

**HRI** THE  
2011 HUMANITARIAN  
RESPONSE  
INDEX

**DARA**  
IMPACT  
MATTERS


FOCUS  
ON **PAKISTAN**

**LESSONS FROM THE FLOODS**



# CRISIS AT A GLANCE

# PAKISTAN



TOTAL FUNDING TO PAKISTAN IN 2010:

US\$ **3.1** BILLION

**55%** INSIDE THE CAP

## THE CRISIS AND THE RESPONSE

- A fifth of Pakistan was flooded in July-September 2010 when unprecedented monsoon downpours created a slow-onset complex emergency as rivers broke their banks the length of the nation. Large areas of Sindh remained under water for months.
- Coming atop the ongoing caseload of those displaced as a result of campaigns against Islamic militants, Pakistan was faced with the largest internal displacement crisis the world has experienced this century.


- Some 20 million people – around one in eight Pakistanis – were affected by the floods, many losing houses and livelihoods and suffering from diarrhoeal and skin diseases due to lack of clean water and sanitation.
- The United Nations (UN) appeal was the largest in its history \$1.88 billion.
- The unprecedented humanitarian response prevented a major food crisis and epidemic outbreak.
- Pakistani government and military actors again played a lead response role but were unable to deliver on pledges to provide recovery assistance.
- A principled approach and independent needs-based response was often missing due to interference from politicians, landlords or tribal leaders.
- There was insufficient commitment to the aid effectiveness agenda, particularly around accountability.

# CRISIS AT A GLANCE

# PAKISTAN

## TOTAL HUMANITARIAN FUNDING TO PAKISTAN


US\$ MILLION



Total funding committed and/or contributed inside and outside the appeal

## 2010-11 PAKISTAN FLOODS APPEAL COVERAGE

UNCOVERED REQUIREMENTS  
**30%**




TOTAL REQUIREMENTS  
US\$ 1.9 BILLION

FUNDING TO THE APPEAL  
**70%**

Source: UN OCHA FTS, accessed in December 2011

## 2010 PAKISTAN IDPs APPEAL COVERAGE

UNCOVERED REQUIREMENTS  
**50%**




TOTAL REQUIREMENTS  
US\$ 661.2 MILLION

FUNDING TO THE APPEAL  
**50%**

## MAIN HUMANITARIAN DONORS IN 2010


US\$ MILLION



Total funding inside and outside the appeal. Total new funding excludes carry-over.

## HRI DONOR PERFORMANCE BY PILLAR

FIELD PERCEPTION SCORES



Source: DARA

Colors represent performance compared to donor's average Humanitarian Response Index score:

● Good ● Mid-range ● Could improve

OECD/DAC average pillar score 5.02

## DONOR PERFORMANCE AND AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT

- By December 2011 the UN flood appeal was 70 percent funded, including from a range of new donors.
- Donors could do more to collectively reaffirm the universality of humanitarian principles and the need for greater accountability and coordination.
- Donors should urge the UN to work closely with in-country climate change experts to map at-risk areas and devise preparedness scenarios.
- Donors should provide more funding to national non-governmental organisations (NGOs)

# LESSONS FROM THE FLOODS

## THE CRISIS

Pakistan is highly vulnerable to earthquakes, avalanches, floods and political conflict. This century it has faced recurrent emergencies characterised by extensive displacement. A major earthquake in 2005 which affected 3.5 million people was followed by military operations against Islamic militants which caused the world's largest displacement in over a decade – some 4.2 million people were affected, and it is thought 1.5 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) are yet to return.

A fifth of the country was inundated after large areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK), Sindh, Punjab and Balochistan provinces were deluged with severe monsoon downpours from late July 2010. Areas of KPK received ten times the average annual rainfall in the space of a week. Within hours, flash floods started sweeping away villages and roads, leaving local and national government agencies apparently at a loss what to do. For the next four weeks the ensuing floods progressed the length of the Indus river system before reaching the Arabian Sea, 2,000 kilometers downstream. At the height of the inundation, 20 percent of the country was under water. The slow-moving body of water was equal in dimension to the land mass of the United Kingdom. Pakistan's National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) ranked the floods as the worst natural disaster in the country's history.

