Inter-Agency Real Time Evaluation (IA-RTE) of the Humanitarian Response to Typhoons Ketsana and Parma in the Philippines

April 2010

Riccardo Polastro
Bernardo Roa
Nicolai Steen

DARA – Development Assistance Research Associates

List of Content

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

*All photographs were taken by Riccardo Polastro during the field mission in the Philippines in February 2010. Cover page: House damaged by the typhoons in Santa Cruz Laguna

ABOUT THE EVALUATION TEAM:

Riccardo Polastro (team leader) is Head of Evaluation at DARA. He has 17 years of experience in humanitarian affairs and development aid in more than fifty countries for the United Nations, the International Movement of the Red Cross, NGOs and donor agencies. Riccardo lectures in several university MA programs and provides professional training on evaluation and development related topics. He has carried out policy and operational evaluations for the DG ECHO, IASC, ICRC, OCHA, UNICEF, SIDA and other organizations. He holds an MPhil in Peace and Security, an MA in International Relations, and Maîtrise of the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, Paris.

Bernardo Redondo Roa, is the current Chairperson of the Grassroots Democracy Institute and Resource Center, Inc., a non-governmental organization based in Northwestern Mindanao, Philippines. He has had prior engagements with international NGOs and the United Nations System in various capacities and had postings in Southern Asia Timor Leste, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Nepal, Pakistan and Uganda, and was Sr. Research Consultant to the Oro Research Resources and Services (ORRES). He is presently pursuing a Ph.D in Public Administration, holds an MA in Management (Development and Human Resource), and a BS Economics and an AB in Philosophy.

Nicolai Steen is evaluation officer at DARA. He has more than 13 years of experience in international development and humanitarian assistance in Africa, Asia and Latin America. He has been a consultant on numerous evaluations, reviews, programme formulation, appraisals and thematic studies for bilateral donors (CIDA, DANIDA, Dfid and SIDA) multilateral organisations (World Bank, NDF, UNICEF, WFP and OCHA), as well as for international NGOs and research entities (Spanish Red Cross, IBIS, ADRA, MS/Action-Aid and DIIS). Nicolai Steen holds an MA in International Development Studies and Education and an advanced degree in International Relations.

List of Acronyms

CAR	Cordillera Autonomous Region
CERF	Central Emergency Response Fund
DA	Department of Agriculture
DCC	Disaster Coordinating Council
DND	Department of National Defence
DOF	Department of Finance
DoH	Department of Health
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
DRM	Disaster Risk Management
DSWD	Department of Social Welfare and Development
DTM	Displacement Tracking Matrix
EC	Evacuation Centre
FA	Flash Appeal
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FRI	Food Relief Items
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GoRP	Government of the Republic of the Philippines
HC	Humanitarian Coordinator (UN)
HCT	Humanitarian Country Team
HDI	Human Development Index
HQ	Headquarter
IASC	Inter Agency Standing Committee
IFRC	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
IOM	International Organization for Migration
ILO	International Labour Organization
LGU	Local Government Unit
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
NCR	National Capital Region
NDCC	National Disaster Coordinating Council
NGOs	Non Governmental Organizations
NFRI	Non Food Relief Items
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OECD / DAC	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development / Development Assistance Committee
PAGASA	Philippine Atmospheric, Geophysical and Astronomical Services Administration
PDNA	Post Disaster Needs Assessment
PNRC	Philippines National Red Cross Society
RC	Red Cross
RTE	Real Time Evaluation
UN	United Nations
UNCT	United Nations Country Team
UNDAC	United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assessment Framework
UNDP	United Nations Development Fund

UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children Education Fund
UN RC	United Nations Resident Coordinator
US	United States
US$	United States Dollars
WASH	Water Sanitation and Hygiene
WB	World Bank
WFP	World Food Program
WHO	World Health Organization

1. Executive Summary

Key findings, conclusions and main recommendations

General Findings

The Philippines is one of the most hazard prone countries in the world (paragraphs 15-17). For this reason, the country has dedicated significant resources to strengthen response capacity and disaster management mechanisms. Under normal circumstances the Filipino Government has the capacity and ability to manage response to natural disasters. However, the magnitude, sequence and impact of the recent typhoons and storms overstretched the Philippines' response capacity. As a result, assistance from the international community was requested (paragraphs 44-47).

In general, the international response positively added to national response mechanisms, but the effectiveness and efficiency of the combined response efforts was hampered by two factors: Firstly, the different sectors of the international response did not systematically take into consideration the existing national capacities and response mechanisms. Secondly, the response was complicated by the fact that the Filipino Government's own response clearly prioritised and focused efforts on certain sectors (clusters) making common coordination and prioritisation a challenging act.

Before the next typhoon season begins, all parties, including the Inter-Agency Standing Committee/Humanitarian Country Team, the Government and National Disaster Coordination Council, and local government units, need to work together more closely to ensure better coordination, understanding of capacities and division of labour in between and within clusters (see specific recommendations below and in annex ii

Needs assessments

While joint needs assessments were carried out throughout the emergency, many were conducted in order to feed into the information needs of individual partners at the cost of coordinated analysis and common approach throughout the cluster system. This resulted in multiple needs assessments that reduced efficiency and challenged coordination and information flow among humanitarian actors because linkages among the identified needs and the response capacity analysis were missing. This information would have contributed to ensure the presence of international actors and enhance thematic and geographic coverage. Common templates were not used and needs assessment data was not standardized. (see paragraph 25-27)

In similar emergencies, the Inter-Agency Standing Committee/Humanitarian Country Team and cluster leads should focus on joint needs assessments, as they will improve effectiveness and efficiency. Cluster leads and cluster members (at a global and country level) should use standard templates and information management procedures in order to facilitate and enhance situational analysis and consolidation of assessed data (see paragraph 32).

Funding

While initial funding flows enabled the international response, the overall funding did not allow for a comprehensive response as foreseen in the Flash Appeals. Most of the funding was pledged within the first three weeks, but quickly levelled off. While the first Flash Appeal was well funded, the revised appeal was the fourth most underfunded Flash Appeal in 2009 (see paragraphs 33-38) one of the main reasons being that the Flash Appeal was inflated and did not properly outline the most critical gaps in the "ongoing" response. Before the appeal was revised, the World Bank's Post Disaster Needs Assessment was formulated upon the Government's request, and seems to have shifted donor attention away from the Flash Appeal (see paragraph 39).

Within the next six months, the Emergency Relief Coordinator, the Head of UNDP Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery and the World Bank, should clearly define the division of labor and the standard operating procedures among the United Nations Flash Appeal, UN recovery plans and the World Bank's Post Disaster Needs Assessment. At the regional level, the respective regional offices should plan in advance how they will divide roles and responsibilities. At the national level, the Humanitarian Coordinator, OCHA's Head of Office and the government should jointly determine the timing of each of these action plans (see paragraphs 41).

Coordination

The international community coordinated the response, together with the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and National Disaster Coordination Council. According to the Government the cluster approach added value in terms of making the international community efforts easier to handle. However, it was also found that both national and international actors did not sufficiently understand the roles, mandates and mechanisms of clusters. In the Philippines, two parallel coordination systems - one for national coordination and the other to coordinate the international effort – were introduced and rolled out. While overall coordination seemed to have functioned well at the capital level, this tendency seemed to have levelled off at decentralised levels (see paragraphs 43-58).

The Government and the United Nations Resident Coordinator should define the division of labor in terms of who does what, where, when, with whom and how.[1] A central part of this process will be to ensure coherence and complementarity between humanitarian actors and the role and extent of the cluster system (see paragraphs 60).

Response

Assistance from the international community complemented a prompt national response and significant value was added in areas where the emergency was prolonged. However, several interviewees reported that initially the overall international response was reactive and "running behind the challenges". Early recovery was not undertaken as foreseen in the appeals, and consequently, the needs of affected populations have only received partial assistance or no assistance at all (see paragraphs 61-78). The levels of preparedness among humanitarian actors differed and an integrated and functional contingency plan was missing (see paragraphs 72 and 75)

The evaluation found positive trends in the activities of individual agencies (see paragraph 81). However, at the inter-agency level, IASC members and government institutions did not agree on response standards beforehand. Sector and geographic coverage was uneven due to the different levels of funding and delivery channels. The vast majority of private, governmental and international donations were channelled through evacuation centres, meaning that the support for people outside these centres was late, uneven and insufficient (paragraph 79).

Before the next Typhoon season, the Inter-Agency Standing Committee/Humanitarian Country Team should, in collaboration with National Disaster Coordination Council, develop a contingency plan in which roles and responsibilities of international and national actors are clearly defined.

UN agencies should focus more holistically on disaster risk reduction measures in their next Development Assistance Framework (see paragraph 83).

---

[1] This plan should be endorsed by the newly elected Filipino government in May 2010.

Key findings, conclusions and recommendations (for a complete list of recommendations refer to annex 2)

AREA	Finding	Conclusion	Recommendation	Responsible Institution	Timing
Needs Assessment	Common templates or standardized procedures were not applied and with a few exceptions, needs assessments were generally carried out to feed into individual partners' information needs. [Paragraphs 25-26]	Without compatible information, assistance is more likely to be provided in an uncoordinated manner or based on assumptions.	To improve effectiveness and efficiency, cluster leads and cluster members should use standard templates and information management procedures (i.e. the 4 W's: who, what, where and when) to enhance situation analysis and consolidate needs. [Paragraph 32]	OCHA, with the support of other cluster leads	Before the next typhoon season(before July 2010)
Funding	The flash appeal was underfunded due to several factors. Among these, the World Bank's Post Disaster Needs Assessment, Focusing on early recovery, the PDNA overshadowed the Revised Flash Appeal. [Paragraph 39]	The Philippines, being a middle income country, and considering the loan-based PDNA, donor support leveled off after the relief efforts and early responses were completed.	Define division of labor among the United Nations Flash Appeal, UN recovery plans and the World Bank's Post Disaster Needs Assessment at global, regional and national levels. Especially in middle income countries where donors are less willing to fund middle to longer term responses. Actors in the Philippines could develop and pilot-test operational standards and procedures for later dissemination country levels. [Paragraph 41]	Emergency Relief Coordinator, the Head of UNDP Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery and the World Bank, as well as regional and national representations UN HC, OCHA, WB and the Government	Within the next 6 months
	Needs and scope of Flash Appeal were overestimated which put insufficient emphasis on critical gaps. [Paragraph 39]	The ability of the UN to work in an integrated manner was not reflected in the Flash Appeal as several clusters recovery activities overlapped.	In middle income countries affected by disasters, there is a need to present the Flash Appeals in a more integrated, prioritized and complementary way. In future emergency operations, the preliminary Flash Appeal should focus on the most critical needs and life saving activities, covering	Humanitarian Coordinator (HC)/Resident Coordinator (RC), OCHA and the HCT	On a revolving basis

AREA	Finding	Conclusion	Recommendation	Responsible Institution	Timing
			a two to three week period. A smaller number of clusters should be rolled out and recovery activities should be combined (i.e. agriculture, early recovery and livelihood) to avoid fragmentation.		
Coordination	The cluster approach can be considered a place for the international response to plug into the national effort. However it proved to be a challenge when clusters did not operate as a joint forum but rather as two parallel systems. [Paragraphs 47-50]	While the cluster approach still seemed unclear to some actors (national and international), there is a firm belief that clusters can efficiently facilitate coordination between the international community and government. [Paragraph 50 and 59]	Define and update the division of labor in terms of who does what, where, when, with whom and how in situations of conflict and disaster. [Paragraph 60-1]	Government and UN RC, OCHA	From now onwards (update after the elections)
Response	The level of preparedness differed among actors and response was also affected by the absence of an integrated and updated contingency plan. [Paragraph 72 and 75]	Increased preparedness is needed in order to provide more effective and efficient future responses.	Elaborate contingency plan and define 'tipping point' or scenarios in which an international response is needed [Paragraph 83]	OCHA, HCT and NDCC	Prior to the next typhoon season(bef ore July 2010)
	Limited effects of prior DRR investments or activities [Paragraph 79]	Few UN agencies invest sufficient resources in DRR related activities	Strengthen government's DRR capacity through integrated activities under the UNDAF [Paragraph 83]	Government and UN HCT	First steps before the next typhoon season (before July 2010) and on a continuous basis under UNDAF

2. Introduction

Subject of Evaluation

Beginning in 2007, the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) piloted three external real time evaluations (RTE)[2] following natural disasters in Mozambique, Pakistan and Myanmar. Lessons from these first RTE experiences were examined in a review in 2009[3] and since late 2009 the RTEs have become an institutionalized and regular practice of the IASC.

This RTE focuses on the humanitarian response following typhoons Ketsana and Parma that swept across the Philippines in the last quarter of 2009. The evaluation intends to inform decision-makers at both the headquarters and field-level; including the Inter-Agency Standing Committee, humanitarian organisations, the Philippine Government, donors as well as the wider international and humanitarian communities.

Purpose

The purpose of the evaluation is to provide a snapshot of the current situation with real-time feedback and lessons learned to the United Nations Country Team and to the Inter-Agency Standing Committee locally. The results of the real-time evaluation are envisaged to support the operational planning of the Humanitarian Country Team and provide recommendations on how to improve the response to typhoons Ketsana and Parma, and similar responses in the future.

---

[2] "In recent years, efforts have been increasingly directed toward improving humanitarian response through inter-agency real-time evaluations (IA-RTE). An IA RTE can be defined as an evaluation carried out at the early implementation states of a humanitarian operation which almost simultaneously feeds back its findings for immediate use by the broader humanitarian community at the field level. An IA RTE is primarily intended for sudden-onset disasters, or protracted crises undergoing a phase of rapid deterioration or escalating violence. These evaluations differ from other forms of humanitarian evaluation regarding speed, coverage, methods, and outputs. IA RTE are typified by their shared management and methodological oversight through global and national level inter-agency reference and management groups; celerity of mobilization, feedback and follow-up; light, agile approaches; restricted scope; and participatory methods. Ideally, IA RTEs seek to unlock inter-agency coordination problems or operational bottlenecks and provide real time learning to the field.

[3] Joint Review of Experience with IASC-madated Real-time Evaluations and the Future of Joint Humanitarian Evaluations, July 2009 by John Telford
http://ochaonline.un.org/OCHAHome/AboutUs/Evaluations/EvaluationReports/tabid/5876/language/en-US/Default.aspx

Objectives

The main objectives of the evaluation are to learn from the initial phases of the response, to identify lessons that should be incorporated into programming and to enable field and headquarter staff to take corrective action as the response evolves.

Audience

The intended audience of the report is the United Nations Country Team and the Inter-Agency Standing Committee in the Philippines, regional offices, respective Inter-Agency Standing Committee headquarters as well as the Inter-Agency real-time evaluation interest group.

Methodology

The evaluation team used both qualitative and quantitative methods. Data collection was initially based on documentary evidence gathered through a desk review. Field evidence was gathered and triangulated through interviews, observation and workshops with different stakeholders and different operational levels.

Structure of the report

The report is structured in main chapters namely "needs assessments", "funding", "coordination" and "response" to regroup the different evaluation questions outlined in the ToR and to respond to the issues raised during the initial briefing with the IASC/HCT.

The Context

"*The Philippines is like a 7/11- we are always open to disasters.*"[4]   Lying on the Western Pacific typhoon belt and the north-western fringes of the Pacific Ring of Fire, the Philippines is among the most disaster-prone countries in the world. It is recurrently exposed to slow and fast onset disasters, such as droughts, earthquakes, floods, landslides, typhoons and volcanic eruptions from approximately 20 active volcanoes. Additionally, four conflicts are currently taking place in the country. Among them is the longest reported internal armed conflict in Asia.

During the third quarter of 2009, three sequential typhoons swept across the Philippines. Typhoons *Ketsana*[5] (locally known as *Ondoy*) and *Parma* (locally known *as Pepeng*) struck

---

[4] Interview with General Rabonza, at NDCC. February 4, 2010
[5] Ketsana, a category 1 storm, brought approximately 450 mm of rain within 12 hours, the equivalent of a month's worth of rain. These rains generated high flooding in the Marikina river, affecting the Metro

the northern Philippines on the 26th of September and the 3rd of October, wreaking havoc across Central Luzon, including Metro Manila (National Capital Region). Typhoon *Mirinae* (locally known as *Santi*), caused further casualties and destruction when it struck southern and central Luzon on the 30th of October, prolonging floods and causing additional damage to already impacted areas. Within five weeks, these typhoons caused numerous causalities and extensive physical damage.

Manila area in the National Capital Region (NCR) and the neighboring Rizal province, including the cities of Antilopo, Makati, Malabon, Marikina, Muntinlupa, Pasig, Quezon, San Juan, Taguig, and Valenzuela.

3. Methodology and Data Collection

1. Prior to the field visit, the evaluation team carried out an extensive desk review of relevant documentation on the emergency, including various situation reports from the United Nations (UN), International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), as well as needs assessments, relevant web-sites, and consultants' reports, among others. On this basis, the team created questionnaires and identified key issues for different interviewee groups. The evaluation team also developed a timeline of the emergency based on the desk review (see Annex VI).

2. Quantitative data analysis provided the team with an indication of the overall donor response to the crisis both in terms of timeliness and sectoral support. Special attention was given to needs assessment and to the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) humanitarian funding mechanisms, including the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF), the Flash Appeals and other organisations rapid response funds.

3. The evaluation team carried out a field visit from the 1st to the 18th of February in which data was collected through interviews, focus groups and field observations. Interviews focused on key issues initially outlined in the inception report and raised during the telephone briefing with Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Evaluation and Studies Section Geneva and the Bangkok Regional Office and in the briefing with the IASC/Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) in Manila.

4. Approximately fifty semi-structured interviews were carried out. Personal interviews took place in different locations, including various affected areas in urban and rural settings. Beneficiary consultation was mostly conducted through focus groups and individual interviews using a prepared script that covered the main issues of the evaluation (i.e. the disaster, needs, response and the future).

5. To address the high turnover of emergency personnel that generally occurs during the early stages of emergency responses, the team conducted telephone interviews (or mail/web-based consultations) to gather information from key staff that had already left the Philippines.

6.   Key informants included those affected by the disasters and organisations active in the humanitarian coordination and response, including the following:

- Governments agencies such as the National Disaster Coordination Council (NDCC) that coordinate and respond to emergency;

- Key managers and stakeholders within the IASC;

- Donor representatives;

- UN agencies:

- Other humanitarian actors such as non-governmental organisations;

- Individuals, families and communities who have received assistance, as well as people who did not benefit from assistance, but live in the areas affected by the typhoons.

