EVALUATION OF THE CONSORTIUM OF BRITISH HUMANITARIAN AGENCIES (CBHA) PILOT

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CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report is an evaluation of the Consortium of British Humanitarian Agencies. This evaluation specifically covers the activities of the CBHA under the initial grant of £8 million from DFID over the period 2010-2012, it does not cover the activities carried out under two separate grants of £1 million[1] and of £20 million by some members in Pakistan.

This is an unusual evaluation report, in that it combines the findings of two separate evaluations. The first of these was an evaluation of the CBHA capacity building component by an independent capacity building specialist[2]. The capacity building element accounted for twenty per cent of the overall CBHA budget. The second was an evaluation of the overall CBHA carried out by two independent humanitarian evaluators[3]. This evaluation focused on the other four elements of the CBHA, but took the findings of the capacity building evaluation into account. This report summarises both evaluations.

The evaluation of capacity building is based on multi-method assessments including field visits to four countries[4]. The overall evaluation is based on a review of CBHA documentation, the capacity building evaluation, and interview with some 36 key informants, including humanitarian directors, CBHA secretariat staff, chief executives, DFID and others. This report incorporates feedback and discussion from the March 5th workshop where the conclusions and recommendations were presented.

The Report contains chapters on:

- The context, including the formation of the CBHA and the overlap with other consortia
- The methodology used by the evaluation
- The results from the CBHA – supported by Annex 1 and Annex 2
- Evidence of value added
- Conclusions from the pilot
- Recommendations for the future

A series of annexes provide largely tabular data on:

- CBHA achievements against the original log frame (Annex 1)
- Results achieved with the surge grants in the first year of the CBHA (Annex 2)
- The chronology of the main events and milestones of the CBHA (Annex 3)
- Names of persons interviewed for this evaluation (Annex 4)
- The Emergency Response Fund (ERF) grants made by the CBHA (Annex 5)
- The sources cited in the evaluation (Annex 6)

Key findings, conclusions and main recommendations on the CBHA pilot

…a ground-breaking approach to resourcing humanitarian response

The CBHA was a two year pilot of a ground-breaking approach to resourcing humanitarian response. It consisted of five elements, a pooled fund for emergency response, support for capacity building, support for improved surge capacity, support for logistic chain management, and learning from the pilot. Although the pilot has been positively reviewed by a number of evaluations and reviews (including DFID's HERR) DFID decided not to renew the MoU[5].

The evaluation found that most of the targets agreed with DFID for the CBHA pilot have been achieved or exceeded. The CBHA pioneered new approaches and strengthened collaboration between agencies. This reinforced the response of the NGO Sector (the so called third pillar of humanitarian response) to humanitarian crises even though it was limited to 15 NGOs with bases in the UK.

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1.   The disbursements made from this grant are described in Table 8 in Annex 5.
2.   Willem van Eekelen.
3.   John Cosgrave and Riccardo Polastro.
4.   Kenya, Indonesia, Bangladesh and Bolivia. A visit to South Sudan was cancelled because of security concerns
5.   However CBHA is eligible to compete for funding in new DFID grants such as the Global Resilience Action Programme

The CBHA strengthened the capacity of the British NGOs to deliver results to people affected by emergencies

The evaluation found that the collaborative approach triggered peer to peer learning and decision making through a 'practitioner forum' which contributing significantly to the value added by the CBHA. The CBHA strengthened the capacity of the British NGOs to deliver results to people affected by emergencies. As the evaluation did not travel to the field (except for the capacity building component), it cannot comment on the appropriateness or effectiveness on the ground. However, the evaluation can say that the high quality of the ERF proposals emerging from the process and the speed of ERF funding, suggest that the interventions improved the outcomes for affected populations.

Where used ERF increased access to fast, efficient and effective funding fostering front-line humanitarian work

All the key informants interviewed recognized the central value of the Emergency Response Fund (ERF) while other three main elements received a more mixed appraisal. The ERF increased access to fast, efficient and effective funding for front-line humanitarian work. The ERF component of the CBHA allocated 12 rounds of funding an enabled rapid response in 11 different emergencies[6]. The ERF was the fastest non-internal funding available to the CBHA members. The CBHA allocation mechanism was fast and had low transaction costs for agencies.

The ERF requirements for grantees to begin operations within seven days of funding and to complete them within thirty days were largely met. The ERF was most effective when it provided funding for low profile emergencies or for the initial stages of slow-onset emergencies. Allocations made by the ERF were on the basis of humanitarian needs. The ERF allowed members to leverage funding from other donors in some cases. The ERF fund helped to attract members to the CBHA and acted as the glue that kept the consortium working together through a principled approach[7].

the ERF was so successful that it could well serve as a model for an NGO equivalent to the UN's CERF

The ERF was so successful that it could well serve as a model for a NGO equivalent to the UN's Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF). However, this would require broader membership of the CBHA or a different allocation mechanism that would need to be tested in a further pilot.

*CBHA capacity building programmes strengthened the humanitarian competencies
of new, junior and mid-level humanitarian workers*

For the first time, a core humanitarian competencies framework has been developed, endorsed and utilised by a group of INGOs with networks that jointly cover the globe. This was one of three CBHA programmes that strengthened the humanitarian competencies of starting, junior and mid-level humanitarian workers. All CBHA members utilised at least two of these programmes. They did so with varying but generally considerable success, and the CBHA has collected many positive examples of ways in which humanitarian workers and leaders have strengthened and applied their humanitarian competencies in their work.

These capacity building programmes had been developed on existing initiatives (and had in fact been selected because of these initiatives). The CBHA programmes had enriched these initiatives by opening them up to CBHA members and some of their partners, and by connecting them through the joint utilisation of the Core Humanitarian Competencies Framework.

This competency framework had been developed and endorsed by the CBHA members. Its initial purpose had been to strengthen the CBHA capacity building programmes, but its wider usefulness was quickly recognised. At the time of writing, several agencies have already started using this framework in their recruitment and staff development processes. To support these agencies, ActionAid and People In Aid have produced reference material that aid NGOs in using the framework to build humanitarian capacity throughout their employees' life cycles.

*The CBHA effectively served as an incubator that moved the long-standing
capacity building agenda forward in a step-change*

Capacity issues are a very pertinent focus for the CBHA as they have been a long-standing issue in the humanitarian sector. The CBHA effectively served as an incubator that moved parts of this long-standing capacity building agenda forward in a step-change.

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6.   See Annex 5 for a list of all ERF grants
7.   One interviewee commented that their organisation was not in the CBHA for the money, but that the money helped to keep then at the table when they might
        have walked away for other reasons

*…in some organisations the CBHA proved the concept of surge capacity and has raised
the internal priority of having such surge capacity*

The surge capacity contributed to enhance CBHA capacity to respond to new emergencies. All of the CBHA members got a grant of £110,000 over two years to improve their surge capacity. The majority of agencies used the surge grant to cover the costs of one or two additional staff to increase their surge capacity in a non-sustainable way. However, in some organisations the CBHA proved the concept of surge capacity and has raised the internal priority of having such surge capacity. The CBHA was less successful in enabling the use of innovations and technology to improve efficiency and effectiveness of member agencies performance. The logistics chain management component of the CBHA was probably the least successful. Although it exceeded the logical framework target of having four agencies develop business cases, it has not been adopted by any of the agencies testing it[8].

The CBHA included a strong learning and evaluation component. Learning from the pilot was incorporated into on-going operations and the strategic planning for the future of the CBHA.

Despite the CBHA being intended as an initial pilot for a larger roll-out, there is already some evidence of impact and value added even over the short two year time frame. The impact of the CBHA has been the strongest on the organisations with less well established surge and emergency funding mechanisms. However, even the large INGOs benefited from added value from the CBHA. Peer to peer learning has been a significant benefit of the CBHA as it became a 'practitioner forum'. The evaluation found strong indirect evidence of a positive cost-benefit for the CBHA.

Overall, the evaluation found that the CBHA has been a success. It served as an incubator to move the capacity building agenda forward, it facilitated response for low profile emergencies, and it enabled CBHA members to send humanitarian specialists to twenty different humanitarian emergencies around the world.

…the decision not to renew the MoU and continue funding was a political decision that ran counter to the evidence

After the pilot the UK's Department for International Development (DFID) decided not to renew the MoU. However, the decision not to continue funding was a political decision that ran counter to the evidence and counter to the recommendation of DFID's own Humanitarian Emergency Response Review (HERR). This was a politically driven policy shift contrary to the performance evidence and the value for money offered by the pilot.

Even so, the CBHA influenced DFID to establish a Rapid Response Facility to which NGOs will have access. The lack of independent funding raises the question as to whether the CBHA secretariat can survive as a separate entity or whether it should not become a sub project of another collaborative approach such as the DEC.

The CBHA demonstrated that a consortium of NGOs could allocate pooled resources in a fair, efficient, and effective manner on the basis of need rather than on the basis of policy or other considerations. It also demonstrated that this could be done with low transaction costs. The report makes five recommendations for the future of the CBHA and one recommendation related to the organisational structure of member agencies:

1. The CBHA should consider dropping the tag "British" while maintaining a requirement for regular face-to-face meetings. The model could be replicated in other countries with the support of existing members' families and networks.

2. The CBHA secretariat should continue its effort to obtain alternative funding in order to maintain the ERF and increase member agencies capacity to respond to low-profile emergencies.

3. The next phase of the ERF could include the plan to develop a mechanism for an NGO emergency fund that would function similarly to the CERF but would be open internationally and not just to British CBHA members as at present.

4. There is a continuing need for a peer mechanism for addressing specific blockages to more effective humanitarian action in the sector. The CBHA need to continue in some form to provide a platform for launching such initiatives.

5. The DEC and the CBHA should conduct a dialogue to explore both the possibility and modalities of having the CBHA as a sub-project of the DEC.

6. CBHA agencies should review whether the current institutional location of humanitarian departments is appropriate given the critical importance of humanitarian action to organisation growth and sustainability.

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8. In addition to the agencies testing it, Oxfam and World Vision are founder members of the HELIOS foundation and Oxfam uses the software as its core logistics chain management package.