Fewer than two thousand people were killed but some 1.74 million houses (particularly those built of mud) were damaged or destroyed. The floods affected 84 of Pakistan's 121 districts and more than 20 million people – approximately an eighth of Pakistan's population. While the death toll was relatively low compared to the other massive natural disaster of 2010 – the Haiti earthquake –

the affected area was vastly greater and 13 times as many were displaced. Around 14 million people were in need of immediate humanitarian aid. The number of seriously affected individuals exceeded

## ■ AFTER THE FLOODS AROUND 14 MILLION PEOPLE WERE IN NEED OF IMMEDIATE HUMANITARIAN AID

the combined total of individuals affected by the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, the 2005 Kashmir earthquake and the Haiti

earthquake. People already affected by chronic poverty and dependent on feudal landlords were further marginalised as a result of the flood.

The protracted presence of standing water rendered swathes of prime agricultural land uncultivable, led to loss of livelihoods and caused large-scale water-borne and skin diseases. The World Bank and Asian Development Bank assessed the disaster cost at \$9.7 billion (5.8% of GDP), including the loss of livestock, fodder, crops and food stores, damage to housing and infrastructure and the impact on education, water and sanitation services. Damage to the world's largest contiguous irrigation network – already inadequately maintained prior to the floods – is massive.

## THE RESPONSE

Once again, Pakistanis rallied in support of those affected by disaster on a crippling scale. The local culture of hospitality and charitable impulse meant that millions were housed with relatives for months, significantly reducing the burden on the thousands of camps established with donor funds.

Considerable support was received from Pakistani philanthropists, charitable organisations, the general public and the Pakistani diaspora.

The new crisis came as the federal government was already fighting an insurgency and being criticised for not responding sufficiently to the related internal displacement. At both federal and provincial levels, and within senior military ranks, many state officials had experience working with the international community, either during previous Pakistani crises or international

peacekeeping operations. It was thus unsurprising that the government of Pakistan immediately called for United Nations (UN) help.

The international response was

relatively quick. On August 11 the UN launched an Initial Floods and Emergency Response Plan (PIFERP) requesting \$459 million. In September a revised plan in excess of \$2 billion was launched, finally endorsed by the Pakistani government in November 2010. The revised PIFERP was the UN's largest ever appeal.

The floods captured world attention as 79 donors contributed to the humanitarian response through in-kind and in-cash contributions. As of December 2011, the PIFERP was 70 percent funded. More than \$600 million is still needed to support early recovery activities and achieve the objectives set out in the plan.

The US has been the largest PIFERP donor (providing \$434 million or 31.5% of the total donated), followed by Japan, the UK, private individuals and organisations, the European Commission, Australia, Canada and the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF). The role of CERF was vital in facilitating the early response: the \$40 million mobilised represents the CERF's largest funding allocation to a disaster. PIFERP donations

have been the largest ever humanitarian response for such key donors as the United Kingdom (UK) Department for International Development (DFID), the European Commission and the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (ODFDA).

Some three quarters of funds allocated for the floods have come from countries involved in the war in Afghanistan, a reminder "there is a high level of dependency among international humanitarian actors on institutional donors directly or indirectly involved in conflict and a regional stabilisation strategy" (Péchéayre 2011).

A separate UN appeal through the CAP, the Pakistan Humanitarian Response Plan (PHRP), revised in July 2010, sought funding for the support of 2.6 million conflict-affected IDPs in north-west Pakistan. It was overshadowed by the PIFERP. As of December 2011 the PHRP was 50% funded.

Despite the volume of funding for the flood appeal it should be noted that it was relatively lower than other recent emergencies with only \$3.2 for every affected person within the first ten days after the appeal, compared to \$495 for the 2010 Haiti earthquake and \$70 for the 2005 Pakistan Kashmir earthquake (Oxfam 2011).

Pakistan now has several years of experience issuing cash cards to those in need. In response to the floods of 2010 it introduced a debit card (the Watan Card) to each household directly affected by the floods. Over a million cards were issued within three months and by the end of January some 1.48 million. The Inter-Agency Real Time Evaluation (IA-RTE) found that injection of cash had been "instrumental in reactivating local markets" but also that many registered recipients had not received a promised second instalment. In Punjab and Sindh, many affected people have not received the cards, especially women in female-headed households and other vulnerable groups (Polastro et al. 2011).

