


# AUSTRALIA

HRI 2011  
Ranking  
**10th**




Group **3**  
ASPIRING  
ACTORS

OFFICIAL  
DEVELOPMENT  
ASSISTANCE **0.32%**  
of GNI

HUMANITARIAN  
AID **10.9%**  
of ODA

**US \$19**  
Per person

## HUMANITARIAN AID DISTRIBUTION (%)



## GENDER RATING

POLICY

FUNDING

FIELD PERCEPTION

### STRENGTHS

| Pillar | Type | Indicator                                   | Score | % above OECD/DAC average |
|--------|------|---|-------|--------------------------|
| 2      | QT   | Funding reconstruction and prevention       | 9.03  | +101.5%                  |
| 5      | QT   | Participating in accountability initiatives | 7.78  | +73.8%                   |
| 4      | QT   | Refugee law                                 | 7.96  | +41.6%                   |
| 4      | QL   | Funding protection of civilians             | 8.08  | +18.9%                   |

### AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT

| Pillar | Type | Indicator                                    | Score | % below OECD/DAC average |
|--------|------|--|-------|--------------------------|
| 4      | QL   | Advocacy towards local authorities           | 4.00  | -28.1%                   |
| 5      | QL   | Implementing evaluation recommendations      | 3.23  | -24.7%                   |
| 1      | QL   | Adapting to changing needs                   | 4.74  | -24.4%                   |
| 1      | QT   | Funding vulnerable and forgotten emergencies | 5.41  | -21.6%                   |
| 2      | QL   | Beneficiary participation                    | 3.78  | -21.3%                   |

## OVERALL PERFORMANCE

Australia ranked 10<sup>th</sup> in the HRI 2011, improving three positions from 2010. Based on the patterns of its scores, Australia is classified as a Group 3 donor, "Aspiring Actors". Donors in this group tend to have more limited capacity to engage with the humanitarian system at the field level, but often aspire to take on a greater role in the sector. They generally focus on a few core strengths, such in the area of prevention, preparedness and risk reduction, or on specific geographic regions. Other donors in the group include Belgium, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg and Spain.

Australia's overall score was below the OECD/DAC average, yet above the Group 3 average. Australia scored above the OECD/DAC and Group 3 average in most pillars, with the exception of Pillars 1 and 3 (Working with

humanitarian partners). In Pillar 1, Australia scored below both the OECD/DAC and Group 3 averages and in Pillar 3, Australia received its lowest score - below the OECD/DAC average, yet above the Group 3 average.

Australia did best compared to its OECD/DAC peers in indicators on *Funding reconstruction and prevention*, *Participating in accountability initiatives*, *Refugee law*, and *Funding protection of civilians*. With the exception of the latter, Australia's relative strengths are concentrated in quantitative indicators. Its scores were relatively the lowest in the indicators on *Advocacy towards local authorities*, *Implementing evaluation recommendations*, *Adapting to changing needs*, *Funding vulnerable and forgotten emergencies* and *Beneficiary participation* – all qualitative indicators except for *Funding vulnerable and forgotten emergencies*.

# AID DISTRIBUTION

In 2010, Official Development Assistance (ODA) represented 0.32% of Australia's Gross National Income (GNI), with 10.59% of ODA allocated to humanitarian aid, or 0.034% of its GNI. According to data reported to the United Nations (UN) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs' (OCHA) Financial Tracking Service (FTS), in 2010, Australia channelled 67.2% of its humanitarian assistance to UN agencies, 6.5% to the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement, 10.7% to NGOs and 1.9% bilaterally to affected governments. In 2010, the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID) provided humanitarian assistance to 21 emergencies in Asia, ten in Africa, four in the Americas

and two in Oceania (OCHA FTS 2011). The 2005 Humanitarian Action Policy affirmed Australia's intention to focus aid "primarily...on the Asia-Pacific region." It has also played a significant lead role in spearheading humanitarian relief efforts with France and New Zealand in the South Pacific. Recently, AusAID has begun to increase its development and humanitarian assistance to other regions of the developing world and has announced its intention to scale up development and humanitarian relief efforts in the Middle East and Africa, particularly in Sudan, South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and the Horn of Africa in the coming years (AusAID 2011c).

# POLICY FRAMEWORK

The Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID), an autonomous body within the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), manages Australia's humanitarian aid. In 2010, AusAID was established as an Executive Agency directly accountable to the Minister of Foreign Affairs (Australian Government 2011). AusAID's Corporate, Humanitarian and International Group now encompasses four divisions, including the Africa, West Asia and Humanitarian Division (AusAID 2011a). AusAID has strengthened its base in Canberra, while further expanding the role for its overseas offices and offshore programme management (AusAID 2009a). AusAID also cooperates with other areas of the government when mobilising responses to humanitarian emergencies, in particular with the Australian Defence Force. In 2011, Australia established the Australian Civilian Corps for the deployment of Australian specialists to countries affected by natural disaster and conflict to facilitate recovery and longer-term rehabilitation efforts (AusAID 2011c).

The 2005 *Humanitarian Action Policy* governs Australia's humanitarian assistance, blending

humanitarian action with development, conflict prevention, peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction goals and is complementary to Australia's 2002 *Peace, Conflict and Development Policy*. The *Humanitarian Action Policy* is rooted in a *Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) Principles* and explicitly references them multiple times. A new policy is currently being developed and is due for release at the end of 2011.

The 2011 *Independent Review of Aid Effectiveness* called for the development of a comprehensive policy statement and the articulation of multiple year strategies (AusAID 2011c). AusAID responded to this review by producing *An Effective Aid Program for Australia: Making a Real Difference—Delivering Real Results*. In recent years, AusAID has focused on incorporating disaster risk reduction (DRR) efforts into its development programmes, publishing *Integrating Disaster Risk Reduction, Climate Change and Environmental Considerations in AusAID Programs* (AusAID 2010b) and *Investing in a Safer Future: A Disaster Risk Reduction Policy for the Australian Aid Program* (AusAID 2009b).

## HOW DOES AUSTRALIA'S POLICY ADDRESS GHD CONCEPTS?

### GENDER

AusAID's 2005 *Humanitarian Action Policy* describes the need to incorporate gender considerations into all stages of humanitarian action, taking into account the different effects of crises on women, and to ensure female participation in activities (AusAID 2005). AusAID has also declared gender equality and female empowerment to be an overarching goal of its aid programme at all levels of activities. The 2007 publication, *Gender Equality in Australia's Aid Program*, insists on preserving gender perspectives, especially in crisis situations and DRR efforts, and seeks to promote equal participation of women in decision-making roles in conflict situations (AusAID 2010c). AusAID has also reaffirmed its commitment to promoting gender equality in all programmes in *An Effective Aid Program for Australia*, and has declared its intention to collaborate with multilateral agencies and NGOs to implement gender sensitive policies (AusAID 2011c and AusAID 2011f). In recognition of women's increased vulnerability in humanitarian crises, Australia helped fund the production of the *2010 Inter-agency Field Manual on Reproductive Health in Humanitarian Settings*. Australia has supported programmes related to maternal health care and protecting women from exploitation during crises; for example, it supports SPRINT, a programme to provide sexual and reproductive health services to women in crisis situations (AusAID 2011f). Furthermore, Australia has supported GenCap to support the deployment of gender experts to humanitarian crises, as well as training for peacekeepers on prevention and response to sexual violence.

### PILLAR 1

### RESPONDING TO NEEDS

AusAID's 2005 *Humanitarian Action Policy* upholds the importance of neutral, impartial and independent humanitarian aid and sets forth plans to allocate funding in proportion to needs and on the basis of needs assessments, according to the changing situations in humanitarian crises (AusAID 2005). AusAID also pledges to provide support based on the scale of the disaster and to mobilise resources rapidly (AusAID 2005). Australia has standby funding arrangements with NGOs, in which funding can be requested through simplified, fast-track procedures during crises (AusAID 2011e). AusAID has also announced its intention to deliver "faster, more effective responses" as the frequency and intensity of humanitarian crises continue to increase (AusAID 2011c).

## PILLAR 2

# PREVENTION, RISK REDUCTION AND RECOVERY

Australia's humanitarian action also includes capacity building, vulnerability reduction and the promotion of disaster and emergency prevention and preparedness measures (AusAID 2005). AusAID articulated its commitment to supporting implementation of the *Hyogo Framework for Action* in the 2009 document *Investing in a Safer Future: A Disaster Risk Reduction Policy for the Australian Aid Program* to be applied in conjunction with existing policies to integrate disaster risk reduction (DRR) efforts into responses to crises and disease outbreaks (AusAID 2009b). A progress report and the 2010 publication of *Integrating Disaster Risk Reduction, Climate Change and Environmental Considerations in AusAID Programs* have followed (AusAid 2010b). AusAID also recognises the crucial nature of DRR and the importance of engaging local communities (AusAID 2005). More recently in *An Effective Aid Program for Australia*, AusAID declared its intention to increase its focus on DRR and disaster preparedness, including measures to anticipate natural disasters. The *Peace, Conflict and Development Policy* also outlines AusAID's commitment to conflict prevention and peace-building (AusAID 2002). Australia's 2005 *Humanitarian Action Policy* stresses the importance of beneficiary participation in all programme stages and describes its commitment to facilitate the transition between relief and development (AusAID 2011). Australia recently established the Civilian Corps with the *Australian Civilian Corps Act 2011*, and part of their mission is to "provide a bridge between emergency response measures and long-term development programs," (DFAT 2011).

## PILLAR 3

# WORKING WITH HUMANITARIAN PARTNERS

AusAID stresses the importance of cooperation with humanitarian partners in its *Humanitarian Action Policy*. The policy highlights the usefulness of partnering with NGOs for rapid and flexible emergency responses and plans to support both local and Australian NGOs. Australia holds a leading role in a number of partnerships established for coordinating responses to natural disasters in this region, e.g. the France, Australia and New Zealand (FRANZ) agreement (AusAID 2005) and *Talisman Sabre* with the US (Department of Defence 2011). AusAID also promotes flexible responses by establishing longer-term funding arrangements with humanitarian agencies for better planning and responsiveness to emergencies and recognises the importance of untying aid to improving effectiveness and efficiency (AusAID 2006). In *An Effective Aid Program for Australia*, AusAID asserts its commitment to supporting partnerships with governments, NGOs, UN agencies and the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement.

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## PILLAR 4

# PROTECTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

Australia's 2005 *Humanitarian Action Policy* expresses a clear commitment to meeting the protection needs of vulnerable people and promoting international humanitarian law, human rights law and refugee law. It pledges to advocate for humanitarian agencies' access to displaced populations and outlines plans for meeting the safety requirements of humanitarian workers. The policy affirms Australia's support for the *Good Humanitarian Donorship Principles* and commits to actively supporting the development of international standards (AusAID 2005).

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## PILLAR 5


# LEARNING AND ACCOUNTABILITY

AusAID's 2005 *Humanitarian Action Policy* provides for a robust evaluation system and stresses the need to ensure transparency and accountability of operations. AusAID publishes an evaluation report each year that includes a review of its performance in emergency, humanitarian and refugee programmes. Australia is also an International Aid Transparency Initiative signatory with an implementation plan set for July-October 2011 (IATI 2011). Following the 2011 release of the *Independent Review of Aid Effectiveness*, AusAID has announced that it will improve its ODA evaluations and issue a Transparency Charter by the end of 2011 to make information on funding and results more accessible (Australian Government 2011).

# FIELD PARTNERS' PERCEPTIONS

## AUSTRALIA'S FIELD PERCEPTION SCORES

Collected questionnaires: 21



SOURCE: DARA

Colours represent performance compared to donor's average performance rating:

■ Good   
 ■ Mid-range   
 ■ Could improve

## HOW IS AUSTRALIA PERCEIVED BY ITS PARTNERS?

### GENDER

AusAid's field partners provided mixed feedback regarding gender. One organisation reported that AusAID "comes back with questions" about its gender sensitive approaches in programmes, seeming to confirm that Australia's policy focus on gender issues is translated to the field. However, others lumped Australia together with other donors for whom "gender is not an issue".

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## PILLAR 1

# RESPONDING TO NEEDS

In Pillar 1, evidence from the field suggests that Australia is following through with its promises to respond to needs. Some interviewees situated Australia as part of a group of donors that links needs assessments to project designs. Australia's field partners held mixed views of the independence and timeliness of Australia's humanitarian assistance. It received a significantly lower score for its efforts to verify that programmes adapt to changing needs.

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## PILLAR 2

# PREVENTION, RISK REDUCTION AND RECOVERY

Although Australia's quantitative scores in Pillar 2 were above average, field perceptions were significantly lower. Particularly poor was its score for *Beneficiary participation*, where one interviewee stressed that "it's all just on paper," and that there was "no follow up to see what's really happening." Its scores for linking relief to rehabilitation and development and support for prevention and risk reduction were also low. Feedback on Australia's support for local capacity was more positive.

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## PILLAR 3

# WORKING WITH HUMANITARIAN PARTNERS

Although Australia received its lowest score in Pillar 3, its scores in the qualitative indicators were comparatively higher. Pillar 3 is the only pillar where Australia's qualitative scores are better than its quantitative scores. Most field organisations considered Australia supportive of coordination, a flexible donor and felt it has sufficient capacity and expertise to make appropriate decisions. For example, one interviewee noted that Australia participated in cluster meetings, and another pointed to AusAID's strong capacity at the field level, noting that its staff is well prepared. Feedback was not as positive regarding Australian support for its partners' organisational capacity in areas like preparedness, response and contingency planning, though one respondent thought AusAID would be willing to help strengthen its organisational capacity "if asked".

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## PILLAR 4

# PROTECTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

In Pillar 4, Australia's partners praised the country for its funding for the protection of civilians. Its scores were much lower, however, in qualitative indicators on advocacy – both for protection and toward local authorities. Perceptions of Australia's support for safe access and security of humanitarian works was also poor.

## PILLAR 5

# LEARNING AND ACCOUNTABILITY

In Pillar 5, field organisations seem fairly satisfied with Australia's reporting requirements and transparency. One organisation stated that Australia took some steps towards promoting transparency of its funding and decision-making by sending out its scoring sheet. Multiple organisations suggested AusAID could work to improve the integration of accountability towards affected populations into the programmes it supports and work with partners to implement evaluation recommendations.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

The following recommendations are based on data from 2010, prior to Australia's aid review. It remains to be seen how the new policy will influence these issues.

### ● ENSURE CRISIS SELECTION IS BASED ON NEED

Australia performed well in the majority of the quantitative indicators. Only one quantitative indicator was found to stand out as a weakness: *Funding vulnerable and forgotten emergencies*, which measures funding to forgotten emergencies and those with the greatest vulnerability. Australia is supportive of forgotten emergencies, but tends to prioritize crises in its geographic region. As a result, Australia provides less funding to crises with high levels of vulnerability when compared to other donors. In 2010, Australia designated 40.2% of its humanitarian funding for these crises, compared to the Group 3 average of 63.0% and the OECD/DAC average of 63.9%. Australia could review its funding criteria to ensure it responds to crises with the greatest need at the global level while maintaining its niche in the Asia-Pacific.

### ● ENSURE ACCOUNTABILITY TOWARD BENEFICIARIES IS INTEGRATED IN HUMANITARIAN PROGRAMMES

Australia could improve its efforts to ensure accountability toward affected populations. Australia received one of the lowest scores of the OECD/DAC donors for this qualitative indicator, as partners indicated minimal emphasis and follow-up on downward accountability from Australia. Australia should engage in dialogue with its partners to discuss practical measures to ensure accountability towards beneficiaries is integrated in humanitarian programmes.

### ● ENCOURAGE LEARNING FROM THE PAST

Australia's partners indicate that Australia could also enhance the use and follow-up of evaluations and other lesson-learning exercises to ensure recommendations are integrated in subsequent programming. Australia's


recent announcement of a renewed focus on evaluations is highly positive. It would do well to also enhance its efforts to work with its partners to use the lessons learned.

### ● LOOK FOR WAYS TO IMPROVE MONITORING OF PROGRAMMES WITHOUT FIELD PRESENCE

Australia also received low scores for *Adapting to changing needs*, *Beneficiary participation* and *Gender*. Partner feedback was similar for all three indicators: greater monitoring is needed to transform them from requirements on paper to meaningful components of programmes. However, it is possible that the crisis selection may have influenced the lower scores and that Australia does verify that these requirements are fulfilled in crises where it has field presence. Australia should consider alternatives, such as partnerships with other donors, greater dialogue or field visits to monitor more closely the programmes it funds beyond its region.



# AUSTRIA






**OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE**  
**0.32%**  
 of GNI

**HUMANITARIAN AID**  
**4.2%**  
 of ODA

**US \$6**  
 Per person

## HUMANITARIAN AID DISTRIBUTION (%)



## GENDER RATING

POLICY →

FUNDING →

FIELD PERCEPTION N/A

### STRENGTHS

| Pillar | Type | Indicator                                  | Score | % above OECD/DAC average |
|--------|------|--|-------|--------------------------|
| 5      | QT   | Funding and commissioning evaluations      | 8.89  | +114.7%                  |
| 1      | QT   | Timely funding to complex emergencies      | 9.57  | +20.9%                   |
| 1      | QT   | Timely funding to sudden onset emergencies | 9.61  | +19.3%                   |

### AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT

| Pillar | Type | Indicator                                   | Score | % below OECD/DAC average |
|--------|------|---|-------|--------------------------|
| 5      | QT   | Participating in accountability initiatives | 0.00  | -100.00%                 |
| 3      | QT   | Funding NGOs                                | 0.76  | -83.3%                   |
| 5      | QT   | Funding accountability initiatives          | 1.08  | -73.6%                   |
| 3      | QT   | Un-earmarked funding                        | 1.50  | -71.1%                   |
| 3      | QT   | Funding UN and RC/RC appeals                | 1.58  | -61.3%                   |

## OVERALL PERFORMANCE

Austria is not included in the overall ranking, as insufficient survey responses were obtained to calculate the qualitative indicators that make up the index.

Austria's overall scores in the HRI's quantitative indicators were below both the OECD/DAC and Group 2 averages. Austria scored below the OECD/DAC and Group 2 averages in all pillars, with the exception of Pillar 1 (Responding to needs), where the average of its quantitative scores placed it above both the OECD/DAC and Group

2 averages. It received its lowest score by far in Pillar 3 (Working with humanitarian partners).

Austria did best compared to its OECD/DAC peers in indicators on *Funding and commissioning evaluations*, *Timely funding to complex emergencies* and *Timely funding to sudden onset emergencies*. Its scores were relatively the lowest in the indicators on *Participating in accountability initiatives*, *Funding NGOs*, *Funding accountability initiatives*, *Un-earmarked funding* and *Funding UN and RC/RC appeals*.

# AID DISTRIBUTION

Austria's Official Development Assistance (ODA) comprised 0.32% of its Gross National Income (GNI) in 2010, an increase from 0.30% in 2009, yet below its 2008 level of 0.43% of GNI. Humanitarian assistance represented 4.09% of its 2010 ODA, or 0.013% of its GNI.

According to data reported to the United Nations (UN) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs' (OCHA) Financial Tracking Service (FTS), Austria channelled 53.4%

of its humanitarian funding to UN agencies in 2010, 5.5% to the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement, 4.0% bilaterally to affected governments and 2.5% to non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Austria supported a total of 17 humanitarian crises in 2010: six in Asia, four in Africa, four in Europe and three in the Americas. Pakistan, Haiti and the occupied Palestinian territories received the greatest amount of support in 2010.

# POLICY FRAMEWORK

Within Austria, the Federal Ministry of the Interior (FMI), the Federal Ministry for European and International Affairs (FMEIA), the Federal Ministry of Defence (FMD), and the Austrian Development Agency (ADA) coordinate humanitarian affairs (ADC 2009a). The Federal Ministry of European and International Affairs (FMEIA) is responsible for the strategic orientation of humanitarian aid. The Austrian Development Agency (ADA) is the operational arm of the Austrian Development Cooperation (ADC), created by the *Federal Ministries Act of 1986* and the *Federal Act on Development Cooperation of 2002* (ADC 2009). The Federal Ministry of the Interior (FMI) can also establish crisis teams to coordinate humanitarian action (ADC 2009a). The *Austrian Action Plan on Aid Effectiveness 2006-*

*2010/2011* (ADC 2008), the *Three-Year Programme on Development Policy* (Federal Ministry for European and International Affairs 2008) and the *Austrian Development Cooperation International humanitarian aid: a policy document 2009* (ADC 2009a) guide Austria's humanitarian policy. ADC also refers to the policies of the European Commission for its humanitarian aid (ADC 2009a). ADC's humanitarian budget is intended mainly for priority and partner countries, but can also be used to respond to humanitarian crises in other places (ADC 2009a). The Austrian Council of Ministers can approve additional federal government funds for the Foreign Disaster Aid Fund if sufficient funds are not available for humanitarian action in the budgets of the individual federal departments (ADC 2009a, p.13).

## HOW DOES AUSTRIA'S POLICY ADDRESS GHD CONCEPTS?

### GENDER

Women are listed as one of the particularly vulnerable groups Austria targets in crisis situations. Gender is mentioned as a part of Austria's overall development policy including *Focus: Women, Gender and Armed Conflicts* (ADC 2011b) and *Focus: Gender Equality and Empowerment of Women* (ADC 2009), and *Gender equality and empowerment of women: Policy document* (ADC, 2006). However, Austria's policy regarding the integration of gender-sensitive approaches in humanitarian action is not clear.

## PILLAR 1

# RESPONDING TO NEEDS

Austria commits to providing aid based on the principles of neutrality, impartiality and non-discrimination (ADC 2009a). ADC recognises the need to provide aid based on need, especially to vulnerable groups including women, children, sick and disabled persons, refugees and internally displaced and homeless persons (ADC 2009a). Additionally, “particular attention is paid to ‘forgotten crises’ in ADC partner countries” (ADC 2009a, p.17). Austria also emphasises the need for timely decision-making and provision of funds (ADC 2009a). ADC only supports prequalified, ECHO-accredited NGOs to allow for a rapid response to crises (ADC 2009a).

## PILLAR 2

# PREVENTION, RISK REDUCTION AND RECOVERY

Austria addresses capacity building and beneficiary participation in its humanitarian policy in multiple ways. *Austrian Humanitarian Aid Policy* highlights that “the creation of greater prevention and self-help capacities in the target country is enhanced by transferring know-how and strengthening local structures,” (ADC 2009a, pp.18-19), and includes building self-reliance as one of its goals (ADC 2009a). Austria also recognises the need for rehabilitation, reconstruction and disaster prevention to be integrated in humanitarian aid (ADC 2009a). Furthermore, Austria encourages working with local partners in order to strengthen local capacities; however, organisations must be accredited before they can receive funding, as Austria considers that the accreditation process can increase organisations’ capacity. Austria stresses the need to consider the environment before and after crises (ADC 2009a).

## PILLAR 3

# WORKING WITH HUMANITARIAN PARTNERS

Austria’s humanitarian policy addresses coordination on many fronts: nationally, within Austria, internationally, as well as with host governments, civil society organisations and the affected population (ADC 2009a). Internationally, Austria’s humanitarian policy highlights the important role OCHA plays in coordination, and also notes its participation in the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC), the Partnership for Peace (PfP) and the EU Monitoring and Information Centre (MIC) (ADC 2009a). Austria’s humanitarian policy also emphasizes the need to coordinate before a crisis occurs (ADC 2009a). ADC uses initial UN needs assessments and reviews international situation reports and funding appeals to inform its decisions (ADC 2009a). Austria provides un-earmarked funds to UN agencies, the EU, and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) (ADC 2009a).

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## PILLAR 4

# PROTECTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

International humanitarian law, human rights law and refugee law are addressed in Austria's development policy, but do not seem to be given the same attention in Austria's humanitarian aid policy, with the exception of human rights, which is addressed in the *Human Rights Manual Guidelines for Implementing a Human Rights Based Approach in ADC* (ADA 2010). Austria recognizes that "impartiality is an essential prerequisite for access to the affected civilian population on all sides of a conflict and for the safety and security of humanitarian personnel in the field," (ADC 2009a, p.14). Austria stresses that the military should be used as a last resort, yet acknowledges its use to gain access in certain situations: "The coordination of civil and military activities is vital and should be designed to ensure and safeguard access by aid organizations to the affected population," (ADC 2009a, p.19). Austria highlights the need to protect refugees and the displaced (ADC 2009a).

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## PILLAR 5

# LEARNING AND ACCOUNTABILITY

ADA has a quality assurance and knowledge building unit, which can evaluate the content and operational aspects of humanitarian projects and programmes (ADC 2009a). Austria's policy regarding accountability and transparency is not clear.

# RECOMMENDATIONS

## ● RENEW COMMITMENT TO ACCOUNTABILITY

Austria has significant room for improvement in relation to its support for and participation in learning and accountability initiatives. Austria does not participate in any of the humanitarian accountability initiatives included in the indicator<sup>1</sup> and its funding of accountability initiatives<sup>2</sup> is also low: Austria allocated 0.1% of its humanitarian funding to this, compared to the OECD/DAC average of 0.4%.

## ● ENHANCE SUPPORT FOR UN AND RC/RC APPEALS, COORDINATION AND SUPPORT SERVICES AND POOLED FUNDS

Austria received the fifth-lowest score of the OECD/DAC donors for *Funding UN and RC/RC appeals*, which measures the extent to which donors provide their fair share<sup>3</sup> of funding to UN and Red Cross/Red Crescent (RC/RC) appeals, coordination and support services and pooled funds. Austria scores well below average in all the components that comprise this indicator.

## ● LOOK FOR ADMINISTRATIVE SOLUTIONS TO CHANNEL MORE FUNDING TO NGOS

Austria channelled little funding to NGOs – only 2.5% of its humanitarian aid. This places Austria among the donors that channel the least funding to NGOs, well below the OECD/DAC average of 15.3%. Austria could consider flexible working models to increase its funding to NGOs, such as arranging shared management agreements with other donors, or supporting consortiums.

## ● IMPROVE FLEXIBILITY WHILE STRENGTHENING PROGRAMME MONITORING


Austria provided the vast majority of its funding with earmarking: only 9.0% of its humanitarian funding was provided without earmarking, placing it below the OECD/DAC average of 33.2% and the Group 2 average of 15.2%. This would seem to indicate that Austria should review the flexibility of its funding.



Please see [www.daraint.org](http://www.daraint.org) for a complete list of references.

# BELGIUM

HRI 2011 Ranking  
**13th**




Group **3**  
ASPIRING ACTORS

OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE **0.64%**  
of GNI

HUMANITARIAN AID **7.8%**  
of ODA

**US \$22**  
Per person

## HUMANITARIAN AID DISTRIBUTION (%)



## GENDER RATING POLICY FUNDING FIELD PERCEPTION

| STRENGTHS |      |  |       |                          |
|-----------|------|--|-------|--------------------------|
| Pillar    | Type | Indicator                                    | Score | % above OECD/DAC average |
| 4         | QL   | Facilitating safe access                     | 6.19  | +21.4%                   |
| 5         | QL   | Appropriate reporting requirements           | 8.35  | +17.9%                   |
| 1         | QT   | Funding vulnerable and forgotten emergencies | 8.11  | +17.5%                   |
| 1         | QL   | Independence of aid                          | 8.24  | +11.3%                   |

| AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT |      |   |       |                          |
|-----------------------|------|---|-------|--------------------------|
| Pillar                | Type | Indicator                                   | Score | % below OECD/DAC average |
| 5                     | QT   | Funding and commissioning evaluations       | 1.00  | -75.8%                   |
| 5                     | QT   | Participating in accountability initiatives | 1.81  | -59.6%                   |
| 2                     | QT   | Funding international risk mitigation       | 2.84  | -40.6%                   |
| 5                     | QL   | Accountability towards beneficiaries        | 2.87  | -33.6%                   |
| 1                     | QT   | Timely funding to sudden onset emergencies  | 6.52  | -19.0%                   |

## OVERALL PERFORMANCE

Belgium ranked 13<sup>th</sup> in the HRI 2011, a major improvement from its 18<sup>th</sup> place ranking in 2010, largely due to significantly higher scores in the quantitative indicators compared to 2010. Based on the patterns of its scores, Belgium is classified as a Group 3 donor, “Aspiring Actors”. Donors in this group tend to have more limited capacity to engage with the humanitarian system at the field level, but often aspire to take on a greater role in the sector. They generally focus on a few core strengths, such as in the area of prevention, preparedness and risk reduction, or on specific geographic regions. Other donors in the group include Australia, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg and Spain.

Belgium’s overall score was below the OECD/DAC average, and also slightly below the Group 3 average. Belgium scored below the OECD/

DAC and Group 3 averages in all pillars, with the exception of Pillar 4 (Protection and international law), where it scored below the OECD/DAC average, yet above the Group 3 average. Belgium received its lowest overall score in Pillar 3 (Working with humanitarian partners).

Belgium did best compared to its OECD/DAC peers in indicators on *Facilitating safe access*, *Appropriate reporting requirements*, *Funding vulnerable and forgotten emergencies* and *Independence of aid*. Its scores were relatively the lowest in the indicators on *Funding and commissioning evaluations*, *Participating in accountability initiatives*, *Funding international risk mitigation*, *Accountability towards beneficiaries* and *Timely funding to sudden onset emergencies*. Overall, Belgium scored significantly higher on the qualitative, survey-based indicators than on the quantitative indicators.

SOURCES: UN OCHA FTS, OECD StatExtracts, various UN agencies’ annual reports and DARA

All scores are on a scale of 0 to 10. Colours represent performance compared to OECD/DAC donors’ average performance rating: Good Mid-range Could improve Non applicable Quantitative Indicator Qualitative Indicator

# AID DISTRIBUTION

In 2010, Belgium's Official Development Assistance (ODA) comprised 0.64% of its Gross National Income (GNI), up from 0.55% in 2009, yet slightly short of its prior pledge of 0.7% by 2010. Humanitarian assistance represented 7.8% of its ODA, or 0.049% of its GNI. Belgium's sector-specific funding focused on food, agriculture and protection.

According to data reported to the United Nations (UN) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs' (OCHA) Financial Tracking Service, Belgium channelled

70.0% of its 2010 humanitarian assistance to UN agencies, 13.5% to non-governmental organisations (NGOs), 11.0% the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement and 1.6% to private organisations and foundations. In 2010, Belgium provided humanitarian assistance to 11 crises in Africa - especially the Great Lakes region, which is prioritised in Belgium's 2006 *Strategic Plan* - six crises in Asia and three in the Americas. The Democratic Republic of the Congo, Pakistan and Sudan received the greatest amount of funding in 2010.

# POLICY FRAMEWORK

The Directorate-General for Development Cooperation (DGDC), under the Department of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation, manages Belgium's humanitarian aid. Belgium has recently undergone restructuring whereby most humanitarian assistance now falls under the DGDC with the aim of enhancing opportunities for cooperation with development programmes (OECD/DAC 2010). The 1999 *Law on Belgian International Cooperation* limits the number of partner countries to 25 (Government of Belgium 2011b). With the exception of food aid, which is governed by the 1999 *London Food Aid Convention*, Belgium's current policy is largely based on a 1996 *Royal Decree*. All funding to NGOs is subject to the decree and must be project-based, with limited implementation periods, and undergo an extensive approval process. Funding to UN agencies and the Red

Cross/Red Crescent Movement, however, generally does not encounter the same restrictions. The 2006 *Strategic Plan for Humanitarian Aid* has been able to overcome some of these obstacles. In addition, the *Royal Decree* has been circumvented to a certain extent by the creation of the Belgian First Aid and Support Team (B-FAST) and increased funding to pooled funds, such as the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) (OECD/DAC 2010). Belgium is currently drafting a new humanitarian aid strategy, which has the potential to accelerate the positive changes already underway in its humanitarian policy framework (Government of Belgium 2011a). Belgium currently has field presence in 18 partner countries where programmes are monitored by relevant Belgian embassies' development cooperation attachés and are often implemented by Belgian Technical Cooperation (BTC).

## HOW DOES BELGIUM'S POLICY ADDRESS GHD CONCEPTS?

# GENDER

Both Belgium's 2006 *Strategic Plan* and its draft humanitarian strategy contain a number of cross cutting issues, including gender (OECD/DAC 2010). The draft humanitarian strategy emphasises the importance of mainstreaming gender and Belgium's intention to financially support gender-sensitive approaches in humanitarian situations. Belgium also prioritises sexual reproductive health and rights and has developed a national action plan to ensure implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security (Government of Belgium 2009).

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## PILLAR 1

# RESPONDING TO NEEDS

Belgium recognises the importance of a principled, needs-based approach to humanitarian assistance. Its draft humanitarian aid strategy reaffirms Belgium's commitment to humanitarian principles, including the importance of needs-based humanitarian action, while also acknowledging its limitations to do so due to its comparatively small size. Therefore, Belgium intends to focus on geographic and thematic areas such as the Great Lakes region, food security and protection (Government of Belgium 2011a). Belgium acknowledges the importance of timeliness but is hampered by the limitations of the *Royal Decree* (DBEO 2008, DBEO 2009). Belgium endeavours to enhance the timeliness of its support by maintaining B-FAST, its rapid response unit and by providing flexible and core funding to multilateral organisations (DBEO 2008 and Government of Belgium 2011a).

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## PILLAR 2

# PREVENTION, RISK REDUCTION AND RECOVERY

Belgium's previous humanitarian policies have highlighted the need to mainstream environmental issues, although this is absent from its draft humanitarian strategy (OECD/DAC 2010 and Government of Belgium 2011). The need for disaster risk reduction and linking relief, rehabilitation and development are expressed in Belgium's current humanitarian policy, but do not form an integral part thereof as a result of the *Royal Decree*. This is due to the fact that the decree limits the funding of local capacity building and action by local NGOs. For similar reasons, Belgium is also restrained from promoting disaster preparedness (OECD/DAC 2010). However, the draft humanitarian strategy could bring about significant progress in these issues, as it emphasises the importance of beneficiary participation and local capacity building (Government of Belgium 2011a).

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## PILLAR 3

# WORKING WITH HUMANITARIAN PARTNERS

Flexibility and multi-year funding are limited by the Royal Decree, although Belgium has been able to circumvent this to an extent by providing core funding with limited earmarking for multilateral organisations and by contributing to pooled funds, such as the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) (OECD/DAC 2010 and DBEO 2008). The draft humanitarian strategy continues this approach, in addition to narrowing the number of NGO framework partnerships with the aim of increasing flexibility and predictability. Belgium recognises the leading role of UN agencies, particularly OCHA, for the coordination of the humanitarian system (Government of Belgium 2008).



## PILLAR 4

# PROTECTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

Belgium's current humanitarian policy makes little mention of protection and international law, although they are addressed to a greater extent in the draft humanitarian strategy, which contains a thematic focus on protection, particularly that of children. The same strategy mentions the importance of international humanitarian law (IHL), refugee law and human rights, in addition to specific UN resolutions, as establishing the international legal framework for humanitarian aid. Belgium intends to advocate against breaches of IHL, and for the security of aid workers and increased humanitarian space (Government of Belgium 2011a).

## PILLAR 5


# LEARNING AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Belgium's draft humanitarian strategy lays out plans to provide additional funding to projects and international efforts that build knowledge, particularly in relation to standards. It also affirms its commitment to supporting initiatives such as the Sphere Project and views international standards as an important means to increase transparency (Government of Belgium 2011a). Belgium has its own "Special Development Cooperation Evaluation Unit" (DBEO), which conducts independent evaluations of Belgium as a donor. These evaluations have previously called for an increase in transparency and accountability, as well as a greater focus on evaluations (DBEO 2008 and DBEO 2009), which are reflected in the draft humanitarian strategy. It stresses the importance of applying different methods of evaluation, both internally and for partners (Government of Belgium 2011a), as well as the need for upward and downward accountability.

# FIELD PARTNERS' PERCEPTIONS

## BELGIUM'S FIELD PERCEPTION SCORES

Collected questionnaires: 17



SOURCE: DARA

Colours represent performance compared to donor's average performance rating:

■ Good 
 ■ Mid-range 
 ■ Could improve

## HOW IS BELGIUM PERCEIVED BY ITS PARTNERS?

### GENDER

Field organisations do not consider Belgium to be strong in ensuring gender-sensitive approaches are integrated in programming. The country received low marks in this regard; some asserted that gender did not seem to be on its agenda.

### PILLAR 1

### RESPONDING TO NEEDS

Belgium received some of its highest qualitative scores in Pillar 1. The vast majority of Belgium's field partners felt that its humanitarian aid was neutral, impartial and independent, although a few considered that "Belgium is very much influenced by their politics" and that "Belgium places a high economic conditionality on aid", but they were in the minority. Organisations in the field held slightly more mixed views regarding Belgium's verification that programmes respond to changing needs. For example, one organisation praised Belgium, as its "director of cooperation visited Haiti for two weeks, traveling everywhere in the country [...] There was a will to understand the needs and see what projects other donors were funding and learn from their experience." Another agency in a different country reported, however, that Belgium "just checks reports", while its other donors engaged in monitoring visits.

### PILLAR 2

### PREVENTION, RISK REDUCTION AND RECOVERY

Belgium's scores were relatively low in the qualitative indicators that make up Pillar 2. Field perceptions in this pillar were lowest regarding Belgium's support for prevention, preparedness and risk reduction, followed by beneficiary participation.

### PILLAR 3

### WORKING WITH HUMANITARIAN PARTNERS

In Pillar 3, Belgium's field partners were largely positive regarding the flexibility of the country's funding. One organisation noted that Belgium is "generally accommodating for change". Most partners also considered that Belgium has sufficient capacity and expertise to make appropriate decisions. They were more critical in relation to Belgium's support for partners' organisational capacity and for coordination.

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## PILLAR 4

# PROTECTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

In Pillar 4, Belgium's partners found it to be somewhat weaker in issues related to advocacy, both for protection of civilians and toward governments and local authorities. Facilitating safe access and security of humanitarian workers, on the other hand, was found to be a "top priority".

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## PILLAR 5

# LEARNING AND ACCOUNTABILITY

In Pillar 5, Belgium received one of its highest scores for the appropriateness of its reporting requirements. One organisation highlighted that Belgium was also "generally accommodating with common reporting mechanisms." Field organisations were much more critical, however, regarding requirements to ensure accountability toward affected populations and the transparency of Belgium's funding and decision-making.

# RECOMMENDATIONS

The following recommendations are based on data from 2010. It remains to be seen how Belgium's new policy will influence these issues.

## RENEW COMMITMENT TO ACCOUNTABILITY

Belgium has room for improvement in its commitment to accountability. Although Belgium financially supports a number of humanitarian accountability initiatives, it received one of the lowest scores of the OECD/DAC donors for its participation in accountability initiatives.<sup>1</sup> Its partners also report that Belgium could do more to ensure accountability toward beneficiaries at the field level, as Belgium received the lowest score for this qualitative indicator. It appears this will be addressed in Belgium's new strategy, but Belgium would do well to follow-up with field partners to ensure mechanisms for accountability are properly integrated into programmes.

## ENHANCE USE OF EVALUATIONS

Belgium received the third-lowest score for *Funding and commissioning evaluation*, which measures the number of joint and individual evaluations commissioned and the existence of an evaluation policy. Belgium has not yet formalised an evaluation policy and has only commissioned one joint evaluation and two individual evaluations (publicly available) over the past five years. This appears to support the findings of Belgium's DBEO, which called for a greater focus on evaluations.

## CONTINUE PROGRESS UNDERWAY TO IMPROVE TIMELINESS


Belgium has improved substantially the timeliness of its funding to complex emergencies. In 2009, it provided only 4.4% of its funding within the first three months following a humanitarian appeal, while in 2010 it provided 51.4% during this time frame, compared to the OECD/DAC average of 59.4%. It has also improved significantly the speed of its response to sudden onset emergencies, but still has room for improvement. In 2009, Belgium provided 14.9% of its funding within the first six weeks of sudden onset disasters. In 2010, it provided 65.2% of its funding within this period, though it is still below the OECD/DAC average of 80.5%.

## ENHANCE SUPPORT FOR PREVENTION, PREPAREDNESS, RISK REDUCTION AND RECONSTRUCTION

Belgium's support for prevention, preparedness, risk reduction and reconstruction is fairly weak. Its funding for prevention and reconstruction comprised 13.7% of its humanitarian aid, while its OECD/DAC peers provided an average of 18.6%. Similarly, its funding for international risk mitigation mechanisms represented only 0.55% of its ODA, below the OECD/DAC average of 0.77%. Belgium's field partners seem to confirm this, rating Belgium below average for its support for prevention, preparedness and risk reduction.

## ENSURE AID MEETS THE DIFFERENT NEEDS OF WOMEN, MEN, BOYS AND GIRLS


Although Belgium's policy highlights the importance of gender, its partners indicate the need for greater emphasis on gender-sensitive approaches and follow-up to ensure it is properly integrated into humanitarian programmes.

 Please see [www.daraint.org](http://www.daraint.org) for a complete list of references.

# CANADA

Group **2**  
LEARNING LEADERS

HRI 2011 Ranking  
**14th**






OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE **0.33%**  
of GNI

HUMANITARIAN AID **12.2%**  
of ODA

**US \$18**  
Per person

## HUMANITARIAN AID DISTRIBUTION (%)



## GENDER RATING

POLICY

FUNDING

FIELD PERCEPTION

### STRENGTHS

| Pillar | Type | Indicator                               | Score | % above OECD/DAC average |
|--------|------|---|-------|--------------------------|
| 5      | QL   | Implementing evaluation recommendations | 5.26  | +22.7%                   |
| 2      | QL   | Beneficiary participation               | 5.57  | +16.1%                   |
| 2      | QL   | Strengthening local capacity            | 6.65  | +15.1%                   |
| 1      | QL   | Timely funding                          | 7.47  | +6.8%                    |

### AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT

| Pillar | Type | Indicator                                  | Score | % below OECD/DAC average |
|--------|------|--|-------|--------------------------|
| 5      | QT   | Funding accountability initiatives         | 0.45  | -89.1%                   |
| 2      | QT   | Funding reconstruction and prevention      | 1.48  | -66.9%                   |
| 2      | QT   | Reducing climate-related vulnerability     | 1.54  | -61.8%                   |
| 3      | QT   | Un-earmarked funding                       | 2.02  | -61.1%                   |
| 1      | QT   | Timely funding to sudden onset emergencies | 6.50  | -19.3%                   |

## OVERALL PERFORMANCE

Canada ranked 14<sup>th</sup> in the HRI 2011, improving one position from 2010. Based on the pattern of its scores, Canada is classified as a Group 2 donor, “Learning Leaders”. Donors in this group are characterised by their leading role in support of emergency relief efforts, strong capacity and field presence, and commitment to learning and improvement. They tend to do less well in areas such as prevention, preparedness, and risk reduction efforts. Other Group 2 donors include the European Commission, France, the United Kingdom and the United States.

Overall, Canada’s performance is below the OECD/DAC and Group 2 averages. Canada scored below the OECD/DAC average in all pillars, with the exception of Pillar 4 (Protection and international law), where it was above both the OECD/DAC and Group 2 averages.

Canada was also slightly above its peer group average in Pillar 2 (Working with humanitarian partners), but below the Group 2 average in Pillars 1 (Responding to needs), 2 and 5.

Canada did best compared to its OECD/DAC peers in the indicators on *Implementing evaluation recommendations*, *Beneficiary participation*, *Strengthening local capacity* and *Timely funding to partners* – all qualitative indicators. Its scores were lowest in indicators on *Funding accountability initiatives*, *Funding reconstruction and prevention*, *Reducing climate-related vulnerability*, *Un-earmarked funding* and *Timely funding to sudden onset emergencies* – all quantitative indicators. In fact, overall Canada scored significantly higher on the qualitative, survey-based indicators than on the quantitative indicators.

