusing on preparedness and control of avian influenza has meant that FAO did not capitalise on potential linkages to other livestock development aspirations of the countries concerned.[68]

12.4 Sustainability (Replication and up scaling)

263. FAO has been successful in working together with key national institutions in terms of building up surveillance and laboratory capacities. Ministries of agriculture or specialised government agencies have been targeted in most countries, including the Directorate General of Livestock and Animal Health Services or the Directorate of Animal Health in Indonesia. These institutions have been targeted by FAO and generally their capacities may have increased, if judged against the capacities that were found previously, as in the case of the Department of Agriculture visited in Philippines. However, as already noted, the lack of monitoring data or other outcome evidence means that these findings are based on anecdotal data and the few observations the evaluation was able to carry out.

264. Sustainability is also closely linked to the challenge related to working on capacity development with a large number of extension workers and the wide range of institutions involved in HPAI interventions. HPAI interventions in all countries focused on back yard community poultry prevention schemes. The spread of the virus and continuous outbreaks made FAO and governments realise that without attaining a more comprehensive approach, including commercial poultry producers, the risk of the virus spreading further could not be controlled. Countries like Indonesia, Cambodia, Nepal and the Philippines went through this same learning curve. Training of officials at different levels came as a result of the need to replicate the FAO technical capacities at scale.

265. The 2010 RTE considered that HPAI interventions "started as a response to the disease at the community level and over time it became a sustainable capacity development and prevention programme (DRR) for both the communities and the government system, though it was not intended to be a sustainable programme".[69] The current evaluation did not find the same tendencies of sustainability. It is an area that needs further investigation, as there are important lessons to be learned for FAO because of the scope of the interventions and the fact that capacity development is one of FAO's key intervention areas.

266. The main challenge related to sustainability in projects with high numbers of extension workers is to identify a sustainable model that ensures their participation in surveillance and data collection.

12.5 Gender and HPAI

267. There are clear linkages between household and smallholder commercial poultry production and gender. The regional HPAI focus provides a potentially rich case for documenting the role of gender in terms of managing local level poultry production and the potential risks it entails, not only in terms of HPAI virus, but general livestock raising at household level. However, challenges in collecting and using appropriate data prevent FAO from documenting such linkages.

268. Nonetheless, according to the 2010 RTE, FAO has developed a concept paper on gender and socioeconomic issues in avian influenza control. This paper was completed in March 2006,

[68] *Ibid.*
[69] *Ibid.*

and conducted socioeconomic studies that incorporated gender aspects (in India, Indonesia, Cambodia and Laos). However, based on further experiences, it is time for an updating of the 2006 publication.

12.6 Conclusions

269. The evaluation found that limited activities have been carried out in LAC, whereas initiatives to contrast trans-boundary animal diseases are a key part of DRR work of FAO in Asia. The zoonotic nature of HPAI led to a continuous and high level of funding in this region, where FAO projects were funded for 161 million USD over the period 2006-2011. Over this period, FAO progressively shifted from emergency response to prevention and preparedness, developing long-lasting capacities within national institutions. Even this shift was not deliberately strategized, it proves that under the right conditions FAO can mobilise capacities to provide durable solutions to emergencies.

270. FAO's support was relevant and appreciated by governments, donors and other stakeholders in the countries visited, and FAO is seen as a leader in the sector of HPAI. FAO's work also contributed to include HPAI issues in national policy frameworks or budgets in most countries.

271. The continuity and the level of funding substantially differentiate HPAI from the rest of DRR activities. FAO took advantage of both conditions and succeeded in ensuring proper performance and effective delivery. In most countries visited by the Evaluation Team, FAO was able to provide an early response and limit the spread of the virus, strengthening early detection and reaction.

272. FAO has been successful in working together with key national institutions in terms of building up surveillance and laboratory capacities. However, sustainability might be not ensured in the future as the large number of extension workers needed and the wide range of institutions involved in HPAI interventions remain a challenge.

