

Inter-Agency Real Time Evaluation (IA RTE)  
of The Humanitarian Response to  
Pakistan's 2009 Displacement Crisis  
Commissioned by the Inter-Agency Standing  
Committee



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## PHOTO CREDITS

Cover photo: Four men waiting for a one shot non-food relief item distribution, in Jarma Kohat. © Riccardo Polastro 2010.

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<sup>1</sup> We have not incorporated comments: 1) where addressing them required a lot of explanation that would have made the report much longer; 2) which involved inappropriate of detail on one part of the response; 3) where they would have detracted from the balance of the report by concentrating on the achievements of particular agencies; or 4) where they were contradicted by evidence we already had and did not offer any compelling contrary evidence.

## Executive Summary

This is the report of the Real Time Evaluation of the International Humanitarian Community's response to the 2009 and 2010 Internally Displaced Person (IDP) crisis in Pakistan. The Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) commissioned the evaluation and it was undertaken by a team of three evaluators in May and June of 2010.

This was a humanitarian response set against the backdrop of a very complex environment, in which the Government of Pakistan (referred to as the Government from here on) reluctantly mobilised the military to reassert control of the national territory. Given that the primary driving force of the military operation was the re-establishment of sovereignty, and that underlying causes of the security problems included international factors, it was not surprising that the GoP constrained the response of international humanitarian organisations.

The overall response was a success in which the international community played a key role. There was no large-scale death or disease outbreak even though millions of people fled from their homes in a very short time frame. There were a number of innovative features in the response, including relatively rapid registration and verification and the use of smart cards for distributing cash assistance. The population of the IDP inflow areas, and of Pakistan as a whole, played a major role in the response as did the Government.

Donors gave generous support during the relief phase in 2009, but have been far less willing to fund work in 2010, either to meet recovery needs of returnees or of those still displaced.

The response to Pakistan again illustrates problems with the current UN Humanitarian Reform process. While the Emergency Response Coordinator (ERC) in New York appointed a Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) with solid humanitarian experience, the HC was still not a full-time HC. The Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) has not been as effective a forum for leading the international humanitarian response as it should have been.

Cluster performance in Pakistan has been very variable. Many clusters lacked trained full-time coordinators. Some of the same problems with cluster identified in the response to the 2005 earthquake and the 2007 floods in Pakistan were again evident in this crisis. The clusters have also suffered from unrealistic expectations regarding their ability to manage pooled funding. Field coordination rolled out very slowly, leaving coordination in the hands of the military for several months.

Pakistan is a dangerous environment for humanitarian workers, and insecurity has been a major problem for the humanitarian response. Security concerns have limited assessments and monitoring. Security rules have had large operational costs and have had a negative effect on programme quality.

The Government was simultaneously a party to the conflict and the gatekeeper for humanitarian assistance. The Government constrained access to the affected populations by humanitarian actors, partly for security and partly for other reasons. Access constraints in the form of government controls or agency security rules have completely shaped and constrained the humanitarian response in much of the affected area. The No-Objections Certificate (NOC), through with the authorities control access, system has been a major constraint in the delivery of humanitarian assistance.

Pragmatism and the need for access to the affected community, rather than the humanitarian principles of independence, neutrality, and impartiality drove the actions of the international humanitarian community. Different humanitarian actors compromised these humanitarian principles to different extents so as to get access to the affected population. Pakistan is a member state of the UN and it is a One UN Pilot Country. This means that the UN's programme in Pakistan is closely aligned with the Government priorities. UN agencies did

not work in an impartial, independent or neutral manner, but instead strongly supported one party to the conflict, the Government.

The military's desire to create free-fire zones in the areas controlled by militants led to large-scale displacement as populations fled the areas when notified to do so by the military. The Government sought to repeat the success of the 2005 earthquake response, in which the military led the response while working in close cooperation with the international humanitarian community. The dual role of the Government, both as a party to the conflict and as a gatekeeper for humanitarian assistance, led to a significant encroachment on humanitarian space, with decisions about who got assistance sometimes being influenced by political and military considerations. This encroachment has gone largely unchallenged in Pakistan.

The failure to challenge these limitations in this crisis has set a bad precedent in a context where further complex emergencies can be expected. The Government is not monolithic, and different components of the Government have different interests. While there was criticism of the slow pace of the work of NGOs by some parts of the Government, other parts of the Government were interested in what the international community could provide. There was some space for humanitarian diplomacy to push for a less restrictive humanitarian space. However, there was relatively little effort by the humanitarian community to push issues of humanitarian space up the agenda.

Relatively few needs assessments were conducted, and joint assessments were rare, despite the development of useful tools like the Multi-Cluster Rapid Assessment Mechanism (McRAM). The needs assessments that were conducted were more for individual agency use than for use by the broader humanitarian community. The affected population was rarely consulted in any effective way. Consultation mainly took place with male leaders and not with the broader population or with women. The lack of consultation led to some inappropriate assistance, such as concentrating on shelter kits rather than on rent assistance or on the costs of house repair.

Agencies often did not specifically address the particular needs of women, girls, boys, or men, and took little account of differing needs. This improved somewhat in 2010. However, interviewees commented that this lack of attention to differing needs was driven in part by a lack of willingness to confront cultural norms of patriarchy and gender inequality.

The affected population that the team met with generally preferred cash to in-kind assistance, with good reason. However, agencies were still reluctant to move away from their giving in kind comfort-zone even where such in kind assistance represented poor value for money. The high attractiveness of cash has led to significant political pressure for the inclusion of ineligible beneficiaries, and has provided an incentive for fraudulent registration.

While the registration exercise was a logistic triumph, the registration criteria were fundamentally flawed and led to inclusion and exclusion errors both on IDP status and on the need for assistance. In any emergency, there is a trade-off between speed and accuracy in registration. The registration in this case was a good example of fast and relatively effective registration. However, there was no transition to a more accurate targeting of the bulk of the affected population in the first six months of the response. Thus, the response was category-based (on the registration criteria) rather than status-based (IDP) or needs-based. The major humanitarian actors accepted the flawed registration and used it as a basis for their own distributions.

Assistance was not proportionate to need, but varied with many extraneous factors and over time. Assistance was much harder to access for female-headed families. Relief assistance was much more readily available than recovery assistance. Those in camps were far better assisted by the international community than those hosted by families, families in rented accommodation, returnees, host families or stayees.

The camp population was the best assisted but was also the poorest group of IDPs. However, some of those who stayed in the notified areas were even poorer, as they had stayed because

they could not afford the costs of displacement. Paradoxically they received less assistance than anyone else.

Some of the most difficult gaps in assistance were gaps which predated the crisis and which reflected chronic underlying problems in the provision of basic services in Pakistan. This, together with the complexities of varying patterns of need, and varying levels of assistance for different groups, provides a very complex pattern of need that has made communicating the needs to donors difficult.

Most of the response focus has been on relief rather than on recovery, rehabilitation or development. Recovery needs are not being met, largely because of a lack of funding. Direct damage to infrastructure and livelihood assets is a major problem in some areas of return. There has been relatively little livelihood support.

While the response was far from perfect, it was effective in preventing large-scale death and suffering. This is due in part to the support provided to the IDPs by the local community, but the international community has also played a key role. The international community in Pakistan is already working to resolve many of the issues identified in this report.

## Recommendations

1. The ERC should immediately introduce a requirement that, except in exceptional circumstances, the heads of the three main UN humanitarian agencies (UNICEF, WFP, and UNHCR- where present) should attend the regular meeting of the HCT. The ERC should also require HCs to provide a summary of HCT attendance by heads of agencies each quarter.
2. The ERC should consult with the IASC about changing the HCT guidelines to limit membership on the UN side to the key UN humanitarian operational agencies (typically UNHCR, WFP, and UNICEF) with a single representative for other UN agencies and the possibility of inviting specific UN agencies as dictated by the agenda.
3. The chair of the HCT meeting should, with immediate effect for all decisions, establish who exactly is responsible for implementing the decision, who should report back on it, and when progress reports should be made. Progress against implementation should be reviewed at subsequent meetings.
4. The IASC should develop a common reporting format that can be promoted as a single reporting format in all new emergencies.
5. The HCT should develop an active strategy of humanitarian diplomacy to work toward a more principled approach and a less constrained humanitarian space in Pakistan, including putting the issue on the agenda for donors.
6. The HCT should encourage members to implement the IASC policy on gender in humanitarian action and should actively monitor progress towards the achievement of this policy.
7. The humanitarian community in Pakistan should reassess all existing programmes, both in terms of the appropriateness of the assistance that they are providing and whom they are targeting. The priority for reassessment should be programmes delivering goods in kind. In kind assistance should only continue where the affected population prefer it to cash or vouchers on an equivalent cost basis.
8. The HCT should roll out the vulnerability assessment model for the whole affected area and base assistance on vulnerability rather than just on registration.
9. The HCT should begin a process of consistently mapping needs across the affected area disaggregated by region, age, and sex. Such a mapping may require that the HCT commission a detailed survey of the affected population to discover what types of assistance has been most useful, and what types of assistance are still needed.

10. The Government should introduce a 'presumed to comply' rule for NOCs where, unless NOCs are formally refused, they are deemed to come into effect within seven days of the submission of the application.
11. The HCT should continue to advocate with donors to adequately fund recovery in the short to intermediate term while waiting for the medium to long term mechanisms to come into play.

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# Map




Figure 1: Please note that this map does not show the returnees to Bajaur Agency in FATA whom WFP is currently assisting.

## Acronyms and special terms

Acronym	Meaning
ALNAP	Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action
BOR	Basic Operating Rules
CAR	Commissionerate for Afghan Refugees, also the Central African Republic
CERF	Central Emergency Response Fund
CERINA	Conflict Early Recovery Initial Needs Assessment
CHF	Common Humanitarian Funds
CMLC	Civil-Military Liaison Cell
DARA	Development Assistance Research Associates
DFID	Department for International Development (the UK aid administration)
DNA	Damage and Needs Assessment
DPKO	Department of Peace Keeping Operations
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
EC	European Commission
ECHO	European Commission Humanitarian (Aid) Office
ERF	Emergency Response Fund
ESS	Evaluation and Studies Section
FATA	Federally Administered Tribal Areas
FDMA	FATA Disaster Management Agency
FODP	Friends of Democratic Pakistan (a forum of 26 member states - mostly donors)
GDI	Gender-related Development Index
GoP	Government of Pakistan
HC	Humanitarian Coordinator
HCT	Humanitarian Country Team
HDI	Human Development Index
HPI	Human Poverty Index (HPI-1 is for development countries and HPI-2 is for selected OECD countries)
HRF	Humanitarian Response Fund, another name for the ERF
IA	Inter-Agency
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IFRC	The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies

IG	Interest Group
INGO	International Non Government Organisation
IPDET	International Program for Development Evaluation Training
KPK or KP	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa ( <i>Khyber, land of the Pashtuns</i> ) the new name for NWFP since April 2010.
McRAM	Multi-Cluster Rapid Assessment Mechanism
MDTF	Multi Donor Trust Fund
NADRA	National Database and Registration Authority
NDMA	National Disaster Management Agency
NFI	Non Food Items
NGO	Non Government Organisation
NIHA	Neutral and Impartial Humanitarian Action
NNGO	National Non Government Organisation
NOC	No Objection Certificate – permits issued by the Pakistani Authorities for the operations of NGOs, travel etc.
NWFP	North West Frontier Province, renamed Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in April, 2010.
OCHA	Office of the Coordinator of Humanitarian Affairs
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OFDA	The Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, part of USAID
PaRRSA	Provincial Relief, Rehabilitation and Settlement Authority
PCNA	Post-Conflict Needs Assessment
PDMA	Provincial Disaster Management Agency
PKR	Pakistani Rupees
PK-RCS	Pakistan Red Crescent Society
PSM	Policy and Strategy Meeting
RTE	Real-Time Evaluation
SDM	Sub District Magistrate
SSG	Special Support Group (a special military-civilian unit set up under the Prime Minister's office to implement assistance to IDPs and to those in the conflict affected areas)
SWA	South Waziristan Agency
SWD	Social Welfare Department
TNSM	Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi ( <i>Movement for the Enforcement of Islamic Law</i> ) a militant group whose objective is to establish Sharia law in Pakistan. Founded by Sufi Muhammad in 1992, it was banned by President Musharraf in January 2002.
ToR	Terms of Reference

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TTP	Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan ( <i>Student Movement of Pakistan</i> ) the main Taliban militant umbrella group in Pakistan, formed in 2002. The word Talib means Student, and refers to the roots of the Taliban in the Islamic schools of Pakistan.
UN	United Nations
UNDSS	United Nations Department of Safety and Security
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
Unicef	United Nations Children's Fund
UNIFEM	United Nations Fund For Women
UNMAS	United Nations Mine Action Service
USAID	The United States Agency for International Development
USD	United States Dollar
WB	World Bank
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organisation

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# 1 Introduction

This Real-Time Evaluation (RTE) is the eighth Inter-Agency RTE (IA RTE) conducted for the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC)<sup>2</sup>. It is the second IA RTE conducted about a complex emergency response and the third IA RTE in Pakistan since 2006.

The UN's Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) managed the evaluation on behalf of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC). Five agencies<sup>3</sup> jointly funded the evaluation. The Terms of Reference, which set out the task for the evaluation team, are presented as Appendix 1.

The evaluation was conducted by a team of three consultants working for DARA, an independent organisation specialising in evaluation, particularly of humanitarian programmes. It is the third IA RTE that DARA has worked on. Brief biographies of the consultants are including in the methodological section in Appendix 3.

## 1.1 The structure of the report

Writing this report has been a challenge due to the wealth of data collected by the team. The team used an evidence table to organise and analyse their observations, reading, and interview notes. The evidence table contained over 26,000 words on 1,245 pieces of evidence (Table 1). Appendix 3 provides more information on the evidence table and the way in which the evaluators used it to ensure that the findings, conclusions, and recommendations were well-grounded. The evidence table drew information from all the different information sources. In the few cases where there was a conflict of evidence, the team assessed this through:

- Weighing the credibility of the evidence based on:
  - The depth of knowledge that the source was likely to have about the issue
  - Any likely agenda or institutional bias<sup>4</sup>.
- Favouring the interpretation represented by the preponderance of sources, especially when that interpretation was triangulated.

Table 1: Summary of evidence table

<b>Evaluation Criterion</b>	<b>No. of pieces of evidence</b>	<b>Word Count</b>
Connectedness	162	3,637
Consistency	297	6,348
Effectiveness	426	8,708
Relevance	304	6,222
Timeliness	56	1,411
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,245</b>	<b>26,326</b>

<sup>2</sup> The other IA RTEs in the present series are: Pakistan 2005 Earthquake, Darfur crisis 2006, Mozambique 2007 Floods and Cyclone, Pakistan 2007 Floods and Cyclone, Myanmar 2008 Cyclone, Philippines 2009 Cyclones, Haiti 2010 Earthquake.

<sup>3</sup> DFID, OCHA, UNDP, UNHCR and UNICEF

<sup>4</sup> For example, if a cluster coordinator said that their own cluster performed well and all the cluster members interviewed said it had not, the team took the view that the cluster had not performed well.

The team needed to prioritise findings for this report, and focused on what readers are most likely to find useful. This was done in order to keep the report to a more readable length. Interested readers can find details about data collection and evidence gathering in Appendix 3. We have concentrated on our findings, conclusions, and recommendations rather than on presenting detailed evidence. In the interest of transparency, we have shown the number of the pieces of evidence and the number of sources from which evidence was obtained for each section of the criteria chapters.