SOURCES: UN OCHA FTS, OECD StatExtracts, various UN agencies’ annual reports and DARA

All scores are on a scale of 0 to 10. Colours represent performance compared to OECD/DAC donors’ average performance rating:  
 Good Mid-range Could improve Non applicable Quantitative Indicator Qualitative Indicator

# AID DISTRIBUTION

Canada's Official Development Assistance (ODA) comprised 0.33% of its Gross National Income (GNI) in 2010. Humanitarian assistance represented 12.2% of its ODA and 0.04% of its GNI (OECD 2010).

According to data reported to the United Nations (UN) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs' (OCHA) Financial Tracking Service (FTS), in 2010 Canada channelled 69.1% of its humanitarian funding to the

UN system, 12.7% to non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and 16.8% to the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement. Canada destined 7.0% of its humanitarian aid to the Central Emergency Relief Fund (CERF). In 2010, Haiti, Pakistan and Sudan received the greatest amount of assistance. Canada responded to 39 emergencies in 2010: 15 in Africa 13 in Asia, eight in the Americas and three in Europe (OCHA FTS 2010).

# POLICY FRAMEWORK

The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), under the Minister of International Cooperation, is responsible for managing Canada's development and humanitarian programming. The Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) develops its humanitarian policy and coordinates the response to natural disasters when a whole-of-government response is required, while the International Humanitarian Assistance Directorate (IHA), within CIDA, manages Canada's operational response to humanitarian crises in developing countries (DFAIT 2011b). The Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) of the Canadian military may also be deployed to provide emergency health and water services for up to 40 days (National Defence 2005, DFAIT 2011b). Other government departments, such as the Department of National Defence and the Privy Council Office, may also participate in operational coordination

mechanisms when a whole-of-government approach is required (CIDA 2011a).

Canada lacks a comprehensive humanitarian policy document, but has been one of the leading members of the *Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) Principles* group, and has a *GHD Domestic Implementation Plan*. This plan called for a humanitarian assistance policy, which was drafted and consulted with Canadian NGOs, but ultimately not formalised (CCIC 2009). CIDA published the *Guidelines for Emergency Humanitarian Assistance Project Proposals and Reports*, revised in 2006, and includes the main principles that guide its humanitarian policy on its website (CIDA 2011b). CIDA currently has 49 field offices to respond to development and humanitarian needs in partner countries. Canada's *Aid Effectiveness Action Plan 2009-2012* foresees increasing its field presence and delegating greater authority to field offices.

## HOW DOES CANADA'S POLICY ADDRESS GHD CONCEPTS?

## GENDER

Canada expresses a firm commitment to gender-sensitive approaches in humanitarian and development policies, and gender is a cross-cutting theme in all programmes. CIDA's revised *Policy on Gender Equality* (2010) emphasises Canada's commitment to gender equality and outlines how to incorporate a gender-sensitive approach in all programmes (CIDA 2010). The *Gender Equality Action Plan* (2010-2013) lays out goals for Canada's gender-sensitive policies, and calls for an annual report

regarding progress on gender equality measures in CIDA's work (CIDA 2010). Partners must include sex and age disaggregated indicators in funding proposals and reporting, and CIDA encourages the inclusion of gender-sensitive policies (CIDA 2006). The integration of gender into humanitarian aid is guided by CIDA's toolkit, *Gender Equality and Humanitarian Assistance: A Guide to the issues* (CIDA 2003), and the results of gender equality institutional assessments CIDA has conducted of its main multilateral partners. Its *Framework for Assessing Gender Equality Results* also serves as a tool to measure partners' commitment to gender equality, and was the first of its kind to be released by an OECD country (CIDA 2010). Canada has supported the Gender Standby Capacity (GenCap) project to mainstream gender into humanitarian response (CIDA 2011c). Most significantly, 2011 will see the start of Canada's action plan for the implementation of UN Security Council resolutions regarding women, peace and security (CIDA 2011a).

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## PILLAR 1

# RESPONDING TO NEEDS

CIDA expresses a firm commitment to timely, impartial, independent aid that adapts to changing needs (CIDA 2011b). Canada relies on multiple sources for needs assessments, including those of the UN Disaster Assessment and Coordination Team (UNDAC), calling on its embassies and offices abroad for additional information (DFAIT 2011a). Its Interdepartmental Strategic Support Team (ISST) provides expert analysis in humanitarian situations to support relief efforts (Parliament of Canada 2011). CIDA has expressed its commitment to provide funding to improve needs assessment tools (CIDA 2011a). With the aim of providing timely aid to crisis situations, Canada is a strong supporter of the CERF and has vowed to increase its funding of pooled mechanisms (CIDA 2011b), and accepts abridged proposals from pre-approved NGOs (CIDA 2006). The 2007 *DAC Peer Review* also states that Canada regularly contributes to the Canadian Red Cross Emergency Disaster Assistance Fund, created to provide a speedy response in times of crisis (OECD/DAC 2007).

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## PILLAR 2

# PREVENTION, RISK REDUCTION AND RECOVERY

Canada requires beneficiary participation in the design, implementation and monitoring of humanitarian programmes; participation in evaluation, however, is not mentioned in Canada's humanitarian guidelines (CIDA 2006). Funding proposals must include an environmental impact assessment, beneficiary participation assessment and strive to build local capacity (CIDA 2006). Canada also places importance on disaster risk reduction (DRR) and prevention and preparedness measures and has signed the *Hyogo Framework for Action* (DFAIT 2011a). Canada has supported preparedness initiatives to increase emergency response capacity as well as capacity to monitor and prepare for hazards (CIDA 2011c). Furthermore, Canada has supported projects for training, capacity-building and policy support geared toward prevention, preparedness and DRR (DFAIT 2011a). Canada also places importance on conflict prevention, and DFAIT's Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START) manages



conflict prevention programmes under the Global Peace and Security Fund (DFAIT 2011d). Finally, Canada's *Aid Effectiveness Action Plan* stresses the need to "more effectively bridge humanitarian, recovery, and longer-term development phases," (CIDA 2009, p. 6).

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### PILLAR 3

## WORKING WITH HUMANITARIAN PARTNERS

CIDA commits to provide flexible and predictable funding to humanitarian organisations and to support the coordination and organisational capacities of their partners (CIDA 2011b). Canada has recently taken a series of steps to ensure its funding is more flexible and predictable. As part of its *Aid Effectiveness Action Plan*, Canada untied 100% of its food aid budget in 2008 (CIDA 2009). Canada also provides multi-year funding to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the CERF (CIDA 2011a). In addition, Canada supported the Policy Action Group for Emergency Response (PAGER), which is intended to enhance policy and operational dialogue among NGOs, the Canadian Red Cross and the Canadian government.

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### PILLAR 4

## PROTECTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

CIDA asserts that protection of civilians, promotion of international humanitarian law (IHL), facilitation of access to affected populations and safety of humanitarian workers are priorities for Canada's humanitarian efforts (CIDA 2006). Apart from funding organisations with a protection mandate, Canada has continuously supported the Protection Standby Capacity (ProCap) project, which supports the strategic and operational protection response of UN agencies (CIDA 2011c). CIDA's *Funding Guidelines* state that it will fund proposals that seek to improve the protection and security of the affected population or the dissemination of refugee law and IHL (CIDA 2006). Canada works with humanitarian organisations to improve training and equipment with the aim of supporting the safety of aid workers (DFAIT 2011c). Additionally, Canada has endeavoured to secure extra funding to support security measures in particularly unstable crises (DFAIT 2011c). The *Official Development Assistance Act* (2008) requires all Canadian ODA to be provided in line with international human rights standards.

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### PILLAR 5

## LEARNING AND ACCOUNTABILITY

CIDA has recently taken steps to improve the accountability and transparency of its funding (CIDA 2009). Canada requires all NGOs to perform evaluations of their humanitarian assistance, and CIDA manages the evaluation of programmes it implements directly. As part of the *Official Development Assistance Accountability Act* (2008), CIDA publishes a yearly report to Parliament on its programmes, budgets, and progress on overarching policy goals. Furthermore, all humanitarian projects funded by CIDA are published on an online database, "Project Browser". Canada commits to continue participating in initiatives like

the *Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance (ALNAP)* and to provide leadership in groups like the *Multilateral Organizations Performance Assessment Network*. In 2011, CIDA announced its intention to strengthen the independence of its evaluations by bringing in more outside expertise and conducting more joint evaluations of country-level programmes (CIDA 2011a). Following a disaster requiring a whole-of-government response, DFAIT convenes an interdepartmental meeting to identify actions to improve future responses (DFIAT 2011a).

# FIELD PARTNERS' PERCEPTIONS

## CANADA'S FIELD PERCEPTION SCORES

Collected questionnaires: 65



SOURCE: DARA

Canada's average score 6.03 ← ..... → OECD/DAC average score 6.05

Colours represent performance compared to donor's average performance rating:

Good    Mid-range    Could improve

## HOW IS CANADA PERCEIVED BY ITS PARTNERS?

### PILLAR 1

## RESPONDING TO NEEDS

Canada's partners held mixed views regarding the neutrality, impartiality and independence of its aid. Many organisations reported that Canadian aid was "very dependent" on other political, economic or military interests. In particular, multiple organisations reported that CIDA frequently established "no-go" or "no-engagement" policies with certain groups or regions which prevented aid from going where it was needed most. Organisations interviewed held mixed views over Canada's efforts to ensure the programmes it supports adapt to changing needs. For example, one interviewee asserted that "CIDA doesn't really care," and another noted that "CIDA is disengaged with us, they don't have a real presence here" to be able to verify these details. On a more positive note, organisations appreciated the timeliness of Canada's funding. Some lauded Canada's quick reactivity in making more aid available when the humanitarian situation worsened; another reported that Canada was "very good" in terms of timeliness.

### PILLAR 2

## PREVENTION, RISK REDUCTION AND RECOVERY

In the field, Canada's partners provided mixed reviews of beneficiary participation. Some pointed to improvement, stating: "This has become more and more important in the last few years. Now it's a requirement," and reporting that, contrary to the other donors, "Canada promotes this." Partners were impressed with CIDA's engagement with this issue in the field, reporting that CIDA "sent a consultant that went with us to the field," and that "CIDA came in for a monitoring mission and even organised focus groups with beneficiaries." On the other hand, others reported that beneficiary participation in monitoring and evaluation was "promoted, but not required," and many considered that "It's all just on paper," and a "tick-off-the-box" requirement. In terms of linking relief to rehabilitation and development, NGOs reported that Canada was unhelpful in this regard because it had very strict definitions of what constituted "humanitarian" versus "development" aid and was unwilling to finance the transition to the latter. For example, one interviewee reported that Canada does not allow construction, which "hinders sustainability," while another revealed that "Canada considers livelihoods recovery so they don't want to finance that."

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## PILLAR 3

# WORKING WITH HUMANITARIAN PARTNERS

Many organisations in the field felt that Canada was fairly flexible in its funding. Interviewees stated that “Canada is excellent for funding four-year plans!” that there was “flexibility within the log frame of the project,” and that CIDA was “generally accommodating for change.” Canada received significantly less favourable reviews in regards to its support of its partners’ organisational capacities, as organisations reported that Canada does not finance this. Many NGOs had positive views of Canada’s capacity to make appropriate decisions, though a few dissented. One organisation complained that CIDA’s field representatives did not participate sufficiently in decisions made at headquarters. On the other hand, another reported that “CIDA has the capacity and experience, and their decisions are appropriate towards the government’s policies.”

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## PILLAR 4

# PROTECTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

Similar to many other donors, Canada’s field partners felt the country was stronger in funding protection of civilians than in advocating for it. Its efforts in advocating toward local authorities to fulfill their responsibilities in response to humanitarian needs was also somewhat weaker, according to field partners, although some pointed to improvement in this area. In one crisis, an NGO affirmed that CIDA “engages closely with the humanitarian coordinator” and local authorities to this end. Partners noted that Canada “requires an access strategy” of its partners, but “does not facilitate it.”

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## PILLAR 5

# LEARNING AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Canada’s partners were largely appreciative of its reporting requirements, although one interviewee noted that “CIDA changes the design and plans of their reporting forms too often.” Most interviewees also praised the transparency of Canada’s funding, although a few pointed to an interesting paradox. While CIDA is “extremely clear” about who it funds, it is reportedly much less transparent about why it funds them. An interviewee revealed they did not understand “why a specific NGO is selected and another one isn’t...” and another stated that “Canada at the capital level is completely inaccessible to us . . . we just don’t understand how decisions are taken and what goes on there.” For other matters, however, several organisations lauded Canada’s communication and transparency. Canada’s partners were much more critical regarding accountability toward affected populations and implementation of evaluation recommendations.

# RECOMMENDATIONS

## ● PROTECT THE NEUTRALITY, IMPARTIALITY AND INDEPENDENCE OF HUMANITARIAN AID

Canada should engage with its partners to discuss practical measures to ensure the neutrality, impartiality and independence of its humanitarian aid. This is especially important in crises with counter-terrorism operations underway and in crises where Canada adopts integrated approaches. Canada's partners reported that no-contact policies are inhibiting aid from reaching those most in need. In particular, partners considered Canada's aid to be less neutral, impartial and independent in Somalia, the occupied Palestinian territories (oPt) and Colombia.

## ● RENEW COMMITMENT TO ACCOUNTABILITY

Consistent with the HRI 2010, Canada received its lowest score of the index in *Funding accountability initiatives*, an indicator which measures financial support for humanitarian accountability initiatives.<sup>2</sup> In 2009, Canada allocated 0.09% of its humanitarian aid to these initiatives, and dropped to 0.04% in 2010. Canada's Group 2 peers allocated an average of 0.2% to these initiatives. Similarly, Canada received its second-lowest qualitative score for *Accountability toward beneficiaries*, indicating that Canada should review its practices related to accountability toward beneficiaries and consider increasing its support for humanitarian accountability initiatives.

## ● ENHANCE SUPPORT FOR PREVENTION, PREPAREDNESS, RECONSTRUCTION AND EFFORTS TO REDUCE VULNERABILITY

In Pillar 2, Canada scored slightly above average for its support for international risk mitigation mechanisms, but received low scores for *Funding reconstruction and prevention* and *Reducing climate-related vulnerability*, indicating the need to place greater importance on preventing and preparing for future crises. In 2009, Canada allocated 14.1% of its humanitarian aid to prevention, preparedness and reconstruction, but dropped to 5.9% in 2010, placing it well below the OECD/DAC average of 18.6%. Regarding climate vulnerability, Canada provided only 36.3% of its fair share<sup>3</sup> to Fast Start Finance, which supports climate change mitigation and adaptation efforts, compared to the OECD/DAC average of 102.4%. Furthermore, Canada has fallen short on its commitments to reduce emissions.


## ● CONSIDER EXPANDING CURRENT MEASURES TO EXPEDITE FUNDING

Canada has improved significantly the timeliness of its funding to complex emergencies. In 2009, it provided only 14.4% of its funding within the first three months of a humanitarian appeal. In 2010, it gave 49.3% within this time frame. Canada's funding to

sudden onset disasters has become slower, however. Although Canada was particularly strong in responding quickly to sudden onset disasters in 2009, it was below average in 2010, providing 65.0% of its funding within the first six weeks of a disaster, compared to the OECD/DAC average of 80.5%. Canada's partners seem to confirm this, rating the country below average for the timeliness of its funding. Canada's policy of accepting abridged proposals from pre-approved organisations is highly positive. Canada would do well to consider engaging with a greater number of organisations prior to the onset of emergencies to enlarge this programme.


## ● IMPROVE FLEXIBILITY BUT MAINTAIN PROGRAMME MONITORING

Canada received one of its lowest scores in *Un-earmarked funding*. Canada's partners seem to confirm this, rating Canada below average for the flexibility of its funding. In 2009, Canada provided 15.2% of its funding without earmarking, but dropped to 12.1% in 2010. The OECD/DAC average was 33.2%. Canada should review the flexibility of its funding and consider taking advantage of its Policy Action Group for Emergency Response (PAGER) to discuss this issue with its partners.

 Please see [www.daraint.org](http://www.daraint.org) for a complete list of references.

# DENMARK

HRI 2011  
Ranking  
**2nd**






Group **1**  
PRINCIPLED  
PARTNERS

OFFICIAL  
DEVELOPMENT  
ASSISTANCE **0.90%**  
of GNI

HUMANITARIAN  
AID **6.2%**  
of ODA

**US \$32**  
Per person

## HUMANITARIAN AID DISTRIBUTION (%)



## GENDER RATING

POLICY

FUNDING

FIELD PERCEPTION

### STRENGTHS

| Pillar | Type | Indicator                                   | Score | % above OECD/DAC average |
|--------|------|---|-------|--------------------------|
| 5      | QT   | Funding accountability initiatives          | 10.00 | +143.1%                  |
| 5      | QT   | Participating in accountability initiatives | 9.44  | +111.1%                  |
| 3      | QT   | Funding NGOs                                | 8.40  | +85.3%                   |
| 5      | QT   | Funding and commissioning evaluations       | 7.59  | +83.4%                   |
| 3      | QT   | Funding UN and RC/RC appeals                | 7.21  | +77.3%                   |

### AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT

| Pillar | Type | Indicator                                  | Score | % below OECD/DAC average |
|--------|------|--|-------|--------------------------|
| 2      | QT   | Funding reconstruction and prevention      | 3.01  | -32.9%                   |
| 1      | QT   | Timely funding to sudden onset emergencies | 7.64  | -5.2%                    |
| 4      | QL   | Facilitating safe access                   | 4.94  | -3.0%                    |
| 1      | QL   | Adapting to changing needs                 | 6.12  | -2.4%                    |
| 5      | QL   | Appropriate reporting requirements         | 7.01  | -1.1%                    |

## OVERALL PERFORMANCE

Denmark ranked 2<sup>nd</sup> in the HRI 2011, dropping one position from 2010. Based on the pattern of its scores, Denmark is classified as a Group 1 donor, "Principled Partners". This group is characterised by its commitment to humanitarian principles and strong support for multilateral partners, and generally good overall performance in all areas. Other Group 1 donors include Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland.

Denmark's overall score was above the OECD/DAC and Group 1 averages. Denmark scored above the OECD/DAC and Group 1 averages in all pillars, with the exception of Pillars 2 and 3. In Pillar 2 (Prevention, risk reduction and recovery) Denmark scored above the OECD/DAC average, yet below the Group 1 average.

Similarly, in Pillar 3 (Working with humanitarian partners) Denmark scored above the OECD/DAC and slightly below the Group 1 average. Denmark's performance stands out in Pillar 5 (Learning and accountability), where it scored well above both the OECD/DAC and Group 1 average scores.

Denmark did best compared to its peers in the indicators on *Funding accountability initiatives*, *Participating in accountability initiatives*, *Funding NGOs*, *Funding and commissioning evaluations* and *Funding UN and RC/RC appeals* - all quantitative indicators. Its scores were relatively the lowest in *Funding reconstruction and prevention*, *Timely funding to sudden onset emergencies*, *Facilitating safe access*, *Adapting to changing needs* and *Appropriate reporting requirements*.

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# AID DISTRIBUTION

Danish Official Development Assistance (ODA) increased from 0.88% of Gross National Income (GNI) in 2009 to 0.90% in 2010. Humanitarian assistance represented 6.2% of Denmark's ODA in 2010, or 0.056% of its GNI.

According to data reported to the United Nations (UN) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs' (OCHA) Financial Tracking Service (FTS) (2011), Denmark channelled 51.0%, of its 2010 humanitarian aid to United Nations (UN) agencies (2011), 27.7% to non-governmental organisations (NGOs), 11.0% to the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement, 1.8% to private

organisations and foundations and 0.8% bilaterally to affected governments. Denmark contributed 3.8% of its total humanitarian aid to the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF), 3.2% to Common Humanitarian Funds and 2.2% to Emergency Response Funds. In 2010, Denmark supported a total of 29 emergencies: 16 in Africa, 11 in Asia and two in the Americas. The top three countries receiving Danish humanitarian aid in 2010 were Sudan, Haiti and Pakistan. Sectorally, Denmark concentrated its funding on food and protection, human rights and rule of law initiatives (OCHA FTS 2011).

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# POLICY FRAMEWORK

Denmark's humanitarian aid is managed by the Danish International Development Agency (Danida) and the Department of Humanitarian Assistance and NGO Co-operation, both of which fall under the umbrella of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). Denmark's 2002 *Strategic Priorities for Humanitarian Assistance* lays out overarching guidelines for Denmark's humanitarian action and the *Strategy for Danish Humanitarian Action 2010-2015: Addressing Vulnerability, Climate Change, and*

*Protection Challenges* sets forth specific objectives for the coming years. The strategy intends to address current challenges to humanitarian aid and outline Denmark's approach, key directions and priorities that will be used to translate the strategy into action. Danish embassies coordinate humanitarian aid, often for multiple crises in the region. Embassies in Afghanistan, Syria, Pakistan and Namibia are especially involved in overseeing humanitarian efforts in their regions (MFA 2011).

## HOW DOES DENMARK'S POLICY ADDRESS GHD CONCEPTS?

### GENDER

Danish humanitarian policy states that gender equality and the empowerment of women are essential components of Denmark's efforts to reduce vulnerability in areas of conflict and disasters (MFA 2009). By working with a broad range of partners, the MFA attempts to mainstream gender-based violence prevention into all humanitarian action (MFA 2009). Its policy also actively supports the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security. Furthermore, in October 2010, the Danish Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Danish Minister for Development Cooperation, in cooperation with the American Embassy, hosted a high-level conference on the "Role of Women in Global Security" (MFA 2011).

#### PILLAR 1

### RESPONDING TO NEEDS

Denmark's humanitarian policy shows a strong commitment to administering timely aid along the lines of neutrality and impartiality, with a focus on the most vulnerable populations (MFA 2009). Denmark states that funding will be provided to partners who can provide the fastest relief in emergency situations. Furthermore, Denmark commits to engage in dialogue with partners on how to strengthen focus on vulnerability, including marginalised groups, displaced people and persons with disabilities. A small reserve fund is made available annually through Danish embassies for rapid response activities (MFA 2009).

#### PILLAR 2

### PREVENTION, RISK REDUCTION AND RECOVERY

Denmark's policy, *Strategy for Danish Humanitarian Action 2010-2015: Addressing Vulnerability, Climate Change and Protection Challenges*, lays out its commitment to prevention, risk reduction and recovery. The 2002 *Strategic Priorities for Humanitarian Assistance* also highlights the importance of disaster and conflict prevention in humanitarian efforts. Danida aims to implement the *Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015* into its humanitarian and development initiatives, while identifying, assessing and monitoring disaster risks and enhancing early warning (MFA 2009). Furthermore, Denmark developed *Guidelines for Disaster Risk Reduction in Danish Development and Humanitarian Assistance* in 2007, providing specific objectives and plans to integrate disaster risk reduction through Denmark's aid. Denmark considers beneficiary participation in programming a priority when selecting humanitarian partners (MFA 2009). A new development policy, *Freedom from Poverty – Freedom to Change*, was put in place in 2010 and calls for greater integration between humanitarian and development activities (MFA 2010).



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### PILLAR 3

## WORKING WITH HUMANITARIAN PARTNERS

In its 2010-2015 humanitarian strategy, the MFA recognises that it can only achieve its humanitarian objectives by working closely with a range of different partners. With the aim of increasing funding predictability and operational flexibility, Denmark has entered into Partnership Framework Agreements with UN agencies and a range of humanitarian NGOs with in-depth knowledge and experience in specific areas (MFA 2009). Denmark has also expressed its continued support for OCHA.

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### PILLAR 4

## PROTECTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

Denmark's humanitarian strategy states that protection of civilians should be based on the global framework of international humanitarian law, human rights law, refugee law and the *Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement*. The MFA also pledges to strengthen its use of humanitarian diplomacy as an active tool for humanitarian access to people at risk (MFA 2009). By working with EU partners and other relevant forums, Denmark attempts to improve access to vulnerable populations and increase the safety of humanitarian aid workers, especially national staff (MFA 2009). In terms of advocacy, Denmark seeks to increase its own efforts and encourage other donors and organisations to do the same by engaging in dialogue with international actors, governments, authorities and other parties.

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### PILLAR 5


## LEARNING AND ACCOUNTABILITY

As a supporter of the Humanitarian Accountability Partnership (HAP) standards, Denmark's humanitarian policy advocates for accountability toward affected populations (MFA 2009). In an effort to enhance learning, the MFA states that it will establish partnerships with research institutions that can assist in promoting learning and innovation within the humanitarian community (MFA 2009). Implementation of Denmark's humanitarian strategy will be subject to independent mid-term review in 2012 and evaluation in 2015 (MFA 2009). The MFA affirms that its funding for humanitarian partner organisations is based on a set of transparent selection criteria (MFA 2009).

# FIELD PARTNERS' PERCEPTIONS

## DENMARK'S FIELD PERCEPTION SCORES

Collected questionnaires: 28



SOURCE: DARA

Colours represent performance compared to donor's average performance rating:  
■ Good    ■ Mid-range    ■ Could improve

## HOW IS DENMARK PERCEIVED BY ITS PARTNERS?

### PILLAR 1

# RESPONDING TO NEEDS

Field partners were largely positive regarding the neutrality, impartiality, independence of Denmark's humanitarian assistance. Most partners reported that Denmark provides funding on time and that responding to needs is a priority. "For Danida, the priority is the community and how the project is addressing their needs," stated one organisation.

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## PILLAR 2

# PREVENTION, RISK REDUCTION AND RECOVERY

Pillar 2 encompasses many of Denmark's lower scores when compared to its overall qualitative average. In general, all donors scored lower on the qualitative indicators on *Strengthening local capacity*, *Beneficiary participation*, and *Prevention and risk reduction*, and Denmark is no exception. Nevertheless, Denmark's scores were better than most. "Denmark scores the highest in my opinion," stated one organisation, after describing a Danida project that was implemented with a local womens group. Other organisations reported that Denmark requires a local capacity assessment before and after programme implementation. Another stated that Denmark requires partners to show that programmes do not contribute to the conflict and to take measures to avoid putting beneficiaries in potentially harmful situations.

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## PILLAR 3

# WORKING WITH HUMANITARIAN PARTNERS

Field partners consider that Denmark is a flexible donor, supportive of coordination and with the capacity and expertise to make appropriate decisions. Perceptions were less positive regarding Denmark's support for organisational capacity in areas like preparedness, response and contingency planning. While one interviewee criticized the lack of support in this area, another reported that Denmark provides funding for training and emergency stocks.

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## PILLAR 4

# PROTECTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

According to field partners, Denmark is highly supportive in relation to providing funding for protection. Feedback was less positive, however, regarding the country's engagement in advocacy for protection, as well as toward local authorities, perhaps because several organisations noted that Denmark relies on the European Union to carry out this function.

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## PILLAR 5

# LEARNING AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Field interviews indicate that Denmark's partners regard highly its practices in terms of transparency and reporting. "Danida's reporting requirements are a little stricter and the design is better than most," responded one representative. Another organisation added to this by stating that Denmark makes efforts to clearly explain reporting procedures. In general, most donors received low scores for *Implementing evaluation recommendations* and *Accountability toward beneficiaries*. Denmark, in comparison, stood out for some field partners. One noted, "Danida scores off the charts in this category," commenting on the country's efforts to work with partners to implement evaluation recommendations.

# RECOMMENDATIONS

## ● ENHANCE SUPPORT FOR PREVENTION, PREPAREDNESS, RISK REDUCTION AND RECONSTRUCTION

Denmark's partners rated the country highly for its support for prevention, preparedness and risk reduction. It also received one of the best scores of the OECD/DAC donors for the quantitative indicator, *Funding international risk mitigation*. However, similar to most of its Group 1 peers, Denmark received a low score for the quantitative indicator, *Funding reconstruction and prevention*. This was also one of Denmark's weaknesses in 2009, when it allocated 12.8% of its humanitarian aid to reconstruction and prevention. In 2010, it dropped to 12.0%, while OECD/DAC donors allocated an average of 18.6% of humanitarian aid to these issues.

## ● EXPLORE OPTIONS TO EXPEDITE FUNDING TO SUDDEN ONSET EMERGENCIES

Denmark is the second-fastest donor to respond to complex emergencies, but could improve the timeliness of its funding to sudden onset emergencies. This indicator measures the percentage of funding provided within the first six weeks following the disaster. Denmark provided 76.4% of its funding within this time frame, compared to the OECD/DAC average of 80.5% and the Group 1 average of 84.1%.

## ● LOOK FOR WAYS TO IMPROVE MONITORING OF PROGRAMMES

Denmark scored slightly below average in *Adapting to changing needs*, a qualitative, survey-based indicator regarding donor verification that programmes adapt to changing needs. Its scores were especially low in Kenya and Somalia. It received a higher score in Pakistan, where it has field presence and is a member of the International Humanitarian Partnership. Denmark also received a fairly good score in Sudan, despite not having field presence. It should endeavor to improve monitoring to ensure consistently that the programmes it supports adapt to changing needs.

## ● ENHANCE SUPPORT FOR HUMANITARIAN ACCESS AND THE SAFETY OF HUMANITARIAN WORKERS


Despite Denmark's strong policies regarding humanitarian access and safety of humanitarian workers, its partners scored the country below average on this indicator. Its score was substantially lower in Pakistan and substantially higher in the occupied Palestinian territories. Denmark should engage in dialogue with its partners to discuss the reasons behind the variation and strive to support humanitarian access and the safety of humanitarian workers consistently.



Please see [www.daraint.org](http://www.daraint.org) for a complete list of references.

# EUROPEAN COMMISSION

HRI 2011 Ranking  
**7th**






Group **2**  
**LEARNING LEADERS**

**HUMANITARIAN AID**

**13.0%**  
of ODA

## HUMANITARIAN AID DISTRIBUTION (%)



### GENDER RATING

POLICY

FUNDING

FIELD PERCEPTION

### STRENGTHS

| Pillar | Type | Indicator                                   | Score | % above OECD/DAC average |
|--------|------|---|-------|--------------------------|
| 3      | QT   | Funding NGOs                                | 10.00 | +120.5%                  |
| 5      | QT   | Participating in accountability initiatives | 9.86  | +120.4%                  |
| 5      | QT   | Funding accountability initiatives          | 6.78  | +64.9%                   |
| 5      | QL   | Implementing evaluation recommendations     | 5.81  | +35.5%                   |
| 4      | QL   | Facilitating safe access                    | 6.55  | +28.5%                   |

### AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT

| Pillar | Type | Indicator                                  | Score | % below OECD/DAC average |
|--------|------|--|-------|--------------------------|
| 3      | QT   | Un-earmarked funding                       | 0.48  | -90.7%                   |
| 1      | QT   | Timely funding to sudden onset emergencies | 5.35  | -33.5%                   |
| 1      | QT   | Timely funding to complex emergencies      | 6.51  | -17.7%                   |
| 3      | QL   | Flexibility of funding                     | 5.97  | -13.9%                   |
| 5      | QL   | Appropriate reporting requirements         | 6.60  | -6.9%                    |

## OVERALL PERFORMANCE

The European Commission (EC) ranked 7<sup>th</sup> in the HRI 2011, dropping one position from 2010. Based on the pattern of its scores, the EC is classified as a Group 2 donor, "Learning Leaders". Donors in this group are characterised by their leading role in support of emergency relief efforts, strong capacity and field presence, and commitment to learning and improvement. They tend to do less well in areas such as prevention, preparedness, and risk reduction efforts. Other Group 2 donors include Canada, France, the United Kingdom and the United States.

The EC's overall score is above the OECD/DAC and Group 2 averages. The EC scored above the OECD/DAC and Group 2

averages on all pillars, with the exception of Pillar 1 (Responding to needs), where it scored below the OECD/DAC and Group 2 averages. In all pillars, the EC scores significantly higher in the qualitative, survey-based indicators than in the quantitative indicators.

The EC did best compared to its OECD/DAC peers in the indicators on *Funding NGOs*, *Participating in accountability initiatives*, *Funding accountability initiatives*, *Implementing evaluation recommendations* and *Facilitating safe access*. Its scores were relatively the lowest in indicators on *Un-earmarked funding*, *Timely funding to sudden onset emergencies*, *Timely funding to complex emergencies*, *Flexibility of funding* and *Appropriate reporting requirements*.

# AID DISTRIBUTION

Humanitarian assistance represented 13% of the European Commission's (EC) Official Development Assistance (ODA) in 2010.

According to data reported to the United Nations (UN) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs' (OCHA) Financial Tracking Service (FTS) (2011), in 2010, the EC channelled 41.5% of its humanitarian aid to non-governmental organisations (NGOs), 41.1% to

UN agencies, 10.9% to the Red Crescent/Red Cross Movement, 4.9% to intergovernmental organisations and 0.9% to private organisations and foundations. The EC provided humanitarian assistance to a total of 76 crises in 2010: 30 in Africa, 26 in Asia and 13 in the Americas, five in Europe, and two in Oceania. Pakistan, Sudan and Haiti received the largest amount of assistance in 2010.

# POLICY FRAMEWORK

The EC's humanitarian aid is managed by the Directorate-General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (DG ECHO). ECHO is supported by contributions from 27 EU member states and is complementary to the countries' individual allocations for humanitarian assistance. The European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid specifically highlights the importance of gender-sensitive approaches, and ECHO operates under a mandate laid out in European Council Regulation No. 1257/96, through EC Budget Title 23. Additional humanitarian funding come from both the budget line for emergency aid to African-Caribbean-Pacific countries within the European Development Fund and from an Emergency Aid Reserve, which allows funds to be rapidly allocated to unanticipated crises. ECHO's current

humanitarian policy is outlined in the 2007 *European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid*, its corresponding *Consensus Action Plan* (2008) and *Mid-term review of the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid Action Plan* (2010) and an annual strategy document. ECHO has also developed sectoral policies for its humanitarian aid. The EC places great importance on humanitarian aid, and to this end, appointed a Commissioner solely for this purpose (European Commission 2010a, p.3). ECHO maintains 50 field offices: 22 in Sub-Saharan Africa, 17 in Asia, five in the Middle-East & North Africa, four in Latin America/Caribbean, and two in Europe. Humanitarian assistance represented 12.00% of the European Commission's Official Development Assistance (ODA) in 2010.

## HOW DOES DOES THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION'S POLICY ADDRESS GHD CONCEPTS?

## GENDER

The EC has committed to systematically consider gender and women's different needs and promote their active participation (European Commission 2008). It also acknowledges, however, that "it has supported specific projects on an ad hoc basis, without developing a gender policy" (European Commission 2008). The European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid specifically highlights the importance of gender-sensitive approaches, and ECHO foresaw the creation of gender policy for humanitarian aid at the end of 2010, but it has not been published as of yet. ECHO conducted a *Review of Gender Issues Including Strategies Against Gender-Based Violence in Humanitarian Interventions* in 2009. Additionally, the European Commission stated, "DG ECHO will continue to work on a systematic framework for dealing with gender issues in general and sexual violence in particular. The issue will be mainstreamed in regional response strategies where necessary," (2010a, p.6).

## PILLAR 1

# RESPONDING TO NEEDS

ECHO has developed a Global Needs Assessment and Forgotten Crisis Assessment as tools to allocate funding. The Global Needs Assessment uses a vulnerability index to identify the most vulnerable countries and a crisis index to identify countries experiencing humanitarian crises (European Commission 2010b). Maintaining adequate funding especially for protracted crises is considered a key challenge in the *Mid-term Review of the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid Action Plan* (European Commission (2010c). The EC expresses a firm commitment to humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence, including for its civil protection forces (European Council, European Parliament and European Commission 2007). ECHO also affirms that military forces should only be used as a last resort to maintain the neutrality and independence of humanitarian action (European Council, European Parliament and European Commission 2007). With regards to the timeliness of funding, "ECHO uses 'primary emergency decision' which is a unique tool that allows the Commission to provide funds of up to €3 million almost immediately (a decision must be adopted within 72 hours of the event that provoked the crisis)," (Europa 2007, p.5).

## PILLAR 2

# PREVENTION, RISK REDUCTION AND RECOVERY

ECHO supports disaster risk reduction (DRR) through the creation of its Disaster Preparedness ECHO (DIPECHO) programme and the development of a related policy, the *EU Strategy for Supporting Disaster Risk Reduction in Developing Countries* 2009, which describes its intention to support community-based preparedness activities, mainstream DRR into humanitarian and development aid, engage in advocacy and provide funding for this purpose (Commission of the European Communities 2009). To address transitional activities, the EC uses the Instrument for Stability, which allows for a rapid financial response while linking short-term crisis response and long term development assistance (European Council, European Parliament and European Commission 2007, p.10). The *Mid-term Review* states that participatory approaches increase local ownership, strengthen local capacity, and increase the effectiveness and appropriateness of humanitarian response (European Commission 2010c). This document also acknowledges that "there remains scope for consolidating collective EU efforts and strengthening individual donor commitment on some key challenges including a stronger commitment to promoting the role of local actors," (European Commission 2010c, pp. 5-6).

## PILLAR 3

# WORKING WITH HUMANITARIAN PARTNERS

The EC underscores the need for flexible humanitarian funding. ECHO has a Financial and Administrative Framework Agreement with multiple UN agencies and Framework Partnership Agreements with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) (European Commission 2011). The EC highlights its responsibility to coordinate on multiple fronts, and unique role in uniting European countries. The EC also affirms its support for OCHA and encourages “broad participation in and flexible use of ‘the Cluster Approach,’” (European Council, European Parliament and European Commission 2007, p.6). Additionally, ECHO highlights its permanent field presence as a means of coordination (European Council, European Parliament and European Commission 2007, pp.7-8).

## PILLAR 4

# PROTECTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

The EC considers international humanitarian law (IHL) a priority and provides funding to partner organisations with this mandate (European Commission 2010a). The EC expresses its concern for the decreasing respect for IHL, as it limits access to vulnerable populations and increases security risks for humanitarian workers (European Council, European Parliament and European Commission 2007, p.1). In 2009, the European Commission published *Humanitarian Protection: DG ECHO's funding guidelines* regarding funding and monitoring protection-related humanitarian projects. Humanitarian aid and civil protection are the responsibility of the same Commission department and Commissioner but have separate strategy documents (European Commission 2010a, p.3). The *Mid-term Review* points to progress toward “ensuring full complementarity and maximum synergies between traditional humanitarian aid approaches and the use of civil protection expertise and assets,” (European Commission 2010c, p.4) and lists the advantages of civil protection resources, while stating the risk of compromising humanitarian principles through collaboration with civil protection forces. Access is a defining criterion in selecting implementing partners (European Council, European Parliament and European Commission 2007, p.6). Refugee law is not specifically highlighted in ECHO's humanitarian policy, and human rights are only briefly addressed as a related policy field.

## PILLAR 5

# LEARNING AND ACCOUNTABILITY


The European Commission reports that it is required “to regularly assess humanitarian aid operations financed by the Community in order to establish whether they have achieved their objectives and to produce guidelines for improving the effectiveness of subsequent operations,” (European Commission 2010d). ECHO conducts evaluations of its operations, as well as evaluations on a thematic basis and of its



partnerships. The European Commission states that “accountability and transparency vis a vis the... ultimate beneficiary is ensured by the process of setting priorities, providing humanitarian aid, reviewing and refocusing areas for funding as necessary, and ceasing activities when appropriate,” (2010a). Additionally, “accountability, including reporting transparently on results” is listed as a defining criterion for selecting implementing partners (European Council, European Parliament and European Commission 2007, p.6). The *European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid* states that humanitarian aid should be based on minimum standards of assistance and protection and that partners should adhere to the same standards (European Council, European Parliament and European Commission 2007). Additionally, ECHO reaffirms its commitment to jointly assess the implementation of the *Principles of Good Humanitarian Donorship* as well as *Good Humanitarian Partnership* (European Council, European Parliament and European Commission 2007, p.24).

# FIELD PARTNERS' PERCEPTIONS

EUROPEAN COMMISSION'S FIELD PERCEPTION SCORES Collected questionnaires: 159



SOURCE: DARA

Colours represent performance compared to donor's average performance rating:

Good      Mid-range      Could improve

## HOW IS THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION PERCEIVED BY ITS PARTNERS?

### GENDER

EC/ECHO's efforts to ensure programmes integrate gender-sensitive approaches received mixed feedback from field partners. Some organisations seem to consider it a requirement on paper that is not taken as seriously as it should be. For example, one interview felt that it "is not an imperative demand from ECHO at all." Another noted that they "ask us for gender approaches in our proposals, but they never verify it. It's not a real gender policy, they just target women because of their vulnerability, like the handicapped, but it's not that important."

### PILLAR 1

### RESPONDING TO NEEDS

Similar to most donors, the European Commission's field partners gave high marks for its performance in Pillar 1. Field partners largely consider its humanitarian aid neutral, impartial and independent. One organisation stated, "ECHO is the least restrictive donor in contexts dealing with non-state actors, like in oPt and Somalia," a sentiment many others shared. Another expressed appreciation for EC/ECHO taking a stand to support humanitarian principles. Its partners are also highly positive regarding EC/ECHO's efforts to ensure the programmes it funds adapt to changing needs, although a few felt it could be "too interventionist" in internal decisions. Feedback was mostly positive regarding the timeliness of funding, although there were a few reports of delays: "ECHO funding is not on time. Even big NGOs are in trouble... up to four months delay in implementation."

### PILLAR 2

### PREVENTION, RISK REDUCTION AND RECOVERY

Compared to other donors, the EC/ECHO performed well in the qualitative indicators that comprise Pillar 2. However, it encompasses some of the EC's lowest qualitative scores. Some of the EC/ECHO's field partners provided negative feedback of its support for transitional activities: "ECHO has a very big barrier between development and humanitarian," and "[they] don't adapt the response to actual needs now. It's time to assure transition to development." Feedback on beneficiary participation was mixed. On the one hand, some organisations praised EC/ECHO for ensuring beneficiary participation: "they [other donors] ask us for it but they never verify it. ECHO, however, is more demanding on beneficiary participation," and "with the exception of ECHO, no donor prioritizes beneficiary participation." Another organisation, however, observed that "ECHO's requirement on beneficiary participation is limited to the implementation stage," though partner organisations held differing opinions in this regard. Others reported greater interest in beneficiary participation in monitoring and evaluation.

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## PILLAR 3

# WORKING WITH HUMANITARIAN PARTNERS

Partner organisations expressed appreciation for the EC/ECHO's capacity and expertise. "Their knowledge of the context is great," affirmed one interviewee. Another noted that EC/ECHO "comes and speaks with you... and provides you with knowledge from other contexts." In fact, EC/ECHO received the highest score of all donors for this, and also its second-highest qualitative score. Partners also praised EC/ECHO's support for coordination. One organisation indicated that EC/ECHO "tries to go beyond its limits" and participates in "weekly coordination meetings with all actors, information sharing and is involved in the field's mechanisms." Feedback was more critical regarding the flexibility of funding and support for organisational capacity in areas like preparedness, response and contingency planning: "ECHO does not support strengthening of organisational skills."

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## PILLAR 4

# PROTECTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

Partners in the field were mostly positive regarding support for protection. One organisation observed that it has changed over time: "ECHO has evolved significantly the support they provide for protection of civilian activities. Originally they refused to fund protection activities and now they do." In comparison, partner feedback was less positive for its advocacy for protection – a trend common to many donors. Field partners generally gave high marks for EC/ECHO's efforts to obtain access: "they support the UN access team which is very useful for NGOs," although several disagreed. One interviewee considered that "ECHO could do more in terms of humanitarian space in buffer zone and Gaza restricted areas," and another added "ECHO does not support humanitarian access."