Photograph n.2: Resettled families in Laguna

7.   OCHA supported the team in identifying key informants, data and other information that provides relevant information on the efficiency of the coordination and the response.

Locations

8.   A sample of 10 urban and rural field locations were visited by the team, following IASC recommendations and advice. The evaluation team visited the Metro Manila area and the National Capital Region (NCR) (where the highest level of damages were reported), Laguna and Rizal regions (region IV-A reported highest economic losses),[6] covering around 12 different locations. The main purpose was to understand how coordination, needs assessments and response was carried out in the different areas affected by the disasters and to examine the operations of the few humanitarian actors still present. These visits allowed the team obtain a representative sample of the whole cycle of displacement, as the team met people who did not move during the disaster, people who were still in evacuation centres, others in transitional shelter and relocation sites, as well as people who had returned to their areas of origin.

---

[6] According to the PDNA (2009), p. 14

Validation and feedback

9.   Information from interviews, and the findings of the desk review was validated through triangulation and cross-validation. For that purpose, the team used an evaluation matrix in order to systematise and triangulate findings transcribed from interviews. Therefore, before drawing up the findings, the team cross-validated the information as follows:

- documents against interviews;

- research/documentary evidence against interviews;

- observation against interviews;

- comments against initial findings presented during workshops

10. The team organized smaller workshops in the field with government officials at the national level and also at the end of the mission for the purpose of providing feedback and validating initial findings through immediate feedback with the IASC and Humanitarian Country Team. The workshops were followed by regional debriefings in Bangkok on the 19th of February and headquarter debriefings in Geneva on the 23rd of February and in New York on the 26th of February.

Constraints of the Methodology

11. Constraints on the data collection process included staff turnover, the availability of data, representativeness of the sample of areas visited, key stakeholders' availability for interviews and their involvement in the response, as well as their participation in workshops (see annex on RTE process).

12. Time constraints prevented the evaluation team from visiting Northern Luzon.[7] Based on consultations with IASC/HCT and OCHA, the team was also convinced that the most pertinent data would be collected in NCR, Luzon and Rizal, as the interventions were still ongoing, , while only one operation was still running in the North, meaning that very limited beneficiary views could be collected from the northern Luzon provinces. Therefore the team decided to focus on the most damaged parts in the South where the entire cycle of displacement could be assessed

---

[7] Although some support was given from OCHA before the evaluation team arrived to Manila, the agenda had to be constructed almost from scratch. Much time was therefore dedicated to setting up meetings, interviews and field visits. The team acknowledges the support received from Agnes Palacio (OCHA) as well as regional DCC and civil defense staff for visits in and around Manila.

Limitations

13. The RTE took place when the main emergency phase was over, although RTE's are most effective and can have the greatest influence on operations during the early stages of a response. Therefore, as the evaluation has limited influence on operational issues, it focused on the response as a whole. It is nevertheless an opportunity to enhance learning with regards to similar emergencies in the future. The delayed timing of the evaluation also meant that in the initial phases, a more comprehensive (and timely) understanding was lost of the context of the unfolding humanitarian response.

Structure of Report

14. The report is divided into five different chapters that focus on the context, needs assessment, funding, coordination and the response. The structure of the report relates to the TOR and the issues and questions that were raised in these. While the structure does not reflect a prioritization of issues as such, the order should facilitate the readers´ understanding of how the response unfolded. Following the initial briefing with the IASC/HCT and the request of the UN HC, more in depth analysis has been conducted of funding issues.

4. Context

15. *"The Philippines is like a 7-11- we are always open to disasters."*[8]

The Philippines is an archipelagic country located in Southeast Asia, comprised of 7,107 islands[9] in the western Pacific Ocean - sharing maritime borders with Indonesia, Malaysia, Palau, Taiwan, Province of China, and Vietnam. "The Philippines is a middle income country on the low end of MDGs [Millennium Development Goals],"[10] (its rank slipped from 90th in the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) Human Development Index (HDI) in 2007-2008 to 105th in 2009) and it has a population of 84.6 million people - the world's 12th largest population, with the highest birth rate in Asia. Despite being a middle income country with a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita of US$3,406, 43% of its population lives below the poverty line, with less than US$2 per day.[11] Over half of the population lives in areas prone to disasters and conflict.[12]

16. Philippines is among the top 15 of most hazard prone countries with more than a fith of territory and more than a third of its population living in areas at risk Lying on the Western Pacific typhoon belt and the north-western fringes of the Pacific Ring of Fire, it is vulnerable to recurrent slow and fast onset disasters, such as droughts, earthquakes, floods, landslides, typhoons and volcano eruptions from approximately twenty active volcanoes.[13]

Hazards map OCHA 2010.

17. On average, the Philippines experiences numerous typhoons every year (see Graph 1 below[14]), with the northern and eastern parts of the country the most affected. Typhoons remain the deadliest hazards in the

---

[8] As stated by General Rabonza during our meeting with NDCC representatives on the 4th of February 2010.

[9] Most of its population lives on eleven islands.

[10] Interview with UN Resident Coordinator

[11] UNDP Human Development Report 2007/2008

[12] UNICEF (2010), p.113.

[13] According to the UN International Strategy for Disaster Reduction Philippines ranks 12th among 200 countries that are most at-risk for tropical cyclones, floods, earthquakes, and landslides.

[14] EM-DAT: The OFDA/CRED International Disaster Database , www.em-dat.net; Université Catholique de Louvain, Brussels (Belgium)

Philippines, followed by volcanoes and floods. Deaths from typhoon in the 20th Century amounted to 28,812 and economic losses represented US$5,653 million.[15] In 2006, between September and November, three typhoons hit the Philippines in a span of ten weeks.

18. Additionally, four conflicts are currently taking place in the country, among them is the longest internal armed conflict reported in Asia[16] - since the late 1960s the central government has been in conflict with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. In 2008, this conflict produced approximately 600,000 IDPs (IDMC).

The Typhoons and the Evolving Disaster

19. During the third quarter of 2009, three typhoons swept across the Philippines. Typhoons *Ketsana[17]* (locally known as *Ondoy*) and *Parma* (locally known *as Pepeng*) struck the northern Philippines on the 26th of September and the 3rd of October, wreaking havoc across Central Luzon, including Metro Manila (the capital region). Typhoon *Mirinae* (locally known as *Santi*), caused further casualties and destruction when it struck southern and central Luzon on the 31th of October, prolonging floods and causing additional damage to already impacted areas.

Graph 1. Storms in Philippines 2000-2009

Source: EM-DAT: Database Philippines, 2000 – 2009. The OFDA/CRED International Disaster Database, www.em-dat.net; Université Catholique de Louvain, Brussels (Belgium)

---

[15] Natural Disaster Risk Management in the Philippines: Enhancing Poverty Alleviation Through Disaster Reduction" by the World Bank and National Disaster Coordinating Council, 2004.
[16] Despite the July 2009 announcement in the Philippines of the suspension of military operations in a decade-long internal conflict by the Government and by the Moro Islamic Liberation Front two days later, the situation on the ground remains fragile and volatile.
[17] Ketsana, a category 1 storm, brought approximately some 450 mm of rain within 12 hours equivalent to the monthly average of rainfall. These rains generated high flooding in the Marikina River affecting Metro Manila area in the National Capital Region (NCR) and the neighboring Rizal province, including the cities of Antilopo, Makati, Malabon, Marikina, Muntinlupa, Pasig, Quezon, San Juan, Taguig, and Valenzuela.

20. Within five weeks, these typhoons caused extensive causalities and serious physical damage. According to NDCC, Typhoons Ketsana[18] Parma and Mirinae killed 963 people,[19] with 89 people still missing; 46,203 houses have been completely destroyed, and 260,885 significantly damaged. Over 10 million people (about 2 million families) across the country were affected and some 700,000 were physically displaced to more than 720 evacuation centres, while others were hosted by host families (Table 1 summarizes available information by each typhoon). Infrastructure damage and major economic losses represented US$4.4 billion, or 2.7 percent of the Philippine gross domestic product (GDP), according to a World Bank Post-Disaster Needs Assessment report. These disasters where not the deadliest to hit the country, but, typhoon Kestana was the third largest disaster, and Parma the eighth in terms of people affected since 1900.[20]

---

[18] Typhoon Ketsana also affected Vietnam in 2009.
[19] The majority of deaths resulting from Ketsana were due to drowning, while deaths following Parma were also due to landslides.
[20] See the CRED emergency database http://www.emdat.be/result-country-profile last consulted on January 30, 2010.

Estimated Expenses

		Ketsana (Ondoy)	Parma (Pepeng)	Mirinae (Santi)	Total
SUMMARY OF DAMAGE BY STORM	**Affected Provinces**	26	27	13	66
	Affected Municipalities	172	364	123	659
	Affected Cities	16	36	22	74
	Affected Barangays	1,987	5,487	1,148	8,622
	No Affected Families	997,983	954,087	143,849	2,095,919
	No Affected Persons	4,929,382	4,478,284	657,751	10,065,417

Source: NDCC Report Number 52.

21. After a period of prolonged drought, the Philippines experienced abundant rainfall during a period of two weeks. When Ketsana struck, the equivalent of an average month's worth of rain swamped Manila within 12 hours. The San Roque dam had to release reserves into the lake. As a result, water levels progressively started to increase and flooded houses close to the lake.

22. In Manila,[21] which has more than 10 million inhabitants, the impact of the disaster was heightened due to neglected urban planning and strong migratory pressure.[22] Those most affected were the poor and economically vulnerable population in urban areas. They lived – and many still do - in unsafe and hazard prone areas that are located close to the lakeshores, rivers or water-spillways where floods are recurrent events. The lack of alternative settlement areas where livelihoods can be re-established prevents them from leaving the 'danger zones' and they continue to be at risk of future floods. Informal settlers are populating disaster prone areas, residing in make-shift shelters without proper sanitation facilities.

23. In areas with high incidences of poverty, there is often a vicious cycle of limited economic opportunity exacerbated by recurring natural disasters and related vulnerability, set-backs, coping, etc.

---

[21] Manila is built on a strip of land between the sea and Laguna bay.
[22] The Filipino population has boomed from 16 million inhabitants in 1946 to 92 million today with some 8 million nationals living abroad. The present birth rate is the highest in Asia and the population is expected to double within 30 years

5. Needs Assessments

Findings:

24. The government and the IASC carried out a joint needs assessment[23] within 48 hours, outlining the immediate needs in key areas, such as food, logistics, non food items, shelter and water and sanitation. To support the IASC capacity to carry out assessments, United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination **(**UNDAC) and Regional Disaster Response Teams were deployed to support the UN agencies and RC Movement present in the country. Following the first assessments, partners within the different clusters initiated their own assessments and over the next two to three months, 57 needs assessment missions took place.[24]

25. With few exceptions,[25] needs assessments were generally carried out to feed into individual partners' information needs, mostly driven by mandates and individual organisations' activities, and not according to a coordinated analysis and common approach through the cluster system, reducing the level of efficiency.[26] First of all, the many assessments meant that large quantities of data were produced, but many interviews highlighted that data was not consolidated for the purpose of providing an overall picture of needs and existing gaps. Secondly, although information sharing within the clusters was good, the lack of consolidated analysis of needs also meant that interventions within the clusters were not prioritised to target those most in need.

26. There were no common templates or standardized procedures that guided the partners' assessments to ensure that the right information was collected. A common feature for these assessments was the missing linkages among needs and analysis of identified needs, the capacity to respond, presence, coverage and eventual gaps. This was generally absent at the cluster and inter-cluster level and prevented partners from identifying who does what, where, when and how prior to the assessments. Without this information, assistance is more

---

[23] Government participation included the Office of Civil Defense (OCD), the Department of Health (DOH), the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DWSD). UN participation included IOM, UNOCHA, WHO, WFP, UNICEF and UNDP.

[24] The number is based on team's own account, according to http://www.un.org.ph/response/assessments.php. The account does not include assessments that have not been registered by IASC or international partners through this website.

[25] The emergency food security assessment was jointly carried out in November 2009 by WFP, DSWD, FAO, UNICEF, SCF, Oxfam, World Vision, Christian Aid and CFSI.

[26] One EC in Pasig City recorded 44 assessment missions

likely to be provided in an uncoordinated manner or based on assumptions, inhibiting the conditions necessary for an efficient and effective response.

27. However there are several factors that may explain the reason so many assessments were carried out.

- Firstly, there was a general lack of accurate data from local authorities; data was either destroyed by the typhoon or the capacity to produce data at the local level was overwhelmed by the events. Secondly, the lack of communication (physical and structural) from Barangay levels prevented provincial, regional and National Disaster Coordination Councils from consolidating data. Reportedly, there were contradictions or significant variations among the numbers from province, region, municipal and Barangay levels, and the data from the local level was not sufficiently disaggregated to allow for specific 'cluster' targeting.[27] According to OCHA's Situation Report there were differences among the needs reported by NDCC, DSWD, UNDAC and other assessments.[28]

- Secondly, the templates used by the government were too basic and merely indicated the number of damaged and destroyed houses, people affected and deaths by province.[29] They were not sector specific, despite the fact that a recommendation from the 2007 NDCC and UN lessons learned workshop was that needs assessment templates for each cluster be developed and that clusters act as a "*clearing mechanisms for data gathered in the different sectors.*"[30]

- Thirdly, assessments were not shared. They were only posted on websites and served more as evidence of what had been carried out instead of being a source of continuous situation analysis.

The clusters did not come up with clear alternatives and ways of improving the efficiency of assessments while operations were ongoing.

---

[27] This meant that partners, including governmental institutions such as DSWD and DoH, the UN and INGOs, did not have sufficient data upon which to base their emergency response.
[28] OCHA situation report n. 11, 20 October 2009
http://www.un.org.ph/response/general/sitReps/OCHA%20Situation%20Report%2011_Typhoon%20Ketsana%20and%20Parma%20-%2020%20October%202009.pdf
[29] NDCC situation report n. 24, October, 7 2009
http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWFiles2009.nsf/FilesByRWDocUnidFilename/VVOS-7WLM6Z-full_report.pdf/$File/full_report.pdf
[30] A report on the Assessment of Organizational Responses to the December 2006 Typhoon Disaster: A "Lessons Learned" workshop, A joint undertaking of the National Disaster Coordinating Council, the United Nations and its Partners, Legaspi City, Philippines, May 29-30, 2007

28. An exception from these general observations is the Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) – introduced by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and used by the Department of Social Welfare (DSW) to assess conditions at evacuation centers.[35] While the DTM provides a general and useful picture of the situation at evacuation centers, or transitional shelter sites, it does not however, identify roles, responsibilities or recommendations and assist relevant partners in identifying gaps in service delivery.

29. With the exception of the Red Cross Movement, some NGOs, private groups, and the church, few organisations consulted the affected population on what their needs were, and even fewer provided feedback or information to the affected population on what, how and when assistance would eventually be provided. Among all beneficiaries consulted during the field visit, there were no cases of the beneficiary population being involved in the entire cycle of the emergency response. Apart from being consulted on a limited basis to define what their needs were, the affected population did not receive feedback on what they were entitled to and did not participate in monitoring.

30. Need assessments generally left out disaggregated data by sex and age. This renders vulnerable groups such as women, girls, children, the disabled and the elderly population invisible. Since all this information is integrated within the "vulnerable" group, there is limited clarity regarding the specific needs of each age-group or sex, and therefore, tends to generate a more standard response, which is neither effective nor efficient. While aggregated data would have allowed for better targeting and responses to specific needs, the overall approach has overtly been 'one size fits all', with the exception of hygiene kits for women at evacuation centres.

Conclusions

31. Needs assessments must be carried out jointly across clusters (horizontally), providing the international community and the government with the opportunity to share information and potentially coordinate the response at the national level and decentralised levels (vertically) in order to avoid the so-called 'disconnect' between central and local coordination. Integrating both dimensions means a more effective and efficient response.

32. **Specific recommendations are (see also Annex II):**

1. OCHA Head of Office, with the support of other cluster leads (i.e. World Food Program (WFP)), should support the government in improving its information management. This will enhance the government's coordination capacity in identifying outstanding needs, as well as in prioritizing and bridging sector and geographic gaps.

2. In similar emergencies, the IASC/HCT and cluster leads should carry out more joint needs assessments

3. To improve effectiveness and efficiency, cluster leads and cluster members should use standard templates and information management procedures (i.e. the 4 W's: who, what, where and when) to enhance situation analysis and consolidate needs.

4. The information management templates should also be built into the work flows of all agencies prior to the emergency –

5. In similar emergencies, all IASC/HCT components must actively involve the affected population throughout the whole program cycle (as far as this is possible) and integrate accountability mechanisms (i.e. did the affected population receive what they needed?).

6. Funding

Findings

33. While initial funding flows activated the international response; the overall funding did not allow for the integrated response foreseen in the Flash Appeals. Most of the existing funding was released within the first three weeks of Ketsana and interest in funding the Philippine typhoons decreased (see Graph 2). At the time of the RTE, the Flash Appeal remained highly underfunded – not surpassing 37%.

34. Nationally, public and private resources were swiftly mobilized through multiple channels and triggered the response of national actors. After the government requested the support of the international community, organisations' and donors' rapid funding response mechanisms, such the IFRC's Disaster Relief Emergency Fund (DREF),[31] WFP and United

> On October 7th, the UN launched a first Flash Appeal (FA) of US$74 million to meet the urgent relief and early recovery needs of the most vulnerable people affected by Ketsana. The appeal was based on an initial caseload of 2.5 million affected people. Fifteen UN organisations and NGOs submitted some 55 project proposals across thirteen clusters. Following typhoons Parma and Mirinae, a revised FA was issued on the 18th of November and the requested amount doubled to meet the needs of an estimated 4.2 million people in 364 municipalities. The total number of projects increased to 137. The level of requirements in key areas such as agriculture, economic recovery and infrastructure, education, food, protection and shelter nearly doubled in the revised Flash Appeal. With the exception of the food cluster, all the clusters mentioned above were funded below 12%.

Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) emergency funds and CERF,[32] as well as European Commission Humanitarian Office's (ECHO) primary emergency decision were activated. These allowed all IASC HCT components, namely NGOs, the Red Cross Movement and the UN, to initiate the international humanitarian response. Other countries from South East Asia mobilized large quantities of in-kind donations. These donations are unaccounted for, however, as they have not been registered by the national government or the Local Government Units (LGUs).

35. Overall, the nature and level of these resource flows triggered a fast but short response. Even if the Flash Appeal were launched ten days after the first typhoon, donors'

---

[31] In response to the Philippines Red Cross National Society request, the IFRC allocated approximately US$242,000 from it's Disaster Relief Emergency Fund (DREF) and on October 1st launched a preliminary emergency appeal of US$3 million to assist an estimated 100,000 people.
[32] From a global perspective, the Philippines in 2009 were the 9th largest recipient of CERF funds receiving a total of USD$11,904,932. In regional terms, it was the third largest recipient of CERF funds in Asia, after Sri Lanka and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. CERF funds have been requested for the Philippines both for sudden onset disasters and forgotten crises for the conflict in the South of the country. CERF funding by Country Summary (01-01-2009 to 31-12-2009)

responsiveness did not last long and was mostly limited to the immediate response. In mid-November, when the Flash Appeal was revised, the CERF was still the largest source of funding.[33] Progressively, traditional donors to the Philippines, including the United States, Australia and ECHO funded the response to Kestana, but the overall donor commitment was low, and 80 percent of the total contributions received in the Flash Appeal came from only seven donors.[34]

36. The first Flash Appeal was relatively well funded compared to the second. Before being revised, 91% of the total funding received had already been pledged. However, after its revision, the Philippines Flash Appeal became the 4th most underfunded, with only 37% of funding requests met (see Graph 2).

Graph 2: Evolution of Funding Philippines Flash Appeal – Revised October 2009 - March 2010.

Source: UN FTS October 2009 – March 2010.

37. Funding distribution varied substantially across the twelve clusters and funding gaps where reported in several clusters (see graph 3).[35] Several UN agencies and NGOs could not respond without securing funding upfront because they did not have their own emergency funding mechanisms. Other UN agencies were underfunded and were not able to reach their

[33] OCHA FTS November 13 and revised FA (2009), p.7
[34] These donors included the US (23.8%), CERF (12.8%), ECHO (11.5%), private funding (11.1%), Australia (8.5%), Japan (8.5%) and Canada (4.3%).
[35] The sectors that received the most funding were food (54%) and coordination (53%), followed by water and sanitation (29%) and health (28%), while others such as agriculture (12%), shelter and non food items (10%), protection, human rights and the rule of law (8%), economic recovery (7%) and education (4%) were largely underfunded. FTS consulted on January, 20, 2010.

objectives and finalize their programmed activities. Subsequently, the UN HC stated that "*The emergency response is being hampered by low levels of funding, particularly in areas such as agriculture, protection, shelter and education of children.*"[36]

Graph 3: Sectoral distribution to Philippines Flash Appeal –Revised
October 2009 - March 2010.

38. Donors and appealing organisations reported that the total humanitarian funding, including contributions outside the Flash Appeal (bilateral, Red Cross, etc.), amounted to US$93,566,715.[37] Other international organisations, such as the IFRC, managed to secure 47 percent of their requirements,[38] while larger international NGOs, such as ADRA, Handicap International, Oxfam and World Vision received 100% of their funding requirements, notably outside the Flash Appeal.

39. Several factors contributed to the limited international donor response to the Flash Appeal:

---

[36] IRIN News 18 November 2009. PHILIPPINES: Funding shortfall brings health, food security risks, UN warns http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?ReportId=87094

[37] FTS consulted as of 20/01/2010

[38] Nevertheless, the head of IFRC shelter department in Geneva stated that "the dramatic lack of funding could seriously jeopardize our ability to provide vital emergency and transitional shelter to highly vulnerable populations. At the same time, emergency shelters, such as schools and churches are closing, and the people housed there have to leave. So there is an urgent need to distribute shelter materials to people wishing to repair their homes and to build transitional shelters." IFRC, 30/12/2009 Cluster shelter lead also indicated that the lack of funding worsens the plight of homeless typhoon survivors. http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900SID/EDIS-7Z8MCW?OpenDocument

1) At the international level
   - There was low and short media coverage of the crisis
   - The disaster happened at the end of the fiscal year

2) At the regional level
   - Other major emergencies took place at the end of the year. The typhoons occurred almost simultaneously with other disasters in the South Asia and Pacific region, particularly the earthquakes in Bhutan and Indonesia and the Samoa tsunami.
   - Typhoon Ketsana also had a regional impact, affecting Laos and Vietnam.

3) At the national level
   - Donors considered that actors in the country could manage the response with isolated international support (on the assumption that the GoRP disaster response structure (NDCC and PNRC was sufficiently robust and well functioning).
   - Being a middle income country on the low end of MDGs, several OECD DAC countries do not consider the Philippines a priority country for their humanitarian funding. Therefore, donors tend to focus on emergency relief and are more reluctant to fund recovery activities.
   - The recurrence of disasters in the Philippines and (Mindanao) has led to a progressive donor fatigue.
   - There is a small pool of international donors present in the country that essentially work through bilateral channels with the government.
   - These disasters hit the country before the elections and some donors did not want to provide assistance, as it could be quickly politicized.
   - Traditionally, the UN draws on the CERF to fund the protracted crisis and sudden onset disasters in the Philippines, but does not have a humanitarian strategy in place.

4) Flash Appeal content:
   - According to several interviewees, needs were overestimated in the Flash Appeal. When the first appeal was launched, most needs assessments where still ongoing. Needs were poorly prioritized and the operation was in the relief "fog". The appeal was revised twice and despite the information being incomplete a decision was taken to proceed with the launch. The decision was based on the fact that to delay the submission of the launch would delay the potential for aid reaching those in desperate need. However, some actors interviewed during the field mission considered it inaccurate and based on quick and dirty assessments they consider overestimated. As in other emergencies, there is a trade off between the need for more accurate information and responding to the need. The assessments used to create the Flash Appeal were based on unverified assumptions.[39]

---

[39] For immediate planning purposes, the IASC is using the NDCC-based assumption that one million people will require assistance over the next six months., Philippines Flash Appeal 2009, p.6

- The Flash Appeal did not reveal what and where the real gaps were, or highlight what the government was doing and what it could do, and what the UN would do.
- According to several donors and stakeholders interviewed in the field the period covered in the Flash Appeal was too long as the activities included were initially foreseen to last six months
- The ability of the UN to work in an integrated manner was not reflected in the Flash Appeal. Some donors perceived it as an individual agency shopping list maximizing their own interest, rather than a prioritization based on inclusiveness, coordinated needs analysis and agency complementarity.
- The World Bank's Post Disaster Needs Assessment overshadowed the Flash Appeal and donors switched their attention as most of the early recovery activities in the Flash Appeal were also included in World Bank's Post Disaster Needs Assessment. Overall, these Flash Appeal recovery activities[40] with a cost US$68.7 million, were integrated in the PDNA.[41] Flash Appeal activities are funded with donations, while the PDNA activities are funded through loans.

- Several clusters' recovery activities overlapped among early recovery, livelihoods, agriculture, etc.

Conclusions

40. The UN HC/RC and OCHA, need to develop an outline of a humanitarian funding strategy before the next OCHA donor support group visit (foreseen for the end of March 2010). In order to have more a predictable, flexible and coherent response, the UN, with the donor community, could consider developing an emergency response fund. This funding instrument would also allow boosting contingency planning.

Recommendations

41. The evaluation team recommends that:

1. At *global level* the Emergency Relief Coordinator, the Head of UNDP Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery and the World Bank clearly define the division of labor among the United Nations Flash Appeal, UN recovery plans and the World Bank's Post Disaster Needs Assessment.

2. At the *regional* level, the respective regional offices should plan in advance how they will divide roles and responsibilities.

3. At the *national* level the HC, OCHA HOO and the Government will jointly determine the timing of each of these action plans. The United Nations Humanitarian

4. Coordinator/Resident Coordinator, together with the Government, should develop standard operational procedures at headquarter, regional and country levels.

---

[40] Including agriculture, housing, education, health, water and sanitation, local government recovery through LGUs and social protection
[41] See PDNA (2009), p.18.

42. In middle income countries affected by disasters, Humanitarian Coordinator (HC)/Resident Coordinator (RC), OCHA and the HCT team should make sure that Flash Appeals are presented in a more integrated, prioritized and complementary way. In future emergency operations, the preliminary Flash Appeal should focus on the most critical needs and life saving activities, covering a two to three week period. A smaller number of clusters should be rolled out and recovery activities should be combined mainstreamed to avoid fragmentation, i.e. agriculture, early recovery and livelihood.

7. Coordination

Findings

43. The international community coordinated the response with the Government of the Philippines (GoRP) and NDCC. According to the GoRP, the cluster approach added value in terms of making the international community's efforts easier to handle. Nevertheless, its effectiveness and efficiency can be improved in future emergencies.

National System

44. First of all, the Philippines has a strong track record of national disaster management and is considered a reference in other Asian middle income countries. The GoRP, through NDCC,[42] is able to respond to small and middle scale disasters, however, disaster management capacity within the government varies (in terms of organisational capacity, decision-making processes, leadership, availability of human and financial resources, operational means and focus on risk). Funding is tied to the level of revenues from the population and corresponds to 5% of the taxes paid by citizens, which directly determines the response capacity at the local level.

45. In general, the government is not keen on internationalizing disasters. On the one hand, this is due to their negative experience in the 2006 typhoon response in which there was a heavy influx of uncoordinated organisations and unrequested assistance. The other reason for the government's reluctance to internationalize disaster response is their unwillingness to increase the attention and presence of foreign organisations in Mindanao.

46. Nevertheless, the scale of damage and suffering caused by typhoons Ketsana and Parma overwhelmed the national capacity to respond, and the GoRP called for international assistance. Despite their request for assistance, the GoRP was not used to working with the UN agencies in the affected areas in Luzon and several problems arose initially, both in practical terms (i.e. information management or coordinating the response at the regional, provincial or municipal levels), and also strategically, regarding the definition of the roles and responsibilities of the two coordination systems, the international and national cluster systems.

---

[42] See annex on structure and function

> In the Philippines, there is no direct line management from the national bureaus to the provinces or the municipalities. For example, the DSWD at the national level directly manages only the regional level. The provincial DSWD officer is directly managed by the Provincial Governor. There is no direct line management from the Province Office to the Municipality. In turn, at the municipal level, the DSWD is directly accountable only to the mayor. The mayor is accountable to the population of the municipality and is free to operate independently. Such a system is challenging to the humanitarian community for two reasons. Firstly, information retrieval becomes complex as the responsibility for overall coordination is lost and secondly, the people responsible for identifying those most affected are based at the municipal and at Barangay level and are dependent on the Office of the Mayor for they salary. Therefore, at the municipal level, the MSWDO is in an uncomfortable situation, as they may look to serve the political interest of the mayor rather than the humanitarian imperative, as this is their direct management line. This results in a lack of confidence within the system and a mistrust of the listings of the affected populations.

47. When large scale disasters hit the Philippines and require an international response, the cluster approach can be considered a place for the international response to plug into the national effort. Although coordination and cooperation with the government improved over time, the two parallel cluster systems proved to be a challenge[43] when clusters where not operating as a joint forum.

The table below summarizes the government clusters lead and their IASC counterparts.[44]

Cluster/Sector	Government Cluster Lead	IASC Cluster Lead
Agriculture	Department of Agriculture	FAO
Camp Coordination/Camp Management	Department of Social Welfare and Development	IOM
Child Protection (Protection sub-cluster)	Department of Social Welfare and Development	UNICEF
Coordination	National Disaster Coordinating Council	OCHA
Early Recovery	Office of Civil Defence	UNDP
Education	Department of Education	UNICEF
Food	Department of Social Welfare and	WFP

---

[43] The cluster approach is not new in the Philippine context. Following the UN reform and the 2006 international response to the Reming Typhoon, the UNCT rolled out the cluster approach in the Philippines. Since May 2007, the government institutionalized the cluster approach in the Philippines Disaster Management System. Eleven national clusters have been established and cluster leads have been designated to define operational strategies. These strategies are developed in conjunction with international agencies

[44] It is interesting to note that the IASC protection cluster has no official counterpart among government agencies.

Cluster/Sector	Government Cluster Lead	IASC Cluster Lead
	Development	
Health	Department of Health	WHO
Livelihoods	Department of Social Welfare and Development	ILO
Logistics & Emergency Telecommunications	Office of Civil Defence / National Disaster Coordinating Council Operations Centre	WFP
Nutrition	Department of Health	UNICEF
Shelter & NFIs	Department of Social Welfare and Development	IFRC (shelter) and IOM (NFIs)
WASH	Department of Health	UNICEF

48. The fact that the government, with the support of IASC partners, leads assessment and the response has different implications depending on whether it is in a conflict or disaster setting. In Mindanao, the government acts as cluster lead and simultaneously is party to the conflict. This represents a serious issue in operational and political terms for the UN, which must intervene through the government, but whose ability to act independently is constrained.

49. Despite the fact that most of the international clusters took time to get started, they did well integrating a variety of organisations that the government has been unable to handle, considering the different nature of their mandates and agendas. Clusters also improved networking and information sharing, which was highly appreciated by most interviewees. However, in several clusters, most cluster participants and some cluster leads considered the lack of information management and coordinated analysis to be a constraint.

50. In general, all national and international actors did not sufficiently disseminate and understand the role, mandate and mechanisms of the clusters. The division of labour between the government and international clusters was not clear and clusters sometimes operated in parallel. Even if national cluster counterparts were identified, the IASC system did not fit into the national set-up.[45] According to a donor representative interviewed during the field mission, "*people did not know what they were supposed to be doing and who was the lead.*"

51. Nevertheless, the food, logistics, health and WASH clusters successfully managed a clear division of labour with the government. Initially, only the IFRC, UNHCR, WFP and WHO had

---

[45] Prior to the typhoon the government merged the shelter and protection and camp management cluster but did not participate in any of these cluster meetings.

clearly mandated international clusters with full time staff dedicated to leading the clusters, while others relied mainly on program staff temporarily assigned to manage the emergency response.

52. The availability of staff represented a critical issue according to many organisations. Most of the staff present in the country worked on regular program activities. The surge capacity allowed UN agencies to shift from development to an emergency mode. Some organisations, such as WFP, increased their small liaison office in Manila to fifty people. Nevertheless, the high turnover of emergency staff affected institutional memory and working relationships.

53. The major challenges reported were that government officials did not attend some cluster meetings (protection, shelter and livelihoods), as they mainly prioritized relief. Some clusters were too multi-dimensional with no clear counterpart, outcome or output. These clusters progressively became 'virtual', as all parties did not share and understand basic concepts. The division of labour was better for organisations that had a functional relationship with the government prior to the disaster, such as WHO, WFP and UNICEF.

54. Clusters did not always lead to a more strategic response, nor was there evidence that they promoted greater coverage or connectedness, as vertical and horizontal coordination was repeatedly challenged.

1. At the international level, effective partnership between the UN/Red Cross/NGOs and the government worked on an ad hoc basis due to the different mandates and operational cultures.

2. Cluster coordination work well at the capital level but progressively lost ground in the field. Strategic field coordination was mostly absent and represented a major disconnect, as the high level of decentralization and decision making process at the municipal level had not been taken into consideration. Field level coordination was often absent and disabled local prioritization and accountability.[46]

3. Some organisations, especially small NGOs and private organisations responded directly at the municipal and Barangay level, posing a challenge to existing national and international coordination mechanisms.

---

[46] Nevertheless, there were fewer actors responding in the North.

Meetings

55. Initially, cluster meetings had many participants as organisations saw a clear added value for information gathering and funding opportunities, but progressively were attended only by operational partners. Smaller NGOs made some commitments upfront without having secured the necessary funding. In addition, cluster leads did not manage to secure and follow through with their commitments to respond, monitor and control the quality. According to most interviewees, cluster leads often acted partially, reporting only on their own activities.

56. However, for most actors interviewed, cluster meetings represented a major constraint and need to be rationalized. According to most interviewees, coordination meetings often lasted too long. Time was managed inefficiently and it was inconvenient for many organizations to have to travel to Makati, as they had to make three hours available to travel the distance through Manila's perpetual traffic jams.

57. Often the agenda was undefined, with no clear output, and participants were not always in a position to make decisions. Several organisations faced the dilemma of either prioritizing attending meetings or being able to respond. Staff turnover also represented a concern in terms of coordination for interviewees.

58. OCHA's presence was not strong from the onset, being initially managed by the regional office for Asia and the Pacific in Bangkok. Although funding was received promptly, OCHA was only able to establish an office starting in December. The effectiveness of the inter-agency coordination was hampered by the fact that OCHA was initially understaffed and could not provide the overall coordination support needed from the onset. The support of the regional delegation was key, but it did not manage to provide the coordinated analysis that was needed.[47] Another constraint was that each cluster did not always analyze what had been done and what needed to be done. However, despite its minimal presence in September, OCHA was able to strategically support NDCC.

Conclusions:

59. The cluster approach can be considered a place for the international response to plug into the national effort. Clusters can facilitate the coordination of the international

---

[47] OCHA office received initial and essential support from both the Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific and Headquarters as surge staff were deployed. From mid-November surge staff started to leave and severe understaffing set in from 12 December.

community and support the government with fewer counterparts. The IASC/HCT should not focus on increasing its own capacity, but that of government.

Recommendations:

60. The recommendations are prioritised as follows:

1. Before the next typhoon season hits the region, the Government and the United Nations Resident Coordinator should define and update the division of labor in terms of who does what, where, when, with whom and how.[48] A central part of this process will be to ensure that all humanitarian actors understand what the role of the international cluster is *vis-a-vis* the national one, their functions and how they complement each other both when conflict and disasters strike.

2. The UN RC/HC, with the support of OCHA, the IASC/ HCT and clusters leads, should continue to build the capacity of the government to prioritize and lead future emergency responses. A more mainstreamed response is essential from within the government structure to improve its capacity to respond to future emergencies.

General recommendation replicable in other contexts:

Custer leads need to return to basics. When meetings are held, an agenda must be shared beforehand and outputs must be clearly defined (i.e. identifying what the most urgent needs, the actions required and who is able to meet them).

---

[48] This plan should be endorsed by the newly elected Filipino government in May 2010.