SECTION D: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

13 Overall Conclusions and Recommendations

13.1 Conclusions

273. The Evaluation of FAO's role and work in Disaster Risk Reduction, carried out in eleven countries in LAC and Asia, has analysed a large number of projects that ranged from predominantly post-emergency recovery schemes mostly focusing on re-establishing livelihoods of affected populations, to core FAO agricultural activities. The evaluation made site visits to numerous projects, conducted numerous interviews, assessed relevant independent evaluations and relevant normative publications.

274. Despite being a relatively new concept in the Organisation, DRR has spread rapidly across strategic documents and normative publications. Because of its embryonic character, the evaluation has found that DRR (including CCA) still constitutes a conceptual and practical challenge for FAO. While significant progress has been indeed achieved since 2006, the Organisation has yet to define its role and place within DRR, and demonstrate the potential the Organisation possesses in terms of moving DRR out of the emergency-mode and into development oriented approaches. The FP DRR is a relevant step in the right direction but this (and other relevant FAO publications) needs to be more widely disseminated and discussed and followed up by an institutional willingness to approach DRR, including CCA, from a more multi-disciplinary and integrated approach, investing in the right and sufficient capacities that will enable the Organisation conceptually and practically to approach DRR and CCA work in a more consistent and effective manner.

275. The evaluation finds that FAO has fragmented elements within the Organisation that, if used more coherently, could endow it with opportunities to contribute significantly to reducing exposure and food insecurity of vulnerable populations. Bringing forward these elements will give FAO a comparative advantage "*that no other organization can adequately provide*".[70] This implies promoting more innovative research-based agricultural interventions, high-level technical inputs, use of land use and territorial planning formats, environmental service management and up-to-date forecasting tools and methods, which are some of the more important means FAO possesses for potentially achieving this, rather than explicit DRR and CCA practices *per se*. If FAO focuses on what the organisation is good at (and manages to do this effectively and efficiently), medium and longer-term DRR and CCA outcomes will be achieved.

276. The Reviewed Strategic Objectives (as of March 2013) provide FAO with an adequate framework within which DRR and CCA can be addressed more comprehensively and could help to overcome the silo-approach still dominant. It is particularly the focus on resilience (SO-5) and how this objective is linked to other strategic areas of the organisation that caters for more coherent FAO interventions in the future.

13.2 FAO approach to DRR and its effectiveness

277. DRR came into FAO through emergency operations. This means that intervention areas have mainly been defined in terms of the geographic locations that were affected by specific disasters such as hurricanes, tropical storms, floods and to some extent drought. As such, most FAO-supported DRR interventions are characterised as being mainly reactive. The evaluation

[70] FAO, *Independent External Evaluation of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations*, ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/meeting/012/k0827erev1.pdf, 2007.

does not question the relevance of such operations as they originated from an emergency response and consequently aimed at re-establishing food supply and livelihoods of affected rural populations. At the same time, criticism is directed in the evaluation at the approaches, time horizons and organisational aspects of many such operations. Operating with an emergency scope has implied shorter financing windows, hence also shorter projects and a main focus on preparedness and recovery. These factors have conditioned the effectiveness of the operations that have been evaluated and how they have actually contributed to DRR.

278. Field observations, desk reviews and interviews provided limited evidence of project outcomes that were anticipated in project documentation. The evaluation found no demonstrable or by other means documented medium or long-term impact of the sub-national level or local level projects.

279. Effectiveness was also compromised by the number of activities that FAO Country offices are engaged in. The Evaluation Team found that there were too many small-scale activities in the countries visited (including those that were not related to DRR). Considering the limited (at times even inexistent) capacity for DRR within FAO, it can hardly be expected that these should be scaled up or sustain a wider policy dialogue. The Evaluation Team found that FAO would benefit from selecting specific interventions under a programmatic approach (based on thorough analysis as highlighted above). This would concentrate the portfolio of FAO interventions and scarce resources on core sectors or areas.

280. Very few projects had sufficient scope to ensure proper performance, with the exception of the HPAI support across Asia. In this case, FAO has generally delivered effectively, managing to move from emergency operations into developing long-lasting capacities with national institutions among partner countries. This despite the fact that HPAI did not follow an explicit strategy of moving from phase to phase and deliberately introducing new features as countries moved forward in terms of absorption capacity and challenges that stakeholders were faced with in each country. The HPAI has, however, clearly demonstrated that under the right conditions FAO can mobilise capacities to provide durable solutions to an emerging challenge. None of the other interventions under the DRR scope of this evaluation had similar features in terms of funding and timeframe, clearly suggesting that effectiveness depends on both.