This initial introductory chapter sets out the structure of the report and the approach taken by the team in the evaluation. Following the introductory chapter is a chapter on the context of the evaluation, as context is critical in complex emergencies.

The chapters following the context chapter address the evaluation criteria specified in the terms of reference:

- Effectiveness (of response given as compared to objectives and targets defined).
- Consistency (of response given as compared to standards adhered to).
- Relevance (of the response given as compared to needs).
- Timeliness (time elapsed between displacement, assessments and response).
- Connectedness (sustainability as achieved through ensuring that activities are planned in support to pre-existing response structures and capacities).

Each of the criteria chapters are subdivided into the topics through with the team addressed each particular criterion, the definition of which is presented at the start of each chapter.

We present conclusions and recommendations at the end of each criterion chapter. This is to help to make it clear how the conclusions and recommendations are based on the findings.

The main report is followed by a series of appendices:

- Terms of Reference
- Chronology
- Methodology
- Individuals met
- Itinerary
- Interview Guide
- Basic Operating Rules
- References

## 1.2 Evaluation approach

The evaluation methodology is described in Appendix 3. The evaluators have followed a mixed method approach using the following methods:

- Document research
- Semi-structured key-informant interviews drawn from UN agencies, INGOs and, National NGOs, ICRC, governments, donors, and the military. Appendix 4.1 presents a full list of the individuals that the team met with including breakdowns by method used and interviewee type. In total, the team met 143 people on an individual or small group basis of which 36 (25%) interviewees were female.
- The team held group interviews with the affected population: with IDPs in camps or in rented or hosted accommodation, with returnees, stayees; and with host families. The

team met with 846 people in 23 group meetings. Of these, 273 (32%) were women. For cultural reasons women were usually met with separately from men. Appendix 4.2 presents a full list of all group meetings held.

- Direct observation of coordination processes and of aid operations.

The team visited 12 different locations in Pakistan to conduct the fieldwork. Appendix 5 shows the consultants' itinerary.

The evaluators used triangulation and drew on multiple sources to ensure that the findings could be generalised to the response and were not the results of bias or the views of a single agency or type of actor.



Figure 2: Evaluation team member conducting group discussion with IDPs from Orakzai in Kohat province.

The main constraints faced by the evaluation team included:

- The timing of the evaluation. The main effort for IDPs in Pakistan was concentrated in 2009, when this evaluation was first mooted. The October 2009 attack on the WFP offices in Islamabad led to a postponement of the evaluation. The fielding of two other RTEs<sup>5</sup> in the first six months of 2010 led to a further postponement until May 2010. The evaluation is therefore more retrospective than RTEs should ideally be.
- Security. Pakistan is a dangerous environment for both national and international humanitarian staff.
- The No Objection Certificate (NOC) system. The team's visits to different locations had to be approved by the local authorities who issued NOCs for the visit. This limited the

<sup>5</sup> The Philippines and Haiti.



sites that could be visited, as the team was not able to visit areas of current displacement or return in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).

- UN Security Rules. These rules meant that the team travelled with an armed escort, and thus was limited in where and when it could go or stay.
- Limited time for fieldwork. The team spent only two weeks in Pakistan. While the team prioritised field visits, they were still relatively limited.

## 2 The Context

The Pakistan IDP crisis was a “complex emergency”. This term refers to emergencies that are caused by the hazards of the struggle for power rather than by natural hazards. The fact that the disaster causing forces are *human* is what makes such emergencies complex. It also means that understanding the historical, social, cultural, economic and political contexts is essential to address the needs of the affected population effectively.

We included a detailed chronology of events in Pakistan in Appendix 2 to illustrate just how complex the context is and to set the IDP crisis within the broader historical context. In addition to being subject to complex emergencies, Pakistan is also a natural disaster hotspot (Figure 3).




Figure 2: Pakistan is a high-risk area for geophysical and hydrological disasters as shown in this image from the Natural Disaster Hotspots Global Risk Analysis. (Dilley et al, 2005, p 22) and <http://www.earth.columbia.edu/news/2004/story10-29-04.html>.

Due to the “global war on terror” and a history of support for armed Islamist groups in Kashmir and Afghanistan, current day Pakistan presents a very complex environment in which a range of factors contribute to the displacement crisis. Appendix 2 presents a chronology of some of the main events relevant to the current crisis clustered around the British rule, independence, Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, 9/11 and the Global War on Terror.

The FATA has had a chequered history in terms of its strategic importance. There have been enormous fluctuations in the central government and other groups’ interest in FATA due to changes in its strategic and geo-political importance. Today, the region has returned to the limelight as one of the front lines in the Global War on Terror. Some of the roots of the current crisis lie in the Colonial Era, when the sub-continent was under British rule: the Durand Line border that divided the Pashtun tribes of Pakistan from those of Afghanistan<sup>6</sup>; and the indirect government of the border area.

The British Colonial Administration introduced collective punishment and a system of mutual non-interference to maintain the border area as a buffer between Afghanistan. The post-partition independent Government continued the same policy, with a FATA that was outside the national mainstream.

<sup>6</sup> The Afghanistan-Pakistan border is 2,445km long.

The IDP crisis in Pakistan is intimately connected with developments in Afghanistan and the role that Pakistan has played in conflict there. Pakistan's policies have focused on countering Indian influence in the region, including in Afghanistan, where Pakistan was concerned with having a communist regime on its doorstep. Even before the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, Pakistan (with western assistance), was supporting Islamist fighters struggling against the communist government of Afghanistan. This support greatly expanded following the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 1979.

Support to fighters in Afghanistan was generally delivered through the FATA, where the Pashtun tribes on both sides of the border shared a common heritage. Following the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, the Federal Government (with international support) dramatically increased spending on development programmes in FATA, but this spending vanished after the Geneva Accords and the collapse of the communist government in Afghanistan.

There are chronic problems with the delivery of basic services in much of rural Pakistan. In FATA, decades of infighting and rivalry have left the population of three million impoverished compared to other parts of Pakistan. The overall literacy rate is only 17.4%, with female literacy at a very low 3% (GoNWFP 2006). The absence of a good road network restricts access to basic services. Even where physical facilities for social services exist, the staff needed to deliver services is often lacking. While this is a problem throughout rural Pakistan, it is particularly severe in areas with greater social restrictions such as in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) and FATA.

Dissatisfied with the post-communist chaos in Afghanistan, and concerned with the opportunities this chaos offered to India, Pakistan's Inter-Service Intelligence agency (ISI) sponsored the Taliban: a movement of Islamist Jihadis initially drawn from Madrassas in Pakistan. The Taliban sought to create an Islamic Emirate in Afghanistan, with a state based on Islamic principles. The Pakistani media at the time, much of which was under government control, portrayed the Taliban very favourably.

With Pakistan's financial and diplomatic support, together with support from conservative regimes like Saudi Arabia, the Taliban rapidly gained ground in Afghanistan. It eventually controlled 90 to 95% of Afghanistan, with the Northern Alliance controlling only 5% to 10% of the state. The Northern Alliance survived because it enjoyed the support of the West and of the Russians, and the Taliban Government was only recognised by Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, while the Northern Alliance government continued to hold Afghanistan's seat in the UN.

The September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks in the United States forced a change in Pakistani policy, with then President Musharraf announcing the end of support for the Taliban experiment and stating that "the Nation comes first". However, there are persistent allegations of continued Pakistani support of the Taliban in Afghanistan as a bulwark against Indian regional ambitions<sup>7</sup>.

The initial success of the overthrow of the Taliban in Afghanistan led to a blundering counter insurgency campaign as the Taliban re-emerged as a focus for those opposed to foreign occupation. Military operations in Afghanistan led to an overspill of Afghan Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters into FATA. Pakistan came under pressure from the West to act against those fighters taking shelter in Pakistan. The Government undertook a number of limited campaigns in response.

The continuing international military presence in Afghanistan increased support for radical groups in Pakistan, and the Pakistan Taliban became a political force in FATA, gradually extending into parts of North West Frontier Province (NWFP). Many Pakistani interviewees saw the continuing international presence in Afghanistan as a foreign occupation, and that it is the biggest driver for the current crisis. The early political gains of the Pakistani Taliban led

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<sup>7</sup> Waldman, M. (2010).

to displacement long before the 2009 crisis when better -off families fled the oppressive rule of the Taliban. The Government followed a policy of negotiation interspersed with military campaigns to limit the encroachment of such groups beyond FATA.

One major agreement in early 2009 that effectively conceded control of Swat district to the Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e- Shariat-e- Muhammadi (TNSM), an affiliate of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, collapsed when the Taliban began to extend out of the Swat valley, destabilising other parts of Pakistan. This led to a reluctant government decision to use military force to re-establish the writ of the national government in the affected areas<sup>8</sup>.

The May 2009 military operations in Swat began with the army advising the population to move out of the area to allow the military to deal with the militants. This led to a sudden large-scale movement of around two million people from the Swat valley. When added to the existing numbers of displaced, this gave a total caseload of close to three million.

Another strand in the response is the role of the Pakistani Military. The military in Pakistan is widely seen as the most effective part of the State<sup>9</sup>. The military is proud of its status and military officers often proudly compare their performance with that of the humanitarian community or of the Civil Administration. The military also plays a key role in the economic life of Pakistan, controlling some of the largest industrial enterprises in the country.

Another factor is chronic poverty and inequality. Pakistan ranks 141 on UNDP's Human Development Index. Swat has rich natural resources and a large tourism industry and was seen as one of wealthier parts of KPK<sup>10</sup>. However, there is still considerable inequality between the landlord class and the tenants. Such inequalities and the failure of the Government to provide basic services to the population have helped to increase support for militants.

Another complexity in the response is the marginalisation of women in Pakistan<sup>11</sup>. While there are wide variations in the severity of female seclusion throughout Pakistan, and even throughout KPK, the team was able to see its impact during the field work. Male interviewees were fully aware of the aid packages offered by different agencies even for other populations, but female interviewees had no knowledge of who was providing the aid that their families were accessing. This lack of knowledge was driven by an interlinked mix of seclusion, low female literacy and local traditions of male dominance.

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<sup>8</sup> Akjhtar notes *"The state is using force against the Taliban insurgents very reluctantly. The latter have long been considered "strategic assets" and also represent the logical culmination of the state ideology."* (2009, p.24)

<sup>9</sup> This is again highlighted in the response to the 2010 floods in Pakistan, with the international media contrasting the strong performance of the military in the response with the poor performance of the civilian government (Shah, 2010).

<sup>10</sup> However this "wealth" is relative. The 2003 National Human Development Report rated Swat as 66<sup>th</sup> out of 91 districts in terms of UNDP's Human Development Index (Hussain et al. 2003, p.12).

<sup>11</sup> Pakistan's Gender-related Development Index is 93% of its HDI, giving Pakistan the third lowest ratio of the 155 countries for which UNDP has calculated both the HDI and GDI. (UNDP 2009b, p.181-184)

## 3 Effectiveness

*Effectiveness measures the extent to which an activity achieves its purpose, or whether this can be expected to happen on the basis of the outputs.*

The team examined effectiveness through the lens of seven different topics:

- Achievements
- Funding and resourcing
- Coordination
- Access constraints
- Security constraints
- General learning for the future

### 3.1 Achievements

*This section is based on 81 pieces of evidence from 39 different sources.*

The response had several significant achievements. First, there were no major outbreaks of communicable diseases despite the speed and scale of the displacement<sup>12</sup>. Neither was there any large-scale mortality<sup>13</sup>. There are a number of factors underpinning this achievement:

- The displaced population travelled to an area with existing infrastructure, and families often accommodated the displaced in their own homes<sup>14</sup>.
- The communities in which the displaced took refuge gave strong support to the IDPs. Only 10-15% of the displaced were located in camps. The majority stayed with private families either as guests or as paying renters.
- WFP's establishment of more than 40 humanitarian hubs gave more than two million IDPs access to food aid within three weeks of their arrival.
- The crisis provoked a national response with assistance pouring in from the Government, private individuals, Pakistani charities, and the private sector.
- The international community in 2009 responded to the crisis with a significant amount of funding and the mobilisation of humanitarian actors through an emergency relief response.

The response also saw a number of innovative features which promoted an effective response:

- Registration of the affected population, although flawed, was very rapid<sup>15</sup>. The registration of more than two million people in such a short period of time was a huge achievement, especially against the background of security and access constraints.

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<sup>12</sup> Large scale mortality is rare after sudden-onset natural disasters, but it is far more common in complex emergencies that lead to displacement (Toole, 1997, p.98).

<sup>13</sup> While there appears to have been no formal overall mortality survey, several interviewees commented on the lack of large scale mortality.

<sup>14</sup> Only 15% of the IDP population was accommodated in tented camps. The rest of the population was accommodated in private homes, schools, and mosques.

<sup>15</sup> Between them, the Commissioner for Afghan Refugees (CAR)- a long-time partner of UNHCR and the International Rescue Committee (IRC) registered IDPs in the tented camps. The Provincials Social Welfare Directorate (SWD) registered IDPs in the host population.

Without this rapid registration, it would have taken many months to target assistance, in a context where most of the affected population was not in camps. An innovative feature of the registration was the relatively fast validation of National Identity Cards by Pakistan's National Database and Registration Agency (NADRA). This allowed the removal of duplicates in ineligible registrations from the relief rolls.

- The Government created a new hybrid military-civil structure, the Special Support Group, under the Prime Minister's office, that directly delivered assistance primarily in active combat zones. However, this innovation undermined the National Disaster Management Agency (NDMA) and the possibility of a fully civilian response where the military acts as an aid to the civil power rather than supplanting it. It repeated the example of the Earthquake response where the Government created another ad hoc body, the Earthquake Relief and Reconstruction Agency (ERRA) rather than empowering a permanent disaster response structure.
- The NWFP government established a provincial Emergency Response Unit (ERU) which played a leading role in the response at the provincial level. The Government later folded this into the Provincial Disaster Management Authority (PDMA).
- The Government used ATM cards and *smart cards*<sup>16</sup> to distribute cash to millions of beneficiaries. Those beneficiaries met by the team generally preferred cash to assistance in kind<sup>17</sup>. This was only possible because of the verification of identities by NADRA.
- WFP's humanitarian hubs serves as distribution points not only for food, but also for non-food items for any reputable agency that wanted to use them. Hubs were located not only in areas of displacement, but also in areas of return, allowing for faster food delivery to returnees who could choose from where to get their food<sup>18</sup>.
- Online monitoring of food distribution by WFP based on the verified NADRA data gave the affected population a free choice of which hub they could draw their rations from, while at the same time preventing cheating through multiple claims.
- The Disease Early Warning System developed during the earthquake response was rolled out to provide monitoring of disease threats.

## 3.2 Funding and resourcing

*This section is based on 91 pieces of evidence from 36 different sources.*

The first Pakistan Humanitarian Response Plan (PHRP) was launched in September 2008. This was a response to floods in August 2008 and to displacement as a result of conflict in Seat and Bajaur. This first appeal was for 55 million US Dollars (USD). This initial PHRP was revised several times. The PHRP is similar to other Common Appeals Process (CAPs) but is treated not as a CAP but as an "Other Appeal"<sup>19</sup>.

