Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC)

The International Community's Funding of the Tsunami Emergency and Relief



NGO Funding

United Kingdom

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Abbreviations

DAC	Development Assistance Committee of the OECD
DARA	Development Assistance Research Associates
DEC	Disaster Emergency Committee, UK
DFID	UK's Department for International Development
DMI	Disaster Mitigation Institute
FTS	Financial Tracking System of the UN
GEO	Global Emergencies Operations
HR	Human Resources
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organisation
IR	Islamic Relief
m	Million
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
OCHA	UN Office of the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ODA	Official Development Assistance
PARC	Performance Assessment Resource Centre
SCFUK	Save the Children Fund UK
SDC	Swiss Agency for Development and Co-operation
TEC	Tsunami Evaluation Coalition
UK	United Kingdom
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
WFP	World Food Programme
£	Pounds Sterling (GBP)

1. Introduction

This UK study is part of the International community's evaluation of the funding of the tsunami emergency and relief efforts. The purpose of this study is to:

- Understand how the UK NGOs acquired and managed their funding
- Analyse the relationship between the agencies competence – competence in terms of what? Presence and appeals on the one hand and funding flows, spending and impact on the other. Another focus is on implementing agency plans and how funds raised/accessed are/will be allocated in terms of the overall response timeframe
- Describe the overall nature of the agencies' funding base for this operation. What is the ratio of government to private funds and how does this compare with their normal profile? How important have corporate donations been?
- Describe what evidence there is that the tsunami response has tapped into a hitherto "unaccessed" support base? Is there any evidence of an increase in the support base of the agencies?
- Analyse how well the agencies financial systems have coped wit the significant increase in funding flows? Is there evidence of system overload? On the programming side, is there evidence of funding to other operations being affected? Is there evidence of tsunami funds being used to offset previously under funded areas of work?
- Analyse if programming was needs driven or more influenced by the need to send quickly.
- Analysis of flow of goods in kind including pharmaceuticals. Have unsolicited goods been donated?

A general overview of the tsunami funding and response timeline for UK NGOs is provided in figure 1.

Figure 1: Overview of tsunami response timeline



2. Methodology

As part of this study the evaluator undertook desk reviews of monitoring reports, implementation papers, reviews and various web sites of 14 NGOs. The evaluator also carried out telephone and face-to-face interviews as well as qualitative and quantitative research. During the inception phase the evaluator organised detailed discussions with some project implementers.

The evaluator undertook interviews, personally or through self-completion questionnaires of selected UK NGOs, which have actively been engaged in the tsunami emergency relief operations. For this purpose DARA, the donor of this evaluation, developed a standardised questionnaire in collaboration with PARC before the evaluation and in accordance with the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC). This questionnaire was used for all evaluations of NGO's in the participating countries of the TEC study.

2.1. Tools to collect and analyse information

The evaluator decided to use a series of tools that are available for collecting and analysing information and for interpreting results. The tools used are listed in the chapters below.

2.1.1. Review of documents

The documents the evaluator took into account included monitoring reports, evaluation reports, training materials and case studies.
This kind of information often proved to be very useful as a starting point for the discussion of capacity development issues and to focus further information collection. Despite its limitations, the evaluation team thinks that the information available in these documents can be very useful for the cross-checking exercise.

In broad terms, two types of information were used in this evaluation:

- Primary information that needed to be collected specifically for the evaluation;
- Secondary information such as information that already exists in written records, files, reports, or publications.

2.1.2. Key informant interviews

Key informant interviews involved in-depth discussions with individuals who are selected because they represent certain groups of interest, or they are particularly experienced, insightful, or informative. These key informant interviews were conducted over the telephone or by e-mail. The interviews allowed the evaluator to capture the views and expectations of stakeholders.

2.1.3. Personal histories

In a few cases, detailed personal histories were compiled from individuals who had long-term knowledge of emergency and recovery. The evaluator decided to apply this tool in order to access institutional memory.

2.1.4. Questionnaire surveys

In accordance with the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition, DARA and PARC prepared a questionnaire as outlined above. This was sent by email to selected NGOs with the objective to assess the implementation of interventions at the operational level.

2.2. Gathering data and strategy analysis

The evaluator decided to apply a "Triangulation – Cross-Checks Methodology", as presented in figure 2. The method of Triangulation can help to increase the confidence in the results of the UK study by assessing and crosschecking the findings from multiple points of view, including using different sources of data, different methods for data collection and analysis, different evaluators, or different theoretical perspectives. Given the complex nature of capacity development efforts, the difficulty of applying experimental methods to evaluate them and the limited information on them (particularly baseline data), this approach proved being useful.

One important way to crosscheck and build confidence in results is to use more than one information source to confirm findings. This allows the consistency of results across methods to be checked.

Figure 2: Triangulation – Cross Checks Methodology



2.3. Limitations

An important limitation for this evaluation that needs to be taken into account is the limited collaboration of the Disaster Emergency Committee (DEC) with this PARC/DARA evaluation. The PARC initially envisaged evaluating the UK NGO sector and DARA was prepared to fund this evaluation. This was accepted by the TEC.
After initial contacts with UK NGO's had been established, it turned out that the DEC was also planning an evaluation of its members regarding their tsunami response. In the spirit of the TEC co-ordination, DARA and PARC decided to collaborate with the DEC rather than duplicating efforts and causing an evaluation fatigue in the UK NGO sector. Despite a personal meeting in London and frequent contacts, DEC was unable to provide the PARC/DARA evaluator with relevant and promised information. Neither were documents exchanged nor contact details of relevant staff passed on. It is not clear whether this was due to the lack of capacity in the DEC or a lack of willingness to collaborate.
As a direct collaboration with the DEC evaluation was not possible and several deadlines passed without receiving a response, PARC and DARA decided to go ahead with the evaluation of the UK NGO sector on its own. The huge delay caused by the fruitless intents to collaborate with the DEC meant that there was very limited time to directly contact UK NGOs. In addition, quite understandingly UK NGO's were puzzled by the lack of co-ordination of 2 parallel DEC studies and the TEC evaluation carried out by the PARC. Nevertheless the reply rate to the PARC questionnaire was over 20%. As UK NGO's reacted very positively to the PARC evaluation in the first instance, it is regrettable that the failed DEC collaboration limited the direct participation of UK NGO's in this study.

3. General description of NGO context in the country

In the UK 32 charities got register after the tsunami. All these charities had fund raising for this emergency as main aim.

Currently there are approx. 187,997 main charities registered with the Charity Commission in the UK. This does not include the not-for-profit organisations that don't need to register, such as schools, community groups, churches, hospitals and self-help groups. Overall it is quite difficult to identify the exact number of charities that were raising funds for the tsunami appeals.

Charity income comes from a variety of sources, for example the general public, charitable trusts and foundations, companies and the Lottery.