ACRONYMS AND SPECIALIST TERMS

AA	ActionAid
AAR	After Action Review
ACF	Action Against Hunger
ALNAP	Active Learning Network on Accountability & Performance in Humanitarian Action
BOAG	British Overseas Aid Group
BOND	British Overseas NGOs for Development, now called Bond since 2009
CA	Christian Aid
CAFOD	Catholic Overseas Development Agency
CAP	(UN) Consolidated Appeal Process
CBHA	Consortium of British Humanitarian Agencies
CERF	Central Emergency Response Fund
CHFS	Conflict, Humanitarian and Security Fund
DAC	Development Assistance Committee of the OECD
DEC	Disasters Emergencies Committee
DFID	Department for International Development
ECB	Emergency Capacity Building Project
ELHRA	Enhanced Learning & Research for Humanitarian Agencies
ERF	Emergency Response Fund
GHOA	Greater Horn of Africa – Horn of Africa plus Kenya, Sudan, and South Sudan
FATA	Federally Administered Tribal Areas
HAI	HelpAge International
HERR	Humanitarian Emergency Response Review
HLDP	Humanitarian Leadership and Development Programme and Trainee Scheme
HOA	Horn of Africa – Somalia, Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Eritrea
INGO	International Non-governmental Organisation
IRC	International Rescue Committee
IRW	Islamic Relief Worldwide
L&E	Learning & Evaluation
MERLIN	Medical Emergency Relief International
NGO	Non-governmental Organisation
NSDP	National Staff Development Programme
ODI	Overseas Development Institute
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
PED	Primary Emergency Decision
PIA	People in Aid
PMU	Programme Management Unit
RRF	Rapid Response Facility
RTE	Real Time Evaluation
SC	Save the Children
UN	United Nations
WAHRF	West Africa Humanitarian Response Fund
WV	World Vision

1. THE CONTEXT

Early Beginnings

The Consortium of British Humanitarian Agencies (CBHA) has its roots in informal discussions between Humanitarian Directors of the British Overseas Aid Group (BOAG)[9]. The group discussed ways in which British NGOs could work more closely together.

Coordination or competition?

The current business model for INGOs in the UK takes its cues from the private sector. Competition rather than collaboration is the primary ethos. NGOs compete for market share, and compete to promote their own brands. Within agencies, marketing departments have become increasingly important in this competitive struggle. Typically, marketing managers are part of the senior management team and humanitarian directors are not.

INGOs coordinate with each other around work in the field and quality initiatives[10]. In exceptional circumstances, agencies may compete to deliver assistance to affected populations in the field. However, there is a broad dichotomy, with competition dominating the country of origin, and coordination dominating the country where agencies implement. Field coordination occurs at multiple levels, between common families or networks, between agencies working in the same geographical area, between agencies funded by the same donor, and between agencies working in the same sector through the UN-led cluster coordination system.

There are contrary examples to this dichotomy, such as the collaborative Disasters Emergency Funding (DEC) structure in the UK, set up in 1963. Other than fundraising through the DEC the broadest coordination between INGOs in the UK has been through participation in the large number of quality and accountability initiatives in the humanitarian sector.

Competition sometimes raises its head in the field, especially in contexts where the number of INGOs mushrooms such as after the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami, or the 2010 Haiti Earthquake. After the 2004 Tsunami, a number of evaluations were critical of the competition between INGOs responding to the disaster. Here competition was driven by the need to produce quick results to demonstrate the agency's ability to deliver to the funding public (Telford et al., 2006, p. 22). INGOs may also compete in the field for field-managed donor funding.

Apart from the DEC, all CBHA members are members of Bond - the UK membership body for NGOs working in international development – and all five BOAG members are CBHA members.

The DFID call for proposals

In early 2010, the Department for International Development (DFID) called for proposals for funding under the Conflict, Humanitarian and Security Fund (CHFS) humanitarian response and said that applications from consortia would be considered favourably[11]. The Humanitarian Directors already in discussion then sought the involvement of other leading INGOs with bases in Britain and in all 15 NGOs joined the consortium. There was a very strong overlap between CBHA and DEC membership with all of the eligible DEC members and three others joining to form the CBHA.

The CBHA organisations and their networks represent the "third pillar" of humanitarian action, with the United Nations and the Red Cross movement being the first and second pillars respectively[12].

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9. BOAG's five members are: Christian Aid, Action Aid, Save the Children UK, CAFOD, and Oxfam GB. The BOAG agencies normally advocate around issues of humanitarian access and policy.
10. Examples of quality initiatives are People in Aid, the Sphere Project, and the Humanitarian Accountability Partnership (HAP). A 2007 paper from HAP listed 70 initiatives and standards for or applicable to the humanitarian sector. The list was not comprehensive and does not include 28 codes of Fundraising practice of the Institute of Fundraising (http://www.institute-of-fundraising.org.uk/guidance/codes-of-fundraising-practice/codes-directory/) or initiatives that have borne fruit since 2007 (UNEG, 2008).
11. During the Labour Government DFID strongly preferred consortia approaches, in part because of the much lower cost of administering one grant to a consortia than many different grants to the consortia members.
12. Assigning the third pillar to NGOs reflects status rather than age or financial strength or roles in humanitarian response. In age order the pillars would be RC, NGO, and UN (The British Red Cross Society was founded during the 1870 Franco-Prussian war, nearly 50 years before Save the Children, the first INGO. In terms of finance, the order would be UN, NGO, and RC. In humanitarian response, NGOs and the Red Cross Movement lead in the implementation (with NGOs often acting as implementing partners for UN agencies).

DEC and CBHA membership

Organisation	CBHA	DEC	Remarks
ActionAid	Yes	Yes	DEC member prior to 1997
Action Against Hunger (UK)	Yes	No	Not a DEC member
Age UK	No	Yes	DEC member prior to 1997 (as Help the Aged). Age UK is a member of HelpAge International, which is a CBHA member.
British Red Cross Society	No	Yes	Founder member of the DEC. Excluded from the CBHA as the DFID call from proposals was for NGOs and not for the Red Cross.
CAFOD	Yes	Yes	Joined the DEC in the 1997 reform of the DEC
CARE International (UK)	Yes	Yes	Joined the DEC in the 1997 reform of the DEC
Christian Aid	Yes	Yes	Founder member (as Inter-Church Aid)
Concern Worldwide (UK)	Yes	Yes	Joined the DEC in 1997
HelpAge International	Yes	No	A member of HelpAge International, Age UK, is a member of the DEC
International Rescue Committee UK	Yes	No	Not a DEC Member
Islamic Relief Worldwide	Yes	Yes	Joined the DEC in April 2005
Merlin	Yes	Yes	Joined the DEC in the 1997 reform of the DEC
Oxfam	Yes	Yes	Founder member
Plan International UK	Yes	Yes	Joined the DEC in July 2011 (not a DEC member when the CBHA was founded)
Save the Children Fund	Yes	Yes	Founder member
TearFund	Yes	Yes	Joined the DEC in the 1997 reform of the DEC
World Vision UK.	Yes	Yes	Joined the DEC in the 1997 reform of the DEC

The proposal

The members, with Save the Children acting as the lead, prepared a proposal for DFID with activities under five headings:

1. An Emergency Response Fund (ERF) mechanism
2. Capacity building and human resource development
3. Increased surge capacity
4. Improved supply chain logistics via the Helios Project
5. Learning and evaluation

The budget was split between these five elements and the Project Management Unit (PMU) as shown below.

Figure 1: Breakdown of the initial CBHA budget - drawn from the project logical framework

Capacity Building £1.65m, 20.6%

PMU £0.29m, 3.6%

ERF £4.00m, 50.0%

Helios £0.37m, 4.6%

Surge £1.65m, 20.6%

Learning and evaluation £0.04m, 0.5%

Some of the CBHA elements, such as the ERF and some of the surge, were completely new projects that all members implemented[13]. Others such as Helios and element of the capacity building budget were existing projects led by individual CBHA members that were rolled out to a wider group. The surge support element was the most diverse component, being used in very different ways by the different CBHA members.

Other funding

In October 2010 a subset of CBHA agencies[14] formed a consortium for a DFID grant of £20 million for Early Recovery in response to the Pakistan Floods. The activities carried out under this grant are not subject to this evaluation. However, the evaluation team did look at the impact that this process had on the CBHA. This followed an earlier DFID supplement of £1 million for the ERF, specifically for Pakistan. This initial grant was allocated between seven of the ten CBHA agencies who applied for funding. This £1 million grant was effectively a supplement to the CBHA ERF fund.

Other Consortia and Groups

CBHA members are also members of other consortia and groups. Table 1 lists some of the main cross family[15] NGO consortia where there is a significant overlap in terms of membership with the CBHA. The CBHA is unique in that it is the only operationally focused consortia governed by humanitarian directors, and that it is only one that has used joint financial resources for humanitarian response rather than for capacity building.

Table 1: Major NGO consortia and grouping in the Humanitarian Sector where there is a significant overlap with the CBHA

Organisation	Membership	Purpose	CBHA overlap
International Council of Voluntary Agencies	Over 75 national and international NGOs active in the humanitarian sector. Founded in 1962. Sits on the UN's Inter-Agency Steering Committee.	Focuses primarily on the issues and agencies involved in humanitarian and human rights policies and activities.	All the CBHA members are members of ICVA except for Christian Aid, Islamic Relief, and Tearfund
Interaction	More than 190 US NGOs working internationally on both relief and development. Sits on the UN's Inter-Agency Steering Committee	To shape policy decisions on relief and long term development issues, including foreign assistance, the environment, women, health, education and agriculture.	All of the CBHA family or networks member in the US are members of InterAction
Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response (1972)	Nine members. ICRC, IFRC, two NGO networks, one NGO, and four NGO families. Founded in 1972. Sits on the UN's Inter-Agency Steering Committee.	To bring together major international humanitarian actors with common values and shared principles	CBHA members are represented in all six SHCR NGO networks and families.
Voluntary Organisations in Cooperation in Emergencies.	83 European NGOs. VOICE is the main NGO interlocutor with the EU on emergency aid, relief, rehabilitation and disaster preparedness	Seeks to involve its members in advocacy, lobbying and common positioning,	All the CBHA members are members except for HelpAge International.
Disasters Emergency Committee	13 British NGOs and the British Committee of the Red Cross.	Fundraising from the public for major emergencies.	All of the CBHA agencies expect for AAH and IRC.
British Overseas Aid Group	5 British NGOs	BOAG focus on humanitarian policy issues.	All five BOAG members are members of the CBHA
Emergency Capacity Building Project	In 2003 the emergency directors of 7 INGOs came together to discuss the most persistent challenges in humanitarian aid delivery	Improving the speed, quality, and effectiveness of the humanitarian work of the members	Four of the six ECB members are members of the CBHA

13.   Oxfam, which has the largest internal emergency response fund of any of the CBHA agencies, did not apply for any ERF funding
14.   Action Against Hunger, Care, Concern Worldwide, International Rescue Committee, Oxfam, and Save the Children
15.   In this report, family refers to a group of NGOs sharing a common brand (e.g. Oxfam GB, and Oxfam US etc.) who closely coordinate with each other and would typically have only a single member running programmes in a given country. The term network will be used to refer to a loser organisation of NGOs who may share a common subsidiary brand, and where several network members might work in one country (e.g. Christian Aid as part of the Action by Churches Together Network).