The need for funding increased dramatically after the May 2009 influx. Interviewees reported that funding was initially slow in response to the influx, with some traditionally rapid donors not releasing funding until July 2009. However, food needs were covered from the onset of the crisis.

<sup>16</sup> *Smart cards* are pocket-sized plastic cards, usually of credit-card size, with embedded electronic circuits that can store information. Smart cards may rely on electrical contacts to exchange information with card readers, or may rely on wireless technology.

<sup>17</sup> This issue will be discussed further in the Relevance chapter.

<sup>18</sup> Members of the affected community interviewed by the team commented that the hubs were not accessible for some due to travel costs etc.

<sup>19</sup> Interviewees stated that the GoP considered that CAPs and UN Appeals were not welcomed by the GoP as they are often associated with failed and failing states.

Some donors made funding available through the clusters system<sup>20</sup>. Such funding has the advantage that it reduces the transaction cost for donors. NGOs criticised the time it took for UN agencies to pass-through such funds. One donor, which normally prefers multilateral funding, split their planned grant for the UN between the UN and the ICRC because of this criticism<sup>21</sup>. NGOs also criticised the large share that some cluster lead agencies allocated for their own operations.

While another PHRP was launched for 2010, it has been relatively poorly supported<sup>22</sup>. Interviewees offered a number of reasons for this:

- The 2010 PHRP was only launched in February 2010. This late launch was due to government objections to the wording of the document and other aspects. The Government sees the PHRP as competing for donor funds that would otherwise flow through as development funding<sup>23</sup>.
- The Government advocated with donors to give priority to other funding mechanisms such as the Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF).
- The delay in the launch meant that the January 2010 Haiti earthquake soaked up humanitarian funding that might otherwise have been allocated to the PHRP. At least one donor had its budgets reduced to allow for the cost of donations for the Haiti earthquake.
- The global financial crisis has led to cuts in aid budgets and a more cautious funding approach from donors.
- There is a general perception among donors that the IDP crisis is over and that the needs in the PHRP are overstated. The Government estimates that there are currently 1.3 million IDPS from FATA and KP. The humanitarian community has not always been able to communicate needs very effectively to the donors.
- While there are continuing needs in areas of new displacement, the greatest needs currently are for early recovery. Typically, it is much harder to attract funding for early recovery than it is for emergency relief.
- Donors are waiting for the launch of the Post Crisis Needs Assessment (PCNA), expected shortly, to have a coherent strategy for recovery. However, the level of buy-in to the PCNA process is questionable at some levels of government<sup>24</sup>.
- Donors plan to fund recovery via the MDTF. The total size of the MDTF (currently 120 million USD) is quite small compared to the bilateral funding from some large donors, and to the total scale of needs.
- There was a perception among some donors that the humanitarian community was trying to address long-term development rather than humanitarian needs in the

<sup>20</sup> Essentially, clusters in the field have no legal or administrative personality, so the cluster lead agency, i.e. a UN agency, manages any cluster funding.

<sup>21</sup> This, however, did not help the NGOs as ICRC is not an NGO and does not fund them. It should be noted that this type of unbalanced funding is not in line with the GHD principle 10 that donors should: “*Support and promote the central and unique role of the United Nations in providing leadership and co-ordination of international humanitarian action, the special role of the International Committee of the Red Cross, and the vital role of the United Nations, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and non-governmental organisations in implementing humanitarian action*”. Good Humanitarian Donorship. (2003). *Principles and Good Practice of Humanitarian Donorship*. Stockholm.

<sup>22</sup> It was only 42% funded by 5 July 2010 against 62% for the Afghanistan appeal (OCHA FTS data).

<sup>23</sup> While most donors have separate budgets for development and humanitarian funding, this is not the case with all Donors. DFID for example allocates money between development and relief in Pakistan from a single budget.

<sup>24</sup> This assessment was initially titled the Post Conflict Needs Assessment, but the GoP objected to the use of the word conflict and the title was changed to the Post Crisis Needs Assessment.

affected areas. They quoted the general absence of exit strategies in funding proposals for short term interventions as support for this argument.

These same factors meant that funding levels in 2010 are low even outside the PHRP process. Overall though, relief operations were well funded in 2009. Funding for 2010 has been much lower than for 2009 and this has constrained operations in 2010, and led to the closure of some programmes. While these constraints are felt most strongly in the areas of return, the lack of funding constrains support for the remaining 1.3 million IDPs.

### 3.3 Coordination

*This section is based on 144 pieces of evidence from 39 different sources. It focuses on coordination within the international humanitarian community. Coordination with the Government and military are dealt with in the consistency chapter*

Pakistan is unusual because the Resident Coordinator (RC) is not also the HC. Instead, the head of UNICEF has been simultaneously appointed as HC. This avoids the disadvantage of the normal arrangement in that the head of UNICEF has significant humanitarian experience while RCs are generally development specialists.

However, as with RC/HC double-hatting, there are conflicts between the Head of Agency role and the RC role. For example, the larger UN agencies are generally opposed to pooled funding arrangements<sup>25</sup> because they argue that they have a high transaction cost<sup>26</sup> for these agencies and compete with them for funding. However, pooled funding arrangements greatly increase the authority of the HC.

One disadvantage of double-hatting a Head-of-Agency as the HC, is that the other Heads-of-Agency may see the HC as an equal, rather than someone who can hold them accountable.

Pakistan also has a HCT with NGO representation and ICRC observer membership and representation even from UN agencies with relatively limited humanitarian portfolios. The HCT was seen by interviewees as ineffective in decision making. One referred to the HCT as “the place where issues go to die” and stated that going back to a HCT meeting after a gap of a few weeks was like “Groundhog Day”<sup>27</sup> with the same items on the agenda and the same decisions being made repeatedly. Interviewees suggested the following reason for this lack of effectiveness:

- The absence of some senior figures. While the head of UNICEF normally attends, interviewees told us that the heads of the other two large UN humanitarian agencies (WFP and UNHCR) rarely do and send their deputies instead<sup>28</sup>.
- The size of the HCT. The biggest part of the HCT is composed of representation from UN agencies, even though many agencies have very limited humanitarian mandates or

<sup>25</sup> The two most common pooled funding arrangements are the Common Humanitarian Funds (CHF) now established in four countries Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Sudan, the Central African Republic (CAR), (and Somalia from June 2010), and the Emergency Response Funds (ERF) which may also be called Humanitarian Response Funds (16 Countries). (OCHA, 2010, 05 February).

<sup>26</sup> The transaction cost is not just the administrative charges on the grants (only 3% in the case of the new ERF in Pakistan), but also the cost of managing and reporting on a grant. Grants made through pooled funding are quite small for UN agencies, and a grant of \$500,000 has the same reporting requirement as a grant for \$5,000,000. The average grant size for the 2,755 grants made by the CHFs in DRC, Sudan, and CAR since the CHFs were founded is just over US\$400,000 up to August 2010 - a relatively small grant for the larger UN agencies.

<sup>27</sup> This is a reference to the 1993 film in which the main character lives through the same day over and over again until he redeems himself. See [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Groundhog\\_Day\\_\(film\)](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Groundhog_Day_(film)).

<sup>28</sup> UNHCR’s official policy in Pakistan is to delegate attendance at the HCT to a Deputy. WFP points out that the large number of meetings in Peshawar and Islamabad makes it impossible for Heads of Agencies to attend every meeting.



portfolios. It is difficult to see why, in a One UN pilot<sup>29</sup>, there needs to be so many representatives on the HCT.

Even where decisions are ‘made’ at the HCT they are not made in such a way as to establish accountability for their implementation:

- No one is given responsibility for carrying them out.
- No timetable was set for their implementation.
- No one is called to account for progress or lack of such on previous action points.

The HCT was also criticised because discussions in the HCT constantly veered away from a concentration on strategy to a concentration on operational issues. In particular, there is little linkage between the HCT and the Policy and Strategy Meeting (PSM) where the Government, UN, and NGOs meet. Ideally, the HCT should be setting at least part of the agenda for the PSM, as it should for the informal humanitarian briefings (also known as the “humanitarian breakfasts”) with the donors<sup>30</sup>.

The Cluster Coordination system was used for the very first time in Pakistan in the wake of the October 2005 earthquake. The cluster system was activated again after the floods and cyclone of 2007, and also for the present crisis.

Interviewees generally stated that the cluster system has not achieved the aims set for it (Text Box 1). Attention to gender and the promotion of participatory based approaches were particularly weak as this report shows. Cluster coordination was split between Islamabad and Peshawar. The latter was much closer to the action, but was difficult for some agencies to attend because of security concerns. Coordination at the field level was left in the hands of the military for many months.

Text Box 1: The responsibility of cluster leads at country level as set out in the Guidance Note on the Cluster Approach (IASC, 2006b) and the generic terms of reference for cluster leads (IASC, 2009).

1. Inclusion of key humanitarian partners
2. Establishment and maintenance of appropriate humanitarian coordination mechanisms
3. Coordination with national/local authorities, State institutions, local civil society and other relevant actors
4. Participatory and community-based approaches
5. Attention to priority cross-cutting issues (e.g. age, diversity, environment, gender, HIV/AIDS and human rights)
6. Needs assessment and analysis
7. Emergency preparedness
8. Planning and strategy development
9. Application of standards
10. Monitoring and reporting
11. Advocacy and resource mobilization
12. Training and capacity building
13. Provision of assistance or services as a last resort

Interviewees generally reported that cluster performance varied between clusters and over time. NGO interviewees cited the Health, Agriculture, and WASH clusters as being among the best performers. Interviewees said that some clusters meetings were more like implementing

<sup>29</sup> The One UN initiative was launched in response to the High Level Panel’s 2006 report on improving coherence in the UN system (<http://www.undg.org/index.cfm?P=7>). The four pillars of the One UN approach are: One Leader, One Budget, One Programme, and One Office.

<sup>30</sup> The Agenda for the meetings is shared orally with the HCT and specific cluster leads or heads of agencies are invited depending on the agenda.

partners meetings than collaborative cluster meetings. Some cluster coordinators had no training in cluster leadership or in understanding of the principles of partnership underlying the cluster approach.

Some clusters suffered from having coordinators with both an agency operational role and the cluster coordination role. This significant conflict of interest intensified when donors channelled funding through the clusters. Donors complained about the quality of review of cluster projects, but clusters do not have the capacity to thoroughly vet the projects of members. Cluster members were critical of the delays in accessing such funding, and in the perceived unfairness of allocations by cluster leads of the bulk of the available funds to their own agencies.

The RTE after the Pakistan floods found that: *“Lessons from the 2005 Pakistan earthquake, particularly in relation to the operation of the Clusters, had not been learned or implemented, and many of the issues that were identified in the earthquake RTE re-emerged this time.”* (Young et al, 2007, p.v). Many of the same problems, such as cluster leadership, and role conflict, and inattention to cross-cutting issues cited in the 2006 Earthquake RTE (IASC, p3) and the 2007 floods RTE (Young et al. p20-21) were also problems in this response.

The persistence of some of the same problems does not mean that the implementation of the cluster approach has not improved. Several interviewees commented that the application of the cluster approach has become more consistent over time, and that roll-out is faster, but that this only served to highlight the underlying problems stemming from role conflict. The problems seen in the variable quality implementation of the cluster approach in Pakistan are not specific to this response, but are broader issues seen in other contexts<sup>31</sup>.

### 3.4 Security constraints

*This section is based on 56 pieces of evidence from 30 different sources.*

Security affects the response in a number of ways. Firstly, insecurity poses a threat to the lives and well-being of the affected population. Those who displaced did so because they had well-founded fears for their own safety. Such fears have prevented return in some cases. Secondly, security has had a large impact on agency operations, and this section will concentrate on this aspect.

Pakistan is a dangerous environment and eighteen members of the humanitarian community were killed in Pakistan in 2009<sup>32</sup> as aid agencies were targeted by militants. This equalled the death-toll of air workers in Afghanistan, making these the two most dangerous countries for aid workers in 2009<sup>33</sup>. The resulting security restrictions have affected all aspects of the work of the humanitarian community in general, and particularly that of international humanitarian actors.

Security concerns have led to unsightly and expensive security measures at many agencies. The designation of Pakistan as a “non-family duty station” by the UN and some other organisations led to the loss of staff who had experience in the earthquake response. The associated rest and recuperation arrangements have meant that key staff are absent for at least one week in seven<sup>34</sup>, with cost and management implications.

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<sup>31</sup> Some of these broader issues were identified in the 2007 evaluation of the cluster approach (Stoddard et al.).

<sup>32</sup> [http://humanrights.change.org/blog/view/aid\\_worker\\_fatalities\\_in\\_2009](http://humanrights.change.org/blog/view/aid_worker_fatalities_in_2009) last viewed on 5 July 2010.

<sup>33</sup> Violence has continued in 2010, with six aid workers being killed in a single attack in March, and another dying of their wounds within a week.

<sup>34</sup> Staff may also be absent for annual leave and headquarters and other international meetings.



Figure 3: Security control before entering a food distribution point in Zarra Mallia, Kohat. © Riccardo Polastro 2010

The high cost of security measures such as armoured vehicles, blast walls, and new offices in more secure sites, has had an impact on agency budgets. Rules designed to reduce risks such as staff ceilings, limited travel, limits on which places staff can remain overnight in, no-go areas etc., have significantly curtailed operations.

Security constraints have limited the coverage of humanitarian assistance leading to insufficient assistance to some groups, such as IDPs in host families and stayees. Security has also limited assessments and monitoring and has constrained the quality of programmes. The security measures taken by the Government, such as curfews, road-closures, and checkpoints<sup>35</sup> have had an impact on operations, slowing them down and making them more expensive. Rules about secure accommodation have prevented gender balance in assessment teams<sup>36</sup>.

### 3.5 Access constraints

*This section is based on 32 pieces of evidence from 21 different sources.*

Closely related to security are access constraints. These have affected both the coverage and the quality of assistance. The Government tightly controls access to the affected areas, and has ruled out any access by international staff (and in some cases national staff) to particular areas. All of these restrictions are justified by security concerns. This is a valid reason in some

<sup>35</sup> When the road from Mingora to Upper Swat first opened, there were 45 checkpoints on 48km of road. This has now been reduced to 13.

<sup>36</sup> As local authorities insist that men and women do not share the same building, this is a problem as there is only one building approved for overnight stays by UN security.

cases but not in others. The Government has sometimes used security as a reason for not granting access to areas in which they did not want the humanitarian community to go.

Changing access conditions over time have shaped the humanitarian response. For example, NGO projects are clustered around Mingora in Lower Swat because when the projects were launched there was no access to Upper Swat. When NGOs eventually had access to upper Swat, they had no funding to begin projects there.

The main level for access control is the NOC system. NOCs may be required for agencies, projects, and individuals. In theory, NOCs are meant to be issued within seven days of request, but in some cases three month projects can be completed before the NOC is issued<sup>37</sup>.

The system is non-transparent and NGOs report that they have had problems with access when they have angered local authorities by not providing beneficiary lists or when they have refused to assist particular individuals or groups.

### 3.6 Conclusions

The overall response, in which the international humanitarian community played a vital role, meant that there was no large-scale death or disease outbreak in a context where millions of people were displaced from their homes in a very short time frame. There were a number of innovative features in the response, including relatively rapid registration and verification based on flawed criteria, and the use of smart cards for distributing cash assistance.