8. Response

61. Primary emergency response by local communities and the national and local government units was prompt and swift. Although their response was not immediate, the international community supported national relief efforts, especially in areas where the emergency was prolonged. Early recovery was not undertaken as foreseen in the appeals, with the result that affected populations have only received partial assistance or no assistance at all.

Photograph n. 3: Displaced women in IDP camp in Santa Cruz

62. The magnitude of the effects of typhoon Ketsana, affecting highly populated areas, including the Philippines' economic centres and the central administration, overwhelmed the GoRP's capacity to respond to the evolving emergency situation. Within 48 hours, a request for international assistance was launched to support the national response effort. On the 2nd of October, the Government declared a national state of calamity, requesting all agencies to coordinate activities through the NDCC.

The national response

63. Following Ketsana, the GoRP responded rapidly by launching a search and rescue operation in the flooded areas and immediately releasing emergency relief stocks on the 26-27 of September. The Philippines military and the National Red Cross Society, as well as the police, the bureau of fire protection and the coast guard also responded immediately. The private sector, volunteer groups, and the US military rapidly joined the relief effort.

64. The Philippines is considered a regional model in terms of responding to emergencies. The response to the late 2009 emergencies was no exception. In varying degrees, LGUs provided assistance to the flood victims starting on day one.[49] Some areas were already on alert when Ketsana hit and the municipalities and Barangays were fast. They immediately

---

[49] The local response uses the so-called calamity funds which represent 5% of local tax revenues. The response capacity therefore varies according to vulnerability and revenues.

indicated where the affected population should evacuate and made shelter arrangements that same day for the affected population at evacuation centres - mostly in elementary schools or other public facilities.

65. The first to benefit from the local response were those that sought refuge at the evacuation centres. Here, food items and water was provided immediately while the affected population that stayed in their homes did not receive the same levels of assistance due to access problems. Nevertheless, the majority of the international actors recognized that the local response to the emergency was robust and timely. The same applies to Metro Manila area, where many areas were flooded for the first time since 1979. Here, according to reports and most interviewees, the first response was fast - the search and rescue operations and provision of relief items was timely and appropriate. They also have highlighted the stand-by agreements between LGUs and the private sector in these urban areas, as they facilitated the provision of items for the initial response.

66. At the same time, private donations from within the Philippines were sent to the affected areas. While they were appreciated by the population, these donations posed a challenge for the authorities in terms of coordination and making sure that all needs were met and duplication avoided. Duplications were reported several times at LGU levels and this seems to indicate that coordination efforts at local level did not manage to optimize the initial response. In the first weeks following Ketsana, some of the affected population in the evacuation centres received five food distributions.

67. Some of the challenges facing the overall response were that distributions in local areas, mainly at LGU or Barangay levels, were often based on political alliances. The politisation of assistance also prevented international partners from targeting assistance based on need.

68. Furthermore, the international partners and central government had to deal with a lack of clear plans for resettlement and the uncoordinated closures of evacuation centres; decisions were made at the local level without prior notice or information, preventing international partners from addressing the evolving needs efficiently.

Unfolding IASC´s Response

69. The IASC/HCT response went through three different channels, namely the Red Cross Movement, United Nations agencies and NGOs. Each of these components of the humanitarian system worked through different national counterparts - the Philippines Red Cross Society, the national government and directly at the Barangay level. Overall, the response was most effective when these different actors managed to coordinate. However, the scale and scope of their work, as well as the speed and connectedness of their response varied substantially according to the levels of funding, presence, previous working relationship and surge capacity.

70. As the emergency situation unfolded, what was originally foreseen as being a response to the emergency situation caused by Ketsana became a response to the sequential disasters during the month of October.[50] This was aggravated by the inadequate management of flood waters (i.e. insufficient spill-water conducts from the lake), which affected large parts of the population with prolonged floods and slow receding water levels.

71. Therefore, two to three weeks after Ketsana, when international actors began to respond, their response was mainly focused on the prolonged effects of Ketsana and the effects of Mirinae and Parma (see Annex v).

Preparedness

72. According to interviewees, the level of preparedness differed among the humanitarian actors. The RC Movement, through the National Society and its branches, had a functional contingency plan, while the UN's 2006 contingency plan was outdated and dysfunctional, as the role and mandate of national institutions had changed since then.[51]

73. When the disasters struck, the RC Movement responded swiftly. NGOs with long-standing presence in the country also responded promptly at the local level. Comparatively, it took more time for the UN CT to mobilize.

74. Few experienced international emergency response practitioners were present in the country when the disaster first hit. As a result, several organisations moved personnel working in Mindanao to support the initial response effort. Nonetheless, the different agencies managed to mobilize surge capacity and the first support came in only a few days after the 26th of September. With the support of the surge capacity, the international

---

[50] 'Parma' hit the Northern part of Luzon three times from October 3 and 'Mirinae' (end of October) heavily affecting already flooded areas in Region IV-A
[51] NDCC Circular No 05 s 2007 10/05/2007

clusters coordinating mechanisms progressively became active (see paragraphs 70-90 on coordination).

75. As the emergency operations unfolded, there were still strategic and practical issues to be addressed. First and foremost, there was no clear prioritization of who does what, when, how and in which sectors and geographical areas, due to the absence of an integrated contingency plan. Such a plan should define operational roles and responsibilities of the major international organisations and how these would best complement each other and the government's assistance, taking into consideration the Filipino context (capacity, middle income country, low donor presence, etc.).

76. The connectedness or transition between relief, rehabilitation and development has been limited due to funding constraints and the absence of a clear division of labour among international actors. Hence, while the international food relief items and non food relief items complemented the national relief efforts, the international partners failed to respond to needs in areas related to livelihoods (including agriculture), shelter and early recovery, where major gaps remain. Beneficiaries interviewed said that their basic needs of food and non food items were largely met, but priorities such as livelihoods and shelter had not been met.[52]

77. Response standards were not agreed upon beforehand, both among IASC members and in

> Presently, in San Vicente, some 38 families are still living in tents but still do not know when they will be relocated. Others living in transitional shelter had no access to water and livelihoods.

coordination with governmental institutions. The government has clearly stated that response standards should follow national criteria and capacities; however there were no signs of putting measures into practice to meet or define these standards, on the part of the government or the IASC. As for inter-agency preparedness, there were cases where standards (or practices) were defined during the operations. For example, the position on 'safe feeding' for infants and young children at evacuation centres was not clear;[53] a common UN stance related to usage of schools as evacuation centres was lacking;[54] as was an agreement on quantities of food to be delivered (this was further compounded by the fact that the centres received in kind private donations) and the best way to address water and sanitation at evacuation centres in urban settings.

---

[52] According to the affected population consulted, cash grants were would be appreciated as these were the best way to recover/ reactivate their livelihoods
[53] UNICEF worked on ensuring secure feeding at ECs. A new UNICEF strategy has recently been published and the experiences from the Philippines seems to be good learning for the organization in terms of adapting strategy to different needs and contexts.
[54] While some clusters advocated for closure of ECs in order not to disrupt schooling (education), others were concerned with lack of alternative solutions for evacuees (protection). A thirds party (shelter) was unable to provide solution due to lack of funding.

78. Several interviewees also highlighted that the immediate response of clusters was hampered by a lack of personnel, as most have been assigned to regular programming and not the emergency response. Despite the major effort of the UN CT to mobilise and respond, interviewees indicated that the lack of experience of the UN team seems to have "delayed the 'kick-off'", and as a result, the response became reactive, or as one interviewee put it: "we are running behind the challenges,"[55] – not anticipating them. Furthermore, as previously mentioned, the role and mandate of the IASC clusters was not always clear to all actors participating in the initial response.

The overall response:

79. Generally, the international community managed to channel emergency relief to many of the affected areas during the floods caused by tropical storm Ketsana and typhoon Parma. The affected population has generally expressed their unreserved appreciation of the relief assistance received. While the response improved over time, the effectiveness was conditioned by several factors, including:

a) The early warning system functioned for the second typhoon but not for the first. All those interviewed who had been affected by typhoon Ketsana left their houses after they were flooded, while pre-emptive measures were taken before Parma, evacuating more than 45,000 people. In other words, during the first typhoon, the response was more reactive, compared to the second.

b) The level of preparedness differed among the actors.

   i. The local government was better prepared in rural settings than in urban settings.

   ii. The HCT not as well prepared for the first typhoon. When the second typhoon struck, the HCT was already in operational mode.

c) The emergency responses went through parallel systems and highly decentralized administrations, leading to uneven geographical coverage. Some areas such as Marikina and Pasig received large quantities of assistance, while others received far less. Duplications were reported particularly at the Barangay level.

d) Most of the relief assistance went through the evacuation centres, while a very limited number of organisations managed to work directly with the population outside the evacuation centres.

---

[55] One active cluster member characterized the response as being like a "knee jerk"

e) The response was supply driven and immediate needs were largely met, but according to beneficiaries, was not based on consultation. Therefore, the needs addressed were not identified.

f) Protection activities were rolled out too late. International leadership was tested following this natural disaster, but the government and partners did not have a common understanding concerning priority issues to be addressed.

g) The Filipino population is known for its resilience. While many people remain affected (an estimated 25,000 still living in shelter facilities or evacuation centres, others are affected by destroyed houses, loss of jobs, displacements, etc.), during the time of the evaluation (February 2010), most of the affected population returned to their daily lives shortly after the disaster.

h) Quantity and quality of food relief items and non-food relief items varied substantially. Overall, the emergency response was not based on agreed standards and indicators, leading to uneven levels of response.

i) Limited effects of prior DRR investments or activities.

j) Although the Philippines has precedence requesting international assistance, the international community, and especially the UN system, was to a large extent unprepared to respond to the unfolding emergency situation.

80. Apart from technical assistance and advice in specific areas, such as health, coordination, logistics and communications, combined with deliveries of a limited number of NFIs, the response – and life-saving measures – rested on the national capacity and response system. The main bulk of the international response began 7 to 14 days after Ketsana. The response was further delayed[56] by low logistical capacity (especially for NFIs purchased abroad) and difficult access to some of the flooded areas and cut-off villages in the North.[57]

81. The relief and emergency operations generally responded to identified needs in terms of providing food, water and sanitation (though conditions in evacuation centres were critical). Food assistance and NFIs complemented the local responses, although too much food was provided in the majority of the evacuation centres, according to numerous interviewees

---

[56] At the time of the mission, many items were still in warehouses around Manila area.
[57] Mainly due to landslides

(national authorities and affected population).[58] The WASH cluster was also mentioned as being responsive in terms of providing water and sanitation facilities, hygiene kits and purification tablets, which were distributed to families at evacuation centres and in flooded neighbourhoods, where clean-up activities have also been undertaken. The main challenges were the reduction of water-borne diseases, as well as means for safe disposal of excreta in flooded areas. Health has also managed to mobilize a significant response in terms of providing mobile clinic services, medical and hygiene kits and vaccination. There were cases of leptospirosis and acute watery diarrhoea, which may have been prevented or their impacts limited through better information and preparedness of evacuation centres' physical infrastructures and choice of delivery points in flooded areas. In terms of education, repairs and rehabilitation were carried out on a limited number of schools. Some schools also benefitted from cleaning kits, and teachers were provided with instructional kits.

Conclusions

82. By comparing different sources of information, the team considers that the international response generally arrived late and therefore did little in terms of contributing to saving lives in the immediate hours after the Ondoy. In the weeks after the onset of the disaster, it cannot be discarded that lives were saved as a result of interventions such as the prevention of water-born diseases or access to portable water. Furthermore, it is clear that many of the needs previously identified were not met, mainly due to lack of funding. Furthermore, while assessments registered many needs, reported gaps were not acted upon. Today, the main needs in protection, shelter and livelihoods still remain among the population experiencing protracted displacement.

Recommendations:

83. The recommendations are prioritised as follows:

> 1. Within the next two months, NDCC,UN HC/RC and IASC/HCT should develop a contingency plan, before the next disaster strikes[59] including who would do what, where, when, with whom and how (see also part on coordination). In order to increase preparedness and timeliness of response, it is recommended that the 'tipping point' or scenarios for when an international response is needed should be defined together with the Philippine Government (i.e. level of strength of Typhoons,

---

[58] The WFP clarified that the reason why population may have felt that 'too much' food was provided, is that Government rations are way below WFP standard rations; reason why these were cut to 25kg instead of standard family rations of 50kg.

[59] This plan should be validated with the newly elected Government, considering elections will take place in May 2010

foreseen point of entry (most prone areas), etc. as should the division of labour and responsibilities between international and national partners. This plan should be revised both by the government and the IASC/HCT on a regular basis.

2. IASC/HCT needs to strengthen the government's disaster risk reduction (DRR) capacity. By May 2010, UN agencies must focus on DRR within UNDAF in a more holistic approach by integrating risk reduction in social and economic development plans. Furthermore, IASC/HCT should reduce the scope and better target their operations in order to increase the quality of outputs and outcomes.

3. In similar emergencies, all IASC/HCT members should adapt standards according to the national context and identify suppliers ahead of time (through standby agreements).

9. Annexes:

Annex I: Terms of Reference

Inter-Agency Real Time Evaluation (IA-RTE) of the Humanitarian Response to Typhoons Ketsana and Parma in the Philippines

Draft Terms of Reference

1. Introduction

In recent years, efforts have been increasingly directed towards improving humanitarian response through inter-agency real-time evaluations (IA-RTE). An IA RTE can be defined as an evaluation carried out at the early implementation stages of a humanitarian operation which almost simultaneously feeds back its findings for immediate use by the broader humanitarian community at the field level. An IA RTE is primarily intended for sudden-onset disasters, or protracted crises undergoing a phase of rapid deterioration or escalating violence.[60] These evaluations differ from other forms of humanitarian evaluation regarding speed, coverage, methods, and outputs. IA RTEs are typified by their shared management and methodological oversight through global and national level inter-agency reference and management groups; celerity of mobilization, feedback and follow-up; light, agile approaches; restricted scope; and participatory methods.[61] Ideally, IA RTEs seek to unlock inter-agency coordination problems or operational bottlenecks and provide real time learning to the field.[62]

As an initiative of the IASC, IA RTEs have thus far been applied in the context of natural disasters. Based on the results of a two-year testing phase in such contexts, the IASC's Working Group accepted in July 2009 IA RTEs for regular implementation.

2. Background to the current crisis

On 26 September, Typhoon Ketsana (locally known as *Ondoy*), swept across Manila and parts of Central Luzon, bringing a month's worth of rain in just 12 hours and causing the worst floods in over four decades. In addition, a second typhoon named Parma (locally known as *Pepeng*) made landfall on 3 October 2009. According to the National Disaster Coordinating Council (NDCC), more than 8.4 million people were affected by the two typhoons, causing 849 deaths. As of 21 October, they are a total of 221,320 people staying in evacuation centres, whereas an unknown number of people are displaced with host families. A total of 120,000 families are living in houses that are still submerged in water. As of 19 October, the National Epidemiology Center reports that there are 1,670 of leptospirosis, with 104 deaths in the National Capital Region (NCR).

---

[60] Draft Inter Agency Real Time Evaluation (IA RTE) Concept Paper rand Management Plan Prepared by the Evaluation and Studies Section, UN OCHA for the Inter Agency Standing Committee January 2009
[61] Inter-Agency Real-Time Evaluations Concepts and Management Discussion Paper Prepared for the Evaluation and Studies Section, UN OCHA by John Telford (11 October 2009)
[62] Draft Inter Agency Real Time Evaluation (IA RTE) Concept Paper rand Management Plan Prepared by the Evaluation and Studies Section, UN OCHA for the Inter Agency Standing Committee January 2009

Both storms have resulted in massive damage to critical infrastructure. Typhoon Parma had a devastating impact on the agriculture sector in Isabela Province, which raises food security concerns. Moreover, approximately 16,094 houses were destroyed by Tropical Storm Ketsana and 22,849 houses partially damaged, according to the NDCC.

On 19 October typhoon Lupit (locally known as *Ramil*), was located some 1,160km east of Aparri, Cagayan and was expected to likely make landfall in late October in northern Luzon. According to the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) emergency relief items were being pre-positioned in several provincial regions. However, on 26 October Typhoon Lupit changed course just before making landfall in northern Luzon, not affecting the Philippines.

Government agencies responded swiftly to the storms, launching extensive search and rescue operations and releasing emergency relief stocks. However, the extensive damage caused by the floods meant that capacities of many local and national response agencies have been exhausted. On 28 September 2009, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GoRP) represented by the Chair of the NDCC requested, through the United Nations Resident Coordinator (UN RC), the assistance of the international community in responding to the effects of the storm Ketsana. The Department of Foreign Affairs through its Missions in Geneva and New York and other foreign service posts are actively supporting efforts to facilitate the appeal process and other international humanitarian assistance measures.

Teams including Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) cluster leads and NDCC member agencies carried out initial rapid assessments of several areas of Metro Manila on 28 and 29 September. Initial results indicate that priority needs are food, drinking water, non-food items (NFIs) (household items, bedding, and clothing). There is also an urgent need for water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH), health including reproductive heath, and targeted protection interventions, and the establishment of camp management structures in 561 evacuation centres.

Access to the worst-affected areas and the restoration of water services and electricity will require extensive clearing operations. The restoration of schools being used as evacuation centres, and the provision of education and protection to displaced and affected children are also priorities. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), through its Disaster Management Committee, expressed its support and solidarity with the Philippines in the aftermath of Ketsana's devastation. In addition, as of late October, the company Google has offered to use small aircraft equipped with high resolution cameras to assess the extent of damages in flood affected areas.

The UN, in consultation with humanitarian partners and donors, has developed a Flash Appeal for $74 million to address needs across 13 sectors, which was launched on 6 October in Geneva and on 7 October in Manila.[63] This Appeal is planned to last for six months, has been developed in partnership with the NDCC and provides the framework for a common inter-agency understanding of needs and priorities based on the best

---

[63] Information taken from OCHA Situation Reports, Humanitarian Snapshots and the Flash Appeal

information currently available. Currently, a revision of the Flash Appeal is underway with all clusters providing project proposals by 28 October. The final draft will be submitted to the CAP Section in Geneva by 3 November.

Meanwhile, on 19 October, the NDCC also asked the UN RC to reflect areas affected by Typhoon Parma in the upcoming revision of the Flash Appeal. A United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC) team was requested to pre-deploy to allow for rapid assessments and support to areas likely to be affected by the expected Typhoon Lupit.