In addition to consortia and grouping listed in Table 1, CBHA members also participate in groupings such:

- NGO families such as Oxfam International or the Save the Children Alliance, where members set the common strategy and policy for the family.
- NGO networks, such as CAFOD or the Action by Churches Together network where members may agree on joint policies that will apply to all members.
- Quality initiatives in the humanitarian sector such as Sphere, the Humanitarian Accountability Partnership, or ALNAP.
- NGO development groupings, such as Bond or Alliance 2015.
- NGO coordination mechanisms at the field level, such as the NGO Forum in South Sudan.
- Cluster coordination mechanisms at the field level.
- Global cluster coordination mechanisms.
- Donor specific groupings at the field level such as all ECHO partners.
- Implementing partners groups, such as for UNHCR or WFP.

Organisational variety

One key aspect of the context is that the CBHA members are very different from each other in a number of respects:

- Scale: CBHA members vary in scale from less than £10 million a year to over £200 million.
- Implementation strategy: CBHA members represent a range of implementation strategies from direct implementation to working through partners and mixed approaches.
- Underlying philosophy: The CBHA includes both faith-based and secular agencies. Such differences have little practical impact on operations.
- Funding base: CBHA members range from those who get less than 15% of their resources from voluntary donations (e.g. Merlin or CARE) to those getting two-thirds of their income from such sources (e.g. Tearfund). Voluntary donations, except for donations for particular emergencies, are unrestricted and can be used for building capacity to respond to emergencies.
- Logistics: Some CBHA members engage in relatively little procurement or logistics operations, but fund local partners to do so. For others, logistics play a key part in their emergency responses (e.g. medicines for Merlin) and others maintain emergency stocks and warehouses (e.g. Oxfam).
- The balance between development and humanitarian action: CBHA members range from those who are almost exclusively engaged in humanitarian action (Action Against Hunger) to those with a largely developmental portfolio (ActionAid).

2. METHODOLOGY

This report is based on two evaluations commissioned by Action Against Hunger UK, in January and February 2012, as part of the Learning and Evaluation component of the CBHA project.

The evaluation of the CBHA overall, focusing on the non-capacity-building components

The main methods used were document research by the consultants in January and February 2012 and interviews with key informants in February 2012. A workshop was held in March to validate the findings and prioritise conclusions and recommendations.

The main document set was assembled by the CBHA and the consultants identified and located other documents in the course of the work. The evaluation had the advantage of being able to draw on excellent resources such as the mid-term evaluation of the CBHA (Featherstone, 2011) and the Desk Study of the ERF (Stoddard, 2011).

The document set was indexed using DTsearch to facilitate searches on any issues that arose in the report writing phase. The team used an evidence tool to collate evidence from the documents and from interviews and to facilitate the writing of the report.

In all 36 people were interviewed by the team both in person and over the telephone. The list of persons interviewed can be found in Annex 4. One addition to the original work-plan was a series of short telephone interviews with Chief Executives. This flowed from issues identified in the interviews with humanitarian directors[16] and other key informants.

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16. The term "humanitarian director" is used in the report to refer to the person directly responsible for managing an agency's programme of humanitarian action. In some agencies the humanitarian director reports directly to the chief executive officer (CEO) who in turn report to the board. In the majority, the humanitarian director reports to a "programme director" responsible for both development and humanitarian action.

The evaluation of the capacity building components

Initial programme assessments were based on a review of documents, and 47 open and 54 structured telephone interviews[17] with programme staff, programme participants, their line managers and their coaches. During visits to Bangladesh, Bolivia,[18] Kenya, and Indonesia, the evaluation observed learning sessions and visited 25 national and local offices of CBH Agencies.

The methods used during these visits were varied to suit the context. The range of methods included one-to-one conversations, focus group discussions, project site visits, mind maps, the stimulated recall technique, the nominal group technique, the 'five whys' routine, the urgent/important matrix, the 'method of silence', swimming lanes, provocative questions, and 'what if' and naïve questions. To counter the sometimes very obvious desirability bias the evaluation occasionally presented a provocative point of view in order to either reduce the bias or to ensure a maximum substantiation of opinions.

The feedback and observations were coded and formed the basis of draft reports which were shared with CBHA programme staff and Director. Several feedback loops led to final assessment reports of the SCF-led traineeship and the Oxfam-led learning programmes. As a last step the evaluation conducted 19 interviews with programme staff and CBHA Board members, for bigger picture thinking and context.

Final steps

The findings of the evaluation of the capacity building component were incorporated into this report through consideration of the internal summary of the evaluation of the capacity building elements (van Eekelen, 2012).

Given the extent of existing CBHA monitoring and evaluation, the interviews served to triangulate the information provided in the documents. To this end the preliminary results from both components of the evaluation were presented at a well-attended workshop in London on March 5th. Feedback from the presentation at workshop has been incorporated into this report.

It was clear in interviews that perceptions of the different components were mixed. The ERF was perceived unanimously as the most positive, followed by surge support. Opinions about the capacity building were more mixed, but still largely positive. The logistics component generated some strongly negative comments. The reasons for this are complex and are discussed below. Where there was strong dissenting review the evaluation notes this.

3. RESULTS

Overall results

…most of the targets for the CBHA have been achieved or exceeded

A summary of achievements against the logical framework for the project (presented in Annex 1) shows most of the targets for the CBHA have been achieved or exceeded. This was confirmed in interviews and in the document review. It should be noted that it is unusual for projects in the humanitarian sector to achieve all of their objectives because of the changing context of humanitarian action, and because projects in the humanitarian sector often overestimate their potential impact.

CBHA logical framework overall purpose: To pioneer new approaches to funding and resourcing humanitarian responses which strengthen the coordination and capacity of the "third pillar" - the NGO sector - to deliver appropriate, higher quality, more effective and quicker humanitarian responses over the current decade 2010 - 2020.

The evaluation found that the CBHA had pioneered new approaches and had strengthened coordination. Increased collaboration between agencies added significantly to the value of the CBHA. Beyond the achievements of the activities planned in the CBHA logical framework the members invested considerable amounts of time, effort and resources in the Consortium and extended the CBHA's lifespan by at least ten more months (until the end of 2012) using agency unrestricted funds.

Increased collaboration between agencies added significantly to the value of the CBHA

Two of the key indicators that have not been met are those of funding from other donors and funding from DFID after the pilot phase. It should be noted that the DFID decision is a result of a political decision as it goes counter to the positive

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17.   The structured interviews were conducted by Fatma El-Banna, Liz Light and Kathrine Olsen.
18.   Visit made by Jill Edbrooke.

assessment of the CBHA in DFID's own Humanitarian and Emergency Response Review (HERR) (Ashdown, 2011). This and the issue of other funding will be discussed below under recommendations for the future.

Emergency Response Fund

CBHA logical framework output for the ERF: Consortium member agencies have immediate access to emergency response funding enabling them to mount focused and effective field operations in the immediate aftermath of a disaster or other crisis.

The evaluation found that the ERF did provide CBHA members with rapid access to emergency response funding. It is worth comparing the CBHA with other significant financial response mechanisms that CBHA members might get funding from.

For those agencies that have them, internal agency emergency funds were the fastest sources of funding, and the CBHA was the fastest external mechanism for financing the member NGOs' response to emergencies. The CBHA timetable typically consists of an initial alert, followed by a teleconference to take a decision on whether or not to make funds available. This is then followed by a call for applications and a decision on the applications made.

the CBHA was the fastest external mechanism for financing the member NGOs' response to emergencies

In only one case was the allocation decision more than 7 days after the alert (this was due to the decision to make a follow up allocation after the initial allocation decision). Typically allocation decisions are made within two to five days of the initial alert (Figure 2).

The Desk Review of the ERF noted that for sudden-onset emergencies the lead time for other NGO grants was two to three times the lead time for ERF grants, and that for slow-onset emergencies the lead time for other NGO grants was more than 20 times the lead time for ERF grants (Stoddard, 2011).

Figure 2: Timelines for CBHA ERF Grants (in chronological order - oldest grants at the top, drawn from available ERF summaries)

| | CBHA Alert | Needs Assessment | CBHA Allocation |
| | Preparation for implementation | Project Implementation | |

Number of days before and after the allocation decision

16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38		Organisation
																							201006	Christian Aid
																							201006	Help Age International
																							201006	Action Against Hunger
																							201007	Action Aid
																							201007	CAFOD
																							201007	Christian Aid
																							201007	Concern
																							201007	IRC
																							201007	Islamic Relief
																							201007	Merlin
																							201007	World Vision
																							201010	Action Against Hunger
																							201010	Christian Aid
																							201010	Merlin
																							201010	Save the Children
																							201101	Care
																							201101	Christian aid
																							201101	Islamic Relief
																							201102	Action Against Hunger
																							201102	Islamic Relief
																							201102	Save the Children
																							201103	CAFOD
																							201103	Tearfund
																							201103	Merlin
																							201103	Save the Children
																							201104	Action Aid
																							201104	Christian Aid
																							201104	Concern
																							201104	Save the Children
																							201106	Agency 1
																							201106	Agency 2
																							201108	Plan
																							201108	Tearfund
																							201108	World Vision
																							201108	CAFOD
																							201108	Christian Aid
																							201108	HelpAge International
																							201108	Save the Children
																							201108	Tearfund
																							201109	Action Aid
																							201109	Christian Aid
																							201109	Concern
																							201109	World Vision

Legend:
- CBHA Alert
- Needs Assessment
- CBHA Allocation
- Preparation for implementation
- Project Implementation

The CBHA ERF rules are that implementation should begin within 7 days and should be finished within 30 days. This is a very short window for expenditure, but Figure 2 shows that these conditions are normally respected. In some circumstances (access or logistics constraints) initial implementation was delayed beyond the first seven days. In other cases implementation began as soon as the grant was made.

Other emergency funding: Internal emergency funds

Almost all the CBHA members interviewed have some sort of internal emergency funding mechanism that allows the agency to respond quickly to crises. In some cases these are revolving funds, where the programme has to repay money to the fund when other donors are found. Most are grant funds, where there is no requirement to replenish the fund from other donations. In other cases the funds available were quite small.

Interviewees reported that such internal funds these were the fastest source of funding for emergencies. However, they were also grateful for the CBHA funding as the internal funds are quite small in some cases. It is notable that Oxfam, with the largest internal emergency response fund of the UK agencies (the Catastrophe Fund) did not apply for any funding from the ERF as they thought that ERF grants would be more useful for CBHA agencies without large emergence reserves. Save the Children, which also has large emergency reserves, did apply for ERF funding, arguing that it was not the funding, but participation in the process, that was important.

Other emergency funding: Disasters Emergency Committee

DEC appeals are launched[19] where:

1. The disaster is of such a scale and of such urgency as to call for swift international humanitarian assistance. This excludes many of the smaller scale disasters to which the CBHA has responded.