281. However, the evaluation found that even if such features were in place (albeit on a different scale), they were not a guarantee for more effective interventions. Consecutive projects, like the climate work in Nepal, developed from a short-term exercise into a longer-term joint engagement. However, in this case, an over-ambitious and insufficiently focused project design, limited capacity to manage implementation, and lack of proper monitoring has prevented such a programme from becoming more effective. This pattern was similar for many other projects and often the explanations were the same.

282. Interestingly, what the evaluation has identified as implicit DRR interventions (i.e. those focusing on core agricultural aspects such as land use management, coastal management and watershed management), have had and continue to have the potential to contribute significantly to DRR, as well as to CCA. Such interventions require different and more long-term approaches as they address challenges that aim to improve the overall agricultural systems and create conditions in which populations are less vulnerable and become more resilient over time through improved practices that are adapted to variations in climate. An example of such an intervention is the Plan GRACC in Peru.

283. Increasing food security and, therefore, increasing resilience, is best achieved by addressing the root causes of vulnerability. Where disasters hit, people’s livelihoods are affected

to a varying degree – often depending on their socioeconomic status. Consequently, some recover faster than others. Thus, for FAO there is a need to ensure that DRR interventions identify those that are most vulnerable and address the structural causes of their food insecurity, and not only those that are revealed by a disaster. Transforming populations to become less vulnerable and more resilient towards the negative effects of events by targeting the root causes of their vulnerabilities is best done through long-term engagements. The evaluation strongly considers that this is a very sustainable way for FAO to do risk reduction, and probably also the way in which FAO adds most value to what the Organisation can do in terms of DRR and CCA. In the end, if the root causes of vulnerable populations are addressed, they become less exposed and thus more resilient towards future disasters and eventually also towards variations in climate. Therefore, FAO should focus on its core activities as a mean by which to contribute more effectively to DRR and CCA.

284. Few organisations have the same potential as FAO in regards to converging its institutional mandate so clearly when addressing underlying risk factors and climate variations. However, as things are now, FAO has spent more time and resources on reactive DRR interventions aimed at post-disaster livelihood recovery and preparedness of affected populations towards future disasters, without necessarily addressing the root causes of their vulnerabilities. Short-term interventions do not allow FAO to address the root causes of vulnerability and when the next disaster hits, recovery investments might be lost.

285. Interestingly, in the "FAO-Adapt Framework Programme on Climate Change Adaptation"[71] 'adaptation' is defined in terms of anticipating future change – or the prospective approach that aims to avoid new risks. It thus implies that FAO's approach should become more adjustable to change in anticipating scenarios of what may happen (and thus there is a need for thorough preparatory studies as argued elsewhere in this report).

286. Such an approach requires solid analysis and examination of root causes and how they can be addressed by FAO, either alone or, preferably, in partnership with other organisations. The evaluation has found limited evidence that FAO gives sufficient attention to such analyses, which would enable FAO to design more relevant projects, and hence increase its effectiveness.

287. Gender-sensitive programming in DRR is clearly an issue that FAO is taking into consideration. The challenge for FAO at the moment is how to make sure that gender becomes a more integral part of the overall programming of DRR in the field. The projects evaluated are not based on a gender analysis and there was very little evidence of an explicit approach to mainstream gender into DRR. Project documents generally do not envisage how gender mainstreaming can or will be done and they rarely report on gender (with the exception of some basic output figures segregating male and female participation in training events or other supported activities). The presence of gender focal points in Country offices proved to have beneficial effects on the gender awareness among staff members regarding gender sensitive programming and implementation.