Figure 3 below provides an overview of the size of annual funds of UK NGOs selected for this study. The majority of NGO's fall in four categories: 29% have an annual budget of less than £20 m and another 29% have an annual budget between £20 m and less than £50 m. Twenty-one percent have an annual budget between £50 m and less than £100 m and 21% have a budget above £100 m.

The major sources of income of NGOs are the fundraising activities. As mentioned before there were 32 small size charities registered after the tsunami and there were approx. 20 representative NGOs in the UK raising funds for the tsunami response. For this study 14 organisations have been analysed. There has been a balance between medium size NGOs and the big INGOs.

The selected NGOs represented approx. £3% of the total income budget of all UK NGOs which is approx. £900,000,000 according to the UK's Charity Commission.

Figure 3: Selected sample of UK NGO's



3.1. NGO mission statements/expertise

The following chapter is outlining the mission statements and expertise of the selected NGO's in funding the emergency response to the tsunami.

3.1.1. Islamic Relief

Islamic Relief (IR) is focusing its tsunami relief operations on two countries: Sri Lanka and Indonesia.

In Indonesia IR is rebuilding houses, schools and healthcare centres, helping people restart their businesses, and improving access to clean water. In partnership with the DEC, IR has built clinics in several parts of the region surrounding Aceh.

In Sri Lanka, IR is focusing most of its relief effort in the Ampara district on the east coast, one of Sri Lanka's worst hit areas. The IR team is clearing up debris, rebuilding houses and developing programmes to help survivors recover their livelihoods.

3.1.2. Mercy Corps

Mercy Corps currently has over 60 emergency staff deployed in affected areas of Indonesia, including Meulaboh and Banda Aceh. Their lifesaving efforts include delivery of food, water and shelter materials. In addition, the organisation's "cash-for-work" programme is combining critical clean-up work with economic revitalization.

In India Mercy Corps is working in close cooperation with the Disaster Mitigation Institute (DMI) to aid the poorest and most vulnerable of coastal India's tsunami-affected population. Mercy Corps staff is distributing essential provisions in the city of Pottuvil. The organisation is also beginning a small grants programme aimed at revitalizing the area's devastated economy.

3.1.3. Christian Aid

Christian Aid is working in the tsunami affected areas in India, Sri Lanka and Indonesia for the long-term, together with their local, but also some UK partner organisations. Christian Aid are funding partners who are building both temporary and permanent homes; repairing damaged houses and schools; providing healthcare and counselling; helping children return to schools; providing training; loans and equipment to get people back to work and making sure communities are better prepared for any future disasters.

3.1.4. Action Aid

Action Aid has five objectives:

- To meet immediate basic needs of tsunami survivors
- To reduce the negative psychological impacts of the tsunami
- To make sure people are able to recover their livelihood in a sustainable way
- To help build foundations of a more secure future by strengthening communities and their institutions
- To ensure aid meets the real needs of the most vulnerable

3.1.5. British Red Cross

The British Red Cross is taking a community-based approach to its rehabilitation work, where they are helping people to rebuild their lives and livelihoods. Work includes giving people the financial support to restart their livelihoods, replacing tools they lost in the disaster, constructing new homes and helping communities prepare for and protect themselves from future disasters.

Communities are involved at every stage so they can understand their needs and requirements and they are actively engaged in their own recovery. British Red Cross aim is to empower beneficiaries so that they can go on to lead sustainable lives in the future.

3.1.6. CAFOD

In the first year CAFOD with its partners decided to offer immediate relief and recovery activities. By mid 2005, on –going relief will be phased down and reconstruction of housing and infrastructure, together with activities to restore livelihoods will be prioritised. Such activities may include, where possible, taking communities beyond their previous level of human development. CAFOD is keen to support the development of capacity in national NGOs and civil society partners.

Their work will include disaster prevention in affected and neighbouring areas. Where appropriate neighbouring areas will be supported to ensure equity and avoid disruption of resources.

3.1.7. CARE

CARE International UK is contributing £9,186,182 to CARE globally. CARE`s aim is to work alongside communities so they achieve a better quality of life than before the tsunami and are less vulnerable to possible future emergencies. With an established presence in five of the most affected countries, CARE now has a wide range of programmes to rebuild homes, infrastructure and community facilities, help people to earn a living now and in the long-term, and meet health, education and psychosocial needs following the immediate emergency relief work. Working with local communities, collaborating with local and international partners and ensuring aid reaches marginalised groups are core to CARE`s work.

3.1.8. CONCERN

The aim of Concern's work in the regions affected by the tsunami is to assist families to recover from the disaster, rebuild their communities and improve their livelihoods. They are focusing on the most vulnerable, including women, children and those who have been made homeless. Concern is working with local agencies to utilise local expertise and develop capacity to ensure communities are better prepared for future emergencies.

Their immediate aim was to provide shelter, food, water and sanitation. Now they are addressing longer term issues, such as enabling families to earn a living, building permanent housing and rebuilding community infrastructures.

3.1.9. Help the Aged

Help the Aged is ensuring that older people in communities affected by the Tsunami are treated with dignity and respect; are guaranteed security in old age through the provision of adequate social protection, a minimum income and sustainable livelihood options; and are protected from future disasters.

3.1.10. OXFAM

Oxfam is working with local partners to help create the conditions for displaced people to return home.

By supporting local civil society organisations, Oxfam aims to develop long-term solutions to the poverty that made millions of people in the Indian Ocean region so vulnerable to the effects of the tsunami.

3.1.11. Merlin

Restoring access to vital health care is the main focus of Merlin's work in tsunami-affected countries. Their ongoing work includes repairing damaged clinics, and constructing temporary facilities. Merlin ensures these clinics are adequately equipped, with clean water and sanitation facilities. A number of destroyed health facilities will be rebuilt from scratch. Health education activities are ongoing to help people stay healthy while living under difficult conditions. In the longer term, Merlin will focus on training, supporting laboratories, increasing immunisation and other activities that will strengthen existing health systems.

3.1.12. Save the Children

Save the Children is working to protect the rights of children who have been affected by the tsunami, their families and communities. They were in a position to respond quickly with food, water, medicines and shelter. Save the Children took the lead on protection of children - including registering and reunifying separated or unaccompanied children, and to get children back in school as quickly as possible.

Now their long-term focus is on health, education, capacity building, recovering livelihoods and repairing or rebuilding infrastructure - including schools, homes and health centres, and helping schools and communities provide emotional support for traumatised survivors.

3.1.13. Tearfund

Tearfund seeks to build safer, more resilient communities that are less vulnerable to future disasters. They responded to the tsunami by providing emergency assistance so that the people affected have access to basic services that enable them to live with dignity. Tearfund is now working to help provide shelter, a way for people to earn a living, education and psycho-social support. Their work is underpinned by the need to ensure that vulnerability to future disasters is reduced.

Tearfund's response is largely through partner organisations although they are working in a joint operational programme in Indonesia.

