



The Humanitarian Response Index 2010



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The problems of politicisation

Introduction

In July 2010, massive flooding in Pakistan left an estimated 14 million people in dire need of humanitarian assistance. On a larger scale than the Indian Ocean tsunami, the disaster came on the heels of a series of other major humanitarian crises, including the displacement of well over two million people due to a Pakistani military offensive against the Taliban and a major earthquake in 2005.

Pakistan is just one example of how the world is facing multiple and progressively more complicated humanitarian emergencies, and how local and international humanitarian actors' capacity to deliver aid in a neutral, impartial and independent way is being increasingly challenged. Other examples include the entrenched crises in Afghanistan, Sudan and Somalia, the complex emergency in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and the massive earthquake in Haiti.

In each of these crises, scope to provide effective protection and assistance to crisis-affected people and avoid future crises is too often contingent on a complex interplay between competing national and international political, military, security or development concerns. Politicisation of humanitarian crises and the instrumentalisation of the response mean that access to affected populations is under threat, the security of humanitarian workers is at risk and affected people are not receiving the protection and assistance they need and deserve.

The world economic crisis has led many traditional government donors – those from states belonging to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) – to announce major cutbacks to their Official Development Assistance (ODA) budgets. While several governments have committed to maintaining their

humanitarian assistance budgets despite the poor economic climate, there is already ample evidence that the needs of millions of people affected by crises remain unmet even at current humanitarian funding levels. There is growing concern that vulnerability due to climate change or rapid urbanisation is set to increase needs in the immediate future, further stretching the capacity of the humanitarian system to its limits. In such an environment, there is an understandable concern and debate about the value and effectiveness of humanitarian assistance and how to reform and improve the international humanitarian system so that it can meet these mounting challenges.

The Humanitarian Response Index (HRI) report, published by DARA since 2007, examines responses to crises to assess how the world's main donor governments – 23 members of the OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC) – face the challenge of ensuring that their aid money is used effectively and efficiently in order to maximise the benefits for those affected. The HRI assesses and ranks how well these donor governments are meeting their commitment to apply the principles and good donor practice set out in the declaration of *Good Humanitarian Donorship* (GHD). The report aims to identify and promote good donor practice and ensure greater transparency, accountability and impact of humanitarian assistance for the millions of people suffering the effects of crisis – all the more important in these times of increased need and reduced aid budgets.

The HRI is not an index on the volume or quantity of funding provided by Western governments for humanitarian assistance. Instead, it looks beyond funding to assess critical issues around the quality and effectiveness of aid in five pillars of donor practice:

- Are donor responses based on needs of the affected populations, and not subordinated to political, strategic or other interests?
- Do donors support strengthening local capacity, prevention of future crises and long-term recovery?
- Do donor policies and practices effectively support the work of humanitarian organisations?
- Do donors respect and promote International Humanitarian Law (IHL), and actively promote humanitarian access to enable protection of civilians affected by crises?
- Do donors contribute to accountability and learning in humanitarian action?

The HRI 2010 report is based on extensive field research in 14 countries affected by humanitarian crises: Afghanistan, the Central African Republic (CAR), Colombia, DRC, Indonesia, the occupied Palestinian territories (oPt), Pakistan, the Philippines, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Yemen and Zimbabwe. A preliminary HRI mission to assess the response to the Haiti earthquake also took place – which will be followed up by a more extensive review of donor responses there in 2011. Together, these crises (excluding Haiti) received over 60 percent of the funding mobilised to respond to crises in 2009, and over 50 percent of OECD/DAC humanitarian funding allocations as recorded by the Financial Tracking Service (FTS) of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). They thus provide an excellent representative sample of where donors prioritised their support. The crises selected also represent a good geographic distribution and a mix of natural disasters, conflicts and complex emergencies. The report also includes analysis of extensive quantitative data on donor governments' policies, funding and practices, and is augmented by analysis and information provided by others in the humanitarian community. This data is used to generate a comparative overall ranking of the OECD/DAC donors. This year's report also includes a classification of donors into groups based on the statistical similarities in their performance. This allows governments to better benchmark their humanitarian assistance against peers in their subgroup, and to use the information and analysis generated to work with their stakeholders to improve their humanitarian assistance policies, procedures and practices.

In the sections that follow, these issues are explored in greater detail. The chapter first provides an overview of the HRI's scope and methodology, including a summary of the changes and refinements made this year. This is followed by the ranking of the OECD/DAC donors against the HRI's five pillars of donor practice, and a classification of donors according to their statistical similarities in scores against the index's 35 indicators. A more detailed analysis of donors' performance by pillar is provided in the next section. This includes examples of how donors score against individual indicators within each pillar, along with examples from the 14 different crises studied to illustrate issues identified from the analysis. This section also includes general recommendations to donors for each of the HRI's pillars. The HRI 2010 concludes with some general suggestions to donors and other stakeholders as to how to continue progress towards improving the quality, effectiveness and impact of donor governments' humanitarian assistance. The report also includes a separate chapter on the HRI process and methodology, with a detailed technical annex on the index's indicators and formulas. Part 2 of the report offers individual donor assessments showing donors strengths and areas for improvement, and specific recommendations for each donor. Part 3 provides a brief report on each crisis studied as part of the HRI field research that analyzes the response of donors in different crisis contexts.

Summary of main findings

This year's report has five main findings, along with a series of recommendations to assist donor governments to make their aid more effective and more closely aligned with the principles contained in the GHD declaration. In summary, the HRI 2010 findings are:

1 Increasing politicisation of humanitarian assistance means millions of people are not getting the aid they need.

Donor governments need to ensure that aid is prioritised and allocated on the basis of the needs of civilian populations, not on political, economic or military objectives.

2 A lack of political commitment and investment in conflict and disaster prevention, preparedness and risk reduction threatens to intensify the impact of future humanitarian crises.

Donor governments need to invest significantly more resources and political will in conflict and disaster prevention and risk reduction, including addressing climate change vulnerability.

3 Slow progress in reforming the humanitarian system means that aid efforts are not as efficient or effective as they should be.

Donor governments need to work together and with other actors, particularly local authorities and civil society in vulnerable countries, to scale-up efforts to reform the humanitarian system and improve aid effectiveness.

4 Continued gaps in the protection of civilians and lack of continued safe humanitarian access means that vulnerable populations are at risk of harm.

Donor governments need to prioritise protection of civilians and facilitate safe humanitarian access so that crisis-affected populations are not put at risk of harm and receive the support and assistance they need to survive and recover from a crisis.

5 Donor governments are collectively failing to improve their transparency and “downward” accountability towards affected populations.

Donor governments need to significantly increase transparency around their funding and support for humanitarian action, and improve their accountability to help ensure that aid efforts have the greatest possible benefit for crisis-affected populations.

The HRI 2010 report shows that donor governments have collectively made some progress towards fulfilling their commitments to the *GHD Principles* and addressing some of the challenges identified in previous HRI reports. But there are still too many gaps in actual practice. In many of the crises analysed in this year’s report it is apparent that humanitarian assistance provided by several donor governments is being subordinated to other objectives, thus undermining the *GHD Principles* calling on donors to ensure separation of aid from other interests. Additionally, many of the governments of crisis-affected countries studied this year, along with non-state actors, have manipulated crises and the international response to meet their own domestic interests and objectives. This is having further negative effects on the ability of humanitarian organisations to provide protection and assistance to affected populations. The complicated and challenging operating environment for humanitarian actors also points to a need to reform the humanitarian system to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of aid and be better prepared to respond to current and future challenges. This includes investing more strategically in prevention and risk reduction

efforts. Finally, donor accountability toward crisis-affected populations – and not just domestic stakeholders – needs to be improved to ensure aid is focused on meeting their needs and priorities.

Overview of the HRI scope and methodology

The main focus of the HRI is assessing how OECD/DAC members that have signed the GHD declaration (except the Republic of Korea) are applying the principles and good practice in the way they fund and support the response to humanitarian crises. According to OECD/DAC and FTS figures, these governments together provide between 75 to 80 percent of the funds for humanitarian action. They are thus key stakeholders in the humanitarian system, with the power and capacity to shape and influence humanitarian action at all levels.

By providing an independent assessment and evidence of how individual donors perform and by ranking them against their peers, the HRI helps civil society benchmark the quality of their government’s humanitarian assistance. It also allows governments to improve the effectiveness, impact and accountability of the way they support relief and recovery efforts in crisis situations. The HRI complements other major monitoring tools and assessments used

Table 1. Members of GHD group

The GHD donors			
Australia	Greece	Spain	<i>Hungary</i>
Austria	Ireland	Sweden	<i>Latvia</i>
Belgium	Italy	Switzerland	<i>Lithuania</i>
Canada	Japan	United Kingdom	<i>Malta</i>
Denmark	Luxembourg	United States	<i>Poland</i>
European Commission	Netherlands	<i>Bulgaria</i>	<i>Republic of Korea</i>
Finland	New Zealand	<i>Cyprus</i>	<i>Romania</i>
France	Norway	<i>Czech Republic</i>	<i>Slovakia</i>
Germany	Portugal	<i>Estonia</i>	<i>Slovenia</i>

Countries in italics are new GHD members that are not currently covered in the HRI’s analysis. Korea, for example, recently joined the OECD/DAC and has signed the GHD declaration but sufficient information is not available at this time to conduct a full analysis of its performance as a humanitarian donor. DARA is tracking and monitoring these and other donor governments, as well as pooled funds and other funding mechanisms, in order to identify and share emerging trends and examples of good and poor donor practice.

Table 2: HRI pillars and indicators¹

Pillar 1: Responding to needs (30% of ranking weight)

This pillar assesses the extent to which donor funding and support are allocated in accordance to needs; respect the fundamental humanitarian principles of impartiality, neutrality and independence and ensure humanitarian objectives are not subordinated to political, economic or military objectives. The indicators in this pillar correspond to GHD Principles 2, 5, 6, and 12.

Qualitative indicators (from field surveys)

- Impartiality of aid
- Independence of aid
- Adapting to needs
- Timely funding to partner organisations

Quantitative indicators (from published data sources)

- Funding based on level of vulnerability and to forgotten crises
- Timely funding to complex emergencies
- Timely funding to sudden onset disasters

Pillar 2: Prevention, risk reduction and recovery (20% of ranking weight)

This pillar assesses the extent to which donors support capacity for disaster and conflict prevention, risk reduction, preparedness and response as well as support for recovery and the transition to development. The indicators in this pillar correspond to GHD Principles 1, 7, 8 and 9.

Qualitative indicators

- Beneficiary participation in programming
- Beneficiary participation in monitoring and evaluation
- Support for prevention and preparedness
- Linking relief, rehabilitation and development.

Quantitative indicators

- Funding for reconstruction and prevention
- Funding of risk mitigation mechanisms
- Reducing climate-related vulnerability

Pillar 3: Working with humanitarian partners (20% of ranking weight)

This pillar assesses how well donors support the work of agencies implementing humanitarian action and their unique roles in the humanitarian system. The indicators in this pillar correspond to GHD Principles 6, 10, 12, 13, 14, 17 and 18.

Qualitative indicators

- Flexible funding
- Support for partners and funding organisational capacity
- Donor capacity for informed decision-making
- Support for coordination

Quantitative indicators

- Funding to NGOs
- Un-earmarked funding
- Funding UN and Red Cross/Red Crescent appeals

Pillar 4: Protection and international law (15% of ranking weight)

This pillar assesses the extent to which donors integrate protection and the application of international humanitarian law and other international guidelines and legal mechanisms into their funding policies and practices and ensure that operational actors apply them. The indicators in this pillar correspond to GHD Principles 3, 4, 8 and 17.

Qualitative indicators

- Support for protection of civilians
- Promotion of international humanitarian law
- Facilitating humanitarian access
- Advocacy towards local authorities

Quantitative indicators

- International humanitarian law
- Human rights law
- Refugee law

Pillar 5: Learning and accountability (15% of ranking weight)

This pillar assesses how well donors support initiatives to improve the quality, effectiveness and accountability of humanitarian action. The indicators in this pillar correspond to GHD Principles 15, 21, 22, and 23.

Qualitative indicators

- Accountability towards beneficiaries
- Transparency of funding
- Appropriate reporting requirements
- Support for learning and evaluations

Quantitative indicators

- Participation in accountability initiatives
- Funding for accountability initiatives
- Funding and commissioning evaluations

¹ For a more detailed description of indicators and the index construction, see HRI Process and Methodology.

by the humanitarian community². The major difference between the HRI and these other mechanisms is that it is an independent exercise, and is not funded by any government. HRI analysis goes beyond the collective analysis of the funding trends of the GHD group to explore important issues around the quality and effectiveness of individual donor governments' aid compared to their peers, and how well the donor respects and applies humanitarian principles in its decisions and actions.

The conceptual foundation of the HRI is the *23 Principles and Good Practice of Humanitarian Donorship* contained in the GHD Declaration. The advantages of using the GHD as the basis for measuring donor performance is that it is currently the only existing point of reference agreed to by donor governments on what constitutes good practice in humanitarian assistance. This makes it an ideal framework to assess the depth and extent of governments' political commitment and accountability to support more effective humanitarian action.

The HRI assesses and benchmarks donors against 35 indicators aligned against the main concepts contained in the *GHD Principles*. The indicators are organised into five pillars of donor practice, each with a qualitative component based on field survey responses on the perceptions and experiences of humanitarian organisations funded by donor governments and a quantitative component based on publically available data.

² These include: a) DAC peer reviews (HYPERLINK "<http://www.oecd.org/dac/peerreviews>"www.oecd.org/dac/peerreviews) which monitor individual members' efforts and performance once every four years, thus examining five or six programmes annually; b) the annual reports of the Good Humanitarian Donorship group (<http://www.goodhumanitariananddonorship.org/gns/activities/annual-reports.aspx>); c) the annual State of the Humanitarian System report (<http://www.alnap.org/forum/post/60.aspx>) prepared by the Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action (ALNAP); Development Initiatives' annual Report on Resource Flows to Fragile and Conflict-Affected States (<http://www.devinit.org/news/resource-flows-fragile-and-conflict-affected-states-2010-annual-report-published>) and e) reports of the Humanitarian Accountability Partnership (<http://www.hapinternational.org>).

The qualitative and quantitative components are weighted equally within pillars to give a balanced overview of donor performance. The pillars are also weighted in the overall index in accordance to the relative priority of the concepts and principles the pillar measures.

Any index has its limitations. In the case of the HRI, the main difficulty is obtaining valid, reliable and comparable data on humanitarian assistance for all of the 23 government donors assessed. For example, despite donor commitments in the GHD to provide timely, accurate and transparent reporting on their humanitarian assistance, the use of tools such as the OCHA's FTS is inconsistent among donors. The *GHD Principles* themselves are vaguely formulated in places, allowing donors to interpret and apply them differently. This presents a challenge to define indicators and benchmark performance. DARA has taken a pragmatic approach and has drawn on the expertise and consensus of experts in the humanitarian field as to what constitutes good donor practice, as well as the most appropriate data sources and indicators to measure this.

Research process

As part of the field research, HRI teams interviewed over 475 senior representatives of humanitarian organisations who work in the 14 crisis-affected countries we studied. Teams asked about the response and the role of donor governments in supporting it. Field research also entailed a survey questionnaire of donor practice, which asked respondents for their opinions and perceptions – based on their direct experience of liaising with donors who support their work – of how well donors are applying good practice in the crisis. This year, nearly 2,000 survey responses were gathered. Teams also interviewed over 75 donor governments' representatives as well as local authorities and civil society organisations. Insofar as possible, teams also interviewed beneficiaries of humanitarian assistance.

The fact that nearly two-thirds of the interview respondents are male confirms the ongoing male dominance of senior humanitarian management structures in the field. The implications of this gender imbalance on attitudes, perceptions and decision-making processes in humanitarian action are potentially

huge – preliminary analysis of the survey responses suggests that gender is a significant factor in determining how donors are scored in survey questions (other factors include the nationality of respondents, level of familiarity with the *GHD Principles*, among others – see the Technical Annex for more information). The issue will be analysed in greater depth by DARA in future HRI reports.

The results of the field research complement extensive quantitative data collected on donor government funding and policies around humanitarian assistance. This data includes information from sources such as the UN, World Bank, the Red Cross/Red Crescent and others. All data has been statistically analysed and converted into indicators to construct the HRI scores and ranking for each of the donors assessed, and to generate a classification of donors based on their similarities and differences. The HRI analysis helps DARA provide a good overview of how well donors and humanitarian organisations are responding to different types of crises. This information is used to advocate for changes and improvements in the humanitarian sector, as well as to provide direct, bilateral technical assistance to donor agencies to address gaps in their policies and practices.

Changes to the HRI methodology this year

Each year, DARA reviews the HRI methodology and adjusts it to reflect developments in the humanitarian field and improvements in the index design and analysis. As part of this process of continual improvement, in 2009 DARA consulted with nearly 50 key informants from governments, UN agencies, the Red Cross / Red Crescent Movement, NGOs and academics for their opinions on the core concepts of the GHD and how to best measure them in the HRI. In addition, the HRI's Peer Review Committee³ and donors themselves provided valuable inputs on how to improve and streamline the index and

³ The HRI Peer Review Committee includes experts in the humanitarian field who, in their personal capacity advise DARA on the HRI. Members include: Jock Baker, James Darcy, Wolf-Dieter Eberwein, Veronique de Geoffroy, Claude Hilfiker, Eva von Oelreich, David Roodman and Ed Schenkenberg.

Table 3. Survey responses by donor and crisis

OECD/DAC donors	Total number of responses	Other funding sources	Total number of responses
AUSTRALIA	52	CERF	52
AUSTRIA	7	INGO	84
BELGIUM	23	MULTILATERAL ORGANISATION	13
CANADA	88	OTHER DONOR COUNTRY	32
DENMARK	29	POOLED FUND	105
EC	275	PRIVATE/FOUNDATION	39
FINLAND	22	RED CROSS MOVEMENT	14
FRANCE	43	UN GENCIES	226
GERMANY	48	Total Non DAC Donors	565
GREECE	5		
IRELAND	29	Survey responses by crisis	Total number of responses
ITALY	51	AFGHANISTAN	198
JAPAN	57	CAR	77
LUXEMBOURG	14	COLOMBIA	87
NETHERLANDS	55	DRC	267
NEW ZEALAND	10	INDONESIA	90
NORWAY	72	OPT	181
SPAIN	79	PAKISTAN	171
SWEDEN	86	PHILIPPINES	103
SWITZERLAND	44	SOMALIA	209
UK	113	SRI LANKA	116
US	182	SUDAN	235
Total DAC donors	1384	YEMEN	52
		ZIMBABWE	163
		Grand Total	1949

expand the analysis to generate more useful and actionable information for donors. The index still retains the basic foundation used in past editions, but has incorporated new statistical analyses and refined the design to improve and expand the robustness of the analysis and findings.

The main refinements to the HRI 2010 methodology include:

- The number of indicators has been reduced from 60 to 35 in order to simplify the presentation of results and focus more clearly on key aspects of donor practice.

- Indicators have been distributed evenly between the HRI's five pillars. Within pillars, qualitative and quantitative indicators represent 50 percent respectively of the calculation of the overall score by pillar. This helps to ensure that donors' scores in pillars reflect a more balanced view of their performance.
- The survey design has been revised and a comprehensive statistical analysis of responses was conducted to identify and adjust for any possible social or cultural factors that could impact the pattern of responses. This helps to reduce the effect of possible biases that could favour and/or penalise donors, and to convert the survey responses into more comparable donor scores.

- Statistical calculations and optimal values were revised and improved, and all scores have been harmonised to a 0-10 scale for better presentation and comparability among indicators, pillars and the overall final scores.
- Sophisticated multidimensional statistical techniques were used to test and validate the data and indicator scores, and to allow for a deeper analysis of the interrelations among donors' performance and the different principles that make up the GHD.
- A new quantitative indicator has been added to Pillar 2 (Prevention, risk reduction and recovery) as a proxy measure for donor governments' efforts to reduce climate-related vulnerability. This is in line with DARA's commitment to track and measure the human consequences of climate change.⁴

The main innovation in this year's index is to expand the HRI's analysis beyond the comparative ranking of all 23 OECD/DAC donors by including a multi-dimensional analysis which groups donors according to the patterns of their similarities and respective differences in their performance.

While the ranking provides a useful synthesis of donors' overall performance, there is a risk that the results can be over-simplified or misinterpreted, and the *relationship* between individual indicators and overall donor practice can be lost. The advantage of this new approach is that it analyses donors by using a more holistic approach. By categorising donors and grouping them by the patterns of their actions, the HRI can begin to provide a more realistic benchmark of where donors stand in relation to their closest peers rather than the overall OECD/DAC group. The analysis can also offer more details on each donor's strengths and areas for improvement compared to its peers, which in turn may help decision-makers to refine and improve their humanitarian strategies. The new approach also allows DARA to incorporate new donors (both governments and other funders) into the analysis in future editions as well as carry out a more comprehensive trend analysis of the data compiled over the past five years of the HRI.

⁴ See <http://www.daraint.org> for more information on the Climate Vulnerability Index, published by DARA.

Central African Republic: Still off the humanitarian radar

This year, DARA selected the Central African Republic (CAR) as a pilot mission. During the field mission (19-26 November 2009), a new survey and other research tools were tested. Below is a summary of the main findings of our field visit to CAR.

The crisis in CAR has for many years been erroneously seen as a spillover from conflicts in DRC, Chad, Sudan and Uganda. Such an analysis overlooks the reality of CAR. In a country of some 4.4 million people, UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reported that in January 2010 there were 197,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) in addition to an estimated 160,000 refugees in neighbouring countries and some 8,500 Chadian and Sudanese refugees. At least a fourth of the population is affected by conflict and food insecurity. Most are dispersed, invisible and very hard to reach. CAR is slipping deeper into chaos.