While donors gave generous support for the relief phase when the crisis was in the news in 2009, support in 2010 has been far less than needed, either to meet recovery needs in the area of return, or the needs of those who are still displaced. Paradoxically support for the early recovery, in terms of funding against the requested amount, increased from 2009 to 2010, but NGOs complained that they had great difficulty in getting funding for recovery.

The response of Pakistan again illustrates the lack of UN commitment to the humanitarian reform process through the failure to appoint a full-time HC free of role conflict. The HCT is not currently an effective forum for leading the international humanitarian response.

Cluster performance has been very variable. With some exceptions, the clusters were plagued by well-known issues such as the lack of trained full-time coordinators. Some of the problems seen in the clusters repeated those of the response to the 2005 earthquake and the 2007 floods. The clusters have also suffered from unrealistic expectations regarding their ability to manage pooled funding. The slow pace of the roll out of field coordination left humanitarian coordination at the district level in the hands of the military for some considerable time.

Insecurity has been a major problem for the humanitarian response. Well-founded security concerns have limited assessments and monitoring and the level of programmes staffing. Security has imposed large operational costs and has had a negative effect on programme quality.

The Government constrained access by humanitarian actors, partly in response to security concerns and partly as a control measure. Access constraints in the form of government controls or agency security rules have completely shaped and constrained the humanitarian response. The manner in which the NOC system operates is a major constraint in the delivery of humanitarian assistance.

### 3.7 Recommendations

Further recommendations relevant to some of the discussion here are presented in later chapters.

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<sup>37</sup> See [http://www.helpidp.org/eru/downloads/NOC\\_Issued.pdf](http://www.helpidp.org/eru/downloads/NOC_Issued.pdf) for a list of the 102 NOCs issued by the provincial government in 2009.

### 3.7.1 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE EMERGENCY RESPONSE COORDINATOR

The HCT needs to become a more effective forum for guiding the humanitarian response. Specifically the following recommendations are made:

**Recommendation 1. The ERC should immediately introduce a requirement that, except in exceptional circumstances, the heads of the three main UN humanitarian agencies (UNICEF, WFP, and UNHCR- where present) should attend the regular meeting of the HCT. The ERC should also require HCs to provide each quarter a summary of HCT attendance by heads of agencies.**

The size of the HCT limits its effectiveness for decision taking. The need for a large number of UN agencies to attend seems questionable especially as Pakistan is a “One UN” pilot country.

**Recommendation 2. The ERC should consult with the IASC on changing the HCT guidelines to limit membership on the UN side to the key UN humanitarian operational agencies (typically UNHCR, WFP, and UNICEF) with a single representative for other UN agencies and the possibility to invite specific UN agencies as dictated by the agenda.**

### 3.7.2 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE HC

The same decisions have been repeatedly taken at HCT meetings.

**Recommendation 3. The chair of the HCT meeting should, with immediate effect for all decisions, establish who exactly is responsible for implementing the decision, who should report back on it, and when progress reports should be made. Progress against implementation should be reviewed at subsequent meetings.**

## 4 Consistency

*The need to assess policies and actions, to ensure that there is consistency with both humanitarian principles and operations standards for assistance.*

This section covers.

- Neutrality, Impartiality, and Independence
- Relations with the Government
- Relations with the military
- Attention to gender issues
- Monitoring systems
- Reviews and evaluations
- General learning for the future

### 4.1 Neutrality, Impartiality, and Independence

*This section is based on 92 pieces of evidence from 36 different sources.*

#### **Definitions of Impartiality, Neutrality, and Independence adapted from ICRC sources**

*Impartiality: No discrimination as to nationality, race, religious beliefs, class or political opinions. Endeavouring to relieve the suffering of individuals, being guided solely by their needs, and to give priority to the most urgent cases of distress.*

*Neutrality: In order to continue to enjoy the confidence of all, no taking sides in hostilities or engage at any time in controversies of a political, racial, religious or ideological nature.*

*Independence: Although subject to the laws of the countries, maintain autonomy so that they may be able at all times to act in accordance with humanitarian principles.*

Neutrality, impartiality, and independence are key humanitarian principles, and together with the principle of humanity (to protect life and health and to ensure respect for the human being), form the four key principles of the Red Cross movement<sup>38</sup>.

The principle of humanity leads to the humanitarian imperative, the provision of assistance to those in need. In the context in which one of the parties to the conflict, the Government, completely controlled access, humanitarian actors had to weigh the humanitarian imperative against the principles of impartiality, neutrality, and independence.

The IDP situation was very different from the response to the October 2005 earthquake, in which the Government, the military, and the humanitarian community worked very closely together to deliver assistance. Some government officials had difficulty understanding how parts of the international community, who worked alongside the military and Government in the 2005 response, were now trying to keep their distance.

<sup>38</sup> Wortel, E. (2009). Humanitarians and their moral stance in war: the underlying values. *International Review of the Red Cross*, 876(91), 779-802, Page 785. Last viewed on 13 June 2010. URL: [http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteengo.nsf/htmlall/review-876-p779/\\$File/irrc-876-wartel.pdf](http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteengo.nsf/htmlall/review-876-p779/$File/irrc-876-wartel.pdf)

The response was not a principled one. Different actors compromised the principles of Independence, Neutrality, and Impartiality to varying extents in order to obtain access to the affected population. In some cases, this compromise was made after careful analysis. In others, there was little or no analysis or even awareness that principles were being compromised. The more that organisations were prepared to compromise humanitarian principles, the better the access they had to the affected population.

Pakistan is a member state of the U N, and operational UN agencies have a long history in Pakistan, and a special relationship with the Government. UN agencies generally supported the Government strongly. The “One UN” approach engages all UN agencies together with the Government. In addition, all the clusters had government co-chairs. This meant that the clusters response was aligned with the Government’s wishes.

Engagement with the Government was absolutely essential to the delivery of assistance in the context, and this highlights the dilemma that agencies operating in Pakistan faced, between maintaining neutrality and effectively assisting the affected population.

While at the provincial and federal level, the policy was that assistance was available to all regardless of whether family members were militants. A different policy prevailed on the ground. In many cases, militants’ families were excluded from distribution lists. Humanitarian concerns came second to political ones. As one local figure told the team: *“The Army blew up [one individual’s] house because his son is a Taliban commander. What sort of message is the Government sending out if it lets some NGO rebuild it?”*

Prior to May 2009, there was an effort to set Basic Operating Rules (BOR) for humanitarian agencies (annexed as Appendix 7). These rules are probably not very realistic when one of the parties in the conflict is the state in which the agencies are based, and the state is one which expects agencies to support government initiatives. The BOR include the provision (rule no. 8) that signatories will not make *“contributions in cash or in kind to any parties or actors.”* Of course, given that the Government is a party in the conflict, this would seem to rule out signatories paying taxes. This illustrates the difficulty of taking a neutral stance in such a context.

While ICRC had enjoyed virtually unimpeded access during its post-earthquake operations, the Government impeded its access when seeking to assist victims of the fighting in 2009. The ICRC worked in close collaboration with the Pakistan Red Crescent Society in an attempt to ensure that affected communities were still assisted even where access by expatriates was limited.

One further challenge to a principled approach in the FATA is that all assistance there is prescribed in law as a set ratio between the different groups there rather than on a needs basis. Additionally, collective punishment in FATA is held to be legal in national law, although the practice contravenes international law.

#### **What is Humanitarian Space?**

*“The term ‘espace humanitaire’ was coined by former Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) president Rony Brauman, who described it in the mid-1990s as ‘a space of freedom in which we are free to evaluate needs, free to monitor the distribution and use of relief goods, and free to have a dialogue with the people.’” (Wagner, 2005).*

Donors reported that they had received relatively little in terms of requests for pressing the Government to respect fundamental humanitarian principles<sup>39</sup>. Interviewees from the humanitarian community countered that donors had little interest in pressing Pakistan on

<sup>39</sup> Agency interviewees reported that there were many requests to donor to advocate for access, but it is clear that there has not been a systematic and concerted effort by the humanitarian community to get donors to push for humanitarian space.

issues of humanitarian space as the Government was carrying out operations against militants with the full backing of, if not at the urging of, the international community.

## 4.2 Relations with the Government

*This section is based on 53 pieces of evidence from 24 different sources.*

Government officials told the team that the fundraising efforts of the international community were in competition with the Government's own fundraising for recovery and development<sup>40</sup>. Donor support for Pakistan has always been strongly conditioned by geo-political considerations (Figure 5) and the Central Government was concerned that the PHRP would attract funding that would otherwise flow bilaterally to the Government.




Figure 5: Donor support for Pakistan declined after the emergence in Afghanistan of the Pakistan-supported Taliban in 1994 and then rose again after the 9/11 attacks. 2009 is expected to show another rise. (The bars show billions of 2008 USD in ODA to Pakistan – left-hand scale, and the line shows the percentage of all ODA funding channelled to Pakistan – right-hand scale.)

The Government at the Federal Level had not been consulted about the launch of the first PHRP in 2008 and resisted the launch of the 2010 PHRP for a mix of reasons including concerns about competition for donor funds and the political implications<sup>41</sup> of having a humanitarian appeal. The Government raised detailed objections to the language used in the appeal document including the use of the word “conflict” to describe the situation in the affected areas, although the Government itself widely used the term.

However, the concerns of the Federal Government were not shared at the provincial level. Provincial politicians and officials saw the PHRP as a way of attracting extra resources for KPK, and were broadly supportive of the PHRP.

The disconnect between policies at the provincial and federal level was only one of such disconnects within the Government which has created difficulties for humanitarian actors. Interviewees cited examples of a lack of communication and coherence between different tiers of government, different organs of government, and even within departments. One consequence of such discordance is that each different part of government demands that all

<sup>40</sup> This seems not to have been a major problem prior to the negotiations around the 2010 PHRP.

<sup>41</sup> The government was apparently concerned that repeated humanitarian appeals are often associated with failed or failing states.



efforts are coordinated with them and sometimes make contradictory demands of humanitarian actors.

NGOs observed that, because of this disconnect between different elements of the civil administration, it was easier to work in areas in which assistance was coordinated by the military than it was to work in the same areas once the civil administration was again fully operational. However, these disconnects often highlight real policy differences within different tiers of government, with provincial and lower tiers often very interested in what agencies could provide to the affected population.

Even without a crisis, the civil administration in Pakistan is slow, and even the simplest matter can take months. Military officials regularly contrast the speed with which they can act and that with which the Civil Administration and NGOs can act. One military interviewee said that while the army can address a problem in two days, the NGOs take two months and the Civil Administration takes two years.

Government officials generally were critical of humanitarian actors. Specific criticisms centred around:

- The unwillingness of some humanitarian actors to deliver assistance in line with government priorities.
- The inappropriateness of some assistance, including the supply of goods in kind instead of cash support. This will be discussed below under “relevance”.
- The clustering of NGO projects around camp populations and in South Swat rather than in North Swat. NGOs explained that by the time they had a green light for access to North Swat, they could no longer get funding for new projects.

Criticism of the Government from the international community centred on the lack of any integrated strategic plan for dealing with the displacement crisis. Donors regarded the current efforts at developing a plan, such as the PCNA, as fragmentary and pointed out that government engagement with these efforts was limited.

### 4.3 Relations with the military

*This section is based on 35 pieces of evidence from 16 different sources.*

The international community worked very closely with the military in the aftermath of the 2005 earthquake. As noted above, the military is one of the strongest institutions in Pakistan and it was clearly in charge at the local level, with decisions by military commanders over-riding those of the local administration.

The military in Pakistan is not limited to simply the role of an armed force but also plays a key role in the economic life of the country, as was well documented in Ayesha Siddiqi's 2007 book<sup>42</sup>. Recently, one military construction unit, the Frontier Works Organisation, was awarded a series of large infrastructure contracts by USAID.

Pakistan is one of the leading contributors to peace-keeping operations under the UN's Department of Peace-Keeping Operations (DPKO) and their troops are widely seen as some of the most effective. This has provided the military with much experience in working alongside the UN and NGOs. Civil-Military liaison is a standard feature of many large DPKO deployments and the Pakistani military established Civil-Military Liaison Cells (CMLCs) to provide a point of articulation for the humanitarian community with the military.

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<sup>42</sup> Siddiqi, A. (2007). The book has been strongly criticised by the Pakistan Government who counter that industries controlled by the military account for less than 1% of GDP (<http://presidentmusharraf.wordpress.com/2008/10/23/ayesha-siddiqas-military-inc-a-deflective-and-derogatory-book/>).

The Pakistani military was very evident in decision-making fora and in the relief effort in general. The hybrid military-civil Special Support Group (SSG) was a largely military team led by a three-star general under the direct control of the Prime Minister's office. The SSG played a key role in assisting the affected population such as the stayees to whom the international community had no access. They also continue to provide some of the medical services at Jalozai, the largest of the remaining IDP camps.

The reason for military dominance at the operational level in Pakistan is clear. Almost all interviewees agreed that the military is more effective and coherent than the civil administration. The military is simply much better at completing tasks. However, interviewees still quoted examples of a lack of coherence within the military, with local unit commanders not being aware of agreements higher up the command chain, or agreements made between humanitarian actors and the SSG or the CMLCs.

As with the civil administration, the military was very concerned about the slow pace of recovery work, and were critical of the scale of the international community's efforts. As one military interviewee put it: *"In the military we are self-contained and able to respond within a week while NGO's need to speak to their mother NGO, international NGO, and their cluster before getting things approved and the response sometimes takes more than two months"*. Both the military and the civil administration emphasised the need for restoring physical assets, such as schools and clinics, despite software (e.g. teachers and doctors) being a bigger constraint on the provision of basic services than is hardware (e.g. schools and clinics).

#### 4.4 Attention to gender issues

*This section is based on 26 pieces of evidence from 16 different sources.*

Gender refers to the social roles and status assigned to both men and women in their societies because of their sex. In Pakistan, gender concerns normally centre on the roles assigned to women as they face a very difficult context in much of the country<sup>43</sup>. *Purdah* (the seclusion of women) is widely practiced in the areas affected by the IDP crisis.

The ratio of Pakistan's Gender-related Development Index (GDI) to the Human Development Index (HDI) is lower than for all but two other countries of the 155 for which UNDP calculate both indices. Pakistan is ranked 99<sup>th</sup> out of 109 countries on the Gender Empowerment Measure<sup>44</sup>. The team found direct evidence of the impact of seclusion with female beneficiaries being far less aware of who was providing assistance or of the difference between different assistance providers.

The current policy of the IASC on the incorporation of gender issues in humanitarian response is set out in the 2008 Gender Equality in Humanitarian Action document (IASC, 2008)<sup>45</sup>. This calls for all seven components to be including in humanitarian action:

- Gender mainstreaming across all sectors;
- Empowerment of women and girls;
- A human rights-based approach to programming;
- Prevention and response to gender-based violence;
- Targeted actions based on gender analysis;

<sup>43</sup> The ADB's *Country Briefing: Women in Pakistan* noted that although there is a lot of diversity in gender relations throughout Pakistan *"women's situation vis-à-vis men is one of systemic subordination, determined by the forces of patriarchy across classes, regions, and the rural/urban divide."* (Bari and ADB, 2000).

<sup>44</sup> [http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/country\\_fact\\_sheets/cty\\_fs\\_PAK.html](http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/country_fact_sheets/cty_fs_PAK.html) on 8 August 2010.

<sup>45</sup> The IASC also published a Gender Handbook in Humanitarian Action which details how some of these policy objectives could be achieved (IASC, 2006c).

