


# GERMANY

HRI 2011  
Ranking  
**12th**






Group **3**  
ASPIRING  
ACTORS

OFFICIAL  
DEVELOPMENT  
ASSISTANCE **0.38%**  
of GNI

HUMANITARIAN  
AID **4.5%**  
of ODA

**US \$7**  
Per person

## HUMANITARIAN AID DISTRIBUTION (%)



## GENDER RATING

POLICY →

FUNDING ↑

FIELD PERCEPTION →

### STRENGTHS

Pillar	Type	Indicator	Score	% above OECD/DAC average
3	QT	Funding NGOs	10.00	+120.5%
1	QT	Timely funding to complex emergencies	9.92	+25.4%

### AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT

Pillar	Type	Indicator	Score	% below OECD/DAC average
3	QT	Funding UN and RC/RC appeals	1.03	-74.6%
3	QT	Un-earmarked funding	1.50	-71.1%
4	QL	Funding protection of civilians	5.01	-26.3%
4	QL	Advocacy for protection of civilians	4.32	-22.4%
4	QL	Advocacy towards local authorities	4.39	-21.1%

## OVERALL PERFORMANCE

Germany ranked 12<sup>th</sup> in the HRI 2011, improving two positions from 2010. Based on the patterns of its scores, Germany is classified as a Group 3 donor, "Aspiring Actors". Donors in this group tend to have more limited capacity to engage with the humanitarian system at the field level, but often aspire to take on a greater role in the sector. They generally focus on a few core strengths, such as in the area of prevention, preparedness and risk reduction, or on specific geographic regions. Other donors in the group include Australia, Belgium, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg and Spain.

Overall, Germany scored below the OECD/DAC average, and slightly above the Group 3 average. It was below the OECD/DAC average in

all pillars, with the exception of Pillar 2 (Prevention, risk reduction and recovery), where it scored above average. Compared to other Group 3 donors, Germany scored above average in all pillars, except for Pillar 3 (Working with humanitarian partners) and Pillar 4 (Protection and international law), where it scored above average.

Germany did best compared to its OECD/DAC peers in indicators on *Funding NGOs* and *Timely funding to complex emergencies*. Its scores were lowest in indicators on *Funding UN and RC/RC appeals*, *Un-earmarked funding*, *Funding protection of civilians*, *Funding protection of civilians* and *Advocacy towards local authorities*.

# AID DISTRIBUTION

Germany increased its Official Development Assistance (ODA) in proportion to its Gross National Income (GNI) from 0.35% in 2009 to 0.38% in 2010. Nevertheless, significant progress still needs to be made to achieve the target of 0.7% by 2015. Humanitarian assistance represented 4.5% of its total ODA in 2010, and 0.017% of its GNI – slightly higher than in 2009.

According to data reported to the United Nations (UN) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs' (OCHA) Financial Tracking Service (FTS), Germany's

2010 humanitarian funding was channelled as follows: 49.6% to UN agencies, 33.2% to non-governmental organisations (NGOs), 14.5% to private organisations and foundations, 9.2% to the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement, 2.1% to governments, and 1.5% to intergovernmental organisations. Pakistan was the country that received the highest percentage of German funding, followed by Haiti and Afghanistan. In 2010, Germany supported 28 countries in Africa, 25 in Asia, 12 in the Americas, six in Europe, and one in Oceania.

# POLICY FRAMEWORK

Germany's humanitarian assistance is principally managed by the Federal Foreign Office's Task Force for Humanitarian Aid and the Commissioner for Human Rights Policy and Humanitarian Aid. The Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) handles food aid and transitional assistance. BMZ often commissions the work of the German Society for International Cooperation (GIZ), a private corporation which as of 1 January 2011 brings together the German Development Service (DED), the German Technical Cooperation (GTZ) and Inwent – Capacity Building International. The Humanitarian

Aid Coordinating Committee brings together humanitarian non-governmental organisations (NGOs) with government agencies to coordinate Germany's humanitarian assistance. Germany's crisis response centre seeks to expedite the response to sudden onset crises. Germany's humanitarian aid policy is principally governed by the 2007 *Federal Government's Humanitarian Aid*, which includes the *12 Basic Rules of Humanitarian Aid* - written in 1993 and updated in 2000. Germany also expresses its commitment to the *European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid*.