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## PILLAR 5

# LEARNING AND ACCOUNTABILITY

EC/ECHO received some of its lowest scores for *Accountability toward beneficiaries* and *Implementing evaluation recommendations*, although it outperformed other donors in these indicators. When asked about requirements for accountability toward beneficiaries, one interviewee asserted that "ECHO is more dynamic, has more imagination to include beneficiaries' voices in its programmes." In Somalia, however, one organisation reported that they "do not require accountability to beneficiaries. They just audit the funds but do not go beyond." Perceptions of the appropriateness of reporting requirements were mixed. Here, EC/ECHO scored below most donors on this indicator, yet close to the average of its qualitative scores. Most organisations agreed that EC/ECHO had highly meticulous reporting requirements. The disagreement lied in whether this level of rigor was appropriate. Some organisations complained of "onerous reporting requirements which lose sight of the core humanitarian mandate," while others considered that "ECHO could simplify the reporting requirements, but they are right in being so strict," and "if all donors were like ECHO, the system would work better, but we would need one person for reporting only."

# RECOMMENDATIONS

## ● IMPROVE FLEXIBILITY AND REPORTING

EC/ECHO is considered a strong donor with the best capacity and expertise of the OECD/DAC donors. However, feedback from partners and data in the quantitative indicators suggest that it could improve in the several administrative areas, such as flexibility of funding and reporting requirements. For example, EC/ECHO's partners rated it poorly for the flexibility of funding. The related quantitative indicators seem to confirm this, as EC/ECHO received the lowest score of the OECD/DAC donors for *Un-earmarked funding*, which measures the percentage of humanitarian funding provided without earmarking to ICRC, UNHCR, WFP, OHCHR, UNICEF, IFRC, OCHA and UNRWA. EC/ECHO provided 2.9% of its humanitarian funding without earmarking to these organisations in 2010, less than in 2009, when it gave 3.4% without earmarking and well below the OECD/DAC average of 33.2%. Furthermore, partners consider EC/ECHO's reporting requirements to be among the most rigorous. While they disagreed over whether or not this was appropriate, even those organisations that appreciated the meticulousness affirmed that at least one staff member was required to dedicate their time to comply with EC/ECHO's reporting requirements.

## ● ENSURE COHERENCE BETWEEN EC AND ECHO TO SUPPORT TRANSITIONAL ACTIVITIES

Some partners indicated difficulty linking relief to rehabilitation and development, though it appears to vary according to the crisis. EC/ECHO obtained its lowest scores for this in Somalia and Pakistan, where partners reported that transitional activities fell in a gap outside of ECHO's mandate, which did not facilitate a continuum of funding with the EC to ensure these activities were covered.

## ● EXPLORE OPTIONS TO EXPEDITE FUNDING DISBURSEMENT

EC/ECHO could improve the timeliness of its funding. It provided 53.5% of its funding within the first six weeks of sudden onset emergencies in 2010, while the OECD/DAC average was 80.5%. *Timely funding to sudden onset emergencies* was a former strength of the EC/ECHO in the 2009, but its funding for complex emergencies has been slower in 2010. The EC/ECHO provided 48.8% of its funding to complex emergencies within the first three months of a humanitarian appeal, making it the slowest of its group whose average is 64.0%.



Please see [www.daraint.org](http://www.daraint.org) for a complete list of references.

# FINLAND

HRI 2011  
Ranking  
**9th**






Group **1**  
PRINCIPLED  
PARTNERS

OFFICIAL  
DEVELOPMENT  
ASSISTANCE **0.55%**  
of GNI

HUMANITARIAN  
AID **19.6%**  
of ODA **US \$49**  
Per person

## HUMANITARIAN AID DISTRIBUTION (%)



## GENDER RATING

POLICY

FUNDING

FIELD PERCEPTION

### STRENGTHS

| Pillar | Type | Indicator                                    | Score | % above OECD/DAC average |
|--------|------|--|-------|--------------------------|
| 2      | QT   | Funding reconstruction and prevention        | 7.17  | +60.0%                   |
| 4      | QT   | Refugee law                                  | 8.74  | +55.5%                   |
| 5      | QL   | Accountability towards beneficiaries         | 5.62  | +29.7%                   |
| 1      | QT   | Funding vulnerable and forgotten emergencies | 8.47  | +22.6%                   |
| 4      | QL   | Advocacy for protection of civilians         | 6.58  | +18.3%                   |

### AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT

| Pillar | Type | Indicator                                   | Score | % below OECD/DAC average |
|--------|------|---|-------|--------------------------|
| 5      | QT   | Participating in accountability initiatives | 1.67  | -62.8%                   |
| 2      | QL   | Prevention and risk reduction               | 2.99  | -33.8%                   |
| 1      | QT   | Timely funding to complex emergencies       | 5.82  | -26.4%                   |
| 1      | QL   | Adapting to changing needs                  | 4.76  | -24.2%                   |
| 2      | QL   | Strengthening local capacity                | 4.68  | -19.0%                   |

## OVERALL PERFORMANCE

Finland ranked 9<sup>th</sup> in the HRI 2011, improving two positions from 2010. Based on the pattern of its scores, Finland is classified as a Group 1 donor, “Principled Partners”. This group is characterised by its commitment to humanitarian principles and strong support for multilateral partners, and generally good overall performance in all areas. Other Group 1 donors include Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland.

Overall, Finland scored above the OECD/DAC average, yet below the Group 1 average. Compared to OECD/DAC donors, Finland scored above average in all pillars, with the exception of Pillar 3 (Working

with humanitarian partners) and Pillar 5 (Learning and accountability). It was below the Group 1 average in all pillars, except for Pillar 4 (Protection and international law), where it was above average.

Finland did best compared to its OECD/DAC peers in the indicators on *Funding reconstruction and prevention*, *Refugee law*, *Accountability towards beneficiaries*, *Funding vulnerable and forgotten emergencies* and *Advocacy for protection of civilians*. Its scores were relatively the lowest in the indicators on *Participating in accountability initiatives*, *Prevention and risk reduction*, *Timely funding to complex emergencies*, *Adapting to changing needs* and *Strengthening local capacity*.

# AID DISTRIBUTION

Finnish Official Development Assistance (ODA) increased slightly from 2010 as a proportion of its Gross National Income (GNI): rising from 0.54% in 2009 to 0.55% in 2010. Humanitarian assistance represented 19.6% of its 2010 ODA, or 0.061% of its GNI.

According to data reported to the United Nations (UN) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs' (OCHA) Financial Tracking Service (FTS) (2011), Finland channelled 70.4% of its 2010 humanitarian aid to United

Nations (UN) agencies, 18.0% to the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement and 9.2% to non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Finland also supported the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) and Common Humanitarian Fund (CHF). In 2010, Finland supported 31 crises with humanitarian assistance: 15 in Africa, 12 in Asia and four in the Americas. Pakistan, Haiti and Sudan received the largest percentages of Finland's humanitarian aid in 2010.

# POLICY FRAMEWORK

The Unit for Humanitarian Assistance, within the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFA), manages Finland's humanitarian assistance. In April 2007, the government published a revised humanitarian policy based on the *Principles of Good Humanitarian Donorship* (GHD). These *Humanitarian Assistance Guidelines* strongly emphasize the need to focus on the most vulnerable communities in both disasters and armed conflicts (MFA 2007). Humanitarian assistance falls within the development budget and is allocated

by the Department for Development Policy. Finland intends to allocate 70% of its humanitarian funding early in the year, and the remaining funds in the final quarter to respond to humanitarian needs assessed by field representatives or humanitarian agencies in respective countries of crisis. Aid decisions are based on individual proposals from partner organisations, which state the target groups, plans and estimated costs for providing aid. The MFA also retains a small reserve to respond to sudden onset emergencies.

## HOW DOES FINLAND'S POLICY ADDRESS GHD CONCEPTS?

## GENDER

Finland's humanitarian policy recognizes the importance of a comprehensive inclusion of gender awareness in all of its humanitarian activities. It particularly points out that women's special needs must be addressed in crises situations and that women must be guaranteed the right to participate actively in humanitarian decision-making. Finland also supports the active implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security in all humanitarian operations, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs recently announced that it will triple its funding to UN Women (MFA 2011).

## PILLAR 1 RESPONDING TO NEEDS

Finland's humanitarian policy, *Humanitarian Assistance Guidelines*, states that it will adhere to the humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence when administering humanitarian aid (MFA 2007). It also emphasises the need to focus on least developed

countries and the poorest and most vulnerable within these countries. The policy also promotes ways in which Finnish NGOs and experts can participate in programmes funded by the European Commission's Directorate-General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (ECHO) that focus on forgotten and underfunded crises. Finland seeks to improve the timeliness of its funding by supporting pooled funding mechanisms, such as the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF).

## PILLAR 2

# PREVENTION, RISK REDUCTION AND RECOVERY

According to its humanitarian policy, Finland aims to promote disaster prediction and preparedness by supporting international initiatives for disaster risk reduction such as the *Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015*. Finland's policy stresses that local communities have the right to participate in every phase of humanitarian action, especially in sudden-onset disasters. The *Humanitarian Assistance Guidelines* state that Finland will link relief to rehabilitation and development (LRRD) within its humanitarian initiatives and that beneficiary participation in programming will be essential to this process (MFA 2007). Both Finnish humanitarian and development policies recognise the dangers of climate change, especially in already vulnerable countries, and call for greater international attention to the issue (MFA 2007).

## PILLAR 3

# WORKING WITH HUMANITARIAN PARTNERS

Finland's *Humanitarian Assistance Guidelines* express support for coordination among humanitarian actors (MFA 2007). Given Finland's relatively small field presence and limited capacities, the Finnish MFA supports the UN's central role in coordination efforts and strongly encourages its partners to participate in sectors or clusters to avoid gaps or duplication of efforts. *Humanitarian Assistance Guidelines* also emphasise the importance of flexibility of humanitarian aid (MFA 2007). Finland bases its decision making on recommendations from humanitarian agencies in the field and states that it will enhance dialogue and exchange of information with UN agencies and other donors, and increase visits to headquarters and field offices to consult with workers in crisis areas.

## PILLAR 4

# PROTECTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

Finland bases the legal framework of its humanitarian policy on the fundamentals of international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law. It cites the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and its protocols as the most important source for international humanitarian law. The *Humanitarian Assistance Guidelines* state that Finland is currently working to promote coordination between European Union (EU) civil protection mechanism and the UN in humanitarian operations in developing countries; however, no specific steps are mentioned (MFA 2007). Finland also expresses its support for OCHA's approach in the use of military and civilian defence assets in disaster relief, as well as the Oslo Guidelines for the use of military assets in humanitarian action. It is not clear from Finland's humanitarian policy if it engages in advocacy toward local authorities, or delegates this to the EU.

**PILLAR 5**


**LEARNING AND ACCOUNTABILITY**

Finland's *The Humanitarian Assistance Guidelines* highlight the need to further develop its monitoring and evaluation capacities (MFA 2007). Harmonising reporting requirements is also a stated objective for Finland, and its policy mentions the need to increase the country's research in humanitarian aid. However, Finland's official policy on transparency of funding and accountability towards beneficiaries is not clear.

**FIELD PARTNERS' PERCEPTIONS**

FINLAND'S FIELD PERCEPTION SCORES

Collected questionnaires: 16



SOURCE: DARA

Finland's average score 6.03 ← OECD/DAC average score 6.05

Colours represent performance compared to donor's average performance rating:

Good (Dark Orange) Mid-range (Light Orange) Could improve (Very Light Orange)



## HOW IS FINLAND PERCEIVED BY ITS PARTNERS?

### GENDER

Finland's partners provided positive feedback regarding the country's support for gender-sensitive approaches. In fact, Finland received the highest score of the OECD/DAC donors for this issue. An interviewee in DRC praised Finland in particular for its support for gender.

#### PILLAR 1

### RESPONDING TO NEEDS

Finland's field partners provided generally positive feedback regarding the neutrality, impartiality and independence of the country's humanitarian assistance. "Given their relative small size they are more interested in their humanitarian investment than other conditions," observed one aid worker. Organisations interviewed also praised the timeliness of Finland's funding: "Finland, especially, provides funding when most needed," stated one interviewee. Another reported that Finland responded rapidly to the 2010 cholera outbreak in Haiti. Partners were more critical of Finland's efforts to ensure the programmes they support adapt to changing needs, although a few pointed to occasional field visits from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and open dialogue as a means of monitoring.

#### PILLAR 2

### PREVENTION, RISK REDUCTION AND RECOVERY

Similar to most donors, field perceptions were poor of Finland's support for local capacity, beneficiary participation and prevention, preparedness and risk reduction. "Finland cannot verify beneficiary participation because they are not in the field. They don't require this in their programming but they know we work with communities to identify specific needs," reported one organisation. Finland scored higher, however, for its efforts to link relief with rehabilitation and development.

#### PILLAR 3

### WORKING WITH HUMANITARIAN PARTNERS

In Pillar 3, Finland stood out for the flexibility of its funding. "Finland is totally flexible," responded one organisation. Partners also appreciated its support for coordination: "Finland stresses coordination, especially through the cluster system," stated another organisation. "They distributed aqua tabs through the WASH [water, sanitation and hygiene] cluster instead of giving them to a particular agency. This allowed them to be distributed more efficiently." Partners were more critical regarding Finland's capacity and expertise and its support for organisational capacity in areas like preparedness, response and contingency planning.

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## PILLAR 4

# PROTECTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

Finland's field partners praised the country for its funding and advocacy for protection, and advocacy toward local authorities. One organisation reported that Finland is supportive of programmes with a strong advocacy component. Feedback of Finland's efforts to facilitate safe access and security of humanitarian workers was more negative, although one organisation noted that Finland requires an access strategy in its project proposals.

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## PILLAR 5

# LEARNING AND ACCOUNTABILITY

In Pillar 5, partner organisations largely seem to consider Finland's reporting requirements appropriate. Although it is one of Finland's lower scores, Finland is one of the better donors for ensuring accountability toward affected populations. One partner described Finland's requirements to set-up accountability mechanisms in camps for the displaced. Finland received one of its lowest scores on the qualitative indicators on *Implementing evaluation recommendations*.

# RECOMMENDATIONS

## ● ACTIVELY PARTICIPATE IN HUMANITARIAN ACCOUNTABILITY INITIATIVES

Compared to other donors, Finland does fairly well for ensuring accountability toward beneficiaries in the programmes it supports. It also increased its funding of accountability initiatives<sup>2</sup> from 0.07% in 2009 to 0.3% in 2010. It could improve, however, its participation in international initiatives for humanitarian accountability. The indicator *Participating in accountability initiatives* measures the commitment of OECD/DAC donors to six different humanitarian accountability initiatives.<sup>1</sup> Finland received the lowest score of Group 1, as it is involved in only one initiative, the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI).

## ● CONTINUE PROGRESS UNDERWAY TO IMPROVE TIMELINESS


Finland is the second-fastest donor to respond to sudden onset disasters; representing significant improvement from 2009. It provided 55.1% of its funding in the first six weeks following sudden onset disasters in 2009 and jumped to 94.3% in 2010. It received the second-lowest score of its group, however, for *Timely funding to complex emergencies*, which measures the percentage of funding that arrived within the first three months after the launch of an appeal. Finland provided 43.6% of its funding within this time period, while the OECD/DAC average was 59.4%.

## ● STRENGTHEN SUPPORT FOR PREVENTION, PREPAREDNESS, RISK REDUCTION, BENEFICIARY PARTICIPATION AND CAPACITY BUILDING

With the exception of *Linking relief to rehabilitation and development*, Finland received low scores in the qualitative, survey-based indicators that comprise Pillar 2. Within this pillar, Finland obtained its lowest qualitative score for *Prevention and risk reduction*. It is interesting to note that Finland did fairly well in the related quantitative indicators in this pillar on *Funding reconstruction and prevention*, *Funding risk mitigation* and *Reducing climate-related vulnerability*, perhaps because Finland's policy stresses support for initiatives aimed at disaster risk reduction at the international level. Partners seem to indicate a lack of support in general for prevention, preparedness and risk reduction at the field level, however, and minimal follow-up to verify beneficiary participation and efforts to strengthen local capacity. Finland should engage in dialogue with its partners to discuss their perceptions of its support for these issues.


## ● ENSURE PROGRAMMES ADAPT TO CHANGING NEEDS

Finland performed well in the qualitative indicators of Pillar 1, with the exception of *Adapting to changing needs*. The survey question related to this indicator refers to the donors' efforts to verify that programmes adapt to changing needs, which is likely more difficult for Finland due to its limited field presence. However, a few partners highlighted Finland's efforts to compensate for this in Haiti through field visits and open dialogue. Finland should endeavour to replicate this model in other crises and engage in dialogue with its partners to discuss their perceptions in this regard.

 Please see [www.daraint.org](http://www.daraint.org) for a complete list of references.

# FRANCE

HRI 2011  
Ranking  
**11th**




Group **2**  
LEARNING  
LEADERS

OFFICIAL  
DEVELOPMENT  
ASSISTANCE **0.50%**  
of GNI

HUMANITARIAN  
AID **2.2%**  
of ODA

**US \$4**  
Per person

## HUMANITARIAN AID DISTRIBUTION (%)



## GENDER RATING POLICY → FUNDING ↑ FIELD PERCEPTION →

| STRENGTHS |      |                                       | Score | % above OECD/DAC average |
|-----------|------|---------------------------------------|-------|--------------------------|
| Pillar    | Type | Indicator                             |       |                          |
| 5         | QT   | Funding and commissioning evaluations | 9.97  | +140.9%                  |
| 1         | QT   | Timely funding to complex emergencies | 9.84  | +24.4%                   |
| 4         | QL   | Facilitating safe access              | 6.15  | +20.6%                   |
| 2         | QL   | Strengthening local capacity          | 6.83  | +18.2%                   |
| 2         | QL   | Beneficiary participation             | 5.61  | +16.9%                   |

| AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT |      |                                       | Score | % below OECD/DAC average |
|-----------------------|------|---------------------------------------|-------|--------------------------|
| Pillar                | Type | Indicator                             |       |                          |
| 3                     | QT   | Funding UN and RC/RC appeals          | 0.45  | -88.9%                   |
| 5                     | QT   | Funding accountability initiatives    | 0.51  | -87.7%                   |
| 2                     | QT   | Funding reconstruction and prevention | 1.02  | -77.1%                   |
| 2                     | QT   | Funding international risk mitigation | 2.91  | -39.2%                   |
| 4                     | QT   | Refugee law                           | 3.47  | -38.3%                   |

## OVERALL PERFORMANCE

France ranked 11<sup>th</sup> in the HRI 2011, improving four positions from 2010. Based on the pattern of its scores, France is classified as a Group 2 donor, "Learning Leaders". Donors in this group are characterised by their leading role in support of emergency relief efforts, strong capacity and field presence, and commitment to learning and improvement. They tend to do less well in areas such as prevention, preparedness, and risk reduction efforts. Other Group 2 donors include Canada, the European Commission, the United Kingdom and the United States.

France's overall score was below the OECD/DAC and Group 2 averages. Compared to OECD/DAC donors and its Group 2 peers,

France scored below average in all pillars, with the exception of Pillar 1 (Responding to needs), where it scored above the OECD/DAC and Group 2 averages.

France did best compared to its OECD/DAC peers in the indicators on *Funding and commissioning evaluations*, *Timely funding to complex emergencies*, *Facilitating safe access*, *Strengthening local capacity* and *Beneficiary participation*. Its scores were relatively the lowest in indicators on *Funding UN and RC/RC appeals*, *Funding accountability initiatives*, *Funding reconstruction and prevention*, *Funding international risk mitigation* and *Refugee law*.

# AID DISTRIBUTION

France's Official Development Assistance (ODA) as a proportion of its Gross National Income (GNI) rose to 0.50% in 2010, up from 0.46% in 2009. Humanitarian aid represented 2.2% of its ODA in 2010, or 0.010% of its GNI.

According to data reported to the United Nations (UN) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs' (OCHA) Financial Tracking Service (FTS), in 2010 France channelled 57.2% of its aid to UN agencies, 21.4% to NGOs, 16.8%

to affected governments and 4.0% to the Red Cross / Red Crescent Movement. France also contributed to the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF), representing 0.5% of its total assistance, and Emergency Response Fund (ERF), with 5.0%. In 2010, France supported a total of 38 emergencies: 17 in Africa, 17 in Asia, three in the Americas and one in Europe (OCHA FTS 2011).

# POLICY FRAMEWORK

France's humanitarian assistance system has recently undergone significant structural change. Three separate agencies coordinate the French humanitarian effort, all under the supervision of the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs. The main agency is the Crisis Centre (CDC), created in 2008, responsible for assessing emergency situations and organising the initial response and follow-up to humanitarian emergencies (MAEE 2011a). The CDC has access to the Humanitarian Emergency Fund and the Aid Fund and provides funding to French and international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) (CDC 2011). It can also conduct humanitarian action directly with its own 50-person staff (CDC 2011). The United Nations and International Organisations Department (UNIO) manages French funding to UN agencies and to the Red Cross / Red Crescent Movement. Finally, the General Directorate for Globalization (DGM) coordinates contributions for food aid (MAE 2011a). It is important to note that the French Agency for Development (AFD) also has a Crisis and Conflict Unit (CCC), which directs some prevention and preparedness activities (AFD 2011). The coordination of French humanitarian assistance is further complicated

by the fact that sub-national authorities in France can also have their own aid programmes (OECD/DAC 2009). France has humanitarian officials posted to some of its embassies for field support and has a total of 55 country offices (OECD/DAC 2008, OECD/DAC 2009).

France does not have a comprehensive humanitarian policy, but has endorsed the *Principles of Good Humanitarian Donorship* (GHD). Several documents are important for France's general development policy; the *Development Policy: a French Vision Strategy* (2011) delineates France's overarching goals (DGMDP 2011). This document includes "crisis countries" as one of the four possible partnerships for French aid; however, given that the document does not provide a specific policy for humanitarian action in these crisis countries, it is often unclear if the general developmental policy outlined in the document applies directly to crisis situations as well (DGMDP 2011). The *Cross-cutting Policy Document* (2011) presented to Parliament sets forth France's aims for its development policy for the next few years and in a similar manner includes France's activities in crisis countries (Republic of France 2011).

## HOW DOES FRANCE'S POLICY ADDRESS GHD CONCEPTS?

### GENDER

France has a *French strategy for gender equality* (2010) with the aim to “guarantee a cross-cutting approach to gender equality in all of the policies, fields of intervention and instruments that characterize French cooperation,” (DGMDP 2010). This action plan calls for the use of OECD “gender markers” in France’s ODA, the use of gender-sensitive indicators in evaluations, and the promotion and monitoring of gender-sensitive programmes (DGMDP 2010). Though this document is mostly limited to actions undertaken by the AFD, there are some measures that overlap and apply to humanitarian assistance. Most notably, France includes the appointment of “gender equality” correspondents in embassies and specific training courses for MAEE officers concerning gender equality (DGMDP 2010).

### PILLAR 1

## RESPONDING TO NEEDS

Though there is no guiding humanitarian policy, the French Ministry’s website declares that humanitarian aid should be guided by the principles of humanity, impartiality, independence and neutrality. France has adopted a leading role in dealing with fragile and highly vulnerable states. In 2007, it revised its *Fragile States and Situations of Fragility: France’s Policy Paper* (2007), which delineates special considerations to take in regards to these states, including its “Fragilities Grid” - a tool to assess vulnerability. In its *Policy on Fragile States*, France emphasizes the importance of rapid response in sudden onset disasters and complex emergencies (CICID 2007). To this end, France’s Crisis Centre, on call day and night, has access to the Emergency Humanitarian Fund. The Crisis Centre can fund NGOs, multilateral organisations, or operations led by its own group of experts and staff (CDC 2011).

### PILLAR 2

## PREVENTION, RISK REDUCTION AND RECOVERY

France has expressed a strong commitment to beneficiary participation and building local capacity in its *Aid Effectiveness Action Plan* (MAEE 2006), although its application to humanitarian crises is not clear. Its *Policy on Fragile States* emphasizes the importance of the transition from relief to rehabilitation and calls for institutionalising links between different players in the field to improve the transition to development (CICID 2011). France’s *Policy on Fragile States* repeatedly underscores the importance of conflict and disaster prevention, preparedness and risk reduction (CICID 2007). This same policy declares that France abides by the OECD/DAC *Principles for Good Engagement in Fragile States* and guidelines on conflict prevention (CICID 2007). Finally, France states that it will introduce a conflict prevention element into its partnership frameworks (CICID 2007).

### PILLAR 3

## WORKING WITH HUMANITARIAN PARTNERS

France's *Policy on Fragile States* stresses the importance of flexible funding for fragile states (CICID 2007). Special emphasis is given to the flexibility of the Emergency Humanitarian Fund (EFH), now under the direct control of the Crisis Centre (CICID 2007 and CDC 2011). The Interministerial Commission for International Cooperation and Development (CICID) is intended to coordinate development, security, peace-keeping and humanitarian strategies (OECD/DAC 2009). The Crisis Centre also serves to focus France's emergency activities, and is attached to the Foreign Ministry directly in order to better mobilise all actors (CDC 2011). France states in its *Fragile States Policy* that its *Fragility Grid* is meant in large part to increase coordination, as it provides French actors with the same assessment of the field situation (CICID 2007). Additionally, the Centre organises meetings with French NGOs to discuss security or cross-cutting issues to further increase coordination among French actors (CDC 2011). In terms of coordinating with non-French actors, the *French Vision* states that in crisis management, "effective coordination between widely differing public and private players" is key, and highlights France's cooperation with the European Union (DGMDP 2011).

### PILLAR 4

## PROTECTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs highlights the importance of international humanitarian law, human rights and refugee law in its humanitarian action (MAEE 2011b). This includes access to affected populations and the safety of humanitarian workers, as well as a clear commitment to the protection of civilians (MAEE 2011b). The Crisis Centre states that it "supports and coordinates the action of NGOs by organising meetings to develop discussion on humanitarian issues and meetings that are more theme-based or related to the security of teams in the field," (CDC 2011). France's policy on advocacy toward local authorities is not clear.

### PILLAR 5


## LEARNING AND ACCOUNTABILITY

In the *Aid Effectiveness Action Plan*, France called for the creation of cross-cutting evaluations of all instruments, countries, and sectors, and for the analysis and assessment of the effectiveness of the *Framework Partnership Documents*. The 2008 DAC Review confirms that evaluations of humanitarian aid are conducted mid-term and at the end of the project, programme or crisis response, and for cross-cutting themes (2008). The Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs (MAEE) carries out evaluations of all bilateral and multilateral aid, including humanitarian efforts, often hiring external consultants to do so. To increase transparency, the 2006 *Institutional Act of Financial Legislation Law* requires the Foreign Ministry submit a report to Parliament detailing all budget costs and aid flows for each year. France is also part of the Multilateral Organization Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN) which aims to monitor the performance of multilateral organisations (OECD 2009). Accountability towards beneficiaries is included in France's *Aid Effectiveness Plan* for the implementation of the Paris Declaration (MAEE 2006), but the policy for humanitarian assistance is unclear.

# FIELD PARTNERS' PERCEPTIONS

## FRANCE'S FIELD PERCEPTION SCORES

Collected questionnaires: 32



SOURCE: DARA

Colours represent performance compared to donor's average performance rating:

■ Good 
 ■ Mid-range 
 ■ Could improve

## HOW IS FRANCE PERCEIVED BY ITS PARTNERS?

### GENDER

Partner organisations reported that France's efforts regarding gender are lacklustre and "all rhetoric". Implementing partners stated that France "doesn't know what [it] wants in terms of gender," and that that it does not "have a real gender approach strategy," or "a means for verifying gender is actually been taken into account." Another interviewee revealed that the French gender strategy is developed far from the field without taking into account field constraints; this results in systems like gender quotas for staff, which can be difficult to implement in some crises.



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## PILLAR 1

# RESPONDING TO NEEDS

France scored lower than most donors for the independence of its humanitarian assistance. One organisation declared: “The CDC always has a political interest . . . When they intervene, it is for political reasons.” The timeliness of its funding was similar – again France scored below most donors yet above its qualitative average score. One interviewee called the French “proactive” in this respect, and another mentioned that though France had a set calendar for funding it was accessible to the staff of its partner organisations. Some implementing partners would still like to see a quicker response time, reporting that the funding process could take a long time.

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## PILLAR 2

# PREVENTION, RISK REDUCTION AND RECOVERY

In Pillar 2, field partners were particularly critical of France’s support for *Prevention and risk reduction*. According to its partners, however, incorporating the reinforcement of local capacity in programmes is one of France’s strengths. Partner organisations praised France’s efforts in cooperating with and building local authorities’ capacities, and in asking for verification of this component through reports from its partners. Feedback was somewhat less positive regarding beneficiary participation, though France still outperformed its peers. Partner organisations report that beneficiary participation in programme design and implementation “has become more important over the past two years,” though they also report there is more emphasis on beneficiary participation in the implementation stage than in the design stage. Some interviewees considered that beneficiary participation in monitoring and evaluation is the weakest, where France reportedly encourages participation but does not verify.

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## PILLAR 3

# WORKING WITH HUMANITARIAN PARTNERS

France’s partners generally praised its commitment to providing flexible funding, stating: “They don’t even ask for justification,” and that French funding is “totally flexible”. However, France received significantly lower scores than its peers on this indicator. In terms of coordination, humanitarian organisations in the field pointed out several impressive aspects of the French system. One revealed that there was “real synergy” among France, European Commission’s Directorate-General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (ECHO) and a pooled funding mechanism, emphasising that France consulted ECHO for information on its funding before making decisions on its own funding to avoid duplication of efforts. Another interviewee stated that France “has a steering committee that includes all of their partners to follow up on the action.” Overall, it seems that interviewees appreciated France’s knowledge of the crises, stating that it has “the right expertise and experience to make good decisions at the right moment.” Partners were more critical of France’s limited support for their organisational capacity.

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## PILLAR 4

# PROTECTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

Partner organisations reported that France does fairly well in regards to protection and international law in the field. One organisation confirmed that France took measures to advocate for central governments to fulfill their responsibilities in response to humanitarian needs. Interviewees stressed the importance France places on protection, describing the protection of civilians as “an entry point in the implementation and design of projects for the CDC.” Regarding France’s efforts for the security of humanitarian workers, some organisations underscored that France is cautious in terms of security: one interviewee reported that France, “doesn’t want you to go where there’s insecurity,” and that security “is a great priority... [France wants] to go everywhere, but only if security is assured.”

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## PILLAR 5

# LEARNING AND ACCOUNTABILITY

According to its field partners, France does not do enough to ensure accountability to affected populations. One organisation declared the “CDC does not understand what accountability is. They try but there is no translation of the word in French.”<sup>4</sup> Partner organisations also reported that the French system for implementing recommendations from evaluations was “very weak”. Interviewees would also like to see greater transparency of France’s funding. Many organisations complained that France’s funding mechanisms are “impossible to understand,” or that France is “not so transparent . . . for example they refused a project . . . and then agreed to it [later].” On a more positive note, organisations appreciated France’s reporting requirements, as it accepts the ECHO’s report from its partners, considerably reducing their workload.

# RECOMMENDATIONS

## ● FORMALISE COMMITMENT TO HUMANITARIAN PRINCIPLES IN A COMPREHENSIVE HUMANITARIAN POLICY

France would do well to create an official humanitarian policy which explains its commitment to *Good Humanitarian Donorship* principles and unites the information from various web pages and documents into a common humanitarian policy.

## ● INVEST ADEQUATELY IN PREVENTION, PREPAREDNESS AND RISK REDUCTION

France could improve its support for prevention, preparedness and risk reduction, as it received some of its lowest scores for indicators on these issues. For example, funding for reconstruction, prevention and preparedness represented only 4.1% of its humanitarian aid, while the OECD/DAC donors allocated an average of 18.6%. France also received the second-lowest score for *Funding international risk mitigation* and among the lowest in the qualitative, survey-based indicator, *Prevention and risk reduction*.

## ● ENHANCE SUPPORT FOR UN AND RC/RC APPEALS, COORDINATION AND SUPPORT SERVICES AND POOLED FUNDS

France received the third-lowest score of the OECD/DAC donors for *Funding UN and RC/RC appeals*, which measures the extent to which donors provide their fair share<sup>3</sup> of funding to UN and Red Cross/Red Crescent (RC/RC) appeals, coordination and support services and pooled funds. France scores well below average in all the components that comprise this indicator.

## ● PROTECT THE INDEPENDENCE OF HUMANITARIAN AID

France's partners perceive that its humanitarian aid is not independent of other political, military, security or economic objectives; France received the fourth-lowest score of the OECD/DAC donors for this indicator. Field perceptions of its independence were especially low in Somalia and Kenya. France should put practical measures in place to safeguard the independence of its aid and engage with its partners to discuss their perceptions.

## ● RENEW COMMITMENT TO ACCOUNTABILITY

France improved slightly its participation in humanitarian accountability initiatives<sup>1</sup> compared to 2009, but its funding of these initiatives<sup>2</sup> dropped from an already low 0.22% (of France's humanitarian aid) in 2009 to 0.04% in 2010. OECD/DAC donors allocated an average of 0.43%. It also received the third-lowest score for the qualitative, survey-based indicators on accountability towards beneficiaries, indicating that France should renew its commitment to accountability.

## ● REVIEW SUPPORT FOR REFUGEES


France does fairly well in the indicators on *International humanitarian law* and *Human rights law*, but received one of the lowest scores for *Refugee law*, which measures the number of treaties signed and ratified, refugees accepted under resettlement programmes and related funding. France scored especially low in the components related to refugee resettlement and funding.



Please see [www.daraint.org](http://www.daraint.org) for a complete list of references.

# GERMANY

HRI 2011  
Ranking  
**12th**






Group **3**  
ASPIRING  
ACTORS

OFFICIAL  
DEVELOPMENT  
ASSISTANCE **0.38%**  
of GNI

HUMANITARIAN  
AID **4.5%**  
of ODA

**US \$7**  
Per person

## HUMANITARIAN AID DISTRIBUTION (%)



## GENDER RATING

POLICY →

FUNDING ↑

FIELD PERCEPTION →

### STRENGTHS

| Pillar | Type | Indicator                             | Score | % above OECD/DAC average |
|--------|------|---------------------------------------|-------|--------------------------|
| 3      | QT   | Funding NGOs                          | 10.00 | +120.5%                  |
| 1      | QT   | Timely funding to complex emergencies | 9.92  | +25.4%                   |

### AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT

| Pillar | Type | Indicator                            | Score | % below OECD/DAC average |
|--------|------|--------------------------------------|-------|--------------------------|
| 3      | QT   | Funding UN and RC/RC appeals         | 1.03  | -74.6%                   |
| 3      | QT   | Un-earmarked funding                 | 1.50  | -71.1%                   |
| 4      | QL   | Funding protection of civilians      | 5.01  | -26.3%                   |
| 4      | QL   | Advocacy for protection of civilians | 4.32  | -22.4%                   |
| 4      | QL   | Advocacy towards local authorities   | 4.39  | -21.1%                   |

## OVERALL PERFORMANCE

Germany ranked 12<sup>th</sup> in the HRI 2011, improving two positions from 2010. Based on the patterns of its scores, Germany is classified as a Group 3 donor, “Aspiring Actors”. Donors in this group tend to have more limited capacity to engage with the humanitarian system at the field level, but often aspire to take on a greater role in the sector. They generally focus on a few core strengths, such as in the area of prevention, preparedness and risk reduction, or on specific geographic regions. Other donors in the group include Australia, Belgium, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg and Spain.

Overall, Germany scored below the OECD/DAC average, and slightly above the Group 3 average. It was below the OECD/DAC average in

all pillars, with the exception of Pillar 2 (Prevention, risk reduction and recovery), where it scored above average. Compared to other Group 3 donors, Germany scored above average in all pillars, except for Pillar 3 (Working with humanitarian partners) and Pillar 4 (Protection and international law), where it scored above average.

Germany did best compared to its OECD/DAC peers in indicators on *Funding NGOs* and *Timely funding to complex emergencies*. Its scores were lowest in indicators on *Funding UN and RC/RC appeals*, *Un-earmarked funding*, *Funding protection of civilians*, *Funding protection of civilians* and *Advocacy towards local authorities*.

# AID DISTRIBUTION

Germany increased its Official Development Assistance (ODA) in proportion to its Gross National Income (GNI) from 0.35% in 2009 to 0.38% in 2010. Nevertheless, significant progress still needs to be made to achieve the target of 0.7% by 2015. Humanitarian assistance represented 4.5% of its total ODA in 2010, and 0.017% of its GNI – slightly higher than in 2009.

According to data reported to the United Nations (UN) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs' (OCHA) Financial Tracking Service (FTS), Germany's

2010 humanitarian funding was channelled as follows: 49.6% to UN agencies, 33.2% to non-governmental organisations (NGOs), 14.5% to private organisations and foundations, 9.2% to the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement, 2.1% to governments, and 1.5% to intergovernmental organisations. Pakistan was the country that received the highest percentage of German funding, followed by Haiti and Afghanistan. In 2010, Germany supported 28 countries in Africa, 25 in Asia, 12 in the Americas, six in Europe, and one in Oceania.

# POLICY FRAMEWORK

Germany's humanitarian assistance is principally managed by the Federal Foreign Office's Task Force for Humanitarian Aid and the Commissioner for Human Rights Policy and Humanitarian Aid. The Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) handles food aid and transitional assistance. BMZ often commissions the work of the German Society for International Cooperation (GIZ), a private corporation which as of 1 January 2011 brings together the German Development Service (DED), the German Technical Cooperation (GTZ) and Inwent – Capacity Building International. The Humanitarian

Aid Coordinating Committee brings together humanitarian non-governmental organisations (NGOs) with government agencies to coordinate Germany's humanitarian assistance. Germany's crisis response centre seeks to expedite the response to sudden onset crises. Germany's humanitarian aid policy is principally governed by the 2007 *Federal Government's Humanitarian Aid*, which includes the *12 Basic Rules of Humanitarian Aid* - written in 1993 and updated in 2000. Germany also expresses its commitment to the *European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid*.

## HOW DOES GERMANY'S POLICY ADDRESS GHD CONCEPTS?

### GENDER

Germany's humanitarian policy recognises the importance of meeting the specific needs of women and girls in humanitarian emergencies. At the same time, Germany reports that "no-one is favoured or disadvantaged due to their sex" in the provision of humanitarian aid (Federal Foreign Office 2007, p.4). Germany has further addressed gender in its development policies, *Development Policy Action Plan on Gender 2009-2012* and *Taking account of gender issues in German development cooperation: promoting gender equality and empowering women* (Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development 2009 and 2006), although they do not specifically mention humanitarian aid.

## PILLAR 1

# RESPONDING TO NEEDS

Germany's humanitarian policy expresses a clear commitment to need-based aid, grounded on the principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality, and independence (Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany 2011). Germany states that "Humanitarian assistance has no political strings attached," (Federal Foreign Office 2007, p.5). Germany prioritises rapid response to the needs of refugees and internally displaced persons and considers that the response to all humanitarian emergencies should be "implemented within a matter of days and timeframes limited to the period of extreme emergency," (Federal Foreign Office 2011a).

## PILLAR 2

# PREVENTION, RISK REDUCTION AND RECOVERY

Although not included in its humanitarian policy specifically, Germany considers conflict prevention a cross-cutting issue and adopted an action plan, *Civilian Crisis Prevention, Conflict Resolution and Post-Conflict Peace-Building*, in 2004. To address disaster risk reduction within Germany and internationally, Germany created a special committee - the German Committee for Disaster Reduction (DKKV), which developed specific funding guidelines for disaster risk reduction initiatives (German Committee for Disaster Reduction 2011 and Federal Foreign Office 2008) and affirms that five to ten percent of its humanitarian assistance is set aside for this purpose (Federal Foreign Office 2007, p. 2). Rule 11 of Germany's *12 Basic Rules of Humanitarian Aid* mentions beneficiary participation in the design and implementation of humanitarian assistance, yet participation in monitoring and evaluation is not specified. Rule 9 incorporates capacity building to some degree: "Humanitarian assistance...shall help people to help themselves," (Federal Foreign Office 2007, p. 11). Germany's humanitarian aid policy does not specifically address the environment, although the Federal Foreign Office highlights climate and environmental protection as important global issues (2011b). BMZ's transitional aid is intended to bridge the gap between humanitarian assistance and longer-term development (Federal Foreign Office 2007).

## PILLAR 3

# WORKING WITH HUMANITARIAN PARTNERS

Within Germany, the Humanitarian Aid Coordinating Committee brings together German non-governmental organisations (NGOs), the Federal Foreign Office and other German ministries and relevant institutions to coordinate German humanitarian assistance (Federal Foreign Office 2007). However the 2010 *DAC Peer Review* highlighted the need for greater coordination among German government agencies. Internationally, Germany expresses its strong support for the coordinating role of OCHA, participates in UN supervisory board meetings, and endorses the mechanisms created in the humanitarian reform (Federal Foreign Office 2010). Along these lines, Germany has also progressively increased its contributions to the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF). Germany provides un-earmarked funding to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations Relief and

Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), OCHA, and the World Food Programme (WFP) (OECD 2010, p.113). Apart from these contributions, and those specified in the federal budget, Germany does not “grant non-tied contributions” (The *Federal Government’s Humanitarian Aid 2007*, p.4). Germany’s humanitarian funding is intended for programmes with implementation periods lasting from one to six months “at most” (Federal Foreign Office 2011a) although this normally applies to NGOs: international organisations could be granted extensions up to 14 months, and up to two years for disaster risk reduction projects. Germany normally works in partnership with German humanitarian NGOs, international NGOs and other international organisations, however, “via Germany’s missions abroad, smaller projects can also be carried out with local NGOs,” as implementing agencies of Germany’s direct project partners (Federal Foreign Office 2007, p.4).

## PILLAR 4

# PROTECTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

Rule 2 of Germany’s *12 Basic Rules of Humanitarian Aid* describes Germany’s position on protection: “Everyone has the right to receive, and must have the right to provide, humanitarian assistance and humanitarian protection,” (Federal Foreign Office 2007, p.2). Germany created a position of Commissioner for Human Rights Policy and Humanitarian Aid in 1998 and considers the promotion of human rights “a cornerstone of Germany’s foreign policy,” (Federal Foreign Office 2011c). International humanitarian law is given great importance, and in 2006, Germany published a collection of international humanitarian law documents, including refugee conventions. Germany stresses the need to work with local authorities to obtain access, and notes that adherence to humanitarian principles is essential (Federal Foreign Office 2007, pp. 8-9).

## PILLAR 5


# LEARNING AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Germany designates funding specifically for external evaluations of the projects supported (Federal Foreign Office 2007). Germany mentions upward and downward accountability in Rule 8 of its *12 Basic principles of Humanitarian Aid*: “Those providing aid shall be accountable to both the recipients of the aid and those whose donations and supplies they accept.” Positively, Germany affirms its commitment to the Principles of Good Humanitarian Donorship in the *Federal Government’s Humanitarian Aid*. Although Germany does not mention transparency in its humanitarian policy, guidelines are publicly accessible and Germany is currently preparing to implement the International Aid Transparency Initiative at the end of 2011/ beginning of 2012. The 2010 *DAC Peer Review* noted the strong distinction between development and humanitarian aid within the German government’s aid architecture. This translates into different funding proposals and reporting systems for partners, which makes situations of protracted crises and overlap among the sectors difficult to navigate, and increases transaction costs (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 2010).