- Mechanisms to prevent and respond to sexual exploitation and abuse by humanitarian personnel; and
- Promotion of gender balance in the workplace.

KPK is a province in which there is a lot of variation in the attitude towards women, with some areas in which women's roles are very restricted within the culture, and others, such as Swat, where women have enjoyed greater freedom<sup>46</sup>. The response was weak in terms of targeting women. Agencies were poorly placed to assist women because they had relatively few female staff members.



Figure 4: Children in Hangu IDP camp. © Riccardo Polastro 2010

The lack of attention to gender started with assessments, with few assessment missions including women. Security concerns were used as a reason for non-inclusion of females in the teams<sup>47</sup>. Humanitarian agencies seldom collected sex-disaggregated data<sup>48</sup>. There were particular problems in the lack of assistance to female-headed households in a social context where women cannot leave their homes to register. Even such innovations as smart-cards were less useful for women because of the prevailing social conventions. However,

<sup>46</sup> One interviewee noted that Swat was the source of many female staff for agencies responding to the 2005 earthquake.

<sup>47</sup> The evaluation team were told of one occasion on which the local authority expressed their objection to the inclusion of a woman in an assessment team as the whole team would have to stay in a single guest house. The UN therefore sent a male-only team. It did not seem to have occurred to anyone that a female-only team would have met the objection equally well.

<sup>48</sup> The Health Cluster was an exception, and epidemiological data was collected on a gender disaggregated basis. It is interesting to note that the Afghanistan Gender Mainstreaming Manual identifies the first step for gender mainstreaming as sex disaggregated data Azarbaijani-Moghaddam, S. (2007). Even this first step was not taken by many agencies in Pakistan. Without such data, it is not possible to design programmes appropriate for all genders, or to monitor the access that different genders have to different programmes.

interviewees noted that attention to gender issues had slightly improved in 2010 compared with previous years<sup>49</sup>.

The WFP-led Food Security and Market Assessment highlighted the particular problem faced by female headed households. *“Female-headed households face multiple financial, social, moral and psychological challenges. Even more restricted in their mobility due to the crisis, access to basic goods and services such as food, medicine, schooling, and forms of external assistance, becomes a major hurdle. Households formally headed by women have the poorest diets of all those surveyed. Only 28 percent have adequate food consumption...”* (Haller et al, 2010, p.7). This makes it clear why it is essential to consider gender aspects when programming assistance in the affected areas.

It is difficult to implement gender-sensitive programming in the parts of Pakistan affected by the IDP crisis. Lower literacy rates, seclusion, and lower access to mobile phones, all increase the difficulties of communicating messages to women. The problems in recruiting female staff, and the restrictions to which they are subject once recruited, also make it difficult to have an adequate gender focus. However, several interviewees made the point that the relative lack of attention to the different needs of women was driven not only by these difficulties, but also by a lack of willingness among some humanitarian agencies to challenge the marginalisation of women in Pakistani society.

## 4.5 Monitoring systems

*This section is based on 23 pieces of evidence from 16 different sources.*

As is common with sudden-onset humanitarian emergencies, events happened so quickly that there was no time to set up a monitoring system. Monitoring has been poor overall due not only to access issues but also because it was not a high priority for many agencies<sup>50</sup>. These problems have been compounded by the high rates of displacement and return.

Monitoring is difficult in areas where international staff do not have access, particularly for those agencies which normally rely on such staff for monitoring. Different agencies and donors have adopted different remote monitoring strategies including:

- Cross-partner monitoring, where one partner implements and the other monitors.
- Contracted monitoring, where the monitoring is conducted by a contractor.
- Triangulation of community oversight, partner reports, contractor reports, and local authority reports.

One interesting innovation in monitoring was the online food monitoring system used by the Food Cluster.

Experience in remote operation and monitoring in other complex emergencies, such as in Somalia, has demonstrated that the absence of direct monitoring can leave a situation ripe for “double- dipping”, where the same project is funded by different donors. Such abuses can only be controlled by effective coordination using a geo-coded database of projects.

One further problem with monitoring is that a plethora of structures look for monitoring information, including many different government entities. The recent agreement on a single reporting format to cover all such monitoring needs should ease this problem.

<sup>49</sup> One example of this was the establishment of separate waiting areas and food receipt areas for women. This enabled women to access food distributions that they could not otherwise have benefited from. However, neither the men’s nor the women’s waiting areas at the humanitarian hub visited by the team had toilet facilities. This is not a problem for men who may go to the toilet in the open air, but is it a problem for women.

<sup>50</sup> When monitoring was a priority, agencies found ways to do it. There was effective monitoring of epidemiological data by the Health Cluster. This demonstrates that monitoring was possible even in the prevailing constraints.

## 4.6 Learning based changes

*This section is based on 22 pieces of evidence from 12 different sources.*

Interviewees cited a few examples of changes in their approach to the response based on learning. One of these was the introduction of the ERF to allow faster responses at the start of new crises<sup>51</sup>. This was recommended in the 2007 floods RTE but the eventual introduction was driven partly by the slow start of funding at the start of the IDP crisis. Pakistan is a disaster hotspot<sup>52</sup> and having an emergency response fund makes sense for dealing with responding to small disasters or for the very initial response to complement the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF).

Some of the changes made were driven partly by experience in the response to the 2005 earthquake. One such change was that greater attention was paid to rapid registration and the use of cash support and compensation. Over time in the IDP crisis, more attention was paid to removing errors and verifying registration data. IDPs in later displacements saw faster registration and were more likely to receive cash assistance<sup>53</sup>.

Other elements of learning included:

- Assistance (other than food) to later IDPs that was focused on all IDPs and not just primarily to those in camps.
- The development of the Multi-cluster Rapid Assessment Mechanism (McRAM)<sup>54</sup> starting in March 2008 has been a useful tool for learning- based change.
- The introduction of the single report form for all of those requiring reports from implementing agencies, which also reflects learning during the operation.
- The reduction in the numbers of families covered per WFP humanitarian hub to reduce security risks.
- The splitting of operational and policy- focused cluster meetings between Peshawar and Islamabad<sup>55</sup>.
- The move towards a vulnerability-based assessment system.

## 4.7 Reviews and evaluation

*This section is based on 7 pieces of evidence from 5 different sources. The number of pieces of evidence is small as the team generally only recorded evidence where a review or an evaluation had been carried out and not when a negative reply had been received.*

There have been almost no reviews or evaluations of the response so far. There are some exceptions. WFP is conducting a review of a cash-grant pilot in Buner<sup>56</sup>. The Provincial Disaster Management Agency (PDMA) in KPK has conducted a review of the Emergency

<sup>51</sup> The introduction of an ERF recommendation three in the 2007 Floods RTE report: “The RC/HC needs, in some circumstances, a special budget for immediate emergency response....”, (Young et al, 2007 p.vi).

<sup>52</sup> Pakistan has recently had the 2005 Earthquake, 2007 Floods, 2008 Balochistan Earthquake, 2009 IDP Crisis, and the 2010 Floods. It was identified as a disaster hotspot in the 2008 *Humanitarian implications of Climate Change* report (Ehrhart et al. p 2) and in the *Global Risk Analysis* (Dilley et al, 2005, p.22).

<sup>53</sup> However, this may change as budget constraints have limited some cash payments by the GoP.

<sup>54</sup> McRAM Team. (2009).

<sup>55</sup> However, interviewees reported that while this was a good idea, it did not always work in practice as policy and operational issues were discussed in both fora.

<sup>56</sup> In their comments, WFP have informed the team that the study showed that there was not clear beneficiary preference for either food or cash. However the team have not been provided with a copy of the draft report.

Response Unit (ERU). DFID has conducted four reviews of its project portfolio using an external consultant. WFP and partners conducted an excellent Food Security and Market Assessment of affected areas of FATA and KPK in early 2010 (Haller et al, 2010). The lack of broader reviews and evaluations is a concern as these are an essential tool for ensuring the quality of programmes. Security concerns have prevented some evaluation teams from travelling to the field.

## 4.8 General learning for the future

*This section is based on 61 pieces of evidence from 24 different sources.*

Interviewees identified a number of key lessons from their experience of the operation. These lessons included lessons around:

- Adapting the response to the needs, including the greater use of cash where appropriate and focussing on felt needs (such as the need to prepare camps and other accommodation for the summer heat).
- The need for better levels of preparedness, including contingency planning, having agency standard operating procedures, maintaining stockpiles, maintaining staff rosters, and supplier registers, etc.
- The need to establish coordination mechanisms faster, including setting up operational coordination at the field- level quickly.
- The need for effective agreed tools, including a common report format and assessment format for longer term assessment (as Pakistan already has the McRAM).
- The need to give greater emphasis to humanitarian diplomacy to maintain consistency of the response with fundamental humanitarian principles and to maintain humanitarian space.

These lessons are discussed in later sections.

## 4.9 Conclusions

Overall, the response to the IDP crisis was driven by pragmatism and the need for access to the affected community rather than by the humanitarian principles of independence, neutrality, and impartiality. The extent of the trade- off between principles and access varied by actor. The limitation of humanitarian space have gone largely unchallenged in Pakistan.

Pakistan is a member state of the UN and it is hardly surprising that UN agencies did not work in an impartial, independent or neutral manner, but instead strongly supported the Government. Clearly it is very difficult for the UN to work in a principled manner in a UN member state when that UN member state is one of the parties to the conflict and insists that the actions of the UN are aligned with those of the state.

The Government sought to repeat the success of the earthquake response, where the military- led the response while working in close cooperation with the international humanitarian community. The GoP had little understanding of the differences in the relationship between humanitarian agencies and the Government in natural and complex emergencies.

The local community played a key role in the response, with 85% to 90% of the displaced being housed by them. The response of the provincial government, of the Pakistani public, of the national government, and of other provinces was also critical in ensuring that needs were met. The international community also played a key role in the response, not only with resources, but also with specialist skills.

While the level of attention to gender issues improved in 2010, women's needs were often not specifically addressed. Interviewees commented that this lack of attention was partly driven

by a lack of willingness compounding the practical problems of attending to gender issues in a society where women are so marginalised.

The joint problems of access and security meant that monitoring was not strong. This has been compounded by relatively little review or evaluation. While there was some evidence of learning from previous operations and from the early stages of the IDP response, the overall process of learning has been haphazard and ad-hoc.

The internal displacement was spurred by the desire of the military to create free-fire zones in the areas controlled by militants. However, the military also plays a key role in responding to humanitarian emergencies in Pakistan. This role conflict led to a significant encroachment on humanitarian space, with decisions about who got assistance being sometimes influenced by political and military considerations.

The largely unchallenged limitation of humanitarian space has set a bad precedent in a context where further complex emergencies can be expected. The Government is not monolithic, and different components of the Government have different interests. While there was criticism of the slow pace of the work of NGOs by some parts of the Government, other parts of the Government were interested in what the international community could provide. There was some space for humanitarian diplomacy to push for a less restrictive humanitarian space. However, there was relatively little effort by the humanitarian community to push issues of humanitarian space up the agenda.

## 4.10 Recommendations

### 4.10.1 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE IASC

The need for a common reporting format was again highlighted in the Pakistan response. Ideally, such formats should be available from the start of a response.

**Recommendation 4. *The IASC should develop a common reporting format that can be promoted as a single reporting format in all new emergencies.***

Such a common model could be based around the model developed in Pakistan.

### 4.10.2 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE HCT

Pakistan is in a region where further complex emergencies can be expected, and limitations on humanitarian space set a bad precedent.

**Recommendation 5. *The HCT should develop an active strategy of humanitarian diplomacy to work for a more principled approach and less constrained humanitarian space in Pakistan, including putting the issue on the agenda for donors.***

The response has not been sufficiently gender sensitive and has not been in line with the policy established by the IASC (IASC, 2008).

**Recommendation 6. *The HCT should encourage members to implement the IASC policy on gender in humanitarian action and should actively monitor progress towards the achievement of this policy.***

## 5 Relevance

*Relevance is concerned with assessing whether the project is in line with local needs and priorities (as well as stated policy).*

Relevance addresses the extent to which the assistance provided was relevant or appropriate to the needs of the population. We examined the following topics:

- Needs assessments undertaken
- Consultation of affected population
- Gaps between Needs and Assistance
- Targeting (including distribution lists and registration criteria)
- Camps/ Host/ Other

### 5.1 Needs assessments undertaken

*This section is based on 43 pieces of evidence from 32 different sources.*

The effectiveness of needs assessments can be measured by the extent to which the assistance provided matched the needs of the affected population. Interviewees reported that most assessments were single agency assessments rather than joint assessments. As will be seen in the “Gaps” section below, needs assessments were not as effective as one might wish. This was despite the introduction of the McRAM, as relatively few have been undertaken. The reasons for this appear to include: security and access problems making assessment difficult; and the need for prior funding to conduct assessments.

In general, while camp populations were relatively well assessed<sup>57</sup> these represented only one-sixth of the caseload. The needs of the bulk of the population, staying with host families, in rented accommodation, or in schools and mosques, were not assessed. NGO interviewees stated that there had not been one single rigorous nutrition survey published since the crisis began.

There have been a range of large needs assessments including: the Damage and Needs Assessment (DNA)<sup>58</sup> of the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the World Bank (WB); and the Conflict Early Recovery Initial Needs Assessment (CERINA)<sup>59</sup> conducted by inter-agency team led by the HC through the UNDP Early Recovery advisor. These are now being followed by a third large-scale needs assessment, the PCNA, with the involvement of the ADB, WB, UN, and European Commission (EC)<sup>60</sup>.

Three of the most interesting needs assessments conducted, in terms of highlighting vulnerability at the community level are the on-going vulnerability assessment and the Food Security and Market Assessment conducted by WFP and partners (Haller, 2010), and the CERINA household surveys (UNDP, 2009a).

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<sup>57</sup> Some interviewees suggested that those in camps had been over-assessed to the point of fatigue.

<sup>58</sup> Asian Development Bank & World Bank (2009). This focused on large-scale public infrastructure.

<sup>59</sup> UNDP (2009a). This focused on the early recovery needs of the affected population.

<sup>60</sup> Asian Development Bank (2009).



## 5.2 Consultation of affected population

*This section is based on 12 pieces of evidence from 11 different sources. The main evidence here came from asking the affected population about whether they were consulted or not.*

In general, only camp-based beneficiaries were consulted. Generally, where there was some consultation, it was community elders or the Shura<sup>61</sup> who were consulted rather than the broader group. Women were seldom consulted and assessments treated households as monolithic and did not look at the different needs of women, boys, girls and men within the household. ICRC was identified as the agency which was best at listening to the population (they had carried out door-to-door assessments).



Figure 5: Focus group discussion in Tangu Band in the Swat valley. © Riccardo Polastro 2010

One consequence of the lack of consultation, not only with the local community, but also with local agricultural officers, has been the distribution of unsuitable animal breeds and seeds in the affected areas. This led to low survival rates for the provided livestock in some projects and the failure of crops in others.

## 5.3 Gaps between Needs and Assistance

*This section is based on 109 pieces of evidence from 47 different sources.*

Key gaps between needs and assistance arose due to limited geographic coverage, sectoral differences, the inappropriateness of some kinds of assistance, and the lack of

<sup>61</sup> Shura is the Arabic word for consultation, and the term is normally applied to the council of male elders that taken decisions in a community.

proportionality. The biggest gap was the failure to adequately respond to the most acute needs of the affected population as a whole, namely the needs of those displaced outside of the camps in host families and of those that stayed behind and could not displace. There was general agreement that IDPs in camps were the group whose needs were best met, and that the so-called stayees were the group whose needs were least well met (Figure 8)<sup>62</sup>.