As with the 2008-2009 displacement crisis, UN advice was ignored as a populist decision was made to load each card with a substantial sum. Despite its promise, the programme was marred with administrative difficulties and corruption. The

## ■ THE FLOODS AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN WAS THE UN'S LARGEST EVER APPEAL



A man in Balochistan digs through the rubble in search of personal belongings to salvage / UNHCR 2010.

Human Rights Commission of Pakistan reports beneficiaries being forced to sleep in front of banks and that those who are illiterate or who had had no previous exposure to ATMS may have to pay ‘helpers’ to operate the Watan card, some of whom

steal the cards.

## ■ THREE QUARTERS OF FUNDS ALLOCATED FOR THE FLOODS HAVE COME FROM COUNTRIES INVOLVED IN THE WAR IN AFGHANISTAN

The NDMA was the lead federal actor. It has no legislated authority to control the activities of any other agency such as a Provincial or District Disaster Management Authority (PDMA/DDMA) yet public perception deemed it to be responsible for everything from

planning to implementation. Given the size of their tasks the NDMA and PDMA were under-resourced. Some UN agencies opted to coordinate through line departments and not through the NDMA, which developed its own early recovery strategies but detached from cluster efforts. The creation of decentralised hubs was welcomed for bringing cluster coordination closer to field level but also meant that provincial government coordination was detached from the international response with PDMA insufficiently informed about what international actors were doing.

The 2010 flood crisis is continuing for many vulnerable families, particularly the landless. A UK parliamentary committee has argued that the UN response to the flooding was “patchy”. In November 2011, the Pakistani Red Crescent report that 288,031 people still remain in more than 900 camps in Sindh. UNICEF report that 341,000 people – the majority women, children, the elderly and those with disabilities – are still residing in temporary settlements and that water-related and vector-borne diseases are still on the rise 15 months after the floods began.



With so many homes partially or totally destroyed by the 2010 floods it has not been possible for any agency to meet Sphere Standards on per capita provision of water and latrines. The NDMA targets to provide affected households with a one-room shelter could not be delivered due to funding shortages. The IA-RTE noted that alternative solutions have been implemented – including rebuilding on river banks – without sufficient consideration of future risk. Land rights represent a key constraint for livelihood restoration and permanent residence. Many of those returning home find themselves without land to plant or to build a house. Some landlords have benefitted from a disaster which has removed tenants and squatters more efficaciously than by going to court.

A boy makes his way through thick mud and debris carrying belongings he managed to salvage from his family's home, Pir Pai / UNHCR 2010.



## TIMELINESS AND CONSTRAINTS

Agencies were able to start the response almost immediately in KPK due to their on-going presence related to the IDP crisis. However, there were delays of up to four weeks in responding to needs elsewhere due to the lack of capacity and pre-occupation with the KPK conflict (Murtaza 2011). The UN was slow to establish new humanitarian hubs in Sindh and Punjab.

As millions of people were stranded on isolated strips of land, access was central to the response. The humanitarian response was especially slow in Sindh, Punjab and Balochistan due to extreme logistical constraints and the fact that few humanitarian organisations had any presence prior to the floods. In mid-August, the government issued a waiver of its strict regulation of humanitarian actors for certain parts of KPK to facilitate access and speed up international efforts. However, the most sensitive districts of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) – the collective name for 13

administrative entities most of which abut the Pakistan-Afghanistan border - and much of KPK remained practically no-go areas for international actors due to national security reasons. The government did not allow the UN Humanitarian Air Services (UNHAS) to deploy helicopters in KPK/FATA, where the use of Pakistani aircraft by humanitarians was problematic in terms of the perceptions of the local population (Péchéayré 2011).

In Punjab and Sindh humanitarian actors used Pakistani military assets at the onset of the emergency invoking the last resort principle of the Oslo guidelines on the use of military assets in disaster relief. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and Médecins sans Frontières (MSF) were strongly opposed to the use of military assets in delivering assistance or any kind of labelling associating them with donors of the UN. They took this to the point of refusing to be mentioned in UN public reporting such as 3W (who, what, where) listing of humanitarian actors so as to control their public image.