# FIELD PARTNERS' PERCEPTIONS

## GERMANY'S FIELD PERCEPTION SCORES

Collected questionnaires: 41



SOURCE: DARA

Germany's average score 5.25 ← ●●●●● OECD/DAC average score 6.05

Colours represent performance compared to donor's average performance rating:

■ Good 
 ■ Mid-range 
 ■ Could improve

## HOW IS GERMANY PERCEIVED BY ITS PARTNERS?

### GENDER

One field partner reported the following in reference to Germany and the other donors supporting its humanitarian programmes: "All donors require us to incorporate the gender approach, but finally they do not verify how it is been done." Another organisation in Kenya, stated the following regarding Germany, together with its other donors, "no one looks at different gender issues and cultural issues. We have never been given feedback on a proposal in this regard."



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## PILLAR 1

# RESPONDING TO NEEDS

Similar to most donors, Germany received some of its highest qualitative scores in Pillar 1. However, compared to other donors, Germany's scores were relatively lower for the neutrality, impartiality, independence and timeliness of its humanitarian assistance. Field partners reported: "I think Germany has political and economic interests," and, "the German funding for Haiti is not independent of economic or political interests. The funding for this crisis is really poor." Some partners indicated that Germany's funding was, however, linked to needs assessments. One interviewee affirmed, "with Germany we have a first needs assessment for our proposal, then they pay for a second one, more accurate and in real time, then we reformulate our project." Germany was positively recognised by some for carrying out field visits to ensure that programmes adapted to changing needs. However, another interviewee disagreed, pointing to the time required to make changes to programmes: "Germany isn't very open to unexpected changes in programmes. They need too much time (several months) to accept those changes." Although Germany scored lower than its peers for the timeliness of its funding, some partners were pleased with the speed of disbursement. One interviewee in Pakistan noted that Germany was quicker than any other donor in disbursing funds.

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## PILLAR 2

# PREVENTION, RISK REDUCTION AND RECOVERY

In field interviews, Germany was acknowledged for building the capacity of the local population in general, but not the authorities. Regarding beneficiary participation, one of Germany's partner organisations wondered: "The question is: would the Germans drop a proposal if it didn't include beneficiary participation?" Another organisation reported: "It's all just on paper. Donors don't follow up to see what's really happening," referring to Germany, as well as to the other donors supporting its programmes. Germany's partners were generally more critical regarding the participation of affected populations in monitoring and evaluation, compared to other programming stages. "Donors lose interest when it comes to monitoring and evaluation," commented one interviewee.

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## PILLAR 3

# WORKING WITH HUMANITARIAN PARTNERS

Partner organisations provided mixed feedback on the flexibility of Germany's funding. One interviewee criticized Germany for agreeing to finance a project at the end of the year, but requiring that the money be spent before a tight deadline. Another interviewee pointed out that, "Germany gives us funds every three months. It's difficult to live with deadlines, but here it makes things much easier, especially when we work with local NGOs. This helps them be more realistic on what can and can't be done." While most organisations felt that Germany did not do enough to support their organisational capacity, one interviewee commended Germany for allowing four percent of the budget to be invested in organizational capacity. Many of Germany's field partners praised its support for coordination, reporting "Germany finances our attendance to the coordination meetings, and asks us to actually attend them".

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## PILLAR 4

# PROTECTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

Although most interviewees considered that Germany did not actively advocate for local authorities to fulfill their responsibilities, one field organisation noted, “Germany is vocal at the federal level, not at the district level...Germany is more silent and does this behind closed doors.” Another felt that “the German government doesn’t have much influence.” Most organisations pointed to a lack of support for humanitarian access and safety of aid workers: “They are reluctant to fund security training. If you include it in proposals you may not win because of that. They want to say that the highest amount goes to the beneficiaries, probably for publicity reasons.” However, some interviewees noted that Germany “includes funding for security materials like radios” and “Germany has been very good because they asked us to provide a realistic budget for security, instead of a minimalistic budget.”

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## PILLAR 5

# LEARNING AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Most of Germany’s field partners felt that Germany’s reporting requirements were appropriate, although some complained that they were requested to report every three months. Germany received mixed feedback for integrating recommendations from past evaluations: one organisation reported “Germany integrates some recommendations and lessons learnt from evaluations.” Germany’s field partners indicated that requirements to ensure accountability to affected populations were generally lacking, although one interviewee noted that Germany proposed a “suggestions mailbox” in a refugee camp but had yet to implement it.

# RECOMMENDATIONS

## ● IMPROVE FLEXIBILITY OF FUNDING

Germany provided only 9.0% of its funding without earmarking, while its OECD/DAC peers provided an average of 33.2% without earmarking. Germany received the lowest score of the OECD/DAC donors for the qualitative indicator *Flexibility of funding*, pointing to the need for improvement.

## ● ENHANCE SUPPORT FOR UN AND RC/RC APPEALS, COORDINATION AND SUPPORT SERVICES AND POOLED FUNDS

Germany received the fourth-lowest score of the OECD/DAC donors for *Funding UN and RC/RC appeals*, which measures the extent to which donors provide their fair share<sup>3</sup> of funding to UN and Red Cross/Red Crescent (RC/RC) appeals, coordination and support services and pooled funds. Germany scored well below average in all components that comprise this indicator. It provided only 7.7% of its fair share to UN appeals, compared to the OECD/DAC average of 41.0%; 15.4% of its fair share to coordination and support services, compared to the OECD/DAC average of 47.5%; 18.2% of its fair share to Red Cross/Red Crescent (RC/RC) appeals, compared to the OECD/DAC average of 117.1%; and 36.5% of its fair share to pooled funds, compared to the OECD/DAC average of 298.0%.

## ● ENSURE FIELD KNOWLEDGE INFORMS DECISION-MAKING IN CRISES WITHOUT FIELD OFFICES

Germany received low scores in all the qualitative indicators that make up Pillar 4: *Funding protection of civilians, Advocacy for protection of civilians, Advocacy towards local authorities and Facilitating safe access*. It also received the third-lowest score for *Donor capacity and expertise*. It is interesting to note that Germany tends to receive the lowest scores in these indicators in crises where it does not have a field presence, indicating that Germany's partners consider Germany to be more supportive of these issues and to have greater expertise when they have a field office. Some partners also highlighted the difference in capacity between the field and headquarters, generally considering the field offices to be better placed to make appropriate decisions. While Germany may not be able to open additional field offices, it could consider augmenting its efforts to integrate knowledge from the field through coordination with partner organisations and other donors and field visits.


## ● IMPROVE TRANSPARENCY OF FUNDING AND DECISION-MAKING

Germany is considered the least transparent donor, though this may improve with Germany's recent commitment to the International Aid Transparency Initiative. Germany should engage in dialogue with its partners to discuss how to improve its transparency.



Please see [www.daraint.org](http://www.daraint.org) for a complete list of references.

# GREECE



**OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE**




**0.17%**  
of GNI

**HUMANITARIAN AID**

**5.8%**  
of ODA

**US \$3**  
Per person

## HUMANITARIAN AID DISTRIBUTION (%)



**GENDER RATING**

**POLICY** ↓

**FUNDING** N/A

**FIELD PERCEPTION** N/A

### STRENGTHS

| Pillar | Type | Indicator                                  | Score | % above OECD/DAC average |
|--------|------|--|-------|--------------------------|
| 3      | QT   | Un-earmarked funding                       | 9.05  | +74.7%                   |
| 1      | QT   | Timely funding to sudden onset emergencies | 9.37  | +16.3%                   |

### AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT

| Pillar | Type | Indicator                                   | Score | % below OECD/DAC average |
|--------|------|---|-------|--------------------------|
| 5      | QT   | Participating in accountability initiatives | 0.00  | -100.00%                 |
| 5      | QT   | Funding accountability initiatives          | 0.00  | -100.00%                 |
| 5      | QT   | Funding and commissioning evaluations       | 0.00  | -100.00%                 |
| 2      | QT   | Funding reconstruction and prevention       | 0.13  | -97.1%                   |
| 3      | QT   | Funding UN and RC/RC appeals                | 0.17  | -95.9%                   |

## OVERALL PERFORMANCE

Greece is not included in the overall ranking, as insufficient survey responses were obtained to calculate the qualitative indicators that make up the index.

Greece's overall scores in the HRI's quantitative indicators were below the OECD/DAC and Group 3 averages. Greece scored below the OECD/DAC and Group 3 average in all pillars, with the exception of Pillar 1, where it scored above the OECD/DAC and Group 3 average, and Pillar 3, where it scored below the OECD/DAC average, yet above the Group 3 average.

Compared to its OECD/DAC peers, Greece did best in the indicators on *Un-earmarked funding* and *Timely funding to sudden onset emergencies*. Its scores were relatively the lowest in indicators on *Participating in accountability initiatives*, *Funding accountability initiatives*, *Funding and commissioning evaluations*, *Funding reconstruction and prevention* and *Funding UN and RC/RC appeals*.

# AID DISTRIBUTION

In 2010, Greece's Official Development Assistance (ODA) comprised 0.17% of its Gross National Income (GNI), down from 0.19% in 2009. Humanitarian assistance comprised 5.8% of its ODA in 2010 and 0.010% of its GNI. Greece had deferred the intermediate European Union target of 0.51% ODA/GNI ratio to 2012, but is unlikely to reach this target due to the economic crisis (Hellenic Aid 2009).

According to data reported to the United Nations (UN) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs' (OCHA) Financial Tracking Service (FTS), in 2010, Greece channelled 48.0% of its humanitarian assistance to UN agencies, 34.5% in bilateral form to affected governments and 17.5% to a variety of NGOs. Greece contributed to nine crises in 2010, including four in the Americas, two in Asia, two in Europe and one in Africa, with Haiti, Chile and Yemen receiving the greatest amount.

# POLICY FRAMEWORK

Greece's humanitarian system is coordinated by two main bodies under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: the Inter-Ministerial Committee (ESODOS) and Hellenic Aid. EOSDOS decides whether and how to respond to humanitarian emergencies and Hellenic Aid, the international development cooperation department, coordinates the operational response (OECD/DAC 2006). Within Hellenic Aid, the First Directorate and Second Directorate ("Emergency humanitarian and food aid directorate" and "Rehabilitation and development directorate") work closely together to respond to humanitarian crises (OECD/DAC 2006). According to the most recent *DAC Peer Review*, a wide range of government actors are involved in the Greek humanitarian system, and Hellenic Aid manages the coordination among them, which may include the Ministries of Defence, Health, and Agriculture and the National Centre for Emergency Assistance (OECD/DAC 2006). Hellenic Aid is also in charge of relations with non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and multilateral organisations (OECD/DAC 2006).

Standing Order 5-4/2009, Procedures of Humanitarian Aid Provision Abroad provides the legal framework for Greek humanitarian assistance (Hellenic Aid 2009). Although no formal humanitarian aid strategy exists, Greece includes the *Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) Principles* in its guidelines for implementing partners (OECD/DAC 2006). Greece also expresses its commitment to the *European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid* (Hellenic Aid 2011). The *Strategic Framework for Co-operation with the developing world* and Hellenic Aid's 2009 *Annual Report* both serve as guiding frameworks for Greece's overarching international cooperation policy. Greece is in the process of adapting its foreign assistance programmes to its new financial situation, and the new plan will be presented in the *2011-2015 Development Co-operation and Assistance Program* (Hellenic Aid 2011). Greece has attached "Development Officers" to some of its embassies as called for in the *Action Plan*, which recognised the need to provide support for humanitarian assistance and monitor implementation (Hellenic Aid 2004 and OECD/DAC 2006).

## HOW DOES GREECE'S POLICY ADDRESS GHD CONCEPTS?

### GENDER

Greece's policy for gender in relation to humanitarian aid is unclear. However, gender equality is included as a cross-cutting theme in its developmental policy, the *Strategic Framework of Cooperation* (Hellenic Aid 2009). Greece is also a signatory of both the *GHD Principles* and the *European Consensus on Humanitarian Assistance*, which call for the inclusion of a gender-sensitive approach in all parts of the humanitarian assistance process.

### PILLAR 1

### RESPONDING TO NEEDS

Greece has expressed its commitment to the *GHD Principles*, and has explicitly stated that it provides aid based on need and in adherence to the principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence (Hellenic Aid 2004, Hellenic Aid 2009). The *Annual Report* asserts that EOSDOS uses information and needs assessments from the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC), and the EU Monitoring Information Centre (MIC) supplemented by information from Greek organisations to decide which crises to support (Hellenic Aid 2009). Greece regularly donates to the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) with the aim of providing timely funding, (OECD/DAC 2006). Hellenic Aid has also expedited procedures to fund NGOs responding to crises (OECD/DAC 2006).

### PILLAR 2

### PREVENTION, RISK REDUCTION AND RECOVERY

The latest *DAC Peer Review* notes that in order to facilitate a proper transition from relief to development, "the Director General of Hellenic Aid presides over a committee which meets monthly or on *ad hoc* basis in case of crisis to discuss linking relief and development," since this requires the coordination of two separate directorates within Hellenic Aid (OECD/DAC 2006). The Hellenic Aid website states that environment and climate change are cross-cutting issues in the Greek development programme, but it is unclear if these also apply to its humanitarian assistance (Hellenic Aid 2011). Greece's policy on beneficiary participation, local capacity, prevention, preparedness and risk reduction is not clear.

### PILLAR 3

## WORKING WITH HUMANITARIAN PARTNERS

The *Hellenic Aid Action Plan for Coordination and Harmonization* declares that Greece will convene more inter-ministerial meetings and increase communication with Greek NGOs regarding requirements for funding and other relevant information in order to better coordinate Greek assistance (Hellenic Aid 2004). It is unclear, however, if these coordination mechanisms will also apply to Greece's humanitarian assistance. Hellenic Aid funding to NGOs cannot represent more than 75% of its total programme budget (Hellenic Aid 2011). The 2006 *DAC Peer Review* also adds that NGO funding proposals may be submitted at any time, which makes the funding system flexible (OECD/DAC 2006). The *DAC Peer Review* reveals that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs provides a "flexible budget envelope for humanitarian assistance" to account for "both expected and unforeseen need," (OECD/DAC 2006).

### PILLAR 4

## PROTECTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

Greece's 2009 *Annual Report* devotes a section to human rights, emphasizing that "a major area of activity of Greek humanitarian aid is human rights protection and especially human security protection," and this is expressed formally in the annual call for NGO projects (Hellenic Aid 2009). Greece's policy on supporting international humanitarian law, refugee law, or facilitating humanitarian access is not clear, though these are principles included in documents Greece has endorsed, such as the *GHD Principles* and the *European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid*.

### PILLAR 5

## LEARNING AND ACCOUNTABILITY

The *Hellenic Aid Action Plan for Coordination and Harmonization* (Hellenic Aid 2004) states: "It is in the immediate plans of Hellenic Aid to improve extensively its monitoring, auditing and evaluating systems so as to increase transparency [and] efficiency" regarding Greece's developmental policy, but it is unclear if this also applies to its humanitarian assistance. According to this same document, the current monitoring system, started in 2004, includes visits to project sites by experienced staff who "complete record reports in which they evaluate competence, effectiveness, development impact, suitability and expected sustainability of projects and programmes in cooperation with local partners," (Hellenic Aid 2004). The country has had difficulty fully implementing these plans due to financial troubles and the subsequent scaling down of its aid. The *DAC Peer Review* does note, however, that "Hellenic Aid has tightened the rules and set up an extensive ex-ante assessment process covering the technical, management and financial capacity of the NGO..." (OECD DAC 2006). In regards to its own transparency, Hellenic Aid currently publishes an *Annual Report on Development Cooperation* to the Greek Parliament that gives a comprehensive summary of its projects and the budget allocated to each. Unfortunately, there is no mention of concrete strategies for accountability measures toward affected populations.

# RECOMMENDATIONS

Given the severe economic crisis Greece is currently facing, it may need to postpone the following recommendations until after it has surpassed the crisis. Greece's recovery will also present an opportunity for the country to review its position on humanitarian aid and recommit itself to *Good Humanitarian Donorship Principles*.

## ● FORMALISE COMMITMENT TO HUMANITARIAN PRINCIPLES IN A COMPREHENSIVE HUMANITARIAN POLICY

Greece would do well to create an official humanitarian policy which explains its commitment to Good Humanitarian Donorship Principles and unites the information from various web pages and documents into a common humanitarian policy.

## ● RENEW COMMITMENT TO LEARNING AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Greece has significant room for improvement in its support for learning and accountability. Greece has not participated in any of the initiatives for humanitarian accountability included in the indicator *Participating in accountability initiatives*.<sup>1</sup> Greece also did not provide financial support for learning and accountability initiatives.<sup>2</sup> Furthermore, it does not have

evaluation guidelines and has not commissioned any publicly-accessible evaluations over the past five years.

## ● INVEST ADEQUATELY IN PREVENTION, PREPAREDNESS AND RISK REDUCTION

Greece spent 0.52% of its humanitarian aid in 2010 on prevention, preparedness and reconstruction, while the OECD/DAC average is 18.6%. It could also improve its support for international risk mitigation mechanisms, having allocated only 0.37 % of its ODA, compared to the OECD/DAC average of 0.77%. This also makes sense from a financial standpoint, as prevention has been repeatedly demonstrated to cost less than emergency response.


## ● ENHANCE SUPPORT FOR UN AND RC/RC APPEALS, COORDINATION AND SUPPORT SERVICES AND POOLED FUNDS

Greece received a low score for *Funding UN and RC/RC appeals*, which measures the extent to which donors provide their fair share<sup>3</sup> of funding to UN and Red Cross/Red Crescent (RC/RC) appeals, coordination and support services and pooled funds. It scored well below average in all components

that comprise this indicator. Greece provided 0.52% of its fair share to UN appeals, compared to the OECD/DAC average of 41.0%; 3.2% of its fair share to coordination and support services, compared to the OECD/DAC average of 47.5%; 2.0% of its fair share to Red Cross/Red Crescent (RC/RC) appeals, compared to the OECD/DAC average of 117.1%; and 9.1% of its fair share to pooled funds, compared to the OECD/DAC average of 298.0%.

## ● RENEW COMMITMENT TO REFUGEE LAW


Greece has room for improvement in *Refugee law*, which measures signature and ratification of international treaties, participation in refugee resettlement and related funding. Of the six treaties, Greece has ratified three and signed two. Greece could also improve its participation in refugee resettlement and funding.

 Please see [www.daraint.org](http://www.daraint.org) for a complete list of references.



# IRELAND

HRI 2011  
Ranking  
**4th**






Group **3**  
ASPIRING  
ACTORS

OFFICIAL  
DEVELOPMENT  
ASSISTANCE **0.53%**  
of GNI

HUMANITARIAN  
AID **15.3%**  
of ODA **US \$31**  
Per person

## HUMANITARIAN AID DISTRIBUTION (%)



## GENDER RATING

POLICY

FUNDING

FIELD PERCEPTION

### STRENGTHS

| Pillar | Type | Indicator                                   | Score | % above OECD/DAC average |
|--------|------|---|-------|--------------------------|
| 5      | QT   | Funding accountability initiatives          | 10.00 | +143.1%                  |
| 3      | QT   | Funding UN and RC/RC appeals                | 8.30  | +104.0%                  |
| 3      | QT   | Funding NGOs                                | 8.93  | +97.0%                   |
| 3      | QT   | Un-earmarked funding                        | 9.49  | +83.2%                   |
| 5      | QT   | Participating in accountability initiatives | 7.92  | +76.9%                   |

### AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT

| Pillar | Type | Indicator                             | Score | % below OECD/DAC average |
|--------|------|---------------------------------------|-------|--------------------------|
| 2      | QT   | Funding international risk mitigation | 2.61  | -45.4%                   |
| 4      | QL   | Advocacy towards local authorities    | 3.13  | -43.8%                   |
| 4      | QL   | Advocacy for protection of civilians  | 3.30  | -40.7%                   |
| 3      | QL   | Donor capacity and expertise          | 3.81  | -39.1%                   |
| 2      | QL   | Strengthening local capacity          | 4.04  | -30.1%                   |

## OVERALL PERFORMANCE

Ireland ranked 4<sup>th</sup> in the HRI 2011, dropping two positions from 2010. Based on the patterns of its scores, Ireland is classified as a Group 3 donor, "Aspiring Actors". Donors in this group tend to have more limited capacity to engage with the humanitarian system at the field level, but often aspire to take on a greater role in the sector. They generally focus on a few core strengths, such as in the area of prevention, preparedness and risk reduction, or on specific geographic regions. Other donors in the group include Australia, Belgium, Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg and Spain.

Overall, Ireland scored above the OECD/DAC and Group 3 averages. Ireland scored above the OECD/DAC and Group 3

averages in all pillars, with the exception of Pillar 2, where it was below both averages.

Ireland did best compared to its OECD/DAC peers in indicators on *Funding accountability, initiatives, Funding UN and RC/RC appeals, Funding NGOs, Un-earmarked funding and Participating in accountability initiatives* – all quantitative indicators. Its scores were relatively the lowest in *Funding international risk mitigation, Advocacy towards local authorities, Advocacy for protection of civilians, Donor capacity and expertise and Strengthening local capacity*. Overall, Ireland performed better in quantitative indicators than in the qualitative, survey-based indicators.

# AID DISTRIBUTION

In 2010, Ireland's Official Development Assistance (ODA) decreased substantially in absolute terms, although similar drops in its Gross National Income (GNI) left Ireland's ODA/GNI ratio relatively stable. In 2010, ODA comprised 0.53% of Ireland's GNI compared to 0.54% in 2009. Humanitarian assistance represented 15.3% of Ireland's ODA in 2010, or 0.078% of its GNI.

According to data reported to the United Nations (UN) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs' (OCHA) Financial Tracking Service (FTS) (2011), Ireland

channelled 29.5% of its humanitarian assistance to non-governmental organisations (NGOs), 26.4% to UN agencies, 14.5% to the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement and 5.9% bilaterally to affected governments. In 2010, Ireland supported 28 crises: 16 in Africa, 10 in Asia, one in the Americas and one in Europe. The top recipient countries of Irish humanitarian aid in 2010 were Sudan, Haiti and Liberia. In 2010, Irish Aid focused its sector-specific funding primarily on health, coordination and food sectors.

# POLICY FRAMEWORK

Irish Aid, which falls under the Development Cooperation Division of the Department of Foreign Affairs, manages Ireland's humanitarian assistance. Ireland's 2009 Humanitarian Relief Policy is its main humanitarian policy, and is fully coherent with the strategies for development cooperation outlined in the 2006 *White Paper*. In June 2011, the Minister of State for Trade and Development announced an upcoming review of the *White Paper*, which will set out clear priorities for the future direction of the Irish Aid programme. Additionally, Irish Aid has produced sector-specific strategies and policy papers,

particularly with regards to mainstreaming issues such as gender and the environment.

Two important funding channels utilised by Irish Aid are the Emergency Humanitarian Assistance Fund (EHAF), and the Emergency Preparedness and Post-Emergency Recovery Fund (EPPR). These are complemented by the Rapid Response Initiative, which partly functions to provide funding for emergency capacity building. Irish Aid's Multi-Annual Programme Scheme (MAPS) provides multi-year funding to five partner organisations. Irish Aid has a field presence in 16 core countries, primarily in Sub-Saharan Africa.

## HOW DOES IRELAND'S POLICY ADDRESS GHD CONCEPTS?

### GENDER

Irish Aid developed a *Gender Equality Policy* in 2004, updating it in 2010 (Irish Aid 2004 and Irish Aid 2010). A large part of the policy focuses on gender mainstreaming, which is also reflected in the 2009 *Humanitarian Relief Policy*. Ireland recognises that men and women have different needs in crises (Irish Aid 2004). To this effect, Irish Aid requires that partner organisations have a clear understanding of gender specific needs in emergencies and that their programmes are in line with the goal, objectives and strategy outlined in Irish Aid's *Gender Equality Policy*. Irish Aid also stresses its commitment to a rights-based approach, and specifically pledges to address gender based violence (GBV) (Irish Aid 2009).

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## PILLAR 1

# RESPONDING TO NEEDS

Ireland's *Humanitarian Relief Policy* (Irish Aid 2009) states that it respects and promotes the principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence, and will provide assistance on the basis of need. It further emphasises the importance that the scale of response should be commensurate with the scale of need, with a special reference to forgotten emergencies. In addition, Ireland recognises that vulnerable groups within a society often have special needs, which is catered to accordingly (Irish Aid 2009). Irish Aid prides itself in responding to various disasters in a timely and appropriate manner (Irish Aid 2011a). It has endeavoured to increase its ability to respond quickly to emergencies through the creation of the Rapid Response Initiative and support for the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF).

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## PILLAR 2

# PREVENTION, RISK REDUCTION AND RECOVERY

Ireland's various policy documents emphasise the importance of a proper transition from relief to development, as well as support for local capacity, prevention, preparedness, and risk reduction initiatives. In relation to the environment for example, a mainstreaming strategy is set out in the *Environment Policy for Sustainable Development* (Irish Aid 2007). According to Ireland's humanitarian policy, disaster risk reduction (DRR), linking relief to rehabilitation and development (LRRD) and prevention/preparedness are all part of a broader humanitarian effort which take into account longer term objectives and address the core vulnerabilities of communities which are affected or prone to acute crises. Ireland considers that this can be achieved in part by building local capacities. Finally, Ireland's humanitarian policy mentions that relief assistance should build on existing local capacities and ensure the participation of the affected population (Irish Aid 2009).

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## PILLAR 3

# WORKING WITH HUMANITARIAN PARTNERS

Ireland's policy highlights the need to provide flexible, predictable assistance and support the work of the organisations comprising the humanitarian system (Irish Aid 2009). It does not appear to specifically favour Irish NGOs over others, except for the long term funding scheme available for Irish NGOs (Irish Aid 2011b). Ireland provides core funding to UN agencies and contributes to multi-donor pooled funds with the aim of providing flexible aid (Government of Ireland 2006). Ireland recognises the lead role that the UN plays in coordination and expresses its support for the reform of the humanitarian system, including the role of Humanitarian Coordinators and the cluster approach (Irish Aid 2009). In an effort to provide predictable funding, Ireland created the Multi-Annual Programme Scheme (MAPS), which provides predictable, multi-year funding to five partner organisations.

## PILLAR 4

# PROTECTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

Ireland's policy in relation to protection, access and international law is slightly less elaborated than other areas, although it does mention the importance of these issues. With regards to protection, Ireland's *Humanitarian Relief Policy* recognises this as a humanitarian need, specifically for internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees. This is also true with regards to respecting and promoting the implementation of international humanitarian law (IHL), refugee law and human rights law. Furthermore, Ireland recognises the leading role of the International Committee of the Red Cross to promote IHL (Irish Aid 2009). In relation to security and human rights, Ireland's policy states that the Department of Foreign Affairs will use appropriate channels at the country level and inter-governmentally through the UN and other bodies to inform programming and advocate as needed (Irish Aid 2009).

## PILLAR 5


# LEARNING AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Ireland's policy stresses the importance of transparency, learning and accountability. It specifically mentions promoting and supporting the *Principles of Good Humanitarian Donorship* (GHD), Sphere standards, the Inter-Agency Standing Committee standards and guidelines and the *Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief* (Irish Aid 2009). Issues of transparency and accountability are mainly addressed through the promotion of good governance. The White Paper includes public ownership and transparency as one of its guiding principles. Ireland states the importance of "accountability to both the Irish taxpayer and aid recipients," (Irish Aid 2009). Driven by the need to enhance programme effectiveness through continued learning, Ireland focuses on the evaluation of its performance as a donor, as well as that of its partners. Ireland also refers to its GHD domestic implementation plan to assess its own performance (Irish Aid 2009).

# FIELD PARTNERS' PERCEPTIONS

## IRELAND'S FIELD PERCEPTION SCORES

Collected questionnaires: 18



SOURCE: DARA

Ireland's average score 5.60 ← → OECD/DAC average score 6.05

Colours represent performance compared to donor's average performance rating:

Good Mid-range Could improve

## HOW IS IRELAND PERCEIVED BY ITS PARTNERS?

### GENDER

Ireland's field partners seem to consider gender an important priority for the country. According to one organisation, incorporating gender sensitive approaches in programmes "is a must for Irish Aid." Another organisation commented that "Irish Aid requests gender disaggregated data," adding that Ireland supported a GBV programme.

### PILLAR 1

## RESPONDING TO NEEDS

Organisations receiving funding from Irish Aid were generally positive in relation to their commitment to Pillar 1. One agency described Ireland as an "extremely good donor that isn't interested in politics." Partners consider Ireland an engaged donor that is "interested in reviewing annual

reports and regular communication with the field.” In terms of timeliness, most organisations appreciated the speed of disbursement, although a few dissented, stating that “Ireland always arrives a bit late, but at least wants to cover gaps and answer our requests.”

## PILLAR 2

# PREVENTION, RISK REDUCTION AND RECOVERY

Ireland’s field partners were more critical regarding its support for local capacity and beneficiary participation. One organisation stated that Irish Aid does not require it, as “they are more interested in delivering humanitarian aid.” Similarly, in relation to beneficiary participation in humanitarian aid, it was claimed that “they encourage it, but don’t insist.” Feedback was much more positive regarding Ireland’s support for prevention, preparedness and risk reduction: “Irish Aid is very strong in this, while the others [other donors] do not care that much.”

## PILLAR 3

# WORKING WITH HUMANITARIAN PARTNERS

In Pillar 3 (Working with humanitarian partners), partner organisations praised Ireland for the flexibility of its funding. One organisation stated: “We have a longstanding relation with them based on trust. They assume what we do is right as the grants are not earmarked.” Another added: “We have a long-term framework agreement with Irish Aid, so we can use the money as we need it.” In relation to supporting the organisational capacity of its partners, Ireland outperformed its peers, though one interviewee claimed: “This is included in development, but not in humanitarian aid.” The responses on Irish Aid’s focus on coordination differed depending on the country. One organisation asserted that it was a firm requirement: “We have to find out what other organisations are doing and participate in clusters. Irish Aid headquarters coordinates with other donors.” In a different country the response was decidedly more negative: “Coordination about donors is a lot of talk, but not that much acting.”

## PILLAR 4

# PROTECTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

Ireland received some of its lowest qualitative scores in Pillar 4 (Protection and international law). Partner organisations rated Ireland especially low for *Advocacy towards local authorities* and *Advocacy for protection of civilians*. In comparison, Ireland did somewhat better for its funding of protection, though it still received one of the lowest scores of the OECD/DAC donors for this indicator.

## PILLAR 5

# LEARNING AND ACCOUNTABILITY

In Pillar 5 (Learning and accountability), Ireland received two of its lowest scores for *Accountability towards beneficiaries* and *Implementing evaluation recommendations*. One interviewee affirmed that “downward accountability is not a funding requirement or at best a weak one.”

There were some organisations that were more positive regarding lesson learning however: “they evaluate our projects and encourage changes for the next time,” reported one organisation, and “very involved and care about lessons learnt,” noted another. Ireland’s partners seem to consider its reporting requirements appropriate. Responses on its transparency were mixed however: “There is transparency about funding but not about decision making.”

## RECOMMENDATIONS

### ● MATCH SUPPORT FOR PREVENTION, PREPAREDNESS AND RISK REDUCTION WITH CORRESPONDING FUNDING

Ireland’s partners report that the country is highly supportive of integrating prevention, preparedness and risk reduction measures in their humanitarian programmes. In fact, Ireland received the best score of the OECD/DAC donors for this qualitative indicator. However, its scores were very low for the quantitative indicators on funding for prevention, preparedness and reconstruction, and international risk mitigation mechanisms. Ireland allocated 0.31% of its ODA to fund international risk mitigation mechanisms while its OECD/DAC peers averaged 0.77%. Ireland’s funding for prevention and reconstruction is only 10.0% of its humanitarian assistance, while overall OECD/DAC donors dedicated an average of 18.6%. The data seems to indicate that Ireland places importance on these issues with its field partners, but is weaker in providing corresponding financial support.

### ● EXPLORE OPTIONS LIKE INFORMATION-SHARING TO ENHANCE DECISION-MAKING

Ireland’s partners were critical of its capacity and expertise to make appropriate decisions. In fact, Ireland received the lowest score of the OECD/DAC donors<sup>5</sup> for this indicator, a substantial drop from its score in the HRI 2010. Cutbacks in Irish Aid seem to have taken their toll on its capacity and expertise, according to Irish Aid’s partners. Given these circumstances, Irish Aid should partner with other donors and field organisations to share information and ensure information from the field is properly informing decision-making.

### ● ENGAGE IN DIALOGUE WITH FIELD PARTNERS TO PARTICIPATE IN ADVOCACY AS APPROPRIATE

Ireland could improve its advocacy for protection and advocacy towards local authorities. It will need to engage


closely with its field partners to discuss the most appropriate way to do so in each situation.

### ● REINFORCE REQUIREMENT FOR DOWNWARD ACCOUNTABILITY

Ireland could reinforce more strongly its requirement for accountability to aid recipients, as field partners indicate that Irish Aid does not place sufficient emphasis on this.

### ● ENCOURAGE LEARNING FROM THE PAST


Ireland has substantial room for improvement in *Implementing evaluation recommendations*. It should redouble its efforts to work with its partners integrate lessons from the past into future programmes.

 Please see [www.daraint.org](http://www.daraint.org) for a complete list of references.

# ITALY

Group **3**  
**ASPIRING ACTORS**

HRI 2011 Ranking  
**19th**




**OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE** **0.15%**  
of GNI

**HUMANITARIAN AID** **6.3%**  
of ODA

**US \$3**  
Per person

## HUMANITARIAN AID DISTRIBUTION (%)



## GENDER RATING

POLICY →

FUNDING →

FIELD PERCEPTION →

### STRENGTHS

| Pillar | Type | Indicator                             | Score | % above OECD/DAC average |
|--------|------|---------------------------------------|-------|--------------------------|
| 5      | QT   | Funding accountability initiatives    | 10.00 | +143.1%                  |
| 2      | QT   | Funding reconstruction and prevention | 10.00 | +123.1%                  |

### AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT

| Pillar | Type | Indicator                                   | Score | % below OECD/DAC average |
|--------|------|---|-------|--------------------------|
| 5      | QT   | Participating in accountability initiatives | 0.14  | -96.9%                   |
| 3      | QT   | Funding UN and RC/RC appeals                | 0.50  | -87.8%                   |
| 3      | QT   | Funding NGOs                                | 0.60  | -86.7%                   |
| 3      | QT   | Un-earmarked funding                        | 1.20  | -76.8%                   |
| 2      | QT   | Reducing climate-related vulnerability      | 1.37  | -65.9%                   |

## OVERALL PERFORMANCE

Italy ranked 19<sup>th</sup> in the HRI 2011, improving one position from 2010. Based on the patterns of its scores, Italy is classified as a Group 3 donor, "Aspiring Actors". Donors in this group tend to have more limited capacity to engage with the humanitarian system at the field level, but often aspire to take on a greater role in the sector. They generally focus on a few core strengths, such as in the area of prevention, preparedness and risk reduction, or on specific geographic regions. Other donors in the group include Australia, Belgium, Germany, Ireland, Japan, Luxembourg and Spain.

Italy scored below the OECD/DAC and Group 3 averages in all pillars, with the exception of Pillar 2, where it scored above both averages, and Pillar 5 (Learning and accountability), where it was below the OECD/DAC average yet above the Group 3 average.

Italy did best compared to its OECD/DAC peers in the indicators on *Funding accountability initiatives* and *Funding reconstruction and prevention*. Its scores were relatively the lowest in indicators on *Participating in accountability initiatives*, *Funding UN and RC/RC appeals*, *Funding NGOs*, *Un-earmarked funding* and *Reducing climate-related vulnerability*.



# AID DISTRIBUTION

In 2010, Official Development Assistance (ODA) comprised 0.15% of Italy's Gross National Income (GNI), a drop from 0.16% in 2009. Humanitarian assistance represented 6.3% of Italy's ODA in 2010, or 0.009% of its GNI.

In 2010, according to data reported to the United Nations (UN) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs' (OCHA) Financial Tracking Service

(FTS), Italy channelled 51.6% of its humanitarian assistance to UN agencies, 39.1% bilaterally to affected governments, 3.5% to the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement and 2.0% to NGOs. In 2010, Italy supported 41 crises: 17 in Asia, 14 in Africa, nine in the Americas and four in Europe, with Pakistan, Somalia and the occupied Palestinian territories receiving the greatest amount (OCHA FTS 2011).

# POLICY FRAMEWORK

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Directorate General for Development Cooperation (DGCS) manages Italy's humanitarian assistance. DGCS Office VI focuses on emergency operations and food aid, overseeing Italy's humanitarian action. Though Italy has not created a humanitarian policy, Italy asserts that principles contained in the *Good Humanitarian Donorship Initiative* (GHD) and the *European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid* guide its humanitarian action (MFA 2009). Office IV of DGCS specifically focuses on saving lives, alleviating suffering and protecting human dignity during humanitarian emergencies. *Law 49/1987* forms the legal basis of Italian foreign assistance, describing conditions for the involvement of Italian non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and civil protection assets in delivering aid. Article 1 emphasises the importance of humanitarian action, while Article 11 governs Italy's bilateral emergency responses. Italy's 2009 *Action Plan on Aid Effectiveness* seeks to ensure

the effectiveness of Italy's development and, to a minor degree, humanitarian assistance, and the *2011-2013 Programming Guidelines and Directions* chart plans for aid policies and activities for the next three years. A yearly parliamentary financial law determines the quantity of Italy's humanitarian assistance, but specific laws can be issued in parliament to increase funding for unexpected emergencies.

Italy uses its 20 Local Technical Units (LTUs) to manage operations at the field level. However, Italy's *2011-2013 Programming Guidelines and Directions* announce a scaling down of ODA. As part of this downsizing, the number of countries where DGCS operates will be reduced by 15% and the network of Local Technical Units revised; indeed, six LTUs have been made inactive in the past two years. Furthermore, Italy has declared it will not commence operations in new countries unless dire humanitarian needs arise "consistent with available resources," (DGCS 2011).

## HOW DOES ITALY'S POLICY ADDRESS GHD CONCEPTS?

### GENDER

DGCS has long recognised the importance of incorporating gender equality and women's empowerment within its programmes and in 1998 published *The Guidelines for Empowerment of Women and the Mainstreaming of a Gender Perspective in Development Co-operation*. The *2011-2013 Programming Guidelines and Directions* likewise state that gender equality and empowerment of women will be prioritised within individual sectors and country strategies, particularly in reconstruction work in conflict affected countries. The *DAC Peer Review 2009 Memorandum* also mentions gender as a "key," "cross-cutting" element of Italy's humanitarian action and describes Italy's support for gender-oriented programmes through earmarking multilateral aid contributions.

#### PILLAR 1

### RESPONDING TO NEEDS

Although Italy has no policy framework for ensuring its humanitarian action responds to needs, in the *DAC Peer Review 2009 Memorandum*, Italy stresses its commitment to *GHD Principles* and its intention to respond to needs in an impartial, neutral and independent manner (MFA 2009). In addition, DGCS strives to target the most vulnerable populations, address the most urgent and severe needs and support forgotten crises (MFA 2009). Italy has established funding mechanisms to ensure timely funding for unanticipated emergencies, whereby specific laws can be issued by the Parliament to finance humanitarian action. Italy has also set up an "emergency bilateral fund" to provide financial withdrawals for swift transfer to specific international organisations during humanitarian crises (MFA 2009).

#### PILLAR 2

### PREVENTION, RISK REDUCTION AND RECOVERY

Italy strives to strengthen preparedness for both manmade crises and natural disasters and supports a response depot of emergency supplies in Brindisi (MFA 2009). The *DAC Peer Review 2009 Memorandum* explains that though Italy does not specifically carry out risk reduction activities, it recognises these as an important component of humanitarian action and supports activities to reduce vulnerability through collaboration with UN agencies and NGOs (MFA 2009). After approving *The Hyogo Framework for Action*, Italy launched its National Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction in 2008, led by the Civil Protection Department, to support the integration of risk reduction activities into international development policies and programmes (Protezione Civile 2011); however, it is unclear whether this goal extends to humanitarian assistance as well. DGCS has stressed the need to involve beneficiaries in disaster risk reduction (DRR), promoting activities where local communities are encouraged to identify strategies for vulnerability reduction. Beneficiary participation is also encouraged in finding solutions to problems in the

initial and rehabilitation phases of humanitarian action (MFA 2009), and the *DAC Peer Review 2009 Memorandum* and *Aid Effectiveness Action Plan* both highlight the value of capacity-building. Italy underscores the importance of maintaining a “development perspective” in humanitarian action and using emergency programmes as bridges toward longer-term development programmes (MFA 2009).

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### PILLAR 3

## WORKING WITH HUMANITARIAN PARTNERS

Italy stresses its commitment to collaborating with multilateral organisations and recognises OCHA’s leadership in coordinating humanitarian emergencies. Though 95% of Italy’s humanitarian aid is earmarked (MFA 2009), Italy upholds the importance of pooled, multi-donor emergency funds, and supported the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) in 2010 (OCHA FTS 2011). Italy also established a revolving DGCS-International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Emergency Trust Fund in 2008 (MFA 2009). Italy emphasises the need for collaboration with NGOs, especially for long-term projects, and the 2009 *Action Plan on Aid Effectiveness* prioritises collaboration with NGOs. DGCS has signed a partnership agreement with the Italian Agency for Emergency Response (ACT), a coalition of 12 Italian NGOs, to improve the monitoring of humanitarian emergencies and better coordinate responses (MFA 2009).

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### PILLAR 4

## PROTECTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

Italy’s humanitarian assistance strives to save lives, alleviate suffering and maintain human dignity during and in the aftermath of manmade crises and natural disasters (MFA 2009). Italy affirms that it supports protection and international humanitarian law by funding UN Flash and Consolidated Inter-Agency appeals and ICRC emergency appeals (MFA 2009). It also calls for facilitating protection of civilians and humanitarian workers (MFA 2009), and the *DGCS 2011 – 2013 Programming Guidelines and Directions* and *DAC Peer Review 2009 Memorandum* describe measures for collaboration with the Ministry of Defence to ensure safety of aid workers in unstable contexts. Italy insists security measures established by the United Nations Department for Safety and Security are applied when Italian NGOs are involved in UN emergency programmes (MFA 2009).

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### PILLAR 5


## LEARNING AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Both the *Aid Effectiveness Action Plan* and the *DGCS 2011 – 2013 Programming Guidelines and Directions* announce plans to increase transparency of DGCS activities. The *DAC Peer Review 2009 Memorandum* highlights Office VI’s press releases to OCHA and the MFA as a means of informing the public on crisis management activities and emphasises the importance of monitoring programmes through sound evaluations and annual reports. The MFA has not yet joined the International Aid Transparency Initiative. Italy’s position on accountability toward affected populations is not clear.

# FIELD PARTNERS' PERCEPTIONS

## ITALY'S FIELD PERCEPTION SCORES

Collected questionnaires: 22



SOURCE: DARA

Colours represent performance compared to donor's average performance rating:

Good Mid-range Could improve

## HOW IS ITALY PERCEIVED BY ITS PARTNERS?

### GENDER

Italy's partners held varied opinions regarding its requirements for gender-sensitive approaches. Some criticised Italy, among others, for not verifying that the programmes it supports integrate gender-sensitive approaches; one interviewee, for example claimed it was "all rhetoric."