2. The DEC member agencies, or some of them, are in a position to provide effective and swift humanitarian assistance at a scale to justify a national appeal.

3. There are reasonable grounds for concluding that a public appeal would be successful, either because of evidence of existing public sympathy for the humanitarian situation or because there is a compelling case indicating the likelihood of significant public support should an appeal be launched. This excludes some of the lower profile and slow onset disasters to which the CBHA has responded.

The DEC mechanism is relatively fast. Once the decision is taken to launch an appeal, it is usually done within a few days. DEC appeals can bring in enormous amounts of money[20]. While physical transfers of cash to the agencies may take a week or more, the DEC members are happy to spend their own resources in the first few days in the knowledge that the expenditure will be covered by DEC funds.

The DEC mechanism is relatively fast … DEC appeals can bring in enormous amounts of money

Two DEC appeals overlapped the CBHA. The first was the DEC Pakistan Floods appeal (£71 million), launched shortly after ERF allocations were made for this crisis. ERF allocations were made on August 4th 2010, and the DEC appeal was launched on the following day, August 5th. Only one of the CBHA agencies getting funding from the ERF was not a DEC member (IRC).

The CBHA response to the crisis in Somalia long before it became a major news story reflects one of the key advantages of such a peer managed fund – the ability to respond to humanitarian needs even when they are not on the news

The second overlapping appeal was the East Africa Crisis appeal. In this case the first ERF allocations for Somalia were made in February 2011, with a second round of allocations for Somalia, Ethiopia, and Kenya in April 2011. The DEC appeal for this slow onset disaster was only launched on July 8th. This was a reflection of the time it took for the crisis in East Africa to become a major news story. The CBHA response to the crisis in Somalia long before it became a major news story reflects one of the key advantages of such a peer managed fund – the ability to respond to humanitarian needs even when they are not on the news.

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19.   Decisions to launch DEC appeals are not made by the member INGOs alone. The broadcasters, who play a major role in the effectiveness of appeals, have an effective veto on appeals and may decide against an appeal because of concerns about potential consequences. This was why there was no DEC appeal for some more complex crises, such as the 2001 Afghan crisis, despite the desire of the member agencies to have one, and why the Gaza appeal was only launched in January 2009 rather than during the height of the crisis in December 2008.

20.   The DEC appeal after the 2004 Asian Earthquake and Tsunamis raised over £392 million. The Haiti Appeal raised £107 million and the recent East Africa Appeal raised £75 million. Crises with a lower media profile can of the order of £8-10 million (DEC, 2012).

Other emergency funding: The UN's Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF)

Support for the UN's Central Emergency Response fund is a key part of the UK government's humanitarian strategy and support for the UN humanitarian reform. The UK has been the largest donor to the fund, providing nearly one fifth of all CERF funding[21]. CERF funding is available to UN agencies and the International Organisation of Migration (IOM) only, but NGOs may get funding from UN agencies who have received CERF grants.

Of the five mechanisms considered here, the CERF is the slowest

Of the five mechanisms considered here, the CERF is the slowest. The 2011 CERF 5-year evaluation found that the average time from application to disbursement of CERF rapid response grants to UN agencies was four weeks (Channel Research, 2011, p. 66). Eventual disbursements to NGOs were an average of 13 weeks for rapid response grants (Channel Research, 2011, p. 71).

Other emergency funding: Direct donor funding

Bilateral and some multilateral funding can be rapid, but the ERF desk study found that this funding was not as rapid as the CBHA. Even the rapid mechanisms of donors, such as ECHO's Primary Emergency Decision, can take significantly longer than their nominal 72 hours[22]. In the case of DFID, NGOs in the UK have found that since the establishment of the CERF. It is harder to get direct bilateral funding for NGO response to emergencies than it was before the advent of the CERF (Porter, 2007).

A fair process?

HQ interviewees generally considered that the CBHA allocation process was fair. However, it was noted that agencies on the ERF committee were more likely to have their proposals approved (Table 2).

Table 2: Percentage of approved applications by membership of the ERF sub-committee

Membership of ERF Sub Committee	2010	2011	2010 and 2011
ERF sub-committee member	92%	68%	79%
ERF sub-committee non-member	69%	57%	63%
All applications	76%	62%	69%

The higher funding rates for proposals from ERF sub-committee members is highly suggestive of a correlation between committee membership and funding success, especially in the first year. This concern was behind the rule that membership of the Emergency Response Fund subcommittee should be rotated. However, statistical testing shows that the correlation between grant success and sub-committee membership was not statistically significant at the 5% level[23].

Interviewees suggested that ERF sub-committee members enjoyed the advantage of being aware of what the sub-committee was looking for in proposals, rather than any bias. This is supported by the fact that two of the four agencies (CAFOD, Christian Aid, Concern, and Tearfund) that had all their proposals accepted were never members of the ERF sub-committee (CAFOD and Concern). One was a member for both years (Christian Aid), and one was a member only in the second year (Tearfund).

The fact that proposals from sub-committee members were rejected clearly showed that CBHA allocations were not cake-sharing exercises as is sometimes the case with pooled funding[24] or with consortia[25]. Overall the evaluators considered that the ERF management arrangements led to an impartial process.

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21.   The UK provided 18.9% of all funding for the CERF up to 19 November 2010 (Channel Research, 2011, p. 10)
22.   A Primary Emergency financing Decision is a special type of ECHO Emergency financing Decision delegated to the ECHO Director-General in accordance with the empowerment rules. A Primary Emergency Decision must be taken within seventy-two hours of the outbreak of the humanitarian crisis and is limited to a maximum of €3 million. Actions funded under a Primary Emergency financing Decision must begin within five days of the crisis and be completed within three months. The evaluation of the ECHO response to the 2005 Pakistan Earthquake, found that while the funding was announced on the day of the earthquake, it was another six days before all of the contracts for the primary emergency decision were signed (Cosgrave and Nam, 2007, pp. 48-49).
23.   Fisher's Exact Test for the Year One table of CBHA funding (member/non member versus funded/rejected) gives a $p > 0.05$ ($p = 0.092$, right – assuming a positive correlation between membership and funding). A similar test for Year Two gives $p = 0.28$, right. Statistical testing was conducted using Epi Info 7 (http://wwwn.cdc.gov/epiinfo/7/index.htm)
24.   The evaluation of the Common Humanitarian Fund in Sudan found that a participative allocation process, where the agencies bidding for funding act as judges in their own cases sometimes led to cake-sharing rather than strategic allocation. (Cosgrave and Goyder, 2011, p. 3)
25.   The OECD/DAC paper on joint evaluation notes that "In quite a few cases of [evaluation] consortia, the potential for synergies was overshadowed by quarrels and arguments about the shares of the cake…" (Breier, 2005, p. 51)

Capacity building
CBHA logical framework output for capacity building: Increased numbers and competencies of leaders through developing a competency framework and delivering it through both national and international programmes.

The humanitarian competency framework served in part to provide a commonality that linked the replication (albeit with significant modifications) of three existing initiatives: a traineeship programme for sector entrants, and learning programmes for junior and mid-level humanitarian workers.

The Core Humanitarian Competencies Framework

For the first time, a core humanitarian competencies framework has been developed, endorsed and utilised by a group of INGOs with networks that jointly cover the globe.

This component was led by ActionAid, with technical support from People In Aid and substantial contributions from most CBHA members. The result - the Core Humanitarian Competencies Framework - is innovative. Several member agencies were already using competency frameworks, and two members had frameworks for humanitarian competencies in particular, but a framework that is based on input provided and subsequently endorsed by many agencies is new.

The framework built on work that many organisations and people had done in previous years and took shape in the course of two inter-agency workshops and a range of one-to-one and focus group discussions with staff and managers of humanitarian functions. The only key stakeholder that was absent in the discussions is the group that the framework emphasises most: people from communities that have been affected by disasters. Their input has been indirect and unacknowledged, through the expertise present within humanitarian agencies and through a few separate initiatives such as CDA´s Listening Project and ActionAid's PRRP.

The development of the Core Humanitarian Competencies Framework has been an inter-agency affair, which was possible partly because of the early decision to 'keep it simple.' The implication of 'keeping it simple' is that the framework does not provide levels that allow for progression and deepening of the competencies in the course of one's career. The advantage has been that the CBHA agencies endorsed it unanimously, with considerable enthusiasm, and often with plans for framework utilisation.

The Core and the Management and Leadership learning programmes

An innovative humanitarian learning programme has been tested on and with a wide range of international and national NGOs in Asia, Africa and South America – and the resultant materials have been made freely available to the wider humanitarian sector.

Oxfam adapted these two training programmes to the contexts of the Greater Horn of Africa, Indonesia, Bangladesh and Bolivia, and implemented a single round of pilots of each programme in each location. Both programmes used materials provided by ECB, Oxfam, a number of CBHA members and several consultants.

The six-month Core Programme was meant for a wide range of humanitarian workers, and the nine-month Management and Leadership Programme targeted humanitarian workers with management responsibilities. Both components used a range of learning methods that, in combination with trying-while-doing, helped the 152 participants to go through their own individual learning processes.[26]

All CBHA members, a number of their national partners and a few non-member NGOs have participated in these learning programmes. In addition to their participation, many participants engaged, with the project staff, in several cycles of reflection and improvement of each of these learning methods. This engagement has been a key strength of this component. The resultant materials – presented under the brand name of Context[27] and available free of charge – allow for programme replication and cover each of the competencies by and large effectively.

Feedback from both participants and their line managers has generally been positive. However the agencies are not willing to cover the full costs of participation in the next (ECB-led) round of the programme. This is due to: 1) a history of externally financed training in the NGO sector, leading to dependency; and 2) because the competency framework and this accompanying learning programme are not yet sufficiently visible to be part and parcel of NGOs' continuous learning portfolio. CBHA reinforced the dependency syndrome by rejecting Oxfam's proposal to ask participating agencies to cover a substantial part of the programme's costs.

26. The main learning methods were workshops, coaching, peer support and different types of on-the-job learning. The logical framework target was to accommodate 160 participants.
27. It was surprising that these materials were not presented under the CBHA brand, and this reflects the lack of discussion on ownership at the start of the CBHA.

The Humanitarian Leadership Development Programme

*The CBHA has opened the international NGO sector's most thorough
humanitarian traineeship programme up to its members.*

Save the Children led on this component, and based it on the Save the Children humanitarian traineeship programme that it had developed, tried and tested in the preceding years. Several agencies have played important support roles in the recruitment and training processes, and most have hosted trainees.

A total of 43 people, with very diverse backgrounds, went or are still going through this one-year humanitarian traineeship programme. This happened in two regional cycles in the Greater Horn of Africa, and one global cycle that had its first six months in the UK. Trainees in all three cycles enjoyed a structured combination of training and work experience at headquarter and field level – generally with a rotation element that exposes them to different humanitarian functions.