To address the most urgent needs, a request has also been made to the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF). On 5 October, an allocation of $6.7 million from the CERF was approved and will assist an estimated one million people severely affected by recent flooding in the Philippines.

Out of the $6.7 million the World Food Programme (WFP) will receive the largest allocation with $3 million, to provide immediate food aid to those most affected by the flooding and to ensure the coordination of telecommunications and air services within the humanitarian community. The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) will receive $1.1 million to establish emergency water and sanitation support for women and children. Programme beneficiaries will receive water and sanitation supplies, and stagnant rainwater will be drained to prevent water-borne disease, a primary humanitarian concern. Another $1.5 million will go to the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and UNICEF to provide affected families with non-food items and basic shelter materials for those displaced from their homes. Some $450,000 will go to IOM for camp coordination and management. The World Health Organization (WHO) will receive nearly $600,000 to provide emergency health care to those affected by the storms. In addition, the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) will receive some $200,000 to provide reproductive health care for affected women. In addition, the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) will use some $173,000 to help meet the IDPs' reproductive health needs, while the World Health Organization will use some $433,000 to support the Department of Health's efforts to help the displaced by provide enough essential medicines and medical supplies to reduce preventable diseases in some 50,000 families.

On 16 November, the revised Flash Appeal was published. Based on the latest national census, government data and assessments carried out by UN agencies and NGOs, the revised Flash Appeal states that the overall number of people in need in all affected areas stands at 4,200,000 people affected. Some 45% of the people in need are female (1,890,000). Under-five are 12.4% (286,440 male, 234,360 female). To date, Regions I, II, III, IV-A, V, NCR, and Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR) have been most severely affected, requiring life-saving response as well as projects geared towards early recovery.

Of particular concern for humanitarian agencies are the estimated 1,700,000 people still displaced or living in areas that remain flooded. These areas are likely to remain flooded for another three or four months, resulting in serious health concerns due to build up of stagnant water.

In the less populated regions of Northern Luzon, in addition to the lives and livelihoods lost, the timing and extent of the natural disasters have severely affected the critical planting season in what is the Philippine's main agricultural region. According to preliminary assessments conducted jointly by the Department of Agriculture (DoA) and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), some 100,000 – 120,000 farming households (500,000 people) in Region I, II, and III lost 100% of their production and assets.

Following the Government's request, and based on improved assessment data, the revised Flash Appeal will cover Region I, II, III, IV-A, V, NCR, and CAR, representing a caseload of approximately 4,200,000 people in need, whereas the original Flash Appeal was planned for 2,507,000 people. In line with policy to improve needs analysis and response in revised flash appeals, activities are planned according to the following categories, which should allow for a more targeted response that takes into account both life-saving and early recovery aspects, as well as highlighting areas still submerged in water:

·   A1 -   Life-saving activities in flooded areas - 1,700,000 persons
·   A2 -   Life-saving activities in other affected areas - 500,000 persons
·   B1 -   Resumption of livelihoods in flooded areas - 1,700,000 persons
·   B2 -   Resumption of livelihoods in other affected areas - 2,500,000 persons
·   C -   Coordination

With more data available, special attention will be paid to the most vulnerable sections of the affected population including children, women, older persons, and people living in areas that are still submerged. This revised Appeal is planned to run from November 2009 to March 2010. To support the Government, the international humanitarian community, including non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), the International Organization for Migration (IOM), and UN agencies, is seeking $143,774,080 to address the immediate and early recovery needs of approximately 4,200,000 people affected by the storms and floods.

With the typhoon season expected to last until December, needs are continuously evolving and might require a flexible response adapting to the rapidly changing circumstances.

3. Rationale for an IA-RTE in the Philippines
An IA RTE of the humanitarian response in the Philippines meets the selection criteria identified by the IASC as possible triggers. Firstly, it is a large-scale disaster with some estimated 8.5 million people affected and a large Flash Appeal. CERF allocations already total some US$ 6.7 million.

There are also valuable opportunities for lesson learning given the exceptional nature of the disaster, which is of an unusual magnitude for the country, and one which has overwhelmed national capacities. The GoRP is also implementing its own coordination system, with the result that there are currently two parallel coordination systems

operating in tandem with one another. The UNCT for its part is also more accustomed to be operating in a development environment and is now rapidly having to adjust to a new situation. Moreover, there are also lessons learnt for OCHA, as it has no office presence in the Philippines and has largely managed the coordination of the response remotely from the regional office in Bangkok. .

4. Objectives, uses and key questions

The IA-RTE will provide a snap shot of the current situation including real-time feedback and learning to the UNCT and to the IASC locally. The main objectives will be to learn from the initial phase of the response and to identify lessons that need to be taken forward into programme and secondly, to enable field and headquarters staff to undertake corrective actions in real time as the response evolves. The results of the IA-RTE in the Philippines are envisaged to support the ongoing operational planning of the HCT, which will be the main user of the IA-RTE process and its recommendations.

The IA-RTE would focus in large part on the functioning of the effectiveness and efficiency of the current coordination and management systems; at the same time, there would also be a focus on soliciting feedback from beneficiary populations on results achieved thus far.

Effectiveness (including timeliness)
Effectiveness measures the extent to which an activity achieves its purpose, or whether this can be expected to happen on the basis of the outputs.[64] The evaluation will put forth an assessment of the effectiveness and outcome to date of the humanitarian response, identifying its success rate in delivering against stated objectives and indicators, as well as how obstacles unique to this response have been addressed.

Specific questions to be addressed may include:
How effective was the overall inter-agency coordination and management (outputs and outcomes)?
How successful has the humanitarian response been thus far in delivering against stated objectives/indicators (as per cluster work plans at the global and the country level)?
Are the needs being addressed those which have been identified as priority by beneficiary communities?
How might the quality of assessment of needs, prioritization and planning inter- and intra-sectorally be characterized?
Were funding flows sufficient in both quantity and timeliness to allow humanitarian actors to operate effectively? Were lessons regarding consultation and accountability in funding allocations learnt from previous processes?
What is the perception on the effectiveness of the coordination mechanism by outside actors, namely its effectiveness in addressing needs, level of engagement of outside actors, and whether it is something that can be built upon and sustained once the emergency phase concludes?
How might the clusters and technical working groups be rationalized to allow for more effective time management?

---

[64] Information taken from OCHA Situation Reports, Humanitarian Snapshots and the Flash Appeal

How effective has the humanitarian community coordinated the response with the GoRP / NDCC?
How effective have early recovery efforts been?
How effective have protection efforts been?
How effective has resource mobilization taken place?

Efficiency
Efficiency measures the outputs – qualitative and quantitative – achieved as a result of inputs. This generally requires comparing alternative approaches to achieving an output, to see whether the most efficient approach has been used.[65]

Specific questions to be addressed may include:
Has the cluster approach led to a more strategic response in terms of predictable leadership, partnership and cohesiveness and accountability (output)?
Has the activated cluster approach led to a more strategic response and promoted greater coverage and connectedness among stakeholders (outcome)?

Relevance & Appropriateness
Relevance is concerned with assessing whether the [outputs / outcomes] are in line with local needs and priorities (as well as donor policy). Appropriateness is the tailoring of humanitarian activities to local needs, increasing ownership, accountability and cost-effectiveness accordingly.[66]

Specific questions to be addressed may include:
Are the achieved outputs and outcomes of the humanitarian response in line with local needs?
How far has the humanitarian response in the Philippines thus far been tailored to meet local needs and ensure local ownership and accountability to beneficiaries?

5. Stakeholder Involvement
The evaluation team will engage staff from UN agencies, international NGOs, national NGOs, national stakeholders and donor organizations. The team will acknowledge the significant workload already borne by in country staff and endeavor to ensure that any staff resource allocations to the evaluations are minimized.

Interagency technical and policy support will be provided through the IA RTE Interest Group and operational support through UN agencies and INGOs on the ground in the Philippines.

An IA RTE Advisory Group in the Philippines, comprised of representatives from the humanitarian community (i.e. UN, INGO, NGO and the Government) will assist in guiding the team while in the Philippines and facilitate in-country participation. The evaluation team will meet with the in-country Advisory Group upon arrival in country. This forum

---

[65] Ibid
[66] Ibid

will serve as an opportunity for parties to be briefed on emerging issues in country, and those specific to the evaluation. The evaluation team will immediately inform the Advisory Group of any serious issues regarding the integrity or effectiveness of the programme that they come across in their research. The Advisory Group will have no authority to direct the evaluation or to edit the report, but the evaluation team should take their views into account, when finalizing their analysis.

The team will report its findings to the UNCT and humanitarian community (via the IASC) in the Philippines, prior to leaving the region. Presentations in Geneva and/ or New York will follow within two weeks of the consultants' return from the field mission.

Draft reports will be submitted within two weeks of the consultants' return from the field mission, upon which the UNCT and IA RTE Interest Group, will be afforded 7 days to comment. The document will subsequently be disseminated to a wider audience for comment.

6. Methodology

The evaluation will be carried out through analyses of various sources of information including desk reviews; field visits to Manila and the northern Luzon region; interviews with key stakeholders (such UN, I/NGOs, donors, beneficiary communities and government) and through cross-validation of data. Briefing workshops in Manila will serve as a mechanism to both feed back findings on a real-time basis, and further validate information.

While maintaining independence, the evaluation will seek the views of all parties. Compliance with United Nations Evaluation Group standards and ALNAP quality pro forma is expected and the evaluation report will be judged in this regard. The two documents are available from the website of the OCHA Evaluation and Studies Unit (http://ochaonline.un.org/ess). All external evaluation reports will also be submitted to ALNAP for inclusion in the regular meta-evaluation process that rates the quality of evaluation reports.

7. Management Arrangements

The study will be managed by OCHA's Evaluation and Studies Section (ESS), Policy Development and Studies Branch (PDSB), who will assign an evaluation manager to oversee the conduct and quality of the evaluation. The external consultant team (team leader) will report to OCHA's Evaluation and Studies Section (ESS). The inception report as well as the final report will be approved by the IA-RTE Interest Group.

His/her responsibilities are as follows:

- Monitor and assess the quality of the evaluation and its process;
- Provide guidance and institutional support to the external consultant, especially on issues of methodology;
- Provide and/or coordinate logistical support to the evaluation team
- Facilitate the consultants access to key stakeholders and specific information or expertise needed to perform the assessment;

- Ensure that all stakeholders are kept informed;
- Ensure sufficient engagement by UNCT on initial findings prior to dissemination
- Recommend the approval of final report to the IA-RTE IG;
- Ensure a management response to the final report and monitor the subsequent follow up

8. Duration of Evaluation and Tentative Work Plan

Description	Duration
Desk Review of important documents and previous evaluations & studies	3 days
Meetings UN headquarters (Geneva or New York)	3 days
Visits to Manila and northern Luzon to start information collection through engagement of humanitarian actors and beneficiary populations	25 days (pending on team size)
Presentation of findings to UNCT and humanitarian community in Manila and thereafter in New York and/or Geneva (connection via VC)	3 days
Preparation of draft reports	5 days
Preparation of final reports	5 days
Approximate Total	*44 days*

9. Competency and Expertise Requirements

The evaluation will employ the services of a team of 2 international and 1 national consultant embodying the following collective experiences:

- Proven senior-level experience and ability to provide strategic recommendations to key stakeholders;
- Good knowledge of strategic and operational management of humanitarian operations, preferably in the Philippines; the ability to bring on board national consultants(s) from the Philippines would be an asset;
- Good knowledge of humanitarian system and its reforms, including of UN agencies, IFRC, NGOs, and local government disaster response structures and systems;
- Demonstrable experience in conducting evaluations of humanitarian programmes and the capacity to work collaboratively with multiple stakeholders and on a team;
- Strong analytical skills and ability to clearly synthesize and present findings, draw practical conclusions and to prepare well-written reports in a timely manner;
- Strong workshop facilitation skills;
- Excellent writing and presentation skills in English; and
- Immediate availability for the period indicated.

10. Reporting Requirements and Deliverables

A series of presentations of findings to UNCT and humanitarian community in Manila, New York and Geneva;

An evaluation report containing analytical elements related to the issues specified in this set of ToR. The report shall contain a short executive summary of no more than 2,000 words and a main text of no more than 10,000 words, both inclusive of clear and concise recommendations. Annexes should include a list of all individuals interviewed, a bibliography, a description of method(s) employed, a summary of survey results (if applicable), and any other relevant materials. The report will be submitted two weeks after the completion of the mission

The evaluation team is solely responsible for the final products. While maintaining independence, the team will adhere to professional standards and language, particularly that which may relate to the protection of staff and operations. Direct consultations with affected populations will be a formal requirement of the evaluation unless security conditions are overriding. Additionally, agencies at the country level and the IA RTE IG will be consulted prior to the dissemination of any products emanating from the evaluation.

All analytical results and products arising from this evaluation will be owned by the IASC RTE IG. The team leader and/or members will not be allowed without prior authorization in writing to present any of the analytical results as his or her own work or to make use of the evaluation results for private publication purposes.

Annex ii) Key Recommendation – Process Action Plan

AREA	Description	Responsible Institution	Timing
Needs Assessment	Support the government in improving its information management system	OCHA, with the support of other cluster leads	Before the next typhoon season (before July 2010)
	Carry out more joint needs assessments in future emergencies	HCT and cluster leads	Ongoing basis during emergencies
	To improve effectiveness and efficiency, cluster leads and cluster members should use standard templates and information management procedures (i.e. the 4 W's: who, what, where and when) to enhance situation analysis and consolidate needs.	OCHA, with the support of other cluster leads	Before the next typhoon season (before July 2010)
	Actively involve the affected population throughout the whole program cycle (in as much as possible) and integrate accountability mechanisms (i.e. did the affected population receive what they needed?).	IASC/HCT components must	Ongoing basis during emergencies
	Define at a *global level* the division of labor among the United Nations Flash Appeal, UN recovery plans and the World Bank's Post Disaster Needs Assessment.	Emergency Relief Coordinator, the Head of UNDP Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery and the World Bank	Within the next 6 months
	At the *regional* level, plan in advance how the responsible institutions will divide roles and responsibilities.	Respective regional offices	
	At the *national* level jointly determine the timing of each of these action plans.	UN HC, OCHA and the Government	
Funding	Develop standard operational procedures at the headquarter, regional and country levels.	Emergency Relief Coordinator, the Head of UNDP Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery and the World Bank	
	In middle income countries affected by disasters, present the Flash Appeals in a more integrated, prioritized and complementary way; in future emergency operations, the preliminary Flash Appeal should focus on the most critical needs and life saving activities, covering a two to three week period. A smaller number of clusters should be rolled out and recovery activities should be combined (i.e. agriculture, early recovery and livelihood) to avoid fragmentation,.	Humanitarian Coordinator (HC)/Resident Coordinator (RC), OCHA and the HCT	When flash appeals are launched following disasters
Coordination	Define and update the division of labor in terms of who does what, where, when, with whom and how in situations of conflict and disaster.	Government and UN RC, OCHA	From now onwards (update after the elections)
	Continue to build the capacity of the government	UN RC/HC, OCHA, IASC/	Next 5 years

AREA	Description	Responsible Institution	Timing
	to prioritize and lead future emergency responses.	HCT and all clusters leads,	according to the UNDAF plan
	When meetings are held, an agenda must be shared beforehand and outputs must be clearly defined (i.e identifying what the most urgent needs, the actions required and who is able to meet them).	All cluster leads	From now onwards
Response	Define, to the possible extend, the 'tipping point' or scenarios for when an international response is needed should be defined together with the Filipino Government (i.e. level of strength of Typhoons, foreseen point of entry (most prone areas), etc.	OCHA, HCT and NDCC	Before the next typhoon season' (before July 2010)
	During emergencies, considering national capacity and emergency funding for MICs, IASC/HCT should reduce the scope and better target their operations in order to increase the quality of outputs and outcomes	OCHA and HCT together with NDCC and line ministries (departments)	Next disaster response operations
	The government's disaster risk reduction capacity should be strengthened on key areas beyond immediate relief efforts and UN agencies should focus on DRR more holistically by integrating risk reduction in UNDAF planning processes	Government and UN HCT	First steps before the next typhoon season (before July 2010) and on a continuous basis under UNDAF

Annex iii) The National Disaster Coordination Council

In the Philippines the mandate for policy and coordination of disaster risk management is enshrined in the Presidential Decree No. 1(1972) and No.1566 (1978), which led to the creation of the National Disaster Coordination Council (NDCC). These laws establish a comprehensive framework of disaster management, which is divided into four phases: mitigation, preparedness, response and rehabilitation. They also call for the preparation of a National Calamity and Disaster Preparedness Plan and allow for the utilization of a Calamity Fund

The NDCC is an inter-agency council responsible for disaster preparedness, prevention, mitigation and rehabilitation. It is chaired by the Secretary of National Defense and the heads of 18 departments are members. In the fulfillment of its functions, the NDCC utilizes the facilities and services of the Office of Civil Defense as its operating arm. It serves as the President's advisor on disaster preparedness programs, disaster operations and rehabilitation efforts undertaken by the government and the private sector.

The NDCC is a policy and coordination agency and does not implement activities. It operates through members agencies and local networks (i.e. the regional and local disaster coordination councils), which are responsible for planning, implementing, funding and carrying out specific disaster risk management related activities.

The Structure of NDCC.

National Level

Secretary, Department of National Defense	Chairman
18 Government Departments and Agencies	Members
Philippine National Red Cross	Member
Administrator, Office of Civil Defense	Member and Executive Officer

At the regional level (RDCC), the set-up is basically the same. The Local Disaster Coordination Council (LDCC), particularly the provinces, cities and municipalities, is headed by the Chief Executive. At the barangay level, the Punong Barangay acts as the Chairman. It is at this level that emergency is most felt and rescue, evacuation, relief and rehabilitation activities are carried out, and where damages are assessed and requirements evaluated. This local responsibility was further reinforced with the passage of another law, the Republic Act 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, which concedes the competency for the provision of basic services and functions to local government units and the corresponding allocation of a 5% calamity fund for emergency operations.