### PILLAR 1

## RESPONDING TO NEEDS

Many organisations interviewed in the field felt that Italy's humanitarian aid was not sufficiently neutral, impartial and independent. One interviewee mentioned Rome when underlining that "the political agenda determines everything at headquarters level," and commented that "Italy is not always neutral." On a more positive note, interviewees conveyed that Italy's humanitarian action does reflect a concern with properly addressing needs. An organisation in the field mentioned Italy as a donor that "follow[s] up with needs assessments" and expresses a desire to "check" and "know" needs, while another explained that "Italy was very

involved” with verifying that programmes adapted to meet changing needs but also questioned the constructiveness of this involvement. Several organisations, however, complained about the poor timeliness of Italian funding. Interviewees also mentioned “a total lack of response from the donor” and late funding “with unclear conditions.”

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## PILLAR 2

# PREVENTION, RISK REDUCTION AND RECOVERY

Feedback from organisations in the field generally recognised Italy’s support for local capacity. However, not all organisations held this positive view regarding beneficiary participation, especially in the monitoring and evaluation stages. One interviewee suggested Italy was “very far away from beneficiaries, with many stages and processes between them and the needs [of the affected population].” Another pointed to Italy’s “little concern for beneficiary participation, both in design and evaluation of programmes.” Though Italy’s policy upholds the use of a “development perspective” when applying humanitarian aid, an organisation in the field criticised Italy as “only focused on supporting service delivery for life-saving activities,” which perhaps contributed to its low score for *Prevention and risk reduction*.

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## PILLAR 3

# WORKING WITH HUMANITARIAN PARTNERS

Italy generally received positive feedback from its field partners for its support for coordination among actors. Interviewees in several crises also singled out Italy for its capacity and expertise, especially at the field level. However, feedback on the flexibility of Italy’s funding was varied. Some organisations criticised its inflexible funding arrangements, which were described as “very attached” and changeable only with “extensive administrative processes”.

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## PILLAR 4

# PROTECTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

Italy received mixed reviews from organisations in the field for its performance in advocating toward local authorities. One interviewee criticised Italy for its tendency to “operate outside the usual networks and ‘break rank,’” suggesting that Italy’s “strong political interest” coloured its advocacy to local authorities. Other interviewees were more positive in this regard; one organisation commented that DGCS had “very well prepared staff” for advocating for local governments and authorities to fulfill their responsibilities in the response to humanitarian needs.

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## PILLAR 5

# LEARNING AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Similar to many donors, Italy could improve its efforts to ensure accountability towards beneficiaries. While most organisations generally felt that Italy did not do enough to ensure learning from evaluations, one interviewee did highlight the importance Italy grants to evaluations: “independent evaluations are compulsory, they are very strict on this.” Organisations also held contrasting opinions regarding Italy’s reporting requirements. Although most agreed that they are appropriate, several interviewees considered Italy’s reporting requirements “excessive” and “not very reasonable”.

# RECOMMENDATIONS

## ● FORMALISE COMMITMENT TO HUMANITARIAN PRINCIPLES IN A COMPREHENSIVE HUMANITARIAN POLICY

Italy would do well to create an official humanitarian policy which explains its commitment to *Good Humanitarian Donorship Principles* and unites the information from various web pages and documents into a common humanitarian policy.

## ● PROTECT THE NEUTRALITY, IMPARTIALITY AND INDEPENDENCE OF HUMANITARIAN AID

Italy should engage with its partners to discuss practical measures to ensure the neutrality, impartiality and independence of its humanitarian aid, as it received the lowest score of the OECD/DAC donors<sup>5</sup> for these indicators. Its scores were particularly low in the occupied Palestinian territories and Somalia, followed by Sudan.

## ● ENHANCE SUPPORT FOR NGOS, UN AND RC/RC APPEALS, COORDINATION AND SUPPORT SERVICES AND POOLED FUNDS

Italy channelled only 2.0% of its funding through NGOs, compared to the OECD/DAC average of 15.3%. Italy also received the third-lowest score of the OECD/DAC donors for *Funding UN and RC/RC appeals*, which measures the extent to which donors provide their fair share<sup>3</sup> of funding to UN and Red Cross/Red Crescent (RC/RC) appeals, coordination and support services and pooled funds. Italy scored well below average in all components that comprise this indicator. It provided only 6.8% of its fair share to UN appeals, compared to the OECD/DAC average of 41.0%; 5.6% of its fair share to coordination and support services, compared to the OECD/DAC average of 47.5%; 8.3% of its fair share to Red Cross/Red Crescent (RC/RC) appeals, compared to the OECD/DAC average of 117.1%; and 11.7% of its fair share to pooled funds, compared to the OECD/DAC average of 298.0%.

## ● LOOK FOR MEASURES TO EXPEDITE FUNDING TO COMPLEX EMERGENCIES

Italy is fairly timely in its response to sudden onset disasters, but provided only 42.5% of its funding to complex emergencies within the first three months following a humanitarian appeal, compared to the OECD/DAC average of 59.4%. Although still low, this is an improvement from 2009 when Italy provided only 26.5% of its funding within this time frame. Italy's partners were critical of the delays in Italy's funding; it received the lowest score on this qualitative indicator of the OECD/DAC donors.<sup>5</sup>

## ● INCREASE FLEXIBILITY WHILE MAINTAINING PROGRAMME FOLLOW-UP

Italy received the fourth-lowest score for *Un-earmarked funding*. Italy provided only 7.2% of its funding without earmarking to ICRC, UNHCR, WFP, OHCHR, UNICEF, IFRC, OCHA and UNRWA, compared to the OECD/DAC average of 33.2%. Italy's partners seem to confirm this, as Italy received the third-lowest score for the qualitative, survey-based indicator on funding flexibility.




Please see [www.daraint.org](http://www.daraint.org) for a complete list of references.

# JAPAN

Group **3**  
**ASPIRING ACTORS**

HRI 2011 Ranking  
**16th**




**OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE**  
**0.20%**  
 of GNI

**HUMANITARIAN AID**  
**5.7%**  
 of ODA

**US \$5**  
 Per person

## HUMANITARIAN AID DISTRIBUTION (%)



## GENDER RATING POLICY → FUNDING → FIELD PERCEPTION ↓

| STRENGTHS |      |  |       |                          |
|-----------|------|--|-------|--------------------------|
| Pillar    | Type | Indicator                              | Score | % above OECD/DAC average |
| 2         | QT   | Funding reconstruction and prevention  | 10.00 | +123.1%                  |
| 2         | QT   | Reducing climate-related vulnerability | 8.47  | +110.1%                  |
| 2         | QL   | Prevention and risk reduction          | 5.18  | +14.9%                   |
| 1         | QL   | Adapting to changing needs             | 6.97  | +11.0%                   |

| AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT |      |                                    |       |                          |
|-----------------------|------|------------------------------------|-------|--------------------------|
| Pillar                | Type | Indicator                          | Score | % below OECD/DAC average |
| 3                     | QT   | Funding NGOs                       | 0.51  | -88.8%                   |
| 3                     | QT   | Un-earmarked funding               | 0.91  | -82.5%                   |
| 5                     | QT   | Funding accountability initiatives | 0.93  | -77.4%                   |
| 4                     | QT   | Human rights law                   | 1.78  | -71.2%                   |
| 4                     | QT   | Refugee law                        | 2.67  | -52.6%                   |

## OVERALL PERFORMANCE

Japan ranked 16<sup>th</sup> in the HRI 2011, maintaining the same position as 2010. Based on the patterns of its scores, Japan is classified as a Group 3 donor, “Aspiring Actors”. Donors in this group tend to have more limited capacity to engage with the humanitarian system at the field level, but often aspire to take on a greater role in the sector. They generally focus on a few core strengths, such as in the area of prevention, preparedness and risk reduction, or on specific geographic regions. Other donors in the group include Australia, Belgium, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg and Spain.

Overall, Japan scored below the OECD/DAC and Group 3 averages. Japan scored below the OECD/DAC and Group 3 scores in all pillars,

with the exception of Pillar 2, where it scored well above both averages, and Pillar 1, where Japan fell slightly below the OECD/DAC average and above the Group 3 average.

Japan did best compared to its OECD/DAC peers in the quantitative indicators *Funding reconstruction and prevention* and *Reducing climate-related vulnerability* and the qualitative indicators *Prevention and risk reduction* and *Adapting to changing needs*. Its scores were relatively the lowest in the indicators on *Funding NGOs*, *Un-earmarked funding*, *Funding accountability initiatives*, and *Human rights law* and *Refugee law* – all quantitative indicators.

SOURCES: UN OCHA FTS, OECD StatExtracts, various UN agencies' annual reports and DARA

All scores are on a scale of 0 to 10. Colours represent performance compared to OECD/DAC donors' average performance rating:   
 Good (Green), Mid-range (Orange), Could improve (Red), N/A (Grey), QT (Quantitative Indicator), QL (Qualitative Indicator)

# AID DISTRIBUTION

In 2010, Japan's Official Development Assistance (ODA) comprised 0.20% of its Gross National Income (GNI), up from 0.10% in 2009. Humanitarian assistance represented 5.7% of its ODA in 2010, or 0.01% of GNI. The burden of responding to the Tohoku-Pacific Ocean earthquake and tsunami has forced Japan to cut international assistance in 2011: while its bilateral assistance will remain at previous levels, multilateral ODA will be cut drastically (JICA 2011a).

According to data reported to the United Nations (UN) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs' (OCHA) Financial Tracking Service (FTS), Japan channelled 87.4% of its 2010 humanitarian assistance to UN agencies, 7.1% to the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement, 1.7% to non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and 1.0% bilaterally to affected governments. In 2010, Japan funded 20 crises in Asia, 16 in Africa and six in the Americas, with Pakistan, Afghanistan and Haiti receiving the greatest amount (OCHA FTS 2011).

# POLICY FRAMEWORK

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) oversees Japan's humanitarian assistance in conjunction with the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA). The MFA directs emergency grant aid (MFA 2011a), and the Humanitarian Assistance and Emergency Relief Division (HA & ER), created within the International Cooperation Bureau of the MFA in 2009, manages Japan's humanitarian budget. The Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs Division of the MFA's Foreign Policy Bureau is also involved with planning emergency responses. JICA directs bilateral ODA and technical cooperation. It was restructured in 2008 when the Japanese Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) merged with JICA to improve coordination of humanitarian and development activities as well as technical and financial assistance.

Though Japan does not have an overarching humanitarian policy, its actions are governed by a series of laws and policies that generally distinguish

between humanitarian assistance for natural disasters and conflict situations. The 1987 *Japan Disaster Relief Law* governs the dispatch of the Disaster Relief Team, while the 1991 International Peacekeeping Law covers responses to conflict-related disasters, allowing Japanese Self-Defense Forces to participate in international peace-keeping efforts. The *Official Development Assistance Charter* (2003), *Medium Term Policy on Official Development Assistance* (2005) and annual Official Development Assistance White Papers also govern Japan's approach to humanitarian action, in addition to these three laws. Japan's approaches toward disaster risk reduction (DRR), prevention and assistance in the aftermath of conflicts are well integrated with larger development goals such as poverty reduction and peace-building, emphasising seamless assistance spanning prevention, emergency aid, reconstruction and long-term development. JICA has 72 field offices throughout the world (MFA 2010).



## HOW DOES JAPAN'S POLICY ADDRESS GHD CONCEPTS?

### GENDER

Japan has incorporated gender equality into its larger ODA policies, and to a somewhat more limited degree in policies specifically concerning humanitarian action. Japan's ODA Charter declares the importance of using a perspective of gender equality, and JICA has a goal of "gender mainstreaming." In *Japan's Gender Mainstreaming: Inclusive and Dynamic Development*, JICA emphasises the importance of including gender in all of its activities, though it does not specifically highlight gender involvement in humanitarian assistance. The *Thematic Guidelines on Peacebuilding* do, however, highlight the importance of accurately responding to the different needs of both men and women. Japan's taskforce for the development of the *Thematic Guidelines on Peacebuilding* also included a group devoted to Gender Equality and Peacebuilding. Likewise, *The Initiative for Disaster Reduction through ODA* declares Japan's intention to apply a gender perspective in regard to all DRR activities (Government of Japan 2005).

### PILLAR 1

### RESPONDING TO NEEDS

Japan's 2003 *ODA Charter* declares that ODA should be tailored to the "assistance needs" of developing countries, and the 2005 *Medium Term Policy on ODA* further emphasises the importance of targeting the most vulnerable people. In addition, Japan requires needs and impact assessments to be completed at every stage of peace-building operations (JICA 2011b). Though the principles of neutrality, impartiality and independence are not specifically articulated in a humanitarian policy, the HA & ER Division Director Setsuko Kawahara has outlined them as basic tenets of humanitarian assistance (Kawahara 2011). JICA's policies regarding assistance in both disaster and conflict situations also emphasise the importance of swift delivery. The 1987 *Japan Disaster Relief Law* established a comprehensive disaster relief system including a Disaster Relief Team comprised of rescue and medical specialists for rapid deployment to overseas crises, and in 2005, JICA introduced a Fast-Track System to speed the implementation process for post-disaster reconstruction assistance and peace-building support. Japan has also established special procedures to provide emergency grant aid for urgent needs in response to requests from governments and organisations working in countries affected by conflict or natural disasters; the MFA decides the amount and details of this emergency grant aid (MFA 2011a).

## PILLAR 2

# PREVENTION, RISK REDUCTION AND RECOVERY

In 2005, Japan launched the *Initiative for Disaster Risk Reduction* to promote the inclusion of disaster reduction in development assistance and provide for implementation of the *Hyogo Framework for Action* (MFA 2011b). Through this initiative, experts in DRR are deployed in the immediate aftermath of a disaster to assist human capacity development that will enable an emergency response, and DRR assistance is used to link reconstruction to sustainable development (Government of Japan 2005). In 2007, JICA published its *Issue-specific Guidelines for Disaster Reduction*, and in 2008, it created the report *Building Disaster Resilient Societies*. It also stocks four warehouses with emergency relief goods to be prepared for the quick distribution of material aid (JICA 2010). The *Medium Term Policy on ODA* advocates engaging with beneficiaries in all stages of programmes from policy and project formulation through monitoring and evaluation. The *Initiative for Disaster Reduction* and *Thematic Guidelines on Peacebuilding* also highlight the need for supporting self-help efforts in developing countries and using local manpower. In 2008, Japan published the *Capacity Assessment Handbook: Project Management for Realizing Capacity Development* which emphasises the importance of capacity-building in a development context, though without specifically describing humanitarian assistance.

## PILLAR 3

# WORKING WITH HUMANITARIAN PARTNERS

Japan highlights the need for flexible coordination with UN Agencies, other donors, the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement and NGOs, among other entities (Kawahara 2011). Japan has developed methods for coordinating with Japanese NGOs, notably through the Japan Platform, a collaboration of NGOs that provide emergency aid focusing on refugees and victims of natural disasters. In 2010, Japan also established an NGO Advisory Group on the State of International Cooperation by Japan under the MFA to draw on opinions of NGOs working in the field (MFA 2010). Japan's 2003 ODA Charter highlights the importance of flexibility in assistance for peace-building, and according to "A Guide to Japan's Aid," Japan's emergency disaster relief strategy particularly emphasises flexibility and has simplified procedures for emergency relief funding (MFA 1998).

## PILLAR 4

# PROTECTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

Japan clearly upholds the importance of human security and protection in the Medium Term Policy on ODA. JICA's *Handbook for Transition Assistance* explains the importance of upholding international humanitarian law and human rights law in humanitarian assistance for societies transitioning from war to peace (JICA 2006). Japan has strict regulations guiding the security of its humanitarian workers and their involvement in areas with limited humanitarian space. Before self-defence forces can be dispatched to participate in peace-keeping operations, five conditions must be fulfilled, including the existence of a cease-fire and the consent to the operation of the parties involved in the conflict (MFA 1997). Such documents as the *ODA White Paper 2010* and the *Thematic Guidelines on Peacebuilding* likewise emphasise the importance of guaranteeing the safety of personnel, and the MFA maintains that "securing humanitarian space is challenging but essential" (Kawahara 2011).

**PILLAR 5**


**LEARNING AND ACCOUNTABILITY**

Japan has repeatedly affirmed its commitment to maintaining transparency and promoting the public’s access to information on its activities. *Japan’s ODA White Paper 2010* expresses the intention to disclose information about ODA activities and publish reader-friendly evaluation reports, especially in light of faltering public confidence in ODA at the time of publication (MFA 2010). Furthermore, both JICA and the MFA have evaluation systems in place declared to foster accountability in operations. JICA’s *Guidelines for Project Evaluation* (2004) emphasises the importance of accountability to taxpayers as well as to beneficiary countries. These guidelines also stress using evaluations to assess projects’ efficacy, leaving the evaluations open to a public verdict and communicating with both donor and recipient sides at every stage of evaluation.

**FIELD PARTNERS’ PERCEPTIONS**

JAPAN'S FIELD PERCEPTION SCORES

Collected questionnaires: 32



SOURCE: DARA

Japan's average score 5.84 ← ..... → OECD/DAC average score 6.05

Colours represent performance compared to donor's average performance rating:

- Good
- Mid-range
- Could improve

## HOW IS JAPAN PERCEIVED BY ITS PARTNERS?

### GENDER

Japan, along with many other donors, was criticised for its failure to integrate gender issues into programming. Partner organisations conveyed the general idea that all donors superficially address gender, but in reality this is “not an issue.” One interviewee reported that “Japan has no concern for gender at all;” similarly, another said, “Japan is less concerned about gender.”

### PILLAR 1

### RESPONDING TO NEEDS

Most of Japan’s partners considered its humanitarian assistance to be neutral, impartial and independent, although several organisations disagreed. One placed Japan in a group with other large donors whose aid is “less neutral and affected by government policies.” Though some respondents mentioned the economic and political interests underlying Japanese support, another made sure to stress that “Japan respects humanitarian objectives.” Others cited Japan’s heavy focus on funding refugees and its “interest mainly in actions and outputs but not [the] ground situation.” Japan did especially well compared to other donors for ensuring the programmes it supports adapt to changing needs. One interviewee praised Japan’s assistance as free from conditions that impair the ability to deliver aid, and another commended Japan for being “especially strong on tracking needs and adapting to them.” One organisation complained that annual funding prevented funding from being altered to reflect the current situation, however, and others criticised Japan’s poor timeliness of funding, referring to nearly year-long waits to secure approval for programming.

### PILLAR 2

### PREVENTION, RISK REDUCTION AND RECOVERY

Responses from interviewees reveal the need for Japan’s requirements from partners to ensure beneficiary participation in the programmes Japan supports. For example, one respondent noted that donors generally require beneficiary participation in design and implementation of programmes before claiming, “Japan is an exception, since they have never expressed any interest.” Japan’s field partners held varying views regarding Japan’s support for local capacity. One interviewee noted, “Japan is pushing to build capacity for sustainability,” though another organisation lumped Japan together with other donors, saying, “No donor requires or supports local capacity building, they only look at local capacity from a risk reduction point of view. Can local staff ensure aid reaches beneficiaries? How much is diverted by mismanagement in a remote control set up?” Field perceptions of Japan’s support for prevention, preparedness and risk reduction were somewhat mixed, though Japan outperformed many of its peers. One organisation proclaimed Japan to be the best donor for these issues although others considered the support insufficient.

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## PILLAR 3

# WORKING WITH HUMANITARIAN PARTNERS

Several organisations commented that Japan was more flexible than other donors, but one did mention the “extensive administrative process” when flexibility was provided. One interviewee asserted that Japan, among other donors, does “not support any sort of organisational capacity building.” While one implementing partner placed Japan in a group of donors “keen on supporting coordination among actors” and following up with clusters, another claimed Japan was “very government oriented” with an “upstream focus.”

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## PILLAR 4

# PROTECTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

Japan’s field partners largely felt that Japan did not actively advocate for local authorities to fulfill responsibilities in response to the humanitarian needs, though one organisation mentioned Japan as one of a group of donors who advocates indirectly through OCHA. On a similar note, one organisation reported that Japan, together with other donors, does not facilitate access, believing it to be the responsibility of OCHA. In terms of the protection of civilians, interviewees were generally more positive regarding Japan’s funding of protection than its advocacy for protection.

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## PILLAR 5

# LEARNING AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Feedback from the field suggested a need for Japan to improve accountability towards beneficiaries, with interviewees claiming Japan required only “limited accountability to beneficiaries.” Once again, there was some disagreement, as one interviewee praised Japan’s “strong exit strategy based on accountability towards affected populations”. Others complained of Japan’s lack of support for implementing recommendations from evaluations. One organisation mentioned that Japan was honest about its true priorities, and another said Japan was “not very heavy on reporting.”

# RECOMMENDATIONS

## ● FORMALISE COMMITMENT TO HUMANITARIAN PRINCIPLES IN A COMPREHENSIVE HUMANITARIAN POLICY

Japan would do well to create an official humanitarian policy which explains its commitment to *Good Humanitarian Donorship Principles* and unites the information from various web pages and documents into a common humanitarian policy.

## ● STRENGTHEN SUPPORT FOR CAPACITY BUILDING, AND BENEFICIARY ACCOUNTABILITY AND PARTICIPATION

Japan received low scores for the qualitative indicators related to its efforts to ensure beneficiary participation, accountability towards beneficiaries and local capacity building. Its policy appears to take these issues into account more in development contexts, without specifying their equal importance in humanitarian crises. Field partners' low scores seem to confirm that greater emphasis is needed. Japan received the third-lowest scores for *Strengthening local capacity* and *Beneficiary participation* and the second-lowest score for *Accountability towards beneficiaries*.

## ● ENHANCE SUPPORT FOR NGOS, UN AND RC/RC APPEALS, COORDINATION AND SUPPORT SERVICES AND POOLED FUNDS

Japan provides the majority of its funding to UN agencies. As a result, Japan received a low score for its funding to NGOs - only 1.7% of its funding compared to the OECD/DAC average of 15.3%. Although Japan channels most of its funding through UN agencies, it is short of providing its fair share to UN appeals. Japan received a low score for *Funding UN and RC/RC appeals*, which measures the extent to which donors provide their fair share<sup>3</sup> of funding to UN and Red Cross/Red Crescent (RC/RC) appeals, coordination and support services and pooled funds. Japan scored well below average in all components that comprise this indicator. Japan provided 33.6% of its fair share to UN appeals, compared to the OECD/DAC average of 41.0%; 24.4% of its fair share to coordination and support services, compared to the OECD/DAC average of 47.5%; 15.5% of its fair share to Red Cross/Red Crescent (RC/RC) appeals, compared to the OECD/DAC average of 117.1%; and 2.0% of its fair share to pooled funds, compared to the OECD/DAC average of 298.0%.

## ● RENEW COMMITMENT TO HUMAN RIGHTS AND REFUGEE LAW

Japan has signed 19 of 36 human rights treaties and has not established

a national human rights institution. It could also improve its funding to the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), which comprised 0.00001% of its Gross Domestic Product, while the OECD/DAC average was 0.00065%. It also has room for improvement in *Refugee law*, which measures signature and ratification of international treaties, participation in refugee resettlement and related funding. Of the six treaties, Japan has signed two treaties and ratified others. It could also improve its participation in refugee resettlement.

## ● RENEW COMMITMENT TO ACCOUNTABILITY


Japan received a fairly low score for its participation in humanitarian accountability initiatives.<sup>1</sup> However, its financial support of humanitarian accountability initiatives<sup>2</sup> was especially low – only 0.08% of its humanitarian aid was allocated to these initiatives, while the OECD/DAC average was 0.43%.

## ● ENSURE AID MEETS THE DIFFERENT NEEDS OF WOMEN, MEN, BOYS AND GIRLS

Japan's partners indicate the need for greater emphasis on gender-sensitive approaches and follow-up to ensure it is properly integrated into humanitarian programmes.

# LUXEMBOURG

HRI 2011  
Ranking  
**18th**




Group **3**  
ASPIRING  
ACTORS

OFFICIAL  
DEVELOPMENT  
ASSISTANCE **1.09%**  
of GNI

HUMANITARIAN  
AID **16.2%**  
of ODA

**US \$130**  
Per person

## HUMANITARIAN AID DISTRIBUTION (%)



## GENDER RATING

POLICY **↑**

FUNDING **↓**

FIELD PERCEPTION **↓**

### STRENGTHS

| Pillar | Type | Indicator                             | Score | % above OECD/DAC average |
|--------|------|---------------------------------------|-------|--------------------------|
| 3      | QT   | Funding UN and RC/RC appeals          | 7.60  | +86.9%                   |
| 2      | QT   | Funding international risk mitigation | 8.00  | +67.3%                   |
| 1      | QL   | Independence of aid                   | 8.38  | +13.1%                   |
| 1      | QL   | Timely funding to partners            | 7.50  | +7.2%                    |

### AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT

| Pillar | Type | Indicator                                   | Score | % below OECD/DAC average |
|--------|------|---|-------|--------------------------|
| 5      | QT   | Funding and commissioning evaluations       | 0.00  | -100.0%                  |
| 5      | QT   | Participating in accountability initiatives | 0.00  | -100.0%                  |
| 5      | QT   | Funding accountability initiatives          | 0.74  | -82.0%                   |
| 2      | QT   | Reducing climate-related vulnerability      | 1.28  | -68.3%                   |
| 4      | QL   | Advocacy towards local authorities          | 3.55  | -36.2%                   |

## OVERALL PERFORMANCE

Luxembourg ranked 18<sup>th</sup> in the HRI 2011, dropping eight positions from 2010, mainly due to lower scores from its field partners. Based on the patterns of its scores, Luxembourg is classified as a Group 3 donor, "Aspiring Actors". Donors in this group tend to have more limited capacity to engage with the humanitarian system at the field level, but often aspire to take on a greater role in the sector. They generally focus on a few core strengths, such as in the area of prevention, preparedness and risk reduction, or on specific geographic regions. Other donors in the group include Australia, Belgium, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan and Spain.

Luxembourg scored below the OECD/DAC average in all pillars. Compared to other Group 3 donors, Luxembourg was above average

in all pillars, with the exception of Pillar 2 and Pillar 5 (Learning and accountability), where it scored below average.

Luxembourg did best compared to its OECD/DAC peers in indicators on *Funding UN and RC/RC, appeals, Funding international risk mitigation, Independence of aid* and *Timely funding to partners*. Its scores were relatively the lowest in *Funding and commissioning evaluations, Participating in accountability initiatives, Funding accountability initiatives, Reducing climate-related vulnerability* and *Advocacy towards local authorities*. In general, Luxembourg ranked significantly better in the quantitative indicators than in the qualitative, survey-based indicators, which may be due to its limited capacity and field presence.

# AID DISTRIBUTION

Luxembourg was one of the most generous OECD/DAC donors; its Official Development Assistance (ODA) comprised 1.09% of its Gross National Income (GNI) in 2010, up from 1.01% in 2009. Humanitarian assistance represented 16.2% of Luxembourg's ODA in 2010, or 0.167% of its GNI. Luxembourg's 2009-2014 Stability and Growth Programme calls for its ODA to remain at approximately 1% of its GNI (Government of Luxembourg 2010).

According to data reported to the United Nations (UN) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs' (OCHA) Financial Tracking Service (FTS), Luxembourg channelled 46.3% of its aid to UN

agencies in 2010, 34.0% to the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement and 16.2% to non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Luxembourg also supported the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) and Common Humanitarian Fund (CHF). In 2010, Luxembourg supported a total of 42 crises: 18 in Asia, 14 in Africa, seven in the Americas and three in Europe, although a significant portion of Luxembourg's assistance was provided regionally. The top recipient countries in 2010 were Pakistan, Niger and Haiti. Luxembourg primarily allocated its sector specific funding to food, followed by health and economic recovery and infrastructure.

# POLICY FRAMEWORK

Luxembourg's humanitarian assistance is managed by the Department of Humanitarian Aid, which is under the umbrella of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Development Cooperation Directorate (DCD). Its humanitarian action is carried out under the authority of the Minister for Cooperation and Humanitarian Affairs. Luxembourg's guiding strategy paper is titled *Humanitarian Action: Strategies and Orientations* and focuses on the importance of local capacity building, and funding for transition, disaster prevention and preparedness (DCD 2010a). Luxembourg's development and humanitarian

policy have their legal base in the 1996 *Development Cooperation Law*. Its humanitarian action is further guided by the *European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid*, the *Principles of Good Humanitarian Donorship* (GHD) and the *Oslo Guidelines on the Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief* (DCD 2010a). Luxembourg has also developed sector-specific policies on gender, the environment and water, sanitation and hygiene, among others. Every year Parliament must approve the humanitarian budget as part of the government's overall budget.



## HOW DOES LUXEMBOURG'S POLICY ADDRESS GHD CONCEPTS?

### GENDER

DCD published *Gender: Strategies and Orientations* in 2010 with the aim of promoting gender mainstreaming and gender-specific activities, which is echoed in the *Humanitarian Action: Strategy and Orientation* paper. Some of the practical implications for gender mainstreaming include: integrating the gender dimension into the DCD's policy tools, educating DCD staff on the issue of gender and developing systems of monitoring and evaluation that integrate gender. The strategy paper highlights Luxembourg's support for relevant multilateral organisations and encourages partners to development projects to promote gender equality.

### PILLAR 1

### RESPONDING TO NEEDS

Luxembourg's policy expresses a clear commitment to humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence (DCD 2010a). Luxembourg works to support the primary needs of affected populations, placing particular attention on addressing the needs of vulnerable groups, such as women and children, the elderly, the handicapped, internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees, prisoners, orphans and separated families (DCD 2010a). DCD also asserts the importance of responding to forgotten crises (DCD 2010a). In its *2007 Annual Report*, Luxembourg states that it seeks to provide timely funding through its cooperation with OCHA and contributions to the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF). In addition, Luxembourg has entered a joint undertaking with several private companies to create a rapid response communications system called "emergency.lu" (DCD 2011).

### PILLAR 2

### PREVENTION, RISK REDUCTION AND RECOVERY

Luxembourg's humanitarian policy states that within humanitarian action, Luxembourg places a particular emphasis on issues of environmental protection and climate change (DCD 2010a). With regards to disaster risk reduction (DRR), Luxembourg strives to spend at least five percent of its humanitarian budget on building local capacities, strengthening national and regional risk prevention strategies, raising awareness and preparing local population for disasters. Luxembourg recognises the importance of linking relief to rehabilitation and development (LRRD) in its *Humanitarian Action: Strategies and Orientations* paper (DCD 2010a). Participation of affected populations and national ownership are mentioned as one of the guiding principles in Luxembourg's humanitarian policy (DCD 2010a). Accordingly, humanitarian action should, wherever possible, promote the participation of beneficiaries in decision-making of needs-assessments, programme design and implementation (DCD 2010a). Finally, DCD often adopts a strategy to prevent the resurgence of violence after a period of calamity (DCD 2009).

### PILLAR 3

## WORKING WITH HUMANITARIAN PARTNERS

Luxembourg recognises the UN, and particularly OCHA, as having a central role in coordinating relief, both with partners and donors. It also recognises the importance of efforts to reform the humanitarian system and make it more coherent. It praises the cluster approach as a means to making humanitarian action more efficient and requires its partners to participate in and strengthen national and international coordination mechanisms (DCD 2010a). Luxembourg has contributed to a variety of pooled funding mechanisms, such as multi-donor funds and CERF (DCD 2009). Its *Humanitarian Action: Strategies and Orientations* sets out clear guidelines and duration periods for projects (one year for emergency assistance and three years for transitional contexts); making an exception for crisis prevention and risk reduction initiatives (DCD 2010a). Luxembourg's policy does not seem to favour Luxembourgian NGOs over those of other nationalities, and provides NGOs with predefined annual funding allocations. It has also signed multi-annual funding agreements with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), World Food Programme (WFP) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) with the aim of providing predictable and flexible funding.

### PILLAR 4

## PROTECTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

DCD attaches particular importance to the protection of minorities and vulnerable persons and purports to guarantee the protection and physical security of populations in disaster affected areas by supporting programmes for disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration, return and reintegration of IDPs and refugees, demining and defusing of unexploded devices, as well as policing bodies (DCD 2010a). In addition, Luxembourg affirms its commitment to the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) (DCD 2010a). *Humanitarian Action: Strategies and Orientation* expresses support for international humanitarian law, human rights and the Geneva Convention, but does not specifically highlight refugee law. Luxembourg's policy on the facilitation of safe humanitarian access and the safety of humanitarian workers is not clear.

### PILLAR 5


## LEARNING AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Luxembourg created an Evaluation and Audit Unit in 2001, which has carried out a number of evaluations of Luxembourg's development and humanitarian assistance (DCD 2004). *Humanitarian Action: Strategies and Orientations* notes that Luxembourg will reimburse partners for costs associated with monitoring and evaluation (DCD 2010a). Luxembourg requires its partners to abide by quality standards, including the *Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief*, SPHERE standards, the technical guidance of the World Health Organization and the principle of "Do No Harm" (DCD 2010a). Luxembourg's position regarding transparency of funding and accountability toward beneficiaries is not clear from its policy.

# FIELD PARTNERS' PERCEPTIONS

## LUXEMBOURG'S FIELD PERCEPTION SCORES

Collected questionnaires: 17



Colours represent performance compared to donor's average performance rating:

- Good
- Mid-range
- Could improve

## HOW IS LUXEMBOURG PERCEIVED BY ITS PARTNERS?

### GENDER

Field partners seem to indicate that Luxembourg could strengthen its efforts to ensure gender-sensitive approaches. One organisation commented, “Luxembourg is not very strict on this compared to other donors though it does require sex and age disaggregated data.” Another interviewee observed some improvement in this regard: “This wasn't a requirement two years ago, but now is. They ask for this in every project. I don't know if they will check it on it though.”

### PILLAR 1

### RESPONDING TO NEEDS

Luxembourg's field partners are appreciative of the neutrality, impartiality, independence of its funding. However, a few organisations felt its aid could be more closely aligned with need. One organisation pointed to different approaches of the decentralized aid compared to the Ministry: “Luxembourg communes may only be interested in funding certain activities whereas the Luxembourg ministry funds the entire project from A to Z.” Regarding Luxembourg's efforts to ensure the programmes it supports adapt to changing needs, field partners gave low scores. One interviewee, for example, considered that “Luxembourg doesn't have a clue what the needs are.” Another reported the following: “usually we have a contract for a certain period with Luxembourg and they want you to do what you have said you would do. If there are changes you can make them in the next period. Funding periods normally last one year.” Partners largely considered Luxembourg's funding timely, though one interviewee noted that it depends on the availability of funding: “Yes and no. When Luxembourg has the money, it's fine. They are quite fast. Once you have a green light for funding, it's fast.”

### PILLAR 2

### PREVENTION, RISK REDUCTION AND RECOVERY

Feedback from Luxembourg's field partners seems to point to a need for improvement in Pillar 2 indicators. While some interviewees felt that “Strengthening local capacity is one of the pillars for Luxembourg,” and “they are big on working with local institutions,” others noted that they are scared to work with local NGOs due to corruption issues.” Feedback was regarding support for transitional activities and linking relief to rehabilitation and development. One interviewee commended Luxembourg, stating, “Compared to other donors, Luxembourg is very interested in LRRD.” Others reported problems in this regard: “We have a problem with Luxembourg with this because they want to keep them separate, probably because they have separate funding schemes.” Feedback was generally negative regarding beneficiary participation and support for prevention, preparedness and risk reduction, though one organisation reported receiving support for this: “with Luxembourg it used to be more for conflict and disaster prevention and now it is a lot on preparedness and DRR.”

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## PILLAR 3

# WORKING WITH HUMANITARIAN PARTNERS

Luxembourg's partner organisations seem to consider its funding sufficiently flexible. When asked about the flexibility of its funding, one interviewee noted, "For Luxembourg it depends how much funding they have. If they have a lot, yes." Another reported: "For the Luxembourg Ministry, we can move money between budget lines, but if we do we have to make a ledger." Its scores for supporting the organisational capacity of its partners were significantly lower. "For the Luxembourg Ministry, if we need more staff they will support us. For the Luxembourg communes, they don't support our contingency planning or support us with more staff if we need it."

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## PILLAR 4

# PROTECTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

Partner organisations seem to find Luxembourg's advocacy toward local authorities weak, however one interviewee disagreed, stating: "Luxembourg is a small country but with a very active diplomacy". Luxembourg's partners seem to consider it a strong financial supporter of the protection of civilians, rating it lower for advocacy for protection. Luxembourg also received low marks for its efforts to facilitate humanitarian access and the safety of aid workers.

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## PILLAR 5

# LEARNING AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Luxembourg's partners generally consider its reporting requirements appropriate. Though its scores for *Implementing evaluation recommendations* were significantly lower, several organisations reported positive experiences: "Luxembourg applies lessons learnt in different programmes and different crises to others. There are bridges between programmes and projects even about technical issues." Another interviewee noted that Luxembourg wants us to do evaluations and have a management response on the recommendations." Most organisations felt that Luxembourg was transparent about its funding and decision-making. "We are very happy," stated one interviewee when asked about Luxembourg's transparency. Another organisation disagreed, stating: "Luxembourg is not very transparent. You don't hear much how they decide or how many organisations apply."

# RECOMMENDATIONS

## ● RENEW COMMITMENT TO LEARNING AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Luxembourg has significant room for improvement in its support for learning and accountability. It has not participated in any of the initiatives for humanitarian accountability included in the indicator *Participating in accountability initiatives*.<sup>1</sup> Luxembourg's financial support for learning and accountability<sup>2</sup> was also low - only 0.06% of its humanitarian funding, while the OECD/DAC average was 0.43%. Furthermore, it has not published evaluation guidelines and has not commissioned any publicly-accessible evaluations over the past five years.

## ● INVEST ADEQUATELY IN PREVENTION, PREPAREDNESS, RISK REDUCTION AND TRANSITIONAL ACTIVITIES

With the exception of its funding international risk mitigation mechanisms, Pillar 2 appears to be a weakness for Luxembourg. In particular, it could improve its efforts to reduce climate-related vulnerability. Luxembourg provided only 32.6% of its fair share<sup>3</sup> to Fast Start Finance, which supports climate change mitigation and adaptation efforts, compared to the OECD/DAC average of 102.4%. Furthermore, it has fallen short on its commitments to reduce emissions.

Luxembourg's partners seem to confirm the need for greater investment in prevention, preparedness and risk reduction, as well as transitional activities (LRRD), scoring well below average in both of these qualitative, survey-based indicators.

## ● ENHANCE PROGRAMME MONITORING TO IMPROVE BENEFICIARY PARTICIPATION AND STRENGTHEN LOCAL CAPACITY

Also in Pillar 2, Luxembourg scored below average in *Beneficiary participation* and *Strengthening local capacity*, both of which could be influenced by Luxembourg's limited capacity. Luxembourg received the second-lowest score for this indicator. While Luxembourg may not be able to increase in size and capacity, it should strive to increase programme follow-up through other means to ensure its partners strengthen local capacity and involve beneficiaries.

## ● ENGAGE IN DIALOGUE WITH PARTNERS TO PARTICIPATE IN ADVOCACY AS APPROPRIATE

Luxembourg received a low score for the qualitative indicator *Advocacy towards local authorities*. Luxembourg should engage in dialogue with its partners to discuss the most appropriate means to advocate for local authorities to fulfill their responsibilities in response to the humanitarian needs in each crisis.

## ● ENSURE AID MEETS THE DIFFERENT NEEDS OF WOMEN, MEN, BOYS AND GIRLS


Luxembourg's partners indicate the need for greater emphasis on gender-sensitive approaches and follow-up to ensure it is properly integrated into humanitarian programmes.



Please see [www.daraint.org](http://www.daraint.org) for a complete list of references.

# NETHERLANDS

HRI 2011  
Ranking  
**5th**






Group **1**  
PRINCIPLED  
PARTNERS

OFFICIAL  
DEVELOPMENT  
ASSISTANCE **0.81%**  
of GNI

HUMANITARIAN  
AID **6.8%**  
of ODA

**US \$26**  
Per person

## HUMANITARIAN AID DISTRIBUTION (%)



## GENDER RATING

POLICY

FUNDING

FIELD PERCEPTION

### STRENGTHS

| Pillar | Type | Indicator                                    | Score | % above OECD/DAC average |
|--------|------|--|-------|--------------------------|
| 2      | QT   | Funding reconstruction and prevention        | 10.00 | +123.1%                  |
| 3      | QT   | Un-earmarked funding                         | 10.00 | +92.9%                   |
| 2      | QL   | Strengthening local capacity                 | 6.95  | +20.3%                   |
| 1      | QT   | Funding vulnerable and forgotten emergencies | 8.23  | +19.2%                   |
| 2      | QL   | Beneficiary participation                    | 5.62  | +17.1%                   |

### AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT

| Pillar | Type | Indicator                             | Score | % below OECD/DAC average |
|--------|------|---------------------------------------|-------|--------------------------|
| 3      | QT   | Funding NGOs                          | 1.22  | -73.2%                   |
| 4      | QT   | International humanitarian law        | 4.72  | -22.9%                   |
| 5      | QT   | Funding and commissioning evaluations | 3.28  | -20.8%                   |
| 5      | QT   | Funding accountability initiatives    | 3.59  | -12.8%                   |
| 1      | QT   | Timely funding to complex emergencies | 7.20  | -8.9%                    |

## OVERALL PERFORMANCE

The Netherlands ranked 5<sup>th</sup> in the HRI 2011, improving four positions from 2010. Based on the pattern of its scores, the Netherlands is classified as a Group 1 donor, "Principled Partners". This group is characterised by its commitment to humanitarian principles and strong support for multilateral partners, and generally good overall performance in all areas. Other Group 1 donors include Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland.

The Netherlands' overall score was above the OECD/DAC average, yet below the Group 1 average. The Netherlands scored above the OECD/DAC average in all pillars, with the exception of Pillar 5 (Learning and accountability), where it was average. Compared to

Group 1 donors, the Netherlands was below average in all pillars, except for Pillar 2 (Prevention, risk reduction and recovery), where it scored above average.

The Netherlands did best compared to its OECD/DAC peers in the indicators on *Funding reconstruction and prevention*, *Un-earmarked funding*, *Strengthening local capacity*, *Funding vulnerable and forgotten emergencies* and *Beneficiary participation*. Its scores were relatively the lowest in the indicators on *Funding NGOs*, *International humanitarian law*, *Funding and commissioning evaluations*, *Funding accountability initiatives* and *Timely funding to complex emergencies*.

# AID DISTRIBUTION

The Netherlands' Official Development Assistance (ODA) comprised 0.81% of its Gross National Income (GNI) in 2010, a slight decrease from 2009. Humanitarian assistance represented 6.8% of the Netherlands' ODA in 2010, or 0.062% of its GNI. Reforms proposed in the Netherlands' new development strategy foresee a reduction of ODA/GNI to 0.7%, with an intermediary step of 0.75% in 2011 (MinBuZa 2011a).

According to data reported to the United Nations (UN) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs' (OCHA) Financial Tracking Service (FTS) (2011), the

Netherlands channelled 60.7% of its humanitarian assistance to UN agencies, 15.2% to the Red Cross/ Red Crescent Movement 7.1% to private organisations and foundations and 4.0% to non-governmental organisations (NGOs). The Netherlands supported a total of 26 crises in 2010: 12 in Africa, 10 in Asia and four in the Americas. The top recipient countries in 2010 were Pakistan, Haiti and Sudan. In 2010, the Netherlands focused its sector-specific funding primarily on coordination, education and food.

# POLICY FRAMEWORK

The Netherlands' humanitarian assistance is managed by the Humanitarian Aid Division (DMH/HH), which is part of Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Human Rights, Gender, Good Governance and Humanitarian Aid Department. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' 2006 *Grant Regulations*, the Minister for Development Cooperation, recently replaced by the Minister for European Affairs and International Cooperation, has the authority to award grants for emergency aid or conflict management (Government of the Netherlands 2008a). The Department for Fragile States and Peace-building (EFV) manages early recovery assistance, although this is not funded through the humanitarian budget, and the Department for United Nations and Financial Institutes (DVF) provides core funding to a number of United Nations (UN) agencies.