13.3 Relevance and mainstreaming DRR

288. From this evaluation it has become clear that DRR and CCA converge effectively within the agriculture sector and this gives FAO several opportunities for positioning itself stronger internationally. Governments of the countries visited are becoming ever more sensitive to CCA, though internally they do still struggle with a significant divide between reactive or corrective

[71] FAO, *FAO-Adapt: Framework Programme on Climate Change Adaptation*, 2011.

forms for DRR and the need for more prospective approaches that are also closer to the realm of CCA.

289. However, FAO never considered DRR and CCA as being the same nor addressed them in an integrated way and retained a separation between these elements, with CCA partially covered under SO-F/OR 5 and partially under SO-I/OR1, and DRR entirely covered under SO-I/OR1. While this division may reflect how FAO is organised internally at Headquarters, the analysis above (part 13.2) clearly outlines the options for convergence. The FP DRR publication is an initial attempt to bridge these two areas under one strategic framework and is a move in the right direction, provided that the publication is disseminated more effectively and that the linkages between DRR and CCA are made clearer.

290. The FP DRR furthermore reflects a tendency of increased focus on CCA and resilience, both in the academic literature and global declarations. UNDAF's increased attention towards CCA and DRR also underlines the relevance of FAO's intention to address the two areas. Nonetheless, FAO can do much more to promote the linkage and the potential role for agriculture in combining the two areas.

291. Sector capacities in most countries are still very low and few ministries of agriculture are in a position to promote a more prospective approach. However, if FAO manages to create the necessary technical skills within the Organisation, there should be multiple options of engaging constructively in promoting and mainstreaming DRR and CCA within national sector programmes and strategies.

292. Ensuring that DRR and CCA are mainstreamed and that the right conditions are in place to do so requires more concerted capacity development efforts. FAO's interventions that were evaluated in the field will not suffice in terms of developing the necessary capacities required in terms of mainstreaming DRR and CCA. The evaluation has demonstrated that most of the success criteria that FAO uses were unmet and there is a need for more concerted efforts at country level.

293. The FP DRR is a first attempt to link DRR and CCA with food security (and resilience). While this is a reflection that FAO is starting to consider DRR in a more comprehensive matter, there is still a need to consolidate and disseminate these linkages. Furthermore, it requires closer coordination of agriculture, climate and natural resource management, and should include humanitarian programming to facilitate the progression from humanitarian response through recovery to long-term food security strategies to safeguard the livelihood and nutritional security of vulnerable populations subject to extreme climatic events and seasonal stress.

13.4 Institutional Arrangements and Capacities

294. The capacity within FAO to promote a coherent and prospective approach to DRR that includes considerations with regard to changes in climate requires a stronger institutional set-up across the Organisation, both at Headquarter, Regional and Country levels.

295. While FAO has been relatively successful in responding to emergencies with recovery interventions, these (reactive) interventions have their obvious limitations in terms of addressing the more structural dimensions of food insecurity. Changing the mindset or adding to the reactive approach will require some institutional changes and upgrading of the Organisation's technical skills, if FAO wants to take a more central position in terms of promoting agriculture and DRR/CCA amongst its partner countries.

296. The current attention FAO gives to DRR and CCA does not suffice to position the Organisation more proactively within the DRR and CCA field. The reason is that there are far too few resources dedicated to promoting DRR and CCA within FAO's core activities (i.e. those that we have referred to as being the implicit ones, where FAO has demonstrated capacities and technical influence). There is a need to create more capacity and awareness around DRR, for example through the creation of a multi-divisional task force that oversees and ensures the mainstreaming of DRR and CCA across FAO's core activities, from the reactive to the prospective approaches. In other words, such a unit would ensure that FAO, across its different units and sectors, addresses the mainstreaming of DRR and CCA in its technical and normative work (and not the other way around, which seems to be the tendency at the moment). The unit should, in other words, ensure that FAO does what FAO is good at, while always bearing in mind that many of those things may be the best and most effective means to address DRR and CCA. The undergoing decentralisation process within FAO could offer further opportunities to reinforce DRR capacities in the regions, even if the evaluation could not find evidence of this for the time being.