Funding

Under the Philippines' General Appropriation Act, a national calamity fund is administered by NDCC, which is to be used for aid, relief and rehabilitation services in areas affected by disasters. The limited budget allocation of NDCC prompted the regional and local levels of the organization to rationalize the use of the fund in order to be able to respond to urgent and immediate needs in disaster-affected areas

Annex iv) Process

The Philippines IA RTE provided immediate feedback in a participatory way to those executing and managing the humanitarian response (field, national, regional and headquarters levels).

Triggers:
The magnitude of this sudden onset disaster; the importance of the Flash Appeal and the support of OCHA and UNICEF were factors that triggered the activation of the IA RTE.

However, the IA RTE faced some limitations due to its slow activation

- The RTE could not be conducted during the implementation of the emergency operation as the field mission took place four months after the Ketsana typhoon struck and most of the emergency response was completed.

Timing of the IA RTEs
A full trimester was needed to initiate the IA RTE, resulting in a cumbersome activation. Furthermore, the IA headquarters initiated the evaluation – it was not demand driven - reducing its utilization focus and capacity to influence the early stages of the response.

Terms of Reference where promptly formulated, and a potential Team Leader was contacted in late October 2009 and selected by the IASC Interest Group in late December. The other team members were not identified until the end of January 2010, and selected on the basis of their immediate availability.

> The IASC should draft a one pager on RTEs, explaining their nature, purpose and added value and share this with all their country teams in conflict and disaster prone areas. To maintain the utilization focus of RTEs, country teams should be among the primary stakeholders requesting these evaluations; they should be conducted when the field requests them.
>
> In the future, IASC members at the headquarters level should identify and prequalify candidates and develop stand by agreements (including the Team Leader and Team Members) to carry out a RTE. IASC members should develop a common database in countries affected by conflicts, disasters and complex emergency.
>
> When the issues treated are similar, joint and not separate evaluations should be conducted.

The UN RC accepted the IA RTE under the ERC request. However, in the meantime, major national and international stakeholders had jointly taken operational decisions and carried out several collective lesson learning workshops and were not requesting an externally facilitated learning exercise.

Originally, the field mission of the RTE was planned for December 2009, but the timing of the mission was not considered appropriate as this coincided with bank holidays (Christmas and New Year).

The IA RTE took place during same period as the joint DEC evaluation, the Spanish Government evaluation and the OCHA donor support group, representing a heavy burden on the same stakeholders.

Annex v) Coverage of Revised Appeal as of 8 January

Sector	Revised Requirement	Received	Unmet requirement	% Covered
Food	54,807,205	29,539,843	25,267,362	54%
Shelter and nfi	20,161,336	2,084,405	18,076,931	10%
Coordination and Support Services	12,659,422	6,761,826	5,897,596	53%
Health	12,170,871	3,372,580	8,798,291	28%
Water and Sanitation	10,377,470	3,014,883	7,362,587	29%
Agriculture	10,000,000	1,183,432	8,816,568	12%
Economic Recovery and Infrastructure	9,723,398	643,863	9,079,535	7%
Education	8,277,878	327,678	7,950,200	4%
Protection/Human Rights/Rule of Law	5,596,500	475,691	5,120,809	8%
Total	**143,774,080**	**53,003,309**	**90,770,771**	**37%**

Annex vi) Table of cluster inputs, outputs and outcomes

Cluster	Inputs	Outputs	Outcomes
Agriculture Estimated losses are placed at US$560,013,285. The largest losses are in rice production, comprising 83% of the total value of losses in agricultural commodities. **Needs**: Emergency supply of crop seeds, planting material, vegetable seeds, fertilizers, and repair of damaged small-scale irrigation are the highest priority needs for the affected farmers for the upcoming dry season starting in November/December 2009. Affected and vulnerable fishing communities, as well as vulnerable farmers who lost their livestock, will need immediate assistance to restore their food security (livelihoods).	• Department of Agriculture about to initiate rehabilitation measures. Limited response to date; the Agriculture Cluster to meet on 7 October 2009. • Immediate Restoration of Food Security in Storm and Typhoon affected Regions I, II, III and CAR in the Philippines through the provision of agriculture, livestock and fisheries inputs, technical support and the rehabilitation of essential small scale irrigation facilities. • Effective Humanitarian Response Through Enhanced Cluster Coordination of Agricultural Emergency and Rehabilitation Intervention Through Agriculture Cluster • Restoring the means of subsistence for typhoon-affected population of Pangasinan and La Union Provinces.	• No progress reported/available against objectives (due to lack of funding)	• No progress reported/available against objectives (due to lack of funding)
Camp Coordination/Camp Management According to NDCC 1,872,036 persons have been affected by the storm and subsequent flooding. At the peak of the response-period, up to 375,000 people were located in 607 Evacuation Centres. **Needs**: There is an urgent need to enhance camp committee structures, including IDP participation, in particular women, incorporate protection measures for vulnerable groups in the displaced population, and facilitate the development of adequate exit strategies.	• Identified as a major gap with minimal organization in the 607 established evacuation centres (no registration and precarious hygiene situation). • Other concerns are separated children and private spaces • IOM and DSWD were coordinating to finalize the first CCCM cluster meeting. • The Cluster identified over 130 evacuation centres housing approximately 150,000 individuals in need of assistance. This information, collected through IOM's displacement matrix, was shared with the Government, as well as international and local partners to ensure a coherent response.	• Camp Coordination and Camp Management Assistance and Support in Flood Affected Areas • Provision of Emergency Household items to people displaced or still living in flooded areas as a result of Tropical Storm Ketsana and Typhoon Parma • Provision of Non-Food-Items (NFI) In the Philippines Following Typhoons Pepeng and Ondoy. • IOM has received 110mt of WASH NFIs on behalf of the cluster from the United States Government. This is for distribution in Region IV-A and NCR. • The cluster was working closely with the Government to ensure proper standards in new structured settlement areas and on distribution strategies, including camp management training for leaders of evacuation centres.	N/A

Cluster	Inputs	Outputs	Outcomes
Coordination & Support Services Coordination mechanisms and ensuring timely data collection, analysis, mapping of affected areas and available resources, and dissemination of information. These activities are crucial in order to avoid gaps in meeting humanitarian needs.	• Support from a UNDAC team – arriving few days after Ondoy. • UNCT website dedicated to the response launched beginning of October. • The information management and mapping team based out of the NDCC • The Cluster aims to complement Government of the Philippines and civil society efforts in providing all disaster-affected evacuees with safe, adequate, appropriate, and habitable refuge, that promotes human dignity to agreed national and international standards	• Support to the Humanitarian Coordination Structures in the Philippines • Satellite-derived geo-information to support humanitarian relief efforts in the Philippines	N/A
Early Recovery The massive floods seriously affected the normal and emergency management functions in three cities within the NCR, Regions I, and IV-A, and four municipalities in Rizal Province. Immediate relief and recovery management which are more difficult to organize since basic	• Assisting affected population; facilitate return, repair of housing, restoring livelihoods, etc.	• Recovery of Essential Government Facilities in Target Sites and Support to Debris Clearing • Early Recovery Assistance to Flood Affected Return Communities in Regions NCR, IVA, and I • Consultancy on ER in different clusters	• No progress reported/available against objectives (due to lack of funding)
Education Approximately 1.2 million school-aged children were affected. The Department of Education reports that 2,719 schools were damaged (2,235 elementary and 484 high schools). Altogether, 299 schools were being used as evacuation centres. A total of 239 day care centres in Metro Manila.	• Assessments was undertaken by cluster members at schools, day care centres and evacuation centres • The cluster was consolidating and/or seeking funds for immediate setting up of child-friendly spaces /temporary learning spaces for children in evacuation centres • Attention is mainly given to the ECs, tent cities and relocation sites. Increasing attention is being paid to psychosocial support. Early recovery activities are ongoing to ensure long term solutions to the challenges posed by the disasters. • Emergency Education to affected children needed as well as training of teachers	For children in ECs/relocation sites: • Education Cluster has provided about 90,000 essential learning packages for individual students, 3,073 teaching packs for individual teachers, 128 library sets with recreation materials, 2,623 individual packs for ECCD children, 136 ECCD kits for day care centers/preschools, 22,212 food packs for individual children, 106 clean-up sets, 30,179 hygiene kits for elementary/high schools, 4,995 jerry cans and 4,995 bottles of hyposol. first aid kits to 68 day care centres • Conducted repair and rehabilitation in more than 39 schools. • Conducted psycho-social sessions for	• About 200,000 affected preschool and school-aged boys and girls were assisted (against the target of 490,560 with focus on the following areas: Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR), Region I, III, IV-A, V and the National Capital Region; • An estimated 88,000 children are benefiting from safer and restored learning facilities as a result of the repair and rehabilitation done in 39 schools; • About 2,405 field partners with enhanced awareness on DRR and capacity to provide psychosocial care and support to children; • Cluster member capacity for DRR

Cluster	Inputs	Outputs	Outcomes
		school children. • Distributed megaphones and flashlights in schools used as evacuation centres. • Conducted trainings on psychosocial support interventions, CRC and DRR awareness for about 2,405 field partners (day care workers, teachers, education supervisors, etc) • Cluster workshop was held on DRR in education. 130 DRR Manuals distributed to Division heads and supervisors, barangay workers. For displaced children/dropouts: • Provision of _school packs for 16,846 primary and secondary level school dropouts; • Production and distribution of 2,261 modular instructional materials for alternative education • To be conducted during Summer 2010: o Training of teachers on alternative education and psychosocial care interventions and use of the modules Conduct of alternative education sessions combined with psychosocial interventions	was enhanced following the cluster workshop on DRR and an action plan was developed; • About 16,850 displaced children or drop outs are expected to be able to catch up with lost school days and to be mainstreamed back to formal schooling after they undergo alternative education sessions
Food 35 flooded municipalities located in NCR, Region III, and IVA, affecting 1.5 million people. **Needs**: This will require $55 million to purchase 70,000 MTs food and supply the necessary staff and logistics to deliver to identify beneficiaries	• During October 2009 was to ensure that households had enough rice and other commodities to cover their basic food needs. Supplementary food was targeted to 200,000 people in the form of a blanket ration of fortified, high energy biscuits (HEBs) to communities that could not easily prepare food, with guidelines that the HEBs are to be prioritized for children under-five and pregnant or nursing mothers. However, due to prevailing hardship conditions, from November to March, an additional supplementary ration is advised for the	• Food Assistance to Typhoon-Affected Populations in northern Philippines • According Emergency Food Assistance to Typhoon – Affected Populations in northern Philippines, budget revision no.2 was distributed: 37.500 mt Rice, 2.340mts oil (palmolein oil), 900mt Mixed & blended food and 3.888mts of Other kind of food (Canned fish, sugar, micronutrient powder)	• Life-saving and sustaining food requirements are met for targeted, typhoon-affected households from October 2009 to March 2010, while also meeting the additional nutritional requirements of the most vulnerable women and children under-five. • Adequate caloric intake of targeted populations, through livelihood projects to prevent them from incurring additional debt, selling assets or otherwise engaging in activities that undermine their

Cluster	Inputs	Outputs	Outcomes
	50,000 vulnerable children in the 6-24 month age group. • WFP was working with the NNC of the Philippines to establish an enhanced supplementary feeding programme using locally produced, nutritious food for young children. This will be coordinated with UNICEF and the supplementary feeding programme is reflected in categories A1 and A2. • WFP and OXFAM are working under the leadership of the NDCC through DSWD. • The EFSA helped to assess how people are coping with the flood impact, to validate assumptions about the impact of the floods on food security, and to help refine programme strategies, targeting criteria, and mechanisms for assistance.		livelihoods.
Health Twenty-seven health facilities were reported damaged (22 in NCR, five in Region IV-A). Barangay Health Stations (BHS) located in flooded areas were dysfunctional. Diseases were reported, including watery diarrhoea, upper respiratory tract infections, skin infections, and pneumonia. There was an outbreak of *Leptospirosis* with 2,358 total admissions and 177 deaths. Total of 17 Government hospitals, 110 municipal health centres and 7 Local Government Unit (LGU) hospitals have been damaged by floods. DOH estimates the costs at US$21million.	• Department of Health deployed medical teams. Monitoring the cases of water born diseases, dengue and measles • Measles vaccination and vitamin A supplementation campaign for children 9 - 59 months of age in all evacuation centres. • According to the NEC, the top five morbidity cases in evacuation centres are acute respiratory infections (53%); skin infection (19%); diarrhea (15%); fever, influenza-like illness (4%); and pneumonia (0.3%). The NEC has also confirmed an outbreak of leptospirosis in three Barangays in Marikina. • DOH has deployed the following teams: 206 medical; 32 psychosocial; 33 WASH; five nutrition; four disease surveillance, 14 assessment; and 65 public health teams; and seven international teams to 494 sites. • DOH and Local Government Units (LGUs) have developed a strategy for leptospirosis prevention, control, and treatment.	• An estimated $85,000 in medicine and supplies were distributed to all evacuation centres. • Restoring Access to Reproductive Health Services in the Typhoon-Affected, Provinces, Cities and Municipalities • Leptospirosis prophylaxis given to affected population in NCR and Region IV-A. Emergency Health for Children and Families Affected by Tropical Storm Ketsana in the Philippines • Pneumococcal Vaccine for Elderly in Typhoon Ondoy Affected Communities in Laguna • A total of 337,936 individuals have been given prophylaxis in NCR and Region IV-A.	• GOARN has given recommendations on post-disaster disease surveillance for discussion with the Department of Health.

Cluster	Inputs	Outputs	Outcomes
	• Members of the Health Cluster took part in the joint rapid needs assessment on 01 November. • Disease surveillance, outbreak prevention, and response to disease outbreaks • Strengthen the Emergency Health Response and Health Cluster Coordination Joint IOM/WHO Emergency Medical Reconnaissance Support for (KETANA/ONDOY) Affected Families and Communities • Outreach & mobile medical healthcare services to communities affected by the typhoon in the Laguna Region		
Livelihoods Damage to productive assets includes loss of physical assets; destruction of common assets critical to functioning of livelihoods destruction of shop or business premises; loss of inventories and loss of financial capital. 64% of the total workforce lost two working days, affecting workers in the informal sector disproportionately. The total cost of this disruption is estimated to be $17.68 million. The cost of productive assets losses is estimated to amount to $178.27 million.	• Restoring vital community infrastructure through emergency job creation in flood-affected areas • Emergency Livelihoods Program for Children and Families Affected by Tropical Storm Ketsana • Livelihood Recovery Support in Emergencies • Quick recovery of assets and livelihoods for the most vulnerable (Informal sector workers)	• No progress reported/available against objectives (due to lack of funding or limited funding)	• No progress reported/available against objectives (due to lack of funding or limited funding)
Logistic & Emergency Telecommunications The cluster support to ensure the uninterrupted supply of relief items to the most affected populations, including those in areas cut off by flooding and landslides which could only be reached by air.	• Deployed a team to Manila and established emergency communications services at the NDCC • Providing technical support to the humanitarian community in Manila and in Region IV-A. • Logistics and Emergency Telecommunications Cluster Activities in Support of the Government of the Philippines and the Humanitarian Community's Response to Tropical Storm Ketsana and Typhoon Parma	N/A	N/A

Cluster	Inputs	Outputs	Outcomes
	• Provision of Air Services in Support to the Humanitarian Community's Response to Tropical Storm Ketsana & Typhoon Parma		
Nutrition Even in the absence of a natural disaster, some 82,000 children die each year in the Philippines before the age of five. Some preliminary estimates prior to the emergency indicate that as many as 47% of children are being mix-fed and only 34% exclusively breast-fed increasing the urgency of ensuring knowledge transfer of the risks associated with these feeding practices.	• Safe feeding measures (BMS) to be defined at evacuation centres.	N/A	N/A
Protection These groups include female-headed households, unaccompanied children, older persons without family support, persons with disabilities or impoverished families settled in flood or landslide prone areas, irrespectively of whether they are staying in evacuation centres, host families or in their flooded homes or in rural communities in remote areas. The risk of gender-based violence (GBV) due to overcrowding in evacuation centres and the breakdown of community support systems requires effective prevention mechanisms.	• UNICEF and partners mobilized over 300 volunteers of whom 198 are trained in delivering psychosocial activities especially structured recreation and play. These activities are being conducted daily with affected children across at least twenty evacuation camps. UNICEF in partnership with NGOs and DSWD reports that rapid registration of unaccompanied and separated children is on-going with numbers still to be confirmed. Community Educators trained on trafficking and CSEC prevention currently mobilized by UNICEF and partners.	180 Child Friendly Spaces have been established in more than 81 flood affected areas reaching at its peak over 74,000 children; More than 3,200 community volunteers have been recruited and orientated on psychosocial support and child protection; More than 2,000 recreation and play kits have been distributed to aid learning and structured play activities; Immediate response was organised to address cases of child sexual abuse committed in the context of this emergency. UNICEF provided technical support on the existing referral pathway in reporting to mandated bodies including the DSWD and PNP-Children's and Women Desk for intervention as well as IEC materials 'Say No, Run, Tell'; and Rapid Registration of unaccompanied and separated children was also conducted across affected areas with over 100 cases recorded and responded to. UNFPA participated in a participatory protection assessmnent and developed a basic protection cluster training course	N/A

Cluster	Inputs	Outputs	Outcomes
Shelter & NFI's Expected that the total number of damaged houses is 325,000, affecting 1,625,000 people. The Shelter Cluster calculated that some 50% of the families with damaged houses are in need of shelter support.	• Identification of alternative evacuation centres and in-depth assessment of shelter needs for the period after the initial emergency response is needed. • Tarpaulins and other NFIs were provided to the DSWD by various organizations. PNRC set up 165 evacuation centres to house up to 32,434 families. • Habitat for Humanity proposes repairing about 10,000 houses, targeting the poorest 30 percent of flood-affected families.	• The Shelter Cluster agencies have been active in the distribution of NFIs to 17,000 families mainly in evacuation centres. • Transition shelter provided for displaced population (outside EC) and those affected by closures of ECs	N/A
WASH A total of some 135,000 men, women, and children were in need of immediate WASH assistance at ECs in NCR and Region IV-A. A further 1,650,000 men, women, and children continued to live in flooded Barangays in Region IV-A and NCR. Communal water supply systems for 150,000 people in Benguet Province require repair and rehabilitation. Affected families need access to sufficient quantities of safe water, safe excreta disposal, bathing facilities, containers for water storage, and sufficient quantities of hygiene items, and to ensure these facilities being accessible for all.	• DoH is the Government Cluster lead for WASH, with UNICEF as the IASC Cluster Lead. • Sanitation facilities at evacuation centres to be improved. Each evacuation centre will have three sets or a total of 12 cubicle/toilets. • Purifiers for clean drinking water.	• Water supply for ECs and affected population in transition camps (too much water reported in some ECs) • Sanitation facilities established at transitional camps	• Functioning cooperation between Manila water and cluster on improving sanitation at evacuation centres and transitional camps