The international community's commitment to peacekeeping has been limited, if not tokenistic. Peacekeeping interventions have not primarily focused on restoration of security within CAR but included the country within the context of conflicts in Darfur and Chad. In January 2010, the government of Chad asked the UN to withdraw the UN Mission in Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT), triggering discussions which led to revision of its mandate and a Security Council decision to wind up MINURCAT operations at the end of 2010. This reduction in international engagement is despite access problems to wide areas of the country.

By October 2010, only 44 percent of US\$144 million requested by the 2010 Consolidated Appeal (CAP) had been made available. The largest share (21.9 percent) has come from carry-over from 2009. The US has provided 13.6 percent, followed by CERF, the European Commission and the UK. France, which once contributed a larger share of humanitarian aid to CAR, has so far offered only US\$2.1 million. There are hardly any donors with permanent representation in Bangui – the US, France and the European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO).

HRI interviewees consistently criticised donors for failing to focus on humanitarian needs and prioritising development programmes in spite of the difficult circumstances in most parts of the country. A typical comment was that “development initiatives currently promoted are premature. Much more work is needed before there is enough local capacity to maintain services at an acceptable level.” Many others lamented lack of support for humanitarian interventions, describing the response as “inadequate, inappropriate and unadapted”. “Donors don't see CAR as an emergency”. There is concern that funds are channeled mainly to the conflict areas in the north while minimal funding reaches the equally impoverished west and south. The need for better integration of relief aid and development programmes was constantly reiterated during interviews.

Many of those interviewed also expressed concerns that the Common Humanitarian Fund (CHF) does not provide support for enhancing organisational capacity or meeting operational – and particularly security-related – costs and that it may be biased towards approval of requests from UN agencies. Interviewees generally reported that managers of the CHF were transparent in explaining funding decisions and in providing information, although they lacked a clear strategy during the absence of a Humanitarian Coordinator. Funds are very limited and the competition for CHF support is intense. One interviewee described the process as “a meat market”.

Most of those interviewed described ECHO and the UK Department for International Development (DFID) as the best donors. ECHO's stable presence in Bangui has been helpful to boost partnership and facilitate coordination. ECHO is also seen as the most coherent of the donors, integrating aid strategies with the development policies of the EC. DFID's willingness to provide financial assistance to improve capacity of its partners was also welcomed. Some interviewees praised the US and French ambassadors for their consistent pressure for humanitarian access.

Humanitarian actors stress that the main challenge is currently related to protection. Even if elements within the CAR government do agree to prioritise protection, they lack the capacity to do so. Many of those interviewed would like to see much greater donor engagement in advocacy to ensure local authorities effectively address protection issues.

When it comes to explaining donor lack of interest in the CAR, interviewees offered the HRI team several explanations. Many noted that the previous Humanitarian Coordinator was instrumental in placing the humanitarian needs of CAR at the forefront of donor attention. In late 2008, however, he departed and a year's delay in appointing a successor helps explain the decline in donor contributions. Others, however, spread the blame wider, one arguing that “the reduction in available funding in 2009 is due to poor fundraising and advocacy by the humanitarian community in CAR, not to divergence of funds to other crises.” Others suggest, however, donor attention has moved elsewhere as a result of over-optimism following signing of the Libreville peace accord in 2008.

There are positive developments in CAR. The government and its main opponents have not reverted to full-scale civil war. Some armed combatants are being demobilised. Mechanisms to integrate humanitarian and development work have been established. Relief activities in some parts of CAR are providing assistance and early recovery support to communities severely affected by the conflict. In 2009, the Paris Club cancelled a significant amount of CAR debt. The CAR government has formally undertaken to commit itself to the transparency principles set out in the Paris Declaration and created a mechanism (*DAD République centrafricaine*) to allow for greater monitoring of aid management and facilitate aid coordination.

However, for the time being, the deterioration of the humanitarian crisis, postponement of presidential elections and the withdrawal of MINURCAT have heightened uncertainties.

It is important for donors to:

- End the funding volatility of recent years by making long-term commitments;
- Build on the potential for timely, strategic disbursements demonstrated by the CHF and ensure it is sufficiently funded;
- Emulate the integrated relief-development approach of ECHO;
- Ensure that all projects have a cross-cutting peace building/ protection/human rights component.

HRI 2010 donor ranking and donor classifications


Before presenting the donor ranking and classifications for this year, an overview of some of the major factors influencing donor governments helps to contextualise their performance.

The global economic crisis continued in 2009–2010, severely straining the economies of many of the GHD donors. Greece, for example, was virtually pulled back from the brink of bankruptcy, while Spain, Portugal and many other countries faced serious recessions and rising rates of unemployment. Confronted with economic adversity, many governments have chosen to cut back their aid budgets, slowing progress towards meeting their commitments to allocate 0.7 percent of Gross National Product (GNP) dedicated to development cooperation. On a positive note, many OECD/DAC donor governments have committed to maintaining levels of funding and support for humanitarian assistance, though continued concerns about growth and deficits may mean these pledges will not be kept.

As Graph 1 shows, the absolute volume of aid is not necessarily a good predictor of its quality. However, there is a clear relationship between a donor's humanitarian assistance as a proportion of its Gross National Income (GNI) and the donor's HRI scores. More generous donors – those that invest a higher percentage of their GNI for humanitarian assistance – tend to score higher overall in the HRI, including in non-financial indicators such as adherence to good practice and international humanitarian law.

At the same time, humanitarian needs have been on the rise. There were several mega-disasters in 2009 and early 2010 and a number of major protracted crises continued to require significant international support and assistance. The response to these crises has shown that progress towards humanitarian reform remains slow: efforts are now lagging behind. The different responses to the crises in Haiti and Pakistan illustrate the continued challenges of ensuring equitable distribution of resources based on needs, engagement and ownership of the response by affected populations, effective coordination between donors, international actors, local authorities and the military.

Graph 1. HRI final score compared to generosity



* Generosity is calculated as total humanitarian aid as a percentage of GNI.

Along with the economic crisis, another factor influencing donor behaviour has been the high degree of turnover in OECD/DAC governments in the past year (including minority governments in some countries). This has affected the functioning of aid agencies in some countries, as many incoming administrations have yet to define a strategic direction for their humanitarian assistance. Many OECD/DAC countries recently initiated comprehensive policy reviews of their humanitarian assistance, the outcomes of which may or may not be aligned to *Principles of Good Humanitarian Donorship*. There is a potential risk that leading politicians and policy-makers in donor governments may be unfamiliar with humanitarian principles and good donor practice, or may consider the GHD declaration outdated and irrelevant. DARA will thus be redoubling efforts to monitor and promote good donor practice in humanitarian assistance.

Another, often overlooked factor is that high staff turnover and cutbacks in many donor aid agencies have undermined donor capacity for engaging with partners and providing adequate support and follow-up to humanitarian programming. The pressures of reduced donor capacity were already highlighted in last year's HRI, and the negative impacts of donor staff cuts appear to be growing according to many of the people interviewed in the field research. The results of the HRI field research over the past four years indicates that most government representatives


responsible for humanitarian assistance are attempting to apply good practice in their work to have greater impact but donor agencies still lack guidance and political support to apply good practice. This is particularly apparent in contexts where governments may have competing political, economic or security interests. Given the relatively low priority given by many governments to humanitarian assistance compared to development, trade or security, this makes it even more challenging for donor agencies to apply good practice.

The research findings also show that the majority of senior representatives of donor agencies and humanitarian organisations are not fully aware of or familiar with the *GHD Principles*. This makes it difficult for donor representatives at the field level to know what their governments are committed to. For representatives of humanitarian organisations it is also difficult to know what they can expect from donors in terms of good practice or whether it is feasible to try to hold their donors accountable for applying the principles and good practices they have committed to (see Graph 2).

HRI ranking

The HRI 2010 ranking is calculated by taking a donor's average scores by pillar and then adjusting the scores according to the weighting assigned to each pillar for the overall index. The resulting scores are ordered into a ranking that gives a composite picture of how well individual donors compare to other donors in the donor group. Nevertheless, the ranking does offer an overview of where individual donors stand in comparison to the overall group of GHD donors.⁵

Graph 2. Survey respondent familiarity with the GHD Principles



■ Not at all familiar – 36%
 ■ Somewhat familiar – 40%
 ■ Very familiar – 18%
 ■ No response – 6%


Denmark takes top position in the HRI 2010 ranking based on consistently good scores in all of the HRI's five pillars and many of its indicators. Denmark is one of the better donors in the OECD/DAC group in terms of indicators for *Timely funding to complex emergencies and sudden onset disasters*, and for Pillar 2 (Prevention risk reduction and recovery) and Pillar 3 (Working with humanitarian partners). It is the best donor overall for *Support for learning and accountability*. Nevertheless, Denmark's first place in the ranking should be treated with caution.

Denmark gives proportionally less than many donors to forgotten emergencies as well as funding based on the level of vulnerability of crises. DARA notes with concern that a number of recent Danish media reports and declarations by Danish politicians suggested that aid in response to the Pakistan floods should be contingent on addressing Denmark's political and security interests, and should not contribute to strengthening the Taliban. This suggests that Danish humanitarian assistance may be susceptible to media and public pressure that appears inimical to the more principled approach outlined in the GHD declaration⁶.

⁵ See for example: <http://www.cphpost.dk/news/politics/90-politics/49721-minister-criticised-for-linking-security-to-pakistan-aid.html>. Similar debates took place in the US, with the New York times sponsoring an online debate on the US response to the Pakistan floods: http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/18/opinion/18wed1.html?_r=1&ref=opinion. For the most part, these debates missed the point entirely: the objectives of humanitarian assistance are to save lives and prevent suffering, and not contribute to political or security agendas.

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Graph 3. HRI 2010 final scores and ranking



* Austria, Greece and Portugal are not included in the ranking due to insufficient data.

Ireland takes 2nd place in the HRI 2010, reflecting good overall performance against the HRI's five pillars. Despite cutbacks to its aid budget, Ireland has continued to perform above average in some of the index's quantitative indicators. It does particularly well in indicators around responding to current needs but is among the poorest performing donors in terms of investing in preparedness, prevention and risk reduction. In addition, many partner organisations funded by Ireland expressed concerns about its capacity to monitor the humanitarian context and support their work in different crises. This is reflected in many of the index's qualitative indicators, where Ireland receives below average scores.

New Zealand is in 3rd place this year. Despite its small size and limited field presence as a donor, New Zealand has shown a good level of commitment to applying the *GHD Principles* in the way it supports humanitarian action. It is one of the best donors in terms of timely funding, and in learning and accountability. However, it could improve in terms of supporting *Beneficiary participation in programming* and *Funding to NGOs*.

Norway is ranked 4th in the HRI 2010, showing good performance in Pillar 3 (Working with humanitarian partners) and Pillar 4 (Protection and international law), where it is the best performing donor. It is also above average in Pillar 2 (Prevention, risk reduction and recovery) and Pillar 5 (Learning and accountability). Norway does less well overall in Pillar 1 (Responding to needs), with below average scores in indicators for *Timeliness of funding to complex emergencies*, *Funding based on level of vulnerability and to forgotten crises*. Norway could also do better in terms of *Linking relief, rehabilitation and development (LRRD)* in its funding practices, and in *Funding for reconstruction and prevention*.

The **European Commission (EC)**, ranked 6th in the HRI 2010, is one of the largest humanitarian donors by volume, matched by good overall performance in most areas of the HRI. The EC does especially well at Pillar 1 (Responding to needs), and in the indicators *Beneficiary participation in programming* and *Accountability towards beneficiaries*. However,

it is also one of the donors with the highest level of earmarking and received low scores from the organisations it funds for *Flexible funding* and *Appropriate reporting requirements*⁷.

Sweden is ranked 5th in the HRI 2010. While Sweden has done well overall in Pillar 4 (Protection and international law) and Pillar 3 (Working with humanitarian partners), it is below average compared to other donors in Pillar 1 (Responding to needs). In particular, it could do much better in terms of *Timely funding to complex emergencies* and *Timely funding to sudden onset disasters*, though this is somewhat compensated for by its support to the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) and other quick disbursement mechanisms.

Switzerland is in 7th place in the HRI 2010 ranking, with a generally good performance in Pillar 3 (Working with humanitarian partners), Pillar 4 (Protection and international law) and Pillar 5 (Learning and accountability). It also does well in Pillar 2 (Prevention, risk reduction and recovery) but could respond better Pillar 1 (Responding to needs) in indicators, such as *Funding based on level of vulnerability and to forgotten emergencies*.

The **United Kingdom** is ranked 8th in this year's HRI. Compared to other donors, the UK does well in areas such as *Funding based on level of vulnerability and to forgotten crises* and in Pillars 2 (Prevention, risk reduction and recovery) and 3 (Working with humanitarian partners). The UK is also a strong supporter of the CERF and other pooled funds, and an advocate for humanitarian reform, transparency and innovation in humanitarian action. It is well regarded by its partners for its support for coordination. However, the perceptions of the UK's partners are that it could do more to keep its aid impartial and independent of other interests.

Ninth place in the HRI 2010 ranking goes to **the Netherlands**, followed by **Luxembourg** (10th) and **Finland** (11th). These donors are generally well-regarded by their partners, and do well in Pillar 4 (Protection and international law). The Netherlands does well in providing un-earmarked funding but could offer more support for prevention and reconstruction. Luxembourg and Finland both do well in supporting Red Cross/Red Crescent appeals but perform below average in terms of *Funding and participation in humanitarian accountability initiatives*.

Canada, Australia and **Germany** took 12th, 13th, and 14th place positions respectively in the HRI 2010 ranking. Each of these donors performed slightly above the overall average in areas such as Pillar 1 (Responding to needs) and Pillar 5 (Learning and accountability) but less well in Pillar 2 (Prevention, risk reduction and recovery). Canada does particularly well for its *Timely funding to complex emergencies*. Compared to other donors, Australia stands out for *Funding for reconstruction and prevention*, while Germany does well compared to other donors for *Funding to NGOs*.

Fifteenth-placed **France, Japan** (16th), **Spain** (17th) and **Belgium** (18th) share many similarities. In general, these donors perform below the overall average in areas such as Pillar 3 (Working with humanitarian partners), Pillar 4 (Protection and international law) and Pillar 5 (Learning and accountability). With the exception of France, these donors perform above the overall donor average for the indicator *Funding for reconstruction and prevention*. None stands out for their active participation in accountability initiatives in the humanitarian sector, though France is among the best donors in terms of *Funding and commissioning evaluations*.

Despite its size and importance as a humanitarian donor, the 19th ranked **United States** does not perform as well as it could in the HRI. Although the US does well in many aspects of Pillar 1 (Responding to needs) – such as timeliness of funding and funding to forgotten emergencies – it scores below average in such critical areas as perceived impartiality of its aid and its independence from other interests,

⁷ The EC's unique status as a regional "governmental" body means that several quantitative indicators in Pillar 4, such as ratifications of treaties, are not included in calculating its scores. Thus, comparisons of its scores to other donors should be undertaken with care.

earmarking, aid conditionality and flexibility of funding. It also receives scores well below the overall average in Pillar 2 (Prevention, risk reduction and recovery). The US is one of the poorest performers in the GHD group in terms of respect and support for IHL, human rights law and refugee law, as it has not signed or ratified a number of important international treaties and conventions that impact humanitarian action such as the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty.

Italy takes the final position in the HRI 2010 ranking at 20th. It performs below the overall average in Pillar 3 (Working with humanitarian partners), Pillar 4 (Protection and international law) and Pillar 5 (Learning and accountability). In particular, it does poorly in indicators regarding flexibility and earmarking of funding and funding and support to UN and Red Cross/Red Crescent appeals. It does slightly better in Pillar 2 (Prevention, risk reduction and recovery).

Austria, Greece, and Portugal are not included in the HRI ranking this year, as there was insufficient data to calculate the qualitative component of the index. In past editions of the HRI, survey responses for these donors were pooled with responses from previous years in order to have a sufficient number for statistical analysis. In the case of Portugal, none of the over 475 humanitarian agency representatives interviewed in 14 different crises received funding from the Portuguese government. Similarly, DARA was only able to obtain five survey responses for Greece and seven for Austria. With such a small number of responses this year, it was considered more appropriate to limit the analysis to the quantitative data and indicators of the index. The low number of responses is an indicator of the very limited capacity of these donors to engage directly with the humanitarian system at the crisis level. Most of their funding is channelled through multilateral agencies, with little monitoring or follow-up. With the exception of Austria, participation in humanitarian forums is also very limited. More details of their performance in the quantitative indicators and their group classification can be found in the following sections.

Donor classification

This year, the HRI donor ranking has been expanded to include an analysis of donor performance based on their characteristics and similarities with other donors. The donor classification uses a more sophisticated statistical analysis than the one used to generate the ranking in that it looks for relationships and patterns among donors based on their scores against all 35 indicators. The two approaches complement each other and allow for different perspectives from which one can compare and contrast donor performance against the overall group and within a smaller subset of donors. The advantage of this approach is that it allows for a more sensitive comparative analysis among donors in each sub-group than a simple comparison of a donor's performance against the overall average of the 23 donors assessed in the ranking. It also allows individual donors to compare and contrast their performance against their closest peers in terms of similarities in their scoring (See HRI Process and Methodology chapter for more information).


After collecting all the quantitative and qualitative data gathered in the HRI research process, a number of statistical analyses were conducted in order to classify and group the 23 OECD/DAC donors assessed in the HRI into three categories, based on their performance against the HRI's five pillars of donor practice and key indicators:

- Group 1: donors with a consistently **high level of implementation** of GHD concepts
- Group 2: donors with a **mid-range level of implementation** of GHD concepts
- Group 3: donors with a **lower level of implementation** of GHD concepts

Group 1 donors include Denmark, Finland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway and Sweden. These donors are characterised by scores consistently above the overall OECD/DAC average in most of the HRI's qualitative and quantitative indicators, and have the highest overall scores in four of the five pillars of the HRI. The exception is in Pillar 1 (Responding to needs), where these donors perform slightly below the overall OECD/DAC average in the quantitative indicators. The overall average score for these donors is 6.27, compared to the overall OECD/DAC average of 5.89 on the HRI's 10-point scale.

As a group, these donors tend to do well in qualitative indicators assessing the perceptions of the level of independence, impartiality and lack of conditionality of their aid. They also do well in indicators related to support to their partners, including funding for capacity building, flexibility and non-earmarking of funding as well as respect for and promotion of IHL, human rights law and refugee law.

Graph 4. Overall score by group



* This graph does not take Greece, Portugal and Austria into account, as only quantitative information is available.

Group 2 donors include Australia, Canada, the EC, Germany, Greece (based on quantitative indicators only), Ireland, the UK and the US. Greece also meets some of the characteristics of this group, but as data is incomplete, comparisons should be made with caution. The scores for these donors are generally mid-range, with better than average scores in quantitative indicators, particularly in Pillar 1 (Responding to needs). However, in qualitative indicators from the HRI survey, this group of donors has scores only slightly better than the OECD/DAC average, indicating that there may be somewhat negative perceptions and experience from the humanitarian agencies they fund, in contrast to donors in Group 1. This group has an overall average score of 5.88 in the HRI, compared to the overall OECD/DAC average of 5.89 on the HRI's 10-point scale.

Group 2 donors are characterised by higher scores in indicators assessing the perception of *Donor capacity for informed decision-making*, *Support for learning and evaluations*, and *Beneficiary participation in programming*. However, the perceived independence and impartiality of their aid, along with flexibility of funding and conditionality of aid, are weaknesses. This group also does poorly in indicators for the appropriateness of their reporting requirements.

Group 3 donors include Austria (quantitative indicators only), Belgium, France, Italy, Japan, Portugal (quantitative indicators only) and Spain. Within the group, there is a relatively high range of differences in scores in Pillars 1 and 2. Scores are below the overall average in Pillars 3, 4 and 5 in both quantitative and qualitative indicators. The average overall score for these donors is 5.32 compared to the overall OECD/DAC average of 5.89 on the HRI's 10-point scale.

In terms of specific indicators, Group 3 donors have few examples of above average performance. In some cases, donors in this group perform reasonably well for *Timely funding to complex emergencies*, and for *Funding for reconstruction and prevention*. However, these donors (excluding Austria and Portugal) do not do well in terms of the perceived independence, impartiality and non-conditionality of their aid. With the exception of Spain, they also perform below average in terms of promotion of IHL, refugee and human rights law, as well as *Support for learning and evaluations* and *Participation in accountability initiatives*.

The following table (Table 4) shows how individual donors pillar scores compare to the OECD/DAC donor average as well as their group average. Arrows pointing up indicate that a donor has scored at least seven percent higher than the average, while arrows pointing down indicate when a donor's scores are at least seven percent below the average. Looking specifically at a donor like Denmark, ranked 1st in the overall HRI 2010, it obtains scores consistently above average pillar scores compared to donors in its group, as well as compared to the overall OECD/DAC average. In contrast, Ireland is classified as a Group 2 donor as its pillar scores are generally above average in Pillars 1, 3 and 5 but it has below-average scores in Pillar 2. However, when pillars are weighted according to their importance, Ireland's scores give it second place in the overall ranking. Similarly, while the US is classified as a Group 2 donor, it performs consistently below its group average and the overall OECD/DAC average in four of the index's five pillars. Its position in the ranking is based on its weighted pillar scores, which place the US 19th compared to other donors.