Figure 6: The degree to which needs were met depended on the group. The scale is not linear. Relatively few returnee needs were met, and almost no stayee needs were met by the international community.

The gaps between needs and assistance varied by sectors, with food generally being the sector best served. This is largely due to the efforts of WFP which was the first agency to broadly serve those outside of the camps<sup>63</sup>. WFP's humanitarian hubs also served as distribution points for those agencies who wanted to use them.

Areas where there were gaps in service provision included health, education and protection. However, in many cases, these gaps predated the displacement.

Again, there has been a temporal gap, with the initial IDPs from Swat getting better levels of assistance than later IDPs from FATA. For example, IDPs from Swat in 2009 received both a government grant of 25,000 PKR and food assistance, but those from the South Waziristan Agency (SWA) in FATA in 2010 received only food or a cash allowance for food without any compensation grant<sup>64</sup>. Two other time related issues were:

- Emergency needs were met far better than recovery and rehabilitation needs.
- Returnees concentrated more around urban locations (Mingora) were better served than those in the rural areas of Upper Swat due to a lack of access when funding was available.

The problem with kits like Non Food Item (NFI) kits or shelter kits is that they reflect an average pattern of need, rather than reflecting the varying needs of individual families. It was for this reason that many beneficiaries said that they would have preferred cash so that they could select exactly what they needed. UN Habitat gave the example of the Baluchistan earthquake reconstruction cash grants, when families had often used the cash for purposes other than that which it was intended. Examples included financing annual migration or extending orchards. However, it may have been wholly appropriate for families to have used cash grants to strengthen livelihoods rather than rebuilt shelter.

Generally, IDPs preferred cash assistance where there was a functioning market. Where markets were severely constrained, such as for stayees in notified areas, the affected population preferred assistance in kind, as curfew and travel restrictions led to the prices of

<sup>62</sup> The fact that the crisis was generally referred to as an IDP crisis tended to focus attention on the displaced rather than the stayees, and agencies had trouble getting NOCs to assist stayee rather than displaced populations.

<sup>63</sup> The food cluster also assisted stayees to a limited extent after a workshop in September 2009. Through a joint effort with ICRC, food rations were distributed on the basis of established vulnerability criteria to locally-affected people unable to leave the area during the fighting (3 months assistance) as well as returnees (6 months assistance). In total 43 of the 46 affected Union Councils (an administrative division) were assisted by WFP and ICRC. However, this assistance was after the end of the fighting in these areas due to access restrictions.

<sup>64</sup> This policy has apparently changed since the time of the fieldwork. The government has recently announced that the South Waziristan displaced will also receive the 25,000 PKR grant.

some commodities doubling or more. In the case of NFI kits, the value of the kits on the local market was only 40% of the cost of the NFIs, and there was a general preference for cash.

Cash grants to the affected population was not without its problems, however. There was a greater perceived risk of corruption with cash distribution, and agencies engaging in cash distribution faced a great deal more political pressure on the selection of beneficiaries than they did for other types of assistance. Also, issuing cash through ATMs is a problematic strategy in places like FATA given the lack of ATMs and reliable power. Also, just as with food distributions, women's access to ATMs may be constrained.

WFP has conducted a pilot study of cash versus food assistance in Buner, but the results were not yet available at the time of the field-work. Previous such studies (Ahmed et al, 2009, and Tchatchua, 2008) have demonstrated that the relative advantages of cash and food depend on the context.

IDPs generally preferred the NFI package from ICRC, and complained that the UNHCR package, which was still being distributed at the start of the summer, included heavy winter blankets. The IDPs generally lived at far higher (and cooler) altitudes than where they took refuge and they found it difficult to deal with the summer heat of the plains. This led to many demands for electric fans (which were widely provided in 2009 for the KPK IDPs, but not in 2010 for the FATA IDPs), to cope with the summer heat.

One gap in assistance was the provision of cooking fuel. This issue was repeatedly raised by the IDPs interviewed, whether in camps, in rented accommodation or with host families. In some camps, such as Togh Sarai in Hangu, firewood harvesting by the IDPs was the largest sources of conflict with the resident population. Typically IDPs were demanding a gas cylinder. They said that they could afford the cost of gas, but did not have the cost of the initial gas cylinder.

IDPs staying in rented accommodation often raised the issue of support with the payment of rent. Rents were quoted as being in the region of 1,000 to 4,000 PKR per month by IDPs, but agency sources said that rents were mostly in the 1,000 to 1,500 PKR per month range. Paying rent support is far cheaper than the cost of keeping IDPs in tented accommodation (tents typically cost USD\$500 and last for no more than 12 months in a typical camp setting - about 2-4 times the cost of paying rent support). However, the problem, as with all cash payments, is that cash is often much more useful and attractive than in-kind assistance that individuals will go to greater length to establish false claims that for less-useful assistance. This means that cash programmes often require stronger controls than for in kind programmes.

One additional gap between needs and assistance is the adoption of a standard food package regardless of family size. This means that a family of two (admittedly rare) gets the same ration as a family of ten. If food is intended to be a nutritional support, then it should be based on at least the family size. It is notable that in the very complex and difficult context of Darfur, WFP gives rations to families based on the size of family.

## 5.4 Targeting (including distribution lists and registration criteria)

*This section is based on 82 pieces of evidence from 45 different sources.*

Some NGOs conducted their own assessment exercises, but the bulk of assistance was distributed to those registered as IDPs through the following processes:

- IDPs in the tented camps were registered either by the Commissionerate for Afghan Refugees (CAR) - a long-time UNHCR partner, or by the International Rescue Committee (IRC).
- IDPs in the host population were registered by the Provincial Social Welfare Directorate (SWD).

The registration data was then verified by the National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA)<sup>65</sup> to check that the Computerised National Identity Card (CNIC) used for the registration was genuine (as there is a problem with forged and unauthorised CNICs) and that the IDP was not registered elsewhere.



Figure 9: Verification process during food distribution in Zarra Mallia Kohat. © Riccardo Polastro 2010.

<sup>65</sup> NADRA is a major player in Identify technology and sells its services internationally

Generally, IDPs got their first assistance based on their registration<sup>66</sup>, and subsequent assistance based on verification. At the time of the fieldwork, the system had developed as follows:

- IDPs in the host population got their first food packet on registration. In some cases food distribution continued even where there were verification problems.
- IDPs in the host population got other assistance such as non-food items and other assistance after verification. Until 17 May 2010, NFI assistance was distributed on the basis of registration, but this was then changed to assistance on the basis of verification due to the high number of fraudulent registrations.

The registration of so many people so quickly was a huge achievement for the agencies doing the registering and the rapid verification indicates the capacities of NADRA. It should be noted that there is no obligation for government to register IDPs, so the Government exceeded its obligations in this respect. However, the registration was flawed due to the criteria applied for verification. One criterion was that only those with CNIC addresses in the notified areas<sup>67</sup> were eligible. This led to inclusion errors as some of those who had emigrated from the notified areas even years before had never changed their addresses. It also led to exclusion errors:

- Some IDPs fled areas which were not formally notified, but which were the scenes of significant military activity.
- Those who had fled the Taliban were also excluded from assistance, unless the area they fled from was subsequently notified. The flight from Taliban control began from the time that they first became a significant force in Pakistan.
- Some female-headed households were also excluded as experience during the earthquake proved that women are more likely to be without a CNIC than men. New CNICs could only be issued with paperwork from the Union Councils, but most of these were not operating or were inaccessible.

Obviously only those who could access registration sites could be registered. This led to exclusion errors as female-headed households and the very poor found it difficult to get to registration sites<sup>68</sup>. Some of this was later corrected by mobile registration teams. However, a briefing on the vulnerability assessment surveys indicated that there were high levels of non-registration among the poorest in some areas.

The level of exclusion errors is controversial. However, the food security assessment in FATA considered that: *“Displacement within and from FATA remains significantly underreported by the present NADRA registration system. The actual number of current IDPs is estimated to be up to 25 percent higher than the total currently registered by NADRA. More than one third of current IDPs, and six percent of returnees are unlikely to have been formally registered.”* (Haller et al., 2010, p.9).

The decision to verify on the basis of CNIC address led to status-wise inclusion errors. People who had moved before the crisis for economic reasons but had not changed their address were able to register for assistance and be verified as genuine. A further inclusion error stemmed from the inclusion of all those with IDP status in the relief rolls, regardless of

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<sup>66</sup> The team has been given two conflicting accounts of registration. One account is that registration was restricted to those from notified areas, with those from non-notified areas being refused registration. The other account is that all were registered, but that those from non-notified areas were removed from the lists on verification. The team concluded that both accounts were true, but for different areas at different times.

<sup>67</sup> “Notified areas” were areas where the military notified the population that they were going to conduct operations and that the population should leave for their own safety. A McRAM exercise in Kohat in February 2010 found that approximately three percent of claimants were not verified due to being from outside the notified areas.

<sup>68</sup> On a recent visit by the Gender Task Force to a NADRA registration site, there were no female data entry clerks, female waiting area or toilets.

whether they actually needed any assistance. The international community did not challenge this flawed registration in any serious way.

The Government's decision to provide every IDP with a cash grant of 25,000 PKR led to restrictions on registration as the cost of the cash grants hit home. NADRA was under pressure to limit the number of eligible individuals.

The attractiveness of the cash grant was one of the factors driving false registrations. Verification of the CNIC data led to the dropping of nearly 800,000 from an initial relief registration of over three million. The most common reason for dropping people from the relief role was double registration.

Over time, verification rather than registration became the entry level of assistance. From May 2010, NFIs are only distributed on the basis of verified registrations (previously all those registering were regarded as being entitled). Only a single month's food ration is now provided upon registration, and subsequent rations are only provided if the registration is verified. While the team was told that verification is now much faster than it was previously, there are still instances in which it can take some months to verify CNIC data.

In some cases, IDPs presenting themselves at an IDP camp were registered even if they were not from a notified area. IDPs from some parts of FATA were only registered if they were members of a particular ethnic group<sup>69</sup>.

One improvement in registration is the move towards vulnerability-based registration for assistance. A group of 14 NGOs and UN agencies have been working on a Vulnerability Assessment pilot for some months and this provides a much better model for identifying those in need of assistance in the future. The team considered that this was a very positive example of partnership<sup>70</sup>.

## 5.5 Camps/ Host/ Other

*This section is based on 58 pieces of evidence from 34 different sources.*

As noted earlier, assistance was concentrated on those in camps. A McRAM assessment found that 91% of the IDPs surveyed were in rented accommodation because the community cannot afford to treat the hosted families as guests for extended periods.

However, the initial assistance provided by those who hosted IDPs was critical to the prevention of a humanitarian catastrophe. The international community concentrated first on providing assistance to those in camps<sup>71</sup>, while the host community went to great lengths to meet the needs of the families they were hosting. The initial concentration on camp populations for health and sanitation services was appropriate because people in camps face increased disease risks compared to people scattered throughout the population<sup>72</sup>.

Generally, interviewees said that families in camps were generally those who could not afford to rent, so inadvertently, the poorest of the displaced were assisted by the international community. However, some of those who stayed did so because they could not afford to be displaced, or had a family member of reduced mobility that prevented displacement.

<sup>69</sup> This was on the basis that military operations were only to begin in the home area of that particular ethnic group. However, members of the ethnic group from the surrounding areas were also displaced because their district was used as a military staging area.

<sup>70</sup> The protection cluster has played a strong role in supporting this assessment process.

<sup>71</sup> Again, the food cluster was the exception here.

<sup>72</sup> Topley (1941, p.347) noted that aggregation of populations such as in camps can lead to an increased disease risk. Essentially bringing populations together in camps increases the contact between those carrying particular diseases and those susceptible to those diseases, and thereby increases the risk of epidemics.

One feature is that in some camps, families are making an attempt to move into rented accommodation for the summer as the tents are too hot. These families will return to the camp when the weather cools as they cannot afford to rent all year.

## 5.6 Conclusions

Relatively few needs assessments were conducted, and joint assessments were rare, despite the development of useful tools like the McRAM. The needs assessments that were conducted were more for individual agency use than for use by the broader humanitarian community. Assessments generally looked at the household as a monolithic unit, without considering the different needs of women, boys, girls, and men in the household.

The affected population was rarely consulted in any effective way. Consultation mainly took place with male leaders and not with the broader population or with women. The lack of consultation led to some inappropriate assistance, such as concentrating on shelter kits rather than assistance with rent or with the costs of house repair.

The affected population that the team met with generally preferred cash to in-kind assistance, with good reason. However, agencies were still reluctant to move away from their giving-in-kind comfort-zone even where such in-kind assistance represented poor value for money. The high attractiveness of cash has led to significant political pressure for inclusion, and has provided an incentive for fraudulent registration.

While the registration exercise was a logistic triumph, the registration criteria were fundamentally flawed and led to inclusion and exclusion errors both on IDP status and on the need for assistance. In any emergency, there is a trade-off between speed and accuracy in registration, the registration in this case was a good example of fast and relatively effective registration. However, there was no transition to more accurate targeting for the bulk of the affected population in 2009. Thus, the response was category-based (having a CNIC with a particular address) rather than status-based (IDP) or needs-based. However, the major humanitarian actors accepted the flawed registration and used it as a basis for their own distributions without raising any major issues.

The in-camp population was the best assisted. However, these were also those who were the poorest among the displaced. Some of those who stayed did so because they could not afford the costs of displacement, and paradoxically received less assistance than anyone else.

Some of the most difficult gaps in assistance were gaps which predated the crisis and which reflected chronic underlying problems in the provision of basic services in Pakistan<sup>73</sup>. This, together with the complexities of varying patterns of need, and varying levels of assistance for different groups, provides a very complex pattern of need that cannot be described with a single indicator. This has led to difficulties in communicating the level of needs to donors.

Assistance was not proportionate to need, but varied with many extraneous factors and over time. Assistance was much harder to access for female-headed families. Relief assistance was much more readily available than recovery assistance. Those in camps were far better assisted than hosted families, families in rented accommodation, returnees, host families or stayees.

## 5.7 Recommendations

### 5.7.1 FOR THE HUMANITARIAN COMMUNITY IN PAKISTAN

The current beneficiary lists are flawed, and assistance is not always a good match to needs. Assistance should, in line with humanitarian principles, be needs-based and not category- or

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<sup>73</sup> UNDP ranks Pakistan 101<sup>st</sup> out of 135 in terms of the human poverty index (HPI-1) (UNDP 2009b, p.177). The index measures access to basic services.

status -based. Interviews with the affected population were critical of much of the in-kind assistance which often appears to be of limited use.

**Recommendation 7. *The humanitarian community in Pakistan should reassess all existing programmes, both in terms of the appropriateness of the assistance that they are providing and whom they are targeting. The priority for reassessment should be programmes delivering goods-in-kind. In-kind assistance should only continue where the affected population prefer it to cash or vouchers on an equivalent cost basis.***

### 5.7.2 FOR THE HUMANITARIAN COUNTRY TEAM

The vulnerability assessment pilot is an excellent initiative.