297. The causes of food insecurity are multiple and FAO cannot effectively address them all alone. Institutional and strategic partnerships are therefore essential. The Evaluation Team found examples from many countries showing that FAO can do more to vitalise those partnerships. While it requires more proactiveness from the Country offices, there should also be clear guidance from Headquarters and Regional offices as to what types of partnerships FAO should pursue in terms of fulfilling its goals related to food insecurity, and how DRR and CCA should be addressed within them.

298. Leadership is key in order for FAO to succeed. Nepal is an example where FAO has nearly gone invisible with regards to DRR and CCA (the Country office has been without a Representative for more than one year). Whereas in Bangladesh, FAO currently plays a central role in combining food insecurity with DRR and CCA.

13.5 SWOT

299. Below there is a summary of findings presented in the format of a SWOT.

Table 5: SWOT

Strengths	Opportunities
FAO's mandate has clear linkages to DRR and DRM Acknowledged technical expertise in key FAO areas that are relevant for DRR Improving frameworks (i.e. FP-DRR) Increasing organisational awareness of DRR Strong normative products with DRR relevance	Recognition of FAO as technically strong Increased international attention towards food security Potentials for FAO to strengthen the linkage food security-DRR Core expertise may lead to more CCA opportunities HFA awareness of agri-sector importance Increasing member state demands for DRR related services Clear options for strong cross sectorial work Decentralisation process to strengthen capacities in the regions
Weaknesses	**Threats**
Ineffective projects Short-term funding windows Lack of multi-disciplinary approaches Lack of institutional DRR expertise Insufficient monitoring and learning Non-prioritisation of countries for DRR Insufficient dissemination and internal communication Silo-approach still dominant Insufficient up-stream work and results	Missing opportunities – FAO indiscernible Other actors taking over role of FAO Other UN organisations more proactive Increasing capacities in member states Increasingly difficult for FAO to add value – particularly in middle income countries

13.6 Recommendations

Recommendation 1: To Technical Departments, on DRR mainstreaming within FAO

It is recommended that FAO refocuses its approach to DRR by mainstreaming it through the Organisation's core development activities as this will ensure a more coherent and technically sound contribution to risk reduction and potentially also climate change adaptation in line with the Organisation's Reviewed Strategic Objective 5's focus on resilience.

300. Early post-disaster recovery operations, where DRR interventions often define the nature of FAO's support (i.e. restoring livelihoods) should, to the extent possible, be transitioned into development programmes or have clear short lived exit-strategies. Refocusing the DRR approach thus implies not having DRR as the programmatic entry point (or primary objective), but instead build DRR into core activities where FAO has demonstrated capacities. Hence, such an implicit notion of risk management infers a stronger focus on FAO's core areas of expertise. Such a change also implies that FAO's core activities become a mean to achieve more prospective, effective and long-term DRR effects and hence more resilient communities.

301. This requires a clear analytical framework – or causality analysis – of how agricultural and related interventions, including (but not limited to) land-use and watershed management, environmental services, forestry and control of deforestation, fisheries, animal diseases, coastal management, agricultural extension work and seed varieties, will contribute to reducing risks through decreased generation of socio-natural hazards, decreased exposure and increased livelihood and population resilience, thus reducing risk of slow and rapid onset disasters. Such mainstreaming, carried out on the basis of a clear analytical framework where most vulnerable populations and their immediate and future exposure are addressed, will enable FAO to contribute much more significantly to risk reduction and climate change adaptation.

302. This approach will furthermore imply that DRR and risk management must be considered as elements to be mainstreamed in all relevant FAO interventions where prior analysis contemplates possible causalities between the selected activity, food security, DRR and resilience.

303. How the Reviewed Strategic Framework 2010-2019 will support such linkages remains to be seen, but it is key for FAO to ensure that complementarities are found across the different Strategic Objectives through more multi-disciplinary approaches.

Recommendation 2: To Technical Departments, on a multi-disciplinary logical framework complementing the FP DRR

It is recommended that FAO develops a multi-disciplinary logical framework that clearly identifies causalities between FAO core interventions, food security, DRR, climate change and resilience.

304. Such a logical framework identifies the causal connections between root causes for structural food insecurity, the possible implications related to natural hazards and climatic variations and how these are expressed among determined (vulnerable) population groups in different contexts and territories.