Donor performance by pillar

Overall, all donors continue to do reasonably well in Pillar 1 (Responding to needs). However, there is a significant range between the highest-scored and lowest-scored donors, reflecting differences in the way donors understand and apply core humanitarian principles and GHD concepts around neutrality, impartiality and independence of aid. As previous editions of the HRI have shown, donors uniformly do not perform as well in Pillar 2 (Prevention, risk reduction and recovery), showing that this is an area all donors need to prioritise. In contrast, Pillar 3 (Working with humanitarian partners) shows a high degree of variance in donors' scores, reflecting different approaches among donors, and opportunities for significant improvements in the way many donors interact with and support humanitarian actors. Pillar 4 (Protection and international law) shows reasonably consistent donor behaviour, with a smaller range of scores and the second-highest average scores compared to other pillars. However, there are still significant differences among donors in core indicators for this pillar, indicating that there is room for improvement. Finally, Pillar 5 (Learning and accountability) shows the highest variance in donor scores as well as the lowest average scores, indicating both that there are vast differences in the way donors are performing in this area and the reality that for several donors, this simply is not a priority.

Pillar 1: Responding to needs

Key finding: Increasing politicisation and instrumentalisation of humanitarian assistance means millions of people are not getting the aid they need.

Table 4. Donor pillar scores compared to OECD/DAC and group averages

GROUP 1	Pillar 1			Pillar 2			Pillar 3			Pillar 4			Pillar 5		
	Score	Compared to OECD/DAC average [†]	Compared to the group average	Score	Compared to OECD/DAC average [†]	Compared to the group average	Score	Compared to OECD/DAC average [†]	Compared to the group average	Score	Compared to OECD/DAC average [†]	Compared to the group average	Score	Compared to OECD/DAC average [†]	Compared to the group average
DENMARK	6.90	↑	↑	6.32	↑	↑	6.93	↑	↑	6.81	↑	→	7.51	↑	↑
FINLAND	5.89	↓	↓	6.04	→	→	6.18	↑	→	6.34	→	↓	4.67	↓	↓
LUXEMBOURG	6.67	→	→	5.13	↓	↓	6.00	↑	→	6.92	↑	→	4.12	↓	↓
NETHERLANDS	6.96	↑	↑	5.72	→	↓	5.58	→	→	7.05	↑	↓	7.33	↑	→
NEW ZEALAND	6.49	→	→	5.46	→	→	6.36	↑	↓	6.29	→	→	5.72	→	↑
NORWAY	5.76	↓	↓	5.81	→	→	7.19	↑	↑	7.96	↑	↑	5.98	↑	→
SWEDEN	5.78	↓	↓	6.38	↑	↑	6.48	↑	→	7.64	↑	↑	5.80	↑	→
SWITZERLAND	6.41	→	→	6.27	↑	→	5.70	→	↓	6.40	→	↓	5.85	↑	→
<i>Average Group 1</i>	6.36	→		5.89	→		6.30	↑		6.93	↑		5.87	↑	
GROUP 2															
AUSTRALIA	6.07	→	↓	5.58	→	→	4.93	↓	↓	6.36	→	↑	5.15	→	→
CANADA	6.67	→	→	5.59	→	→	5.24	→	→	6.09	→	→	5.08	→	↓
EC	7.02	↑	→	6.06	→	↑	5.10	→	→	6.06	→	→	6.60	↑	↑
GERMANY	6.45	→	→	5.84	→	↑	4.69	↓	↓	5.60	↓	→	4.88	↓	↓
IRELAND	7.71	↑	↑	4.73	↓	↓	6.86	↑	↑	6.24	→	↑	6.48	↑	↑
UK	6.81	→	→	5.86	→	↑	5.78	→	↑	5.86	→	→	5.77	↑	→
US	6.81	→	→	3.97	↓	↓	4.72	↓	↓	4.51	↓	↓	4.70	↓	↓
GREECE**	7.08	↑	→	3.36	↓	↓	1.54	↓	↓	4.62	↓	↓	0.00	↓	↓
<i>Average Group 2</i>	6.79	→		5.38	→		5.33	→		5.82	→		5.52	→	
GROUP 3															
BELGIUM	4.73	↓	↓	6.57	↑	→	5.00	↓	↑	5.73	→	↑	4.27	↓	→
FRANCE	6.78	→	↑	5.07	↓	↓	4.67	↓	↑	5.20	↓	→	5.15	→	↑
ITALY	5.84	↓	→	6.33	↑	→	3.19	↓	↓	4.62	↓	↓	3.76	↓	↓
JAPAN	7.19	↑	↑	6.48	↑	→	3.57	↓	↓	4.36	↓	↓	4.32	↓	→
SPAIN	6.03	→	→	6.36	↑	→	4.54	↓	↑	5.45	↓	↑	4.28	↓	→
PORTUGAL**	4.60	↓	↓	4.69	↓	↓	4.07	↓	→	3.89	↓	↓	1.17	↓	↓
AUSTRIA**	3.38	↓	↓	5.53	→	↓	2.35	↓	↓	4.77	↓	→	0.83	↓	↓
<i>Average Group 3</i>	6.12	→		6.16	→		4.19	↓		5.07	↓		4.36	↓	
Total Average	6.45			5.78			5.44			6.07			5.37		
Max	7.71			6.57			7.19			7.96			7.51		
Min	3.38			3.36			1.54			3.89			0.00		

*The average scores do not include Greece, Austria or Portugal.

** Scores for Austria, Greece and Portugal are based on quantitative information only.

As stated in the *GHD Principles*, the objectives of humanitarian assistance are to save lives, alleviate suffering, and maintain human dignity in situations of disaster, conflict and emergency. When they committed to the *GHD Principles*, donor governments agreed to keep their humanitarian assistance strictly focused on these objectives and free from political, economic, military or security objectives and influences. They also agreed to avoid placing conditions on their funding that could affect the ability of humanitarian organisations to reach victims with live-saving aid, without discrimination and based solely on needs.

This pillar assesses the extent to which donor funding and support meets these criteria, by looking at three related questions:

- Do donor governments distribute their aid where needs are greatest?
- Do donor governments provide aid in a timely manner?
- Do donor governments keep their aid objectives free from other objectives and aims?

Independence, impartiality and conditionality of aid

In line with the *GHD Principles*, the HRI field research includes survey questions on the perceptions and experiences of humanitarian organisations with regard to how independent from political, economic, security or other interests they feel their donor governments' support is. The survey also asks questions about the conditionality of funding and whether this conditionality affects the agency's ability to meet the needs of affected populations.


Unfortunately, in the majority of the 14 crises studied this year, DARA found many different examples of donor governments that did not respect these humanitarian principles but allowed other objectives to take precedence over the aims of saving lives. This has seriously jeopardised the ability of humanitarian organisations to gain physical access and provide assistance to affected populations. It has also put the security and protection of humanitarian workers and civilians at risk.

The politicisation and instrumentalisation of aid can take many different forms such as when OECD/DAC donor governments:

- Link their support for humanitarian assistance to political, military or anti-terrorism objectives;
- Give priority to state-building and economic development programmes at the expense of meeting immediate humanitarian needs;
- Uncritically fund and support the agenda of the host government even when that government is in part responsible for the humanitarian situation;
- Use aid as an instrument to achieve other objectives such as attempting to use aid to build "goodwill" towards the government, or meeting domestic concerns about visibility.

OECD/DAC donor governments are not the only ones responsible for the politicisation and instrumentalisation of aid. DARA also found that many governments and other non-state actors in crisis-affected countries also politicise crises and manipulate the international aid response to serve their own aims. Examples of this include when the governments of crisis-affected countries:

Graph 5: Overview of donor scores in Pillar 1 indicators



- Deny the existence of a humanitarian crisis or manipulate assessments of the extent of needs for their own purposes;
- Use the discourse of national sovereignty, the War on Terror or the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness to justify their actions and limit external scrutiny of the humanitarian situation;
- Impose unreasonable restrictions on international aid agencies and limit their access to populations;
- Deliberately use (and abuse) civilian populations and access to humanitarian assistance as part of their tactics in a conflict.

Germany, Finland and New Zealand were the donors perceived as the most impartial by their partners, with above average scores in this indicator. In contrast, Belgium, France and the US all scored significantly below the OECD/DAC average in this indicator. The majority of survey responses for Belgium come from organisations working in the DRC, a country with colonial ties to Belgium, which may partially explain this low score. The highest scores for the HRI indicator around the perceived independence and non-conditionality of aid go to Luxembourg, Finland, Denmark, Switzerland and Sweden, each with scores well above the overall average. The US, Italy and Japan receive some of the lowest scores for this indicator.

The HRI 2010 field missions illustrate how neutral, impartial humanitarian action is under threat:

- In *Afghanistan*, the use of Western military forces to deliver humanitarian assistance as part of so-called “hearts and minds” campaigns has blurred the boundaries between neutral, impartial humanitarian assistance and places humanitarian organisations at risk of being targeted by armed groups. It also means that aid is prioritised to certain areas of strategic interest, leaving needs unmet in other parts of the country.

- In *Somalia*, US anti-terrorism legislation has meant unreasonable restrictions on aid agencies working in areas controlled by Al-Shahaab, a group linked to Al-Qa’ida. This is making it extremely difficult for aid agencies – even those not funded by the US – to deliver aid. As a result, hundreds of thousands of people affected by the crisis are not receiving the aid they need. At the same time, uncritical support for the Transitional Government (TFG) by donors such as Norway and the EC has contributed to politicising the crisis, as the TFG is itself a protagonist in the conflict. This stance appears to be undermining efforts by international agencies to preserve their identity as neutral and impartial humanitarian actors who do not primarily serve Western interests.

- In the *oPt*, the Israeli government’s blockade on Gaza and restrictions on aid and lack of respect for IHL has created unprecedented levels of need for the local population. At the same time, Western governments’ “no contact policy” and restrictions on working with Hamas have hampered the ability of aid agencies to deliver aid effectively.

- In *Sudan*, the government expelled several international aid agencies and placed severe restrictions on others. Meanwhile, Western governments’ attention to Darfur has meant needs in other parts of the country are under-funded. The International Criminal Court’s indictment of Sudanese President Omar Bashir has contributed to further politicisation of the humanitarian crisis and fostered mistrust of humanitarian organisations.

- In *Colombia*, the government has tried to deny the existence of an armed conflict and discourage international attention to the humanitarian crisis. It has successfully used the discourse of the War on Terror and the *Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness* to pursue its own strategic agenda with donor governments, including trying to negotiate free trade agreements with the European Union, the US and Canada, and obtaining development cooperation and military assistance. Government actions have severely compromised humanitarian space and access to affected populations

and accentuated problems of protection and displacement. With some exceptions, donor governments have largely accepted this situation uncritically.

- In *Zimbabwe*, the restriction of humanitarian space due to the government ban on NGO activities was a major issue preventing a timely response to a cholera outbreak. The ban’s negative impact was amplified by the risk-averse behaviour of donors and international organisations reluctant to challenge the government’s position.

Distribution of aid according to needs

The HRI 2010 assesses the extent to which donors allocate funding based on the level of vulnerability and to forgotten crises and ones with low media coverage. This helps to understand if donors are basing their funding decisions on objective criteria rather than being unduly influenced by the media, lobbyists or foreign policy objectives.

The HRI 2010 average score for this indicator is among the lowest in this pillar. The Netherlands, Luxembourg, Canada and the US are among the better performers in terms of distributing their aid more equitably according to needs. In contrast, Australia, Portugal, Norway and Denmark all score significantly below the overall OECD/DAC average, indicating that aid distribution is likely influenced and determined by other factors, such as regional interests in the case of Australia.

In comparison, GHD indicators (developed by donors to measure their collective progress in applying the *GHD Principles*) relating to distribution according to needs show that in 2008 only 31 percent of funding needs were covered in the five least-funded UN Consolidated Appeals (CAPs), compared to 70 percent for all appeals. The same data shows that several crises received more funding than their proportional share of the overall requirements.⁸

⁸ See: <http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/reports>

Together, the HRI and GHD data suggest that donors are still not living up to their commitments to distribute aid in accordance to needs. This is partly a consequence of the problem, highlighted in previous HRI reports, of obtaining consistent, comparable and reliable needs assessments data. HRI field research this year shows that this is still a major gap in the humanitarian system. Donors must address this shortcoming if they want to make the *GHD Principles* of needs-based funding a reality. Many field missions highlighted this issue. For example, the HRI crisis reports show that:

- In *Afghanistan*, the inability to access conflict zones means that needs assessments are either done by proxy or generally estimated, with little or no implementing support by donors for carrying them out. In addition, aid tends to be focused on areas where donor governments already have a presence, through Provincial Reconstruction Teams, or in conflict regions, leaving needs in other less-publicised areas uncovered.
- In the *Philippines*, donor governments largely accepted the Philippine government's assessments of needs following a series of cyclones, even though needs were likely inflated. Donors also channelled their aid disproportionately toward food aid, leaving gaps in critical areas like shelter. At the same time, domestic political interests interfered in the equitable distribution of aid. Meanwhile, the government has under-estimated or under-reported the extent of humanitarian needs arising from the unresolved internal conflict in southern Mindanao.
- In *Indonesia*, two earthquakes, one in West Sumatra and the other in West Java, received hugely different levels of response. For West Sumatra, 90 percent of emergency needs were met; however, for West Java, the government did not request international aid and donors respected the government's stance, despite obvious needs there.
- In *Haiti*, accurate and reliable needs assessments were delayed, and not always used by donors, who in some cases were influenced by the massive

media coverage of the earthquake. For example, the IASC rapid needs assessment did not appear to be known or used by many humanitarian actors. The prioritisation of costly foreign search and rescue teams at the expense of meeting other immediate needs was also questioned by some organisations.

- In *Zimbabwe*, the initial unwillingness by the government and – according to some respondents also some UN agencies and donor governments – to acknowledge the severity of the cholera outbreak and severe restrictions imposed on NGOs and other actors meant that the response was delayed and the death toll was considerably higher than in recent cholera epidemics elsewhere.
- In *DRC*, donors are disproportionately channelling funding to eastern conflict areas and thus not responding sufficiently to equally serious needs elsewhere: 65% percent of the Humanitarian Action Plan (HAP) funding was allocated to four provinces, leaving the rest of the country without adequate humanitarian aid.
- In *Pakistan*, donor response to the 2008–2009 displacement crisis addressed immediate relief needs appropriately but fell short on early recovery or community restoration needs. For instance, the agriculture sector has so far been only 16 percent funded and early recovery and education also remain underfunded.

Timeliness of funding

A key component of meeting the needs of crisis-affected populations is ensuring that humanitarian agencies have timely access to funding in order to provide assistance rapidly and when it is needed. The HRI looks at the percentage of donor funding allocated to sudden onset crises within the first six weeks of an appeal launch, and the percentage of funding allocated to complex emergencies (where needs typically continue beyond a one-year period) within the first three months of the calendar year. These HRI indicators are not limited to UN appeals but also incorporate donor response to appeals by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the

International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC). In addition, the HRI establishes thresholds for optimal donor behaviour: the best performing donors disburse at least 75 percent of funds within three months for complex emergencies and 100 percent of funding with the first six weeks of a sudden onset disaster. The rationale for these indicators is that rapid and secure funding allows humanitarian organisations to better plan their programming, which in turn means beneficiaries are more likely to get the right aid at the right time.

In terms of complex emergencies, collectively, donors did not perform well in this indicator. Less than half (10 of the 23 DAC donors) provided more than 37.5 percent of their funding (half the optimum threshold of 75 percent) within the three month timeframe. Ireland and Portugal were the best performing donors, with an optimal score of ten. Belgium was among the poorest performing donors, along with Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and Austria, who all performed significantly below the overall OECD/DAC average (This does not take into account donor contributions to the CERF and other quick disbursement funding mechanisms, which is included in a different indicator).

- In *Indonesia*, funding for the West Sumatra earthquake arrived quickly and was considered flexible and generous, while in West Java, funding generally arrived too late or not at all. Many agencies considered the response there to represent a collective failure of the humanitarian community. The funding process of the European Commission Humanitarian Office (ECHO) reportedly took a minimal 72 hours to finalise, which was seen as an example of good practice by humanitarian organisations responding to the crisis.
- In *Pakistan*, donors responded to the displacement crisis in a generally timely manner, although delays were experienced by some agencies. However, the existence of CERF funds and organisations reserve funds eased the process and provided a starting point from which agencies like the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) could begin project implementation.

What can donor governments do to address these issues?

Politicisation and instrumentalisation of humanitarian assistance can have devastating consequences for those affected by crises. Donor governments can support neutral, impartial humanitarian action and needs-based approaches to their funding and support by:

- **Allocating humanitarian assistance on the basis of needs alone and ensuring that humanitarian assistance is not subordinated to other priorities or objectives.** To do this, governments should support ongoing efforts to develop more integrated and objective needs assessment tools and methodologies. This may also require donors to revise their policies and procedures to ensure that funding and decision-making processes are based on clear, transparent and publically accessible criteria.
- **Ensuring government's foreign, trade and development policies complement and reinforce the independence, neutrality and impartiality of both government donor agencies and the humanitarian organisations they fund.** Donor governments should explicitly ensure that in cases of a crisis, neutral, impartial humanitarian action should take precedence over all other concerns. This requires governments to integrate and increase awareness of, and respect for, humanitarian principles into other policy areas.
- **Advocating more forcefully in situations where governments (either donors or host countries) and other parties are not respecting neutral, impartial and independent humanitarian action.** Better coordination at the field and headquarter level can ensure that donors governments can use their access, influence and collective voice with host governments to more effectively address issues of access and protection and remind states of their obligations to respect IHL. Donors should consider

other high-level mechanisms to monitor and take collective action in cases when donor governments' crisis responses contravene the spirit and intent of the *GHD Principles*.

- **Disseminating and applying the Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief (the Oslo guidelines) and reviewing donors' visibility requirements to ensure that humanitarian organisations are clearly distinguished from non-humanitarian actors.** In a climate of growing mistrust and misunderstandings about the objectives of humanitarian action, donor governments should review the guidelines for collaboration between their military and humanitarian actors. Governments should also consider reviewing how they give visibility to their humanitarian assistance – including such requirements as “branding” with donors logos and national flags – to help reinforce that humanitarian aid and personnel are independent from governments.
- **Reviewing and reducing unnecessary aid conditionality and other donor requirements to ensure that humanitarian organisations have sufficient flexibility and independence to carry out their work effectively.** While governments should be concerned that their aid funding is not used for non-humanitarian purposes, legitimate, professional humanitarian organisations have developed working procedures that preserve their independence and impartiality and ensure quality and accountability in the use and distribution of resources. Donors should therefore review and reduce any restrictions that could hamper access and the provision of assistance and protection to affected populations.

Pillar 2: Prevention, risk reduction and recovery


Key finding: *A lack of political commitment and investment in conflict and disaster prevention, preparedness and risk reduction threatens to intensify the impact of future humanitarian crises.*

Donor governments recognised the importance of prevention, risk reduction and recovery as a key component of humanitarian action when they established the *GHD Principles*. The *GHD Principles* state that the objectives of humanitarian action are in part to “prevent and strengthen preparedness” for situations of crisis and to “facilitate the return to normal lives and livelihoods.” The principles are also clearly oriented towards strengthening local capacities for prevention and preparedness, mitigation, working towards restoring sustainable livelihoods and the “transition from humanitarian relief to recovery and development activities.”

This pillar examines the extent to which donors are meeting their commitments to prevention, risk reduction and recovery in their funding allocations and practices. As the HRI 2009 report stressed, donors can do much more to support prevention and preparation for both disasters and conflicts. Emerging trends, such as increased risk in urban areas and climate-related vulnerability threaten to increase the impact of disasters unless significantly more attention is given to better integrating relief and development efforts with prevention, preparedness and risk reduction. The indicators in this pillar try to address the following questions:

- Do donor governments work to strengthen local capacity by supporting beneficiary participation in programming?
- Do donor governments invest in prevention, preparedness and risk reduction?
- Do donor governments ensure their aid supports long-term recovery of affected communities?

Graph 6. Overview of donor scores in Pillar 2 indicators



Prevention and preparedness for future conflicts and disasters continues to rate poorly in the HRI survey and interviews. Despite many expressions of commitment for this area, donors – and the UN system – are still not investing consistently or sufficiently in building local community capacity to prevent and minimise the effects of disasters and conflicts. Nor are they investing in enhancing the operational capacity and contingency planning of humanitarian actors, particularly local NGOs, to respond quickly and effectively to such new challenges as the politicisation of aid and reluctance of host governments to acknowledge a humanitarian crisis and to accept international assistance.

Beneficiary participation in programming

The involvement and engagement of crisis-affected populations in programme design, implementation and monitoring have long been recognised as a good humanitarian practice. Beneficiary participation is seen as a means to build and strengthen local capacity to prevent, prepare for and respond to potential crises. Most humanitarian actors include provisions for beneficiary participation in their programmes – some with a greater commitment to and level of ownership of programmes by affected populations than others. The HRI survey questions that make up the indicators for this area ask humanitarian organisations about the extent to which their donors prioritise and are committed to supporting beneficiary participation, as suggested in the *GHD Principles*.

In this indicator, Denmark, Norway and the EC stand out for above average scores for promoting and encouraging beneficiary participation in all aspects of programming. For example, ECHO specifically asks its partners to show in funding proposals and reporting how beneficiaries are engaged in programming, and actively monitors this in the field. According to many of the humanitarian organisations surveyed, the majority of donors state they are committed to beneficiary participation, but most do not actively monitor, follow up or support this. The donors with the lowest scores for these indicators are New Zealand, France and Japan.

The HRI field research provides examples of donor practice in this area:

- In *Sri Lanka*, beneficiaries were not at all involved in all stages of the humanitarian response: this was largely the result of the Sri Lankan government’s denial of access to humanitarian agencies and donors.

