


SPAIN

HRI 2011
Ranking
15th




Group **3**
ASPIRING
ACTORS

OFFICIAL
DEVELOPMENT
ASSISTANCE **0.43%**
of GNI

HUMANITARIAN
AID **8.9%**
of ODA

US \$11
Per person

HUMANITARIAN AID DISTRIBUTION (%)



GENDER RATING

POLICY

FUNDING

FIELD PERCEPTION

STRENGTHS

Pillar	Type	Indicator	Score	% above OECD/DAC average
1	QT	Funding vulnerable and forgotten emergencies	8.20	+18.7%
1	QT	Timely funding to complex emergencies	9.29	+17.5%

AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT

Pillar	Type	Indicator	Score	% below OECD/DAC average
3	QT	Funding NGOs	0.36	-92.0%
2	QT	Reducing climate-related vulnerability	2.01	-50.1%
2	QT	Funding international risk mitigation	2.86	-40.1%
5	QL	Implementing evaluation recommendations	3.40	-20.7%
3	QL	Donor capacity and expertise	5.33	-14.8%

OVERALL PERFORMANCE

Spain ranked 15th in the HRI 2011, improving two positions from 2010. Based on the patterns of its scores, Spain is classified as a Group 3 donor, "Aspiring Actors". Donors in this group tend to have more limited capacity to engage with the humanitarian system at the field level, but often aspire to take on a greater role in the sector. They generally focus on a few core strengths, such as in the area of prevention, preparedness and risk reduction, or on specific geographic regions. Other donors in the group include Australia, Belgium, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan and Luxembourg.

Spain's overall score fell below the OECD/DAC and Group 3 averages. Spain scored below the OECD/DAC and Group 3 average

in all pillars, with the exception of Pillar 1, where it was above both averages, and Pillar 4 (Protection and international law), where Spain scored below the OECD/DAC average, but above the Group 3 average.

Spain did best compared to its OECD/DAC peers in the indicators on *Funding vulnerable and forgotten emergencies* and *Timely funding to complex emergencies*. Its scores were relatively the lowest in indicators on *Funding NGOs*, *Reducing climate-related vulnerability*, *Funding international risk mitigation*, *Implementing evaluation recommendations* and *Donor capacity and expertise*.

AID DISTRIBUTION

Spain was formerly one of the largest donors to the World Food Programme and the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF), but the financial crisis has led to budget cutbacks. In 2010, Spain's Official Development Assistance (ODA) comprised 0.43% of its Gross National Income (GNI), down from 0.46% in 2009. Humanitarian assistance accounted for 8.9% of its ODA, and 0.040% of its GNI.

According to data reported to the United Nations (UN) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs'

(OCHA) Financial Tracking Service (FTS) (2011), Spain channelled 74.6% of its funding to the UN system, 11.5% bilaterally to affected governments, 3.9% to the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement and 1.2% non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Spain contributed 10.9% of its humanitarian assistance to the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) and 8.2% to Common Humanitarian Funds. Spain supported 30 emergencies in 2010: 14 in Africa, seven in the Americas and nine in Asia.

POLICY FRAMEWORK

The Humanitarian Aid Office of the Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation (AECID), under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, oversees Spain's humanitarian assistance. An important characteristic of the Spanish humanitarian system is that some of the autonomous communities in the country provide humanitarian assistance using separate funds and strategies. Over the past few years, Spain has attempted to focus and coordinate these efforts through the Humanitarian Aid Office of the AECID. The General Directorate for Planning and Evaluation (DGPOLDE) is in charge of evaluating all of Spain's cooperation efforts, including its humanitarian aid. *Law 23/1998* serves as the legal framework for Spanish foreign cooperation, establishing AECID as the main organ in the Spanish body for coordinating Spanish assistance; the *Royal Decree 1403/2007* formally established the Humanitarian Aid Office and its mandate (AECID 2011b). Spain is in the process of passing a new law to replace *Law 23/1998*, which will substantially modernise its international aid system, mostly to improve coordination among the

Spanish actors (ECD Política 2010). The *Humanitarian Action Strategy (2007)* guides Spanish humanitarian action and explains the principles governing Spanish humanitarian efforts. Spain endorsed the *Principles of Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD)* in 2004. Though it is in the process of developing its domestic implementation plan, it has already incorporated the *GHD Principles* into its humanitarian framework. The *2009-2012 Cooperation Master Plan (2009)* is the main policy document for Spanish aid and maps out cooperation activities until 2012. This document includes a section addressing humanitarian programmes specifically and echoes the commitments expressed in the Humanitarian Strategy. Every year, AECID also publishes the *Annual Plan for International Cooperation (PACI)* document, which delineates how the agency will carry out the goals of the *Cooperation Master Plan* during the year and provides a brief overview of the progress accomplished the previous year. AECID has a total of fifty "Offices for Technical Cooperation" or "Offices for Policy Formation" in beneficiary countries (AECID 2011a).

HOW DOES SPAIN'S POLICY ADDRESS GHD CONCEPTS?