Annex vii) Timeline of the disasters

Date	Event	Intervention
May 10th 2007	The cluster approach in the Philippine Disaster Management System is adopted. Cluster Leads are designated and their ToR at the National, Regional and Provincial Level drafted	NDCC Circular was signed by 18 government institutions, 9 UN Agencies, IFRC, PNRC and UN ResCoord
January 3rd, 2009	Start the Typhoon season 2009- from January to September the Philippines has been hit by 8 tropical storms of different categories.	Philippine Atmospheric, Geophysical and Astronomical Services Administration (PAGASA,) reported, that they were expecting a total of 19 tropical cyclones or less during the upcoming typhoon season.
September 22nd, 2009	An area of convectional cloudiness associated with the monsoon trough had formed about 720 km (450 mi), to the east of Manila, Philippines.	
September 23rd, 2009	The whole archipelago experienced a torrential rain starting on September 23. More than 30 areas in Luzon, including Metro Manila, were placed under storm alerts as tropical storm "Ondoy" accelerated further and moved closer to Central Luzon.	
September 26th, 2009	Tropical storm *Ketsana* (known locally as *Ondoy*) brought heavy rains that caused flooding in the capital city of Manila, the Cordillera Autonomous Region (CAR) and 25 provinces in the northern island of Luzon. An estimated 45cm of rain fell in 24 hours. This is equivalent to a typical month's rainfall in the monsoon season. The result was six-meter-high flood waters in parts of Manila. Towns east of Manila were submerged, with landslides in other parts of Luzon. Floods damaged much of Manila's health infrastructure and electricity was disconnected in large parts of the city. This is the fourth severe weather-related incident in September 2009.	
September 27th, 2009	Needs Assessment	A GoRP Rapid Assessment Team attempted to be deployed but could not access affected areas by road due to flooding and blocked roadways. The second attempt was successfully.
September 28th, 2009	The Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GoRP) has declared a state of calamity in several regions and requested international humanitarian assistance to deal with the affects of	The second attempt of a GoRP Rapid **Assessment** Team was successfully in five areas. The task was done by GoRP and their corresponding cluster IASC

Date	Event	Intervention
	Tropical Storm Ketsana locally known as "Ondoy". The following regions have been declared as Calamity areas by the GoRP: • CAR: Mt Province, Ifugao and Benguet • Region I: Pangasinan, La Union and Ilocos Sur • Region II: Isabela, Quirino and Nueva Viscaya • Region III: Aurora, Nueva Ecija, Zambalez, Pampanga, Balacan, Tarlac and Bataan • Region IV-A: Cavite, Laguna, Batangas, Rizal, Quezon; Region IV-B: Mindoro (Occidental and Oriental) and Marinduque • Region V: Catanduanes, Camarines Norte and Camarines Sur The water has receded by 75 %; however, more rain is expected.	counterparts. The **Assessment** Teams identified the priority need as drinking water distribution at all points of displacement and in flood affected areas, including restoration of water services and water quality testing following risk of flood water contamination. Other priority needs include immediate food and essential non-food item distribution to both the evacuation centres and homes of flood-affected households. Establishing or strengthening of Camp Management/ **Coordination** Services, with particular attention to sanitation and protection concerns in the evacuation centres. The IASC CT convened for an emergency meeting with relevant donors and partners to brief on the situation and begin managing/coordinating the intervention. OCHA started to develop a Flash Appeal WFP approved an Immediate Response Emergency Operation to purchase of 742 MT of rice from the National Food Authority.
September 29th, 2009	According to NDCC figures, 277 people were confirmed dead and 42 people remain missing. An estimated 2,075 houses were destroyed by the storm and floods and 2,569 houses were partially damaged.	An emergency IASC Cluster Leads meeting to accelerate the development of the Flash Appeal and the **Coordination** of Information management resources.
September 30th, 2009	NDCC and IASC conducted a joint **rapid need assessment** in the affected areas. Preliminary results were; water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH); food; non-food items (NFI); health; protection; and education. Cluster detailed **assessment**s underway.	UN Resident Coordinator and Heads of agencies for the key IASC clusters met with NDCC, the Department of Social Welfare and Development, and the Department of Health at the NDCC Operations Center to consult on the scope and management of the Flash Appeal.

Date	Event	Intervention
		UNDAC team arrived in Manila and plan to assist the GoRP, U.N. Resident Coordinator, and U.N. Humanitarian Country Team with **assessment**, **Coordination**, and information management in the field.
October 01st, 2009	Tropical Storm Ketsana (locally named Ondoy) affected 3,232,234 people (668,864 families), leaving 288 dead and 42 missing. A total of 370,147 people are currently in 515 evacuation shelters. An estimated 4,404 houses were destroyed by the storm and floods and 6,033 houses were partially damaged, according to the NDCC.	OCHA Reported that de GoRP response has shifted from emergency rescue and evacuations. U.N. WFP announced plans to strengthen GoRP logistics capacity through provision of helicopters and boats to assist humanitarian agencies in reaching otherwise inaccessible areas and deliver emergency assistance to affected populations. A sub cluster **assessment** team composed of UNDP Philippines, UNEP and UNDP Crisis Prevention and Recovery Adviser conducted a mission to Cainta, Pasig and Pateros to determine immediate recovery needs. OCHA reported that the GoRP Department of Health (DoH), WHO, and U.N. Health Cluster members had signed a Memorandum of Understanding to enhance **Coordination**, cooperation, and member commitment to agree on **Coordination** activities.
October 02nd, 2009	Typhoon Parma (Pepeng') is intensifying and is forecast to skirt the east coast of Luzon as a Category 5 "Super Typhoon" with potential to bring further rains and high winds to Luzon and further exacerbate the ongoing situation and response. President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo declared a nationwide state of calamity and ordered the evacuation of residents in six provinces of Luzon in the direct path of Typhoon Parma. Currently, GoRP military and police officials are supporting the evacuation process and moving affected populations to safer areas while pre-	OCHA was operating from the NDCC Operations Centre in Manila to support the GoRP overall efforts for **Coordination**. OCHA had deployed Information Management Officers as well as Humanitarian Affairs Officers from its Regional Office for Asia Pacific as surge support. UNDAC revealed that in some areas with poor access there are significant numbers of families living in submerged housing. These include families unable to be accommodated in evacuation centers

Date	Event	Intervention
	deploying disaster relief response teams to targeted areas.	and should be considered at high risk. An application for a rapid response grant from the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) was submitted, drawn from projects in the flash appeal, as a means of kick-starting response activities in core sectors. The process of developing a Flash Appeal, as requested by GoRP, was ongoing with a tentative submission. In addition, ECHO had dispatched an emergency assessment mission to Manila, and other donors have indicated preliminary support to respond to the emergency.
October 3rd, 2009	Typhoon Parma (locally named Pepeng) made landfall in Cagayan Valley – Region III (Aurora and Isabela Provinces) as a Category 3 Typhoon. Typhoon Parma weakened to a Category 2 and is currently over far North Luzon, according to PAGASA. The GoRP led a pre-emptive evacuation of 45,486 people from the path of Typhoon Parma from 15 provinces in Regions I (Ilocandia), II (Cagayan Valley), III, IV-A, V (Bicolandia) and National Capital Region (NRC) from 1-3 October. The people were evacuated to host families and 117 evacuation centres.	UNDAC team conducted **assessment**s of the impact of the Tropical Storm Ketsana in Marilao Municipality (Region III), Valenzuela City (National Central Region), Taytay Municipality (Region IVA), Pasig City (National Central Region). General findings indicated that the food situation remains dire in the worst flood-affected areas and in some evacuation centres. There is an urgent need for potable water supplies, additional sanitation facilities in some evacuation centres, in particular the over-crowded centres, and a dire need for waste management.
October 4th, 2009	Tropical Storm Ketsana (locally named Ondoy) affected 3,232,234 people (668,864 families), leaving 288 dead and 42 missing. A total of 370,147 people are currently in 515 evacuation shelters. An estimated 4,404 houses were destroyed by the storm and floods and 6,033 houses were partially damaged, according to the NDCC.	Once Typhoon Parma passed, the UNDAC team conducted an aerial **assessment** of the Central National Region (Metro Manila) to assess the water levels; transportation access to the flood affected areas and estimated damage. NDCC conducted an aerial **assessment** of the flood affected areas in Cagayan Region

Date	Event	Intervention
October 5th, 2009	Isabela Province was one of the hardest hit areas in Region II by Typhoon Parma. Crop damage reached US$ 137,155,761 from Tropical Storm Ketsana and US$ 24,030,849 from Typhoon Parma that require immediate resumption of farming and agriculture-based livelihoods activities in affected areas, which totals 188,375 hectares from Tropical Storm Ketsana and 78,770 hectares from Typhoon Parma. Data available prior to the onset of Typhoon Parma indicates the total number of destroyed or damaged houses is at 38,943, with 16,094 houses destroyed and 22,849 damaged. As expected, the number continues to rise, indicating that initial estimates on number of people requiring shelter repair kits need to be revised upwards.	UNDAC conducted a rapid **Needs Assessment** of Isabela Province Aerial **assessment**s were also conducted in Tuguegarao, Alcala, Camalaniugan, Apparri, Abulug, Ballesteros, Buguey and Gonzaga Santa Teresita.
October 6th, 2009	Zambales (Region III), some flood-damage to crops was evident.	Rapid **assessment** conducted in Zambales, according to the UNDAC Based on this aerial assessment, the office of Civil Defence (OCD), Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), Department of Agriculture and UNDAC will conduct a rapid **Needs Assessment** of Aparri, Buguey, Sta. Teresita, Gonazaga and Sta. Ana municipalities A formal launch of the appeal was scheduled in Geneva, and will be presented in Manila the following day.
October 9th, 2009	Typhoon Parma (known locally as Pepeng) left the Philippines, after reversing track twice over northern Luzon, bringing heavy rains to a far larger area than initially anticipated.	
October 11st, 2009	NDCC figures indicate that a total of 4,125,237 people were affected by Tropical Storm Ketsana (known locally as Ondoy), with 241,789 persons currently staying in 471 evacuation centres.	Joint rapid needs assessments, led by UNDAC and including participation by WFP (Food and Logistics), UNICEF (Health and WASH), WHO (Health), IOM (Shelter and NFIs) and UNFPA (Health and Protection), will be carried out in Paniqui (Tarlac province) and Bayambang,

Date	Event	Intervention
		Rosales and Villasis (Pangasinan province).
October 12nd, 2009	The UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, John Holmes, arrived in Manila for a two-day visit. He met with the president, senior government officials, IASC agencies, and partners and members of the donor community.	National Nutrition Council, a co-lead of the nutrition cluster, started a rapid nutritional assessment in NCR, Rizal and Laguna
October 13th, 2009	According to the NDCC, 2,546,101 people have been affected by Typhoon Parma (*Pepeng*), with 311 deaths confirmed and 80,262 people staying in 245 evacuation centres. Regions I, II, III and Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR) have been most severely affected	Teams carried out assessments in Guimba (Neuva Ecija) and Rosales (Pangasinan) municipalities, and met with the Tarlac and Nueva Ecija PDCCs. A total of $18 million had been committed or pledged against the Flash Appeal by seven countries or donor agencies, including rapid response grants from the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) in the amount of $6.8 million. $10.3 million was mobilized out of total $19.7 million required for WFP emergency food assistance in northern Philippines
October 15th, 2009	The NDCC reports that 3,157,533 people have been affected by Typhoon Parma (*Pepeng*), with 374 confirmed deaths. A total of 4,320,699 people were affected by Typhoon Ketsana, with 337 confirmed deaths. According to the latest consolidated data from the Department of Agriculture (DA the approximate total of production losses caused by extensive rainfall following Tropical Storm Ketsana and Typhoon Parma are US$491,468,569 (Ketsana $120,603,985, Parma $70,864,5840). The total damage to agricultural infrastructure is $577,557,055. Reports from 34 provinces indicate that approximately 614,118 hectares of croplands were damaged and approximately 1.4 million MT of rice, corn, vegetables, fruits and abaca. The most devastated commodity is rice, with 564,420 hectares of land affected and 1,140,160 MT of production losses (source: damage and situation report from the Department of Agriculture, 15 October). A joint FAO and DA	

Date	Event	Intervention
	assessment has assessed Region III (Buacan, Pampanga and Nueva Ecija) and Region II (Isabela and Cagayan).	
October 16th, 2009		UNDAC team left the Philippines having completed its assigned mission. The UNDAC team conducted 39 rapid needs assessments and follow-up/monitoring missions with Government and IASC partners.
October 17th, 2009	Typhoon Lupit (*Ramil*) is expected to make landfall in northern Luzon on Thursday 22 October	
October 19th, 2009	National Epidemiology Center reports that there are 1,670 cases of leptospirosis with 104 deaths in the National Capital Region (NCR). One hundred cases of Acute Watery Diarrhea have been reported, with three deaths. On behalf of the Humanitarian Country Team, the RC sent a letter to donors in the Philippines, highlighting **funding** needs in life-saving sectors. According to the NDCC, more than 8.4 million people were affected by Typhoons Parma (*Pepeng*) and Ketsana (*Ondoy*), causing 849 deaths. There are differences between the needs data reported by NDCC, DSWD, UNDAC and other assessments. Typhoon Lupit, locally known as *Ramil*, was located some 1,160km east of Aparri, Cagayan. According to DSWD, emergency relief items are being pre-positioned in Batanes (Region II); Cagayan (Region II); Isabela (Region II); La Union (Region I); Ilocos Norte (Region I); Ilocos Sur (Region I); Pangasinan (Region I); Benguet (Cordirella Administrative Region/CAR); Apayao (CAR); Kalinga (CAR); Abra (CAR); and Mountain Province (CAR).	NDCC asked the United Nations Resident Coordinator (RC) to reflect areas affected by Typhoon Parma (*Pepeng*) in the upcoming revision of the Flash Appeal. The typhoon caused widespread flooding in Regions I, II, III and landslides in CAR. The NDCC also encouraged the deployment of another UNDAC team in the country to allow for rapid deployment to areas likely to be affected by Typhoon Lupit. WFP was anticipating that the emergency operation will need to extend to March 2010.
October 20th, 2009		The FTS indicates that $20 million has been pledged or contributed to the Flash Appeal. This represents 27.3 percent of total requirements as initially assessed ($74 million). the second UNDAC team arrived in Manila to assist the NDCC, the United Nations Resident Coordinator and the humanitarian country team in coordinating

Date	Event	Intervention
		the anticipated response.
October 21st, 2009		A cluster leads meeting took place to discuss the upcoming revision of the Flash Appeal and preparations for Typhoon Lupit. Clusters convene meetings with their partners on a regular basis.
October 22nd, 2009	Typhoon Ramil (Lupit) was located at 350km east northeast of Aparri, Cagayan, with maximum sustained winds of 160km per hour near the centre and gustiness of up to 195 km per hour. It is forecast to move west southwest slowly. DSWD reports as of 22 Oct, typhoons "Ketsana" and "Parma" damaged 183,627 houses, of which 163,162 are partially damaged and 20,465 are totally damaged. Heavily affected areas are Regions I, III, IV-A and National Capital Region (NCR). Based on information from the National Housing Authority (NHA) on existing relocation sites, the government has started relocating people to Towerville in San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan, in Sta. Rosa and Binan, Laguna (those displaced coming from Marikina and Pasig).	27.3% of the Flash Appeal was covered. Critical **funding** gaps remain in life-saving sectors, while agriculture and protection are currently the least-funded sectors. To date, the majority of **funding** contributions are from the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF), Japan and the European Commission.
October 23rd, 2009	According to a preliminary assessment conducted jointly by the Department of Agriculture and FAO approximately 100,000 – 120,000 farmer's households in Region I, II and III lost 100% of their production and assets.	
October 25th, 2009	Typhoon Lupit, locally known as "Ramil" had exited the Philippines Area of Responsibility (PAR) and continues to move northeast. As of 4PM local time on Sunday, 25, the storm was 780 km Northeast of Basco, Batanes.	
October 26th, 2009		The Early Recovery Cluster met to discuss the revision of the flash appeal and cluster involvement in the PDNA process. A cluster-lead meeting was held to discuss the revision of the Flash Appeal and categories

Date	Event	Intervention
		proposed. The FTS indicates that $22.175 million has been pledged or contributed to the Flash Appeal. This represents approximately 30.1% of total requirements as initially assessed ($74 million).
October 28th, 2009		The revision of the Flash Appeal was underway with all clusters providing project proposals
October 29th, 2009	PAGASA reports that Typhoon Mirinae (local name Santi) is 800km east of Aurora province, and is continuing to move towards Luzon. It is expected to make landfall in Region III on Saturday, 31 October, in the morning. According to DSWD (DROMIC), there are 306 evacuation centres (ECs) in Region IV-A and NCR, hosting a population of over 87,000 people affected by Typhoons Ketsana (Ondoy) and Parma (Pepeng). DSWD additionally reports an increase of up to 12,000 people who moved to ECs as a result of typhoon Mirinae (Santi), but that many of these IDPs have started to return. Assessments of these ECs are ongoing, particularly in Region IV-A, which was hardest hit by the latest typhoon.	The revision of the Philippines 2009 Flash Appeal was underway with all clusters preparing to submit revised projects that week.
October 30th , 2009	DSWD and NDCC report that, 212,563 houses were damaged by typhoons Ketsana and Parma. Of these, 178,792 are damaged and 33,771 destroyed. Typhoon Mirinae is reported to have damaged an additional 5,422 houses (563 destroyed and 4,859 damaged) mainly in Quezon province (IV-A).	
October 31st, 2009	The damages caused by Tropical Storm Miranae are estimated at approximately 2,412 hectares (HA) of crop land in 5 provinces in Region IV-A. The estimated production losses are $3,368,143. The approximate production loss of rice amounts to $4,173,200 (Dept. Agriculture, Central Action Center 1 November 2009). The total losses and damages to the agriculture and fisheries sector is an estimated $560,013,285. The findings of a joint DA-FAO	