- In *Colombia*, donors such as ECHO, Canada and Sweden required partners to show how beneficiaries were involved in programming as part of their contractual arrangements. Most humanitarian organisations appreciated their commitment and determination to use subsequent monitoring to verify whether needs are being met and to work with their partners to overcome challenges to wider participation.

Support for prevention and preparedness

In many disasters or conflicts, needs continue long after the emergency phase is over. Many of the humanitarian organisations surveyed over the past four years for the HRI have consistently criticised their donors for not providing either sufficient funding or support for long-term recovery or to enhance preparedness for future conflicts and disasters. The results from this year's research show little change in the two qualitative indicators related to prevention and preparedness and linking relief, rehabilitation and development (LRRD). Only the Netherlands and Luxembourg have above average scores in both these indicators, while Italy and France are well below the overall average scores. Sweden and the EC score above average in *Support for prevention and preparedness*, while Switzerland and Finland score above average in LRRD. Ireland, however, receives above average scores for *Support for prevention and preparedness* but is among the lowest scored for its support to LRRD. In general, support for preparedness and contingency planning tends to focus on natural disasters and epidemics. Conflict prevention is less of a focus and receives less advanced planning.

The HRI field missions showed several examples of this:

- In *Haiti*, despite a long-standing international presence in the country, and the recent experiences dealing with four back-to-back hurricanes in 2008, capacity-building efforts to strengthen preparedness, prevention and response capacities of vulnerable communities and local authorities appear to have had little impact. As an example, internationally funded civil protection bodies such as the DPR and UPC were largely absent or sidelined in the immediate response. There is great concern that the pledges made by donor governments to support long-term recovery may not be honoured.
- In *Indonesia*, donors like Australia had a large disaster risk reduction (DRR) programme but countries like the US consider DRR to be outside the scope of humanitarian action and even asked some partners to remove it from funding requests. There is a general trend for donor governments to separate DRR from emergency response needs.
- In *Zimbabwe*, support for preparedness and risk reduction varied depending on the donor and their mandate. For instance, ECHO, the Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) and the UK's Department for International Development (DFID) emphasised preparedness and DRR but CERF and funds provided by embassies of donor states in Harare did not include it in targeted activities.
- In *Pakistan*, donor governments performed poorly across the board in terms of prevention. Many acted with an attitude that often supported the efforts of the Pakistani Army in their War on Terror, thus doing little to prevent further displacement and violence or reduce risk. Donor governments acquiesced in military control of protection efforts, raising questions about their prioritisation of security concerns over commitment to advocate for protection of civilians.

Funding for risk mitigation, prevention and reconstruction

Donor investment in risk reduction mechanisms, prevention and reconstruction can contribute to reducing vulnerability towards disasters and conflicts, and the impact of crises. The level of funding provided to these areas as a proportion of overall humanitarian funding helps to show how much importance donors give this. The HRI uses 2008 data from the OECD database to determine donor governments' humanitarian funding allocations to Reconstruction, relief and prevention (VII.3) and Disaster prevention and preparedness. There are significant variations in donors' scores: Belgium allocates just over 40 percent of its humanitarian funding to these areas, while Greece allocates only 1.1 percent and Sweden only 3.7 percent. Other donors that provide more than the average are Japan, Spain, the EC and Australia. This is clearly an area that requires further attention by the GHD donor group.

Donors tend to do slightly better overall in terms of support for international disaster risk reduction mechanisms, but there is wide variance among donors. In this indicator, Sweden is the best performing donor, with above average scores for Finland, Canada, Denmark, Luxembourg and Switzerland. Donors that could improve the most in this indicator are the US, Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain.

What can donor governments do to address these issues?

Donors' continued lack of attention to and investment in risk reduction, prevention and preparedness strategies means that millions of people are unnecessarily affected by crisis each year. Governments can contribute to redressing this by:

- **Ensuring that beneficiary participation and “ownership” of humanitarian programmes are integrated as a requirement into a donor’s funding decisions, monitoring and reporting.**

Despite the emphasis in the *GHD Principles* on beneficiary engagement in programming, surprisingly few donors make this a requirement for funding, monitoring and reporting.

- **Allocating a percentage of humanitarian assistance funding to conflict and disaster risk reduction, preparedness and for local capacity building.**

Some donor governments already dedicate part of their humanitarian budgets to these areas, while others see this falling within the realm of development cooperation. Regardless of the funding model, donors could establish clearer and more transparent criteria to show how they will support this. They could consider integrating risk reduction and capacity building as an explicit requirement for partners that they fund and obliging partners to include local capacity building as an outcome of their humanitarian activities.

- **Investing in greater capacity building and contingency planning for local actors and the wider humanitarian system.** Donor governments need to prepare for a future of increased and changing humanitarian needs. The humanitarian system is hardly able to cope with existing needs and is ill prepared to anticipate and prepare for future needs. This is why an investment in preparedness, response and risk reduction at the local level and with governments in vulnerable countries is so important. Donors should set aside funding to strengthen the capacity of all components of the humanitarian system, particularly local actors.


Pillar 3: Working with humanitarian partners

Key finding: *Slow progress in reforming the humanitarian system means that aid efforts are not as efficient or effective as they should be.*

A central thrust of *GHD Principles* is improving the quality of the relationship between donor governments and the humanitarian organisations they fund. The principles establish where donors have a responsibility to ensure that their policies and practices facilitate effective humanitarian action and do not impede the work of their partners. This includes respecting the different roles and competencies of the various components of the humanitarian system (UN, Red Cross/Red Crescent and NGOs) and of national governments and local actors, promoting flexible funding arrangements and un-earmarked funding, support to partners and promoting coordination among all actors. This pillar assesses how well donors are supporting the work of humanitarian organisations, not only in terms of funding but also other critical issues where donors can exert a positive influence on the effectiveness of humanitarian response. The indicators in this pillar gather information on questions such as:

- How do donor governments have flexible funding arrangements that allow their partners to better respond to needs?
- How do donors allocate their funding among the different components of the humanitarian system?
- Do donor governments support efficient functioning of the humanitarian system?

Graph 7. Overview of donor scores in Pillar 3 indicators



Flexible funding arrangements

The *GHD Principles* call for donors to provide more predictable and flexible funding for their partners, including reducing earmarking. Flexibility in funding allows humanitarian organisations to better plan and allocate resources based on priority needs as well as adapting to changing situations in a crisis. These concepts were integrated into the humanitarian reform agenda, and in part led to the establishment of pooled funds like the CERF so that UN agencies had access to rapid, timely and flexible funding to meet priority needs. The GHD Indicator Report 2009 suggests that according to 2007 OECD/DAC data, donors collectively provided just under ten percent of overall humanitarian funding under flexible terms, with another seven percent available through flexible funds such as CERF and in-country pooled funds.⁹

The HRI looks at the issue from several different perspectives: un-earmarked funding as reported by the UN, IFRC and the ICRC, as well as OCHA's FTS and the perception of humanitarian organisations on how flexible their donors are. According to the HRI data, Portugal, New Zealand and the Netherlands provide the greatest percentage of un-earmarked funding, while the US, the EC, Japan, Italy and Germany are the donors with the greatest level of earmarking. At the crisis level, these same donors are considered the most inflexible in terms of their funding arrangements. In contrast, humanitarian organisations funded by Luxembourg, New Zealand, Finland and Ireland considered their donors the most flexible.

The HRI field missions provide several examples:

- In *Somalia*, donors such as Australia, Finland, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden were commended for flexibility to fill funding gaps. However, donors were reluctant to fund extra overhead costs and provide contingency funds required in this difficult operating context, thus hampering the response.

- In *Zimbabwe*, ECHO and DFID were cited as positive practices for their flexibility and responsiveness to changing needs.
- In the *oPr*, some donors were praised for providing multi-year commitments and flexible or un-earmarked funding, while others were criticised for the conditionality put on their aid.

Funding to partners

While the GHD does not specifically set out how donors should channel their aid, there is an implicit message that donors should recognise that all components of the humanitarian system have an equally important contribution to make to ensure responses to crises are as effective as possible, and that donors should fund and support the UN system, Red Cross/Red Crescent and NGOs. The GHD Indicator Report 2009 provides an overall percentage of how the total amount of OECD/DAC donor aid is channelled, estimating that in 2007 over half (51.4 percent) was allocated to UN agencies, almost one-fifth (17.8 percent) to NGOs and civil society organisations, and 7.4 movement percent to the Red Cross/Red Crescent.¹⁰

⁹ See: <http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/07/2009-ghd-indicators.pdf>

¹⁰ See: <http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/reports>

The HRI uses a similar approach but provides more detailed analysis of donor funding channels by looking at funding to NGOs and adding a component for funding to non-national NGOs (this could include local or international NGOs engaged in the response). The HRI also includes donor funding of UN, IFRC and ICRC appeals, funding for the CERF and other pooled funds and UN coordination. Together, these appeals offer a more complete assessment of how well donors are covering needs. Finally, the HRI introduces the concept of “fair-share” in calculating the scores for donors. This implies that donor funding to appeals and pooled funds should be in proportion to their GDP compared to the overall DAC group. In other words, the optimal value for a donor’s funding is based on the size of the country’s economy so that the burden is shared equitably among donors.

Based on this data, Denmark, Germany and the EC come out well above the overall average in terms of their support and funding to NGOs. Italy, Spain, Greece and Belgium are the donors with scores well below the overall average. In the case of Spain, this reflects a clear policy orientation to support multilateral funding channels such as the UN system.

Using the fair share criteria, Norway, Sweden and Ireland are the best donors in terms of funding UN, IFRC, ICRC appeals and CERF and other pooled funds in proportions that are well above their fair share – over 150 percent in the case of Norway and Sweden. The Netherlands, the UK, Finland and Denmark also meet or exceed the “fair share” criteria. By contrast, Italy, France, Greece and Portugal contribute significantly less than their “fair share.” Also of note, the US is one of the largest donors in terms of absolute volume of aid, yet it performs well below the OECD/DAC average in terms of funding appeals in proportion to its corresponding “fair share.”

Supporting coordination and reform efforts

Recent UN and ALNAP reports paint a cautiously optimistic view on the progress of reforms and performance of the different components of the humanitarian system¹¹. However, the HRI field research underscores that there is a significant need for improvements, particularly in the areas of leadership, coordination and integration of disaster and conflict prevention, preparedness and capacity building in humanitarian action.

As the key funders of humanitarian assistance, donor governments can shape and influence the direction and functioning of the humanitarian system. When the GHD declaration was developed, it was an excellent example of how donors can exert positive peer pressure to support reforms. Subsequently, many of the ideas and concepts in the GHD declaration have found their way into the humanitarian reform debate. Many GHD donors have actively contributed to the development of clusters, pooled funds and other elements of the reform agenda, including strengthening the capacity of the components of the system to respond more effectively to humanitarian challenges.

As the GHD predates the humanitarian reform agenda, the HRI does not currently include direct indicators to assess how donors are contributing to improving the system. However, as part of the field research process, DARA asks senior representatives of humanitarian organisations about how well their donor government support coordination and building organisational capacity. They are also asked about their perceptions of the capacity of their donors for informed decision-making in the crisis context, based on their experiences working with donors. As part of the HRI field research, DARA also asks several open-ended questions around the effectiveness of humanitarian reform in each of the crises studied.

Luxembourg, Finland and New Zealand were generally rated well by their partners for supporting organisational capacity building. Finland also rated above average for support for coordination along with Norway, Australia, the EC and the UK. The EC, the US and the UK were the top-rated donors in terms of donor capacity for informed decision-making, along with Norway. However, donor capacity can be both a strength and weakness. Many humanitarian organisations welcomed that capacity to engage with partners and work with them to resolve operational issues. However, many also remarked that donors with good capacity also overstepped their boundaries by, for example, intervening in programming decisions or imposing unnecessary additional reporting requirements.

At the field level, several issues consistently emerged in HRI interviews. These resonate with evidence from recent evaluations at the crisis level and globally:

Humanitarian Coordinators (HCs) are a key element of the reform agenda, responsible for providing effective leadership and coordination in crises. In the crises studied, however, few of the organisations interviewed felt that HCs provide such leadership. Concerns were frequently raised by all actors, particularly NGOs, about “double-hatted roles”, when a UN Resident Coordinator (RC) is also an HC. Many fear this means humanitarian issues get subordinated to other UN priorities and that the close relationship between a host government and an RC/HC can impede forceful advocacy on humanitarian issues.

- In *Zimbabwe*, many humanitarian organisations felt the RC/HC was too closely aligned with the government, subordinating humanitarian concerns to other interests. A formal complaint was made by NGOs and UN agencies about the RC/HC’s performance, leading to a tense and mistrustful relationship between the RC/HC and the humanitarian community.

¹¹ See: <http://www.alnap.org/forum/post/60.aspx>

- In *CAR*, coordination of the response to the ongoing crisis – and advocacy to ensure it is not forgotten by international policy makers – has been weakened by the absence of an HC for the past two years. Many argue this helps explain funding shortfalls.
- In *Colombia*, many NGOs considered the RC/HC too passive, unwilling to forcefully challenge the government in its propaganda to deny the existence of an armed conflict and the applicability of IHL or advocate against government measures that jeopardise neutral, impartial humanitarian action.

Clusters were in place in most of the crises studied but results have been mixed, pointing to a need to continue to strengthen and consolidate technical expertise, coordination and most importantly leadership in different clusters. WASH (water, sanitation and hygiene) and food and nutrition clusters were consistently mentioned as examples of effectively utilising the cluster concept for more efficient and effective use of resources. However, other clusters were often critiqued as inefficient and burdensome, particularly for smaller NGOs.

- In *CAR*, clusters did not function far beyond the capital city of Bangui, in part due to limited operational capacity and reach. At the same time, because of the small number of humanitarian actors involved, coordination mechanisms like clusters have been praised – especially the protection cluster, which is considered a success.
- In the *Philippines*, the capacity of clusters and even their legitimacy was thrown into question by competition with a parallel cluster system used by the government to address the same needs
- In *Zimbabwe*, food cluster cooperation between the World Food Programme (WFP), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and UNICEF yielded positive results, partly due to effective cluster leadership.

- In *Afghanistan*, clusters suffered from problems with management, staff turnover, and regularity of meetings. Progress was hampered due to the predominance of military and security coordination instead of humanitarian coordination. There was a common perception in the humanitarian community that funds are not being equitably distributed among all actors and the clusters. Food aid receives most funding, while sectors such as health receive hardly any support. Tensions between NGOs and UN agencies have damaged and undermined cluster effectiveness and created an atmosphere of resentment and distrust among actors.

- In *Indonesia*, many informants thought the cluster system developed in response to the 2009 earthquakes needed better leadership and organisation. Some clusters like education and health performed markedly better than others such as shelter.
- In *Haiti*, clusters lacked strong political leadership, essential in the complicated working environment. Many meetings were held in hard to access venues and in English, creating barriers to the engagement and participation of Haitian government and NGO actors. The multiplication of actors, many inexperienced in humanitarian response, and high turnover of staff made coordination next to impossible in the first phase of the emergency. Coordination with the different military present in the operation was also a real challenge, despite CIMIC guidelines. To their credit, donor governments maintained a coordinated approach to the initial response. However, the massive private funding available to some INGOs meant that they were less dependent on donor government funding, and donors therefore had less direct influence and coordination with these actors.

Pooled Funding such as the UN's CERF and in-country pooled funds are increasingly being used. Respondents appreciate the existence of flexible gap-covering mechanisms. However, a frequent comment from NGOs and many UN agencies was that HCs, who normally manage

such funds, prioritise funding for UN agencies over NGOs, and that disbursement procedures are unnecessarily bureaucratic and time-consuming.

- In *Indonesia*, funding from the CERF took six weeks to arrive at the scene after the earthquake had destroyed large tracts of Padang – a delay that was simply too long to address the emergency at hand. Organisations working on earthquake relief also found the CERF to be less flexible than other funding sources. The Emergency Response Fund (ERF), on the other hand, was considered to be an effective response mechanism for NGOs.
- In *Zimbabwe*, UN agencies were given preferential treatment and received 93 percent of the contributions from pooled funds like the CERF while international NGOs only received seven percent. One of the biggest criticisms levelled at the CERF by many INGOs is that it does not coordinate well enough, or directly support the work of, many local or international NGOs, even though they are often the quickest responders to emergencies.
- In *Afghanistan*, CERF funds did not always go for emergency responses but instead for the purpose of sustaining normal, ongoing UN operations. This is a violation of its intended purpose, to fill immediate funding needs.
- In *CAR*, CERF assistance is channelled mainly towards UN agencies, losing some of its impact due to administrative and transaction costs. However, many credit the CERF for helping to mobilise efforts in the field. The locally-managed CHF is the main source of funding for the over 75 international organisations currently operating in the country.
- In *DRC*, the CHF has been applauded as a positive practice. Collaboration of humanitarian partners through the use of this fund is seen as one of the successes of the response.

What can donor governments do to address these issues?

Strengthening and improving the effectiveness of the humanitarian system is essential to meet current and future needs effectively and have greater impact for people affected by crisis. Donor governments can support greater effectiveness and efficiency in the humanitarian system by:

- **Continuing to actively promote reforms of the international humanitarian system, not just UN reform.** Donors can continue to sponsor reviews and evaluations of efforts so far, such as the reviews of CERF and clusters. They must ensure that these mechanisms are accessible to more actors, particularly national NGOs and, when appropriate, national authorities. Donors can also invest in looking for new, innovative approaches to emerging issues and challenges.
- **Supporting and promoting more active leadership by the recently-appointed UN Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC) and Humanitarian Coordinators.** Donors can jointly advocate for better-qualified leadership in the humanitarian system by insisting on a merit and experience-based approach to finding candidates for senior leadership posts in humanitarian crises. They need to encourage the organisations that they fund to engage fully with the HC. At the same time, donors can channel the concerns of their partners to the highest level to ensure that the ERC takes action to resolve outstanding issues.
- **Looking for means to harmonise and improve needs assessments to achieve more objective allocations of resources to crises.** Donor governments need to continue to support efforts for more accurate and reliable needs assessments as the best means to ensure resources are allocated in line with actual needs at the global and crisis level – and then use these mechanisms as the basis for transparent and objective decisions on where to allocate resources.

Pillar 4: Protection and international law

Key finding: *Continued gaps in the protection of civilians and safe humanitarian access means that vulnerable populations are at risk of harm.*

The *GHD Principles* call on donor governments to respect and implement international laws, guidelines and other legal mechanisms that sustain neutral, impartial and independent humanitarian action and ensure access, protection and assistance for crisis-affected populations. The principles also call on donor governments to facilitate humanitarian access and advocate for local governments and other actors to fulfil their responsibilities to respond to humanitarian crises. Pillar 4 assesses to what extent donor governments respect, promote and apply the legal instruments related to humanitarian action, by asking:

- Do donor governments adhere to, respect and apply international legal frameworks that support humanitarian action?
- Do donor governments actively advocate for and promote safe humanitarian access and protection of civilians?
- Do donor governments advocate to governments and other parties to respect humanitarian principles?

Protection of civilians from harm is one of the fundamental international humanitarian law (IHL) principles. But in too many of the crises studied this year, protection of civilians from harm was not given enough priority in the international response. Of particular concern is the deliberate targeting of civilian populations, particularly women and children for sexual and gender-based violence. This happens both in conflict situations where sexual violence is a frequently deployed tactic but also occurs after disasters where populations are often exposed to risks of rape and violence. All states have an important responsibility to ensure respect for and implementation of IHL and related legal frameworks to protect civilians (See special box text on the next page).

At the same time, increasingly high-risk operating environments are making it difficult for humanitarian actors to have safe access to affected populations to provide assistance and protection. Recent UN reports suggest that over 260 humanitarian workers were killed, kidnapped or seriously injured in 2008, with similar numbers for 2009.¹² Understanding of, and respect for, the neutrality and impartiality of humanitarian action is being steadily eroded. Increasingly – and particularly in crisis-affected states in the Muslim world – local populations and armed groups often see aid workers as part of a Western political agenda. This reinforces the need for humanitarian actors to engage with local communities and other actors to build confidence and respect for their work around protection and assistance. Governments need to advocate more strongly for access and protection. There is an urgent need to continue to develop and implement professional protocols and common approaches among aid agencies on how to protect civilians and minimise security risks to their own personnel.


Support and respect of humanitarian legal frameworks

The HRI quantitative indicators on respect for *International humanitarian law*, *Human rights law* and *Refugee law* all look at the extent to which donor governments have ratified international treaties and related conventions that facilitate effective and principled humanitarian action, protection and assistance of crisis-affected population. This includes, when appropriate, actions to support the implementation of these legal instruments, such as support to the ICRC and the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), or domestic policies to promote IHL or honour the principles set out in the *Refugee Convention* and the *Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement*.

Several donors received above average scores for their support to *International humanitarian law*, *Human rights law* and *Refugee law*. These include Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Luxembourg, governments which have taken measures to ratify IHL instruments and to comply

¹² See <http://www.un.org/en/events/humanitarianday>

Graph 8. Overview of donor scores in Pillar 4 indicators



with their international responsibilities. Interestingly, Switzerland, which receives the highest score for support for IHL receives only average scores for its support for refugee law and below average scores for support for human rights laws. The US, Italy, France and Austria all score below average in all three of these indicators. At the crisis level, Sweden, Norway, Switzerland and New Zealand all received higher than average scores for promoting respect for IHL.

Access and protection

Donor governments can play an important role in supporting and facilitating access by humanitarian organisations to affected populations and advocating among all actors for protection of civilians. At the crisis level, the qualitative indicator for *Facilitating humanitarian access* has one of the lowest average scores in the HRI. The US, EC and Australia were among the donors with above average scores for this indicator. However, both the US and the EC were criticised in some crisis contexts like Somalia and the oPt for policies and procedures that in fact restricted access to populations. For example, the US has placed restrictions on aid agencies preventing them from working in areas controlled by entities judged to be terrorist groups, yet this is precisely where needs are often greatest.