## HOW DOES GERMANY'S POLICY ADDRESS GHD CONCEPTS?

## GENDER

Germany's humanitarian policy recognises the importance of meeting the specific needs of women and girls in humanitarian emergencies. At the same time, Germany reports that "no-one is favoured or disadvantaged due to their sex" in the provision of humanitarian aid (Federal Foreign Office 2007, p.4). Germany has further addressed gender in its development policies, *Development Policy Action Plan on Gender 2009-2012* and *Taking account of gender issues in German development cooperation: promoting gender equality and empowering women* (Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development 2009 and 2006), although they do not specifically mention humanitarian aid.

## PILLAR 1

# RESPONDING TO NEEDS

Germany's humanitarian policy expresses a clear commitment to need-based aid, grounded on the principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality, and independence (Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany 2011). Germany states that "Humanitarian assistance has no political strings attached," (Federal Foreign Office 2007, p.5). Germany prioritises rapid response to the needs of refugees and internally displaced persons and considers that the response to all humanitarian emergencies should be "implemented within a matter of days and timeframes limited to the period of extreme emergency," (Federal Foreign Office 2011a).

## PILLAR 2

# PREVENTION, RISK REDUCTION AND RECOVERY

Although not included in its humanitarian policy specifically, Germany considers conflict prevention a cross-cutting issue and adopted an action plan, *Civilian Crisis Prevention, Conflict Resolution and Post-Conflict Peace-Building*, in 2004. To address disaster risk reduction within Germany and internationally, Germany created a special committee - the German Committee for Disaster Reduction (DKKV), which developed specific funding guidelines for disaster risk reduction initiatives (German Committee for Disaster Reduction 2011 and Federal Foreign Office 2008) and affirms that five to ten percent of its humanitarian assistance is set aside for this purpose (Federal Foreign Office 2007, p. 2). Rule 11 of Germany's *12 Basic Rules of Humanitarian Aid* mentions beneficiary participation in the design and implementation of humanitarian assistance, yet participation in monitoring and evaluation is not specified. Rule 9 incorporates capacity building to some degree: "Humanitarian assistance...shall help people to help themselves," (Federal Foreign Office 2007, p. 11). Germany's humanitarian aid policy does not specifically address the environment, although the Federal Foreign Office highlights climate and environmental protection as important global issues (2011b). BMZ's transitional aid is intended to bridge the gap between humanitarian assistance and longer-term development (Federal Foreign Office 2007).

## PILLAR 3

# WORKING WITH HUMANITARIAN PARTNERS

Within Germany, the Humanitarian Aid Coordinating Committee brings together German non-governmental organisations (NGOs), the Federal Foreign Office and other German ministries and relevant institutions to coordinate German humanitarian assistance (Federal Foreign Office 2007). However the 2010 *DAC Peer Review* highlighted the need for greater coordination among German government agencies. Internationally, Germany expresses its strong support for the coordinating role of OCHA, participates in UN supervisory board meetings, and endorses the mechanisms created in the humanitarian reform (Federal Foreign Office 2010). Along these lines, Germany has also progressively increased its contributions to the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF). Germany provides un-earmarked funding to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations Relief and

Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), OCHA, and the World Food Programme (WFP) (OECD 2010, p.113). Apart from these contributions, and those specified in the federal budget, Germany does not “grant non-tied contributions” (The *Federal Government’s Humanitarian Aid 2007*, p.4). Germany’s humanitarian funding is intended for programmes with implementation periods lasting from one to six months “at most” (Federal Foreign Office 2011a) although this normally applies to NGOs: international organisations could be granted extensions up to 14 months, and up to two years for disaster risk reduction projects. Germany normally works in partnership with German humanitarian NGOs, international NGOs and other international organisations, however, “via Germany’s missions abroad, smaller projects can also be carried out with local NGOs,” as implementing agencies of Germany’s direct project partners (Federal Foreign Office 2007, p.4).