## COORDINATION

At the beginning of the response, coordination was poor and there were cases of overlapping food distributions. As with the extraordinarily intense national response to the 2005 earthquake, some duplication was inevitable. Affected people received assistance not only from international agencies and federal, provincial and district government agencies, but also from a plethora of local NGOs and uncoordinated private citizen initiatives. At the inception of the emergency, self-appointed committees provided beneficiary lists (Murtaza 2011). The flood response showed, yet again, that links between national and provincial disaster management are generally weak (Polastro et al. 2011).

Coordination remains the Achilles heel of the UN reform process. Many of the observations about the cluster system made by previous Humanitarian Response Index (HRI) missions and IA-RTEs remain



valid. The cluster system has been misused to allocate funds, rather than coordinated, and meetings have been time consuming and often unproductive. Some of the same problems with the cluster approach were identified when it was rolled out in Pakistan's response to the 2005 floods and then when the 2008-2009 conflict recurred (Cosgrave et al. 2010). The IA-RTE of the flood responses concluded that "clusters were operating independently from contextual realities and to a large extent, also to the phases of the operation" (Polastro et al. 2011).

The mission heard of the lack of continuity, how "the UN cluster leaders usually stay only for a maximum of two to three weeks in the country". Many cluster leaders allegedly did not have the appropriate qualifications and experience, one informant telling the mission that "no cluster leader should start to work without having had a preceding one week training". Many meetings were also cumbersome due to the large number of organisations represented. Rather than coordinating, said one informant, "the cluster meetings serve just as information centers". Some cluster leaders were said to have prioritised their own organisations.

A real-time evaluation conducted for the UK Disasters Emergency Committee noted that pricing was never discussed in clusters, a

missed opportunity to promote transparency and competition to improve value for money in early relief interventions (Murtaza 2011). For its part, the federal government has argued that the cluster system needs to be reorganised in order to "achieve greater congruity with relevant tiers of government" (NDMA 2011).

Coordination within the UN family was complicated – as it has been during previous emergencies in Pakistan – by the separate roles played by the UN Special Envoy for Assistance in Pakistan, the Resident Coordinator and the Humanitarian Coordinator. An analyst has noted "the ambiguity the UN apparatus is embedded in ... On the one hand, UN agencies belong to the One UN and are therefore expected to support Pakistani institutions. On the other, the UN humanitarian reform gave Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the humanitarian country team (HCT) the responsibility to coordinate the response and in doing so, to uphold principles of neutrality and impartiality. UN officials interviewed have described this as a 'clash between the two reforms'" (Péchéayre 2011).

The mission noted the extent to which donors insisted that their implementing partners coordinate among themselves and with the UN. However, there is also scepticism of donors' increased emphasis on the creation of alliances



and consortia, and a perception that consortia can be time consuming and short-lived.

A Pakistani government assessment noted coordination challenges between centre-province, government-UN and inter-agency, reporting that “a lack of effective coordination was also identified by some stakeholders in relation to the UN’s internal strategic decision-making processes, because of differences amongst the top-tier UN leadership in the country” (NDMA 2011).

The fact that Pakistan was almost entirely dependent on outside help to sustain the massive humanitarian response “created”, suggests a Pakistani academic, “an interesting love-hate working relationship between the two parties” (Malik 2010). Some key response decisions were made in ways which were not conducive to working relations. The PDMA reported the UN “overstepped their mandate” as the Humanitarian Coordinator and OCHA advised North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) not to establish an air bridge after the government had invited it (as NATO and other military forces had after the 2005 earthquake) to assist in the transport of relief goods (NDMA 2011). OCHA insisted on having a dozen clusters when the Pakistani government wanted seven (in accordance with NDMA criteria). The separate UN appeal for conflict-displaced persons was launched initially against the will of the government. In Punjab the UN opened a humanitarian hub in Multan, rather than in the provincial capital, Lahore, thus creating a parallel structure and reducing government engagement. The federal government did not routinely allow access to conflict areas also suffering from flooding. The transition between emergency relief to recovery was substantially impacted by the Pakistani government’s insistence that all recovery programmes come under its purview.