GENDER

Spain's *Gender in Development Strategy* (2007) is the main framework that outlines Spain's policy for gender equality measures in development and humanitarian aid. The *Humanitarian Action Strategy* incorporates the principles outlined in this document and calls for a gender sensitive approach to humanitarian aid. This includes a gender analysis in all humanitarian activities, the representation and participation of women in the implementation phase, special attention to the security concerns of women, and the compilation of gender-disaggregated indicators (MAEC 2007).

PILLAR 1

RESPONDING TO NEEDS

Spain's policy expresses a clear commitment to providing timely humanitarian assistance based on the principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence. The *Humanitarian Action Strategy* asserts that Spain uses the European Commission's Directorate General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (ECHO) *Global Needs Assessment* (GNA) and the *Forgotten Crisis Assessment* (FCA) to determine its priority countries for humanitarian aid (MAEC 2007). For disaster operations, Spain uses the analysis of the United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination Team (UNDACT) and is currently in the process of elaborating an official protocol of its own for emergency activities (MAEC 2007).

PILLAR 2

PREVENTION, RISK REDUCTION AND RECOVERY

The *Humanitarian Action Strategy* and the *Cooperation Master Plan* emphasise Spain's pledge to engage beneficiaries at all levels of humanitarian action and to link relief to rehabilitation and development along with prevention and preparedness (MAEC 2007). The *Humanitarian Aid Strategy* calls for the inclusion of beneficiaries in the design and implementation of a project, and requires an evaluation of beneficiary participation (MAEC 2007). The *Humanitarian Action Strategy* declares that Spanish aid shall be provided "in line with local capacity," in an effort to strengthen and support it (MAEC 2007). The *Cooperation Master Plan* emphasises the importance of risk reduction and disaster prevention, in line with the Hyogo principles (MAEC 2009).

PILLAR 3

WORKING WITH HUMANITARIAN PARTNERS

The *Humanitarian Action Strategy* and the *Cooperation Master Plan* recognise the importance of predictable, multi-annual and flexible funding for humanitarian assistance. The *Cooperation Master Plan* calls for a review and reform of the current financing rules for NGOs to provide “more efficacy, efficiency and relevance” in responding to humanitarian crises (MAEC 2009). Spain has tried to make its funding more consistent through a permanent appeals process for implementing partners, and has called for an increase of multi-annual funding mechanisms for its biggest implementing partners (MAEC 2007). The *Annual Plan*, however, reports that multi-annual partnerships have not been implemented “in a massive way” with Spanish implementing partners yet (MAEC 2010). Spain has also vowed to continue supporting the Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP) and the CERF, along with providing longer-term contracts to its more important and preferential partners, especially UN agencies (MAEC 2009). Both the *Humanitarian Action Strategy* and the *Cooperation Master Plan* emphasise the importance of coordinating Spanish humanitarian assistance, especially within its own system and in regards to the aid provided by the Autonomous Communities of Spain (MAEC 2007). There is less concrete discussion, however, about how to coordinate with other international actors.

PILLAR 4

PROTECTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

Spain states its policy of providing access to civilians and promoting international humanitarian law, including human rights and refugee law, in the *Humanitarian Action Strategy*, and echoes these commitments in the *Cooperation Master Plan* (AECID 2009). Spain also strongly affirms in both documents that it will facilitate safe humanitarian access and help guarantee the security of humanitarian workers (MAEC 2009). The *Humanitarian Action Strategy* mentions that Spain is committed to advocacy in the form of increasing public awareness and sensitivity to humanitarian issues, but Spain’s policy regarding advocacy to local governments is unclear (MAEC 2007).

PILLAR 5


LEARNING AND ACCOUNTABILITY

The *Humanitarian Action Strategy* specifies that DGPOLDE has adapted the *Evaluation Methodology for Spanish Cooperation* to evaluate the national humanitarian assistance programme (MAEC 2007). Both the *Humanitarian Action Strategy* and the *Master Cooperation Plan* state that Spain aims to improve the publication of its funding information to the public, and is a signatory of the International Aid Transparency Initiative (MAEC 2007). In regards to the accountability of funded NGOs, Spain has reporting and evaluation policies that are guided by Spain’s *System for Results-oriented Development Management*, which include accountability towards affected populations (MAEC 2007).

FIELD PARTNERS' PERCEPTIONS

SPAIN'S FIELD PERCEPTION SCORES

Collected questionnaires: 45



SOURCE: DARA

Colours represent performance compared to donor's average performance rating:

Good Mid-range Could improve

HOW IS SPAIN PERCEIVED BY ITS PARTNERS?

GENDER

Spain's partners provided mixed feedback regarding gender. Several highlight Spain's interest in gender-sensitive approaches, but point to problems in the follow-up. One interviewee reported, "AECID does not use well-defined gender markers in the needs assessment, so later it is not easy to have a good gender approach." Others reveal that though AECID has a formal gender analysis requirement, "there is no monitoring for its implementation," or that they get a sense it is important to Spain "because of the gender marker in the CAP, but not because of any real commitment."