As per the CBHA Statement of Intent, these traineeships are meant to increase the pool of new leadership talent in the humanitarian sector. Not mentioned in this document or the logical framework but part of conversations about the programme are:

- The notion that graduates with relevant degrees but without having proven their resilience yet pose an expensive risk to humanitarian operations. This traineeship programme reduces this risk as it has been designed for new entrants to get monitored exposure to humanitarian work.
- The idea that humanitarian staff should ideally be transferable. The argument is that this is not currently the case because investments in and focus of continuous learning varies widely across organisations in scope, depth and quality.

In line with the CBHA Statement of Intent and towards the end of the third cycle (in September 2012), the traineeship programme will develop a handbook that will be freely available to all CBHA members. This handbook could help agencies to replicate the programme. This handbook will cover the procedures and processes of the management of a traineeship programme. It will not include much detail on the training programme which forms part of the traineeship experience. This training programme has been developed by Save the Children in the course of many years, and will remain this agency's property.

Commonalities

All logical framework indicators, milestones and targets have been exceeded, or met in full or very nearly in full (see Annex 1 for a comprehensive overview), and there are only two deviations from the CBHA Statement of Intent. First and at least in the short run, the programmes do not address "[t]he lack of availability of experienced senior leadership". Second, the programmes have developed "leadership and key humanitarian skills of international and national NGOs" but not of "other national actors and government personnel".

All capacity building components would have benefited from clearer governance arrangements. The roles of the CBHA Board, the Capacity Building Sub-Committee, and the project teams had not been outlined sufficiently clearly, and the intellectual ownership of some of the end products of the various components remains unclear.

Surge capacity

CBHA logical framework output for surge: Consortium member agencies have available standing capacity to respond quickly and effectively to emergencies.

The evaluation found that the CBHA increased the standing capacity of members to respond quickly and effectively to emergencies during the course of the CBHA. The extent to which this is sustained is discussed in the impact section below.

*The majority of agencies used the surge grant to cover the costs of one or two additional
staff to increase their surge capacity in a non-sustainable way.*

Each of the agencies got a grant of £110,000 for improving their surge capacity. Of all of the elements of the CBHA this was the one with the greatest variability. The evaluation was not able to sensibly compare the model of surge used by the different agencies as the models were specific to each agency's context.

Some agencies used the money to cover staff costs of humanitarian specialists, others invested in upgrading their roster systems, in training their own staff or the staff of partners, or in evaluations, learning or reviews. CBHA funding allowed some organisations to put surge capacity in place and others to significantly increase their surge capacity. This illustrated the benefits of having such capacity to senior managers. The surge grants enabled the CBHA members to deploy humanitarian specialists to 20 different crises in Asia, Africa and Latin America.

The focus was on concrete inputs and processes even though the 2007 review of surge capacity noted that: *"Developing an effective surge capacity therefore requires a whole organisation approach, and is as much about mandate, structure, culture and effective leadership as it is about concrete inputs and processes"* (Houghton, 2007, p. 3). The CBHA surge grants allowed some organisations to test the concrete inputs and allowed humanitarian directors to advocate for a broader approach.

Logistics chain management

CBHA logical framework output for logistics: 1) improve the ability for organisations to respond more efficiently in humanitarian and relief work through the adoption of information technology and best practices in the control of their supply chains; 2) bring these improvements to both individual CBHA agencies as well as the wider community by supporting proof of concept HELIOS pilots and the writing of outline business cases; 3) develop the processes and tools to allow multiple agencies to share supply chain information to improve joint responses in emergencies; and 4) make available generated learning and tools to the wider community.

The evaluation found that this complex objective had only been partially achieved. The component did support pilots and outline business cases, aided in the development of tool and their broader divulgation. However, the evaluation questions the extent to which the logistics component improved the ability of organisations to respond more efficiently. The evaluation considered that this objective was unrealistic in terms of the actual activities planned; nevertheless to a limited extent it helped some organizations understand their procurement process needs and how to address them.

The Fritz Institute[28] developed the HELIOS software as the successor to the Humanitarian Logistics Software it had developed in partnership with the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC). HELIOS is intended for use by any humanitarian agency rather than just the IFRC. The HELIOS software is still in the course of development and two CBHA Agencies have formally adopted it (Oxfam and World Vision). Together Oxfam, the Fritz Institute, and World Vision set up the HELIOS Foundation[29] charity to enable Oxfam to invest in the development of the software and to safeguard its future.

HELIOS is a web-based supply chain solution designated specifically for humanitarian logistics. HELIOS automates five critical humanitarian supply chain activities: request processing, project management, mobilization, procurement, and warehousing. It provides organization-wide visibility to the entire humanitarian supply chain, from source to final destination, via a tracking module that tracks commodities flowing through the supply chain at the line-item level, as well as a full complement of management report.

> *…this was the CBHA component that generated the greatest amount of negative comment from interviewees*

The objective of the CBHA logistics component was not to develop the HELIOS software, but to enable at least four CBHA agencies to pilot the software. Five members prepared outline business cases for an integrated supply chain management system instead of the four planned. Those piloting the HELIOS software gained a better understanding of their procurement processes and of the costs involved. Nevertheless, this was the CBHA component that generated the greatest amount of negative comment from interviewees. The reasons for this were complex and will be discussed in the impact and value added chapter below.

Learning and evaluation

CBHA logical framework output for learning and evaluation: Evidence is available to assess the effectiveness of the programme in the first two years and it is integrated in future strategic planning of the CBHA.

The CBHA continuously reflected upon and improved its programmes throughout their implementation. This happened both internally and with the support of external assessors. The team notes in particular:

- The high quality of the CBHA mid-term review (Featherstone, 2011) and of the desk review of the ERF (Stoddard, 2011).
- The manner in which the learning programmes incorporated both internal learning and external advice into their practice and, subsequently, their package of staff development materials.
- The way in which ActionAid followed up on feedback about the full potential of the competency framework, and moved well beyond the logical framework in its efforts to turn this framework into a sector standard.

The evaluation found that the learning outputs provide good evidence for assessing the CBHA processes, and more limited evidence for assessing the overall effectiveness of the CBHA.

> *The CBHA continuously reflected upon and improved its programmes throughout their implementation.*

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28.   The Fritz Institute is a US charity that works in partnership with Governments, the private sector, NGOs, and the Red Cross Movement around the world to innovate solutions and facilitate the adoption of best practices for rapid and effective disaster response and recovery (http://www.fritzinstitute.org/aboutUs.htm).

29.   http://helios-foundation.org/about/foundation

4. EVIDENCE OF VALUE ADDED AND IMPACT

Overall impact

…despite this short two year time-frame, there is already some evidence of impact and of value added

Originally the CBHA was intended to be a two year pilot for a new approach to funding emergency response and working together. The expectation was that DFID would continue funding the mechanism once it had proved itself. The evaluation found that the mechanism proved itself, but DFID decided instead to establish another mechanism for emergency funding, the Rapid Response Facility (RRF)[50]. However, the RRF is inferior in many respects to the CHBA ERF mechanism (see Table 3 for a comparison).

Two years is a relatively short time in which to expect to see impact, and some of the CBHA outputs could only be expected under conditions of sustained funding. This was the case with the aspiration to have improved senior leadership. While the CBHA assisted with the training of junior leaders, it could be expected to take a decade or more before these began to work in senior positions.

Nevertheless, despite this short two year time-frame, there is already some evidence of impact and of value added. One strong argument that the CBHA delivered added value was the decision of the members to fund the CBHA from their own resources for another year to permit the CBHA to find alternative funding.

As noted earlier, CBHA members are different from each other. This means that the impact of the CBHA has been different for different members. Some members have significant own resources to develop their capacity, but other are largely dependent on grant income which cannot be used for such purposes. While large members like Oxfam have large and well-established surge capacity and emergency funding mechanisms that represent best practice in the sector, but this is not the same for all the members.

The impact of the CBHA has been the strongest on the organisations with less well established surge and emergency funding mechanisms... However, even the large INGOs benefited from added value from the CBHA

The impact of the CBHA has been the strongest on the organisations with less well established surge and emergency funding mechanisms. Such organisations are useful in humanitarian responses as they may offer advantages in particular emergencies such as:

- Key specialist skills in a particular sector
- Existing programmes or partners on the ground that can respond immediately
- Access to large international networks

However, even the large INGOs benefited from added value from the CBHA because they have learned from the rolling-out of what were agency-specific programmes to a wider audience. They have also benefited from the interchange and discussion that all the CBHA members have benefited from.

…peer to peer learning was a significant benefit of the CBHA

All the CBHA agencies benefited from being part of the CBHA largely through intangible benefits from working together. This meant that agencies which had previously had individual programmes learnt from the wider application of these programmes to a broader group. Such peer to peer learning was a significant benefit of the CBHA. All of the CBHA members benefited from the discussions on whether to respond to particular emergencies, and from a better understanding of each other's organisations and capacities.

The evaluation found strong indirect evidence of a positive cost-benefit for the CBHA

The evaluation found strong indirect evidence of a positive cost-benefit. Humanitarian directors were very engaged with the CBHA process, despite the many other demands on their time. This high level of engagement was strong evidence that the managers rated the intangible value-added of the CBHA very highly. This investment in the CBHA runs counter to the general unwillingness of NGOs to invest their own financial resources in such initiatives. This is discussed further in the conclusions.

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30.   http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Work-with-us/Funding-opportunities/Conflict-and-humanitarian/Rapid-Response-Facility-applications/

Capacity building
The Core Humanitarian Competencies Framework

*The value of the Core Humanitarian Competencies Framework far exceeds
what had been foreseen in the original plans.*

This competency framework had been developed and endorsed by the CBHA members. Its initial purpose had been to strengthen the CBHA capacity building programmes, but its wider usefulness was quickly recognised. At the time of writing, several agencies have already started using this framework in their recruitment and staff development processes. To support these agencies, ActionAid and People In Aid have produced reference material that aid NGOs in using the framework to build humanitarian capacity throughout their employees' life cycles.

The Core and the Management and Leadership learning programmes

*The learning programmes helped many participants to grow into more rounded humanitarians,
who are able to think beyond their own technical areas.*

These Oxfam-led learning programmes strengthened some of the humanitarian competencies of 152 participants in Bangladesh, Indonesia, Bolivia, and the Greater Horn of Africa. Particularly for the more experienced participants, the evaluation found that the programme:

• Gave them the confidence required to be more assertive, to take on new responsibilities, and to enter new fields of work;
• Rendered them less inclined to rely on bureaucratic rather than principled approaches;
• Made them feel able to provide leadership;
• Turned them into more 'rounded' humanitarians who are able to consider the broader humanitarian context rather than just their own specialist areas.

Examples of applied learning were easy to find. In a few cases, the application of learning transcended individual practice and strengthened the performance of project teams and departments.