**Recommendation 8. *The HCT should roll-out the vulnerability assessment model for the whole affected area and base assistance on vulnerability rather than just on registration.***

Registration and verification will still be needed to limit fraud, but assistance should be based on need.

The lack of hard data on needs, due to the complexity of the pattern of needs, makes it easy for donors to brush aside requests for assistance. Humanitarian actors in Pakistan need better evidence base to convince donors of the real levels of need.

**Recommendation 9. *The HCT should begin a process to map needs in a consistent way across the affected area disaggregated by region, age, and sex. Such a mapping may require that the HCT commission a detailed survey of the affected population to discover what types of assistance has been most useful, and what types of assistance are still needed.***

This raw data for the mapping process may come from consolidating the different assessments (such as CERINA and the McRAM assessments) that have been carried out with the support of a detailed survey of the affected population. Such a survey should also clearly compare the situation of the population now with their situation prior to the crisis. It must clearly identify need by gender.



## 6 Timeliness

*The extent to which whether interventions were carried out in a fashion that adequately supported the affected population at different phases of the crisis.*

Timeliness is a key aspect of the effectiveness of the emergency response. We looked at two issues under timeliness:

- Delays in response
- Bureaucratic constraints (both internal and external)

### 6.1 Delays in response

*This section is based on 18 pieces of evidence from 14 different sources.*

One donor made the point that many of its partners (who were some of the leading humanitarian agencies) were unable to deliver their projects within a rapid time frame. The slow implementation speed of humanitarian actors was also an issue raised by local officials and the military.



Figure 10: Focus group discussion during an NFI distribution in Jarma Kohat. © Riccardo Polastro 2010

NGOs countered that one of the main factors slowing down their operations was the need for NOCs. In theory, they are supposed to be issued within seven days, but as noted earlier, they may only be issued after the project is finished. NGOs noted that NOCs are sometimes used to control access to pressure NGOs to accept instruction about providing assistance to particular beneficiaries.

In reality, any delays in implementation of projects by the international humanitarian community were not critical, as the local community and the military were the first responders. The support from the local community in the initial hours of the crisis was fast and timely.

The biggest delays in responding to needs did not occur in the relief phase, but are occurring now in the recovery phase. The delayed launch of the 2010 PHRP due to objections from the federal level has had a big impact on funding for 2010. The lack of funding for recovery means that the affected population are seeing long delays in their needs being met.

## 6.2 Bureaucratic constraints (both internal and external)

*This section is based on 38 pieces of evidence from 21 different sources.*

NGOs repeatedly made the point that NOCs are a serious bureaucratic constraint for their operations. This was discussed above.

The bureaucratic constraints faced by aid providers can be divided into three groups:

- The normal bureaucratic constraints that are part of normal daily life in Pakistan. The bureaucracy moves very slowly.
- Additional bureaucratic rules that were introduced to control humanitarian access.
- The security measures introduced by the military, such as road-blocks and curfews, which have an indirect impact on the ability of agencies to deliver assistance in a timely manner.

In practice, it was not possible to distinguish between these different groups of constraints as they are interlinked. For example, rules that were intended to control access were implemented in a bureaucratic fashion, increasing the extent and impact of the denial of access.

Internal bureaucratic constraints also impacted the response of humanitarian actors. Internal security rules for different agencies are one example. Personnel ceilings limit the number of international staff that can be deployed. This impacts agency operations on a daily basis<sup>74</sup>. Some donors have even more restrictive rules than the UN and almost never travel to the affected areas.

Corruption is a problem in Pakistan<sup>75</sup> and humanitarian actors rely on their own bureaucratic procedures to prevent abuse. These procedures, such as tendering and procurement rules, limit flexibility and can slow the response. This is the case with the procurement of shelter kits, where UNHCR's procurement rules (sensibly, in the context) prevent the procurement of small quantities of local available materials.

## 6.3 Conclusion

The response to the crisis by the local community was fast and timely. The response meant that delays in the initial relief response by the international community were non-critical. However, funding problems, including the delay of launching the PHRP, has resulted in large delays in responding to recovery needs.

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<sup>74</sup> The evaluation team saw this as first hand when it was announced that their travel plans would have to be changed to avoid breaching staff ceilings. However, after discussion, the fact that the evaluation team, as indirect contractors, did not fall under the UN's malicious acts insurance meant that the programme could continue as planned.

<sup>75</sup> Transparency International ranked Pakistan 139<sup>th</sup> out of 180 countries for transparency in 2009.

The NOC system is a serious bureaucratic constraint that prevents timely action by NGOs. It is one of the bureaucratic measures used to control access of NGOs, but the normal constraints within the Government bureaucracy greatly amplify its impact.

## 6.4 Recommendations

The NOC system is a serious impediment to a rapid and effective response by NGO.

### 6.4.1 RECOMMENDATION FOR THE GOVERNMENT

**Recommendation 10. *The Government should introduce a 'presumed to comply' rule for NOCs, where, unless NOCs are formally refused, they are deemed to come into effect within seven days of the submission of the application.***

## 7 Connectedness

*Connectedness looks at the extent to which activities of a short-term emergency nature take longer term and interconnected problems into account.*

The topics we have looked at under this heading include:

- Changes from 2009 to 2010
- Recovery constraints
- Connectedness

### 7.1 Changes from 2009 to 2010

*This section is based on 57 pieces of evidence from 23 different sources.*

The biggest change in the operation from 2009 to 2010 was the scale of the operation. Over three million IDPs were registered in 2010 and they were arriving at the rate of tens of thousands per week. Flows in 2010 have been far less extensive, and the pace of the operation is significantly slower.

The geographical focus of the operation has also changed as different areas have been “notified” or declared as “cleared” by the military. The fact that new IDPs are from FATA rather than KPK has had an impact, as the KPK government feels that the FATA secretariat should be providing some funding for support for IDPs from FATA, whereas the FATA secretariat says that they are only responsible for IDPs in FATA.

The pattern of need has become more complex as there are simultaneously new IDPs in one area, with returnees in others, and growing recovery needs in yet more areas. This complexity of the pattern of need makes it difficult for the humanitarian community to deliver a simple summary of the level of needs.

Agencies have improved their operations due to learning from 2009. This has already been discussed, but the end result is faster and the responses are of a higher quality in 2010.

The relative paucity of funding for 2010 is also driving major changes in the response. Although there are still nearly one million IDPs, the issue attracts relatively little media attention, even within Pakistan. This also contributed to the difficulties of mobilising resources for the affected population.

### 7.2 Recovery constraints

*This section is based on 41 pieces of evidence from 26 different sources.*

The biggest problem facing early recovery are:

- The lack of funding for recovery work<sup>76</sup>.
- The impact of the longer term structural poverty problems on the recovery context.

In some areas, the conflict led to significant damage to livelihood assets, with the destruction of housing, orchards, and damage to irrigation systems. Security measures such as curfews and road-blocks have had a negative impact on economic activity and have slowed recovery in some locations.

Recovery can only commence when people return to an affected area. However, it is clear that return is not happening within some areas as the displaced population does not feel it is safe

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<sup>76</sup> As noted earlier, this has been slightly better in 2010, but is still inadequate for the scale of needs.

to return<sup>77</sup>. Even where people have returned, support for livelihood interventions is ad hoc and is not integrated.

However, the biggest challenge facing agencies trying to support recovery is the lack of donor support. The central government is pressing donors to support mechanisms such as the Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) and process such as the PCNA rather than supporting the recovery activities of individual humanitarian actors.

However, experience of mechanisms like the MDTF in neighbouring Afghanistan and elsewhere suggest that it will be a long time before any physical work is implemented because of the bureaucratic procedures that are an essential part of such multi-lateral pooled funding mechanisms. This means that populations who have returned to their areas of origin may have to wait two years before seeing any impact of the MDTF or other multi-lateral mechanisms on their lives.

### 7.3 Connectedness

*This section is based on 64 pieces of evidence from 37 different sources.*

Many of the critical social issues in Pakistan reflect longer term development problems. These include multi-dimensional poverty, governance issues, and social inequalities including the marginalisation of women. One donor referred to NGO proposals in the health sector in the aftermath of the crisis that proposed to address structural problems in a six-month IDP project that well-funded programmes elsewhere in Pakistan has not been able to address over decades of assistance. In all aspects of the response, structural poverty compounded connectedness issues.

Several interviewees expressed the view that the growth of extremism in Pakistan had been encouraged by the failure to provide basic services, thus connecting the IDP crisis with issues of longer term development.

Most of the humanitarian agencies responding to the IDP crisis are multi-mandate agencies which also have long-running development projects in Pakistan. Because of this, they were well-aware of the longer term context and thus, their relief projects were connected to it.

Interviewees involved with private schools<sup>78</sup> complained that the delivery of WFP food through government schools was having a big impact on education. Children were being withdrawn from private schools to get access to the ration from public schools. Private schools attract pupils due to their smaller pupil-teacher ratios and better performance<sup>79</sup>. Some private schools are run as primarily as commercial ventures. Others were run on a non-profit basis to provide a service to the community from which their founders sprang. While increased enrolment at the government schools makes it seem as though the WFP project is supporting education, it is actually having a negative impact as parents prioritise the food ration ahead of the quality of education. There is also a gender dimension here as girls are five times more likely to drop out of government schools than private ones (Lloyd et al, 2006, p. 13, 28).

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<sup>77</sup> There is a different issue in parts of FATA where community leaders are negotiating for a return package with the Government.

<sup>78</sup> Private schools are not restricted to the urban elite, but are they prevalent in rural areas but also are affordable to middle and even low income groups (Andarabi et al., 2002, p.1). Between 2000 and 2005 the number of private school increased from 32,000 to 47,000 in Pakistan and by the end of 2005 one-in-three enrolled primary school children was in a private school (Andrabi et al., 2007, p.vi).

<sup>79</sup> The LEAPS report found that: *The differences between public and private schools are so large that it will take government school students between 1.5 [in maths] to 2.5 [English] years of additional schooling to catch up to where private school students were in Class 3.* (Andrabi et al., 2007, p.xiii).

## 7.4 Conclusions

Early recovery is strongly constrained by funding with recovery needs not being met. Most of the response focus has been on relief rather than on recovery, rehabilitation or development.

Direct damage to infrastructure and livelihood assets is a major problem in some areas of return. There has been relatively little livelihood support.

The biggest changes since 2009 are the scale of movements, donor interest and level of funding, the shift from assisting the displaced to recovery, and the geographical focus of the crisis and response.

## 7.5 Recommendations

### 7.5.1 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE HUMANITARIAN COUNTRY TEAM

The longer term support for recovery is going to take a long time to become effective. There is a need for assistance in the immediate term so that the momentum of return is not lost.

**Recommendation 11. *The HCT should continue to advocate with donors to adequately fund recovery in the short to intermediate term while waiting for the medium to long term mechanisms to come into play.***

# Appendix 1 Terms of Reference

## Inter-Agency Real Time Evaluation (IA-RTE) of The Humanitarian Response to Pakistan's 2009 Displacement Crisis

### A1.1 Introduction

In recent years, efforts have been increasingly directed towards improving humanitarian response through inter-agency real-time evaluations (IA-RTE). An IA RTE can be defined as an evaluation carried out at the early implementation stages of a humanitarian operation which almost simultaneously feeds back its findings for immediate use by the broader humanitarian community at the field level. An IA RTE is primarily intended for sudden-onset disasters, or protracted crises undergoing a phase of rapid deterioration or escalating violence.<sup>80</sup> These evaluations differ from other forms of humanitarian evaluation regarding speed, coverage, methods, and outputs. IA RTEs are typified by their shared management and methodological oversight through global and national level inter-agency reference and management groups; celerity of mobilization, feedback and follow-up; light, agile approaches; restricted scope; and participatory methods.<sup>81</sup> Ideally, IA RTEs seek to unlock inter-agency coordination problems or operational bottlenecks and provide real time learning to the field.<sup>82</sup>

As an initiative of the IASC, IA RTEs have thus far only been applied in the context of natural disasters. Based on the results of a two-year testing phase in such contexts, the IASC's Working Group accepted in July 2009 IA RTEs for regular implementation. The Working Group further noted that the approach had yet to be tested in a conflict situation and that such testing should take place as soon as possible.

In mid October, the UN Country Team in Pakistan requested an IA RTE of the current humanitarian response to the on-going displacement crisis. The HCT in Pakistan is of the view that an IA RTE would constitute an appropriate support to the country team particularly at a time when new strategies and thinking may be needed to cope effectively with the evolving crisis on the ground. The proposed evaluation also has the support of the broader humanitarian community within the country. Subsequent developments including most notably the terrorist attack on the offices of the UN World Food Programme in Islamabad have served to create an even more difficult security environment. Subject to the determination of the UN Designated Official, the evaluation will take place as soon as security conditions permit.

### A1.2 Background to the current crisis

In spring 2009, a peace deal between the Government of Pakistan (GoP) and pro-Taliban militants broke down, prompting a military offensive by the Pakistani army against the pro-Taliban militants in the country's northwest in late April 2009.

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<sup>80</sup> Draft Inter Agency Real Time Evaluation (IA RTE) Concept Paper and Management Plan Prepared by the Evaluation and Studies Section, UN OCHA for the Inter Agency Standing Committee January 2009.

<sup>81</sup> Inter-Agency Real Time Evaluations Concepts and Management Discussion Paper Prepared for the Evaluation and Studies Section, UN OCHA by John Telford (11 October 2009).

<sup>82</sup> Draft Inter Agency Real Time Evaluation (IA RTE) Concept Paper and Management Plan Prepared by the Evaluation and Studies Section, UN OCHA for the Inter Agency Standing Committee January 2009.

This offensive led to a deterioration in security conditions throughout the North Western Frontier Province (NWFP) and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and resulted in a massive humanitarian crisis which at its peak led to the displacement of 2.7 million Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) between April and July 2009.

By 15 of October, a total of 1.66 million IDPs had already returned to their homes. Still some 1.02 millions individuals remain internally displaced due to the ongoing conflict situation. There are currently 12 camps within IDP hosting areas as well as in area of return with a total IDP population of approximately 117,400 individuals (21,000 families).

In response, the humanitarian community has to provide assistance to four beneficiary groups, who are: 1) the returnees, 2) those who have remained in the conflict zones during operations, 3) IDPs who remain in camps or with host families and, 4) host families providing food and shelter to IDPs.

It is expected that these groups will continue to require assistance during 2010, and that on going population displacements and returns will continue over the same period. As the number of aid organizations working within the conflict areas continues to increase and the crisis itself continues to change course, the need for an impartial review of the current strategies in place is now critical

### A1.3 Purpose

The HCT has requested an inter-agency real-time evaluation as a means of obtaining real-time analysis and feedback to help better focus and adjust on-going implementation strategies. The evaluation will as such provide an analytical snap shot of the current situation. It will also offer an independent perspective on issues such as main successes and shortcomings within the current response. It will also address the issue of whether current humanitarian action in Pakistan is adequately grounded in humanitarian principles including gender equality. The evaluation will also focus on the crucial issue of whether the current response is addressing and covering actual needs on the ground particularly vulnerable individuals and families and whether partnership arrangements with key national actors are wholly adequate. The evaluation seeks to complement the work already done in the frame of the Inter-Cluster diagnostic missions. Hence, it will be targeted at the main results and outcomes of the aid provided by the whole system and will not address coordination issues already analyzed by the Clusters.