3.1.14. World Vision

With existing development programmes in India, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Indonesia and Myanmar, and a global partnership operating in 100 nations, World Vision has been well positioned to mobilise resources and staff to the tsunami's hardest-hit areas.

The organisation is focussing on the most vulnerable and marginalised people in the region, helping communities to rebuild their lives and livelihoods.

In the first six-months, World Vision has engaged in programmes that correspond with its four strand strategic response: Emergency Response, Economic Recovery, Community/Social Rehabilitation and Infrastructure Rehabilitation.

These four pillars are intended to address the critical needs of communities over the next 3-5 years.

3.1.15. The Disaster Emergency Committee (DEC)

The DEC is an umbrella organisation which unites 12 independent humanitarian agencies in the United Kingdom in their efforts to maximise income from the people across the UK to mount an effective humanitarian response to major disasters overseas.

DEC Appeals are reserved for major disasters and emergencies which cannot be dealt with by the usual in-country coping mechanisms, and where DEC member agencies are in a position to respond quickly and effectively. DEC Members have to be able to make a difference and be confident that they can spend public donations effectively.

The DEC Secretariat organises information sharing teleconferences to monitor situations in several "at risk" countries across the world. This mechanism enables members to benefit from each other's field reports and analysis and strengthens preparedness prevention strategies.

In the period leading up to an Appeal, member agencies share relevant information which in turn enables the DEC Secretariat and Trustees to assess the gravity of the disaster or emergency concerned and the likely level and effectiveness of any collective response.

Three principles have been adopted to provide a guideline for Trustees and others involved in deciding whether a national joint Appeal is the appropriate response to a particular emergency:

- The disaster must be on such a scale and of such urgency as to call for swift international humanitarian assistance.
- The DEC agencies, or some of them, must be in a position to provide effective and swift humanitarian assistance at a scale to justify a national Appeal.
- There must be sufficient public awareness of, and sympathy for, the humanitarian situation to give reasonable grounds for concluding that a public Appeal would be successful.

3.2. Selection of NGO under study and criteria for selection

The following figure 4 given an overview of the selected NGOs and figure 5 gives detailed information about the NGO's mandate, funds raised and spent and planned interventions.

Figure 4: UK NGO's selected for the study

Christian Aid	CAFOD	Tearfund	British Red Cross	Oxfam
Action Aid	Merlin	Help the Aged	Mercy Corps	World Vision
Save the Children	Care	Islamic Relief	Concern	DEC*

*DEC is not a NGO but an umbrella organisation

For this study 14 NGOs have been selected. 13 out of 14 are members of the Disaster Emergency Committee (DEC) and the other agency; Mercy Corps was selected out of DFID's beneficiaries list. The number of agencies available to participate directly in this study was very limited. This was due to the lack of coordination between the Disaster Emergency Committee Evaluation and the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition. In order to wait for the promised collaboration of the DEC, this study was delayed. There was little interest from DEC's side in collaboration and information sharing, as outlined in more detail in chapter 2.3.

The criteria for selecting the above NGOs were:

- Size of agency: some big NGOs in the UK and some medium size NGOs
- NGOs receiving government funds
- Size of funds: For this study only NGOs with a reasonable amount of donations have been taken into account

Figure 5: Detailed overview of selected UK NGO's

NGO	Mandate/specialisation	Raised	Spent	Foreseen intervention
Islamic Relief	▪ Recovery emergency response ▪ Housing, water and sanitation ▪ Education ▪ Livelihoods recovery ▪ Shelter	£10,500,000	£6,000,000	IR plan to continue their intervention and moving to the recovery phase
Mercy Corps		£1,528,389	£103,498	
Action Aid	1) Meet immediate basic needs of survivors 2) reduce the negative psychosocial impacts 3) make sure people are able to recover their livelihood in a sustainable way 4) strengthening communities and their institutions, and 5) ensure aid meets the real needs of the most	£30,542,000	£6,451,000	Continue to work in the tsunami-affected areas for at least another three years. In India the work is shifting from short-term relief to longer-term recovery activities. Planned expenditure of £30,5m for at least three years

	vulnerable.			
British Red Cross	▪ Rehabilitation work ▪ Giving people the financial support to restart their livelihoods, replacing tools they lost in the disaster, ▪ Constructing new homes ▪ Disaster prevention ▪ Communities involvement and actively engaged in their own recovery.	£96,000,000	£12,300,000	
CAFOD	▪ Disaster prevention, awareness and preparation ▪ Where appropriate neighbouring areas will be supported to ensure equity and avoid disruption of resources.	£23,000,000	£6,200,000	▪ On-going relief needs will be phased down and reconstruction of housing and infrastructure, ▪ Activities to restore livelihoods ▪ Support the development of capacity in national NGOs and civil society partners
CARE	▪ Rebuild homes, infrastructure and community facilities ▪ Help people to earn a living now and in the long-term ▪ Meet health ▪ Education ▪ Psychosocial needs ▪ Immediate emergency relief work	9,186,182	£2,469,652	
Christian Aid	▪ Temporary and permanent homes ▪ Repairing damaged houses and schools ▪ Providing healthcare and counselling ▪ Helping children return to school ▪ Providing training ▪ Loans and equipment to get people back to work ▪ Disaster preparation	£40,000,000	£18,000,000	
Concern	▪ Assist families to recover from the disaster ▪ Rebuild their communities	£19,000,000	£4,015,656	▪ Enabling families to earn a living ▪ Building permanent

	▪ Improve their livelihoods ▪ Develop capacity to ensure communities are better prepared for future emergencies. **Immediate aim** ▪ Shelter, food, water and sanitation.			housing ▪ Rebuilding community infrastructures.
Help the Aged	▪ Ensure that older people are treated with dignity and respect ▪ Are guaranteed security in old age through the provision of adequate social protection ▪ A minimum income ▪ Sustainable livelihood options ▪ Are protected from future disasters.	£4,293,697	£1,636,929	
Merlin	▪ Repairing damaged clinics, and constructing temporary facilities ▪ Ensures these clinics are adequately equipped, with clean water and sanitation facilities ▪ A number of destroyed health facilities will be rebuilt from scratch ▪ Health education activities are ongoing to help people stay healthy while living under difficult conditions	£4,572,034	£939,129	▪ Focus on training ▪ Supporting laboratories, ▪ Increasing immunisation and other activities that will strengthen the existing health system
Oxfam	▪ Help create the conditions for displaced people to return home.	£96,954,194	£34,400,000	
Save the Children	▪ Protect the rights of children who have been affected by the tsunami, their families and communities ▪ Food, water, medicines and shelter ▪ Protection of children - including registering and reunifying separated or unaccompanied children	£68,279,184	£14,609,186	▪ Health ▪ Education ▪ Capacity building ▪ Recovering livelihoods ▪ Repairing or rebuilding infrastructure - including schools, homes and health centres ▪ Helping schools and

	▪ Get children back in school as quickly as possible.			communities provide emotional support for traumatised survivors.
Tearfund	▪ Build safer, more resilient communities that are less vulnerable to future disasters ▪ Providing emergency assistance so that the people affected have access to basic services that enable them to live with dignity. ▪ Working to help provide shelter, a way for people to earn a living, education and psycho-social support	£23,748,000	£3,000,000	▪ Ensure that vulnerability to future disasters is reduced.
World Vision	▪ Helping communities to rebuild their lives and livelihoods ▪ Engaged in programmes which correspond with its four strand strategic response: Emergency Response, Economic Recovery, Community/Social Rehabilitation and Infrastructure Rehabilitation.	£19,499,915	£1,703,312	These four pillars are intended to address the critical needs of communities over the next 3-5 years.