## PILLAR 4

# PROTECTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

Rule 2 of Germany’s *12 Basic Rules of Humanitarian Aid* describes Germany’s position on protection: “Everyone has the right to receive, and must have the right to provide, humanitarian assistance and humanitarian protection,” (Federal Foreign Office 2007, p.2). Germany created a position of Commissioner for Human Rights Policy and Humanitarian Aid in 1998 and considers the promotion of human rights “a cornerstone of Germany’s foreign policy,” (Federal Foreign Office 2011c). International humanitarian law is given great importance, and in 2006, Germany published a collection of international humanitarian law documents, including refugee conventions. Germany stresses the need to work with local authorities to obtain access, and notes that adherence to humanitarian principles is essential (Federal Foreign Office 2007, pp. 8-9).

## PILLAR 5


# LEARNING AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Germany designates funding specifically for external evaluations of the projects supported (Federal Foreign Office 2007). Germany mentions upward and downward accountability in Rule 8 of its *12 Basic principles of Humanitarian Aid*: “Those providing aid shall be accountable to both the recipients of the aid and those whose donations and supplies they accept.” Positively, Germany affirms its commitment to the Principles of Good Humanitarian Donorship in the *Federal Government’s Humanitarian Aid*. Although Germany does not mention transparency in its humanitarian policy, guidelines are publicly accessible and Germany is currently preparing to implement the International Aid Transparency Initiative at the end of 2011/ beginning of 2012. The 2010 *DAC Peer Review* noted the strong distinction between development and humanitarian aid within the German government’s aid architecture. This translates into different funding proposals and reporting systems for partners, which makes situations of protracted crises and overlap among the sectors difficult to navigate, and increases transaction costs (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 2010).

# FIELD PARTNERS' PERCEPTIONS

## GERMANY'S FIELD PERCEPTION SCORES

Collected questionnaires: 41



SOURCE: DARA

Germany's average score 5.25 ← ●●●●● OECD/DAC average score 6.05

Colours represent performance compared to donor's average performance rating:

■ Good 
 ■ Mid-range 
 ■ Could improve

## HOW IS GERMANY PERCEIVED BY ITS PARTNERS?

### GENDER

One field partner reported the following in reference to Germany and the other donors supporting its humanitarian programmes: “All donors require us to incorporate the gender approach, but finally they do not verify how it is been done.” Another organisation in Kenya, stated the following regarding Germany, together with its other donors, “no one looks at different gender issues and cultural issues. We have never been given feedback on a proposal in this regard.”

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## PILLAR 1

# RESPONDING TO NEEDS

Similar to most donors, Germany received some of its highest qualitative scores in Pillar 1. However, compared to other donors, Germany's scores were relatively lower for the neutrality, impartiality, independence and timeliness of its humanitarian assistance. Field partners reported: "I think Germany has political and economic interests," and, "the German funding for Haiti is not independent of economic or political interests. The funding for this crisis is really poor." Some partners indicated that Germany's funding was, however, linked to needs assessments. One interviewee affirmed, "with Germany we have a first needs assessment for our proposal, then they pay for a second one, more accurate and in real time, then we reformulate our project." Germany was positively recognised by some for carrying out field visits to ensure that programmes adapted to changing needs. However, another interviewee disagreed, pointing to the time required to make changes to programmes: "Germany isn't very open to unexpected changes in programmes. They need too much time (several months) to accept those changes." Although Germany scored lower than its peers for the timeliness of its funding, some partners were pleased with the speed of disbursement. One interviewee in Pakistan noted that Germany was quicker than any other donor in disbursing funds.

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## PILLAR 2

# PREVENTION, RISK REDUCTION AND RECOVERY

In field interviews, Germany was acknowledged for building the capacity of the local population in general, but not the authorities. Regarding beneficiary participation, one of Germany's partner organisations wondered: "The question is: would the Germans drop a proposal if it didn't include beneficiary participation?" Another organisation reported: "It's all just on paper. Donors don't follow up to see what's really happening," referring to Germany, as well as to the other donors supporting its programmes. Germany's partners were generally more critical regarding the participation of affected populations in monitoring and evaluation, compared to other programming stages. "Donors lose interest when it comes to monitoring and evaluation," commented one interviewee.