In terms of protection, Denmark and Norway stand out for above average scores in this indicator. New Zealand and Luxembourg also receive above average scores but this should be interpreted with caution as their funding and field presence are much more limited and therefore the number of survey responses collected is much less than other donors. France and Spain received below average scores in this indicator. *Advocacy towards local authorities* is another qualitative indicator with a low overall average score. Norway and Sweden were the donors that did best in this area, with above average scores.

Findings from the HRI field missions provide several examples of the challenge of facilitating access and providing protection:

- In *CAR*, protection is one of the main concerns. The presence of a UN peacekeeping mission in the country (MINURCAT) has helped to provide some security for humanitarian operations in the northeast but armed groups and bandits have made access to other areas risky for humanitarian agencies.

- In *DRC*, recent reports of mass rapes by militias have raised serious concerns about the ability of the UN peacekeeping mission to provide effective protection to civilians and about donor willingness to invest in security sector reform to enable DRC military and police to do so.
- In *Somalia*, donors funded only 28 percent of funds requested for protection activities. Few donors are actively engaged in advocating for safe humanitarian access. Due to security concerns and restrictions of working in Al-Shabaab areas, many organisations are managing operations remotely, making it difficult to actively support protection with a physical presence in the field. Some donors actually hampered humanitarian access by paying ransoms without coordinating with other stakeholders in the humanitarian community.
- In *Sri Lanka*, the government's tight control over access to military-run camps for those displaced by the conflict with the Tamil Tigers has created near insuperable constraints to meeting protection and assistance needs.

- In *Afghanistan*, donors are blamed by many humanitarian agencies for being silent about constant violations of human rights by state actors and their supporters, and for not advocating for the rights of women and children.
- In the *oPt*, the EC was praised for advocating for protection and security of humanitarian workers. However, many other donors advocated at the political level for the lifting of the blockade only if it related to the projects they were funding. Donors did not speak out with one common voice, demanding that the Israeli authorities provide unrestricted access for all humanitarian goods and workers.
- In *Pakistan*, protection was not prioritised by donors, nor was the implementation of IHL. Pakistan considers the displacement crisis a law enforcement issue, not a military operation or a conflict, and therefore rejects the use of the term internally displaced person (IDP), further causing donors and agencies difficulties in engaging in dialogue with state actors. Humanitarian space and access are major problems because the people most in need of humanitarian assistance are also often those living in areas of fighting, to which the Pakistani military denies agencies access due to safety and operational concerns. This lack of free access has been a recurring difficulty since displacement in northwestern Pakistan began in 2007.
- In *Yemen*, donors were criticised for failing to advocate more proactively for protection. Some respondents described donors as gender blind when it comes to protection. On the other hand, some donors felt that when UN agencies are challenged to make a clear stand for human rights, they tend to hide under the “umbrella of neutrality and impartiality”. Many NGOs are afraid that they might be expelled from the country if they are too outspoken.

What can donor governments do to address these issues?

Respect for IHL, protection of civilians and safe humanitarian access are vital to minimise the devastating consequences for the people affected by crises. Donor governments can support this by:

- **Using every possible and appropriate means to advocate for the protection of civilians in situations of risk.** Donor governments have been silent in too many crises. They have not spoken out with one voice in other situations where access and protection are issues. Donor governments can exert pressure on parties through the Security Council and other channels but also work through mechanisms like the office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) on Sexual Violence in Conflict.
- **Continuing to fund and support agencies with a dedicated mandate for protection, such as the ICRC and UNHCR and ensuring better cooperation and coordination of protection among all actors.** Donors should not neglect the important role of NGOs and local civil society organisations in monitoring and responding to protection issues. They should invest in building their capacities at the same time as those of larger multilateral agencies. Donors can also promote the development and implementation of operational guidelines on protection within the humanitarian sector.
- **Signing and ratifying international legal frameworks to protect and safeguard humanitarian personnel.** Donors can demonstrate their commitment to improving access and protection by signing and ratifying legal frameworks such as the UN Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel and support the development of other legal mechanisms that could contribute to better protection and assistance.

Special contribution Ending sexual violence: From recognition to action

By Margot Wallström, Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict

Despite its horrifying prevalence, sexual violence in conflict was left off the agenda of global policy-makers for too long. In 2000, the breakthrough UN Security Council Resolution (SCR) 1325 was first to recognise the impact of war on women and to emphasise the importance of their contributions to conflict resolution and sustainable peace. It was not until 2008, however, that SCR 1820 specifically recognised sexual violence as a “tactic of war” and brought security policy into alignment with international criminal justice standards. In 2009, SCR 1888 established my mandate as SRSG on Sexual Violence in Conflict and set out to translate SCR 1820 into practice.

During my second official visit to DRC, where part of the east is described as the “rape capital of the world”, a 70-year old woman told me how she had tried – in vain – to convince the rapists to leave her alone, pointing out to the perpetrators that they could be her own grandchildren.

In the DRC alone, more than 200,000 rapes have been reported since the protracted series of conflicts began. In July – August 2010, an additional 300 rapes were reported in the Walikale region of North Kivu province. For each rape reported, it is likely that as many as 20 are unreported (The Economist 2009). Why does sexual violence in conflict and post-conflict situations keep taking place? What can be done to prevent similar atrocities in the future?

Historical phenomenon

Sexual violence in conflict is often described as unavoidable, collateral damage or as “nothing new”. While no other human rights violation is routinely dismissed as inevitable, the latter is certainly true. Homer in the *Iliad* described Trojan women being treated as war prizes, the most famous of whom is Briseis who was given to Achilles for leading the assault on that city during the Trojan War. Within the Bible, Moses tells military officers to kill everyone in a recently pillaged town except for virgin females and to keep them for themselves.

There are also numerous examples of rape and sexual violence in more recent history from the Thirty Years War, the US Civil War, colonial wars in Africa and the Second World War. We currently hear of horrible accounts in the Western Balkans, Rwanda, Timor Leste, and DRC.

Thus, rape and sexual violence may seem unavoidable, as if it were something to be accepted as part or a consequence of any conflict. However, we must recognise that sexual violence in conflict is neither cultural nor sexual, but criminal. SCR 1820 acknowledges it is a matter of international peace and security and therefore, within the Security Council's mandate.

The changing nature of armed conflict

Modern warfare is predominantly intrastate, waged by non-state actors and triggered by issues of identity, ethnicity, religion and competition for land or resources, particularly oil and minerals. Those who are primarily affected by hostilities have also changed. In contemporary, low-intensity wars, rebel groups and government forces often kill civilians and defy international law (Human Security Group Project 2009). It has been said that most civilians tend to die from war rather than in battle (Slim 2008). Women have ended up on the front-line – not as soldiers but as victims.

Sexual violence in conflict has become the weapon of choice because it is cheap, silent, effective and only requires individuals and cruel intent. It maims victims mentally and physically and can destroy entire communities. Survivors can become pregnant, be infected with sexually-transmitted diseases, develop incontinence and are regularly rejected by their families. The perpetrators often walk free while their victims walk in shame.

Sexual violence as an obstacle to sustainable peace

In addition to long-term psychological injuries, sexual violence is also an obstacle to sustainable peace:

- Long-term, sexual violence undermines social safety through the destruction of families and societies.

- The fear of assaults is an impediment to women's participation in economic activities and girls' school attendance.
- If impunity reigns, the faith in a country's judicial system and its ability to protect its citizens is seriously undermined.

Women must be active participants during peace processes and decision-making. No peace agreement engineered solely by men will ever be legitimate so long as wars affect the lives and livelihoods of women. Unfortunately, many in power continue to see women as merely victims rather than agents of change and despite active engagement in informal efforts to build peace, women are often excluded from any *formal* peace-building efforts.

What has been done?

We must look at what has already worked well and how these actions can be further strengthened. The UN Action network has attempted to capture good practice in *Addressing Conflict-Related Sexual Violence – An Analytical Inventory of Peacekeeping Practice* (UNIFEM 2010). Evidence from the inventory shows the need for:

- Community liaison officers who can build trusting relationships with communities, including with women: ideally, with both women and men serving in these liaison positions;
- Mobile patrols – both by day and night – that actively engage the population, are trusted, accessible and approachable;
- Peacekeepers that are trained to recognise and report sexual violence;
- Early warning/distress call systems;
- UN patrols that include local military and security forces.

The primary responsibility for protecting citizens from violence is held by the state, and neither the UN nor any number of peace keepers can be substitute. The role of the SRSG is to help build government capacity to meet its obligations and includes improving data collection, statistics, monitoring, evaluation, and reporting mechanisms that make it safer and easier to report crimes. The data, once available, must also be widely publicised in order to educate communities. In some

countries, building capacity can have a more comprehensive reach and include overhauling an entire judicial system – not a small challenge.

Donor governments must impose tougher terms when providing assistance to countries in such a situation. Donors, and parts of the UN system, must also be better coordinated. In DRC, for example, there are military and police officers who have received excellent but unharmonised support from donors and neighbouring countries, which risks that these two groups will have a different understanding of how their jobs should be carried out.

Although women's participation must go much further in efforts to prevent and address sexual violence, some achievements have been made in the last two decades. The Beijing Platform for Action in 1995, with 189 signatory countries, aims to strengthen the participation of women in national reconciliation and reconstruction and to investigate and punish those who perpetuate violence against women in armed conflict.

In 2000, the UN Security Council established SCR 1325. For the first time, the Security Council mandated that the UN and its Member States monitor enforceable protection from such violence. SCR 1820 demands nothing less than the 'immediate and complete cessation by all parties to armed conflict of all acts of sexual violence against civilians', and was a historic response to a horrific reality. Finally, SCR 1888 established the position I am the first to hold, to act as an advocate, coordinator and leader within the UN system to address the issue. It also requested that the UN Action against Sexual Violence in Conflict – a network of 13 UN entities – assist the SRSG in this task.

The road ahead

The stories survivors tell of the mass rapes in DRC are indescribable. The terror, violence and cruelty these individuals endured is unimaginable. Journalists who accompanied me often asked how I reacted to the stories I was told. The answer to that question is, I think, very human: I wept. We all wept. Then I experienced an extreme sadness, followed by anger, and a fierce urgency to act.

One glimpse of hope during that visit was the arrest of 'Lieutenant Colonel' Mayele, a commander of the Mai Mai militia believed to be responsible for the mass rapes in Walikale. Only a few days later, the International Criminal Court (ICC) announced the arrest by French authorities of Callixte Mbarushimana, the alleged Executive Secretary of the FDLR's (*Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Rwanda*) Steering Committee and as such, the force behind a plan to intentionally create a human catastrophe through attacks against civilians. These arrests sent a strong message: these atrocities are not going unnoticed, and that justice will ultimately prevail.

The first point in the agenda I outlined to the Security Council is to end impunity, i.e. ensuring that perpetrators do not remain at the helm of security institutions and that amnesty is not an option. If women continue to suffer sexual violence, it is not because the law is inadequate, but because it is enforced inadequately.

Secondly, women must be empowered to become agents of change. A ceasefire is not synonymous with peace for women if the shooting stops, but rapes continue. Women activists should never have to risk their lives to do their work.

The third point is to mobilise political leadership. Resolutions 1325 and 1820 are tools in the hands of political leaders, and should be used as such. Both traditional and non-traditional stakeholders need to feel accountable for the success of this agenda.

Fourth is increasing recognition of rape as a tactic and consequence of conflict. Those who tolerate sexual terror should be notified that they do so in defiance of the Security Council, which holds the power to enact enforcement measures. The Council should not underestimate the tools it has at its disposal and should be ready to use them.

Finally, I will drive and empower efforts to ensure a coordinated response from the entire UN system, which means having more resources, and utilising the strengths of the individual entities for one common goal – to stop rape now.

My vision includes ensuring that the UN system is attuned to early-warning indicators. Crimes on this scale are no accident. They are often strategic, planned and therefore predictable – the painful reminder of the Walikale atrocities is an example.

Women have no rights if those who violate their rights go unpunished. Many women in conflict, such as those in the DRC, are not safe under their own roofs or in their own beds when night falls. Our aim must be to uphold international law so that women – even in war-torn corners of our world – can sleep safe and sound.

Sexual violence is part of a larger pattern. Rule by sexual violence is used by political and military leaders to achieve political, military and economic ends, and this presents a security crisis that demands a security response. Much more must be done to promote actions that have real impact, as we move from recognition to action and from best intentions to best practice. The journey has only begun.

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Pillar 5: Learning and accountability

Key finding: *Donor governments are collectively failing to improve their transparency and “downward” accountability towards affected populations.*


The GHD initiative was a positive step by donors to take action to improve their own accountability for the quality, effectiveness and impact of their humanitarian assistance. The underlying message of the GHD is that donors have a role and specific responsibilities to support more effective humanitarian action. This includes promoting and applying good practices and supporting humanitarian principles in their own practices. Several principles specifically call on donors to support accountability initiatives and evaluations in the sector, to ensure timely, accurate and transparent reporting on donors' assistance.

This pillar assesses how committed donors are to learning and accountability, asking such key questions as:

- Do donors consistently support accountability and learning at both the crisis level and the system level?
- Are donors transparent about how and where their humanitarian assistance funding goes, and for what purposes?

Accountability to affected populations (and to the humanitarian agencies that donors fund) is largely missing from the national policies and debates on improving accountability in humanitarian action. A cursory review of policies and procedures of the 23 different donor governments assessed in the HRI shows that while accountability (or similar concepts) are mentioned by the majority of donors, virtually none make any direct mention of any specific commitment – or responsibility – to meet the needs and priorities of the people that their aid intends to help.

Graph 9: Overview of donor scores in Pillar 5 indicators



At the same time, there is little transparency about governments' funding commitments or decision-making processes. Governments often make announcements of large pledges for support in the aftermath of a crisis like the Haiti earthquake. But beyond the public announcements and press releases, there is frequently little effort by governments to report and track their aid commitments and disbursements to common and publically accessible databases, such as OCHA's FTS. Worse yet, many pledges are not fulfilled – as the recent failure to deliver highly publicised recovery funds promised to Haiti shows – or are diminished by factoring in of debt relief or already-delivered humanitarian assistance. The result is unmet needs and frustrated recovery plans and failure in donors' accountability towards affected populations.

Transparency and accountability

Despite the importance of accountability in the GHD declaration, Pillar 5 receives the lowest average scores of all pillars. The EC, the UK, Ireland and Denmark were among the donors with above average scores. Italy, Portugal, Greece and Austria all received low scores in this indicator, with little evidence that they are actively engaged in the many different accountability initiatives in the humanitarian sector. Funding to support accountability initiatives is another way to show donor's commitments to accountability. However, in this indicator, there is some of the greatest variance between donors' scores. Denmark and New Zealand both reach close to optimal values, at 10, while several donors do not fund any accountability initiatives and therefore receive marginal scores in this indicator. These include Austria, Greece, Luxembourg, Australia, Finland and Canada.

At the crisis level, donors' actions to support greater accountability towards beneficiaries are limited. Most humanitarian organisation interviewed stated that such initiatives were, by and large, developed at their own initiative or as part of their own internal procedures and commitments. Few donors actively monitor and follow-up on these issues through field visits or other mechanisms. Norway, the EC, Denmark and Germany all received above average scores for their support for accountability towards beneficiaries. Many organisations interviewed mentioned these donors as having specific reporting and funding requirements in place to ensure partners implement measures to improve accountability to beneficiaries. France Australia, Spain and Ireland were the donors that had below average scores for this indicator.

The qualitative indicator for donor transparency in funding and decision-making demonstrates that, in general, donors are perceived similarly by humanitarian organisations. The EC, Norway and Luxembourg are the only donors with above average scores, while the rest of donors are close to average. The HRI also examines the appropriateness of the reporting requirements donors impose on their partners. Here, the EC, the US and the UK, three of the largest humanitarian donors and with the greatest crisis level engagement, receive scores significantly below the overall average, along with Japan, Italy and Spain. Donors with higher than average scores are New Zealand, Finland and Luxembourg.

HRI field missions gathered field evidence of this:

- In *Somalia*, some donors were praised for their insistence on maintaining standards such as monitoring, beneficiary involvement and incorporating recommendations from previous evaluations. Specifically the EC, the US, the UK, Germany, Ireland and Denmark were mentioned.
- In *Afghanistan*, despite the fact that donors expect agencies to be accountable and provide accurate information on their activities, the UN and the Afghan government have criticised the lack of transparency of donors funding. Tracking aid funding invested in Afghanistan is a huge and persistent problem. Corruption, mismanagement, and poor targeting all contribute to the apparent lack of progress. As a result, actors harbour resentment and fight against each other instead of engaging in constructive debate.
- In the *oPt*, several donors imposed extensive reporting and other administrative requirements on already overstretched NGOs.
- In *Colombia*, efforts to increase accountability towards beneficiaries and awareness of quality and accountability initiatives in the humanitarian sector were largely absent from the discourse of both donors and humanitarian organisations.

Evaluations

The HRI's assessment of donor support for evaluations and learning, as called for in the GHD, is partly based on a qualitative indicator around donor support for learning and evaluations. It includes funding for monitoring and evaluation and support to implement evaluation recommendations. With the exception of the EC, which received above average scores, and Ireland and Italy, which received below average scores, all donors are close to the average. The quantitative indicator for evaluations looks at donor funding and commissioning of evaluations. Here, France is one of the best donors, with the highest number of evaluations commissioned and funded, followed by New Zealand.

Examples from the HRI field missions include:

- In *Afghanistan*, although donors require accountability, currently there is no system to monitor the involvement of beneficiaries in the humanitarian response. Donors do not always assist humanitarian actors in instituting positive changes based on evaluation.
- In *DRC*, the concept of internal evaluation as a means to improve organisational systems has not registered on the radar of most organisations. There is thus a need for improving in-house evaluation awareness and capacity.
- In *Haiti*, the enormous number of evaluations of previous crises, along with the multitude of evaluations currently underway, appear to have had little influence in terms of applying lessons learned, particularly around building and sustaining local capacity for prevention, preparedness and response.
- In *Zimbabwe*, although donors were rated highly for supporting evaluation and monitoring, implementation of evaluation results was one of the lowest rated survey questions. This shows that although the concept of review was supported, the act of instituting change based on recommendations was rare. There are hardly any independent evaluation reports of responses to the cholera crisis that are publicly available.

What can donor governments do to address these issues?

With the global economic crisis, there is an important and legitimate pressure on governments to show their citizens how and where taxpayers' money has been spent for humanitarian assistance and with what results. But donors also need to collectively address the issue of increasing transparency towards partners and stakeholders. Accountability towards beneficiaries should be the foundation for any discussion on aid effectiveness. Donor governments can support increased transparency, accountability and effectiveness by:

- **Integrating concepts of downward accountability to beneficiaries into humanitarian assistance strategies, policies and procedures.** Donors should integrate more explicit definitions of accountability to beneficiaries and their own responsibilities in monitoring and implementing accountability into their policy frameworks. This could include, for example, specific requirements in funding proposals and reporting requirements from partners to show how quality and accountability are integrated into programming, as well as mechanisms for donors to report back to partners and beneficiaries on how they have fulfilled their obligations.
- **Ensuring that all relevant information on humanitarian funding, programming priorities and decisions is transparent and publically accessible.** Donor governments can demonstrate their commitment to accountability by facilitating access to information for citizens and stakeholders. Appropriate and relevant information should be made available in formats that are easily understood by all stakeholders, including partners and affected populations.
- **Committing to report consistently and to share information on funding pledges, commitments and**

disbursements to common international databases like OCHA's FTS. In order to facilitate more effective planning and avoid duplication of effort, donor governments should report their humanitarian assistance in a timely fashion, using standardised reporting formats, as called for in the *GHD Principles*. The data reported should be entirely consistent with data reported domestically or through other channels.

- **Supporting and participating in initiatives to increase aid accountability and transparency.** In addition to existing accountability forums such as ALNAP, donors can also support new initiatives such as the International Aid Transparency Initiative¹³ or Transparency International's Corruption Fighters' Tool Kit.
- **Reviewing GHD approaches and indicators to update them and align more coherently with advances in the UN-led humanitarian reform process.** The GHD was a significant breakthrough in promoting the collective responsibility and accountability of donor governments to ensure their aid contributes to more effective humanitarian action. However, the collective indicators agreed to by the GHD group do not capture the advances and complexities of the humanitarian system today. The GHD group is a powerful platform to advocate for positive changes in the system. Collectively, donors could take on more of a leadership role in promoting those changes, as they did when the GHD declaration was created.

Conclusion

Providing humanitarian assistance responsibly and in ways that show maximum results for people affected by crisis remains an important, but difficult, challenge for donor governments.

To their credit, OECD/DAC donor governments have maintained their commitments to applying the *Good Humanitarian Donorship Principles*. Yet, as the HRI 2010 findings show, donors still need practical guidance and political determination to apply the concepts of GHD in the way that they fund and support humanitarian action. There is a need for an independent review of their performance and accountability against their commitments in the GHD declaration.

Our evidence shows that donors are still not acting in a coordinated and coherent manner when it comes to applying core concepts of good practice in different crisis situations. While each individual member of the GHD group of donors has strengths, the sum of the parts does not necessarily add up to a better whole. This is true when looking at different crisis contexts, where donors are acting in a disjointed manner, resulting in aid efforts not having the impact they could.