3.3. Overall financial response managed by NGOs in country

The response to the tsunami has been without precedent in the UK. Almost all NGOs taken into account here stated that the donations have broken the records. A survey realised by the Institute of Fundraising reveals that the majority of interviewed NGOs had witnessed an increase in income in the last six months but a few had experience a decrease or stated that it was still too early to be assed.

As shown in figure 6 below most of the DEC planned expenditures for 2005 have been allocated in Sri Lanka, followed by India and Indonesia.

Figure 6: DEC budget for 2005 by country



As an example the British Red Cross plans to spend approximately £40m in Indonesia helping people rebuild their homes and livelihoods. In the Maldives, the British Red Cross will spend around £17 million on reconstruction projects and in Sri Lanka, spending will be around £2.4 million.

The British Red Cross has already spent over £12.3 million on immediate emergency response activities and has committed a total of nearly £60 million to help rebuild communities in the three worst affected countries: Indonesia, Sri Lanka and the Maldives.

Islamic Relief has planned to disburse 2005 £4.5 m Sri Lanka and £ 2.5 m Indonesia.

4. General description of budget sources and allocations

The following chapter is aimed to provide a general overview of how much funds were raised by NGOs have raised in the countries, where the funds come from, how they have been collected and where they are to be spend.

According to this study the total amount of funds raised by UK NGOs has been £448,556,517. The Disaster Emergency Commission (DEC) raised most of the UK public funds. The DEC managed to raise a total amount of £350m. The public response was huge and this showed the big impact that the tsunami had on the society. The 12 DEC members raised further £50m individually.

The Department for International Development (DFID) provided NGOs agencies with a total budget of £9,724,537. Furthermore the UK government funded DEC flights to the affected areas for a total amount of £2,083,126.

It has not been possible to assess how much of the funds per NGO came from corporations directly, as the existing sources don't give a consistent picture. It is possible to say that public donations do include corporation donations in some cases. Overall corporations allocated £50m to the UK NGO sector.

4.1. Description by origin:

From the UK organisations selected it was not possible to show the spent amount as classified in figure 7. Nevertheless all NGOs have provided information about the total budget spent.
In general it has been quite difficult to receive disaggregate data. It is not an issue to receive information regarding the total funds raised but it is difficult to identify the origin of the funds.

Figure 7: Funds raised from private and non-private sources

		Raised	Spent	Total
Non-private Sources	National (UK Government)	£11,807,663	£3,546,027	£9,363,559
	Other	£35,000,000		
Private Sources	General Public	£350,000,000	£109,943,260	£240,056,740
	Corporations	£50,000,000		

*Includes all corporate donations

In the case of Islamic Relief 80% of the tsunami relief funding came from public sources (if DEC is considered public money) and this is similar to other emergencies. In the Save the Children Fund UK (SCFUK) the tsunami funding sources were different from its normal sources of funding. 73% of all funds came from DEC. As much of its work is developmental and funds do normally come from donors such as DFID or EU rather than the DEC, this constitutes a different funding pattern.
Mercy corps noted that the response from the public was much more generous than in other emergencies.

4.1.1. <u>In-kind donations</u>

In order to act in an efficient manner and allow them to act quickly most NGOs decided not to accept donations in kind. This was also due to the high amount of administrative cost that involved the management of such gifts. Another argument against gifts in kind was that they generally do not meet the needs of the agencies in the field.
It should be mentioned that there was an organisation called Global Hand, an organisation that matches offers of gifts with aid organisations that potentially need them.

The British Red Cross decided not to accept goods donations. As in-kind donations might be interpreted flights financed by the British Government for several UK NGOs. The same applies

to a dedicated helpline for people directly affected by the earthquake financed by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and operated by the British Red Cross.
For Islamic Relief, in-kind contributions often donated by private businesses caused huge logistical problems and are a major lesson learned from the tsunami for the organisation.

4.1.2. Gift Aid

In the UK many people decided also to donate through gift aid. Gift aid allows the charity to reclaim the tax paid by UK tax payers on their donation. At no extra cost to the donor the charity can reclaim 28p in every £1 donated.
Overall, the HM Treasuries estimates that the UK government will be contributing approximately £ 50 m through tax relief on public donations made through the gift aid schemes.

4.2. Variations as from usual funding pattern

According to a survey published by the Institute of Fundraising in the UK specific fundraising activities have been affected by the tsunami appeal. This is the case regarding the income from corporate donations, individual donations, and community fundraising that have experienced a decrease. Activities like the use of gift aid and income from new media have increased considerable. The high profile of the tsunami appeal, which included television advertising, and the huge response of the public, might have brought Gift Aid to the attention of many donors, both old and new. The continued support of donations has also increased is also positive and it might be suggested that the tsunami encouraged many donors to commit to charitable giving in the long term.

4.3. Means of donations:

Most NGOs have stated that the donations have gone far beyond their expectations and that the British public has been very generous. The impact of the tsunami in the public made is possible to break records in the UK. Between 6.16pm on 30th December and 6.16pm on the 31st December 2004, the DEC website, with the timely help of British Telecom to increase server capacity, received 166,936 donations, raising £10,676,836 for the Tsunami Earthquake Appeal. This is the highest amount of money ever donated online in 24 hours in the UK.
The following means of donation are considered in figure 8: Telephone, online donations, text messaging, interactive TV, via mail, donations directly through a bank institution or post offices, donations through business and charitable trust as well as gift aid.

Figure 8: Means of donations to NGOs



Online donations

Modern technology has been widely implemented by almost every NGO. The public had the possibility to make its donations through the internet. With the help of major internet service providers, the world record for online donations was broken with over £10 million donated in 24 hours. Overall £44 million was donated online by over half a million web users.

Telephone

Over £75 million was donated over the telephone. This amount represents a 23.7% of the total public donations. Overall the tsunami appeal received 1.7 million calls via the automated system. At peak times over 100 volunteers answered 12,500 live calls.

Text messaging

Major UK mobile phone operators raised £1 million by joining forces and offering a free donation mechanism - enabling people to text their gifts.

Interactive TV

The Community Channel raised over £1 million from donors using the "red button" on interactive TV.

Bank and Post offices

A phenomenal volume of donations was received by post - totalling £55 million. Almost £75 million was donated through banks and post offices. This represents 23.7% of the total public donations. Businesses and charitable trusts contributed £50 million.