*A package of staff development materials is freely available and allows for programme replication.
Such replication is already under way, in both single-agency and multi-agency form.*

Towards the end of a single round of each programme the CBHA developed a package of staff development materials that reflected both the internal learning and external advice. Though branded as Context rather than CBHA products, these materials allow for programme replication which, at the time of writing, has already been picked up in both multi- and single-agency form[51].

The Humanitarian Leadership Development Programme

*Several agencies had been highly critical in the inception and early stages of this traineeship programme.
It is much to their as well as the programme's credit that they changed from critics to fans in the course
of the programme implementation.*

Nearly all member agencies have placed and benefited from trainees. The trainees themselves have gone through an intensive learning process and generally found employment within the sector immediately or soon after they completed their traineeship.

31.   By ECB and Oxfam respectively. Other organisations have expressed an interest in parts of the programmes.

Early Response Fund

The ERF mechanism allocated £4 million in total, plus another £1 million for Pakistan 2010 floods.

Figure 3: Allocation of ERF funding between agencies

ERF allocation (exc. the £1m top up for Pakistan)
Brackets show successful and total applications

World Vision (3/5), 6%
Tearfund (4/4), 5%
Save the Children (7/10), 13%
Plan (1/2), 2%
Merlin (3/4), 7%
Islamic Relief (3/5), 6%
IRC (2/4), 6%
HelpAge (3/4), 4%
ActionAid (3/8), 8%
Action Against Hunger (3/6), 8%
Care (1/3), 1%
Cafod (4/4), 9%
Concern (3/3), 6%
Christian Aid (8/8), 19%

There is very clear evidence both from the ERF Desk Review and interviews that:

- The ERF was fast money, providing funds as soon as the allocation was made
- The ERF had a low transaction cost
- Provided money for low profile crises, and the initial phase of slow onset ones
- Successfully supported the initial response in 11 different crises[32]

… ERF funding allowed CBHA member to leverage funding

In at least seven cases, ERF funding allowed CBHA members to leverage funding[33]. Interviewees stated that the ERF funding served as a spur for other Donors to consider funding (e.g. in Somalia and the Greater Horn of Africa).

It is not possible for this evaluation to determine the effectiveness of ERF funded interventions[34]. However, there is good reason to believe that the ERF grants have been effective because:

- CBHA grants were timely and rapid. The greatest acute humanitarian needs are in the early stages of an emergency and therefore early funding is potentially much more effective than later funding.
- The peer review process drove up the quality of individual project proposals, and limited funding to the best quality proposals. Higher quality proposals are more likely to lead to effective interventions.

32. Two crises (the drought in the Horn and the 2010 flooding in Pakistan) got two rounds of funding. Pakistan 2010 floods ERF was followed by a top-up matching grant from DFID, while Somalia and Greater Horn of Africa disbursements were ERF disbursements although essentially for different stages of the same crisis.
33. The cost benefit analysis calculated that the leverage funds were worth two and a half times as much as the CBHA grants.
34. Although some agencies present data on the effectiveness of ERF grants, the evaluation considers that field visits would be needed to establish what other factors applied. Such is the complexity of the humanitarian environment that it is unusual to be able to correctly directly attributable results to a single intervention or funding source. Normally it is possible to establish that particular interventions have contributed to a result, but not that they directly led to it.

Surge capacity

Overall CBHA agencies´ humanitarian specialists were deployed to some 20 different crises in Asia, Africa and Latin America. However, for surge capacity grants the impact varied with what the agency did, and with the existing state of surge preparedness in the organisation. In the case of Oxfam, which has a very large investment in surge capacity already, the surge grant was just a top up for the current investment in surge. However, the grants allowed some of the smaller agencies, or agencies with limited or no existing surge capacity to trial having an in-house surge capacity.

Increases in surge capacity were useful, but the efforts were largely not sustainable. The majority of agencies used the surge grant to cover the costs of one or two additional staff to increase their surge capacity in a non-sustainable way. However, some did use the grant for developing their emergency response capacity. While the improvement in surge capacity was largely temporary, in some organisations the CBHA proved the concept of surge capacity and has raised the internal priority of having such surge capacity.

…in some organisations the CBHA proved the concept of surge capacity and has raised the internal priority of having such surge capacity

It is too early to say whether this higher priority will be sustained over the longer term.

Logistics chain management

HELIOS is a supply-chain management software. Eventually all the CBHA members that engage in significant logistics operations will be using some such software because of the advantages that it brings. However, the different needs of the different CBHA agencies meant that the then available version of Helios was not a good fit for all of them.

The HELIOS software was not ready for broader roll out in 2010. At the time of roll out, there was little in the way of documentation, and the deployment of the Helios experts to support Helios operations in Haiti meant that there was little or no help-desk support. This meant that for some, the experience of Helios was negative, and this led to strong criticism of this component. However, users have learned something about the nature of such software and it has helped agencies to consider what sort of supply-chain management system they need. It also helped the participating agencies to evaluate their existing supply-chain management systems.

Learning and evaluation

One challenge for the current evaluation was that the learning and evaluation component of the CBHA has provided so much high quality monitoring and evaluation already that there is little new that this evaluation can add.

The products of the learning and evaluation component influenced the CBHA members and influenced the direction of the projects. All components of the CBHA were regularly evaluated. Individual as well as peer to peer learning was fostered. This provides an excellent model for any further such pilot projects.

5. CONCLUSIONS FROM THE PILOT STAGE

Value added through focus

…the CBHA served as an incubator to move the capability agenda forward.

The CBHA added value beyond the expected project outputs through the collaborative approach especially around the ERF. It also added value through the concentrated focus on areas such as capacity building and surge capacity. This focus allowed the CBHA to move the agenda forward on humanitarian competencies and capacity in the sector. Peer to peer exchange and discussion at the humanitarian director level meant that the CBHA served as an incubator to move the capability agenda forward.

Reach

The reach of the CBHA was far broader that was initially anticipated

Although the CBHA was ostensibly funding for UK based agencies, the agencies using the funds on the ground included the partners, and the international network and families of the CBHA members. Thus the reach of the CBHA was far broader that was initially anticipated.

Impact on low profile crises

The biggest impact of the ERF has been facilitating response to low profile emergencies, including the early phases of slow-onset emergencies. The ERF desk review correctly notes that the number of small to medium scale disasters is increasing. Such disasters are often climate related[35] and 10 of the 12 ERF grants were for climate related disasters[36].

The biggest impact of the ERF has been facilitating response to low profile emergencies, including the early phases of slow-onset emergencies

The ERF provided funding in a very timely manner thus kick starting needs-based responses. The mechanism for funding decisions and allocations mean that the CBHA was independent of the political considerations affecting donor funding, and the organisational considerations around the use of unearmarked resources. While the ERF funding was small there was evidence that the CBHA funding enabled members to leverage other funding. The ERF desk study noted that the initial CBHA funding raised the profile of emergencies with other donors and agencies and therefore leveraged responses overall.

Linkages with on-going projects

All of the CBHA capacity building components, and the logistics component were built on (and conceivably overlapped with) existing projects and products[37]. This allowed a far faster start up than would have been needed for new initiatives. It also allowed, in the case of the learning and traineeship components, the diffusion of best practice in capacity building to a wider range of agencies.

Linkages with other initiatives[38]

Some of the CBHA components overlapped existing initiatives in the sector to some extent. This was the case with the capacity-building elements as these are to some extent covered, or should have been covered, by the Emergency Capacity Building Project (ECB)[39] and People in Aid. People in Aid is involved in the CBHA capacity building initiatives now, but this raised the question as to why the CBHA engaged with such activities in the first place.

Part of the reason lies in the way in which agencies have funded their staff development. Capacity building initiatives in the sectors are rarely self-financing, but are often donor funded[40]. This was also the case with the ECB, the original supporter for what became the CBHA core and management skills training. However, CBHA involvement has allowed for a wider spread of the training, and has allowed the development of kits of training material to permit replication.

Humanitarian directors and chief executives

In interviews it became clear that humanitarian directors and chief executives had different views of the CBHA. Several interviewees contrasted the collaborative approach and rapid decision making in the CBHA with the more competitive approach in the DEC that leads to a longer decision-making process. Interviewees generally ascribed this to the differences between the approach of humanitarian directors (who sit on the CBHA board) and chief executives (who sit on the DEC[41]).

As noted earlier there is a broad dichotomy between NGO competition for funding in the UK, and NGO cooperation in overseas operations. The chief executives are responsible for issues such as funding and brand promotion (where NGOs compete), whereas humanitarian directors are responsible for field operations (where NGOs often cooperate).

However, the CBHA proved, as does the DEC in a different way, that cooperation can bring significant advantages, and that there is scope for more cooperation in the sector. Several interviewees noted that such cooperation challenges the current competitive business model in the INGO sector.

It was clear from interviews with humanitarian directors that several felt more empowered within the CBHA than within their own organisations. The CBHA surge funding meant that humanitarian directors could invest in surge even where they had previously been unable to establish it as a large enough priority for funding. Similarly the capacity building elements allowed investment in training that some agencies are unwilling or unable to fund from their own resources.

Influencing DFID

The CBHA was a pilot for a new approach to funding for rapid emergency response. DFID's Humanitarian Emergency Response Review found that: "The Consortium of British Humanitarian Agencies (CBHA) and the West Africa Regional Humanitarian Fund (WARHF) offer two proven models at a global and regional level. These are effective and should be

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36. The other three grants were for conflict-related displacement in Kyrgyzstan, Kordofan, and West Africa.
37. The linkages with on-going projects enabled the CBHA to use previously established relationships and social networks to launch activities. The Oxfam-led programme was built on the in-country relationships in the four pilot countries that had been established by the ECB agencies.
38. The Capacity Building consultant does not support this section.
39. Of the six current ECB members, four (Care, Oxfam, Save the Children, and World Vision) are CBHA members, and one is a partners of a CBHA member (Catholic Relief Services is a member of the Caritas Network and a CAFOD partner). A seventh agency, the International Rescue Committee was a founder member.
40. This is the case even for UN projects such as the roll out of the cluster coordination system (OCHA, 2007)
41. Prior to 1996, it was programme directors or humanitarian directors who represented agency members in the DEC.

expanded" (Ashdown, 2011, p. 34). DFID gave a vote of confidence in the CBHA when it channelled another £1 million through the mechanism, and another £20 million through a CBHA sub-consortium for the Pakistan floods.

Nevertheless, DFID decided to discontinue support for the CBHA or the WARHF rather than expanding them. Interviewees made clear that this was as a result of a political decision taken by the Secretary of State. Instead DFID decided to "Establish a new facility to provide rapid mobilisation funding in the first 72 hours following a crisis to NGOs using pre-qualification to streamline decision making" (DFID, 2011a, p. 17). This facility is the Rapid Response Facility (RRF). However, commercial companies are eligible for grants from the RRF as well as the Red Cross and NGOs.