PILLAR 1

RESPONDING TO NEEDS

Similar to most donors, Spain performed fairly well in the qualitative indicators that comprise Pillar 1. While most organisations deemed Spain's aid to be sufficiently neutral, impartial and independent, several organisations questioned whether Spain endeavoured to ensure programmes adapt to changing needs. Some partners complained that funding decisions are taken far from the field and seem to be poorly informed of real needs: one interviewee reported that "decisions take place at headquarters" and do not always make sense given the ground situation. Several organisations felt that AECID could not monitor to ensure programmes adapt to changing needs due to limited field presence and that it "does not even try to get there." Opinions about the timeliness of Spain's funding are highly mixed. In some crises, interviewees praised Spain for providing funding ahead of time. In others, however, timeliness was the biggest issue: organisations in the field explained that "AECID has the same tools for applying for developmental and humanitarian aid funding, which doesn't make any sense," since the latter often requires a more timely response.

PILLAR 2

PREVENTION, RISK REDUCTION AND RECOVERY

Most organisations in the field considered that the AECID did not seem sufficiently concerned with beneficiary participation, although a few interviewees noted that participation in implementation and design was somewhat better: "AECID pays more attention to the design part of the process ...than in implementation or evaluation." Another interviewee maintained that AECID's follow-up on a project was minimal, and provided "no requirements, recommendations, [or] questions about the project." Feedback regarding *Linking relief to rehabilitation and development* was fairly mixed. One interviewee stated that "AECID has a formal standard... but [has not] implemented a process at all for that." As for prevention, preparedness and risk reduction initiatives, field organisations were largely critical. One interviewee affirmed that "AECID has the idea but... it is a reactive process, and there is no proactivity."

PILLAR 3

WORKING WITH HUMANITARIAN PARTNERS

In terms of coordination, some organisations claimed that while Spain encourages coordination among its own partners, Spanish field representatives "do not even think about attending any cluster meetings." Regarding the flexibility of Spain's funding, interviewees were largely positive. One organisation stated that they are "excellent donors in terms of flexibility." However, others revealed that it was only possible to apply to the permanent appeal fund three times a year, which was somewhat limiting and inflexible.

PILLAR 4

PROTECTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

Most of Spain's partners appreciated the country's funding for protection programmes, though one interviewee added that these had to be "purely protection programmes. They do not want to mix protection with, for example, human rights programmes." Spain's field partners were more critical concerning advocacy to ensure the protection of civilians. One interviewee named Spain, together with other donors, for being "silent" on these issues. In terms of the facilitating humanitarian access and the safety of humanitarian workers, humanitarian organisations in the field agree that current efforts are simply not enough: one organisation revealed that while AECID tried to provide some assistance – for example, giving humanitarian staff an unofficial identification – it was ineffective. That said, when one of Spain's partners took the initiative to take measures on their own to obtain access, "AECID didn't push for it, but when we proposed it, they were ready to fund because they were overlooked areas."

PILLAR 5

LEARNING AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Organisations in the field asserted that AECID was strict in the funding proposal but was lacking in its monitoring and evaluation. One aid worker reported that AECID is "focusing too much in the bureaucratic process . . . it seems it is more important for the proposal to be perfect in a formal way than the impact the project has." Another stated that AECID has a good reporting framework, but project tracking is lacking. Spain's partners also indicate that there is room for improvement in relation to accountability towards beneficiaries.

RECOMMENDATIONS

● LOOK FOR ADMINISTRATIVE SOLUTIONS TO CHANNEL MORE FUNDING TO NGOS

Spain provided only 1.2% of its humanitarian funding to NGOs, compared to the OECD/DAC average of 15.3%. Spain provided the bulk of its funding to UN agencies, but should consider allocating a larger portion to NGOs. To reduce the administrative burden, it could explore flexible working models, such as shared management arrangements with other donors, or supporting NGO umbrella organisations.

● BOOSTER THE CAPACITY OF THE AECID

Spain received one of the lowest scores for the qualitative, survey-based indicator, *Donor capacity and expertise*. In several of the crises covered by the HRI, field-staff were also tasked with non-humanitarian tasks, limiting their ability to follow up with supported programmes. Spain should consider investing in its capacity at the field and headquarters level to ensure aid is used effectively.

● ENCOURAGE LEARNING FROM THE PAST

Spain received the third-lowest score for the qualitative, survey-based indicator *Implementing evaluation recommendations*, which measures the extent to which donors work with partners to integrate lessons learnt in programming. Spain would do well to strengthen its efforts to follow up with partners to utilise lessons learnt and evaluation recommendations in programming.

● STRENGTHEN SUPPORT TO REDUCE RISK AND CLIMATE-RELATED VULNERABILITY

Spain could improve its support to reduce risk and climate-related vulnerability. Spain designated 0.36% of its ODA to international risk mitigation mechanisms – well below the OECD/DAC average of 0.77%. Spain provided only 52.5% of its fair share³ to Fast Start Finance, which supports climate change mitigation and adaptation efforts, compared to the OECD/DAC average of 102.4%. Furthermore, it has fallen short on its commitments to reduce emissions, indicating that Spain could augment its efforts to support these issues.



Please see www.daraint.org for a complete list of references.