Fundraising events and collections were held in supermarkets, fire stations, pubs, restaurants, underground stations, and social clubs - even prisons. Research shows that four out of every five households made donations. For many people, especially young people, this was the first time they donated to charity. Similarly, many businesses for the first time used the workplace for fundraising.

Celebrities were also prominent in fundraising activities. Rock stars donated guitars, musicians played in benefit gigs, comedians participated in the first DEC Comic Aid, members of the royal family packed relief aid, and novelists donated chapters from their latest books.

Finally, the DEC estimates Gift Aid to be in excess of £15 million. As part of the fundraising strategy the DEC decided to write to their donors in order to thank them and encourage completing a Gift Aid declaration allowing the DEC to add a further 28 pence to every pound donated.

A survey realised to 1000 adults over 15 for the Charity Aid Foundation (CAF) showed that technology had a major impact on the way in which people pledged their support - offering them a variety of ways to make donations. Indeed, 61% of people who gave online did so for the very first time, 41% of those who used a debit or credit card to give by telephone were also doing so for the first time. And text messaging, a relative newcomer to charitable giving, was used by 1% of donors – all of whom did so for the first time.

Another key feature of the tsunami appeals has been the focus on tax-efficient giving. While just one in three donations to charities generally are made tax-efficiently, 50% of all donations over £25 were given in this way to the tsunami response.

The impact on levels of donations to charity has also been significant. Half of those surveyed said they had given more in response to the tsunami than to any other cause in the past year: nearly 70% said they had given more to this appeal than to any previous disaster.

4.4. Chronology of all events

Most NGOs launched their appeals on Boxing Day. In the case of the Disaster Emergency Committee their appeal started on December 28th 2004. Already on the first day they raised the amount of £5,3m. On the second day of the appeal they continued with huge TV and Radio appeals and this helped them the DEC to raise the amount of £20m. Within 4 days they raised 32m. After only 18 days the public had donated approx. £200m. The public response was huge and the majority of funds donated to NGOs came from the public as presented in the timeline of the tsunami funding response in figure 9.

Some agencies decided to appeal for funds from different donors like DFID, the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC), Development Corporation Ireland and others. In the case of Islamic Relief it was reported that DFID funds were made available by the end of

January, UNDP in March, DEC funds in April and SDC agreed to provide funding in June, but funds have not been transferred by the time of the interview in September.
Another agency stated that post emergency funding was made available in May and August by Development Corporation Ireland grants and corporate funding from the ING Bank was granted in June.

Figure 9: Timeline of the tsunami funding response December 2004 to June 2005



4.5. Description by destination:

Nearly one year after the tsunami, most NGOs are able to provide detailed information about the funds' allocation by country, but a desegregation of data by country and sector is mostly not available.
Nevertheless it has been stated by interviewees during this study that some donors had identified specific sectors. SDC e.g. was quite keen in working in the education sector while UNDP funds were earmarked for livelihoods and recovery only.
Other donors like DFID were quite open in their approach regarding the sectors. NGOs working with DFID were able to work in the area of their experience e.g. Clean up, transitional shelter, water supply, sanitation, and electricity as proposed by Islamic Relief.
DEC funds were used for transitional housing, clean up, water and sanitation with a high degree of flexibility of donors.
Most NGOs decided to work in the area they have most experience. In the case of Merlin it was decided to contribute with their expertise to the health sector.

Some UK NGOs have been using the "Financial Tracking System of the UN" (FTS) and it is quite admirable. This system allows not only donors but also the public to be informed on how and where funds are being allocated. Nevertheless not all organisations have used that system which makes difficult the tracking of funds implementation. This could be interpreted as a lack of coordination, possibly awareness and transparency of NGOs.

From all UK NGOs only 15 have made use of the FTS database. This means that only approx 5% of all UK NGOs have been wiling to share their financial with others. It is also important to mention at this stage that the FTS hasn't been up dated regularly and as a result the financial information registered in the system isn't real-time.

Based on the limited FTS information, UK NGO's invested 18% of emergency relief funds in health, 17% in shelter and non-food items and 7% in economic recovery and infrastructure. Most of the funds, 58% were designated for multi-sector activities as shown in figure 10.

Figure 10: Fund allocation of UK NGO's by sector according to UN Financial Tracking System data



5. Fundraising and crisis response policy

This chapter is aimed to provide an analysis of the different policies and mechanisms assumed by NGOs in the countries as response to the crisis. The differences between "usual" emergencies" and the tsunami are highlighted.

5.1. Fundraising policy

5.1.1. Usual policy

The Disasters Emergency Committee has developed a short guidance as part of their usual fundraising policy. This guidance has been simplified in 8 steps by the evaluator for the purpose of this study and generalised in order to facilitate its potential use and implementation to other agencies (see figure 11).

The importance of the public interest and the validity of the appeal, before starting, are clearly addressed in the DEC fundraising policy. A very good network of banks, media, telecommunications and other supporters is crucial in order to make an appeal successful. Financial targets and clear strategy of how and where future funds should be implemented should be addressed before starting with the appeal. Setting up a deadline for donations is important for the public as well as providing them with sufficient payment methods. During and after the appeal it is necessary to keep the public informed not only about fundraising activities but also of where, how and how much funds will be implemented in the different sectors and countries.

An evaluation should be planned not only because of accountability reasons but also as part of the learning process. Results should be shared with the public and donors.

Figure 11: Sample fundraising process



5.1.2. Policy applied in the case of the Tsunami

The strategy implemented by the agencies after the tsunami doesn't differ from usual fundraising strategies. Nevertheless the impact of the tsunami on the public has been enormous. During this evaluation huge the amount of work NGOs have invested in the tsunami appeal became evident. Almost every NGO has dedicated a section on their web site to report on the tsunami activities. Through interviews and reports it has been also stated that several NGOs appointed a specific person as part of their tsunami communication strategy. Overall the fast reaction of the NGOs in launching their appeals was impressive. Already on Boxing Day several NGOs were collecting funds.

6. Response to appeals

NGOs were satisfied with the response of the public to their appeals. The British Red Cross' Asia Earthquake and Flood Appeal, launched on Boxing Day, triggered an unprecedented response from the British public, raising £27 million, including £3.5 million from the British government. The biggest UK appeal was launched by the DEC. They raised a total amount of £372m.

Most NGOs have stated that a considerable income increase have been detected due to the tsunami as published for example in Tearfund's "Annual Report & Accounts".

6.1. Coordination

Most NGOs have decided to work through partner agencies in the affected countries. Some NGOs had already offices in the affected areas and others decided to open new offices in order to facilitate the work on the ground.

According to the British Red Cross the tsunami emergency response presented huge challenges because of the sheer number of agencies working in the region: not just the Disasters Emergency Committee agencies, which have a long history of responding to disasters, but around 300 other relatively inexperienced agencies from all over the world.