The Netherlands has published a number of documents on its humanitarian policy, such as the

*A World of Difference* (1990) and *A World of Dispute* (1993). Further policy objectives are published in the *Grant Policy Frameworks for Humanitarian Aid, 2004 and 2005* and more recently, the 2008 *Humanitarian Aid Policy Rules (and annexes)* (IOB 2006 and OECD DAC 2006). These policy rules also serve as guidelines to organisations applying for funding. In 2011, the Netherlands created a new overarching strategy on foreign policy set out in the *Focus Letter on Development*. It has identified the following priorities for its humanitarian and development assistance until 2015: security and rule of law, sexual and reproductive health, water and food security (MinBuZa 2011a). The Netherlands' humanitarian aid division is expected to publish a new humanitarian policy this year, in which it will further specify the role for its humanitarian assistance (MinBuZa 2011b).



## HOW DOES NETHERLAND'S POLICY ADDRESS GHD CONCEPTS?

### GENDER

The 2008 *Humanitarian Policy Rules* require a focus on gender as one of the general criteria for NGOs to apply for funding (Government of the Netherlands 2008). Further specifics are not provided, however. Previous evaluations have encouraged the Netherlands to consider creating explicit gender-sensitive requirements for partner organisations (IOB 2006).

### PILLAR 1

### RESPONDING TO NEEDS

The Netherlands seeks to provide humanitarian assistance on the basis of needs while adhering to the principles of neutrality, impartiality and independence (IOB 2006). Over the years, the Netherlands' policy has become more explicit with regards to identifying vulnerable groups, particularly women and children (IOB 2006 and OECD DAC 2006), and this is reiterated in its most recent policy document. The Netherlands also places emphasis on timeliness, which it aims to achieve by supporting the UN as the central coordinator of humanitarian assistance and through the creation of Channel Financing Agreements (Government of the Netherlands 2008a).

### PILLAR 2

### PREVENTION, RISK REDUCTION AND RECOVERY

The Netherlands' humanitarian policy takes a "humanitarian plus" stance to humanitarian action in an effort to integrate relief with development (IOB 2006). However, it is limited in doing so from a funding perspective as humanitarian budgets are only meant for the acute needs and early recovery phases. To overcome this, the Netherlands established a Stability Fund in 2004 to facilitate the transition to rehabilitation and reconstruction (IOB 2006). Other budget lines, while not part of humanitarian aid per se, also provide funding for prevention and preparedness (IOB 2006 and OECD/DAC 2006). The 2008 *Humanitarian Aid Policy Rules* reaffirm the need to address the gap between relief and development. It further mentions capacity building and beneficiary participation as one of its main guiding principles (Government of the Netherlands 2008a).

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## PILLAR 3

# WORKING WITH HUMANITARIAN PARTNERS

The Netherlands' humanitarian policy stresses the importance of coordination, and recognises the special role of the UN and its various agencies in this regard. The Netherlands intends to strengthen and develop a common, coordinated approach among donors and other relevant actors (OECD DAC 2006). In order to be eligible to receive funding, NGOs must participate in OCHA-led coordination mechanisms (Government of the Netherlands 2008a). In recognition of the need for flexible funding, the Netherlands signed the Channel Financing Agreements in 2003-2004 with several UN agencies and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), providing them with one large allocation per year, earmarked only at the appeal level (IOB 2006). The 2008 *Humanitarian Aid Policy Rules* relating to NGO funding appear considerably stricter in terms of flexibility and extension (Government of the Netherlands 2008a).

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## PILLAR 4

# PROTECTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

The Netherlands affirms that its humanitarian assistance is guided by both the humanitarian imperative and international humanitarian law. In its previous humanitarian policy documents, the Netherlands has vowed to actively promote these principles, along with human rights and refugee law (IOB 2006). With regards to protection, the Netherlands has commissioned evaluations on these issues in an effort to improve their performance. The Netherlands' undertakes diplomatic action when necessary to facilitate humanitarian access and the safety of aid workers (IOB 2006 and OECD/DAC 2006). However, the 2008 *Humanitarian Aid Policy Rules* declare that the responsibility of aid worker security lies with the NGOs (Government of the Netherlands 2008a).

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## PILLAR 5


# LEARNING AND ACCOUNTABILITY

The use and implementation of quality and accountability standards have been actively promoted by the Netherlands. It has financially supported accountability initiatives such as the Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action (ALNAP), the Humanitarian Accountability Partnership International and Sphere. The ICRC and UN agencies benefit from more flexible reporting requirements, as they are funding through the Channel Financing Agreements, while reporting requirements for NGOs are relatively stricter (IOB 2006 and OECD/DAC 2006).

# FIELD PARTNERS' PERCEPTIONS

## NETHERLANDS' FIELD PERCEPTION SCORES

Collected questionnaires: 31



SOURCE: DARA

OECD/DAC average score 6.05 ← Netherlands' average score 6.39

Colours represent performance compared to donor's average performance rating:

Good (Dark Orange) Mid-range (Light Orange) Could improve (Very Light Orange)

## HOW IS NETHERLANDS PERCEIVED BY ITS PARTNERS?

### GENDER

The Netherlands' field partners seem to indicate the need for a greater focus on gender. Some organisations reported that gender is “part of the proposal design” for the Netherlands, but “they don’t emphasise it anymore.”

### PILLAR 1

## RESPONDING TO NEEDS

Most of the Netherlands’ partners consider its aid neutral, impartial and independent, although a few held dissenting opinions: “The Netherlands pays lip service to humanitarian principles, but are beholden to decisions in their capital driven by the domestic political agenda.” Another organisation criticised that the Netherlands, “should be more interested in meeting gaps [of needs] and saving lives. If they are not, you wonder why they started funding in the first place.” On the other hand, an organisation felt that “the Netherlands has a lot of field presence,” which helped to ensure programmes adapt to changing needs.

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## PILLAR 2

# PREVENTION, RISK REDUCTION AND RECOVERY

Compared to other donors, the Netherlands does well in Pillar 2 indicators, particularly for its support of local capacity. However, partner organisations gave lower scores for *Beneficiary participation*, *Linking relief to rehabilitation and development* and *Prevention and risk reduction*. Regarding the latter, one organisation noted that they were requirements “on paper, but there’s no follow-up.”

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## PILLAR 3

# WORKING WITH HUMANITARIAN PARTNERS

Partner organisations were mostly positive regarding the flexibility of Dutch funding. Some organisations praised the Netherlands, stating that “the Dutch have very good flexibility and high capacity to adapt to needs.” Similarly, another organisation affirmed: “the Netherlands are more flexible on funding.” On the other hand, a few organisations commented that “the Dutch have heavy procedures to do cost extensions.” Most organisations felt that the Netherlands was supportive of their organisational capacity, one noting that they “ask for the training of national staff.”

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## PILLAR 4

# PROTECTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

The response from the field in relation to the Netherlands’ government’s commitment to protection and international law is particularly positive. One organisation stated that “the Netherlands is the only one offering funding for advocacy positions on protection of civilians”, while another organisation, in relation to facilitating safe humanitarian access, commented that “the Dutch government has been particularly engaged, in fact, their engagement has been extraordinary.”

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## PILLAR 5

# LEARNING AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Compared to its donor peers, the Netherlands’ received one of the highest scores for *Accountability towards beneficiaries*, though notably below its qualitative average, as this is a common weakness among donors. One organisation reported that “they [the Netherlands] consider accountability key and have the commitment to manage.” Regarding the implementation of evaluation recommendations, an interviewee claimed that “the Netherlands does not closely follow the implementation of the project. Their participation is merely through funding.” In relation to transparency, one of the recipient agencies commented that the “decision-making process stays at the headquarters level in the case of the Dutch ministry for foreign affairs, so we really do not get that much information.”

# RECOMMENDATIONS

## ● LOOK FOR ADMINISTRATIVE SOLUTIONS TO CHANNEL MORE FUNDING TO NGOS

The Netherlands provides a large portion of its funding through multilateral channels, but has one of the lowest scores for its funding to NGOs. In 2010, the Netherlands channelled 4.0% to NGOs, while the Group 1 average is 15.3%. Staff cut-backs will likely make it difficult for the Netherlands to manage a large number of grants to NGO partners, but it may be able to increase its support to NGOs and reduce somewhat the administrative burden by creating flexible working models, such as shared management arrangements with other donors, supporting NGO umbrella organisations or consortia.

## ● FORMALISE COMMITMENT TO INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW

In Pillar 4, the Netherlands could improve its commitment to *International humanitarian law*, which measures signature and ratification of treaties, funding to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and establishment of a national committee to ensure respect of ratified treaties. The Netherlands has signed 49 of 50 treaties on international humanitarian law. However, it provided 0.005% of its GDP to the ICRC, below the Group 1 average of 0.01%. Furthermore, the Netherlands is one of only four OECD/DAC donor countries

without a national committee.

The Netherlands is encouraged to establish a national committee to ensure respect of ratified humanitarian treaties and to consider increasing its support of the ICRC.


## ● RENEW SUPPORT OF LEARNING AND ACCOUNTABILITY INITIATIVES

The Netherlands' partners consider it one of the better donors for ensuring accountability toward beneficiaries. It could improve, however, its funding for humanitarian learning and accountability initiatives. The Netherlands provided 0.31% of its humanitarian funding for these initiatives,<sup>2</sup> compared to the OECD/DAC average of 0.43% and the Group 1 average of 0.69%.



Please see [www.daraint.org](http://www.daraint.org) for a complete list of references.

# NEW ZEALAND






**OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE**  
**0.26%**  
 of GNI

**HUMANITARIAN AID**  
**10.9%**  
 of ODA

**US \$9**  
 Per person

## HUMANITARIAN AID DISTRIBUTION (%)



## GENDER RATING

POLICY →

FUNDING →

FIELD PERCEPTION N/A

### STRENGTHS

| Pillar | Type | Indicator                             | Score | % above OECD/DAC average |
|--------|------|---------------------------------------|-------|--------------------------|
| 2      | QT   | Funding reconstruction and prevention | 10.00 | +123.2%                  |
| 3      | QT   | Un-earmarked funding                  | 8.03  | +55.0%                   |
| 4      | QT   | Human rights law                      | 8.99  | +45.7%                   |

### AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT

| Pillar | Type | Indicator                              | Score | % below OECD/DAC average |
|--------|------|--|-------|--------------------------|
| 3      | QT   | Funding NGOs                           | 0.92  | -79.7%                   |
| 5      | QT   | Funding accountability initiatives     | 1.16  | -71.9%                   |
| 1      | QT   | Timely funding to complex emergencies  | 2.83  | -64.3%                   |
| 3      | QT   | Funding UN and RC/RC appeals           | 1.92  | -52.8%                   |
| 2      | QT   | Reducing climate-related vulnerability | 2.38  | -40.9%                   |

## OVERALL PERFORMANCE

New Zealand is not included in the overall ranking, as insufficient survey responses were obtained to calculate the qualitative indicators that make up the index.

New Zealand's overall scores in the HRI's quantitative indicators were below the OECD/DAC and Group 3 averages. New Zealand scored below the OECD/DAC and Group 3 averages in all pillars, with the exception of Pillar 2 and Pillar 4 (Protection and international law), where it scored above the OECD/DAC and Group 3 averages.

New Zealand did best compared to its OECD/DAC peers in the indicators on *Funding reconstruction and prevention*, *Un-earmarked funding* and *Human rights law*. Its scores were relatively the lowest in indicators on *Funding NGOs*, *Funding accountability initiatives*, *Timely funding to complex emergencies*, *Funding UN and RC/RC appeals* and *Reducing climate-related vulnerability*.

# AID DISTRIBUTION

In 2010, Official Development Assistance (ODA) comprised 0.26% of New Zealand's Gross National Income (GNI), and humanitarian assistance made up 10.9% of its ODA, constituting .026% of its total GNI.

According to data reported to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs' (OCHA) Financial Tracking Service (FTS), in 2010, New

Zealand channelled 81.9% of its humanitarian aid to UN agencies, 6.0% to the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement, 3.0% to NGOs and 2.4% bilaterally to affected governments. In 2010, New Zealand funded four emergencies in Africa, three in Asia, three in the Americas and one in Oceania (OCHA FTS 2011).

# POLICY FRAMEWORK

The International Development Group, a division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT), directs New Zealand's humanitarian aid through the New Zealand Aid Programme. The New Zealand Aid Programme draws on the expertise gained by its predecessor, the New Zealand Agency for International Development (NZAID), which was dissolved in April 2009 when its semi-autonomous status was rescinded and it was reintegrated into MFAT and renamed (New Zealand Aid Programme 2011a). This restructuring was intended to improve effectiveness and efficiency and better situate the programme to link development, trade and diplomacy in New Zealand's foreign policy (MFAT 2010a). During this transition, the Humanitarian Action Fund was discontinued, and the Humanitarian Response Fund was created to provide disaster relief, recovery and reconstruction assistance through non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in the wake of disasters. The

New Zealand Aid Programme coordinates with New Zealand's Emergency Task Force (ETF) to respond to disasters and the New Zealand Defence Force and the New Zealand Police to support peace-building and conflict prevention efforts (New Zealand Aid Programme 2011b). A new humanitarian action policy is expected to be completed in late 2011.

New Zealand Aid Programme representatives are stationed at four embassies in countries in Southeast Asia and the Pacific (MFAT 2011). The New Zealand Aid Programme often plays a leading role in responding to humanitarian needs in the Pacific, taking a "hands-on, whole of government approach" to such crises (New Zealand Aid Programme 2011d). Responses beyond this region are generally part of a larger international effort in collaboration with United Nations (UN) agencies, the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement and local, international or New Zealand NGOs (New Zealand Aid Programme 2011d).

## HOW DOES NEW ZEALAND'S POLICY ADDRESS GHD CONCEPTS?

### GENDER

NZAID strives for "gender mainstreaming" and more recently, the *2011 International Development Policy Statement* named gender as a cross-cutting and thematic issue that will be taken into account in all New Zealand Aid Programme activities. In 2007, NZAID published *Achieving Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment*, which plans to reduce gender-based violence and take into account women's and men's differing needs, priorities and experiences, particularly in conflict and post-conflict settings. *Preventing Conflict and Building Peace* further emphasises gender sensitivity in peace-building and conflict prevention work and recognises the specific roles for women in these efforts.

## PILLAR 1

# RESPONDING TO NEEDS

New Zealand has affirmed its commitment to providing need-based assistance; the scale and human impact of a crisis as well as requests for assistance from the affected country's government guide New Zealand's humanitarian responses (New Zealand Aid Programme 2011d). MFAT also identifies needs in the wake of a disaster before funding NGOs through the Humanitarian Response Fund (MFAT 2010b). Through this mechanism, the New Zealand Aid Programme supports timely humanitarian assistance funding by delivering "fast and effective relief, recovery and reconstruction via non-government organisations (NGOs)," (MFAT 2010b). NZAID's 2005 publication *Preventing Conflict and Building Peace* similarly mentions the need for targeting "at risk" sections of society. This document also highlights the need for humanitarian assistance to be neutral, impartial and independent although it remains to be seen if efforts to link development more closely with diplomacy and trade will affect the independence of humanitarian assistance.

## PILLAR 2

# PREVENTION, RISK REDUCTION AND RECOVERY

The New Zealand Aid Programme has asserted its commitment to providing humanitarian assistance in the Pacific, spanning from disaster preparedness to response and recovery (New Zealand Aid Programme 2011d). It also emphasises the importance of disaster risk reduction (2011d), and NZAID's 2006 *Environment in International Development* mentions the goal of enhancing preparation for natural disasters. NZAID's peace policy also highlights measures for conflict prevention (NZAID 2005), and the Humanitarian Response Fund provides funding to NGOs for disaster response preparation (MFAT 2010). In addition, *Preventing Conflict and Building Peace* explains the importance of ensuring a "seamless transition from humanitarian relief work to longer-term development activities." The New Zealand Aid Programme has articulated its commitment to building local capacity and fostering beneficiary participation for all its undertakings in the *2011 International Development Policy Statement* (New Zealand Aid Programme 2011e), while *Preventing Conflict and Building Peace* stresses the importance of these principles in conflict prevention and management activities.



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### PILLAR 3

## WORKING WITH HUMANITARIAN PARTNERS

New Zealand plays a particularly important role in the coordination of international and local resources for humanitarian responses in the Pacific. As a member of the France, Australia and New Zealand (FRANZ) agreement, it may engage in joint crisis responses in conjunction with France and Australia (New Zealand Aid Programme 2011d). The New Zealand Aid Programme provides annual core funding to multilateral partners and also supports the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement, UN agencies and civil society organisations (New Zealand Aid Programme 2011d). The Humanitarian Response Fund allocates funding for disaster preparedness, relief, recovery and reconstruction to accredited New Zealand NGOs, and the *2011 International Development Policy Statement* asserts New Zealand's intention to channel more aid through New Zealand NGOs for humanitarian emergency and disaster relief. The *2011 International Development Policy Statement* also mentions increasing responsiveness and flexibility as a goal, though not specifically in the context of humanitarian assistance.

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### PILLAR 4

## PROTECTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

New Zealand's humanitarian engagements prioritise the safety of civilians (New Zealand Aid Programme 2011d), and NZAID asserted a strong commitment to human rights in its 2002 *Human Rights Policy Statement*. NZAID also upheld its support for international humanitarian law in peace-building activities and followed the principle 'Do No Harm' and Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) guidelines for the delivery of humanitarian assistance (NZAID 2005). New Zealand's formal policy on safe humanitarian access and advocacy toward local authorities is not clear.

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### PILLAR 5

## LEARNING AND ACCOUNTABILITY

The *2011 International Development Policy Statement* explains that the New Zealand Aid Programme carries out reviews and evaluations to assess programme performance and effectiveness and to foster learning and accountability. MFAT also publishes an annual report to this effect. The New Zealand Aid Programme has an Evaluation and Research Committee to oversee evaluative activities and ensure that their findings inform future programme planning. It also stresses the need to share knowledge within the Aid Programme and with development partners and other donors (New Zealand Aid Programme 2011f). The former NZAID published the *2007 NZAID Evaluation Policy Statement* which highlights fairness and accountability towards beneficiaries.

# RECOMMENDATIONS

## ● ENSURE CRISIS SELECTION IS BASED ON NEED

New Zealand received a low score for the indicator *Funding vulnerable and forgotten emergencies*, which measures funding to forgotten emergencies and those with the greatest vulnerability. New Zealand was slightly below average for its support of forgotten emergencies – 25.9% of its funding, compared to the OECD/DAC average of 32.1%. New Zealand tends to prioritise crises in its geographic region. As a result, it provides less funding to crises with high levels of vulnerability when compared to other donors. New Zealand designated 41.6% of its humanitarian funding for these crises, compared to the Group 3 average of 63.0% and the OECD/DAC average of 63.9%. New Zealand could review its funding criteria to ensure it responds to crises with the greatest need at the global level while maintaining its niche in the Asia-Pacific.

## ● EXPLORE OPTIONS TO EXPEDITE FUNDING TO COMPLEX EMERGENCIES

New Zealand does fairly well in responding in a timely manner to sudden onset emergencies, but could improve the timeliness of its funding to complex emergencies. New Zealand provided 21.2% of its funding for complex emergencies within the first three months of a humanitarian appeal. The OECD/DAC average was 59.4%.

## ● LOOK FOR ADMINISTRATIVE SOLUTIONS TO CHANNEL MORE FUNDING TO NGOS

New Zealand channelled only 3.0% of its humanitarian funding to NGOs, compared to the OECD/DAC average of 15.3%. As New Zealand may not be able to handle a large number of smaller contracts to NGOs, it could explore flexible working models, such as shared management arrangements with other donors and supporting NGO umbrella organisations or NGOs of other nationalities.

## ● ENHANCE SUPPORT FOR UN AND RC/RC APPEALS, COORDINATION AND SUPPORT SERVICES AND POOLED FUNDS

New Zealand received a low score for *Funding UN and RC/RC appeals*, which measures the extent to which donors provide their fair share<sup>3</sup> of funding to UN and Red Cross/Red Crescent (RC/RC) appeals, coordination and support services and pooled funds. It scored well below average in all components that comprise this indicator, with the exception of its funding for pooled funds, where it is close to average. New Zealand provided 12.6% of its fair share to UN appeals, compared to the OECD/DAC average of 41.0%; 0.0% of its fair share to coordination and support services, compared to the OECD/DAC average of 47.5%; and 71.8% of its fair share to Red Cross/Red Crescent (RC/RC) appeals, compared to the OECD/DAC average of 117.1%.

## ● RENEW SUPPORT FOR LEARNING AND ACCOUNTABILITY

New Zealand could improve its support for learning and accountability initiatives.<sup>2</sup> In 2010, New Zealand dedicated 0.10% of its humanitarian aid for these initiatives; the OECD/DAC average was 0.43%.


## ● STRENGTHEN SUPPORT TO REDUCE CLIMATE-RELATED VULNERABILITY

New Zealand provided only 62.5% of its fair share<sup>3</sup> to Fast Start Finance, which supports climate change mitigation and adaptation efforts, compared to the OECD/DAC average of 102.4%. Furthermore, New Zealand has fallen short on its commitments to reduce emissions, which seems to indicate that New Zealand could augment its support to reduce climate-related vulnerability.

 Please see [www.daraint.org](http://www.daraint.org) for a complete list of references.

# NORWAY

HRI 2011  
Ranking  
**1st**



Group **1**

PRINCIPLED  
PARTNERS

OFFICIAL  
DEVELOPMENT  
ASSISTANCE


**1.10%**  
of GNI

HUMANITARIAN  
AID

**12.2%**  
of ODA

**US \$113**  
Per person

## HUMANITARIAN AID DISTRIBUTION (%)



## GENDER RATING

POLICY

FUNDING

FIELD PERCEPTION

### STRENGTHS

| Pillar | Type | Indicator                              | Score | % above OECD/DAC average |
|--------|------|--|-------|--------------------------|
| 3      | QT   | Funding UN and RC/RC appeals           | 10.00 | +145.8%                  |
| 2      | QT   | Reducing climate-related vulnerability | 8.40  | +108.4%                  |
| 3      | QT   | Funding NGOs                           | 8.98  | +98.0%                   |
| 3      | QT   | Un-earmarked funding                   | 10.00 | +92.9%                   |
| 4      | QT   | Refugee law                            | 10.00 | +77.8%                   |

### AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT

| Pillar | Type | Indicator                                    | Score | % below OECD/DAC average |
|--------|------|--|-------|--------------------------|
| 2      | QT   | Funding reconstruction and prevention        | 3.21  | -28.4%                   |
| 1      | QT   | Funding vulnerable and forgotten emergencies | 6.36  | -7.9%                    |
| 1      | QT   | Timely funding to complex emergencies        | 7.67  | -3.1%                    |
| 5      | QL   | Implementing evaluation recommendations      | 4.22  | -1.5%                    |
| 2      | QL   | Prevention and risk reduction                | 4.50  | -0.2%                    |

## OVERALL PERFORMANCE

Norway ranked 1<sup>st</sup> in the HRI 2011, improving three positions from 2010. Based on the pattern of its scores, Norway is classified as a Group 1 donor, "Principled Partners". This group is characterised by its commitment to humanitarian principles and strong support for multilateral partners, and generally good overall performance in all areas. Other Group 1 donors include Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland.

Overall, Norway scored above the OECD/DAC and Group 1 averages. Norway scored above the OECD/DAC average in all pillars. It was above the Group 1 average in all pillars, with the

exception of Pillar 1 (Responding to needs) and Pillar 5 (Learning and accountability), where it scored below average.

Norway did best compared to its OECD/DAC peers in the indicators on *Funding UN and RC/RC appeals*, *Reducing climate-related vulnerability*, *Funding NGOs*, *Un-earmarked funding* and *Refugee law*. Its scores were relatively lower in indicators on *Funding reconstruction and prevention*, *Funding vulnerable and forgotten emergencies*, *Timely funding to complex emergencies*, *Implementing evaluation recommendations* and *Prevention and risk reduction*.

# AID DISTRIBUTION

Norway's Official Development Assistance (ODA) has consistently risen since 2008 and currently represents 1.10% of its Gross National Income (GNI). Humanitarian assistance represented 12.2% of Norway's ODA in 2010, or 0.14% of its GNI.

According to data reported to the United Nations (UN) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs' (OCHA) Financial Tracking Service (FTS) (2011), Norway channelled 45.6% of its 2010 humanitarian aid to UN

agencies, 29.6% to non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and 14.5% to the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement. Norway supported 14 crises in Africa, ten in Asia and eight in the Americas. Of the humanitarian aid allocated to specific countries, Pakistan, Haiti and Sudan received the greatest amount in 2010. Sectorally, Norway concentrated its funding on coordination and support services; and protection, human rights and rule of law initiatives (OCHA FTS 2011).

# POLICY FRAMEWORK

The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) manages Norway's humanitarian aid, with the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad) operating as a technical directorate. The Department for UN, Peace and Humanitarian Affairs and the Department of Regional Affairs and Development are the two main departments involved in overseeing humanitarian action. Norway continues to base its humanitarian policy on the MFA's 2008 *Humanitarian Policy*, which aims to make the country a world leader in the humanitarian field. The MFA has also developed sector-specific humanitarian policies, such as the *Norwegian policy on the prevention of*

*humanitarian crises* and the *2011-13 Strategic Plan for Women, Peace and Security* (MFA 2011). To meet the challenges of an increasingly complex international system, Norway sees its humanitarian engagement as part of a coherent foreign and development policy that aims to promote peace and sustainable development (MFA 2008). The Norwegian Emergency Preparedness System (NOREPS), a partnership among the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Directorate for Civil Protection and Emergency Planning (DSB), was established to strengthen the response capacity of humanitarian organisations, especially in the critical first phase of a humanitarian crisis (MFA 2008).

## HOW DOES NORWAY'S POLICY ADDRESS GHD CONCEPTS?

## GENDER

*Norway's Humanitarian Policy* aims to set new standards in women's rights and gender equality. This commitment is highlighted by the MFA's 2011 publication of the *2011-13 Strategic Plan for Women, Peace and Security* which intends to enhance women's influence and participation and strengthen the protection of women during armed conflicts. Norway supports the *UN Security Council Resolution 1325* on women, peace and security and contributed to the *Gender Handbook for Humanitarian Action* (MFA 2008). Its humanitarian policy states that all partners must ensure that the needs of girls and women are taken into account in all humanitarian activities, on par with the needs of boys and men (MFA 2008).

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## PILLAR 1

# RESPONDING TO NEEDS

Norway bases its humanitarian aid on the principles of neutrality and impartiality and attempts to ensure effective responses to changing humanitarian needs in both sudden and protracted crises (MFA 2008). Special priority is also given to promoting more balanced, needs-based activities where all affected groups are consulted, especially women and children. It pledges to allocate sufficient reserves to respond quickly, with substantial funding, to at least two new humanitarian crises per year (MFA 2008). *Norway's Humanitarian Policy* also mentions that the MFA is increasing multi-year cooperation agreements with selected partners.

---

## PILLAR 2

# PREVENTION, RISK REDUCTION AND RECOVERY

Norway's humanitarian policy expresses a strong commitment to prevention, risk reduction and recovery (MFA 2008). In 2007, the *Norwegian MFA published the Norwegian policy on the prevention of humanitarian crises*, highlighting the need to strengthen the participation of affected parties at the local level, especially women and children and in prevention and preparedness activities. *Norway's Humanitarian Policy* also states that the international community should focus more on capacity building in countries prone to humanitarian disasters.

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## PILLAR 3

# WORKING WITH HUMANITARIAN PARTNERS

*Norway's Humanitarian Policy* emphasises the need to support coordination activities and flexible funding for humanitarian crises. Un-earmarked funds are dispersed early in the year to UN and International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) appeals. The MFA has set forth a strategic plan to work with and fund Norwegian humanitarian organisations while holding them to high standards. Since its inception, NOREPS has worked to improve coordination and responsiveness in providing immediate relief goods and personnel for humanitarian relief operations worldwide. Moreover, the MFA states that more resources will be invested in humanitarian assistance and that a strong humanitarian research capacity will be established in Norway (MFA 2008).

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## PILLAR 4

# PROTECTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW


Protection and international law is a centrepiece in Norwegian humanitarian efforts (MFA 2008). *Norway's Humanitarian Policy* dedicates a section to the protection of civilians in complex emergencies, highlighting the need for greater international focus on protection measures for displaced persons, women and children. Oslo has spearheaded the effort to promote the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions and the 1997 Mine Ban Convention, as well as other disarmament initiatives. Norway's humanitarian policy also regards the Geneva Conventions as the pillars of international humanitarian law and advocates for greater implementation of refugee law in protecting displaced populations (MFA 2008). The MFA recognises that humanitarian crises often call for political solutions and therefore promotes advocacy towards local authorities when appropriate (MFA 2008).

# PILLAR 5 LEARNING AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Norway's Humanitarian Policy expresses a clear commitment to improving learning and accountability within humanitarian aid. Norway is making an effort to improve administrative capacities, simplify the reporting system and increase the use of evaluations and reviews (MFA 2008). The MFA (2008) has also adopted a zero tolerance policy regarding fraud and corruption for recipients. Furthermore, it is stated that in countries where Norway has a diplomatic presence, embassies will increase the use of evaluations and reviews, in cooperation with Norad, in order to facilitate learning. It is not clear from Norway's humanitarian policy whether there are measures promoting accountability towards beneficiaries.

## FIELD PARTNERS' PERCEPTIONS

NORWAY'S FIELD PERCEPTION SCORES



SOURCE: DARA

Colours represent performance compared to donor's average performance rating:

■ Good 
 ■ Mid-range 
 ■ Could improve

## HOW IS NORWAY PERCEIVED BY ITS PARTNERS?

### GENDER

Field partners largely held positive views of Norway's support for gender-sensitive approaches in humanitarian action. One interviewee affirmed that Norway "requires a strong commitment to women, generally women in conflict zones and this always features as a point in grant letters." Another added to this by stating that most Norwegian projects target women. When NGOs were expelled from one country, another organisation reported that Norway took the lead in coordinating a gender task force.

### PILLAR 1

### RESPONDING TO NEEDS

The majority of partner organisations interviewed describe Norwegian aid as neutral, impartial, independent and based on need. A few organisations observed political influence in Norway's aid, but felt that it was not a hindrance: "Norway's humanitarian action is influenced by its political interests, but not in a bad sense." Partner organisations also generally seemed to consider Norway's funding timely and to take into account changing needs, however, an interviewee in a crisis where Norway does not have field presence asserted that "Norway is not on the ground so they can't verify changing needs."

### PILLAR 2

### PREVENTION, RISK REDUCTION AND RECOVERY

Although below Norway's qualitative average, Norway outperformed its peers on *Strengthening local capacity*. One interviewee highlighted Norway's capacity building efforts in strengthening local institutions by training local staff and empowering women. In relation to *Linking relief to rehabilitation and development*, partner organisations gave slightly lower marks, though an interviewee noted that Norway was supporting recovery and developmental activities. Similar to most donors, Norway's partner organisations seem to indicate that there is room for improvement. One interviewee included Norway, together with other donors when commenting "it's not done so much because they're humanitarian programmes." On the other hand, another interviewee reported that beneficiary participation is required in every contract and final report. Partner organisations reported that Norway has supported measures to reduce risks in areas vulnerable to natural disasters; however, some would like to see a broader risk reduction and recovery plan.

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## PILLAR 3

# WORKING WITH HUMANITARIAN PARTNERS

Norway's partners seem highly appreciative of the flexibility of its funding. "Norway still gives a portion of funds that is completely un-earmarked, which greatly assists flexibility," described one recipient. However, it is worth noting that one recipient organisation stated that the funding is too flexible and that there should be greater oversight mechanisms in place. Norway's partners also praised its support for coordination: "After the NGOs were expelled, Norway encouraged increased coordination." Several commented on Norway's active field participation allowing for informed decision making. "Norwegian staff go out into the field, meet with partners and encourage consultation," stated one interviewee. Though Norway outperformed its peers, support for partners' organisational capacity has room for improvement. One of Norway's partners stated that Norway, together with their other donors, "have been reluctant to fund this." However, another organisation reported that Norway offered to provide support to train national staff.

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## PILLAR 4

# PROTECTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

Similar to most donors, partner organisations considered Norway stronger in funding the protection of civilians than in advocating for protection. However, Norway still outperformed its peers in this indicator. Norway received its lowest qualitative score in Pillar 4 in the indicator on *Facilitating safe access*. One organisation stated, "They try to implement safe humanitarian access but rarely succeed." Another criticised Norway, together with other donors, for not responding adequately to threats of abduction of humanitarian workers.

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## PILLAR 5

# LEARNING AND ACCOUNTABILITY

In Pillar 5, Norway stands out for its strong performance in *Donor transparency* and *Appropriate reporting requirements*. While most partner organisations have praised its reporting requirements, others thought that partners should be held more accountable. It received two of its lowest scores in *Accountability towards beneficiaries* and *Implementing evaluation recommendations*. In relation to the former, while most organisations were not very positive regarding accountability toward beneficiaries, one organisation stated that Norway is always interested in getting feedback from beneficiaries. Referring to the implementation of evaluation recommendations, one organisation stated, "Norway is very involved," while another felt that "they don't really do qualitative follow-up."



# RECOMMENDATIONS

## ● CONTINUE PROGRESS UNDERWAY TO IMPROVE TIMELINESS TO COMPLEX EMERGENCIES

Norway has improved the timeliness of its funding substantially. In 2009, Norway provided 69.3% of its funding in the first six weeks following a sudden onset emergency. In 2010, Norway provided 88.4% of its funding within this time frame, surpassing the OECD/DAC and Group 1 average. For complex emergencies, Norway provided only 11.2% of its funding in 2009 within the first three months following the launch of a humanitarian appeal. In 2010, this percentage jumped to 57.5%, though it still fell short of the OECD/DAC average of 59.4%.

## ● INVEST ADEQUATELY IN PREVENTION, PREPAREDNESS AND RISK REDUCTION

In 2010, Norway allocated 12.8% of its humanitarian aid to prevention, preparedness and reconstruction, while the OECD/DAC average is 18.6%. Norway's partners seem to confirm the need for greater support for these issues, giving Norway its second-lowest qualitative score.


## ● ENCOURAGE LEARNING FROM THE PAST

Norway's partners would like to see greater engagement from Norway in the way it works with partners to incorporate lessons learnt from the past and evaluation recommendations. Norway should engage in dialogue with its partners to discuss their perceptions regarding the implementation of evaluation recommendations.



Please see [www.daraint.org](http://www.daraint.org) for a complete list of references.

# PORTUGAL




**OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE**  
**0.29%**  
 of GNI

**HUMANITARIAN AID**  
**2.8%**  
 of ODA

**US \$2**  
 Per person

## HUMANITARIAN AID DISTRIBUTION (%)



**GENDER RATING** POLICY → **FUNDING** N/A **FIELD PERCEPTION** N/A

| STRENGTHS |   | Score | % above OECD/DAC average |
|-----------|---|-------|--------------------------|
| 3         | QT Un-earmarked funding                       | 10.00 | +92.9%                   |
| 1         | QT Timely funding to sudden onset emergencies | 9.28  | +79.1%                   |

| AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT |  | Score | % below OECD/DAC average |
|-----------------------|--|-------|--------------------------|
| 3                     | QT Funding accountability initiatives          | 0.00  | -100.00%                 |
| 5                     | QT Funding UN and RC/RC appeals                | 0.07  | -98.2%                   |
| 5                     | QT Participating in accountability initiatives | 0.14  | -96.9%                   |
| 3                     | QT Funding NGOs                                | 1.28  | -71.8%                   |
| 2                     | QT Funding international risk mitigation       | 1.37  | -71.4%                   |

## OVERALL PERFORMANCE

Portugal is not included in the overall ranking as insufficient survey responses were obtained to calculate the qualitative indicators that make up the index.

Portugal's overall score was below the OECD/DAC and Group 3 averages. Portugal also scored below both averages in all pillars.

Portugal did best compared to its OECD/DAC peers in the indicators on *Un-earmarked funding* and *Timely funding to sudden onset emergencies*. Its scores were relatively the lowest in the indicators on *Funding accountability initiatives*, *Funding UN and RC/RC appeals*, *Participating in accountability initiatives*, *Funding NGOs* and *Funding international risk mitigation*.

SOURCES: UN OCHA FTS, OECD StatExtracts, various UN agencies' annual reports and DARA

All scores are on a scale of 0 to 10. Colours represent performance compared to OECD/DAC donors' average performance rating:   
 Good (Green), Mid-range (Yellow), Could improve (Red), N/A (Grey), QT Quantitative Indicator, QL Qualitative Indicator

# AID DISTRIBUTION

In 2010, Portugal's Official Development Assistance (ODA) comprised 0.29% of its Gross National Income (GNI), up from 0.23% in 2009. Humanitarian assistance represented 2.8% of Portugal's ODA in 2010, or 0.008% of its GNI.

According to data reported to United Nations (UN) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs' (OCHA) Financial Tracking Service (FTS) (2011), in

2010, Portugal channelled 76.4% of its humanitarian aid bilaterally to affected governments, 17.8% to UN agencies, and 4.2% to non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Portugal also provided 15.1% of its total humanitarian aid to the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) (OCHA FTS 2011). In 2010 Portugal contributed to one crisis: Haiti.

# POLICY FRAMEWORK

The Portuguese Institute for Development Support (IPAD) is responsible for coordinating Portugal's humanitarian assistance. The Portuguese aid system is fairly decentralised, and IPAD coordinates the work of approximately 20 ministries and 300 municipalities that also play a role in international cooperation (OECD/DAC 2009). The National Civil Protection Authority is often the mechanism by which Portugal manages the operational delivery of humanitarian aid (OECD/DAC 2010). According to the 2010 DAC Peer Review, "The unit responsible for humanitarian assistance [in IPAD] has been closed and operational responsibility now rests with the head of the Civil Society Unit," (OECD/DAC 2010).

*Decree Law 5/2003* provides the legal framework for Portuguese foreign assistance (OECD/DAC 2009). The *Strategic Vision for Portuguese Development Cooperation* (2006a) serves as a general guiding framework for Portugal's development policy; including a brief section on humanitarian action and key guiding principles. Though the *Strategic Vision for Portuguese Development*

*Cooperation* declares that "humanitarian actions must be viewed, planned and executed within the framework of, and in coordination with, the other instruments that integrate the concept of Official Development Assistance" (IPAD 2006a), it does not provide many details regarding Portugal's strategy for humanitarian action. The *Action Plan for the Portuguese Strategic Vision* calls for the creation of a humanitarian assistance policy, but this has not yet been developed (IPAD 2006b). IPAD includes both the *European Consensus on Humanitarian Assistance and the Good Humanitarian Donorship* (GHD) *Principles* for reference under the humanitarian aid section of its website, asserting their importance as guiding frameworks for humanitarian action (IPAD 2011). IPAD has no staff members fully dedicated to humanitarian assistance, though it has tried to increase its field presence, adding several "Technical officers" or "Cooperation attachés" to embassies to work on development projects that can be co-opted as support in times of humanitarian crises (OECD/DAC 2010).

## HOW DOES NEW PORTUGAL'S POLICY ADDRESS GHD CONCEPTS?

# GENDER

Portugal's *Cooperation Strategy for Gender Equality* (2011) serves as the main policy document regarding the incorporation of a gender-sensitive approach to its aid. This framework calls for the incorporation of a gender-sensitive approach in all of Portugal's long-term projects for each of the six Portuguese-speaking countries as well in its humanitarian aid programmes (IPAD 2011a). Since there is no overarching policy for humanitarian aid, however, it is unclear if or how a gender-sensitive approach is incorporated into Portugal's humanitarian assistance.

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## PILLAR 1

# RESPONDING TO NEEDS

Portugal affirms that “humanity, independence, impartiality, universality and neutrality” guide its humanitarian assistance (IPAD 2006a). Since the Portuguese Civil Authority is sometimes deployed to deliver assigned humanitarian aid, Portugal notes that it will ensure its aid remains neutral, impartial and independent. However, there is no concrete policy on how this is done; the latest *DAC Peer Review* states that there is no way of knowing if “funding levels are based on an objective determination of the severity of a particular crisis,” (OECD/DAC 2010). In its *Strategic Vision for Portuguese Development Cooperation*, Portugal states that “although traditionally . . . [humanitarian] assistance has predominantly been sent to partner countries of Portuguese development cooperation, humanitarian aid has also been distributed in other areas when the dimension of the disaster has entailed particularly devastating consequences,” (IPAD 2006a). Portugal seems to be increasingly willing to respond to emergency needs in countries outside of the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries. Portugal regularly contributes to the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) in an effort to provide timely funding to sudden-onset emergencies.

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## PILLAR 2

# PREVENTION, RISK REDUCTION AND RECOVERY

The *Developmental Strategic Vision* affirms that beneficiary participation in the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of programming is key to Portugal’s cooperation efforts (IPAD 2006a). It is not clear, however, how beneficiary participation is incorporated into Portugal’s humanitarian aid. The same document also stresses that “the transition to the development phase must be taken into account at the earliest possible moment in [humanitarian] aid operations, by building bridges with rehabilitation and sustainable development actions,” (IPAD 2006a). Disaster risk reduction, for example, is not integrated into partner country programmes (OECD/DAC 2010). Portugal’s policy on prevention and preparedness is also unclear. The same report, however, adds that the Ministry of Interior’s civil protection unit is “strengthening existing national disaster response mechanisms in some partner countries,” though this has not been mainstreamed into an official policy (OECD/DAC 2010).

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## PILLAR 3

# WORKING WITH HUMANITARIAN PARTNERS

The *Strategic Vision for Portuguese Development Cooperation* emphasises Portugal’s wish to move towards multi-year financing for all of its international cooperation programmes, but the 2010 *DAC Peer Review* asserts that this is still not a reality (IPAD 2006a and OECD/DAC 2010). The *Strategic Vision for Portuguese Development Cooperation* also called for the “creation of a specific budget line under the responsibility of IPAD, sufficiently flexible to respond to the specificities of Humanitarian Aid,” (IPAD 2006a). Since most of its humanitarian assistance is “project-specific,” however, the 2010 *DAC Peer Review* concludes that Portugal “is an unpredictable source of financing for humanitarian agencies,” (OECD/DAC 2010). It also adds that “Portugal does not provide funds to the

international Red Cross [Red Crescent] movement, or provide core funding for multilateral agencies or NGOs, or fund Common Humanitarian Funds (pooled funds) or Emergency Rapid Response Funds (ERRFs),” (OECD/DAC 2010). Even for project-specific financing, the 2010 *DAC Peer Review* noted that “disbursement of funds can sometimes be rapid, but can also take over 12 months, especially funds for NGOs” (OECD/DAC 2010).

In terms of fostering cooperation with other national and international actors, the *Strategic Vision for Portuguese Development Cooperation* calls for the coordination both of “the various state and civil society actors” as well as “the international community’s efforts, namely the coordination mechanisms existing within the European Union, as well as at the United Nations level,” (IPAD 2006a). IPAD identifies inter-institutional coordination within Portugal as the most important challenge for the Portuguese humanitarian system (2006a). The 2010 *DAC Peer Review* echoes these concerns, noting that without a humanitarian strategy and guidelines for NGOs, it is difficult to coordinate across the different ministries involved in humanitarian aid (OECD/DAC 2010).