## PREVENTION, RISK REDUCTION AND DISASTER PREPAREDNESS

The 2010 floods were probably related to the La Niña phenomenon and can thus be expected to recur. Pakistan’s vulnerability was again apparent as the 2011 monsoon brought well above-average rainfall, resulting in the deaths of some 250 people,

### ■ DONORS RECOGNISE THE RELEVANCE OF PREVENTION, RISK REDUCTION AND PREPAREDNESS BUT DO NOT ACCORD THEM MUCH PRIORITY

further massive displacement and another UN appeal. In a November 2011 statement, four major INGOs warned that nine million people were at risk of disease and malnutrition. The UN Food and Agriculture Organisation lacks resources to support the hundreds of

thousands of farming households who lost assets during the disastrous back-to-back floods.

In principle, donors recognise the relevance of prevention, risk reduction and preparedness but in reality do not seem to accord them much priority. Disaster risk reduction (DRR) has been discussed by Pakistani authorities and the UN for several years but there is a gap between theory and practice. The World Bank has warned that some responses have relied too heavily on rebuilding infrastructure and not enough on better adaptation and preparedness in complementary investments, such as water and flood management, cropping pattern adjustment, rural finance, enhancing capacities of water users groups and early warning systems (World Bank 2010). The HRI mission, like the IA-RTE team, noted the broad awareness of the need to ensure that communities are better prepared and that DRR activities are supported. The need to invest seriously in DRR has been highlighted by the government, donors, UN and INGOs. Emergency responses to disasters

will continue to be reactive unless there is greater donor commitment, a mapping of stakeholders and pre-defined emergency response mechanisms and stand-by agreements.

## HUMANITARIAN SPACE

Humanitarian space was often compromised. There were cases where aid mainly reached people that were locally well positioned and/or aligned to political parties. Security arguments were used by government authorities to prevent access for a number of experienced humanitarian actors. In areas such as Balochistan and KPK, where the government or regional actors are party to conflict, military assets should not have been used.

The 2010 floods again remind us that whatever the size of a natural disaster, diplomatic skills are essential when there is a strong government and a powerful and engaged military insistent on maintaining sovereignty. A certain degree of pragmatism in dealing both with civilian and military authorities is unavoidable. In Pakistan everything is politicised and in the end, decisions made with a view of short-term electoral popularity and appeasement of key interest groups will prevail over principles of humanitarianism and international humanitarian law. It is thus imperative for humanitarian agencies to invest time interacting with all the various field actors they come across.

## PARTNERING WITH GOVERNMENTS


## WHAT COULD DONORS DO?

It is important for donors to collectively reaffirm the universality of humanitarian principles and to be more active in promoting coordination. This may be the best recipe for efficiently and securely reaching beneficiaries. Many of the key recommendations in previous HRI assessments of responses to disasters in Pakistan remain unheeded. The flood response IA-RTE suggested that in Pakistan, humanitarian actors continue to suffer from “chronic amnesia” by not taking stock of lessons learned from prior evaluations.

- Donors need to understand how existing vulnerabilities – particularly related to land rights and gender discrimination – contribute to the impact of disasters.
- Donors should more generously support disaster preparedness and early recovery programmes.
- Donors need to consider ways to allow Pakistani NGOs to access funds and play a bigger role in crisis response; strengthening their capacity (together with that of provincial and district state agencies) is vital if future responses are to be more demand-driven and accountability measures generally strengthened.

### DONOR PERFORMANCE ON WORKING WITH HUMANITARIAN PARTNERS

FIELD PERCEPTION SCORES



INFORMATION BASED ON 22 FIELD INTERVIEWS WITH KEY HUMANITARIAN ACTORS IN PAKISTAN FROM 2 TO 6 MAY 2011, AND 121 QUESTIONNAIRES ON DONOR PERFORMANCE (INCLUDING 96 QUESTIONNAIRES OF OECD/DAC DONORS). THE HRI TEAM WAS COMPOSED OF WOLF-DIETER EBERWEIN (TEAM LEADER), FERNANDO ESPADA AND AATIKA NAGRAH. THEY EXPRESS THEIR GRATITUDE TO ALL THOSE INTERVIEWED IN ISLAMABAD.