305. This logical framework will consequently enable FAO staff to understand the causal nexuses between food insecurity and the realms of vulnerability, resilience and risk management. The framework should outline methodological guiding principles that will facilitate elaboration

of comprehensive multi-disciplinary field interventions under the CPFs. The framework should, as far as possible, promote the use of existing tools developed (or under development) by FAO, such as the IPC 2 and GIEWS, amongst others.

306. The logical framework should complement the FP DRR and thus serve as a programmatic guidance tool for FAO staff, particularly relevant in terms of contributing to achieving SO-5 and SO-2 of FAO's Reviewed Strategic Framework. The logical framework should be based on gender analysis and include specific attention to gender issues, a cross cutting thematic area of the Reviewed Strategic Framework 2010-2019.

Recommendation 3: To Senior Management, on institutional capacity

It is recommended that FAO significantly strengthens its institutional capacity in order to conceptually and technically reinforce DRR at headquarter level and key regional and selected Country offices, including a stronger focus on gender sensitive programming.

307. It is essential that the Organisation's technical profile in DRR is strengthened in order to take full advantage of FAO's unique position with regards to food security. This also goes for the mandate FAO has in linking interventions related to food security and agriculture to resilience, DRR and climate change adaptation.

308. Furthermore, the comprehensive approach to DRR and CCA advocated for by this evaluation requires an enabling institutional setup able to generate learning, innovation and cross-divisional cooperation that promotes mainstreaming of risk management. This comprehensive approach needs to specifically address cross cutting issues such as gender sensitive planning processes.

309. It is strongly suggested that technical capacities are strengthened at Headquarters and Regional offices, as this will enable FAO to adapt a progressive approach that identifies targeted countries where conditions (and demands) are in place for the suggested comprehensive approach. The Regional offices should serve as knowledge centres (as RAP did in the case of HPAI) and provide up-to-date technical support to selected Country offices on how to prepare and implement the more comprehensive DRR (and CCA) approaches under the CPFs. The ongoing decentralisation process is a welcome opportunity to strengthen DRR capacities at Regional and relevant Country offices.

Recommendation 4: To Senior Management and Technical Departments, on DRR engagement in countries

It is recommended that FAO reduces its DRR interventions to pre-selected countries against clear-cut criteria such as national capacities in DRR, vulnerability to climate variability, exposure towards natural hazards, food security data and national commitments (i.e. demands for services).

310. The evaluation found that FAO engages in too many countries. Due to limited resources and capacities, and considering great variations in demands, needs and capacities amongst member countries, FAO should closely analyse where to engage with DRR and CCA. In various countries, particularly in Asia, significant capacities are progressively increasing within national institutions and FAO therefore needs to be realistic in terms of analysing where it can effectively add value.

Recommendation 5: To Technical Departments and Country office Representations, on intervention areas in selected countries

The evaluation recommends that FAO focuses interventions on geographically defined areas in selected countries that would enable the Organisation to fully implement the suggested comprehensive approach to risk reduction.

311. The evaluation identified a wide range of activities in most countries, and these were often spread thin across different geographical areas without prior analysis in terms of vulnerability. Focusing interventions on key areas in countries that are particularly food insecure and vulnerable in terms of climatic variations will lead to more effective interventions.

312. Focused interventions will also lead to more efficient use of limited human and financial resources and enable FAO to undertake a longer term programme outlook, rather than a collection of projects approach, that will have much better prospects for impact and sustainability.

Recommendation 6: To Country office Representations, on policy dialogue

The evaluation recommends that FAO broadens its dialogue in the selected countries beyond the Ministries of agriculture to include other strategic counterparts in DRR such as Ministries of environment, finance and planning.

313. The opportunities lying ahead for FAO in terms of converging DRR and CCA require different and more varied partnerships in the countries where FAO decides to focus on DRR and CCA as part of the Organisation's efforts to reduce food insecurity. Ministries of agriculture are often in a less strategic position when it comes to resource allocation and influence in terms of multi-disciplinary planning processes and mainstreaming of DRR and CCA, in particular. These new partnerships should be emphasised and addressed through more integrated and multi-disciplinary approaches under the CPFs.