## PILLAR 4

# PROTECTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

The *Strategic Vision for Portuguese Development Cooperation* emphasises that humanitarian aid must be “governed by respect for human rights and international law...namely the right to protect victims and defend humanitarian principles,” (IPAD 2006a). The 2010 *DAC Peer Review* notes that Portugal has begun to “upgrade the civil-military coordination (CIVMIL)” in an effort to ensure “compliance with the Oslo Guidelines and respect for International Humanitarian Law,” and has created dialogue with Portuguese NGOs regarding the issue (OECD/DAC 2010).

In terms of protection, the *Portuguese National Strategy for Security and Development* emphasises Portugal’s commitment to human security and protection defined as “support for civilian victims of violent conflict” through “political, military, humanitarian and development-related approaches” and outlines a general set of aims regarding this purpose (IPAD 2009). These measures include the creation of a unit in IPAD to coordinate safety issues, the training of Portuguese staff to consider safety in plans and the encouragement of communication with other actors to increase awareness of this issue (IPAD 2009). The *Strategic Vision for Portuguese Development Cooperation* adds that “it is especially important to pay attention to the situation of refugees and internally displaced persons and to support the work of international organisations which protect and promote their rights,” though there is no more information in terms of how this will be incorporated into its humanitarian activities specifically (IPAD 2006a). Portugal’s position on advocacy for local governments and for the facilitation of humanitarian access is not clear.

## PILLAR 5

# LEARNING AND ACCOUNTABILITY

The *Strategic Vision for Portuguese Development Cooperation* calls for the implementation of comprehensive monitoring and mainstreamed evaluations, both of financed projects and IPAD's overall and country strategies (IPAD 2006a). The assessment of the Strategic Vision in 2009 reports that IPAD has released the evaluation guidelines titled *Evaluation Policy, as well as the Evaluation Guide* (IPAD 2009). The agency also attempts to monitor field implementation "through visits to the locations where the programmes are being implemented and through joint action by Headquarters and by the Embassy co-operation services," but this is often difficult due to IPAD's limited staff. IPAD's Evaluation Unit (GAI) has recently expanded its scope, also responsible now for internal audits of IPAD. Overall, the latest *DAC Peer Review* concludes that Portugal's efforts in this regard are lacklustre. It states that "Portugal has not yet participated in joint evaluations of multilateral partners," instead relying on audited accounts from its implementing NGOs, though it does conduct lesson learning exercises after civil protection units return from carrying out relief activities (OECD/DAC 2010). In regards to transparency of funding decisions, the 2010 *DAC Peer Review* reports that the lack of guidelines for humanitarian action means that, "NGOs are not sure what format to use for proposals, what their funding limits will be, or who should act as their focal point within IPAD," (OECD/DAC 2010). The 2010 *DAC Peer Review* also notes that "the humanitarian budget is not transparently available in any form during the budget year, even within IPAD, which further hinders accountability and transparency," (OECD/DAC 2010). Portugal's position on accountability towards affected populations is not clear.

# RECOMMENDATIONS

Given the severe economic crisis Portugal is currently facing, it may need to postpone the following recommendations until after it has surpassed the crisis. Portugal's recovery will also present an opportunity for the country to review its position on humanitarian aid and recommit itself to *Good Humanitarian Donorship Principles*.

## ● FORMALIZE COMMITMENT TO HUMANITARIAN PRINCIPLES IN A COMPREHENSIVE HUMANITARIAN POLICY

Portugal would do well to create an official humanitarian policy which explains its commitment to *Good Humanitarian Donorship Principles* and unites the information from various web pages and documents into a common humanitarian policy.

## ● ENHANCE SUPPORT FOR UN AND RC/RC APPEALS, COORDINATION AND SUPPORT SERVICES AND POOLED FUNDS

Portugal received a low score for *Funding UN and RC/RC appeals*, which measures the extent to which donors provide their fair share<sup>3</sup> of funding to UN and Red Cross/Red Crescent (RC/RC) appeals, coordination and support services and pooled funds. It scored well below average in all components that comprise this indicator.

## ● CONSIDER CHANNELLING MORE FUNDING TO NGOS

Portugal channelled only 4.2% of its humanitarian funding to NGOs, compared to the OECD/DAC average of 15.3%. As Portugal may not be able to handle a large number of smaller contracts to NGOs, it could explore flexible working models, such as shared management arrangements with other donors, supporting NGO umbrella organisations or NGOs of other nationalities.

## ● INVEST ADEQUATELY IN RISK REDUCTION

Portugal allocated 0.26% of its ODA to international risk mitigation mechanisms – the lowest of the OECD/DAC donors. The OECD/DAC average was 0.77% and the Group 3 average was 0.72%.

## ● RENEW COMMITMENT TO LEARNING AND ACCOUNTABILITY


Portugal could improve its support of learning and accountability initiatives. Portugal is participating solely in Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action (ALNAP) meetings, but in none of the other initiatives included in the indicator *Participating in accountability initiatives*.<sup>1</sup> In addition, Portugal did not provide financial support for learning and accountability initiatives.<sup>2</sup>



Please see [www.daraint.org](http://www.daraint.org) for a complete list of references.

# SPAIN

HRI 2011  
Ranking  
**15th**




Group **3**  
ASPIRING  
ACTORS

OFFICIAL  
DEVELOPMENT  
ASSISTANCE **0.43%**  
of GNI

HUMANITARIAN  
AID **8.9%**  
of ODA

**US \$11**  
Per person

## HUMANITARIAN AID DISTRIBUTION (%)



## GENDER RATING

POLICY

FUNDING

FIELD PERCEPTION

### STRENGTHS

| Pillar | Type | Indicator                                    | Score | % above OECD/DAC average |
|--------|------|--|-------|--------------------------|
| 1      | QT   | Funding vulnerable and forgotten emergencies | 8.20  | +18.7%                   |
| 1      | QT   | Timely funding to complex emergencies        | 9.29  | +17.5%                   |

### AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT

| Pillar | Type | Indicator                               | Score | % below OECD/DAC average |
|--------|------|---|-------|--------------------------|
| 3      | QT   | Funding NGOs                            | 0.36  | -92.0%                   |
| 2      | QT   | Reducing climate-related vulnerability  | 2.01  | -50.1%                   |
| 2      | QT   | Funding international risk mitigation   | 2.86  | -40.1%                   |
| 5      | QL   | Implementing evaluation recommendations | 3.40  | -20.7%                   |
| 3      | QL   | Donor capacity and expertise            | 5.33  | -14.8%                   |

## OVERALL PERFORMANCE

Spain ranked 15<sup>th</sup> in the HRI 2011, improving two positions from 2010. Based on the patterns of its scores, Spain is classified as a Group 3 donor, "Aspiring Actors". Donors in this group tend to have more limited capacity to engage with the humanitarian system at the field level, but often aspire to take on a greater role in the sector. They generally focus on a few core strengths, such as in the area of prevention, preparedness and risk reduction, or on specific geographic regions. Other donors in the group include Australia, Belgium, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan and Luxembourg.

Spain's overall score fell below the OECD/DAC and Group 3 averages. Spain scored below the OECD/DAC and Group 3 average

in all pillars, with the exception of Pillar 1, where it was above both averages, and Pillar 4 (Protection and international law), where Spain scored below the OECD/DAC average, but above the Group 3 average.

Spain did best compared to its OECD/DAC peers in the indicators on *Funding vulnerable and forgotten emergencies* and *Timely funding to complex emergencies*. Its scores were relatively the lowest in indicators on *Funding NGOs*, *Reducing climate-related vulnerability*, *Funding international risk mitigation*, *Implementing evaluation recommendations* and *Donor capacity and expertise*.



# AID DISTRIBUTION

Spain was formerly one of the largest donors to the World Food Programme and the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF), but the financial crisis has led to budget cutbacks. In 2010, Spain's Official Development Assistance (ODA) comprised 0.43% of its Gross National Income (GNI), down from 0.46% in 2009. Humanitarian assistance accounted for 8.9% of its ODA, and 0.040% of its GNI.

According to data reported to the United Nations (UN) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs'

(OCHA) Financial Tracking Service (FTS) (2011), Spain channelled 74.6% of its funding to the UN system, 11.5% bilaterally to affected governments, 3.9% to the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement and 1.2% non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Spain contributed 10.9% of its humanitarian assistance to the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) and 8.2% to Common Humanitarian Funds. Spain supported 30 emergencies in 2010: 14 in Africa, seven in the Americas and nine in Asia.

# POLICY FRAMEWORK

The Humanitarian Aid Office of the Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation (AECID), under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, oversees Spain's humanitarian assistance. An important characteristic of the Spanish humanitarian system is that some of the autonomous communities in the country provide humanitarian assistance using separate funds and strategies. Over the past few years, Spain has attempted to focus and coordinate these efforts through the Humanitarian Aid Office of the AECID. The General Directorate for Planning and Evaluation (DGPOLDE) is in charge of evaluating all of Spain's cooperation efforts, including its humanitarian aid. *Law 23/1998* serves as the legal framework for Spanish foreign cooperation, establishing AECID as the main organ in the Spanish body for coordinating Spanish assistance; the *Royal Decree 1403/2007* formally established the Humanitarian Aid Office and its mandate (AECID 2011b). Spain is in the process of passing a new law to replace *Law 23/1998*, which will substantially modernise its international aid system, mostly to improve coordination among the

Spanish actors (ECD Política 2010). The *Humanitarian Action Strategy (2007)* guides Spanish humanitarian action and explains the principles governing Spanish humanitarian efforts. Spain endorsed the *Principles of Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD)* in 2004. Though it is in the process of developing its domestic implementation plan, it has already incorporated the *GHD Principles* into its humanitarian framework. The *2009-2012 Cooperation Master Plan (2009)* is the main policy document for Spanish aid and maps out cooperation activities until 2012. This document includes a section addressing humanitarian programmes specifically and echoes the commitments expressed in the *Humanitarian Strategy*. Every year, AECID also publishes the *Annual Plan for International Cooperation (PACI)* document, which delineates how the agency will carry out the goals of the *Cooperation Master Plan* during the year and provides a brief overview of the progress accomplished the previous year. AECID has a total of fifty "Offices for Technical Cooperation" or "Offices for Policy Formation" in beneficiary countries (AECID 2011a).

## HOW DOES SPAIN'S POLICY ADDRESS GHD CONCEPTS?

### GENDER

Spain's *Gender in Development Strategy* (2007) is the main framework that outlines Spain's policy for gender equality measures in development and humanitarian aid. The *Humanitarian Action Strategy* incorporates the principles outlined in this document and calls for a gender sensitive approach to humanitarian aid. This includes a gender analysis in all humanitarian activities, the representation and participation of women in the implementation phase, special attention to the security concerns of women, and the compilation of gender-disaggregated indicators (MAEC 2007).

#### PILLAR 1

### RESPONDING TO NEEDS

Spain's policy expresses a clear commitment to providing timely humanitarian assistance based on the principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence. The *Humanitarian Action Strategy* asserts that Spain uses the European Commission's Directorate General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (ECHO) *Global Needs Assessment* (GNA) and the *Forgotten Crisis Assessment* (FCA) to determine its priority countries for humanitarian aid (MAEC 2007). For disaster operations, Spain uses the analysis of the United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination Team (UNDACT) and is currently in the process of elaborating an official protocol of its own for emergency activities (MAEC 2007).

#### PILLAR 2

### PREVENTION, RISK REDUCTION AND RECOVERY

The *Humanitarian Action Strategy* and the *Cooperation Master Plan* emphasise Spain's pledge to engage beneficiaries at all levels of humanitarian action and to link relief to rehabilitation and development along with prevention and preparedness (MAEC 2007). The *Humanitarian Aid Strategy* calls for the inclusion of beneficiaries in the design and implementation of a project, and requires an evaluation of beneficiary participation (MAEC 2007). The *Humanitarian Action Strategy* declares that Spanish aid shall be provided "in line with local capacity," in an effort to strengthen and support it (MAEC 2007). The *Cooperation Master Plan* emphasises the importance of risk reduction and disaster prevention, in line with the Hyogo principles (MAEC 2009).

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## PILLAR 3

# WORKING WITH HUMANITARIAN PARTNERS

The *Humanitarian Action Strategy* and the *Cooperation Master Plan* recognise the importance of predictable, multi-annual and flexible funding for humanitarian assistance. The *Cooperation Master Plan* calls for a review and reform of the current financing rules for NGOs to provide “more efficacy, efficiency and relevance” in responding to humanitarian crises (MAEC 2009). Spain has tried to make its funding more consistent through a permanent appeals process for implementing partners, and has called for an increase of multi-annual funding mechanisms for its biggest implementing partners (MAEC 2007). The *Annual Plan*, however, reports that multi-annual partnerships have not been implemented “in a massive way” with Spanish implementing partners yet (MAEC 2010). Spain has also vowed to continue supporting the Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP) and the CERF, along with providing longer-term contracts to its more important and preferential partners, especially UN agencies (MAEC 2009). Both the *Humanitarian Action Strategy* and the *Cooperation Master Plan* emphasise the importance of coordinating Spanish humanitarian assistance, especially within its own system and in regards to the aid provided by the Autonomous Communities of Spain (MAEC 2007). There is less concrete discussion, however, about how to coordinate with other international actors.

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## PILLAR 4

# PROTECTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

Spain states its policy of providing access to civilians and promoting international humanitarian law, including human rights and refugee law, in the *Humanitarian Action Strategy*, and echoes these commitments in the *Cooperation Master Plan* (AECID 2009). Spain also strongly affirms in both documents that it will facilitate safe humanitarian access and help guarantee the security of humanitarian workers (MAEC 2009). The *Humanitarian Action Strategy* mentions that Spain is committed to advocacy in the form of increasing public awareness and sensitivity to humanitarian issues, but Spain’s policy regarding advocacy to local governments is unclear (MAEC 2007).

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## PILLAR 5


# LEARNING AND ACCOUNTABILITY

The *Humanitarian Action Strategy* specifies that DGPOLDE has adapted the *Evaluation Methodology for Spanish Cooperation* to evaluate the national humanitarian assistance programme (MAEC 2007). Both the *Humanitarian Action Strategy* and the *Master Cooperation Plan* state that Spain aims to improve the publication of its funding information to the public, and is a signatory of the International Aid Transparency Initiative (MAEC 2007). In regards to the accountability of funded NGOs, Spain has reporting and evaluation policies that are guided by Spain’s *System for Results-oriented Development Management*, which include accountability towards affected populations (MAEC 2007).

# FIELD PARTNERS' PERCEPTIONS

## SPAIN'S FIELD PERCEPTION SCORES

Collected questionnaires: 45



SOURCE: DARA

Colours represent performance compared to donor's average performance rating:

Good      Mid-range      Could improve

## HOW IS SPAIN PERCEIVED BY ITS PARTNERS?

### GENDER

Spain's partners provided mixed feedback regarding gender. Several highlight Spain's interest in gender-sensitive approaches, but point to problems in the follow-up. One interviewee reported, "AECID does not use well-defined gender markers in the needs assessment, so later it is not easy to have a good gender approach." Others reveal that though AECID has a formal gender analysis requirement, "there is no monitoring for its implementation," or that they get a sense it is important to Spain "because of the gender marker in the CAP, but not because of any real commitment."

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## PILLAR 1

# RESPONDING TO NEEDS

Similar to most donors, Spain performed fairly well in the qualitative indicators that comprise Pillar 1. While most organisations deemed Spain's aid to be sufficiently neutral, impartial and independent, several organisations questioned whether Spain endeavoured to ensure programmes adapt to changing needs. Some partners complained that funding decisions are taken far from the field and seem to be poorly informed of real needs: one interviewee reported that "decisions take place at headquarters" and do not always make sense given the ground situation. Several organisations felt that AECID could not monitor to ensure programmes adapt to changing needs due to limited field presence and that it "does not even try to get there." Opinions about the timeliness of Spain's funding are highly mixed. In some crises, interviewees praised Spain for providing funding ahead of time. In others, however, timeliness was the biggest issue: organisations in the field explained that "AECID has the same tools for applying for developmental and humanitarian aid funding, which doesn't make any sense," since the latter often requires a more timely response.

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## PILLAR 2

# PREVENTION, RISK REDUCTION AND RECOVERY

Most organisations in the field considered that the AECID did not seem sufficiently concerned with beneficiary participation, although a few interviewees noted that participation in implementation and design was somewhat better: "AECID pays more attention to the design part of the process ...than in implementation or evaluation." Another interviewee maintained that AECID's follow-up on a project was minimal, and provided "no requirements, recommendations, [or] questions about the project." Feedback regarding *Linking relief to rehabilitation and development* was fairly mixed. One interviewee stated that "AECID has a formal standard... but [has not] implemented a process at all for that." As for prevention, preparedness and risk reduction initiatives, field organisations were largely critical. One interviewee affirmed that "AECID has the idea but... it is a reactive process, and there is no proactivity."

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## PILLAR 3

# WORKING WITH HUMANITARIAN PARTNERS

In terms of coordination, some organisations claimed that while Spain encourages coordination among its own partners, Spanish field representatives "do not even think about attending any cluster meetings." Regarding the flexibility of Spain's funding, interviewees were largely positive. One organisation stated that they are "excellent donors in terms of flexibility." However, others revealed that it was only possible to apply to the permanent appeal fund three times a year, which was somewhat limiting and inflexible.

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## PILLAR 4

# PROTECTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

Most of Spain's partners appreciated the country's funding for protection programmes, though one interviewee added that these had to be "purely protection programmes. They do not want to mix protection with, for example, human rights programmes." Spain's field partners were more critical concerning advocacy to ensure the protection of civilians. One interviewee named Spain, together with other donors, for being "silent" on these issues. In terms of the facilitating humanitarian access and the safety of humanitarian workers, humanitarian organisations in the field agree that current efforts are simply not enough: one organisation revealed that while AECID tried to provide some assistance – for example, giving humanitarian staff an unofficial identification – it was ineffective. That said, when one of Spain's partners took the initiative to take measures on their own to obtain access, "AECID didn't push for it, but when we proposed it, they were ready to fund because they were overlooked areas."

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## PILLAR 5

# LEARNING AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Organisations in the field asserted that AECID was strict in the funding proposal but was lacking in its monitoring and evaluation. One aid worker reported that AECID is "focusing too much in the bureaucratic process . . . it seems it is more important for the proposal to be perfect in a formal way than the impact the project has." Another stated that AECID has a good reporting framework, but project tracking is lacking. Spain's partners also indicate that there is room for improvement in relation to accountability towards beneficiaries.

# RECOMMENDATIONS

## ● LOOK FOR ADMINISTRATIVE SOLUTIONS TO CHANNEL MORE FUNDING TO NGOS

Spain provided only 1.2% of its humanitarian funding to NGOs, compared to the OECD/DAC average of 15.3%. Spain provided the bulk of its funding to UN agencies, but should consider allocating a larger portion to NGOs. To reduce the administrative burden, it could explore flexible working models, such as shared management arrangements with other donors, or supporting NGO umbrella organisations.

## ● BOOSTER THE CAPACITY OF THE AECID

Spain received one of the lowest scores for the qualitative, survey-based indicator, *Donor capacity and expertise*. In several of the crises covered by the HRI, field-staff were also tasked with non-humanitarian tasks, limiting their ability to follow up with supported programmes. Spain should consider investing in its capacity at the field and headquarters level to ensure aid is used effectively.

## ● ENCOURAGE LEARNING FROM THE PAST

Spain received the third-lowest score for the qualitative, survey-based indicator *Implementing evaluation recommendations*, which measures the extent to which donors work with partners to integrate lessons learnt in programming. Spain would do well to strengthen its efforts to follow up with partners to utilise lessons learnt and evaluation recommendations in programming.

## ● STRENGTHEN SUPPORT TO REDUCE RISK AND CLIMATE-RELATED VULNERABILITY


Spain could improve its support to reduce risk and climate-related vulnerability. Spain designated 0.36% of its ODA to international risk mitigation mechanisms – well below the OECD/DAC average of 0.77%. Spain provided only 52.5% of its fair share<sup>3</sup> to Fast Start Finance, which supports climate change mitigation and adaptation efforts, compared to the OECD/DAC average of 102.4%. Furthermore, it has fallen short on its commitments to reduce emissions, indicating that Spain could augment its efforts to support these issues.



Please see [www.daraint.org](http://www.daraint.org) for a complete list of references.

# SWEDEN

HRI 2011  
Ranking  
**3rd**






Group **1**  
PRINCIPLED  
PARTNERS

OFFICIAL  
DEVELOPMENT  
ASSISTANCE **0.97%**  
of GNI

HUMANITARIAN  
AID **12.7%**  
of ODA

**US \$61**  
Per person

## HUMANITARIAN AID DISTRIBUTION (%)



## GENDER RATING

POLICY

FUNDING

FIELD PERCEPTION

### STRENGTHS

| Pillar | Type | Indicator                              | Score | % above OECD/DAC average |
|--------|------|--|-------|--------------------------|
| 2      | QT   | Reducing climate-related vulnerability | 9.91  | +146.0%                  |
| 3      | QT   | Funding UN and RC/RC appeals           | 10.00 | +145.9%                  |
| 5      | QT   | Funding accountability initiatives     | 8.25  | +100.6%                  |
| 2      | QT   | Funding international risk mitigation  | 9.00  | +88.2%                   |
| 4      | QT   | Refugee law                            | 10.00 | +77.8%                   |

### AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT

| Pillar | Type | Indicator                             | Score | % below OECD/DAC average |
|--------|------|---------------------------------------|-------|--------------------------|
| 2      | QT   | Funding reconstruction and prevention | 1.79  | -60.2%                   |
| 3      | QT   | Funding NGOs                          | 3.98  | -12.2%                   |
| 1      | QT   | Timely funding to complex emergencies | 7.18  | -9.2%                    |
| 3      | QT   | Un-earmarked funding                  | 4.75  | -8.5%                    |
| 5      | QL   | Appropriate reporting requirements    | 6.82  | -3.7%                    |

## OVERALL PERFORMANCE

Sweden ranked 3<sup>rd</sup> in the HRI 2011, improving two positions from 2010. Based on the pattern of its scores, Sweden is classified as a Group 1 donor, "Principled Partners". This group is characterised by its commitment to humanitarian principles and strong support for multilateral partners, and generally good overall performance in all areas. Other Group 1 donors include Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway and Switzerland.

Sweden's overall score was above the OECD/DAC and Group 1 averages. It scored above both average in all pillars, with the

exception of Pillar 3 (Working with humanitarian partners), where it scored above the OECD/DAC average, but below the Group 1 average.

Compared to its OECD/DAC peers, Sweden did best in the indicators on *Reducing climate-related vulnerability*, *Funding UN and RC/RC appeals*, *Funding accountability initiatives*, *Funding international risk mitigation* and *Refugee law*. Its scores were relatively lower in indicators on *Funding reconstruction and prevention*, *Funding NGOs*, *Timely funding to complex emergencies*, *Un-earmarked funding* and *Appropriate reporting requirements*.



# AID DISTRIBUTION

After rising from 0.98% in 2008 to 1.12% in 2009, Sweden's Official Development Assistance (ODA) dropped in 2010 to 0.97% as a percentage of its Gross National Income (GNI). Humanitarian assistance represented 12.7% of its ODA in 2010, or 0.12% of its GNI.

According to data reported to the United Nations (UN) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs' (OCHA) Financial Tracking Service (FTS) (2011), Sweden channelled 60.6% of its 2010 humanitarian aid to UN agencies, 13.7% to the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement, 13.1% to non-governmental organisations (NGOs), 3.2% bilaterally to affected

governments and 1.6% to private organisations and foundations. Sweden allocated 10.9% of its total humanitarian aid to the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF), 6.0% to Common Humanitarian Funds, and 1.6% to Emergency Response Funds. In 2010, Sweden committed humanitarian aid to 53 different countries: 25 in Africa, 17 in Asia, 11 in the Americas and one in Europe. The Democratic Republic of the Congo, Haiti and Pakistan were the top recipients of Sweden's 2010 humanitarian aid. Sectorally, Sweden concentrated its funding on coordination and support services and health initiatives.

# POLICY FRAMEWORK

The Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the Swedish International Development Agency (Sida) manage the country's humanitarian affairs. Swedish humanitarian policy is based on *The Government's Humanitarian Aid Policy* (2004) and has been enhanced with Sida's *2008-2010 Strategy for Humanitarian Work*. In order to better meet today's demands, Sida's restructuring process was completed in 2010. The new structure became effective on 1 January 2011 with nine

departments directly under the Director General. The series of reforms include reducing staff at headquarters and increasing staff abroad. The 2009 *DAC Peer Review* has lauded Sweden for being proactive in responding to past recommendations and urges Stockholm to continue to overhaul, rationalise and clarify its policy framework (OECD/DAC 2009). Sida currently has field presence in 44 Swedish embassies worldwide (Sida 2011), though it is not clear if this will change the current restructuring.

## HOW DOES SWEDEN'S POLICY ADDRESS GHD CONCEPTS?

# GENDER

Both *The Government's Humanitarian Policy* and Sida's *2008-2010 Strategy for Humanitarian Work* emphasise the need for a gender-sensitive approach in humanitarian operations. Sweden calls for appropriate measures to protect and meet the needs of women in armed conflict and pledges to pay particular attention to the special situation of the women in both disaster and conflict situations in its funding decisions (MFA 2004).

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## PILLAR 1

# RESPONDING TO NEEDS

Sweden's humanitarian policy expresses a strong commitment to need-based humanitarian responses. In *The Government's Humanitarian Aid Policy*, Sweden pledges to adhere to the humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence and to provide timely humanitarian assistance that focuses on the most vulnerable groups (MFA 2004). In its *2008-2010 Strategy for Humanitarian Work*, Sida states that it will inform partner organisations of the funding levels they expect to provide early in the financial year, placing special importance on forgotten crises (Sida 2007).

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## PILLAR 2

# PREVENTION, RISK REDUCTION AND RECOVERY

The *2008-2010 Strategy for Humanitarian Work* recognises the importance of supporting the transition from relief to rehabilitation and development. It also states that Sida prefers to support organisations with local partners in order support the capacity of local structures to handle crisis situations (Sida 2007). In order to reduce vulnerability, the Swedish government asserts that it will allocate funds to promote disaster preparedness and prevention, and for initial reconstruction programmes following a humanitarian crisis (MFA 2004). Sweden, however, does not seem to place the same emphasis on conflict prevention and preparedness.

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## PILLAR 3

# WORKING WITH HUMANITARIAN PARTNERS

The Swedish MFA expresses its commitment to making humanitarian aid as flexible and predictable as possible. For long-term crises, the government can commit itself to grants that extend beyond the current fiscal year, provided Parliament approves the government's budget proposals (MFA 2004). In the *2008-2010 Strategy for Humanitarian Work* Sweden recognises the importance of multilateralism, affirming its support for the coordination efforts of the UN and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), as well as for the Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeals Process and the Common Humanitarian Action Plan (Sida 2007). Sweden supports both national and international NGOs and specifically states that "conditions to the effect that organisations must employ Swedish staff or material in connection with aid must not be attached to the grants," (MFA 2004).

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## PILLAR 4

# PROTECTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

Sweden's humanitarian policy is rooted in international law, especially those derived from the 1949 Geneva Conventions and subsequent protocols. *The Government's Humanitarian Aid Policy* states that Sweden "constantly" advocates for improving the protection of civilians in conflict situations when Sweden engages in international dialogue in multilateral arenas. Sweden recognises the need to adhere to international standards when participating in complex emergencies; these include the *Guidelines on the Use of Civil and Military Defence Assets* and the Inter-Agency Standing Committee's reference paper *Civil-Military Relationship in Complex Emergencies*. Sweden's formal policy regarding advocacy toward local authorities is not clear.

**PILLAR 5**


**LEARNING AND ACCOUNTABILITY**

Sida's 2008-2010 Strategy for Humanitarian Work expresses its support for the Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) Principles regarding learning and accountability. The agency is required to annually assess whether or not goals in its humanitarian policy are being met (Sida 2007). Sweden also participates in several accountability initiatives such as the Humanitarian Accountability Partnership International (HAP-I), Sphere and the Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action (ALNAP). Sida's humanitarian policy calls for increased support for qualified research and methods development in the humanitarian field (Sida 2007).

**FIELD PARTNERS' PERCEPTIONS**

SWEDEN'S FIELD PERCEPTION SCORES

Collected questionnaires: 59



SOURCE: DARA

OECD/DAC average score 6.05 ← ..... → Sweden's average score 6.37

Colours represent performance compared to donor's average performance rating:

Good Mid-range Could improve

## HOW IS SWEDEN PERCEIVED BY ITS PARTNERS?

### GENDER

Organisations interviewed in the field responded positively to Sweden's approach to gender issues in its humanitarian work. "Sweden is especially keen on incorporating gender initiatives," reported one interviewee. Another responded that many of Sida's programmes pay special attention to women's needs.

#### PILLAR 1

### RESPONDING TO NEEDS

Field organisations were largely positive regarding Sweden's Pillar 1 practices. Several organisations commented that Swedish aid was timely, impartial and need-based. "Sweden is keen on being informed and knowing the situation on the ground but they are never intrusive," noted one organisation. Most partner organisations appreciated Sweden's follow-up through field visits and meetings to ensure programmes adapt to changing needs, though a few noted that this was not possible: "Funding is completely unearmarked so you can't expect them to do verification" stated one organisation. Partners consider its funding very timely. One interviewee felt that Sweden was an example of best practice: "they do only one installment and transfer the whole amount at the beginning of the programme."

#### PILLAR 2

### PREVENTION, RISK REDUCTION AND RECOVERY

Similar to most donors, Sweden received some of its lowest scores in Pillar 2 indicators with the exception of *Strengthening local capacity*, where it was stronger. One organisation reported that Sida requires a local capacity assessment before and after each project. One organisation stated that Sida always requests participatory approaches to be included in all programmes, though another noted that "it is in their proposal template, but it's easier to just say you do it." Regarding the indicator *Linking relief to rehabilitation and development*, one organisation reported the following: "Sweden has the same country team for humanitarian and development, so we are able to discuss better both recovery and development approaches in funding, but they are always sending mixed signals with little clarity." One interviewee attributed the lack of clarity to recent changes within Sida: "Sida has split its funding streams, which makes it hard to know who to deal with. Also, policy changes in Sweden are affecting the work of the donor agency and humanitarian organisations. We are tearing our hair out because no one knows for sure which direction to go." Regarding prevention and risk reduction, one interviewee highlighted Sida for requesting partners "show that programmes do not contribute to the conflict, and prevent situations that might place beneficiaries in harm, but this is not very explicit." Another stressed the need for greater focus on prevention: "Sida likes to see how you mitigate risks associated to your programme in your project formulation. Prevention is not as strong as it should be, though."

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## PILLAR 3

# WORKING WITH HUMANITARIAN PARTNERS

In Pillar 3, Sweden received one of its highest qualitative scores for the flexibility of its funding, several highlighted the no-cost extensions Sweden made available to partners. There was greater concern, however, related to recent internal changes affecting Sweden's capacity. While one interviewee was fairly positive: "They came to the field, listened to our needs, asked for detailed information and have followed up on the crisis very closely," others felt that the restructuring process appears to be having negative side effects on Sweden's work in the field. "Sida is overwhelmed. It has strong expertise but insufficient capacity as their funding has been severely cut due to political decisions," noted one representative. "Sida's staff here is only one person, that's why they can't be too good," commented another. Partners see Sweden as a fairly strong supporter of coordination.

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## PILLAR 4

# PROTECTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

While partner organisations state that Sweden is a strong financial supporter of protection, several report that advocacy is less of a priority. However, some interviewees noted that Sweden did engage in advocacy somewhat. One stated that Sweden "engages very closely with the humanitarian coordinator and is very keen to raise the issues." Various organisations stated that Sida mainly relies on the UN to carry out access and safety initiatives.

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## PILLAR 5

# LEARNING AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Many organisations reported that Sweden does not prioritise accountability toward beneficiaries. "Sweden takes a very orthodox humanitarian position, and does not really think it is important or feel the need for beneficiary accountability," stated one organisation. Another reported that Sweden "only demands limited accountability to beneficiaries." Sweden received its lowest qualitative score for *Implementing evaluation recommendations*. On a more positive note, Sweden is considered to be the most transparent donor in its funding and decision-making. Partners held mixed views of the appropriateness of Sweden's reporting requirements, although one organisation applauded Sweden's initiative in harmonising reporting requirements with another donor.

# RECOMMENDATIONS

The following recommendations are based on data from 2010. It remains to be seen how the restructuring of Sida will influence these issues.

## ● INVEST ADEQUATELY IN PREVENTION, PREPAREDNESS, RISK REDUCTION AND RECONSTRUCTION

Sweden received one of the lowest scores of the OECD/DAC donors for *Funding reconstruction and prevention*, giving only 7.1% of its humanitarian aid for these issues, compared to the OECD/DAC average of 18.6%. Sweden's field partners also report the need for greater support, as Sweden received one of its lowest qualitative scores for *Prevention and risk reduction*. Sweden should look into ways to ensure it is supporting these issues sufficiently.

## ● LOOK FOR ADMINISTRATIVE SOLUTIONS TO CHANNEL MORE FUNDING TO NGOS

Sweden channelled 13.1% of its funding through NGOs in 2010, slightly below the OECD/DAC average of 15.3% and a significant drop from 2009 when it allocated 21.2% to NGOs. This is somewhat compensated by Sweden's support for Emergency Response Funds, which normally provides emergency funding to NGOs. Staff cut-backs will likely make it difficult for

Sweden to manage a large number of grants, but it may be able to increase its support to NGOs and reduce somewhat the administrative burden by creating flexible working models, such as shared management arrangements with other donors, or supporting NGO umbrella organisations.

## ● KEEP INTERNAL REFORMS FOCUSED ON IMPROVING EFFECTIVENESS


Field interviews with some of Sweden's long-standing partners warned of the risk of Sweden becoming excessively bureaucratic, asserting that internal restructuring and more exhaustive funding procedures could reduce Sweden's capacity to engage strategically at the field level as well as the flexibility of its funding. This year, Sweden was among the lowest group of donors for *Appropriate reporting requirements*. It could also improve the flexibility of its funding: in 2010, 28.5% of Sweden's humanitarian aid to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the World Food Programme (WFP), the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF), International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) was un-earmarked, while the Group 1 average was 47.8%.



Please see [www.daraint.org](http://www.daraint.org) for a complete list of references.

# SWITZERLAND

HRI 2011  
Ranking  
**6th**



Group **1**  
PRINCIPLED  
PARTNERS

OFFICIAL  
DEVELOPMENT  
ASSISTANCE


**0.41%**  
of GNI

HUMANITARIAN  
AID

**12.6%**  
of ODA

**US \$37**  
Per person

## HUMANITARIAN AID DISTRIBUTION (%)



GENDER RATING

POLICY

FUNDING

FIELD PERCEPTION

### STRENGTHS

| Pillar | Type | Indicator                                   | Score | % above OECD/DAC average |
|--------|------|---|-------|--------------------------|
| 5      | QT   | Participating in accountability initiatives | 9.58  | +114.2%                  |
| 5      | QT   | Funding accountability initiatives          | 8.02  | +95.0%                   |
| 4      | QT   | International humanitarian law              | 9.95  | +62.6%                   |
| 2      | QT   | Funding international risk mitigation       | 6.51  | +36.2%                   |
| 4      | QL   | Advocacy towards local authorities          | 7.13  | +28.1%                   |

### AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT

| Pillar | Type | Indicator                              | Score | % below OECD/DAC average |
|--------|------|--|-------|--------------------------|
| 2      | QT   | Funding reconstruction and prevention  | 1.92  | -57.1%                   |
| 3      | QT   | Funding NGOs                           | 2.36  | -47.9%                   |
| 2      | QT   | Reducing climate-related vulnerability | 3.02  | -25.0%                   |
| 2      | QL   | Prevention and risk reduction          | 3.58  | -20.7%                   |
| 4      | QT   | Human rights law                       | 4.93  | -20.1%                   |

## OVERALL PERFORMANCE

Switzerland ranked 6<sup>th</sup> in the HRI 2011, improving one position from 2010. Based on the pattern of its scores, Switzerland is classified as a Group 1 donor, "Principled Partners". This group is characterised by its commitment to humanitarian principles and strong support for multilateral partners, and generally good overall performance in all areas. Other Group 1 donors include Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden.

Switzerland's global score was above the OECD/DAC average, but below the Group 1 average. Similarly, Switzerland scored above the OECD/DAC average in all pillars, with the exception of Pillar 2

(Prevention, risk reduction and recovery). It scored below the Group 1 average in all pillars, except for Pillar 1 (Responding to needs), where it scored above average.

Compared to its OECD/DAC peers, Switzerland did best in the indicators on *Participating in accountability initiatives*, *Funding accountability initiatives*, *International humanitarian law*, *Funding international risk mitigation* and *Advocacy towards local authorities*. Its scores were relatively the lowest in the indicators on *Funding reconstruction and prevention*, *Funding NGOs*, *Reducing climate-related vulnerability*, *Prevention and risk reduction* and *Human rights law*.

# AID DISTRIBUTION

In 2010, Switzerland reduced its Official Development Assistance (ODA) from 0.45% of Gross National Income (GNI) in 2009 to 0.41% of GNI. Humanitarian assistance represented 12.6% of its ODA in 2010, or 0.051% of its GNI.

According to data reported to the United Nations (UN) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs' (OCHA) Financial Tracking Service (FTS), in 2010, 40.2% of Switzerland's humanitarian funding

was channelled to UN agencies, 27.1% to the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement, 18.7% bilaterally to affected governments, 10.5% to non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and 1.3% to private organisations/foundations. Over half of Switzerland's funding was not designated for a particular region or country. In 2010, Switzerland supported 24 crises in Africa, 18 in Asia, seven in the Americas, three in Europe, and one in Oceania.

# POLICY FRAMEWORK

Switzerland's humanitarian aid is provided by the Swiss Humanitarian Aid Unit of the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) – which is part of the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs. The 1976 *Swiss Federal Law on International Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Aid* clearly separates the objectives of humanitarian aid and development in their budgets (SDC 1988). Switzerland's humanitarian policy, outlined in the humanitarian strategy, *Concept of Commitment of the Swiss Humanitarian Aid (HA) and the Swiss Humanitarian Aid Unit (SHA) from 2009 to 2014*, is grounded in both international humanitarian law and the

*Principles of Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD)* (SDC 2010a). The *Humanitarian Aid of the Swiss Confederation: Strategy 2010* regards Swiss humanitarian action as an investment in sustainable development and emphasises support for humanitarian principles and coordination as strategic priorities (SDC 2010b). SDC has also published specific policies on gender, human rights, corruption, climate change, and disaster risk reduction. Switzerland's Humanitarian Aid Unit, Swiss Rescue Team and Rapid Response Team are available for rapid deployment to humanitarian emergencies.

## HOW DOES SWITZERLAND'S POLICY ADDRESS GHD CONCEPTS?

### GENDER

SDC has a comprehensive policy regarding gender, including its relation to humanitarian aid, a specific Gender Unit and a toolkit to help collaborators implement gender mainstreaming in planning (2011b). Most notably, SDC published *Gender & Humanitarian Aid: Why and how should SDC integrate gender into Humanitarian Aid?* in 2008. Gender is also addressed in *Gender Equality: A key for poverty alleviation and sustainable development*, especially in terms of capacity building (SDC 2003). In its *Guidelines for Disaster Risk Reduction*, Switzerland recognises that disasters can provide opportunities for societal change in power structures including gender (SDC 2008b).



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## PILLAR 1

# RESPONDING TO NEEDS

Switzerland's policy expresses a strong commitment to the principles of neutrality, impartiality, independence, adding that it also "unwaveringly promotes respect for these same principles by other players," (SDC 2010b, p. 6). Swiss humanitarian aid policies state that decisions are based on the greatest need, level of fragility and vulnerability and pay special attention to vulnerable groups including women, children, sick, elderly, poor and disabled persons. Switzerland's humanitarian policy also recognises the importance of timeliness in the provision of humanitarian assistance (SDC 2010b).

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## PILLAR 2

# PREVENTION, RISK REDUCTION AND RECOVERY

Prevention and preparedness are highlighted as strategic fields of activity in the *Swiss Confederation Humanitarian Aid Strategy 2010*. This includes the early anticipation, identification and reduction of disaster risks and damage. The *2008 SDC Guidelines on Disaster Risk Reduction* is intended to instruct SDC staff on the best way to ensure disaster risk reduction is integrated into programming. These guidelines, together with the 2009-2014 humanitarian strategy, stress the importance of capacity building (SDC 2008a and SDC 2010a). Switzerland also acknowledges the need for affected populations to participate in the humanitarian programmes it supports, and considers them partners with important decision-making capabilities. Reconstruction and rehabilitation are underscored as strategic fields of activity, and in 2010, Switzerland published *Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Concept of the Humanitarian Aid of the Swiss Confederation and the Swiss Humanitarian Aid Unit* to guide implementation (SDC 2010c).

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## PILLAR 3

# WORKING WITH HUMANITARIAN PARTNERS

According to the *Humanitarian Aid of the Swiss Confederation Strategy 2010*, Switzerland coordinates with public institutions, the private sector, governments and state actors, UN agencies, regional organisations, the Red Cross / Red Crescent Movement (especially the International Committee of the Red Cross), Swiss NGOs, as well as international and local NGOs (SDC 2010b). Despite earmarking 10% of its budget for food supplies, Switzerland acknowledges the need for flexibility in its humanitarian policies. Additionally, Switzerland considers that "new kinds of crises and complex emergencies require flexible and adaptable measures as well as innovative solutions," (SDC 2010b, p.9).

## PILLAR 4

# PROTECTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

SDC does not have any publicly accessible policy documents specific to human rights, international humanitarian law and refugee law in humanitarian aid, but did publish two related documents for its development work: *SDC's Human Rights Policy: Towards a Life in Dignity, Realising rights for poor people* (SDC 2006a) and *Promoting Human Rights in Development Cooperation* (SDC 1998). The *Humanitarian Aid of the Swiss Confederation Strategy 2010* lists advocacy as one of Switzerland's strategic fields of activity, which further specifies the importance of protection "through presence and testimony," (SDC 2010b, p.10). Switzerland commits to increasing security training for its employees including behavioral exercises and continuing education (SDC 2010a, p.11). A new group of experts dedicated to security was created to improve self-protection for Swiss mission personnel (SDC 2010a).

## PILLAR 5


# LEARNING AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Although Switzerland's humanitarian policy does not specifically mention accountability, *Fighting Corruption: SDC Strategy*, one of its development policies, addresses transparency and accountability (SDC 2006b). The Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action (ALNAP) is also listed as one of the partners of SDC (SDC 2011a). SDC states that it is committed to transparent planning, implementation, and reporting, and considers the transparent delegation of decision-making powers and responsibilities a way to maintain efficiency and reduce bureaucracy. Transparency is also seen as a means of raising awareness of humanitarian activities among Swiss and global citizens. Furthermore, Switzerland acknowledges the need for evaluation and quality control. In 2002, SDC published *Guidelines Evaluation & Controlling*, which details programme cycle management and independent evaluation. *Humanitarian Aid of the Swiss Confederation Strategy 2010* expresses a commitment to the *Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) Principles* and Swiss Humanitarian Aid's Rapid Response Teams have received ISO 9001:2000 certification to ensure conformity with international standards.