## REFERENCES

---

Cosgrave, J. et al (2010), Inter-Agency Real-Time Evaluation (IA-RTE) of the Humanitarian Response to Pakistan's 2009-2010 Displacement Crisis, DARA, July 2010. Available from:  
<http://daraint.org/2010/10/20/656/report-inter-agency-real-time-evaluation-of-the-humanitarian-response-to-pakistan%E2%80%99s-2009-2010-displacement-crisis/>  
[Accessed 8 December 2011]

Malik, A. (2010), The Pakistan Floods 2010: Public Policy Lessons, International Policy and Leadership Institute, May 2010. Available from:  
[http://www.ygl-indo-pak.org/files/Pakistan\\_Floods\\_Malik.pdf](http://www.ygl-indo-pak.org/files/Pakistan_Floods_Malik.pdf)  
[Accessed 8 December 2011]

Murtaza, N. et. al. (2011), Pakistan Floods 2010: The DEC Real-Time Evaluation Report, Disasters Emergency Committee / ThinkAhead, March 2011. Available from:  
<http://www.dec.org.uk/sites/default/files/files/Evaluations/Pakistan/Pakistan RTE - May 2011.pdf>  
[Accessed 8 December 2011]

National Disaster Management Authority (2011), Pakistan 2010 Flood Relief – Learning from Experience: Observations and Opportunities, April 2011. Available from:  
[http://www.ndma.gov.pk/Documents/flood\\_2010/lesson\\_learned/Pakistan\\_2010\\_Flood\\_Relief-Learning\\_from\\_Experience.pdf](http://www.ndma.gov.pk/Documents/flood_2010/lesson_learned/Pakistan_2010_Flood_Relief-Learning_from_Experience.pdf)  
[Accessed 8 December 2011]

Pécharre, M. (2011), Humanitarian Action in Pakistan 2005-2010: Challenges, Principles, and Politics, Feinstein International Center, Tufts University, January 2011. Available from:  
<https://wikis.uit.tufts.edu/confluence/display/FIC/Humanitarian+Action+in+Pakistan+2005-2010>  
[Accessed 8 December 2011]

OCHA (2010 a.), Pakistan Initial Floods Emergency Response Plan 2010. Available from:  
<http://ochaonline.un.org/humanitarianappeal/webpage.asp?Page=1893>  
[Accessed 8 December 2011]

OCHA (2010 b.), Pakistan Floods Emergency Response Plan 2010 – Revision. Available from:  
<http://ochaonline.un.org/humanitarianappeal/webpage.asp?Page=1898>  
[Accessed 8 December 2011]

Oxfam (2011), Six months into the floods: Resetting Pakistan's priorities through reconstruction, January 2011. Available from:  
<http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/bp144-resetting-pakistans-priorities-6month-260111-en.pdf>  
[Accessed 8 December 2011]

Polastro, R. et al. (2011), Inter-Agency Real Time Evaluation of the Humanitarian Response to Pakistan's 2010 Flood Crisis, DARA, March 2011. Available from:  
<http://daraint.org/2011/03/30/1354/report-inter-agency-real-time-evaluation-of-the-humanitarian-response-to-the-2010-floods-in-pakistan/>  
[Accessed 8 December 2011]

World Bank, Independent Evaluation Group (2010), Response to Pakistan's Floods: Evaluative Lessons and Opportunity, 2010. Available from:  
[http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTDIRGEN/Resources/ieg\\_pakistan\\_note.pdf](http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTDIRGEN/Resources/ieg_pakistan_note.pdf)  
[Accessed 8 December 2011]

# HRI THE 2011 HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE INDEX

FOCUS ON is a series of research papers on issues, donors and crises which result from our work for The Humanitarian Response Index (HRI). The HRI is an independent assessment of donor performance against Good Humanitarian Donorship Principles.

© DARA 2011

This publication is copyright but the text may be used free of charge for the purposes of awareness raising, education, and research, provided that the source is acknowledged in full. The copyright holder requests that all such use be registered with them for impact assessment purposes. For copying in any other circumstances, or for re-use in other publications, or for translation or adaptation, permission must be secured. For further information please e-mail [info@daraint.org](mailto:info@daraint.org).

Graphic design:  
Mariano Sarmiento Comunicación Gráfica.  
Design collaborators: María Lasa. Ruth Otero.