The growing politicisation of aid and the instrumentalisation of responses – where donor governments subordinate humanitarian objectives to achieving other aims – are growing concerns with serious implications for people affected by crisis. This hampers efforts of humanitarian organisations to access populations and provide protection and assistance. It puts crisis-affected people and humanitarian workers at risk by undermining the perception that the sole objective of humanitarian assistance is to impartially prevent and alleviate suffering, based on needs alone. Donors must look at means of ensuring their aid policies are not undermined by other interests and that other areas of government understand and respect the need for neutral, impartial and independent humanitarian action. At the same time, a more concerted effort is needed by donors to promote and uphold international humanitarian law and humanitarian principles by all parties. This may require publically criticising one of their peers, for this is an implicit aspect of the commitments they agreed to in the GHD.

Donors can work together in other areas, too. After many years of acknowledging the importance of risk reduction, prevention and preparedness and recovery, it is discouraging to note the continued lack of donor government investment and the lack of coherence between humanitarian action and other policy areas such as development cooperation. Similarly, donor support for ambitious reforms of the humanitarian system require much more coherence about how donors can collectively positively pressure the UN and other actors to integrate approaches, use resources efficiently, and focus on addressing the needs of people affected by crisis. Leadership is needed, and donors can demonstrate this by working together to ensure that the system works for the benefits of crisis-affected populations. A first step would be for donors to universally adopt policies and procedures that place accountability towards affected populations at the centre of their funding and decision-making processes, as well as the core of their relationships with partners. Sadly, this is currently largely absent from most donors' policies and practices.

For its part, DARA intends to continue its efforts to work more closely with donors and partners to utilise the findings as an entry point for discussions on how to make aid more effective, more transparent and more accountable. As part of those efforts, DARA will conduct a retrospective study on the trends and tendencies in donor behaviour against key concepts of good humanitarian donorship over the first five years of the HRI. DARA will thus try to determine the influence the HRI has had, and could have, in shaping and influencing understanding of good donor practice. Part of this analysis will also include the role and influence of new donors and funding sources, such as the CERF. DARA will also look at the social and cultural factors that influence how humanitarian workers and government donor representatives look at and understand good donor practice. As part of our determination to make the HRI ever more effective and contribute to more impact in humanitarian action, DARA welcomes suggestions from our colleagues in donor governments and the humanitarian community.

¹³ See: <http://www.aidtransparency.net/>

The HRI research process and methodology

Introduction

This chapter explains the key elements in the Humanitarian Response Index (HRI) research process to generate the annual assessment of donor governments' respect of the *Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) Principles*. It begins with an overview of the HRI's conceptual foundation. An outline of the HRI data collection process is then followed by a description of how quantitative and qualitative indicators are developed. Finally, information is presented on more sophisticated multidimensional techniques used in 2010 to identify donor groups based on the extent of their application of the *GHD Principles*.

Purpose and foundation of the HRI

The HRI is a collaborative research process that examines donors' role in supporting more effective responses to humanitarian crises. Donor governments are still the main funders of humanitarian assistance. Therefore, understanding how they contribute to meeting humanitarian objectives is key to achieving reforms and comprehensively improving the humanitarian system. The *raison d'être* of the HRI is to provide the humanitarian sector with an empirical evidence base to assess donor's commitment and application of the *GHD Principles*.

When DARA developed the HRI in 2006, an index and a ranking system was chosen as the most appropriate means of tracking government donors' progress in applying recognised good practice in funding and supporting humanitarian action. The HRI is analogous to such other annual ranking assessments as

UNDP's Human Development Index,¹ the Center for Global Development's Commitment to Development Index² or the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA)³ of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Each of these other indices has become an acknowledged portal for informed and balanced debate. The HRI is taking its place alongside them – evaluating whether state-provided humanitarian assistance contributes to meeting the current needs of the millions of people affected by crisis, conflict and disaster and promoting preparedness for future disasters.

¹ See: <http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/>

² See: http://www.cgdev.org/section/initiatives/_active/cdi/

³ See http://www.pisa.oecd.org/pages/0,2987,en_32252351_32235731_1_1_1_1_1,00.html

An important difference between the HRI and other composite indices is the use of qualitative indicators, which measure how field humanitarian staff assesses the quality of the support provided by government donors and quantitative indicators. Perceptions are gathered through personal interviews during field missions using a standardised questionnaire on donor practice. In a second stage, a statistical analysis is conducted to convert the survey responses into qualitative indicators providing comparable donor scores. Thus, qualitative indicators containing humanitarian workers' views at a micro-level (crisis-level), serve to complement the quantitative indicators, which summarise public data describing at a macro-level. A new approach has also been adopted this year: the HRI aims to be not only an index, but a scorecard of humanitarian donorship practices. There is added emphasis on the entire set of indicators measuring


different aspects of donors' actions, providing more interpretative analysis of what the implications are for individual government donors and the wider humanitarian system. The application of various multidimensional techniques to understand the underlying structure of the data and the simultaneous interrelations among donors' behaviour and the *GHD Principles*, has allowed the construction of a complete and coherent indicator system. This system seeks to be of use in determining similarities and differences in donors' actions, strengths and areas of improvement, thus providing an evidence-based tool for donors to refine their humanitarian strategies.

As with any performance measurement framework, the design and selection of indicators is never an exact science, rather a process of building consensus on what constitutes the best possible measure of practice using the data available and time and resources required to gather it. An HRI consultation process in 2006-2007 defined the set of indicators that best captured the *GHD Principles*. In 2009, another expert consultation process was initiated to identify other concepts of good donor practice that have now been incorporated into HRI 2010. Throughout the entire research process, the HRI's Peer Review Committee has provided expert advice and validated the findings.

The HRI research process

This section presents the HRI research process, from its design and extensive data collection, to the conversion of the data into contextualised and useful knowledge. The HRI research process is graphically represented in Figure 1.

Figure 1. HRI Research process



Quantitative data collection

The quantitative indicators that make up the HRI scores come from a variety of sources. Much of the data on humanitarian financing and donor funding comes from databases of the Financial Tracking System (FTS) of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development's Development Assistance Committee (OECD/DAC) and the World Bank. Data on donor coverage of UN Consolidated Appeals (CAPs), Flash Appeals, and appeals issued by the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) are also used to assess indicators such as the timeliness of funding, the distribution of funding in accordance to needs and support of coordination. Other quantitative indicators examine how consistent donor governments' policies are with key elements of the *GHD Principles*, such support for recovery and livelihoods. The HRI also determines if donor governments are complying with international humanitarian law (IHL) and other legal conventions and instruments aimed at ensuring humanitarian action is based on principles of neutrality, impartiality and independence. Sources include the World Bank, the UN, OECD/DAC, the Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action (ALNAP)⁴ and the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement.

More information on the mathematical formulation and conceptual definition of these indicators, the different variables included, the selected optimal values as well as the sources for each of them can be found in the Technical annex at the end of this chapter.

Qualitative data collection

Crisis selection

Each year, the HRI conducts field research in a representative sample of different crisis contexts to assess how *GHD Principles* are being applied in practice. Crises are selected on the basis of the type of crisis (natural disasters, conflicts, and complex emergencies), geographic and regional distribution, scale and nature of the international response and whether there is adequate presence of GHD donors to ensure a sufficient sample size. The selection process also attempts, when possible, to include crises where the nature of the crisis or its response is unique, thereby allowing an opportunity to learn how the humanitarian system can best adapt to different situations.

For 2010, the crises selected were: Afghanistan, the Central African Republic (CAR), Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Haiti, Indonesia, the occupied Palestinian territories (oPt), Pakistan, the Philippines, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Yemen and Zimbabwe. Several of these crises have been in previous versions of the HRI, an opportunity to assess how the international community's response has evolved over time. Once the crises are selected, DARA contacts all humanitarian responders – including UN agencies, the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement, international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) and local organisations – that have received donor government funding. DARA requests their participation in the data collection, and, whenever possible, to provide logistical or operational support. DARA also attempts to contact donor agencies headquarter and field offices to inform them of the mission and to invite them to participate in the interview process.

Field team members are selected based on their knowledge of the crisis country, language, and experience, and often include external experts who can provide additional insight and analysis of the situation and context. A pre-mission briefing is conducted with teams to review documentation about the crisis and to hone research protocols.

Field interviews

Once in the field, the teams begin the process of interviewing humanitarian organisations and conducting surveys of how humanitarian organisations see donor behaviour. In most cases, HRI teams are able to meet with 80 percent or more of the organisations funded by OECD/DAC donors as well as government officials, local authorities, civil society organisations and donor representatives. Whenever possible, teams also visit affected areas to speak to field staff and beneficiaries. This gives teams an unprecedented overview of the overall crisis response. This year, field missions took place between November 2009 and August 2010. While in the field, interviews were conducted with nearly 500 representatives of humanitarian organisations and donor agencies.⁵

HRI questionnaire on donor practice

One of the key research tools used in the HRI is a standardised questionnaire which allows field teams to systematically gather the perspectives of humanitarian organisations on how donors are applying *GHD Principles*. Subsequently, in-depth survey analysis enables conversion of respondents' opinions into comparable scores, referred to as qualitative scores. (The HRI questionnaire is available in the Technical annex).

Surveys are targeted to senior field representatives of humanitarian organisations who have a direct knowledge and experience dealing with the donor governments that fund their programmes in the crisis. Survey respondents are asked to answer a series of 32 questions and statements on how well they feel each of their donors support their work and if they believe donors are applying key concepts of good practice from the GHD, using a 0 to 10 scale. Each question is linked to core concepts contained in the GHD. Additionally, the survey includes several open-ended questions allowing the interviewer and respondents to clarify and expand on any answers. Survey responses are confidential to ensure more candid answers and in order to protect the often delicate relationship between funders and appealing organisations.

⁴ See: <http://www.alnap.org/>

⁵ Not including the field mission to Haiti

Representativeness and validity of responses

DARA conducted an analysis of the representativeness of the responses gathered for each OECD/DAC donor by reviewing the total number of partners receiving funding from each of these governments against the numbers of surveys gathered in the field missions. This was used to establish the minimum threshold necessary to conduct a statistical analysis of the responses. The survey sample size was sufficiently representative to be considered valid for most donors, though the limited number of responses for New Zealand and Luxembourg means that both donors' scores should be treated with caution. However, it was difficult to obtain a sufficient number of survey responses on the humanitarian aid provided by Portugal, Greece and Austria. DARA thus decided it would not be appropriate to include these donors in the ranking.

Construction of HRI indicators

Generating quantitative indicators

In addition to the desk research and the quantitative data collection process, a methodological review was carried out to produce a more comprehensive indicator system balanced by pillars. This has led to some improvements in the indicator formulas, as well as a more balanced aggregation method.

Formulation of some indicators has been simplified to facilitate interpretability:

- Complex concepts like variance or the adjustment coefficient of a regression (R^2) have been avoided in the indicator construction, and left for later analysis of the indicator behaviour and cross-country comparison;
- The 0 to 10 scale has been used in all scores (qualitative or quantitative indicator scores, pillar scores and final HRI scores);
- Normalisation also has been conducted in a simpler manner when possible;

- Comparability over time is a priority for the HRI 2011. It has been integrated in the indicator construction and especially in the normalisation process in which optimal values (10) have not necessarily been given to maximal scores in a sample, as this can prevent comparisons over time. They have most frequently been determined by asking: "what threshold would assure donor excellence in humanitarian action?"
- In order to facilitate interpretability, the minimal score (0) has not been fixed to the minimal sample value. This implies a certain loss of donors' scores' variation, but it can be overcome by using the Principal Component Analysis technique for the comparisons among different donors' humanitarian action.

Qualitative indicators construction

Once the HRI questionnaire responses were collected, reviewed and validated, a number of careful analyses were undertaken to arrive at comparable scores for donors on all the assessed aspects.

- 1 For each mission, a preliminary summary descriptive analysis with basic information on trends in the responses is prepared to share with the field team. This is used during a field debriefing with all the organisations that participated in the process. This is an opportunity to get on-the-spot validation from humanitarian actors, and begin to interpret and contextualise the reasons behind the trends detected. This information is also used to help prepare the crisis report.
- 2 Once all field missions are completed and the entire survey data base has been constructed and revised, a sound analysis is conducted of the responses obtained. Patterns of answers are searched for, as well as factors that determine them. To avoid any kind of systematic biases in the responses, it is essential to search for hidden social or cultural factors having an influence on interviewees' answers, such as gender, country of origin of respondent, years of

experience, type of organisation s/he is working for and position held. This search becomes especially relevant in the case of international surveys of people from different cultures and backgrounds as a way to understand all the information collected through the survey. Analyses include:

- Univariate analysis of 32 survey questions;
- Correlation analysis to find patterns of answers to the 32 questions included in the survey. A qualitative – geometrical approach – Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA) – is used. It serves to identify the interrelation among survey questions, determining the most frequent patterns of response and factors influencing them;
- Intra-class/inter-class variance analysis complements the previous steps and helps in the selection of questions included in the qualitative components⁶ of this year's completed HRI and also those that can be put aside for the HRI 2011 survey in order to have a streamlined questionnaire.

After the analysis is completed and the cultural factors most determinant of survey scores are identified, the needed adjustments are applied. Thus, the region of origin of the respondent, together with the characteristic of being a citizen of the crisis-affected country were taken into account when calculating HRI qualitative indicators. Average survey scores were weighted by origin of respondent, assuring that the percentages of respondents from different regions, and from the crisis-affected country, are controlled for in each donor's sample and qualitative scores are therefore comparable.

⁶ Most questions were included in the analysis. Those for which the interviewees were not informed enough to answer were excluded. Additionally, some question scores were regrouped into a single indicator, so the number of qualitative indicators by pillar would be balanced. (See Table 1 in Technical Annex).

Box. 1 Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA) results

Correlation among survey answers

The application of a MCA¹ in a survey analysis serves to find the patterns of response that most frequently appear in the sample, as well as supplementary factors (including social or cultural) that may condition those patterns.

The first identified pattern is that interviewees tend to show either a general satisfaction with donor's actions, no matter the aspect being asked, or a general dissatisfaction.

¹ Due to the small number of responses collected (fewer than 20), Portugal, Greece, Austria, Luxembourg and New Zealand were not included in this particular phase of the analysis, as the application of the MCA technique requires a certain balance in the number of responses to avoid the bias that outliers could bring.

Moreover, respondents tend to share their views on Pillars 1 and 2, showing a generally positive perception of how most OECD/DAC donors respond to current needs but a less positive perception of how donors are contributing to efforts to prevent and minimise risks and address future humanitarian needs. Questions where responses show a larger variation in respondents' opinions are in Pillars 3, 4 and 5. Therefore, the most significant donor differences in performance seem to be found in issues around coordination, protecting civilians and humanitarian staff, and learning and accountability.

The set of questions that are most frequently given either simultaneously high or low scores are detailed in Table 1.

In the questions listed in Table 1. Particularly good scores were given to the EC, Sweden, and to a lesser extent, to the US, the UK, Australia and Norway. Italy, Spain, France and Ireland are scored below average.

The MCA and analysis of results also sheds light on the relationships among survey questions and the social or cultural characteristics of respondents. The analysis indicates a correlation between generally higher scores for OECD/DAC donors and whether the respondent is resident of the crisis-affected country, is from Africa or South – East Asia or is a woman. Factors that appear to influence the patterns of response (listed in order of relevance) are:

- Origin of respondent: Respondents from less developed regions tend to give higher scores in all HRI survey questions. This becomes especially relevant if they are from the country in crisis.

Table 1. Positively correlated survey questions

Question number	HRI SURVEY QUESTION SHORTNAME	PILLAR	HRI SURVEY QUESTION
16	Donor capacity for informed decision-making	3	The donor's capacity and expertise for informed decision-making in this crisis were... (completely inadequate 0 - completely adequate 10)
30	Implementing evaluation recommendations	5	To what extent did the donor work with you to implement recommendations from evaluations into your programming? (not at all 0 - completely 10)
27	Transparency of funding	5	The funding and decision-making information provided by the donor for this crisis was... (completely inadequate 0 - completely adequate 10)
23	Promotion of international humanitarian law	4	For the donor, advocating for the human rights of affected populations and the implementation of international humanitarian law in this crisis was... (not a priority 0 - a high priority 10)
24	Monitoring of good practice	5	To what extent did the donor request and monitor that your organisation fully apply good practices and quality standards in your programming? (not at all 0 - completely 10)
26	Accountability towards beneficiaries	5	To what extent did the donor support initiatives to improve accountability towards affected populations in this crisis? (not at all 0 - completely 10)
15	Advocacy towards local authorities	4	The donor's advocacy for governments and local authorities to fulfil their responsibilities in responding to humanitarian needs was... (completely negligent 0 - completely effective 10)
28	Requirements for evaluations	5	For the donor, regular evaluations on the efficiency and effectiveness of your programmes were... (not part of its requirements 0 - an important part of its requirements 10)
25	Facilitating humanitarian access	4	The donor's contribution to guaranteeing safe humanitarian access and protection of humanitarian workers in this crisis was... (completely negligible 0 - completely effective 10)
13	Level of support to organisation	3	The support your organisation received from the donor throughout your involvement in this crisis has been... (completely unsatisfactory 0 - completely satisfactory 10)
22	Support for protection of civilians	4	Regarding the protection of affected populations, the support provided by the donor in this crisis was... (completely negligible 0 - completely effective 10)
17	Respecting roles and responsibilities of actors	3	To what extent did the donor respect the roles and responsibilities of the different components of the humanitarian system (UN, Red Cross/Red Crescent and NGOs)? (not at all 0 - completely 10)

The only exception is respondents from Latin America, who, if not from the crisis-affected state, expressed general dissatisfaction with donors respect for *GHD Principles*. This is an interesting result that should be further investigated. Respondents from Sub-Saharan Africa, South – East Asia, the Middle East and North Africa give significantly higher scores to all HRI survey questions. Interviewees from members of OECD/DAC countries belonging to the EU tend to be more critical of donors’ adherence to *GHD Principles* than those from other OECD/DAC countries.


- Type of organisation: Respondents from local NGOs and the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement give better scores (possibly because they are often nationals of the crisis-affected country). UN staff tend to be more critical of OECD/DAC donors’ actions.
- Crisis country in which respondents work: Generally speaking, crises in Africa or East Asia are given better scores in all survey questions. Crises in the Middle East or South Asia receive lower scores (See Graph 2).
- Sex: Women tend to give higher scores than men.
- Years of experience: The less experienced the respondent, the higher the score given to all HRI survey questions.
- Donor: Particularly highly-rated was the EC and Sweden and to a lesser extent the US, Australia, the UK and Norway. Particularly low scores were given to Italy, Spain, France and Ireland.
- GHD Awareness: In a less relevant manner, awareness of the existence of the *GHD Principles* appears to be determinant too. Respondents who were less familiar with the GHD tended to give better scores to donors.

- In Graphs 1 and 2, provided by the MCA, donors and crises are positioned according to the pattern of responses they most frequently received. Those receiving good scores, generally speaking, are situated on the right, and those receiving poor scores are found on the left. Those we describe as “typical” donors and crises, those receiving average scores in most questions, are placed in the centre of the graphs.


Donors (or crises) placed close to one another represent similar patterns of responses: they are regarded as similar by humanitarian in terms of respect for GHD. If they are distant, humanitarian have very different perceptions of their humanitarian practices.

We can see from Graph 2 that the crises in Sudan, CAR and DRC are most similar in terms of the perceptions expressed by humanitarian staff. Yemen, Somalia, Pakistan and Afghanistan are the crises where significantly higher degrees of dissatisfaction were expressed by humanitarian partners.

Graph 1. Donor positions depending on HRI survey scores



Graph 2. Crisis positions depending on HRI survey scores



In-depth data structure study
Multivariate all HRI indicators analysis (principal component analysis)

Once the qualitative and quantitative indicators are constructed and organised by pillars, multivariate techniques are applied to analyse the interrelations existing among them and to verify their validity as an indicator system. Several principal components analyses (PCA) – including different indicator sets (in terms of number or pillar distribution) – have been carried out. The best option – in terms of statistical significance, balance and theoretical coherence, and graphical representativity and interpretability – was selected and used subsequently.

PCA provides us with interpretable graphical representations (see Graph 3) allowing for insight in the structure of data – a requisite preliminary step in the composite indicator construction. PCA is a multivariate technique that allows a set of individual indicators to be summarised while preserving the maximum possible proportion of the total variation in the original data set.⁷ The method assigns a greater importance to the individual indicators that have the largest variation across countries, a desirable property for graphical representation

facilitating cross-country comparisons, as individual indicators that are similar across countries are of little interest and cannot explain differences in performance.

Weighting discussion

In other indices, a PCA is often used for determining composite indicator weightings based on the factor loadings. The Peer Review Committee and DARA’s quantitative team have considered the use of PCA weightings in the construction of the HRI. After rigorous discussions, it was agreed that HRI pillar weights, as determined by humanitarian experts and used in previous HRI editions, would be maintained, and the PCA results would be used as a complementary analysis technique, allowing the validation of the indicator system, the comprehension of the data structure and a further donor classification in terms of the HRI individual indicators on humanitarian action. Furthermore, DARA decided to balance indicator weights in each pillar (all pillars would have the same number of quantitative and qualitative indicators, while 50 percent of each pillar weight would be given to each quantitative/qualitative component). The reasons for keeping “traditional” HRI weights are:

- They grant greater importance to pillars humanitarian experts considered a higher priority in humanitarian action.
- HRI weights are simpler to comprehend for all involved in humanitarian work. This is important for an index that aims to be a generally useful assessment tool, not only comprehensible for those with a solid statistical background.
- PCA’s statistical relevance is not assured when the number of indicators is larger than the number of observations (in this case, donor countries).
- PCA weights are highly dependent on sample data. Their use and interpretability is restricted when cross-year comparability is required, as well as when new donors come into the scene.