Co-operation between aid agencies is improving. There is now a consortium made up of the UN, IFRC and NGOs, which aim to improve co-operation between agencies involved in the tsunami response. Nevertheless according to Tearfund the huge influx of NGOs into Banda Aceh since the disaster means that coordination between government, NGOs and UN agencies remains crucial.

According to Care aid agencies have actively participated in co-ordinating bodies run by the national governments and the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA). National governments and OCHA are primarily responsible for co-ordination.

6.1.1. With other NGO

As already mentioned most NGOs are implementing their projects through partner agencies and their network. Northern NGOs working with local NGOs have benefited from their local knowledge and this has created a competitive advantage.

Examples of NGOs working through a wide range of partners are Oxfam or Action Aid. Action Aid that is currently working with 33 local organisations on tsunami projects in Thailand, India, Sri Lanka, the Maldives and Somalia.

World Vision is working through many partners in order to identify and address the immediate and longer-term needs of the tsunami-affected communities. These include international and local NGOs, government, community and faith-based organisations. Within each country there are coordination meetings between agencies and the DEC members collaborate in order to discuss progress and talk about how lessons learnt in each of the projects.

Mercy Corps worked through two types of partnerships: long-standing partnerships with local NGOs and new partners including e a new form of partnerships: "Twinned-partners". These are UK based organisations that have long-term experience in each country and that help to build the capacity of the organisation's partners like Habitat for Humanity or Sight Savers International.
CARE has been involved with coordination at all levels and played an important role in inter-agency groups. In addition, CARE has worked with other agencies to jointly assess community needs and how well those needs are being met.

All NGOs, taken into account in this study, are working actively in at least two of the following counties: Sri Lanka, Somalia, India, Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Myanmar and Maldives. 6 out of 14 organisations are working in Somalia. 3 out of 14 are in Myanmar. 3 out of 14 are working in Maldives. 13 organisations are working in Indonesia and 9 out of 12 organisations are working in India. All organisations are working in Sri Lanka.

Figure 12 below shows the countries in which the selected NGOs are working and the number of partners they have in the affected area.

Figure 12: NGO's activities by country and number of local co-operation partners

Agency	India	Indonesia	Malaysia	Myanmar	Sri Lanka	Thailand	Somalia	Maldives	Number of Beneficiaries reach in country	Number. Of Overseas Partners
ActionAid	■				■	■	■	■	250.000	33
British Red Cross	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	77.000	3
Cafod	■	■			■				N/A	4
Care	■	■			■	■	■		574.024	14
Christian Aid	■	■			■				737.708	29
Concern	■	■			■				158.400	16
Help the Aged	■	■			■				51.080	3
Merlin		■		■	■				1.506.000	14
Oxfam	■	■			■				531.460	65
Save the Children	■	■			■	■	■	■	625.000	160
Tearfund	■	■			■	■	■		350.050	12
World Vision	■	■		■	■	■	■		1.054.000	5
Islamic Relief		■			■				N/A	N/A
Mercy Corps		■			■				N/A	N/A

6.1.2. With government action

Some of the NGOs have decided to work closely to the government of the affected areas like Islamic Relief and its cooperation with Government of Indonesia's Department of Engineering or SCFUK.
Another example is Merlin work in partnership with the local and national health authorities of Aceh and Sri Lanka.

6.1.3. With UN

There is evidence of co-ordination between NGOs and UN organisations in the field. Mercy Corps for example coordinated interventions locally in Indonesia with WFP where they provided that UN agency with local knowledge. Another way of cooperation with UN is their Financial Tracking System. NGOs like Mercy Corps, Islamic Relief, Christian Aid, World Vision, Help the Aged and others are using this system. Nevertheless the number of NGOs using this tool is quite limited and as a result the information provided to the public in this useful database is very limited too and it is not representative enough. The FTS is a valuable tool that can provide very useful information specially when taking decision of where and in which sectors to invest.

7. Overview of emergency response mechanisms/ agency competence

Several NGOs have decided to work in the areas where they bring most experience. Others had offices in the affected countries, which facilitates accurate information to headquarters, e.g. at the stage of needs assessment. In the case of SCFUK country programmes were responsible for needs assessment. Figure 13 provides an overview of sector where the selected NGO's are active in.

Due to the nature of the emergency many NGOs had to change their initial emergency strategy and to cover the most basic needs in the beginning of the relief operations. SCFUK for example had to take into account the changing security situation in Sri Lanka.

Figure 13: Sectoral focus of NGOs

Agency	Basic Needs	Health (Therapies)	Water and sanitation	Livelihoods	Economic Recovery and Infrastructure	Coordination and support services	Shelter and Non Food Items	Disaster preparedness
ActionAid	■	■		■	■	■		
British Red Cross					■			■
Cafod	■			■	■		■	■
Care	■	■			■	■		
Christian Aid	■				■		■	■
Concern	■		■		■		■	■
Help the Aged				■	■			
Merlin		■	■					
Oxfam		■			■		■	
Save the Children	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	
Tearfund	■	■			■		■	
World Vision	■				■	■		
Islamic Relief			■	■	■		■	
Mercy Corps		■			■			

7.1. HQ level

Several NGOs HQ have acquired an advisory role and assisted in the strategy planning and funds allocations. Two examples are given below.
ActionAid International has had a full-time emergencies unit since 1992. The organisation experienced that this unit represent a huge advantage for Action Aid when responding to an emergency.

Mercy Corps has a Global Emergency Operations (GEO) team. This team coordinates Mercy Corps response in humanitarian emergencies.

7.2. Previous presence in the affected countries

Most NGOs had experience of working in the affected countries especially in India, Sri Lanka, Indonesia and Thailand. Some NGOs had offices in some of the countries before the tsunami. Other NGOs had very good networks of partners and collaborating institutions.

Action Aid is building on its strong local networks to increase the capacity of community organisations and to ensure the appropriate aid is reaching the most vulnerable.
SCFUK had offices before the tsunami in Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Thailand and Somalia (managed from Nairobi).
Tearfund has been supporting partner organisations' relief and development work in India and Sri Lanka for 35 years and in Thailand for 25 years. SCFUK has been working in Aceh for 30 years

Some NGOs did not have offices in the affected countries decided to open new offices in Indonesia and Sri Lanka after the Tsunami. In the case of Oxfam, five new offices were opened in Sri Lanka. Where Islamic relief operations existed in Indonesia they were scaled up and new staff recruited. In Sri Lanka, IR did not have an office but set one up. The same pattern can be observed in Mercy Corps where the tsunami triggered the opening of an office in Sri Lanka.

7.3. Timeliness

Most of the NGOs reacted to the tsunami emergency immediately. Some were already receiving donations on Boxing Day.

Action Aid was working within hours of the disaster in the affected areas, providing people with food, water, clothing, medical supplies and essential household items. Islamic Relief and Mercy Corps reacted within 24 hours to the tsunami. SCFUK started an appeal for the emergency on December 28th and the funding flow for the emergency started immediately after the appeal.