# FIELD PARTNERS' PERCEPTIONS

## SWITZERLAND'S FIELD PERCEPTION SCORES

Collected questionnaires: 27



SOURCE: DARA

Colours represent performance compared to donor's average performance rating:

Good Mid-range Could improve

## HOW IS SWITZERLAND PERCEIVED BY ITS PARTNERS?

### GENDER

In relation to gender, one interviewee reported, “No one looks at different gender issues, and cultural issues. I’ve never been given feedback on a proposal in this regard.” Another noted, “We mainstream gender in our programmes, and donors are not requesting this from us at all,” referring to Switzerland, as well as the other donors supporting their programmes. Some report that while gender is a requirement, it may be reduced to “just check[ing] on paper. That’s all.”

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## PILLAR 1

# RESPONDING TO NEEDS

Switzerland's partners seem to consider its humanitarian funding neutral, impartial, independent and timely. Interviewees also praised SDC for funding based on need, including "things that are not only life saving" and in areas where other donors decided to withdraw. Another interviewee described Switzerland as a "fantastic donor in all senses." In relation to *Adapting to changing needs*, one of Switzerland's partners reported the following: "The Swiss cooperation does field visits. They invite us to elaborate annual plans with them. They discuss with us and get involved in the response. They organise meetings for all NGOs working with them, local and international, and we exchange opinions and good practices." Another interviewee indicated that Sweden was more reactive than proactive in this regard: "We tell them the needs have changed. They trust our capacity."

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## PILLAR 2

# PREVENTION, RISK REDUCTION AND RECOVERY

With the exception of *Strengthening local capacity*, where it received somewhat higher scores, Switzerland's partners were critical of the country's support for the other indicators that comprise Pillar 2. Switzerland received its lowest qualitative score for its support of prevention, preparedness and risk reduction. Partner organisations held mixed views of Switzerland's support for *Linking relief to rehabilitation and development (LRRD)*. While one organisation recognised SDC for supporting a multiyear early recovery programme based on an LRRD approach another interviewee commented, "Our donors could do more. Recovery is not funded." On a more positive note, Switzerland's partners stated that SDC is known for strengthening local capacity, with programmes driven by community knowledge and supporting community rehabilitation.

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## PILLAR 3

# WORKING WITH HUMANITARIAN PARTNERS

Partner organisations' perception of Switzerland's support for coordination was somewhat mixed, although the organisations were appreciative of Switzerland's efforts in this regard and spoke of a "true partnership" with Switzerland because "they get involved and discuss annual plans." Another interviewee said that Switzerland regularly asks for information from another humanitarian organisation which communicated with a party of the conflict. Switzerland was praised for its support and use of the cluster system, pooled funding mechanisms, communication with other organisations, engaging with the humanitarian coordinator and other coordination procedures. However, one interviewee noted a difference in acceptance between the local and headquarters levels of a pooled funding mechanism. Field organisations' feedback on the flexibility of Switzerland's funding was largely positive.

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## PILLAR 4

# PROTECTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

According to one interviewee, Switzerland advocated by slowly pushing authorities to fulfill their responsibilities. Another noted that “the Swiss cooperation does advocacy on technical issues. They are totally neutral for everything else.” Partner organisations praised Switzerland’s funding for protection, though seemed to be more critical regarding the facilitation of humanitarian access and security of humanitarian workers. One organisation complained that “they don’t do anything, even with threats of abduction,” in reference to Switzerland, as well as their other donors.

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## PILLAR 5

# LEARNING AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Many field organisations reported that Switzerland did not do enough to ensure accountability to affected populations. According to one interviewee, Switzerland “does not require accountability to beneficiaries; they just audit the funds, but do not go beyond that.” Regarding the implementation of recommendations from past evaluations, Switzerland’s partners would like to see some improvement. One organisation reported, “Donors give you funding and almost forget about you. There is no follow-up,” referring to Switzerland, as well as its other donors. Switzerland’s partners provided much more positive feedback regarding its transparency and reporting requirements.

# RECOMMENDATIONS

## ● INVEST ADEQUATELY IN PREVENTION, PREPAREDNESS, RISK REDUCTION AND RECONSTRUCTION

Switzerland received some of its lowest scores on indicators related to prevention, preparedness, risk reduction and reconstruction. In 2010, Switzerland allocated 7.7% of its humanitarian aid to prevention, preparedness and reconstruction, while the OECD/DAC average is 18.6%. Switzerland's partners confirm this, giving the country its lowest qualitative score for its support for prevention, preparedness and risk reduction.

## ● STRENGTHEN SUPPORT TO REDUCE CLIMATE-RELATED VULNERABILITY

This indicator measures the extent to which donors have fulfilled their commitments in the Kyoto Protocol and funding to Fast Start Finance, which supports climate change mitigation and adaptation efforts. Switzerland provided only 41.9% of its fair share<sup>3</sup> to Fast Start Finance, compared to the OECD/DAC average of 102.4%, which seems to indicate that Switzerland could do more to support efforts to reduce climate-related vulnerability.

## ● LOOK FOR ADMINISTRATIVE SOLUTIONS TO CHANNEL MORE FUNDING TO NGOS


Switzerland's total allocations to NGOs represented only 7.8% of its humanitarian average, while the OECD/DAC and Group 1 average is 15.3%. To reduce the administrative burden of a large number of contracts, Switzerland could explore flexible working models, such as shared management arrangements with other donors, or supporting NGO umbrella organisations and NGOs of other nationalities.

## ● RENEW COMMITMENT TO HUMAN RIGHTS

Just as in 2010, Switzerland received the highest score of all OECD/DAC donors for *International humanitarian law*. However, it also repeated its low score in *Human rights law*, which measures signature and ratification of human rights treaties, accreditation of national human rights institutions and funding to OHCHR, the guardian of international human rights treaties. Switzerland has ratified 49 of 66 human rights treaties, and provided 0.00048% of its GDP to OHCHR, compared to the OECD/DAC average of 0.00065%.


## ● ENSURE AID MEETS THE DIFFERENT NEEDS OF WOMEN, MEN, BOYS AND GIRLS

Switzerland's humanitarian policy expresses a firm commitment to gender and requires partners to integrate gender in funding proposals. However, Switzerland's partners do not feel this is being translated into practice and indicate that greater effort is needed to support partners throughout implementation.

 Please see [www.daraint.org](http://www.daraint.org) for a complete list of references.

# UNITED KINGDOM

HRI 2011  
Ranking  
**8th**



Group **2**  
**LEARNING LEADERS**




**OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE** **0.56%**  
of GNI

**HUMANITARIAN AID**

**7.2%**  
of ODA

**US \$16**  
Per person

## HUMANITARIAN AID DISTRIBUTION (%)



### GENDER RATING

POLICY

FUNDING

FIELD PERCEPTION

### STRENGTHS

| Pillar | Type | Indicator                                   | Score | % above OECD/DAC average |
|--------|------|---|-------|--------------------------|
| 5      | QT   | Participating in accountability initiatives | 9.44  | +111.1%                  |
| 2      | QT   | Reducing climate-related vulnerability      | 7.50  | +86.2%                   |
| 3      | QT   | Funding NGOs                                | 8.01  | +76.7%                   |
| 1      | QT   | Timely funding to complex emergencies       | 9.34  | +18.0%                   |
| 5      | QL   | Implementing evaluation recommendations     | 4.86  | +13.4%                   |

### AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT

| Pillar | Type | Indicator  | Score | % below OECD/DAC average |
|--------|------|--|-------|--------------------------|
| 5      | QT   | Funding accountability initiatives               | 1.11  | -73.1%                   |
| 3      | QL   | Flexibility of funding                           | 5.68  | -18.1%                   |
| 1      | QL   | Independence of aid                              | 6.13  | -17.2%                   |
| 4      | QL   | Advocacy for protection of civilians             | 4.75  | -14.6%                   |
| 2      | QL   | Linking relief to rehabilitation and development | 5.05  | -11.4%                   |

## OVERALL PERFORMANCE

The United Kingdom (UK) ranked 8<sup>th</sup> in the HRI 2011, maintaining its position from 2010. Based on the pattern of its scores, the UK is classified as a Group 2 donor, "Learning Leaders". Donors in this group are characterised by their leading role in support of emergency relief efforts, strong capacity and field presence, and commitment to learning and improvement. They tend to do less well in areas such as prevention, preparedness, and risk reduction efforts. Other Group 2 donors include Canada, the European Commission, France and the United States.

The UK's global score was above the OECD/DAC and Group 2 averages. The UK scored above both averages in all pillars, with the exception of Pillar 4 (Protection and international law), where it scored below both averages.

In general, the UK scored significantly lower on the qualitative, survey-based indicators than on the quantitative indicators. Compared to its OECD/DAC peers, the UK did best on indicators on *Participating in accountability initiatives*, *Reducing climate-related vulnerability*, *Funding NGOs*, *Timely funding to complex emergencies* and *Implementing evaluation recommendations* – all quantitative indicators with the exception of the latter. Its scores were relatively the lowest in the indicators on *Funding accountability initiatives*, *Flexibility of funding*, *Independence of aid*, *Advocacy for protection of civilians* and *Linking relief to rehabilitation and development* – all qualitative indicators with the exception of *Funding accountability initiatives*.

# AID DISTRIBUTION

The UK increased its Official Development Assistance (ODA) dramatically in 2010. The ratio of its ODA in proportion to its Gross National Income (GNI) rose as well, from 0.52% in 2009 to 0.56% in 2010.

Humanitarian assistance comprised 7.2% of the UK's ODA in 2010, or 0.041% of its GNI. The UK Department for International Development (DFID) intends to reach the target of 0.7% ODA/GNI by 2013 (DFID 2011a).

According to data reported to the United Nations (UN) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Financial Tracking Service (FTS) (2011), in 2010, the UK channelled 46.1% of its humanitarian assistance to

UN agencies, 26.4% to non-governmental organisations (NGOs), 4.0% to the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement and 2.3% bilaterally to affected governments. The UK directed 8.8% of its assistance to the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) and 2.5% to Emergency Response Funds. In 2010, the UK supported a total of 31 crises: 19 in Africa, eight in Asia, three in the Americas and one in Oceania. The top recipient countries of UK humanitarian assistance in 2010 were Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Haiti. In 2010, the UK focused its sector-specific funding primarily on health, food and economic recovery and infrastructure.

# POLICY FRAMEWORK

The Department for International Development (DFID) manages the UK's humanitarian assistance. The UK has a number of funding mechanisms and windows for humanitarian aid including the global Conflict, Humanitarian and Security Department (CHASE); the regional Africa Conflict and Humanitarian Unit (ACHU); and country programmes containing elements of humanitarian assistance.

The legal basis for the UK's humanitarian assistance is grounded in the 2002 *International Development Act*, which vests responsibility in the Secretary of State. The UK government recently commissioned a *Humanitarian Emergency Response Review* (HERR) to

ensure the quality of its humanitarian assistance. In response to this comprehensive review, in September 2011, the UK government updated its humanitarian policy: *Saving lives, preventing suffering and building resilience: The UK Government's Humanitarian Policy*. In addition, it has produced sector-specific humanitarian policies, such as those regarding disaster risk reduction (DRR) and protection. DFID appears to be making significant efforts to operationalise the new policy framework by aligning all existing and new programming to it, and increasing its humanitarian funding and staffing. DFID maintains field offices in 52 countries.

## HOW DOES UNITED KINGDOM'S POLICY ADDRESS GHD CONCEPTS?

### GENDER

The UK's *Gender Equality Action Plan 2007-2009* (later extended to 2011) lays out goals to help developing countries achieve gender equality and women's empowerment (DFID 2007). Adding to the Home Office's *Call to End Violence Against Women and Girls* (2010), the 2011 humanitarian policy calls for gender and age disaggregated data in needs assessments, as well as ensuring humanitarian responses meet the different needs of women, children, the elderly and the disabled (DFID 2011b).



## PILLAR 1

# RESPONDING TO NEEDS

In its latest policy, *Saving lives, preventing suffering and building resilience: The UK Government's Humanitarian Policy*, the UK expresses a firm commitment to the principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence in humanitarian action, stressing that "UK humanitarian action will be based on need, and need alone," (DFID 2011b, p.6). Supporting forgotten emergencies has historically been a priority for DFID, which set a goal in its 2006 humanitarian policy to eliminate forgotten emergencies by 2010 (DFID 2006a). In order to improve the timeliness of its response to humanitarian crises, the UK intends to invest in anticipation, including regular review of the UK's Conflict Early Warning System and Watch list of fragile countries, established as part of the Building Stability Overseas Strategy, and "find[ing] news ways of acting quickly in 'slow onset' disasters to stop them becoming major emergencies." Moreover, the UK aims to improve predictability and timeliness of its aid by "making early pledges to appeals, agreeing multi-year funding, supporting global and country-level pooled funds, fast track funding and pre-qualifying NGOs and private sector partners," (DFID 2011b, p.13). In addition to improving the timeliness of its funding, the UK also seeks to address delays in deploying expert staff to the field by expanding its surge capacity to support multilateral partners.

## PILLAR 2

# PREVENTION, RISK REDUCTION AND RECOVERY

Building on its 2006 *Reducing the Risk of Disasters – Helping to Achieve Sustainable Poverty Reduction in a Vulnerable World: A DFID policy paper*, the UK continues to place great importance on disaster resilience in its latest humanitarian policy, calling for disaster resilience and risk reduction to be integrated into all country programmes, and climate change and conflict prevention initiatives (DFID 2006a and DFID 2011b). In addition, the UK plans to take advantage of science and the Chief Scientific Advisers' network to predict and prepare for disasters by integrating scientific data in country and regional resilience work (DFID 2011b). The UK also seeks to ensure coherence between development and humanitarian action through cooperation with development organisations and the private sector and to "strengthen local capacity to prevent, prepare for and mitigate crises," (DFID 2011b). Finally, the UK commits to ensure beneficiary participation in the design and evaluation of humanitarian action, although their participation in implementation and monitoring is not specified (DFID 2011b).

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## PILLAR 3

# WORKING WITH HUMANITARIAN PARTNERS

The UK recognises the leading role of the UN, particularly OCHA, and the Inter-Agency Standing Committee to coordinate humanitarian assistance, and commits to advocate for reform. “The UK will take on a ‘championing’ role to support humanitarian partners deliver reforms,” and plans to work closely with the European Commission’s Directorate General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (ECHO), the United States and the Good Humanitarian Donorship initiative, as well as with newer donors (DFID 2011b, p. 12). In line with the *Good Humanitarian Donorship Principles*, the UK intends to provide flexible, predictable funding with limited earmarking (DFID 2011b). Furthermore, it has committed to increase core funding to multilateral agencies “that have demonstrated they can deliver swiftly and appropriately to emergencies,” (DFID 2011b, p.7). Finally, in an effort to enhance its capacity, the UK plans to invest substantially in innovation and research, including the establishment of a humanitarian research and innovation team (DFID 2011b).

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## PILLAR 4

# PROTECTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

In 2009, the Foreign Commonwealth Office published the *UK Government Strategy on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict*, stipulating that the government will support organisations with a protection mandate, advocate for protection issues globally and at the country level, support peace-keeping missions, as well as a number of other protection related efforts. It also commits to “lobby strongly for humanitarian access, and hold countries to their commitments and obligations under IHL in this regard,” on the issues of humanitarian space and international humanitarian law (FCO 2009, p.14). The 2011 humanitarian policy stresses the UK’s commitment to the principles outlined in the 2009 protection strategy paper, adding that the UK will “implement the appropriate political, security, humanitarian and development actions necessary to uphold respect for international law, protect civilians and to secure humanitarian access,” (DFID 2011b, p.17), including providing funding for security management costs. In line with the *Good Humanitarian Donorship Principles*, the UK pledges to promote respect for humanitarian, refugee and human rights law.

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## PILLAR 5


# LEARNING AND ACCOUNTABILITY

DFID emphasises the importance of accountability in its humanitarian policy, referring to accountability toward taxpayers, donors and affected populations, which the UK intends to make a central element of its humanitarian support. Furthermore, DFID plans to increase investment in measuring impact and integrating lessons learnt within DFID and will encourage partners to do the same (DFID 2011b). DFID is a signatory of the International Aid Transparency Initiative and calls for greater transparency toward beneficiaries in its humanitarian policy.

# FIELD PARTNERS' PERCEPTIONS

## UNITED KINGDOM'S FIELD PERCEPTION SCORES

Collected questionnaires: 64



SOURCE: DARA

United Kingdom's average score 5.77 ← ..... → OECD/DAC average score 6.05

Colours represent performance compared to donor's average performance rating:

■ Good   
 ■ Mid-range   
 ■ Could improve

## HOW IS UNITED KINGDOM PERCEIVED BY ITS PARTNERS?

### GENDER

DFID's partner organisations held varied perceptions of its approach to gender. Many claimed that the UK only "pays lip service" to incorporating gender sensitive approaches in programmes because "it is in vogue" and "never verified". One organisation, however, claimed that: "the DFID pushed us to make our health programme more inclusive in terms of gender. We have to be more attentive to women's special health needs. We have to calculate our indicators by sex."

## PILLAR 1

# RESPONDING TO NEEDS

As one of the largest humanitarian donors, DFID received a great deal of feedback from its partners, both positive and negative. In relation to responding to needs, however, perceptions are more negative than for other donors, though one organisation noted that DFID endeavoured to link projects to needs assessments. On the issue of providing neutral, impartial and independent aid, organisations affirmed that “the UK so far has been an impartial humanitarian donor” and “has made an effort to respond according to needs.” In other contexts, however, DFID was seen as “using donor aid for political, military agendas” and hindering the response due to its “no-contact” policy. One organisation reported that “DFID was very concerned about how aid to Pakistan would look to their constituencies in the UK. They consulted every step they took with London, slowing the process.” Several organisations raised concerns about the UK’s push for value-for-money: “DFID will face cuts and just fund reactive work,” stated one interviewee. Many complained of delays in disbursement: “UK funding has not been timely. It took 11 months to decide on a grant due to a change in government,” noted one interviewee and “Timeliness of UK funding is always problematic, speeding up when the donor’s budget time is up, but not mirroring needs of the population in a sudden onset disaster” reported another.

## PILLAR 2

# PREVENTION, RISK REDUCTION AND RECOVERY

Similar to most donors, the UK received some of its lowest qualitative scores in Pillar 2. Some agencies were positive about DFID’s requirements to strengthen local capacity, particularly through “supporting the local economy” in one instance. Others reported that the UK “does not support local capacity building, even in the current remote control situation in Somalia which hinges on strong local field capacity.” In terms of beneficiary participation, one organisation mentioned that the DFID “requires it in all stages of the programmes and projects,” though another considered that DFID focused more on beneficiary participation “only in terms of impact on beneficiaries.” On a similar note, another stated: “DFID is more interested in the result of programmes.” DFID scored below the average of its peers for *Linking relief to rehabilitation and development*. Partners complained of short-term funding inhibiting transitional activities: “There should be longer-term funding available... DFID is great for strategic issues. Why aren’t they more committed to longer term funding? With short term funding we don’t have time to plan and implement properly.” A few partners were more positive, asserting: “The UK completely accepts rehabilitation as a part of humanitarian aid” and “DFID is very much into transitional funding”. DFID, like most donors, also received a low score for *Prevention and risk reduction*. One of DFID’s partners highlighted the lack of clarity surrounding the issue: “all donors have been talking a lot about risk reduction, but so far it is unclear what they mean.” A few organisations were more positive, praising DFID for its investment in conflict prevention, prepositioning stocks and requiring “that 1/4 of the funding goes to this type of action.”

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## PILLAR 3

# WORKING WITH HUMANITARIAN PARTNERS

The UK received mixed responses from the field in relation to how they engage with humanitarian partners. For example, one organisation described the UK's funding arrangements as "extremely rigid", while another argued that "DFID offers flexibility in budget earmarking, but is inflexible with regards to duration." The UK was one of the best donors for *Supporting coordination*; partners described this as "a must" for the UK and praised its "support for close coordination through the cluster system and close follow-up of the clusters". Most organisations felt that the UK had a strong capacity and was highly engaged, although in one particular context the DFID was seen to have "very junior staff who seemed to be overwhelmed."

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## PILLAR 4

# PROTECTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

Field responses on the UK's commitment to protection and international law were generally positive. The UK's partners perceived it to be stronger in advocacy toward local authorities, than for the protection of civilians. One interviewee appreciated that "DFID asked us to provide them with recommendations and policy papers to advocate with the government." In one context, an interviewee reported that "DFID is more outspoken but not very effective" regarding its advocacy for protection. In terms of funding, feedback was more positive; DFID was seen as "fully supporting" the protection of civilians. In relation to security and access, one organisation stated: "The UK always supports security and access investments and always says yes to security budgets."

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## PILLAR 5

# LEARNING AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Field perceptions relating to the UK's performance on learning and accountability were mixed. In relation to integrating accountability towards affected populations in programmes, the UK, like most donors, received one of its lowest qualitative scores. One interviewee asserted that "downward accountability is not a funding requirement or at best, a weak one." Another interviewee reported: "It's a bit tick the box thing, like gender; I don't get many questions." DFID also received a low score for *Implementation of evaluation recommendations*, though it outperformed most of its peers as this is a weakness common to many donors. One interviewee commented, "For DFID, it is a requirement to evaluate, but there is less follow-up." Another agency argued that reporting requirements are heavily "personality dependent." UK reporting requirements have been described as both "appropriate" and "too general and ambiguous." One organisation added that "UK reporting requirements are appropriate, but are mostly to ease their mind. There is never any feedback on reporting on dialogue." Various organisations describe DFID as transparent, but there are uncertainties: "With the new government, it is unclear what and how decisions are taken. They are generally quite open though."

# RECOMMENDATIONS

The following recommendations are based on data from 2010. It remains to be seen how the UK's new policy will influence these issues.

## ● RENEW COMMITMENT TO LEARNING AND ACCOUNTABILITY

The UK performed well in the majority of the quantitative indicators with the exception of *Funding accountability initiatives*, which measures funding for humanitarian accountability and learning initiatives as a percentage of total humanitarian aid.<sup>2</sup> The UK allocated 0.09% of its humanitarian aid for these initiatives, while the OECD/DAC average was 0.43%. The UK should consider increasing its support for learning and accountability initiatives.

## ● PROTECT THE NEUTRALITY, IMPARTIALITY AND INDEPENDENCE OF HUMANITARIAN AID

DFID's partners were particularly critical of the neutrality, impartiality and independence of the UK's humanitarian aid in Somalia, Colombia, Pakistan, the occupied Palestinian territories and Kenya. Partners complained of the effects of "no-contact" policies and reported concern over UK interest in funding specific geographic regions or programmes they felt responded to the UK's political agenda more than humanitarian need. The UK should put in place practical measures to preserve the neutrality, impartiality and independence of its humanitarian aid and engage in dialogue with partners to discuss their perceptions in this regard.

## ● EXPLORE FUNDING OPTIONS TO ENSURE CONSISTENT SUPPORT FOR TRANSITIONAL ACTIVITIES

The UK received the second-lowest score of the OECD/DAC donors for *Linking relief to rehabilitation and development* (LRRD). Partners in Haiti, Colombia, Chad, Pakistan and Somalia were especially critical, while it received significantly better feedback in DRC, oPt and Sudan. Related to this, DFID is considered the second-least flexible donor. According to many partners, this is because of the short-term nature of funding, which they also report inhibits LRRD.

## ● ENGAGE IN DIALOGUE WITH PARTNERS TO DISCUSS THE MOST APPROPRIATE WAY TO ADVOCATE FOR PROTECTION IN EACH CRISIS


DFID's partners seem fairly pleased with its financial support for the protection of civilians. What appears to be lacking is advocacy for protection, where DFID was among the lowest scored donors. DFID received its lowest scores for this in oPt, Chad, Haiti and Pakistan.



Please see [www.daraint.org](http://www.daraint.org) for a complete list of references.

# UNITED STATES

HRI 2011  
Ranking  
**17th**






Group **2**  
**LEARNING LEADERS**

**OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE** **0.21%**  
of GNI

**HUMANITARIAN AID** **17.3%**  
of ODA

**US \$17**  
Per person

## HUMANITARIAN AID DISTRIBUTION (%)



## GENDER RATING

POLICY **↑**

FUNDING **→**

FIELD PERCEPTION **→**

### STRENGTHS

| Pillar | Type | Indicator                             | Score | % above OECD/DAC average |
|--------|------|---------------------------------------|-------|--------------------------|
| 3      | QT   | Funding NGOs                          | 7.28  | +60.5%                   |
| 1      | QL   | Adapting to changing needs            | 7.48  | +19.2%                   |
| 1      | QT   | Timely funding to complex emergencies | 9.40  | +18.8%                   |
| 4      | QL   | Advocacy towards local authorities    | 6.48  | +16.4%                   |
| 4      | QL   | Facilitating safe access              | 5.93  | +16.3%                   |

### AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT

| Pillar | Type | Indicator                              | Score | % below OECD/DAC average |
|--------|------|--|-------|--------------------------|
| 3      | QT   | Un-earmarked funding                   | 0.69  | -86.7%                   |
| 2      | QT   | Funding reconstruction and prevention  | 0.96  | -78.5%                   |
| 2      | QT   | Reducing climate-related vulnerability | 0.92  | -77.1%                   |
| 2      | QT   | Funding international risk mitigation  | 1.43  | -70.0%                   |
| 4      | QT   | Human rights law                       | 1.88  | -69.6%                   |

## OVERALL PERFORMANCE

The United States (US) ranked 17<sup>th</sup> in the HRI 2011, improving two positions from 2010. Based on the pattern of its scores, the US is classified as a Group 2 donor, "Learning Leaders". Donors in this group are characterised by their leading role in support of emergency relief efforts, strong capacity and field presence, and commitment to learning and improvement. They tend to do less well in areas such as prevention, preparedness, and risk reduction efforts. Other Group 2 donors include Canada, the European Commission, France and the United Kingdom.

The US' 2011 global score was below the OECD/DAC and Group 2 averages. The US scored below both averages in all pillars, with the exception of Pillar 1 (Responding to needs), where it scored above both averages.

Overall, the US performed significantly better in the qualitative, survey-based indicators than in the quantitative indicators. Humanitarian organisations in the field generally see the US as an engaged, committed partner, but with some clear areas for improvement. Compared to its OECD/DAC peers, the US did best in indicators on *Funding to NGOs*, *Adapting to changing needs*, *Timely funding to complex emergencies*, *Advocacy towards local authorities* and *Facilitating safe access*. Its scores were relatively the lowest in indicators on *Un-earmarked funding*, *Reducing climate-related vulnerability*, *Funding for reconstruction and prevention*, *Funding international risk mitigation* and *Human rights law*.

# AID DISTRIBUTION

Although the US is the largest donor in absolute terms, in 2010 its Official Development Aid (ODA) as a percentage of Gross National Income (GNI) remained low at 0.21%, well below the UN target of 0.7%. Humanitarian assistance represented 17.3% of its 2010 ODA, or 0.036% of its GNI.

According to data reported to the United Nations (UN) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs' (OCHA) Financial Tracking Service (FTS) (2011), the US channelled 31.6% of its total humanitarian aid to the World Food Programme, representing a large portion of the 53.5% that was allocated to UN agencies in 2010, 24.0% to non-

governmental organisations (NGO), 5.4% bilaterally to affected governments, 2.1% to the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement and 0.9% to private organisations and foundations. The US provided 0.23% of its humanitarian aid to the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF). The United States' country-specific humanitarian aid supported 73 crises in 2010: 25 in Asia, 23 in Africa, 14 in the Americas, eight in Europe and three in Oceania, with Haiti, Pakistan and Sudan receiving the greatest amounts. Sectorally, the US provided the greatest amount of support to food, seconded by coordination and support services (OCHA FTS 2011).

# POLICY FRAMEWORK

The United States Agency for International Development's (USAID) Office for Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) and the Food for Peace Program (FFP) - within the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA) - and the Department of State's (DoS) Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) collectively manage the United States' humanitarian assistance. According to the 2011 *DAC Peer Review*, a total of 27 government agencies play a role in US foreign assistance, although USAID manages the majority of US humanitarian assistance, followed by the Department of State, and to a lesser degree the Department of Defense, Department of Homeland Security, the Center for Disease Control and Prevention under the Department of Health and Human Services, and the Department of Agriculture. Additionally, the Commander Emergency Response Program (CERP), which is part of the Department of Defense, was established to provide US military commanders the capability to effectively respond to urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The US is actively involved in the *Good Humanitarian Donorship* (GHD) initiative, though it does not have a comprehensive humanitarian policy. While the Obama Administration issued a new development policy in September 2010, no mention has been made of a humanitarian policy as of yet, despite recommendations from the Organisation of Economic Co-operation's Development Assistance Committee in this regard (OECD/DAC). The Department of State's 2010 *Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review* announced a change in the organisational set up: the Chief of Missions at the embassy level will be tasked to coordinate the development and humanitarian programmes of the various agencies. USAID/OFDA has strategically located field offices to facilitate humanitarian coordination and ensure rapid access to disaster sites to assess needs and deliver assistance. The US also has stockpiles of relief supplies at regional warehouse hubs in Miami, Florida; Pisa, Italy; and Dubai, United Arab Emirates.



## HOW DOES UNITED STATES' POLICY ADDRESS GHD CONCEPTS?

### GENDER

OFDA's *Annual Report for Fiscal Year 2009* expresses a strong commitment to gender issues in the humanitarian field and PRM emphasises the need to pay special attention to gender-based violence (DoS 2010a). According to USAID, funding for programmes that incorporate gender-sensitive initiatives has increased steadily since 2005 and targets continue to be raised (DoS 2010a). The agency seeks to support efforts to prevent and combat gender-based violence, integrating them into multi-sectoral programmes to maximise effectiveness and increase protection. At the same time, PRM is striving to improve the accuracy of sex and age disaggregated data for multi-sectoral assistance programmes (DoS 2010a).

### PILLAR 1

### RESPONDING TO NEEDS

The Department of State affirms that its humanitarian assistance is provided on the basis of need according to principles of impartiality, and human dignity and providing emergency food aid to the most vulnerable is considered a priority, especially to those in complex emergencies (DoS 2010a). The 2011 *DAC Peer Review* reports that the US has made progress in untying its food aid (OECD/DAC 2011); since 2009, the US has invested significantly in the pilot project, "Local and Regional Procurement Project" as part of its food aid appropriation (USDA 2011). DCHA's Rapid Response Fund allows for a prompt response to unforeseen disasters and conflicts, and OFDA's Disaster Assistance Response Teams (DARTs) can be deployed in the immediate aftermath of a sudden-onset disaster. USAID often consults with other donors and humanitarian organisations in the crisis area to best administer emergency relief according to changing needs (USAID 2009).

### PILLAR 2

### PREVENTION, RISK REDUCTION AND RECOVERY

The US takes a multifaceted approach to conflict prevention, risk reduction and recovery. Disaster readiness is generally funded out of three accounts: International Disaster Assistance, Development Assistance, and the Food for Peace Program (DoS 2010a). To facilitate smooth transitions from emergency relief to medium and longer-term development activities, OFDA works with other offices within USAID's DCHA and USAID's regional bureaus and overseas missions, as well as other partners (USAID 2009). Although short funding cycles have made this difficult, the *Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review* called for greater emphasis on early recovery and a smooth transition to rehabilitation and development (DoS 2010b). DCHA has recently increased its conflict mitigation budget and continues to encourage beneficiaries to participate in programming (DoS 2010a).

### PILLAR 3

## WORKING WITH HUMANITARIAN PARTNERS

OFDA's *Annual Report for Fiscal Year 2009* stresses the essential role of coordination and information management for the delivery of humanitarian assistance during crisis situations. Most funding in this field is provided through UN and non-governmental organisation (NGO) partners, as well as through local mechanisms. The US supports pooled funding initiatives (OFDA 2009), and USAID intends for its funding to be as flexible as possible (DoS 2010a). The US recently established a Humanitarian Policy Working Group to improve coordination of humanitarian efforts among the agencies. The 2011 *DAC Peer Review* recommended using this group to coordinate funding procedures for partners, as organisations with funding from different agencies "receive a mix of earmarked and unearmarked funding from a number of US humanitarian bodies, with varying conditions, timeframes and reporting requirements." It is worth highlighting, however, that the US is currently reforming its procurement guidelines, so these issues may be addressed (USAID 2011a). The *Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review* suggested greater investment in the capacity of USAID staff by "retaining expert Locally Employed Staff, tripling midlevel hiring at USAID, seeking expansion of USAID's non-career hiring authorities, expanding interagency rotations, and establishing a technical career path at USAID that leads to promotion into the Senior Foreign Service," (2010b). It remains to be seen if this recommendation will be taken on board given potential budget cuts.

### PILLAR 4

## PROTECTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

The Department of State (2010) considers all humanitarian assistance to have a protection component. It reports that USAID was able to reach its target goals of protecting affected populations in 2009 and 2010 thanks to enhanced cooperation with international partners and to efforts to encourage government authorities to improve humanitarian access (DoS 2010a). OFDA aims to improve the safety and security of relief workers by meeting personally with NGOs and funding innovative research in security coordination and information-sharing (OFDA 2009). The US also supports initiatives such as the Security Unit at InterAction. The 2011 *DAC Peer Review* commended the US for supporting its humanitarian funding with strong diplomatic and advocacy efforts.


# PILLAR 5 LEARNING AND ACCOUNTABILITY

In 2011, USAID published a new evaluation policy for its development assistance and named a full-time Evaluation and Reporting Coordinator who will participate in the USAID-wide Evaluation Interest Group. Furthermore, learning and accountability activities will increase throughout the agency with the recent establishment of the Office of Learning, Evaluation and Research. OFDA's *Annual Report for Fiscal Year 2009* states that OFDA staff carefully monitors partners' programmes to ensure that resources are used wisely. At the same time, the Department of State mentions that its development and humanitarian programmes promote transparency and accountability at the local level (2010). USAID also provides funding to the Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action (ALNAP) (OFDA 2010). In 2010, the US approved a foreign assistance transparency agenda and now publishes data on US foreign aid on the dashboard, [foreignassistance.gov](http://foreignassistance.gov).

## FIELD PARTNERS' PERCEPTIONS

### UNITED STATES' FIELD PERCEPTION SCORES

Collected questionnaires: 142



SOURCE: DARA

United States' average score 6.02 ← ..... → OECD/DAC average score 6.05

Colours represent performance compared to donor's average performance rating:

■ Good 
 ■ Mid-range 
 ■ Could improve

## HOW IS THE UNITED STATES PERCEIVED BY ITS PARTNERS?

### GENDER

Organisations in the field reported that the US often ensures the programmes it supports integrate gender-sensitive approaches. “The US wants to integrate women’s empowerment and gender across all programmes,” reported one organisation. Partners report that the US normally requires sex and age disaggregated data, though in Haiti, gender seems to be given less importance: “OFDA generally requires a gender approach, but in this emergency case, they don’t care that much about it.” Some organisations noted that the US could improve by verifying that gender approaches are actually integrated, and indicated that conditions on US aid often affect gender issues. “USAID is very influenced by US policies and therefore cannot distribute the contraceptive pill because the government doesn’t allow it.”

### PILLAR 1

### RESPONDING TO NEEDS

The United States received one of the lowest scores of the OECD/DAC donors for indicators regarding the neutrality, impartiality and independence of its assistance. Field organisations responded overwhelmingly that US humanitarian agencies are influenced by other interests. One interviewee described the negative effects of this in Somalia: “Extreme politisation of humanitarian aid reinforces negative perceptions of manipulated aid and endangers all operations in Somalia.” “USAID is 100% political,” stated one representative,” and “US assistance in this country is clearly linked to other interests,” stated another. One organisation complained that “the US has an economic interest. You have to use their suppliers.” According to interviewees, US humanitarian assistance often entails conditions that can negatively affect the ability to deliver aid. “With OFDA, we can only purchase drugs from authorised US providers, which is time consuming and directly affects the beneficiaries,” stated one organisation. However, several organisations lauded US field presence and responsiveness to needs. In fact, the US received the second-highest score of the OECD/DAC donors for ensuring the programmes it funds adapt to changing needs. One interviewee praised the US for being the only donor to monitor this for short-term projects. Another interviewee noted that “OFDA is the only donor that came to talk to us and discuss the needs with us.” The timeliness of US funding seems to vary according to the crisis. While in one crisis, organisations complained of six month delays, in others, interviewees reported that it was “exceptionally fast, providing up front funding in every case needed.”

## PILLAR 2

# PREVENTION, RISK REDUCTION AND RECOVERY

Partner organisations report that the US is stronger in *Strengthening local capacity* than in the other indicators that comprise Pillar 2. According to one field partner, “Strengthening local capacity is a requirement in all USAID proposals.” However, beneficiary participation seems to be weaker. One interview asserted that “beneficiary involvement is not verified in a systematic manner.” Another reported that “With OFDA, it depends on the kind of project.” Feedback regarding *Linking relief, rehabilitation and development* was more mixed. An organisation receiving funding from OFDA was critical, stating: “OFDA has a strict emergency approach. Their aim is to leave the country in the same situation it was before the crisis, which isn't good. We want to leave it in a better situation than that.” However, organisations receiving funding from both OFDA and USAID seemed to be in a better position: “The US supports the continuum from emergency life saving relief, through OFDA, to reconstruction and development, through USAID.” The US also received low scores for *Prevention and risk reduction*. One interviewee reported that “USAID pulled prevention and risk reduction out of a programme.” Another partner organisation criticised the lack of funding for these activities, stating: “The donor community rewards those who fight because they don't fund until there is a conflict. No one funds prevention. It costs much less to prevent.” One organisation did report however, that “OFDA won't fund any project in this country that doesn't involve disaster risk reduction.”

## PILLAR 3

# WORKING WITH HUMANITARIAN PARTNERS

Field organisations provided mixed responses in respect to US humanitarian agencies' performance in Pillar 3 categories. Responses showed that US funding is often not flexible and provided under very short timeframes. Though the US received a low score for *Strengthening organisational capacity*, this is also a common weakness for many donors. Several interviewees disagreed, however, reporting that the US was highly supportive of this. “Our organisational capacity is exactly what OFDA funded,” stated one organisation. Another noted that “OFDA supported contingency planning. They look at us as real partners and not just implementers.” Most organisations consider that the US actively promotes coordination in the field, though some complained of the “parallel coordination system” the US created with its partners. The US is one of the OECD/DAC donors considered to have the greatest capacity and expertise.

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## PILLAR 4

# PROTECTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

Field interviews show that partner organisations see the US as a strong supporter of protection and access. Organisations reported that the US places great importance on advocacy towards governments and local authorities to ensure they fulfill their responsibilities. Similar to most donors, partner organisations consider the US stronger in funding protection rather than advocating for it. Although the US' score fell slightly below its qualitative average, the US outperformed its peers in *Facilitating safe access*. An organisation in Pakistan reported that “the US was extremely concerned by access and human rights violations.” Responses also show that the US funds flights and escorts for humanitarian workers in high-risk situations. One interviewee criticised the lack of a common approach among donors in insecure environments, especially regarding relations with belligerent groups.

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## PILLAR 5

# LEARNING AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Field organisations provided mixed responses regarding Pillar 5 indicators. Partner organisations held varied opinions regarding the integration of accountability towards affected populations. For example, one interviewee reported that the US “asks you to not promise things you can't do to not create disappointment among the population,” while another felt that the US is more interested in upward accountability: “There are some donors like the US who push for accountability, but it is mostly towards themselves, not to beneficiaries.” Although it is one of the US' lowest qualitative scores, responses also show that the US is among the most proactive donors in working with partners to implement evaluation recommendations. “It has been great to discuss issues with OFDA,” stated one organisation. “USAID is learning about this with us,” reported another. Partner organisations expressed mixed views on reporting requirements. While one organisation stated that the US has a “good” reporting system, another considered it to be “overbearing”.

# RECOMMENDATIONS

## ● FORMALISE COMMITMENT TO HUMANITARIAN PRINCIPLES IN A COMPREHENSIVE HUMANITARIAN POLICY

The US should continue efforts to streamline and modernise its humanitarian assistance, crisis prevention, mitigation and response activities through a comprehensive official humanitarian policy describing its commitment to humanitarian principles and uniting the information from various agencies and documents into a common humanitarian policy, in line with the proposed overhaul of the Foreign Assistance Act (Senator Berman's proposed "Global Partnerships Act").

## ● PROTECT THE NEUTRALITY, IMPARTIALITY AND INDEPENDENCE OF HUMANITARIAN AID

The US should engage with its partners to discuss practical measures to ensure the neutrality, impartiality and independence of its humanitarian aid. This is especially important in crises where the US has counter-terrorism operations underway, as partners in Somalia, the occupied Palestinian territories (oPt), Pakistan and Colombia reported that politicised aid inhibits their access to populations in need. Many partners also complained of the burden placed on them to comply with the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) regulations. Perceptions of politicised aid led some organisations

to reject US funding due to visibility requirements in sensitive crises as they would put at risk the security of aid workers and further restrict access.

## ● GET THE RIGHT ORGANISATIONAL SET-UP TO ENSURE INTERNAL COHERENCE AND AVOID GAPS

Some of the US' lower scores in indicators like *Unearmarked funding*, *Linking relief to rehabilitation and development* and *Prevention and reconstruction* seem to be influenced by the agencies involved and their varying mandates. Partners receiving funding from only one agency report difficulty covering issues like risk reduction, prevention and preparedness, while organisations receiving funding from more than one agency seem to be in a better position to respond to the range of humanitarian needs co-existing in crises. However, the complicated aid architecture also influences flexibility, as partners that do access funds from more than one agency must address the different earmarking and funding conditions of each.

## ● INVEST ADEQUATELY IN PREVENTION, PREPAREDNESS, RISK REDUCTION

The United States received its lowest scores of the Index (after Un-earmarked funding) in *Reducing climate-related*

*vulnerability*, *Funding for reconstruction and prevention* and *Funding for risk mitigation*, indicating the need to place greater importance on reducing risk and vulnerability to prevent and prepare for future crises. Given current pressure on the US foreign aid budget, support for these measures also makes sense from a financial stand-point as prevention has been repeatedly shown to cost less than emergency response. In 2010, the US spent only 3.8% of its humanitarian budget on prevention and reconstruction, while the OECD/DAC average is 18.6%.

## ● FORMALISE COMMITMENT TO INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN LAW

Although the US is strong in advocating for local authorities to fulfill their responsibilities in response to humanitarian needs, it is weak in its own commitment to respect international human rights and humanitarian law. The United States is the OECD/DAC country that has signed the least number of international human rights and humanitarian treaties: 18 of 36 human rights treaties and 36 of 50 humanitarian treaties. Furthermore, the United States is one of only four OECD/DAC donors, together with Portugal, the Netherlands and Luxembourg, that has not established a national committee on international humanitarian law, and together with Finland, Italy and Japan, is one of only four OECD/DAC donors that has not established a national committee on human rights law.



Please see [www.daraint.org](http://www.daraint.org) for a complete list of references.

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# NOTES

<sup>1</sup> Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action (ALNAP), the Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) initiative, the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI), the Humanitarian Accountability Partnership (HAP), Quality COMPAS, Sphere and People In Aid.

<sup>2</sup> Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action (ALNAP) the Humanitarian Accountability Partnership (HAP), Quality COMPAS and Sphere and projects listed under on learning & accountability in OCHA's FTS.

<sup>3</sup> The concept that all donors distribute the burden of humanitarian needs equitably, based on the share (or percentage) that a country's GDP represents compared to the total GDP of the OECD/DAC group.

<sup>4</sup> In fact, some field interviewees who participated in the French-version of the field survey did not understand the concept behind the French word "redevabilité"; only when interviewers used the English word "accountability" did they understand.

<sup>5</sup> Not including donors with insufficient survey responses (Austria, Greece, New Zealand and Portugal)