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## PILLAR 3

# WORKING WITH HUMANITARIAN PARTNERS

Partner organisations provided mixed feedback on the flexibility of Germany's funding. One interviewee criticized Germany for agreeing to finance a project at the end of the year, but requiring that the money be spent before a tight deadline. Another interviewee pointed out that, "Germany gives us funds every three months. It's difficult to live with deadlines, but here it makes things much easier, especially when we work with local NGOs. This helps them be more realistic on what can and can't be done." While most organisations felt that Germany did not do enough to support their organisational capacity, one interviewee commended Germany for allowing four percent of the budget to be invested in organizational capacity. Many of Germany's field partners praised its support for coordination, reporting "Germany finances our attendance to the coordination meetings, and asks us to actually attend them".

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## PILLAR 4

# PROTECTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

Although most interviewees considered that Germany did not actively advocate for local authorities to fulfill their responsibilities, one field organisation noted, “Germany is vocal at the federal level, not at the district level...Germany is more silent and does this behind closed doors.” Another felt that “the German government doesn’t have much influence.” Most organisations pointed to a lack of support for humanitarian access and safety of aid workers: “They are reluctant to fund security training. If you include it in proposals you may not win because of that. They want to say that the highest amount goes to the beneficiaries, probably for publicity reasons.” However, some interviewees noted that Germany “includes funding for security materials like radios” and “Germany has been very good because they asked us to provide a realistic budget for security, instead of a minimalistic budget.”

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## PILLAR 5

# LEARNING AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Most of Germany’s field partners felt that Germany’s reporting requirements were appropriate, although some complained that they were requested to report every three months. Germany received mixed feedback for integrating recommendations from past evaluations: one organisation reported “Germany integrates some recommendations and lessons learnt from evaluations.” Germany’s field partners indicated that requirements to ensure accountability to affected populations were generally lacking, although one interviewee noted that Germany proposed a “suggestions mailbox” in a refugee camp but had yet to implement it.

# RECOMMENDATIONS

## ● IMPROVE FLEXIBILITY OF FUNDING

Germany provided only 9.0% of its funding without earmarking, while its OECD/DAC peers provided an average of 33.2% without earmarking. Germany received the lowest score of the OECD/DAC donors for the qualitative indicator *Flexibility of funding*, pointing to the need for improvement.

## ● ENHANCE SUPPORT FOR UN AND RC/RC APPEALS, COORDINATION AND SUPPORT SERVICES AND POOLED FUNDS

Germany received the fourth-lowest score of the OECD/DAC donors for *Funding UN and RC/RC appeals*, which measures the extent to which donors provide their fair share<sup>3</sup> of funding to UN and Red Cross/Red Crescent (RC/RC) appeals, coordination and support services and pooled funds. Germany scored well below average in all components that comprise this indicator. It provided only 7.7% of its fair share to UN appeals, compared to the OECD/DAC average of 41.0%; 15.4% of its fair share to coordination and support services, compared to the OECD/DAC average of 47.5%; 18.2% of its fair share to Red Cross/Red Crescent (RC/RC) appeals, compared to the OECD/DAC average of 117.1%; and 36.5% of its fair share to pooled funds, compared to the OECD/DAC average of 298.0%.

## ● ENSURE FIELD KNOWLEDGE INFORMS DECISION-MAKING IN CRISES WITHOUT FIELD OFFICES

Germany received low scores in all the qualitative indicators that make up Pillar 4: *Funding protection of civilians, Advocacy for protection of civilians, Advocacy towards local authorities and Facilitating safe access*. It also received the third-lowest score for *Donor capacity and expertise*. It is interesting to note that Germany tends to receive the lowest scores in these indicators in crises where it does not have a field presence, indicating that Germany's partners consider Germany to be more supportive of these issues and to have greater expertise when they have a field office. Some partners also highlighted the difference in capacity between the field and headquarters, generally considering the field offices to be better placed to make appropriate decisions. While Germany may not be able to open additional field offices, it could consider augmenting its efforts to integrate knowledge from the field through coordination with partner organisations and other donors and field visits.

## ● IMPROVE TRANSPARENCY OF FUNDING AND DECISION-MAKING

Germany is considered the least transparent donor, though this may improve with Germany's recent commitment to the International Aid Transparency Initiative. Germany should engage in dialogue with its partners to discuss how to improve its transparency.



Please see [www.daraint.org](http://www.daraint.org) for a complete list of references.