Nevertheless, the CBHA did influence DFID's decision to establish the rapid response facility. It did so through the interaction with the HERR and the recommendation by the HERR that the CBHA be continued and expanded. While DFID did not accept this recommendation from the HERR, it did introduce the rapid response facility to have a faster funding mechanism for emergencies.

Table 3: The Rapid Response Facility compared to the CBHA

Element	CBHA	RRF[42]
Eligibility	CBHA member NGOs only	Any pre-qualified NGO, Red Cross, or commercial entity
Humanitarian emergency type	All emergencies, including low profile emergencies	High profile emergencies
Funding limits	Action within 7 days, completed within 30 days	Completed within six weeks
Basis for funding	Assessment of humanitarian need by agencies working on the ground	Decision by Secretary of State
Grant decisions	Peer assessment of proposals to see which organisations (or their local partners) are best placed to respond.	Review of light-touch proposal (similar to concept notes) by officials to see which proposals offer the best value for money
Transaction costs	Very low – draft proposal reviewed by peer group	Moderate. Review by officials.
Fundable activities	Wide ranging	Limited to activities here impact can be demonstrated to meet the value for money requirement.

One of the biggest differences is that the new mechanism will not respond to low profile emergencies. Such emergencies include small scale emergencies which attract little media attention, and the initial phases of slow-onset emergencies. Needs in such low-profile emergencies are far less well met than those in high profile emergencies. The CBHA has proved an effective funding mechanism for low-profile emergencies. The number of such emergencies is growing and is expected to continue to do so.

…CBHA grant funds were available on the basis of need rather than on the basis of policy or other considerations.

Financing the initial response to small-scale emergencies gives the potential to address, in part, one of the biggest gaps in the sector, the exclusive focus on large emergencies, and their episodic nature. Sector capacity increases rapidly in the immediate aftermath of a major emergency, but then dies away as agencies reduce staffing. This "boom and bust" cycle sometimes leave agencies poorly prepared to respond to large-scale emergencies. Responding to small-scale emergencies, especially with national staff or local NGOs, preserves capacity in the system. This also contributed to reinforce organizations set up, making them better prepared and resilient when large-scale emergencies occur.

This transparent way in which decisions to fund particular emergencies were made meant that CBHA grant funds were available on the basis of need rather than on the basis of policy, media or other considerations.[43]

In summary:
- The ERF enables more principled humanitarian action that is possible using other mechanisms.
- The ERF is faster, earlier, and cheaper than any other funding mechanism apart from an agency's own emergency fund
- The ERF helped to preserve capacity in the field through mitigating the episodic nature of NGO funding for large emergencies. The scale of this impact was limited by the limited scale of the ERF.

42. http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Work-with-us/Funding-opportunities/Conflict-and-humanitarian/Rapid-Response-Facility-applications/ and (DFID, 2011b)
43. This comment refers to the original ERF fund of £4 million that it covered by this evaluation. It should be noted that this evaluation does not cover the two large additional grants DFID made through the CBHA for the Pakistan Floods.

Overall

> *…the CBHA model demonstrated that a consortium of NGOs was able*
> *to allocate resources in a fair and effective manner…*

The evaluation concluded that the CBHA had strengthened the third pillar through demonstrating that a collective of NGOs were able to address critical issues such as capacity building in the sector and rapidly advance the agenda. While other inter agency initiatives such as the Humanitarian Accountability Partnership, Sphere, and People in Aid, have addressed critical issues, they have generally done so less rapidly than the CBHA as they don´t have a direct link to operational humanitarian directors.

More importantly the CBHA model demonstrated that a consortium of NGOs was able to allocated resources in a rapid, fair, and effective manner, with low overheads, even when this meant that some of those around the table got nothing. This finding reflects the positive findings about the CBHA in other evaluations and reviews (Ashdown, 2011; Featherstone, 2011; Stoddard, 2011).

The CBHA demonstrated value added despite the overlap between CBHA membership and membership of other NGO consortia. CBHA member representatives used a range of arguments when explaining why they would like to see a continuation of the initiative. The most common ones are that:

- There is need for coordination, and there is a scarcity of leadership and professionalism in the sector. A consortium is better able to address both of these problems (and potentially to get funding for it) than individual agencies.
- The CBHA allowed for a joined-up approach to capacity building, and added value by bringing different initiatives closer together.
- With a consortium set-up, organisations are key stakeholders rather than users. This has had implications for the eagerness with which organisations participated and for the adoption of the results.
- Cooperation is a new and positive trend. NGOs are not catching up with this trend fast enough, and this makes the consortium a very timely initiative.

For the humanitarian directors and their staff (but not for all CEOs) these arguments outweigh any perceived or actual drawbacks: not one of those interviewed at this level advocated wrapping-up of the consortium. They do, however, regularly express a belief that any future CBHA requires a vision and strategy, and sometimes argue that the CBHA risks the loss of member loyalty in absence of either (and indeed in absence of new funding). CEOs had a much more critical stance and several advocated wrapping-up the CBHA in the absence of additional ERF funding.

6. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE FUTURE

Britishness

A number of interviewees raised questions about "dropping the B" as they were no longer identifying the CBHA as British but as a Consortium of Humanitarian Agencies. This would contribute to reinforcing the third pillar.

The oldest modern NGO (Save the Children) is British and the UK INGOs attract large amounts of funding from the general public. The UK has, for its size, one of the most vibrant INGO sectors in the world. Ten of the CBHA members have their roots in the UK[44] but most of these are members of broader families or networks. Almost all the CBHA members are members of families or networks of similar organisations. CBHA members are members of other humanitarian NGO groupings (Table 1). Thus while the CBHA member applying for the funding is British, the agency spending the funding may be from another donor country, or may be a national NGO from the family or network of the CBHA member.

Family and network links are generally more important for coordination in the field than the UK link for organisations. A further important coordination platform in the field is the UN's Cluster Coordination system. At headquarters level, coordination on humanitarian issues may take place through the organisations listed in Table 1 and through families and networks. There is also headquarters level coordination with the Cluster Coordination leads.

How would the CHA differ from other coordination mechanisms?

The CHA would differ in being geographically focused unlike the system-wide organisations. This narrow geographical focus allows more frequent face to face contact. The other difference between the CBHA and other fora in the UK would be that the CHA would be a forum for humanitarian directors rather than chief executives as for the DEC and BOAG. This would allow the CHA to focus on continue its focus practical issues rather than on broader advocacy.

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44. The other five are UK affiliates of organisations that were founded elsewhere: Action Against Hunger (UK); CARE International (UK); Concern Worldwide (UK); International Rescue Committee UK; and World Vision UK).

The ability of humanitarian directors to meet face to face is highly valued, and again limits the participation of agencies from a wider geographic area. The "British" could certainly be dropped from the name, but clear membership criteria would be needed.

> *RECOMMENDATION 1: The CBHA should consider dropping the tag "British" while maintaining a requirement for regular face-to-face meetings. The model could be replicated in other countries with the support of existing members' families and networks.*

This recommendation is more about branding than anything else, in that a model without national branding is more likely to be replicated elsewhere.

With or without an ERF?
The ERF was critical to the success of the CBHA. The pot of money on the table, albeit small, encouraged engagement and provided a nucleus for the CBHA formation and discussions. Without money, there is a danger that the CBHA would be just another talking shop. Clearly it would not be possible to support the cost of a secretariat without external funding. The CBHA members have taken, what is a very unusual step within the sector[45], of paying a contribution to keep the secretariat working until the end of 2012 in the hope of finding other funding.

Among chief executives interviewed[46] there was almost no support for a continuation of the CBHA in its current format without an ERF fund. The added value and comparative advantage of the CBHA initiative is limited without the ERF as there are already initiatives on such areas as capacity building.

> *RECOMMENDATION 2: The CBHA secretariat should continue its effort to obtain alternative funding in order to maintain the ERF and increase member agencies capacity to respond to low-profile emergencies.*

Piloting an international NGO ERF
The advent of the CERF grant facility has improved the response capacity of UN agencies through providing them with (for the UN) rapid funding. NGOs do not benefit very much from the CERF as it is nearly three months before CERF rapid response grant applications result in funding flows to NGOs, and then grants are small[47]. While the ERF has provided a mechanism for UK based NGO to access rapid funding, it was so successful that it could form the model for an NGO equivalent of the CERF. There would be lots of practical issues around such a mechanism, stemming from the very large number of potential users of such a fund. Some research is needed on how such a mechanism could operate. The advantages are enormous – NGOs could have funding for emergency response in days through the ERF instead of in months via the CERF but with the same low transaction costs for donors that the CERF offers.

> *RECOMMENDATION 3: The next phase of the ERF could include the plan to develop a mechanism for an NGO emergency fund that would function similarly to the CERF but would be open internationally and not just give grants to or via British CBHA members as at present.*

Incubator role
Some agencies consider that the Core Humanitarian Competencies Framework could constitute the basis for occupational standards in the sector. Engagement with the Joint Standard (a People In Aid / Sphere / HAP initiative) would be useful and could lead to the incorporation of the framework into the Coherence Dialogue's set of standards. This would serve as the basis on which individual agencies could develop their own frameworks.

Oxfam and the ECB have both replicated the humanitarian learning programmes, respectively in a single- and a multi-agency version. Some other CBHA members have incorporated parts of the learning programmes in their own personnel development programmes, and in capacity building programmes that are aimed at their national partners.

Save the Children will continue to implement traineeship programmes that are identical or very similar to the one that it has implemented on behalf of the CBHA – hopefully enriched by a few CBHA -related elements such as broader participation and placements. The organisation says that, funding permitting, it could expand the programme to 3 to 4 times its current size of 70 trainees[48].

The shrinking of the UN Junior Professional Officers' programmes – parts of which are roughly comparable to but much more costly than CBHA 's traineeship programme - suggest that securing funding for such an expansion may prove challenging.

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45. Agencies are very reluctant to spend their own unearmarked funds on collaborative initiatives.
46. The team only managed to interview seven out the fifteen CBHA members CEOs as most of these were not available in the time frame available to the team. However, those interviewed indicated the view on the critical need of ERF funding for a viable CBHA was shared by almost all the CEOs.
47. One interviewee referred to NGOs getting "the crumbs that fall off the table" of the CERF funding.
48. This number includes the CBHA trainees.

The CBHA took some problems in the sector and trial solutions for them in an inter-agency context. This was very successful in the case of capacity building, and also positive in the case of surge capacity and in supply chain management. One of the key added values of the CBHA was the focus it brought on specific issues and the way it was able to advance the agenda on them.