For a better understanding of the aggregation method, see the following table with HRI final weights by pillar, component and indicator.

⁷ OECD 2008: Handbook on Constructing Composite Indicators. Methodology and User Guide. Available from: <http://www.OECD.org/dataoecd/37/42/42495745.pdf>

Table 2. HRI 2010 pillar and indicator weights

PILLAR	NUMBER OF INDICATORS		PILLAR WEIGHT	WEIGHT PER COMPONENT		WEIGHT PER INDICATOR	
	QUALITATIVE INDICATORS	QUANTITATIVE INDICATORS		QUALITATIVE COMPONENT	QUANTITATIVE COMPONENT	QUALITATIVE INDICATORS	QUANTITATIVE INDICATORS
1	4	3	30%	15%	15%	3.8%	5.0%
2	4	3	20%	10%	10%	2.5%	3.3%
3	4	3	20%	10%	10%	2.5%	3.3%
4	4	3	15%	8%	8%	1.9%	2.5%
5	4	3	15%	8%	8%	1.9%	2.5%

PCA results

As intended, PCA provides an image of donors' respect of *GHD Principles*, mapping their commitment to the *GHD Principles* regrouped into the different HRI pillars (See Graph 3).

Pillars 4 and 3, as well as the qualitative component of Pillar 1, are those that best indicate donors' commitment to GHD. They are the HRI's main drivers, the shifting pillars of HRI final scores for donors in which the most statistically relevant differences in donors' performances can be found. In other words, protection and international law, coordination, impartiality, independence from political, economic or military interests and timeliness of aid delivery are the main factors that affect a donors' overall score. Donors showing a good performance in one tend to perform well in all other HRI pillars.

As concluded from the PCA, Table 3 shows the correlation among Pillars 3, 4 and the qualitative component of Pillar 1. (In a less pronounced manner, Pillar 5 appears to be correlated to these pillars as well). This means that donors showing a commitment to international law, protection and humanitarian coordination tend to be perceived by humanitarian workers as better donors, more impartial and independent from geopolitical interests. This interpretation should be treated with caution as respondents may be unaware of the reasons behind donors' funding decisions. It could be that donors seen as human rights and international law defenders on the international stage are perceived as more independent, impartial and needs response-oriented by humanitarians.

Identifying strengths and areas for improvement

Donor classification

Complementing the PCA, an additional exploratory technique was used to identify groups of donors with similar patterns of humanitarian action according to the HRI indicator system. A hierarchical clustering technique was applied:⁸ a systematic, all-indicator-based determination of groups of donor governments, verifying that donors classified under the same group are as similar as possible and donors in different groups are as different as possible in terms of HRI indicators.

The determination of three donor groups allows for a more realistic identification of each donor's strengths and areas for improvement by taking into account how other similar donors are doing. The application of this descriptive technique gives a more detailed view of the humanitarian world, leading to a clearer picture of each donor's performance.

The classification identified the existence of three different groups of donors. A geographical component emerged from the analysis – with mostly Mediterranean countries in Group 3, Scandinavian states in Group 1 and some of largest donors in Group 2 (the EC, the UK and the US.)


Donors in Group 1 outperform their peers at all HRI pillars, except for Pillar 1 (Responding to needs), at which they would be better if the timeliness of their assistance was assured, especially in complex emergencies, but also in sudden onset disasters. Donors in Group 2 are slightly better than others at responding to needs, while presenting a mid-range performance in all other pillars. The weakest aspects of this group are in Pillar 2 (Prevention and risk reduction). Group 3 donors perform generally below average in all pillars, except for Pillar 2, at which they receive mid-range scores.

Table 3. Pillar correlations

	Pillar 1 Qualitative Component	Pillar 1 Quantitative Component	Pillar 2	Pillar 3	Pillar 4	Pillar 5
Pillar 1 Qualitative Component	1					
Pillar 1 Quantitative Component	-0.04	1				
Pillar 2	-0.03	-0.48	1			
Pillar 3	0.68	-0.12	-0.14	1		
Pillar 4	0.78	-0.38	0.12	0.84	1	
Pillar 5	0.57	0.29	-0.03	0.63	0.57	1

⁸ This technique was applied on donors' coordinates in the space determined by the PCA main factors.


Figure 2. Donor classification based on HRI pillar and indicator scores



Donors in Groups 1 and 2 show a better performance at Pillar 3 (Working with humanitarian partners), Pillar 4 (Protection and international law) and impartiality, independence and flexibility and non-conditionality of aid, that make up the qualitative component of Pillar 1, while Group 3's performance is not as satisfactory as the above-mentioned (See Figure 2).


The difference between donor Groups 1 and 2 are better scores for indicators *Funding and commissioning evaluations, Appropriate reporting requirements (Pillar 5); Un-earmarked funding, Flexible funding (Pillar 3)* in the case of Group 1; and for indicators *Adapting to needs (Pillar 1); Donor capacity for informed decision-making (Pillar 3); Transparency of funding, Support for learning and evaluations, Participation in accountability initiatives (Pillar 5)* in the case of Group 2 (See Figure 2).

Figure 3. Donor groups based on HRI performance



* “Typical donor” in the sense that, for all indicators considered, its score is the closest to the group’s average.

Graph 3. PCA graph: Donor mapping



Graph Interpretation:

- 1 Horizontal axis, from left to right, sorts donors from poor to good performances in pillars 4, 3 and 1, generally speaking. Vertical axis separates donors based on specific indicators at which they are especially good (see Boxes A and B).
- 2 Donors that appear close to one another in the graph are donors with similar scores in the HRI indicators. Donors appearing far from each other are donors with very different HRI scores.

* Low and high scores are in relation to OECD/DAC average value.

** Qualitative aspects of Pillar 1 only.

■ Representations of Austria, Greece and Portugal are based on their quantitative scores only.

Table 4. Strengths and areas for improvement by group and pillar

	GROUP 1	GROUP 2*	GROUP 3
STRENGTHS (BY PILLAR)	Protection and international law	Responding to needs	
	Working with humanitarian partners	Learning and accountability	
	Learning and accountability <i>(except for Luxembourg and Finland)</i>		
AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT (BY PILLAR)		Prevention, risk reduction and recovery	Protection and international law
			Working with humanitarian partners
			Learning and accountability

*Strengths and areas for improvement for Group 2 donors are not so statistically apparent for donors in Groups 1 and 3.

Table 5. Strengths and areas for improvement by group and indicator

GROUP 1

Pillar	Qualitative/ Quantitative	STRENGTHS (by indicator)	Pillar	Qualitative/ Quantitative	AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT (by indicator)
1	QL	Independence of aid	1	QT	Timely funding to complex emergencies <i>(except for Denmark)</i>
1	QL	Timely funding to partner organisations	1	QT	Funding based on level of vulnerability and to forgotten crises <i>(except for Luxembourg and Netherlands)</i>
1	QL	Impartiality of aid	2	QT	Funding for reconstruction and prevention <i>(except for New Zealand)</i>
2	QL	Support for prevention and preparedness			
3	QL	Support for partners and funding organisational capacity			
3	QL	Flexible funding			
3	QT	Funding UN and Red Cross Red Crescent appeals <i>(except for New Zealand)</i>			
3	QT	Un-earmarked funding <i>(except for Luxembourg and Sweden)</i>			
4	QL	Support for protection of civilians			
4	QL	Promotion of international humanitarian law			
4	QT	Refugee law			
4	QT	Human rights law <i>(except for Switzerland and Finland)</i>			
4	QT	International humanitarian law <i>(except for New Zealand and Netherlands)</i>			
5	QL	Appropriate reporting requirements			
5	QL	Transparency of funding <i>(except for Finland)</i>			

GROUP 2

Pillar	Qualitative/Quantitative	STRENGTHS (by indicator)	Pillar	Qualitative/Quantitative	AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT (by indicator)
1	QL	Adapting to needs	1	QL	Independence of aid
1	QT	Funding for reconstruction and prevention (except for Australia)	1	QL	Impartiality of aid
2	QL	Beneficiary participation in monitoring and evaluation	2	QT	Reducing climate-related vulnerability
2	QL	Support for prevention and preparedness	3	QL	Flexible funding
3	QL	Donor capacity for informed decision-making	3	QT	Un-earmarked funding (except for Ireland)
5	QL	Transparency of funding	5	QL	Appropriate reporting requirements
5	QL	Funding and commissioning evaluations (except for Germany)			
5	QT	Participation in accountability initiatives			

GROUP 3

Pillar	Qualitative/Quantitative	STRENGTHS (by indicator)	Pillar	Qualitative/Quantitative	AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT (by indicator)
1	QT	Timely funding to complex emergencies (except for Austria, Belgium, Italy and Spain)	1	QL	Independence of aid (except for Austria and Greece)
2	QT	Funding for reconstruction and prevention (except for Austria, France, Greece and Portugal)	1	QL	Timely funding to partner organisations
2	QT	Reducing climate-related vulnerability	1	QL	Impartiality of aid (except for Austria and Greece)
			1	QL	Adapting to needs (except for Austria)
			2	QL	Support for prevention and preparedness
			3	QL	Support for partners and funding organisational capacity
			3	QL	Flexible funding (except for Austria and Greece)
			3	QT	Funding UN and Red Cross/Red Crescent appeals (except for Belgium)
			4	QL	Support for protection of civilians
			4	QL	Promotion of international humanitarian law
			4	QT	Refugee law
			4	QT	Human rights law (except for Spain)
			4	QT	International humanitarian law
			5	QL	Appropriate reporting requirements (except for Austria and Greece)
			5	QL	Funding and commissioning evaluations
			5	QT	Participation in accountability initiatives

* QL qualitative indicators
QT quantitative indicators

References

Lebart, L.; Morineau, A.; Piron, M. (2000, 3rd edition) Statistique Exploratoire Multidimensionnelle. Dunod, Paris.

OECD (2008). Handbook on Constructing Composite Indicators. Methodology and User Guide.

Technical annex

Quantitative indicators

Pillar 1: Responding to needs

Funding based on level of vulnerability and to forgotten crises: Donor funding should fundamentally be guided by considerations of need. Thus, donors are scored higher if their humanitarian interventions are reasonably immune from being driven by the media, if they support forgotten crises and allocate aid based on the level of vulnerability in the crisis. In 2009 this indicator considered over 150 emergencies. It classifies donor funding by the extent of media coverage each emergency received, whether it was classified as “forgotten” in ECHO’s Forgotten Crisis Assessment and whether it is characterised by markers of especial vulnerability such as high rates of malnutrition, mortality, HIV-AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria and gender disparities.

Timely funding to complex emergencies:

This indicator calculates the funds within an appeal committed or disbursed to complex emergencies in the first quarter after the launch of the appeal as a percentage of the total funds contributed to the appeal during 2009.

Timely funding to sudden onset disasters:

Using data on natural disasters from FTS and funding to IFRC flash appeals, DARA judges as timely those funds committed or disbursed within the first six weeks after official declaration of a disaster or, in case is IFRC data, launch of an appeal. These are calculated as a percentage of total funding inside or outside an appeal up to six months after the declaration of a disaster.

Pillar 2: Prevention, risk reduction and recovery

Funding for reconstruction and prevention: Integrating relief and development is essential to ensure sustainability of the outcomes of humanitarian action. Returns to investment in humanitarian assistance will be higher where long-term development issues have been addressed in a comprehensive manner during the emergency phase. However, donors often lack mechanisms for funding recovery and reconstruction work. This indicator looks at funding of reconstruction relief and rehabilitation, on the one hand, and disaster prevention and preparedness, on the other, as a percentage of bilateral humanitarian assistance.

Funding of risk mitigation mechanisms: This indicator uses the amount of funding GHD donors contribute to leading risk mitigation mechanisms as a proportion of total ODA:

- UNDP's Thematic Trust Fund for Crisis Prevention and Recovery¹
- The World Bank's Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery²
- The EC's Disaster Preparedness Facility DIPECHO
- The Global Environment Facility Trust Fund³
- The UN Trust Fund for Disaster Reduction⁴

DARA also considers whether or not donors provide funding to the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPC)⁵ and to the IFRC's International Disaster Response Laws, Rules and Principles Programme (IDRL).⁶

Reducing climate-related vulnerability: Good donorship by a government entails consistency with its domestic policies. As CO₂ emissions have an impact on climate related vulnerability across the entire globe, this indicator measures per capita emissions using latest available data.

Pillar 3: Working with humanitarian partners

Funding to NGOs: Donor support and recognition of the key role of NGOs in delivering humanitarian aid, is measured in this indicator by weighing up the amount of donor funding to NGOs in relation to total humanitarian assistance in 2008 and 2009. DARA also considers the proportion of NGO assistance which each donor provides to NGOs which are not headquartered in their country.

Un-earmarked funding: Principle 13 calls on donors to "enhance the flexibility of earmarking, and of introducing longer term funding arrangements". This indicator gives credit to donors who provide a greater share of their humanitarian assistance in un-earmarked form by considering un-earmarked funds to a set of agencies – OCHA, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), IFRC, ICRC, the World Food Programme (WFP), the

Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) – as a percentage of total humanitarian assistance to these agencies in 2009.

Funding UN and Red Cross Red Crescent appeals: This indicator combines different aspects of donor support to humanitarian partners. It calculates an average of donor funding to:

- UN appeals, using a "fair share" concept, which considers the donor's contribution to total appeal needs (budget requirements) as a proportion of the each donor's GDP compared to the total GDP of the OECD/DAC – in other words, donors contribution to overall needs should be equitably distributed in proportion to the size of each donor's economy.
- IFRC and ICRC appeals, both annual and emergency, as a share of total needs with a fair share criterion.
- Funding to major flexible funding mechanisms: the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF)⁷; the IFRC's Disaster Relief Emergency Fund (DREF)⁸; the Common Humanitarian Funds (CHF) and Emergency Response Funds (ERFs). Funding levels are averaged and divided by total humanitarian assistance. Scores are allocated based on a country's size, i.e. its share of total OECD/DAC GDP.
- Funding to UN coordination mechanisms and common services as a share of total requirements, using a fair share criterion.

Pillar 4: Protection and international law

International humanitarian law:

Principle 4 calls for donors to "respect and promote the implementation of international humanitarian law, refugee law and human rights". This indicator captures three dimensions of implementation. It registers the total number of these 25 key international instruments actually signed and/or ratified by individual donor countries:

- Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field. Geneva, 12 August 1949;

- Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts. Geneva, 8 June 1977;
- Declaration provided for under article 90 AP I. Acceptance of the Competence of the International Fact-Finding Commission according to article 90 of AP I;
- Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts. Geneva, 8 June 1977;
- Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Adoption of an Additional Distinctive Emblem (Protocol III), 8 December 2005;
- Convention on the Rights of the Child, New York, 20 November 1989;
- Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict, New York, 25 May 2000;
- Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998;
- Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, The Hague, 14 May 1954;
- First Protocol to the Hague Convention of 1954 for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, The Hague, 14 May 1954;
- Second Protocol to the Hague Convention of 1954 for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, The Hague, 26 March 1999;
- Convention on the prohibition of military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques, New York, 10 December 1976;
- Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and Warfare, Geneva, 17 June 1925;

¹ See: http://www.undp.org/cpr/whats_new/framework.shtml

² See: <http://gfdrr.org/>

³ See <http://www.undp.org/gef/>

⁴ See: <http://www.unisdr.org/english/about/donors/trustfund/>

⁵ See: <http://www.gppac.net>

⁶ See: <http://www.ifrc.org/what/disasters/idrl/research/publications.asp>

⁷ See: <http://cerf.un.org/>

⁸ See: <http://www.ifrc.org/what/disasters/responding/drs/tools/dref.asp>

- Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction Opened for Signature at London, Moscow and Washington, 10 April 1972;
- Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects. Geneva, 10 October 1980;
- Protocol on non-detectable fragments (I);
- Protocol on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of mines, booby-traps and other devices (II);
- Protocol on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of incendiary weapons (III);
- Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons (Protocol IV to the 1980 Convention), 13 October 1995;
- Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices as amended on 3 May 1996 (Protocol II to the 1980 Convention);
- Amendment to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects (with Protocols I, II and III), Geneva 21 December 2001;
- Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects (with Protocols I, II and III). Geneva, 28 November 2003;
- Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, Paris, 13 January 1993;
- Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, Oslo, 18 September 1997;

- Convention on Cluster Munitions, 30 May 2008.

Implementation requires that states adopt domestic laws and regulations as well as spread knowledge of the relevant Conventions and Protocols as widely as possible. The indicator gives additional credit to countries that have created national commissions aimed at ensuring effective application of IHL, as advocated by the ICRC. The indicator includes total donor funding in relation to GDP for the work of the ICRC.

Human rights law: This indicator also captures three dimensions of implementation. First, it gives credit to donors in proportion to the number of principal legal instruments on human rights and accompanying protocols they have signed or ratified: This includes the :

- Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide;
- International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination;
- International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights;
- International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and its protocols;
- Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity;
- Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women and its protocols;
- Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and its protocols;
- Convention on the Rights of the Child and its protocols;
- International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families;
- Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and its protocols;
- International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance.

It additionally gives credit to donors that have national human rights institutions given accreditation grades determined by the OHCHR; “A” means compliance with the Paris Principles; “A(R)” is accreditation with reservations; “B” indicates not fully compliant and C indicates non-compliance. A third dimension included is core funding (in relation to GDP) for the work of OHCHR.

Refugee law: This indicator is based on whether the state in question is a party to the principal legal instruments of international refugee law:

- the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 protocol;
- the two Protocols on Transnational Organized Crime;
- the 1954 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons;
- the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness.

The indicator gives credit to the relatively small number of countries that accept refugees under UNHCR’s resettlement programme and also reflects the degree of funding (in relation to GDP) provided to UNHCR.

Pillar 5: Learning and accountability

Participation in accountability initiatives:

Principle 21 commits donors to “support learning and accountability initiatives for the effective and efficient implementation of humanitarian action”. There are a number of initiatives which do so. Those taken into account in this indicator are:

- The Sphere Project⁹
- The Humanitarian Accountability Project¹⁰
- Quality COMPASS¹¹
- People in Aid Code¹²
- ALNAP¹³
- Good Humanitarian Donorship¹⁴
- International Aid Transparency Initiative – IATI¹⁵

⁹ See: <http://www.sphereproject.org/>

¹⁰ See: <http://www.hapinternational.org/>

¹¹ See: <http://www.compasqualite.org/en/index/index.php>

¹² See: <http://www.peopleinaid.org/code/>

¹³ See: <http://www.alnap.org/members/full.aspx>

¹⁴ See: <http://www.goodhumanitariandonorship.org/gns/home.aspx>

¹⁵ See: <http://www.aidtransparency.net/get-involved>

This indicator seeks to reflect donor support for and commitment to these initiatives by capturing various dimensions of their participation. The indicator assigns different weights to each initiative, based on experts' consultations reflecting their relative importance in terms of impact on humanitarian action.

Funding for accountability initiatives:

This indicator seeks to measure donor support for accountability initiatives by computing the proportion of funding assigned to ALNAP, HAP, Quality Compass, Sphere, as well as to those projects that support learning and accountability and are listed in OCHA's FTS. Scores are calculated in relation to total humanitarian assistance funding for the years 2008 and 2009

Funding and commissioning evaluations:

Principle 22 encourages donors to make "regular evaluations of international responses to humanitarian crises, including assessments of donor performance". Evaluations assess humanitarian interventions according to defined criteria such as relevance, efficiency and impact, and are useful to assess lessons learned to enhance the effectiveness of future donor interventions. Donors can evaluate their own performance, commission evaluations of activities carried out by organisations funded by them, or engage with other agencies and donors in joint exercises. This indicator counts the number of publicly available individual evaluations carried out, or funded, by donors in the last four years (2004–2009). It also includes a measure of joint evaluations, given their broader scope. The indicator also takes into consideration the existence of evaluation guidelines, viewed as another means of promoting the practice of evaluations.

Checking indicator: Generosity of humanitarian assistance:

This indicator was introduced in HRI 2008 and is calculations as total humanitarian aid in relation to GNI. For this year's index it was taken out of the final calculus but kept in the analysis because it shows interesting results.

Box 1: Mathematical formulation of the HRI 2010 quantitative indicators

Pillar 1: Responding to needs

H1.1. Funding based on level of vulnerability and to forgotten crises

Indicator H1.1 = 0.5* Part A + 0.5* Part B

$$\text{Part A} = \frac{\sum_{j=1}^i (\text{FC}_j * X_j)}{\sum_{j=1}^i X_j}$$

Where,

X_j = Funding to crisis j
 FC_j = Forgotten crisis subindicator for crisis j;
 $\text{FC}_j = 1$ if either $\text{FI}_j=0$ and $\text{MI}_j<4$, or $\text{MI}_j<2$
 $= 0$ otherwise

MI = Number of media reports of the crisis_j during the year (published by AlertNet), re-scaled as follows:

More than 5000 media reports	6
From 1000 to 4999 media reports	5
From 500 to 999 media reports	4
From 100 to 499 media reports	3
From 10 to 99 media reports	2
From 1 to 9 media reports	1
0 media reports	0

FI = Forgotten Crisis Index, which is obtained as follows,

$\text{FI} = 0$ if $a+b>0$
 $= 1$ otherwise

Where,

a = Forgotten Crisis Assessment, ECHO 2008/09
 b = Crisis Index, ECHO 2008/09

Optimal value: The highest score in part A is reached when 53% of funding, is committed to forgotten emergencies.