7.4. Role of the local government authorities, UN coordination and NGO competence and collaboration in the field

NGO's undertook needs assessment in different ways. SCFUK undertook an assessment visit by an emergency team and local staff. Mercy corps acted ad-hoc in the first couple of days due to

the overwhelming nature of the emergency. Then the organisation's internal tool for needs assessment called "Asset" was used. Islamic Relief also used its own needs assessment tool.
In most cases there was a combination of an assessment of local needs and the NGO's capacities to deliver.

8. Influence of and response to the increased funds availability

8.1. HQ level

Most of the NGOs headquarter acquired a role of advisor during the emergency. Funds were managed mostly centrally but decisions were made in the affected areas. In Islamic Relief funds were channelled through a central account in UK and country level agreements with country offices.

8.2. Communication policy

Action Aid appointed a communication coordinator for their tsunami programme. This person is responsible for profiling their tsunami work.
In Islamic Relief a communication officer was responsible for communications, party via the website. The main communication activities took place in the first 6 months of the aftermath. In Sri Lanka and Indonesia, the Head of Operations were responsible for the contacts with the local press.
Mercy Corps opened a position for a programme officer responsible for the co-ordination of the tsunami response, support of field offices and liaison with the media.

8.3. Media coverage and relationship/influence

The following citations outline the tsunami media coverage and the influence of the tsunami on the media.

Reuters
"The Asian tsunami attracted more media attention in the first six weeks after it struck than the world's top 10 "forgotten" emergencies did over a whole year, according to a report from Reuters. Other emergencies - from the devastating wars in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Sudan to HIV/Aids - have been neglected by world's media, according to a survey from the information group's humanitarian news site Reuters AlertNet, which analysed coverage in 200 English-language newspapers.
The survey came just a day after research showed that malaria had become the world's forgotten killer, with half a billion people suffering from the disease but drawing a fraction of the attention of "new" killers such as HIV/Aids.

The tsunami, which killed an estimated 300,000 people, has squeezed the already low levels of press coverage of other emergencies, receiving 34,992 citations in the press to the end of February.

But in the full year up to then, the next most covered emergency - the conflict in Sudan - generated just a fifth of the tsunami's coverage, with 7,661 mentions.

And the war in Congo, in which nearly 4 million people have been killed, has "hardly registered" in the worldwide media, said Reuters, with 3,119 articles across the year.

The other crises "most neglected" by the media, chosen by 100 humanitarian relief professionals, are: Uganda, HIV/Aids, west Africa, Colombia, Chechnya, Nepal, Haiti and infectious diseases such as tuberculosis, which kills 2 million people a year and makes 9 million ill, according to charity TB Alert.

The challenge of distilling a complex crisis down to simple soundbites - and finding a thread of hope to help audiences empathise - are among the reasons that some emergencies are "forgotten", say the humanitarian workers who were surveyed.

Humanitarian Policy Group

"[A tsunami is] simpler, visual and more dramatic, in ways that both drought and conflict aren't," said Paul Harvey of the British thinktank, the Humanitarian Policy Group.

Long-running humanitarian crises are often difficult to package as fresh-sounding stories, while logistical problems and tight budgets could also put news editors off committing reporters and resources to cover the stories.

In countries such as Zimbabwe and Sudan, governments routinely refuse to give journalists visas, while reporting in Congo can mean trekking through the jungle for a story unlikely to make the front page.

Danish Institute for International Studies

"If you had a similar natural disaster [to the tsunami] in Africa three months from now, I don't think you'd have the same media coverage (or) the same consequences, because it's only maybe once a year that the western public is willing to be moved by disasters on that level," said Gorm Rye Olsen, a researcher at the Danish Institute for International Studies.

Without TV time, aid experts say the general public is unlikely to donate in large quantities, as they did after the tsunami when individual donations to charities outpaced initial offers from governments, leaving them rushing to catch up.

The Guardian

"The media is a huge factor in getting people to be generous," said, Oxfam Great Britain's humanitarian funding manager, Orla Quinlan. "If they're visually engaged, that brings it home and makes it real to them."

81% of adults in Britain have contributed to the tsunami appeals, according to figures from the Charities Aid Foundation. The so called "NOP" study, commissioned by CAF (Charities Aid Foundation), is the first attempt to assess the impact on charitable giving of one of the world's worst natural disasters.

Of those people who made donations, 84% gave because they felt deeply affected by events; 64% in response to the harrowing images shown by the media; 65% because information on how to give was readily available; and 14% gave because they knew the area or had actually visited one of the regions affected.

9. Management of funds

9.1. Decision making criteria and mechanisms for funds expenditure

Decisions making criteria and mechanisms for some NGOs are presented in this chapter.

Mercy Corps decided to focus on the Aceh area for a number of reasons. Firstly it was felt that due to the scale of the devastation they could make the most impact there. It was also important, as the Taskforce is represented in the city. The Aceh Recovery Project will restore stability to the area by helping to get people back to work and children back to school.

SCFUK worked with Plan International, SC US and partners in each country based on the size of the organisations, an assessment of its ability to spend effectively and the capacity to implement programmes.

In the case of Islamic Relief no funding was disbursed through partner organisations, but partners were used for planning; e.g. Department of Engineering in Indonesia. In Aceh, there were no NGO capacities available for these purposes.
There are plans to build and learn from local capacitates and to develop loos links into a meaningful cooperation in the future

The British Red Cross is addressing their priorities by finding out what each affected community needs. Their focus is mainly helping people return to safe, permanent homes. They are helping people re-start their livelihoods so they can become self-sufficient once again.

They are also trying to identify other requirements that will allow people to return safely to their homes and communities such as water, sanitation, health and education. They are in constant consultation with other agencies and National Societies to address these issues.

9.2. Programming systems

9.2.1. Costs

There are no DEC Secretariat administration costs incurred for their appeals. The fundraising costs of any appeal are always kept below 2% of the appeal total, and are normally much less.
Up to a further 1% is spent in evaluating the impact of the work funded by the appeal, reporting to the UK public and helping DEC Members improve future performance. Clearly the more they raise the less they spend on appeal costs.
Therefore at least 97% of the appeal fund is transferred to the Members for their relief and rehabilitation programmes. Where necessary, DEC members can invest up to 5% of this money in the management and support of their programmes in the UK.

Most NGOs are keeping their cost below 7% of the total funds raised. Organisations like the British Red Cross have made the public aware of their need to cover the administrative costs out of the funds raised.

9.2.2. Management of overload

9.2.2.1. Funds

According to most NGOs there has not been a funding overflow. The public have been incredibly generous in their response to this disaster. And all the money will benefit because the effects of the tsunami are so widespread and so many people's lives have been devastated. Several agencies will stay in the stricken communities for as long as it takes to help people rebuild their lives. This will take many years and many millions of pounds.