> *RECOMMENDATION 4: There is a continuing need for a peer mechanism for addressing specific blockages to more effective humanitarian action in the sector. The CBHA need to continue in some form to provide a platform for launching such initiatives.*

Independent or DEC?

The CBHA, particularly in providing funding for low profile emergencies, is a natural complement to the DEC funding for large scale emergencies. One of the problems in the sector is that the many quality initiatives have a cost, and there is a need for rationalisation[49]. Having the CBHA as a sub-project of the DEC raises a number of problems, including the need to cater to the needs of current non-DEC members, and the possibilities of being less "British" within a very British institution but none of these difficulties are insurmountable. However, a CBHA within the DEC could serve as a model for replication in other countries as the DEC has done.

> *RECOMMENDATION 5: The DEC and the CBHA should conduct a dialogue to explore both the possibility and modalities of having the CBHA as a sub-project of the DEC.*

The sub-project should manage to maintain a convening space for humanitarian directors to drive joint initiatives along with funding initiatives. The evaluation recognises that this is probably the most controversial of the recommendations. Originally, it was humanitarian directors who sat as their agencies' delegated representatives on the DEC board, but the DEC then encourage Chief Executives participate rather than delegate this to their humanitarian directors. Several interviewees commented that this changed the nature of the DEC.

However, given that the CBHA is worth preserving, and there is already a joint NGO humanitarian funding mechanism in the UK, it would seem sensible.

The institutional position of humanitarian departments within agencies

The CBHA was very successful and the evaluation tried to identify why this was so. One clear reason was that the CBHA empowered humanitarian directors in a way that their organisations do not.

For most of the CBHA members, humanitarian action is a very important part of their budget, from 40% upwards. However this understates the organisational importance of humanitarian action, in that it is humanitarian action which provides the basis for establishing the agency's brand in the public eye and for recruiting new supporters.

In a sense, for most of the CBHA members, humanitarian action is the engine which drives the organisation. The majority of the CBHA members owe their founding to specific humanitarian crises[50]. Humanitarian action is not only vital for affected population, but is a vital contributor to organisational survival. Nevertheless, many CBHA members have a clear bias towards development, with development desks having many more staff than humanitarian departments. Humanitarian directors do not report directly to the chief executives in many cases but report through programme managers or international directors. In contrast, directors of support functions such as fundraising and personnel often report directly to the chief executive. Such arrangements do not give sufficient weight to the institutional importance of humanitarian action.

By contrast, the CBHA gave humanitarian directors power within the consortium commensurate with their responsibilities within their organisations.

> *RECOMMENDATION 6: CBHA agencies should review whether the current institutional location of humanitarian departments is appropriate given the critical importance of humanitarian action to organisation growth and sustainability.*

The evaluation is aware that this recommendation goes far beyond the original terms of reference. However, the evaluation would be remiss if it did not highlight a critical reason for the success of the CBHA, that it circumvented to some extent, the marginalisation of humanitarian directors within some organisations.

The intent of this recommendation is that there should be a closer alignment between the policies adopted by Chief Executive and the humanitarian-imperative policies favoured by the humanitarian directors.

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49.   One of the few examples of rationalisation was the merger or RedR and International Health Exchange.
50.   Most modern NGOs trace their roots to the responses to particular conflicts or humanitarian crises: Save the Children was founded in the aftermath of the First World War; IRC during Nazi oppression in Germany; Plan during the Spanish Civil War; Oxfam and CARE during the Second World War, and Christian Aid shortly after; World Vision during the Korean War; Concern and Tearfund during the Biafran War; Action Against Hunger in 1979 in response to the refugee crisis in Pakistan as a result of the Afghan conflict; Islamic Relief to the 1984 Sahel Drought; Merlin during the Balkan conflict in 1993. Only a few of the CBHA members have their roots in development: CAFOD in 1960; ActionAid in 1972; Help Age in 1983.

ANNEXES

ANNEX 1: LIST OF INTERVIEWEES

Please note that this list does not include the stakeholders interviewed in evaluations that had been conducted previously, and which have informed much of this report.

Table 6: List of persons interviewed (directly or by telephone)

Surname, Forenames	Organisation and function	♀/♂	Date
Adlam, John	DFID, Director OT	♂	Thu 02 Feb
Anderson, Chris	Oxfam GB, Global Adviser for Disaster Risk Reduction, Adaptation and Risk Reduction Team	♂	Thu 23 Feb
Axisa, Tanya	DFID, Humanitarian Specialist	♀	Thu 02 Feb
Bain, Chris	CAFOD, Chief Executive	♂	Wed 08 Feb
Bulpitt, Mark	World Vision UK, Head of Humanitarian Emergency Affairs	♂	Wed 22 Feb
Blown, Lucy	HelpAge, Deputy head of emergencies	♀	Wed 01 Feb
Bulpitt, Mark	World Vision, Head of Emergency Affairs	♂	Mon 06 Feb
Caldwell, Rose	Concern Worldwide, Main Representative, Chief Executive & Main Representative	♀	Tue 31 Jan
Camburn, Jess	ELHRA, Director	♀	Mon 30 Jan
Carter, Matthew	CAFOD, Main representative	♂	Wed 01 Feb
Casey, Neil	Wild Goose Consulting, Director, CBHA strategy consultant	♂	Wed 01 Feb
Chilver, John	CBHA, Finance and grants manager	♂	Mon 30 Jan
Dennis, Geoffrey	CARE UK, Chief Executive	♂	Fri 10 Feb
Desai, Mo	DFID, Humanitarian Response Officer CHASE	♀	Thu 02 Feb
Devonport, Annie	DEC, Humanitarian Program Advisor	♀	Thu 02 Feb
Ellis, Jane	IRC, Head of International Programs	♀	Tue 31 Jan
Elliott, Sharon	ActionAid, International Project Manager, CBHA	♀	Tue 21 Feb
Emmens, Ben	People in Aid, Director of HR Services	♂	Wed 01 Feb and Mon 27 Feb
Faye, Suzi	Oxfam, Deputy Head of Programme Funding and Humanitarian Funding Manager	♀	Mon 20 Feb
Featherstone, Andy	CBHA midterm evaluator- Consultant	♂	Wed 01 Feb and Mon 20 Feb
Gormley, Brendan	DEC, Director	♂	Thu 02 Feb
Grand, Jean Michel	Action Contre la Faim, Director General	♂	Tue 31 Jan
Guerrero, Saul	Action Contre la Faim, Evaluations, Learning and Accountability Advisor	♂	Tue 31 Jan
Guttmann, Nick	Christian Aid, Main Representative Division	♂	Mon 06 Feb and Wed 22 Feb

Hotham, Caroline	Oxfam, Project Manager, Humanitarian Staff Development Project, CBHA Humanitarian Capacity Building Programme	♀	Thu 23 Feb
Ingle, Brian	Plan, Main representative	♂	Wed 01 Feb
Jones, Jack	DFID, Humanitarian Programs Manager	♂	Thu 02 Feb
Kumar, Bijay	Action Aid, Main Representative	♂	Mon 06 Feb and Tue 28 Feb
Lowrie, Sean	CBHA Director	♂	Mon 30 Jan and Mon 27 Feb
Lumsdon, Sarah	Oxfam, Strategic Project Manager for Management and Coordination, Humanitarian Department	♀	Wed 22 Feb
MacKay, Graham	Oxfam, Main representative	♂	Tue 31 Jan and Fri 24 Feb
Miller, Caroline	Merlin, Chief Executive	♀	Wed 08 Feb
Minghella, Loretta	Christian Aid, Chief Executive	♀	Fri 10 Feb
Noyes, Mike	CAFOD, Head of Humanitarian Programme	♂	Wed 22 Feb
O'Brien, Rachel	SCF, Project Manager, Humanitarian Capacity Building,	♀	Mon 27 Feb
Opperman, Jens	Action Contre la Faim, Director of Operations	♂	Tue 31 Jan
Osman, Moustafa	Islamic Relief, Main representative	♂	Tue 31 Jan and Tue 28 Feb
Owen, Gareth	SCF, Main Representative	♂	Mon 30 Jan and Tue 21 Feb
Price, Megan	ActionAid, Project Manager for Component 1 of the CBHA Humanitarian Capacity Building Programme	♀	Fri 17 Feb
Russ, Catherine	SCF, Senior Humanitarian Learning and Development Advisor, Humanitarian and Leadership Academy	♀	Mon 20 Feb
Saaed, Sulleh	Islamic Relief Worldwide, Chief Executive	♂	Tue 07 Feb
Sayce, Clare	CARE	♀	Thu 02 Feb
Schofield, Robert	Tearfund, Main representative	♂	Tue 31 Jan
Stephens, Fraser	Helios Foundation	♂	Thu 02 Feb
Stevenson, Frances	HelpAge, Main Representative	♂	Wed 01 Feb
Wightwick, David	SCF, Head of Capacity Building and Preparedness	♂	Thu 16 Feb

ANNEX 2: LIST OF ERF GRANTS

Table 7: CBHA grants made from the original DFID grant of £4 million for the CBHA ERF

Crisis	Agency	Net Grant (£)
June 2010 Kyrgyzstan conflict	Action Against Hunger	35,663
	Christian Aid	53,500
	HelpAge	71,262
August 2010 Pakistan Floods (see below from the grants from the additional £1 million provided by DFID)	ActionAid	75,000
	CAFOD	100,395
	Concern	96,832
	Christian Aid	78,945
	IRC	50,000
	Islamic Relief	100,000
	Merlin	139,565
	World Vision	109,263
October 2010 Myanmar Cyclone Giri	Action Against Hunger	180,655
	Christian Aid	102,118
	Merlin	92,395
	Save the Children	74,183
January 2011 Sri Lanka Floods	Care	50,223
	Christian Aid	67,973
	HelpAge	42,085
	Islamic Relief	50,000
	Save the Children	68,601
February 2011 Somalia Drought	Action Against Hunger	85,356
	IRC	198,527
	Islamic Relief	91,356
	Save the Children	67,637
March 2011 Liberia Conflict	CAFOD	57,095
	Merlin	59,045
	Save the Children	36,436
	Tearfund	44,469
April 2011 Greater Horn of Africa Drought	ActionAid	196,761
	Concern	131,822
	Christian Aid	97,705
	Save the Children	129,526
June 2011 South Kordofan Conflict	CAFOD	96,300
	Save the Children	92,958

August 2011 Bangladesh Floods	CAFOD	106,080
	Christian Aid	99,270
	HelpAge	52,277
	Save the Children	33,167
	Tearfund	31,861
August 2011 Pakistan Floods	Plan	82,798
	Tearfund	50,290
	World Vision	66,912
September 2011 India Floods	ActionAid	46,454
	Concern	26,803
	Christian Aid	77,388
	World Vision	60,817
October 2011 Central America Floods	Christian Aid	170,162
	Tearfund	49,819

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
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