53% is twice the percentage of funding that overall DAC donors commit to crises classified as forgotten.

$$\text{Part B} = \frac{\sum_{j=1}^i (X_j * C_j)}{\sum_{j=1}^i X_j}$$

Where,

X = Funding to crisis j
 $C_j = 1$ if $\text{CI}+\text{VI}>4$
 $= 0$ otherwise

CI = Crisis Index, ECHO 2008/2009
 VI = Vulnerability Index, ECHO 2008–2009

Optimal value: The highest score in part B is reached when 75% of funding is committed to crises classified as vulnerable.

Source: FTS, ECHO and AlertNet

H1.2. Timely funding to complex emergencies

$$\text{Indicator H1.2} = \frac{\text{F1Q}}{\text{FY}} \star 100$$

Optimal value: 75%, which is twice the percentage of overall funding from OECD-DAC donors committed during the first quarter of the year in 2009.

Source: FTS

Where,

F1Q = Funding committed during the first quarter of the year

FY = Total funding during calendar year after the launch of the appeals

H1.3. Timely funding to sudden onset disasters

$$\text{Indicator H1.3} = \frac{\text{F6W}}{\text{F6M}} \star 100$$

Optimal value: 100% of the funds are committed during the first 6 weeks after the emergency appeal

Source: figures are the result of summing up data from FTS (inside and outside an appeal) and IFRC

Where,

F6W = Funds committed to individual onset disasters or emergency appeals within first 6 weeks

F6M = Total funds committed to individual disasters up to six months after the disaster declaration.

Pillar 2: Prevention, risk reduction and recovery

H2.1. Funding for reconstruction and prevention

$$\text{Indicator H2.1} = \frac{\text{RRR} + \text{DPP}}{\text{BHA}} \star 100$$

Optimal value: 41.4%, as for Belgium

Source: OECD Stat

Where,

RRR = funds to 'Reconstruction Relief & Rehabilitation'

DPP = funds to 'Disaster Prevention & Preparedness'

BHA = Bilateral Humanitarian Assistance

H2.2. Funding of risk mitigation mechanisms

Indicator H2.2 = 0.8* Part A + 0.2* Part B

$$\text{Part A} = \frac{(\text{UNDPTTF} + \text{GFDRR} + \text{DIPECHO} + \text{GEF} + \text{UNTFDR})_{(2008-2009)}}{\text{ODA}_{(08-09)}} \star 100$$

Where,

UNDPTTF = Funds to UNDP Thematic Trust Fund for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (2009)

GFDRR = Funds to World Bank/ISDR Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (2008-2009)

DIPECHO = Funds to DIPECHO (2008-2009)

GEF = Funds to Global Environmental Facility Trust Fund (2008-2009)

UNTFDR = Funds to UN Trust Fund for Disaster Reduction (2008-2009)

ODA = Total official development assistance

Optimal value: Optimal value is fixed as twice the OECD/DAC average proportional funding to these mechanisms.

Part B = Average of two dummy variables that capture funding to the GPPAC and IDRL, re-scaled to a 0 to 10 scale.

Sources: OECD Stat, World Bank, Preventionweb, DIPECHO, UNDP, GEF, IFRC, and GPPAC

H2.3. Reducing climate-related vulnerability

$$\text{Indicator H2.3} = \frac{\text{CO}_2}{\text{Pop}} \star 100$$

Where,

CO₂ = Carbone dioxide emissions, in metric tons (2007)

Pop = Population (2007)

Optimal Value: In this case, 0 metric tons of CO₂ is the optimal value. The poorest score is given to Luxembourg, which emmitted 24.9 tons in 2007, that is the threshold for this indicator.

Source: MDG data

Pillar 3: Working with humanitarian partners

H3.1. Funding to NGOs

Indicator H3.1 = 0.8* Part A + 0.2* Part B

$$\text{Part A} = \frac{\text{NGO}}{\text{THA}}$$

Where,

NGO = Total humanitarian assistance through NGOs by donor

THA = Total humanitarian assistance by donor

Optimal value: Part A's optimal value is reached when 34% of total humanitarian assistance is channeled through NGOs.

This percentage is double of what overall OECD-DAC

donors channel through NGOs

Source: FTS and HRI 2010 survey

H3.2. Un-earmarked funding

$$\text{Indicator H3.2} = \frac{\text{UHA}}{\text{HA}}$$

Source: ICRC, UNHCR, WFP, OHCHR, UNICEF, IFRC, OCHA, UNRWA, WHO.

H3.3. Funding UN and RC/RC appeals

Indicator H3.3 = 0.25* Funding UN appeals
+ 0.25* Funding coordination
+ 0.25* Funding RCM
+ 0.25* Funding pooled funds

$$\text{Funding UN appeals} = \frac{\text{UNCIAA}}{\frac{\text{GDP}}{\text{TOTAL GDP}} * \text{TOTAL UNICIAA}} * 100$$

Optimal value: 150% Fair share

$$\text{Funding coordination} = \frac{\text{UNCOORD}}{\frac{\text{GDP}}{\text{TOTAL GDP}} * \text{TOTAL UNICIAA}} * 100$$

Optimal value: 150% Fair share

$$\text{Funding RCRC} = \frac{\text{ICRC} + \text{IFRC}}{\frac{\text{GDP}}{\text{TOTAL GDP}} * (\text{TOTAL ICRC} + \text{TOTAL IFRC})} * 100$$

Fair share

Optimal value: 150%

$$\text{Funding Pooled Funds} = \frac{\text{QDM}}{\frac{\text{GDP}}{\text{TOTAL GDP}} * \text{TOTAL QDM}} * 100$$

Optimal value: 150% Fair share

$$\text{Part B} = \frac{\text{FNGO}}{\text{TNGO}} \text{ where,}$$

FNGO = Number of foreign NGOs interviewed on the HRI survey receiving funds from the donor

TNGO = Total number of NGO's interviewed on the HRI survey receiving funds from the donor

Optimal value: Part B's optimal value is 100%

Where,

UHA = Un-earmarked multilateral humanitarian aid

HA = Total multilateral humanitarian aid

Optimal value: 100%

Where,

UNCIAA = Funding to UN Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeals

TOTAL UNICIAA = Funding to UN Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeals by all donor countries

UNCOORD = Funding to UN coordination mechanisms

TOTAL UNCOORD = Total funding to UN coordination mechanisms by all donor countries (2008-09)

GDP = Gross domestic product (2008-09)

TOTAL GDP = Gross domestic product of all donor countries (2008-09)

ICRC = Funding to ICRC (2009)

IFRC = Funding to IFRC (2009)

TOTAL ICRC = Funding to ICRC by all donors (2009)

TOTAL IFRC = Funding to IFRC by all donors (2009)

QDM = Actual funding to quick disbursement mechanisms

TOTAL QDM = Total funding to quick disbursement mechanisms by all donors.

Source FTS, IMF, ICRC, IFRC: CERF, DREF, ERF and CHF

Pillar 4: Protection and international law

H4.1. International humanitarian law

Indicator H4.1 = 0.5* Part A + 0.5* Part B

$$\text{Part A} = 0.5 * \left(\frac{X}{50} \right) + 0.5 * Y$$

Where,

X = Variable that measures the number of ratifications of international treaties on humanitarian law by the donor, assigning the value 0 when not signed, 1 when signed but not ratified, and 2 when ratified. The maximum score possible (when all treaties are ratified) is 50.

Y = Dummy variable that takes the value 1 when the Donor country has created a National Committee on IHL

The list of international treaties on humanitarian law considered includes seven on protection of victims of armed conflicts, one on the International Criminal Court, three on Protection of Cultural Property, one on the environment and thirteen on weapons

H4.2. Human rights law

Indicator H4.2 = 0.66* Part A + 0.33* Part B

$$\text{Part A} = \left(0.5 * \frac{X}{X_{\text{MAX}}} + 0.5 * \frac{Y}{2} \right) * 10$$

Where,

X = Variable that measures the number of ratifications of international treaties on human rights law by the donor, assigning the value 0 when not signed, 1 when signed but not ratified, and 2 when ratified.

X_{MAX} = the maximum score possible (when all treaties are ratified) varies depending on the type of donor:
Members of the European Council: 33 treaties to be considered (Maximum score= 66)
Other donors: 18 treaties to be considered (Maximum score=36)

Y = Variable that takes the value 2 when the donor has an A accreditation status regarding its national institutions on human rights, 1 for B, and 0 for not accredited.

$$\text{Part B} = \frac{\text{ICRC}}{\text{GDP}} * 1000$$

Where,

ICRC = Funding to ICRC
Optimal value: 0.1

Sources: ICRC, IMF

$$\text{Part B} = \frac{\text{OHCHR}}{\text{GDP}} * 1000$$

Where,

OHCHR = Core Funding to OHCHR
Optimal value for part B: 0.02

Sources: UN treaties database, Council of Europe, OHCHR and IMF

H4.3. Refugee law

Indicator H4.3 = 0.4* Part A + 0.2* Part B + 0.4* Part C

$$\text{Part A} = 10 * \frac{X}{X_{\max}}$$

Where,

X = Variable that measures the number of ratifications of international treaties on refugee law by the donor, assigning the value 0 when not signed, 1 when signed but not ratified, and 2 when ratified.

X_{max} = The maximum score possible (when all treaties are ratified) which is 12.

Sources: UNHCR, FTS and UN Treaties Database

Part B= Number of people received as part of UNHCR resettlement programmes (per million of inhabitants) in the donor country

Part B's optimal value: 506.5, as for Australia

$$\text{Part C} = \frac{\text{UNHCR} + \text{RL}}{\text{GDP}} * 100000$$

Where,

UNHCR= Funding to UNHCR

RL= Funding to protection/human rights/rule of law (excluding funding to UNHCR, ICRC and UNHCHR to avoid double-counting)

Part C's Optimal value: 100

Pillar 5: Learning and accountability

H5.1. Participation in accountability initiatives

Indicator H5.1 = Weighted average of Participation in accountability initiatives

Source: ALNAP, GHD, HAP, Groupe URD, Sphere, IATI, and People in Aid.

This indicator is a weighted average of different dummy variables that capture membership (and attendance) of humanitarian accountability and learning initiatives, including, ALNAP, GHD (co-chair), IATI (signatories), HAP, Quality Compass, Sphere and People in Aid.

H5.2. Funding for accountability initiatives

$$\text{Indicator H5.2} = \frac{\text{FLAI}}{\text{HA}}$$

where,

FLAI = Funding directed to humanitarian accountability and learning initiatives (ALNAP, HAP, Quality Compass, Sphere) and projects on learning & accountability (listed in OCHA - FTS)

HA = Total Humanitarian Aid (2008-2009)

Optimal value: 1.5% of total humanitarian aid.

Source: ALNAP, HAP, Groupe URD, Sphere and FTS

H5.3. Funding and commissioning evaluations

Indicator H5.3= Part A + Part B

$$\text{Part A} = \frac{E}{\text{THA}}$$

Where,

E = Number of self and joint evaluations of humanitarian assistance interventions (publicly available on relevant websites and humanitarian activities evaluated based on standard criteria) for the period 2004-2010.

Optimal values: 0.07 which is two standard deviations above DAC average. In other words, optimal value is achieved when seven evaluations are conducted for every 100 USD million of humanitarian aid.

Part B = G *10

Where,

G = Dummy variable scoring 1 when the donor has evaluation guidelines in the field of humanitarian aid

Sources: DAC Evaluation Resource Centre (DEReC) (it includes TEC), ALNAP (it includes ECHO), individual donor websites and OECD Stat

Checking indicator: Generosity of humanitarian assistance

$$\text{Generosity} = \frac{\text{THA}}{\text{GNI}} * 100$$

Optimal values: 10%

Source: OECD Stat, ICRC, UNHCR, WFP, OHCHR, UNICEF, IFRC, OCHA

Note: This indicator is not taken into account for the index calculation

Where,

THA (Total humanitarian aid) = MHA + CERF + BHI

GNI = Gross National Income

MHA = Multilateral humanitarian aid (own calculations, based on core un-earmarked funding)

CERF = Funding to CERF

BHI = Bilateral humanitarian aid (data from OECD)

Humanitarian Response Index 2010

Field mission questionnaire

- 1** The donor proved with its decisions in this crisis that meeting humanitarian needs, saving lives, alleviating suffering and maintaining human dignity were...
- (not a priority) 0 - 1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 - 6 - 7 - 8 - 9 - 10 (the top priority) / don't know / not applicable*
- 2** The donor's decisions on humanitarian aid in this crisis were...
- (biased and partial) 0 - 1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 - 6 - 7 - 8 - 9 - 10 (neutral and impartial) / don't know / not applicable*
- 3** To what extent did the donor's funding decisions systematically exclude groups or individuals within the affected populations?
- (not at all) 0 - 1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 - 6 - 7 - 8 - 9 - 10 (completely) / don't know / not applicable*
- 3.b** If applicable, could you provide specific examples of exclusion? *(Open answer)*
- 4** Regarding the interference of political, economic or military interests on humanitarian aid, the donor's decisions in this crisis were...
- (completely dependent) 0 - 1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 - 6 - 7 - 8 - 9 - 10 (completely independent) / don't know / not applicable*
- 4.b** What non-humanitarian interests could influence the donor's funding decisions in this crisis? *(Open answer)*
- 5** For the donor, responding to needs in this crisis was...
- (completely neglected) 0 - 1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 - 6 - 7 - 8 - 9 - 10 (fully undertaken) / don't know / not applicable*
- 6** According to the needs identified in this crisis, the donor's funding was...
- (not at all proportional) 0 - 1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 - 6 - 7 - 8 - 9 - 10 (completely proportional) / don't know / not applicable*
- 7** For the donor, funding your needs assessments was...
- (totally neglected) 0 - 1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 - 6 - 7 - 8 - 9 - 10 (fully met) / don't know / not applicable*
- 8** To what extent was the donor's support for your programmes negatively affected by other crises?
- (completely affected) 0 - 1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 - 6 - 7 - 8 - 9 - 10 (not at all affected) / don't know / not applicable*
- 8.b** Which crises? In case of decreased funding not due to other crises, were funds allocated to other sectors/programmes/organisations? *(Open answer)*
- 9** For the donor, the engagement of beneficiaries in the design and implementation stages of your programming was...
- (not a requirement) 0 - 1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 - 6 - 7 - 8 - 9 - 10 (a fundamental requirement) / don't know / not applicable*
- 9.b** For the donor, the engagement of beneficiaries in monitoring and evaluation of your programming was...
- (not a requirement) 0 - 1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 - 6 - 7 - 8 - 9 - 10 (a fundamental requirement) / don't know / not applicable*
- 9.1** If relevant, what were the specific requirements of the donor in this respect? *(Open answer)*
- 10** Did the donor verify that you adapted your programmes to meet changing needs?
- (never) 0 - 1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 - 6 - 7 - 8 - 9 - 10 (on a regular basis) / don't know / not applicable*
- 10.b** How did the donor verify that adaptation? Were the beneficiaries involved in that process? *(Open answer)*
- 11** To what extent did the donor undertake actions integrating risk reduction measures, improving prevention and strengthening preparedness for future crises?
- (not at all) 0 - 1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 - 6 - 7 - 8 - 9 - 10 (completely) / don't know / not applicable*
- 12** To what extent did the donor provide support for the transition between relief, early recovery and /or development in your programmes?
- (not at all) 0 - 1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 - 6 - 7 - 8 - 9 - 10 (completely) / don't know / not applicable*
- 13** The support your organisation received from the donor throughout your involvement in this crisis has been...
- (completely unsatisfactory) 0 - 1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 - 6 - 7 - 8 - 9 - 10 (completely satisfactory) / don't know / not applicable*
- 13.b** How would you characterise that support? *(Open answer)*
- 14** The donor's activities in facilitating coordination among all actors in this crisis were...
- (completely negligent) 0 - 1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 - 6 - 7 - 8 - 9 - 10 (completely decisive) / don't know / not applicable*
- 14.b** What did the donor do? How could donors improve coordination in the field? *(Open answer)*
- 15** The donor's advocacy for governments and local authorities to fulfill their responsibilities in responding to the humanitarian needs was...
- (completely negligent) 0 - 1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 - 6 - 7 - 8 - 9 - 10 (completely decisive) / don't know / not applicable*
- 16** The donor's capacity and expertise for informed decision-making in this crisis were...
- (completely inadequate) 0 - 1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 - 6 - 7 - 8 - 9 - 10 (completely adequate) / don't know / not applicable*
- 17** To what extent did the donor respect the roles and responsibilities of the different components of the humanitarian system (UN, Red Cross/Red Crescent and NGOs)?

(not at all) 0 - 1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 - 6 - 7 - 8 - 9 - 10 (completely) / don't know / not applicable

17.b In your opinion, what were the criteria used by the donor to allocate funding among the different organisations? (Open answer)

18 To what extent did the donor's conditions on its funding compromise your ability to carry out your work?

(not at all) 0 - 1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 - 6 - 7 - 8 - 9 - 10 (completely) / don't know / not applicable

18.b Please, provide specific examples of good and bad practices (Open answer)

19 The donor's funding to your organisation was...

(completely rigid) 0 - 1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 - 6 - 7 - 8 - 9 - 10 (completely flexible) / don't know / not applicable

19.b What level of flexibility would be desirable? (Open answer)

20 The donor's funding for your programmes in this crisis arrived...

(too late) 0 - 1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 - 6 - 7 - 8 - 9 - 10 (when you needed them) / don't know / not applicable

20.b What does 'timely funding' mean? (Open answer)

21 The donor's funding to maintain and strengthen your organisational capacity in areas like preparedness, response and contingency planning, was...

(completely inadequate) 0 - 1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 - 6 - 7 - 8 - 9 - 10 (completely adequate) / don't know / not applicable

21.b How could donors help your organisation to be better prepared to respond? (Open answer)

22 Regarding the protection of affected populations, the support provided by the donor in this crisis was...

(completely negligible) 0 - 1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 - 6 - 7 - 8 - 9 - 10 (completely decisive) / don't know / not applicable

22.b What could donors do to be more proactive in the protection field? (Open answer)

23 For the donor, advocating for the human rights of affected populations and the implementation of the international humanitarian law in this crisis was...

(not a priority) 0 - 1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 - 6 - 7 - 8 - 9 - 10 (a high priority) / don't know / not applicable

24 To what extent did the donor request and monitor that your organisation fully apply good practices and quality standards in your programming?

(not at all) 0 - 1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 - 6 - 7 - 8 - 9 - 10 (completely) / don't know / not applicable

25 The donor's contribution to guarantee safe humanitarian access and protection of humanitarian workers in this crisis was...

(completely negligible) 0 - 1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 - 6 - 7 - 8 - 9 - 10 (completely decisive) / don't know / not applicable

25.b What did the donor do in order to facilitate the humanitarian access and protection of humanitarian workers? (Open answer)

26 To what extent did the donor support initiatives to improve accountability towards affected populations in this crisis?

(not at all) 0 - 1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 - 6 - 7 - 8 - 9 - 10 (completely) / don't know / not applicable

27 The funding and decision-making information provided by the donor for this crisis was...

(completely inadequate) 0 - 1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 - 6 - 7 - 8 - 9 - 10 (completely adequate) / don't know / not applicable

28 For the donor, regular evaluations on the efficiency and effectiveness of your programmes were...

(not part of its requirements) 0 - 1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 - 6 - 7 - 8 - 9 - 10 (an important part of its requirements) / don't know / not applicable

29 The funds provided by the donor to your organisation for monitoring and evaluation were...

(completely inadequate) 0 - 1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 - 6 - 7 - 8 - 9 - 10 (completely adequate) / don't know / not applicable

30 To what extent did the donor work with you to implement organizations from evaluations into your programming?

(not at all) 0 - 1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 - 6 - 7 - 8 - 9 - 10 (completely) / don't know / not applicable

31 For your organisation, the donor's reporting requirements were...

(an excessive burden) 0 - 1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 - 6 - 7 - 8 - 9 - 10 (completely appropriate) / don't know / not applicable

32 How would you rate each of your donors in terms of their response to the crisis?

(very poor) 0 - 1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 - 6 - 7 - 8 - 9 - 10 (excellent) / don't know / not applicable

33 Can you give any specific examples of good or poor donor practice in this crisis? (Open answer)

34 Are there cases where you have refused offers of support of funding from a donor? If yes, which donors and why? (Open answer)

35 How would you characterize the response to this crisis? Is there anything that makes this crisis unique or different from other crises? (Open answer)

36 How familiar are you with the Good Humanitarian Donorship Initiative?

1 (not at all familiar) 2 (somewhat familiar) 3 (very familiar)

37 How familiar are you with the Humanitarian Response Index?

1 (not at all familiar) 2 (somewhat familiar) 3 (very familiar)

Comments:	Years of experience in the humanitarian or development field:
City and date of the interview:	
Crisis:	Years of experience working in this crisis:
Name of the respondent:	E-mail address:
Sex of the respondent:	Organisation:
Nationality:	Nationality of the organisation:
Position:	Type of organisation:

Table 1. Qualitative indicators' construction from HRI 2010 questionnaire

Pillar	Question name	Question Number
Pillar 1	Impartiality of aid	2
	Independence of aid	4 and 18
	Adapting to needs	10
	Timely funding to partner organisations	20
Pillar 2	Beneficiary participation in programming	9
	Beneficiary participation in monitoring and evaluation	9.1
	Support for prevention and preparedness	11
	Linking relief, rehabilitation and development	12
Pillar 3	Flexible funding	19
	Support for partners and funding organisational capacity	13 and 21
	Donor capacity for informed decision-making	16
	Support for coordination	14
Pillar 4	Support for protection of civilians	22
	Promotion of international humanitarian law	23
	Facilitating humanitarian access	25
	Advocacy towards local authorities	15
Pillar 5	Accountability towards beneficiaries	26
	Transparency of funding	27
	Appropriate reporting requirements	31
	Support for learning and evaluations	24, 28, 29 and 30

Technical annex
Quantitative indicators