Date	Event	Intervention
	preliminary **Needs Assessment** indicate immediate needs for emergency supplies of rice and vegetable seeds, as well as fertilizers and repairs to damaged small scale irrigation to prevent significant negative impact on the next harvest season and on the region's food and livelihood security.	
November 1st , 2009		A Joint Rapid **Needs Assessment** mission to promptly evaluate the impact of Typhoon Mirinae was carried out. The results of the assessment will be published and disseminated as soon as possible.
November 2nd , 2009		The Philippines Flash Appeal 2009 is funded at 35 percent, or US$ 25 million, of the requested $74 million. The Flash Appeal revision is ongoing and all clusters have submitted revised strategies, prioritization, and response plans.
November 3th , 2009	The gravity of the affects of Typhoon Mirinae/Santi, which traversed central Luzon on 31 October, are becoming clearer as more municipalities report damages and causalities. The NDCC was reporting that 483,490 individuals have been affected by the storm in 121 municipalities. So far, there have been 29 reported deaths, 15 injuries, and six people are reported missing. Infrastructure damages was estimated to be PhP 494,698,172 (more than US$10M), including damages to 34,040 houses and 101 school buildings.	A consolidated Joint Rapid **Needs Assessment** of Santa Cruz, Laguna, Region IV-A detailing the impact of Typhoon Mirinae/Santi was published
November 5th , 2009	DSWD / NDCC reports, typhoons "Ondoy" and "Pepeng" damaged 212.918 houses, of which 178.856 werw partially damaged and 34,062 are totally damaged. Updated report from DSWD for typhoon "Santi" shows 25.310 damaged (2,298 total and 23,012 partial) houses in 4 regions. The reported number of damaged houses is still increasing every day. Analysis shows that approximately 40 municipalities in severely affected areas of Laguna (IV-A) and Pangasinan (III) have not reported their house damages to DSWD / NDCC yet. Based on NEW more detailed extrapolation of data by the shelter cluster, it is expected that the total number of damaged houses will be higher than the 250.000 expected before.	
November 6th , 2009		The Post Disaster **Needs Assessment** (PDNA) field missions were completed with data analysis and

Date	Event	Intervention
		report preparation underway. The PDNA included a Recovery Framework that was harmonized with the revised Flash Appeal and addressed short-term (up to November 2010) and medium-term (November 2010-November 2012) recovery needs. The PDNA report and recovery framework are to be completed by November 23.
November 10th , 2009		The FTS shows that, as of 10 November, the Philippines 2009 Flash Appeal had been 36.2 percent funded, having received $26 million of the originally requested $74 million. The revision of the 2009 Philippines Flash Appeal had been forwarded to the CAP section in Geneva for revision and approval. The launch of the Revised Flash Appeal was likely to take place in the week. IASC Partners, donors and Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) counterparts conducted an aerial survey of highly affected regions in Luzon.
November 12th , 2009	Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) reports that the combined effects of Tropical Storm Ketsana/Ondoy and Typhoons Parma/Pepeng and Mirinae/Santi claimed the lives of 961 people, while 756 had been reported injured and 90 remain missing. Department of Health (DOH) reports that 160 barangays remain flooded, affecting 223,289 families or 1,172,085 individuals. According to the HEARS PLUS emergency health report, 202,000 families in Region IV-A, more than one million people, continue to live in areas where flood waters have yet to recede.	UN-OCHA Information Management produced a preliminary 3W (Who is Where) matrix to synchronize all data gathering activities related to the relief operations and ensure complementation of programs as well as minimize duplication of interventions.
November 14th , 2009	The total number of damaged houses has increased to almost 307,000 (46,000 destroyed, 261,000 partially damaged)	
November 16th , 2009	78,915 families (382,541 individuals) reside in still-flooded areas in 871 B*arangays* in 125 municipalities of National Capital Region, Region IV-B, and Region V.	

Date	Event	Intervention
	Leptospirosis cases arising from the disaster from Region NCR, I, II, III, IVA and CAR total 3,382 cases, with 249 cumulative mortalities	
November 19th , 2009		The FTS reported that, as of 19 November, the Revised Philippines 2009 Flash Appeal was 21 percent funded, having received $30 million of the revised request for $143 million.
November 24th , 2009	The total official number of damaged houses has risen to 307,000 units. Shelter support is seriously under-funded (less than 10 percent). The Humanitarian situation was still critical for people who were displaced, still lived in areas submerged in water or people in areas that had been isolated by landslides.	The IASC inputs to the PDNA report is in its final stages, with UNDP consolidating the input to the World Bank editing team. NDCC, OCHA and WFP Logistics and ECT were doing a preparedness assessment of the Mayon Volcano situation on 25 November to map danger zones and the potential set up of on site **Coordination** services. The FTS reports that as of 24 November, the revised Philippines 2009 Flash Appeal has been 23.4 percent funded, having received $33 million of the revised request for $143.77 million. This represents an increase of only 1.4 percent in the requested **funding** during this reporting period. Many clusters remain seriously underfunded, affecting their capacity to implement relief and early recovery projects. The Shelter Cluster (excluding NFIs) has targeted 67,500 households for support but has received less than 10 percent Flash Appeal **funding** to date. Additional fundraising efforts are ongoing by the cluster. OCHA and IASC information managers continue to develop a "Who does What Where" tool to improve **Coordination** and avoid duplication of assistance.
November 25th , 2009		A joint Government of the Republic of the Philippines and Inter-Agency Standing Committee

Date	Event	Intervention
		(IASC) aerial assessment and preparedness assessment of Albay Province, Region V, took place as part of the Phase II preparedness protocol.
December 1st, 2009.		The Post Disaster **Needs Assessment** (PDNA) convened the 2nd Public-Private Sector Dialogue for Post-Disaster Assistance on 02 December 2009. The PDNA main report and sector reports were presented, detailing damages and needs in each sector and estimating the costs of recovery. According to the report, Typhoons Ondoy and Pepeng caused damage and losses equivalent to about 2.7 percent of GDP. A total of $942.9 million is required to meet recovery needs, and a total of $3.48 billion is required for the reconstruction efforts over the short term (2009-10) to medium term (2011-12). **Underfunding** continues to be a key constraint across the clusters. The most seriously underfunded clusters remain: Agriculture (12% funded), Shelter (10% funded), Protection (8% funded) and Education (4% funded). FTS reports that the Revised Philippines 2009 Flash Appeal has been 23.6% funded, having received $33.96 million of the revised request for $143.77 million. WFP Philippines reports having received a further estimated $16 million in donations not yet updated on FTS, tentatively bringing the total appeal to 38% funded.

Annex viii) List of people interviewed/met

Name	Organisation and function	Gender	Email address	Telephone	Place	Date
Claude Hilfiker	OCHA,	Male	hilfiker@un.org	+41 22 917 11 96	Phone interview	26.01.2010
Andreas Schuetz	OCHA,	Male	schuetza@un.org	+41 22 917 19 29	Phone Interview	26.01.2010
Terje Skavdal	OCHA ROAP	Male	skavdal@un.org	+66 (0) 2288 2425	Phone Interview	28.01.2010
Sebastian Rhodes Stampa	OCHA ROAP,	Male	rhodesstampa@un.org	+66 (0) 2288 2424	Phone Interview	28.01.2010
Richard Schnellen	UNDP	Male	richard.snellen@gmail.com	+316 152 70 667	Phone interview	28.01.2010
Renaud Meyer	UNDP	Male	renaud.meyer@undp.org	+63 2 9010237	Manila	01.02.2010
Cheche Cabrera	DSWD	Female		+63 9189345625	Manila	01.02.2010
Philippe Gauthier	OCHA	Male	Gauthier1@un.org	+63 2 9010265	Manila	01.02.2010
Natalie McCauley Lamin	UNICEF	Female	nmccauley@unicef.org	+63 2 9010129	Manila	01.02.2010
Kazuyuki Tsurumi	FAO	Male	kazuyuki.tsurumi@fao.org	+63 2 8897808	Manila	01.02.2010
Aristeo A. Portugal	FAO	Male	aristeo.portugal@fao.org	+63 2 9010353	Manila	01.02.2010
Jacqueline Badcock	UN	Female	jacqui.badcock@one.un.org	63 2 901-0235	Manila	01.02.2010
Vanessa J. Tobin	UNICEF –	Female	vtobin@unicef.org	+63 2 9010188	Manila	01.02.2010
Colin Davis	UNICEF –	Male	cdavis@unicef.org	+63 2 9010126	Manila	01.02.2010
Anselse C. Motcho	UNICEF –	Male	amotcho@unicef.org	+63 2 9010117	Manila	01.02.2010
Fergus McBean	UNICEF –	Male	fmcbean@unicef.org	+63 2 9010141	Manila	01.02.2010

Name	Organisation and function	Gender	Email address	Telephone	Place	Date
Michael Godfrey	UNDSS -	Male	michael.godfrey@undp.org	+63 2 9010100	Manila	02.02.2010
Maria Agnes Palacio	OCHA –	Female	agnes.palacio@undp.org	+63 2 9010265	Manila	02.02.2010
Titon Mitra	AusAID, Australian Embassy	Male	Titon.mitra@ausaid.org	63 27578202	Manila	2.01.2010
Gi Domingo	Portfolio Manager Human Security	Female	Gi.domingo@ausaid.org	6327578202	Manila	2.01.2010
Jean Daniel Tauxe	ICRC	Male	manila.man@icrc.org	006328928901	Manila	3.02.2010
Daniel Llorente	ICRC	Male	manila.man@icrc.org	006328928901	Manila	3.02.2010
Selvaratnam Sinnadurai	IFRC –	Male	selvaratnam.sinnadurai@ifrc.org	+63 2 3098622	PNRC, Port Area Manila	02.02.2010
Sandro Kushashvili	IFRC	Male	alexander.kushashvili@ifrc.org	+63 2 3098622	PNRC, Port Area Manila	02.02.2010
Casey Harrity	Save the Children	Female	Charity@savechildren.org	8525408, 8523059	Manila	
Goran Bilic	Save the Children	Male	gbilic@savechildren.org		Manila	03.02.2010
Latha Caleb	Save the Children	Female	lcaleb@savechildren.org		Manila	9am 3.02.2010
Susan.Robertson	WFP	Female	susan.robertson@wfp.org	6327302561	Manila	10am 3.02.2010
Paula Brennan	Oxfam	Female	PBrennan@oxfam.org.uk	+ 623 929 4470	Manila	03.02.2010
Donna Mitzi Lagdameo	PINGON – OXFAM,	Female	dlagdameo@oxfam.org.uk	+63 2 9294470	Manila	03.02.2010
Maria Marisa M. Ricardo	UNICEF	Female	mricardo@unicef.org	+63 2 9010145	Manila	03.02.2010
Philippe Brewster	IOM	Male	pbrewster@iom.int	+63 848 1260	Manila	03.02.2010
Dave Bercasio	IOM	Male	dbercasio@iom.int			
Olive M Luces	Regional Office – Office Civil Defence (CAR)	Female	Olive_luces@yahoo.com	0915-894-8604	Quezon City, Manila	04.02.2010
Marita Lupig Alcid	CARE Netherlands,	Female	mytalcid@yahoo.com	09088326889	Manila	04.02.2010

Name	Organisation and function	Gender	Email address	Telephone	Place	Date
			mytalcid@gmail.com			
Desiree Amore	SECOURS ISLAMIQUE FRANCE (SIF) –	Female	amore@secours-islamique.org	+63 9217767241	Manila	04.02.2010
Vladimir Arcilla Hernandez	CFSI (Community & Family Services International) –	Male	vhernandez@cfsi.ph	+63 2 5190048	CFSI, Pasay City	04.02.2010
Florence M. Tayzon	UNFPA	Female	tayzon@unfpa.org	+63 2 9010304	Manila	04.02.2010
Gwendolyn T. Pang	Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) –	Female	gwenpang@recross.org.ph	+63 2 5255654	Manila	04.02.2010
Guillaume Zerr	Handicap International	Male	Hiurgence.cdp.manila@gmail.com	+63 812 69 90	Manila	04.02.2010
Camilla Reyes Pante	Handicap International	Female	Hi.astcooro.manila@gmail.com			04.02.2010
Camilla Hagstrom	European Commission	Female	Camilla.hagstroem@ec.europa.eu	8595136	Manila	05.02.2010
Caroline Z. Maningo	European Commission	Female	Caroline.Maningo@ec.europa.eu	8595145	Manila	05.02.2010
Peter Bellen	KindernotHilfe e.V	Male	knh_philippines@hotmail.com	+63 9176271836	Quezon City	05.02.2010
John Mark Cajiaut	Bread for the World – Philippine Coordinator	Male	jmcajiauat@yahoo.com	+63 9199504790	Manila	05.02.2010
Bernard Kerblat	UNHCR.	Male	kerblat@unhcr.org	+63 403-2256 M 917-5963 491	Manila	05.02.2010
Jean Christophe Tapin	Merlin –	Male	pc@merlin_philippines.org	+63 9394437810	Manila	05.02.2010
Dr. Aaron Stern	USAID,	Male	astern@usaid.gov	+63 2 552-9902	Manila	05.02.2010
Rolf Anderson	USAID,	Male	randerson@usaid.gov	+63 2 552-9821		

Name	Organisation and function	Gender	Email address	Telephone	Place	Date
Boy Bersales	World Vision	Male	boy-bersales@wvi.org		Manila	07.02.2010
Jacqueline Manara	Office of Civil Defense	Female		+63 2 4211918	NDCC	08.02.2010
Geraldine C. Repollo	PNRC –	Female	geraldine.repollo@redcross.org.ph	+63 2 6350922	Pasig City	09.02.2010
Valentin P. Guidote, Jr.	Province of Laguna – Planning & Development Coordinator	Male	junjie_27@yahoo.com	+63 49 8081120	Sta. Cruz, Laguna	10.02.2010
Tomas M. Ortega	Office of Civil Defense	Male	ocd4a@ndcc.gov.ph	+63 49 5317266	Calamba City, Laguna	10.02.2010
Roberto M. Bunyi	Muntinlupa City – City Administrator	Male	bunyi@muntinlupacity.gov.ph	+63 2 8622525	Muntinlupa City	08.02.2010
Daphne D. Villanueva	Christian Aid –	Female	dvillanueva@christian-aid.org	+63 2 4261215	Pasig City	09.02.2010
Andrew Parker	World Banks	Male	aparker@worldbank.org	918-939-4096	Phone interview	09.02.2010
Anne Davies	DEC evaluation	Female	davies@channelresearch.com		Manila	09.02.2010
Jimmy Greene	UNICEF	Male	jgreene@unicef.org		Manila	12.02.2010
Nick Hilton	UNICEF	Male	nhilton@unicef.org			
Francessco Notti	OHCHR	Male	notti@un.org		Debriefing Bangkok	19.02.2010
Kasutoshi Nagazaka	UNHCR	Male	nagasak@unhcr.org		Debriefing Bangkok	19.02.2010
Rizvina de Alwis	UNFPA	Female	dealwis@unfpa.org		Debriefing Bangkok	19.02.2010
Ali Shirazi	UNFPA	Male	shirazi@unfpa.org		Debriefing Bangkok	19.02.2010
Roberto Saltori	UNICEF	Male	rsaltori@unicef.org		Debriefing Bangkok	19.02.2010

Name	Organisation and function	Gender	Email address	Telephone	Place	Date
Charlie Ayco	Habitat for Humanity	Male	CAyco@habitat.org		Debriefing Bangkok	19.02.2010
Scott Peterson	Habitat for Humanity	Male	speterson@habitat.org		Debriefing Bangkok	19.02.2010
Sanny Ramos Jegillos	UNDP	Male	sanny.jegillos@undp.org		Debriefing Bangkok	19.02.2010
Sharon Wright	UNICEF	Female	sjwright65@yahoo.com.au		Debriefing Bangkok	19.02.2010
John Bryant	WFP	Male	John.Bryant@wfp.org		Debriefing Bangkok	19.02.2010
Cameron Higgins	WFP	Male	Cameron.Higgins@wfp.org		Debriefing Bangkok	19.02.2010
Pajaree Suwannakarn	UNHCR	Male	suwannak@unhcr.org		Debriefing Bangkok	19.02.2010
Shane Doherty	OCHA	Female	doherty@un.org		Debriefing Bangkok	19.02.2010
Markus Werne	OCHA	Male	werne@un.org		Debriefing Bangkok	19.02.2010
Nidhrat Srisirirojanakorn	OCHA	Female	srisirirojanakorn@un.org		Debriefing Bangkok	19.02.2010
Scott Green	OCHA	Male	Green10@un.org		Debriefing Geneva	23.02.2010
Simon Lawry White	IASC	Male	lawrywhite@un.org		Debriefing Geneva	23.02.2010
Marianne Read	WFP	Female	read@wfp.org		Debrieging Geneva	23.02.2010
Tijana Bojanic	OCHA	Female	bojanict@un.org		Debriefing New York OCHA	26.02.2010
Sunni Kim	OCHA	Female	kim@un.org		Debriefing New York OCHA	26.02.2010
Matthew Hochbrueckner	OCHA	Male	hockbrueckner@un.org		Debriefing New York OCHA	26.02.2010
Carmen Van Heese	OCHA	Female	vanheese@un.org		Debriefing New York	26.02.2010

Name	Organisation and function	Gender	Email address	Telephone	Place	Date
					OCHA	
Kimberly Lietz	OCHA	Female	Lietz@un.org		Debriefing New York OCHA	26.02.2010
Paola Emerson	OCHA	Female	emersonp@un.org		Debriefing New York OCHA	26.02.2010
Tensai Asfaw	OCHA	Male	asfawt@un.org		Debriefing New York OCHA	26.02.2010
Elyse Mosquini	IFRC	Female	Elyse.mosquini@ifrc.org	001-6462296401	Debriefing NY IASC	26.02.2010
Amy Muedin	IOM	Female	Amuedin@iom.int	001-212-681-7000 x 212	Debriefing NY IASC	26.02.2010
Anne Cubilie	OCHA	Female	cubilie@un.org	7.9585	Debriefing NY IASC	26.02.2010
Annette Rolfe	OCHA	Female	rolfea@un.org	001-9176406019	Debriefing NY IASC	26.02.2010
Hansjoerg Strohmeyer	OCHA	Male	strohmeyerh@un.org		Debriefing	26.02.2010