SCFUK broadened the implementation area to make the best use of excess funding in order to include the entire affected district, not just the directly affected population. .

So far 25% of all funds, taken here into account, have been spent. The total budget being analysed is £448,556,517. All DEC members will need to use the DEC funds within a period of 3 years. Only one agency, Islamic Relief has spent more than 50% of their budget in less than one year as shown in figure 14.

Figure 14: Allocation and expenditure of funds



9.2.3. Workload

9.2.3.1. Monitoring and evaluation systems

All NGOs receiving funds from the DEC are implementing strict accountability systems to ensure the money donated through the Disasters Emergency Committee and by other existing supporters reaches those who need it most.

SCFUK has an ongoing evaluation process of its response to the emergency. As a result of the tsunami, Mercy Corps set up an M&E unit in one of its Indonesia offices. Action Aid is putting a lot of effort in empowering communities by ensuring that all communities know their entitlements. This is being done in the form of training programmes or workshops, or in the distribution of easy-to-read guides on what aid the government has promised. ActionAid has distributed over 1000 such guides amongst networks in Tamil Nadu. Action Aid mentions that aid tracking initiatives are underway which will monitor committed funding for the tsunami response, and will analyse how spending relates to the real needs of affected communities.

9.2.3.2. Accountability and reporting mechanisms to donors

Action Aid has international standards of financial management and control supplemented by local policies and procedures specific to the tsunami response programmes. Monthly reporting and regular reviews and audits will be accompanied by the participation of affected communities in planning and reviewing expenditure.

Financially, Save the Children conducts audits and financial reviews to ensure financial accountability and the integrity of all activities and transactions. Internal auditors check the

accounts regularly and all Save the Children national members conduct an annual independent audit of their financial statements.

Islamic Relief is putting a strong effort on financial audit and supported staff in the Sri Lanka office specifically in that area.

One NGO mentioned that there was no overburden with donor reporting requirements, as there were plenty of funds available.

10. Effects on the NGOs

10.1. Implications and/or differences with previous years of donorship patterns

Tearfund's total income in 2004/05 exceeded £50m for the first time ever, reaching £53.0m compared with £35.3m in the previous year. This is explained by the overwhelming response of their supporters to the Boxing Day tsunami and the crisis in Darfur. The £50m included £8.6m from their supporters in response to the tsunami and £6.9m in response to an appeal for the crisis in Darfur.

Save the Children was also one of the several agencies that have reported an income increase compared with previous years. Their total income was at its highest level ever at £133.9 million. This resulted from unprecedented amounts of donations and gifts of £45.4 million, including those in response to the Asian tsunami appeal.

Islamic Relief stated that the ratio in relation to the public donations was similar to previous emergencies: In the Dafur crisis, 70-75% of funding came from the public.
The huge amount of public funding was due to the non-political character of the tsunami with 13-14 countries affected in 2 continents – a catastrophe that this generation had not seen before.

10.2. Effects on Human Resources

In the immediate aftermath of the tsunami, it seems that everybody's work was affected in many NGOs, especially the smaller ones.

In Islamic Relief two senior officials seconded from Sudan office were sent to affected area 3 days after the disaster. In general, it was a struggle to find human resources for the tsunami response for IR. Based on experiences from previous emergencies, strategies for HR recruitment were applied; e.g. an expert database.

In SCFUK staff was lent from other country programmes to work on the tsunami response. They also reported that they have lost through the disaster valuable institutional and traditional

knowledge in Aceh. Another challenge Save the Children is facing is to responsibly use the huge resources available in the country for the limited number of affected people.

Mercy Corps transferred staff permanently from offices in other parts of Indonesia that were in the process of being downsized. Through its Global Emergency Operation (GEO), Mercy Corps got assistance in the recruitment of new staff. These staffs were employed on temporary contracts.

10.3. Effects on the supporting base

There is evidence in Islamic Relief that the tsunami response tapped in a previously un-accessed supporter base as the emergency was non-political.
Mercy Corps tested an innovative model of fundraising coordination successfully. A new partnership with Edinburgh City Council allowed the agency to receive all funds collected by the city council. The supporter base is serviced by visiting local schools and partners, a newsletter and photo exhibitions.

According to the Institute of Fundraising survey there has been a huge increased in the gift aid donations.

11. Conclusions and lessons learnt

In the fund raising response to such an overwhelming disaster as the tsunami, there are an infinite number of lessons to learn. Therefore the evaluator selected the statements of Islamic Relief, the Mercy Corps headquarters and Mercy Corps Indonesia that were available for in-depth interviews, as examples for some of the overall lessons to be learned. These statements might not be representative, but tell a story about what can be learned.

Islamic Relief

Reporting

- Even for small contributions, the reporting burden was high. Donors should be convinced about the value of global reports (and the costs of reporting: In Indonesia, a reporting officer had to be recruited)
- A reporting manager should have been employed from the beginning for the purpose of even more rigorous fund management and reporting

Human Resources

- A good introduction to attitudes and behaviour for new recruits is important
- For quality assurance and to avoid bur-out, aid workers must be properly trained and accustomed to local culture

In-kind donations

- In-kind contributions caused huge logistical problems

Mercy Corps, HQ

Human Resources

- There is a clear need for good human resources capacities that should be well trained and available at short notice
- Staff needs to be recruited **and** retained

Coordination in evaluation

- The TEC co-ordination effort is very much welcomed and it is hoped that it will serve the purpose of evaluation to all donors in order to avoid endless evaluation missions

Mercy Corps, Indonesia, Jakarta office

Needs assessment

- The vast destruction and the significant funding flows called for immediate action. In the first days of the emergency liaising with key informants on the ground was more feasible in that special situation of overwhelming funding flows than following organisation's time-consuming needs assessment rules

Option of giving cash

- It was important to have the option of giving cash to the affected population through communities and social networks as it proved to be a well-working way of quick and direct support

11.1. Conclusions

It is admirable to see how much information from NGOs is available to the public. Almost all NGOs have been delivering up dates on the tsunami and how the funds have been allocated. There has been a reporting system called "The tsunami - six months on" that has been implemented by almost all agencies. Most reports are based on qualitative data. Nevertheless there is a lack of reporting on financial information like fund's allocation by sectors.
Most INGOs are providing aggregated financial information. This has made difficult to analyse the geographical origin of funds. Some smaller NGOs have not published the funds allocation.

There is lack on *common* reporting of NGOs to the public. It is quite difficult to learn from experiences if there is still some lack of transparency.

For this evaluation coordination was a major issue. Even though the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition was set up to co-ordinate the evaluation efforts, the PARC/DARA evaluation and a DEC study stared nearly simultaneously. Efforts made by PARC/DARA to co-ordinate both studies were fruitless and it seems that DEC's own agenda was more important than the international agenda. In the end the public is loosing out as the experiences from UK NGO's that were initially very keen to collaborate directly with the PARC/DARA study got largely discouraged and blocked by the delays in decision making in the DEC.

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