In early December 2009 a preparation mission allowed to further elicit specific expectations by the members of the Humanitarian Country Team on desired focus and outcome of an RTE:

#### Most appropriate approach:

An evaluation to look at results (in terms of what has been delivered) / adherence and compliance to standards and coverage of assessed needs

#### Thematic focuses of RTE:

Special attention needs to be given to issues of humanitarian space and access (to all parts of the population irrespective of sex, age, ethnicity, religion etc.) as well as principles, Civil-Military Coordination, Common strategies and Monitoring and Evaluation systems to track performance.

#### Geographical focus:

The Swat (Malakand Division) and the Bajaur (FATA) districts have been identified as the most appropriate and feasible geographical areas in which to conduct the RTE (security permitting by the time of the consultant team deployment). The rationales for selecting these districts are as follows:



In Swat, about 162,674 families (approximately 1,138,718 people) were displaced from Swat to Peshawar Valleys, Nowshera, Mardan and other safer locations. During the humanitarian response, there was a close collaboration with the Government. Cluster Focal Points had been identified and district coordination systems have been instituted jointly with the civil administration authorities. By July 2009, many areas in Swat were declared safe by the Government and by July the Government started implementing its return plan. Despite significant number of returnees, thousands of families remain to this day unable or unwilling to return. There are valuable lessons to be learnt on return practice and early recovery,

In Bajaur, internal displacement is still ongoing and no return plan has been implemented by the Government up to date. However, the HCT assumes that the response might soon start to plan for returning IDP's and durable solutions. The HCT is therefore in need to learn in 'real time' how to best respond in the near future to the Bajaur displacement. It will offer valuable lessons to be learnt on questions such as IDP return policy and practice, camp establishment and closure, the interweaving of counter-insurgency, humanitarian goals and humanitarian space.

In comparing the humanitarian response in the Swat with the situation in Bajaur, the IA RTE team might come up with findings and recommendations which will be of immediate and 'real time' use for the response planning of the HCT.

If the security situation should not allow for access to Swat or Bajaur, the HCT identified the following geographical areas as possible locations for the IA RTE: S.I. Khan (South Waziristan) and Hangu/ Kohat (FATA).

#### Potential users and uses of evaluation results in real-time:

The whole of the humanitarian country team and partners including government and military actors to adapt and improve strategies of engagement for ongoing and future operations to assist and protect IDPs

The results are also expected to feed into the ongoing Post Crisis Needs Assessment (PCNA).

## A1.4 Evaluation focus, criteria, issues and key questions

### A1.4.1 FOCUS:

The evaluation shall be looking at the following aspects of the humanitarian response both in terms of what was planned and what was delivered:

- Look at how the **needs** of all parts of the populations, men and boys, women and girls, old and young were **assessed** and whether all layers of the population have received what they needed
- Assess **results**, positive and negative outcomes of the response for affected populations by asking some simple questions to beneficiaries who did and did not receive assistance during their displacement
- Assess what was not delivered and the reasons for that
- Look at the humanitarian systems' commitment and compliance to **standards** (such as SPHERE) and **principles** for delivery of services and goods
- Security for IDPs and constraints around ensuring security
- Provide an external **analysis** on **critical issues** that explain why the response was delivered as planned or not delivered and what improvements or adjustments may be needed to help address current needs and what alternatives exist to improve the overall delivery of results and ultimately lead to measurable impacts of the response in similar contexts of displacement.
- Look at **monitoring and evaluation systems**, including the way that recommendations from past evaluations were used

- Look at how the response has promoted greater coverage and connectedness among stakeholders?

#### A1.4.2 EVALUATION CRITERIA:

The following evaluation criteria will be used and assessed in this order of priority:

- effectiveness (of response given as compared to objectives and targets defined)
- consistency (of response given as compared to standards adhered to),
- relevance (of the response given as compared to needs)
- timeliness (time elapsed between displacement, assessments and response),
- connectedness (sustainability as achieved through ensuring that activities are planned in support to pre-existing response structures and capacities)

#### A1.4.3 ISSUES:

While analysing critical successes and failures of the system to deliver what was needed and what it committed to, it should seek explanations of such factors by looking more specifically at

- What were the common strategies and plans developed at the national and the provincial / division level to respond to the humanitarian needs of displaced (and remained?) populations (female and male) whether in camps or in host families
- The way all the civilian and military partners, international and national, UN and non-UN did collaborate to provide an efficient and effective response to the humanitarian needs
- How humanitarian space, access and security has been and is negotiated, maintained, expanded to the effect of providing assistance to the most needy population
- How timely provision of resources to respond was advocated for, obtained and effectively used and managed
- Which systems have been put into place to monitor, report and evaluate the efficiency and effectiveness of the overall response

#### A1.4.4 KEY QUESTIONS:

Some of the key questions suggested are:

- To beneficiaries (male and female): (how) were they asked what their needs were, what kind of assistance did they receive and has it covered their most urgent needs? Were women and girls and women headed households approached separately through females?
- To national and provincial authorities and military forces that participated in the response: Was there a common strategy to respond to the humanitarian needs developed together with all implementing partners of the national and international humanitarian system? Was the assistance provided by the system adequate and timely? Did it build on and build local capacity?
- To all humanitarian partners, national and international involved in the response: What were the major favouring and hindering factors for an effective and efficient response to the need of the affected populations?
- Did the response draw on key lessons from past evaluations/ reviews? What key lessons can be learned from this response to inform future responses in similar settings?

## A1.5 Stakeholder Engagement, Uses and Users of the Real-Time Evaluation

In conducting the evaluation, the evaluation team will engage with staff from UN agencies, international NGOs, national NGOs, national stakeholders (such as the GoP, and the Pakistani Army), and donor organizations. Particular attention will be paid to ensuring that part of the fieldworkers/ enumerators are female.

The team will acknowledge the significant workload already borne by in country staff and endeavor to ensure that any staff resource allocations to the evaluation's data collection needs are minimized.

Interagency technical and policy support will be provided through a core management group within the IASC Interest Group on RTEs as well as through operational support to be provided through UN agencies and INGOs on the ground in Pakistan.

An in-country Reference Group (RG) with representatives from the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT, i.e. UN, INGO, N-NGO, Provincial and National authorities) will help to guide the evaluation process in-country and take ownership and responsibility for acting upon recommendations. Ideally this should happen at the provincial and national level with all partners in order to help to link the experts with key stakeholders from their organization in all locations where the evaluation process takes place and provide critical information and data as requested. It is therefore suggested that such Reference Groups be put into place at the onset of the evaluation process both in Islamabad and in Peshawar (if possible in addition also in the Swat district, e.g. Mingora) to interact with the Evaluation Team and do briefings and debriefings as well as taking forward recommendations which will be coming out of the evaluation. The evaluation team should take their views into account, and provide sufficient explanation on the approach chosen and tailor the recommendations to their specific needs.

The team will report its findings back to the HCT in Pakistan prior to leaving the region. Presentations in Geneva and/ or New York will follow within two weeks of the consultants' return from the field mission.

## A1.6 Methodology

The evaluation will be carried out through analyses of various sources of information including desk reviews; field visits to Islamabad, Peshawar and Mingora / Swat; interviews with key stakeholders (such UN, I/NGOs, donors, beneficiary communities and government including the Core Group on PCNA) and through cross-validation of data. Briefing workshops in Islamabad will serve as a mechanism to both feed back findings on a real-time basis, and further validate information.

The approach will be essentially deductive, trying to identify critical success factors from the assessment of timeliness, adequacy and effectiveness of the response. It will also be highly participatory, facilitating 'space for reflection' by key international actors involved in the response on how well the response was conducted and how it could be strengthened.

There will not be sufficient time to do a random sampling which ideally should be proposed. Instead, since the aim is to identify only critical successes and failures, the identification of affected populations to meet should be made by targeting recipients (female and male) where aid has been provided and also those who have not received any or sufficient / adequate aid. Focus groups as well as individual interviews can be foreseen to that end. These will be constituted so as to reflect views of different groups of recipients so that 'elite capture' of data doesn't skew the evaluation findings. In a second step, interviews with decision-makers in Peshawar and Islamabad as well as joint briefings and debriefings have to be foreseen.

While maintaining independence, the evaluation will seek the views of all parties. Compliance with United Nations Evaluation Group standards and ALNAP quality pro forma

is expected and the evaluation report will be judged in this regard. The two documents are available from the website of the OCHA Evaluation and Studies Unit (<http://ochaonline.un.org/ess>). All external evaluation reports will also be submitted to ALNAP for inclusion in the regular meta evaluation process that rates the quality of evaluation reports.

## A1.7 Management Arrangements

The study will be managed by OCHA's Evaluation and Studies Section (ESS), Policy Development and Studies Branch (PDSB), who will assign an evaluation manager to oversee the conduct and quality of the evaluation. An ad hoc management group made up of interested IASC members will further support OCHA's ESS in the overall decision making and validation process. To ensure independence, the external consultant team (team leader) will report to OCHA's Evaluation and Studies Section (ESS) and to the global management group. A de briefing will be arranged with the HCT and feedback received in country before departure of the mission. All drafts of the evaluation report will be submitted through this group only and not directly to the HCT by the Team Leader.

His/her responsibilities are as follows:

- Monitor and assess the quality of the evaluation and its process;
- Provide guidance and institutional support to the external consultant, especially on issues of methodology;
- Provide and/or coordinate logistical support to the evaluation team
- Facilitate the consultants access to key stakeholders and specific information or expertise needed to perform the assessment;
- Ensure that all stakeholders are kept informed;
- Ensure sufficient engagement by UNCT on initial findings prior to dissemination
- Recommend the approval of final report to the IA-RTE IG;
- Ensure a management response to the final report and monitor the subsequent follow up

## A1.8 Duration of Evaluation and Tentative Work Plan

While recognizing that an evaluation of this type normally should be allocated a much longer time frame and more resources, the challenge will be to identify key success and failure factors, so that recommendations to build on good practice and to avoid main "traps" will be identified and fed back into the planning and the implementation of ongoing and future strategies and operational plans:

Therefore and security permitting, it is envisaged that the IA RTE will be carried out between May-June 2010.

<b>Description</b>	<b>Number of working Days</b>
Desk Review of important documents and previous evaluations & studies and briefing with headquarters	5 days x 2 experts= <b>10 days</b>
(including international travel) Travel Islamabad, Peshawar and Swat & Bajaur region visits to carry out information collection through engagement of humanitarian actors and affected populations and presentation of finding to HCT in Pakistan	2 days x 2 experts= 4 15 days x 3 experts= 45 days <b>49 days</b>
Presentation of findings in Geneva (connection via VC in NY)	1 day per 2 experts= <b>2 days</b>
Preparation of draft report	7 days x 2 experts= <b>14 days</b>

Preparation of final report

1 day x 2 experts= **2 days***Approximate Total Working Days**77 days*

An evaluation mission to last maximum 3 weeks (as the team will be comprised of at least 3-4 experts) in the field should be launched in May 2010. Ideally, the experts should spend just 1-2 days first in Islamabad and then spend at least 8-10 days in the selected field locations before conducting interviews and briefings in Islamabad. Logistic support should be provided by OCHA and evaluation partners (WFP, UNHCR, UNICEF, INGO, Government where needed).

## A1.9 Competency and Expertise Requirements

It is proposed that a mixed team of three to four experts be tasked with this independent evaluation:

- 1/2 internationals with a good Pakistan experience and background
- 1/2 national consultants with good knowledge of the context in the provinces and previous evaluation experience / exposure

At least one member of the team has to be a woman!

The team will have the following qualifications and experience:

- Demonstrable experience in conducting evaluations of humanitarian programmes and the capacity to work collaboratively with multiple stakeholders and on a team is a mandatory requirement
- Proven senior-level experience and ability to provide strategic recommendations to key stakeholders;
- Good knowledge of strategic and operational management of humanitarian operations, preferably in Pakistan; the ability to bring on board national consultants(s) from Pakistan would be an asset;
- Good knowledge of humanitarian system and its reforms, including of UN agencies, IFRC, NGOs, and local government disaster response structures and systems;;
- Strong analytical skills(including gender analysis) and ability to clearly synthesize and present findings, draw practical conclusions and to prepare well-written reports in a timely manner;
- Strong workshop facilitation skills;
- Excellent writing and presentation skills in English; and
- Immediate availability for the period indicated.

## A1.10 Reporting Requirements and Deliverables

The Evaluation process will produce the following deliverables:

- A **series of presentations of findings** to UNCT and humanitarian community in Islamabad, New York and Geneva;
- An **evaluation report** containing analytical elements related to the issues specified in this set of ToR. The report shall contain a short executive summary of no more than 2,000 words and a main text of no more than 10,000 words, both inclusive of clear and concise recommendations. Annexes should include a list of all individuals interviewed, a bibliography, a description of method(s) employed, a summary of survey results (if applicable), and any other relevant materials. The report will be submitted two weeks after the completion of the mission.

The Evaluation Report should contain a set of priority recommendations on good examples to replicate and bad practices to avoid, prioritizing those that can be applied quickly by the Humanitarian Country Team members. The evaluation outcome should serve in improving ongoing strategies for response (including the 2010 Pakistan Humanitarian Response Plan PHRP) and operation plans in ongoing and new displacement situations.

Draft reports will be circulated within two weeks of the consultants' return from the field mission first to the IASC core management group and then to the Pakistan HCT. The document, once finalized will subsequently be disseminated to a wider audience for comment. The evaluation team is solely responsible for the final products. While maintaining independence, the team will adhere to professional standards and language, particularly that which may relate to the protection of staff and operations. Direct consultations with affected populations will be a formal requirement of the evaluation unless security conditions are overriding. Additionally, agencies at the country level and the IA RTE IG will be consulted prior to the dissemination of any products emanating from the evaluation.

All analytical results and products arising from this evaluation will be owned by OCHA and the IASC RTE IG. The team leader and/or members will not be allowed without prior authorization in writing to present any of the analytical materials as his or her own work to any external bodies or to use the materials for private publication purposes.

## A1.11 Key information and informants

It is suggested to make use of the following **key information**:

- Planning documents (including but not exclusively PHRP)
- Previous evaluation documents (including previous RTEs on Earthquake and Floods)
- Assessment documents (such as CERINA, PCNA, MCRAM)
- Situation reports
- Vulnerability assessments (e.g. done in January in Malakand Division)
- Beneficiary lists, population statistics, registration figures
- Monitoring of activities and products / outputs
- Evaluation reports
- Websites with information from all actors

Key informants to interact with the evaluation team and to provide key information will be identified by each organization participating in this evaluation who will designate the contacts in Islamabad, Peshawar and in the Swat / Bajaur district.

## Appendix 2 Chronology

This Chronology has been developed by Farwa Zafar and Riccardo Polastro (with some minor inputs from John Cosgrave) based largely on the following sources:

1. Reuters Alert Net
2. IRIN-Humanitarian News and Analysis
3. PHRP 2008/9 and 2010
4. OFDA/USAID updates
5. DFID updates
6. BBC
7. The Pakistan Real-Time Evaluation of the 2007 Floods and Cyclone
8. The 2010 Cluster Diagnostic Mission
9. Wikipedia
10. Encyclopaedia Britannica 2010 edition

This chronology is intended to illustrate the overall complexity of the context, rather than the specific decisions taken in the response<sup>83</sup>.

### A2.1 1848 British rule

<i>Date</i>	<i>Event</i>
1848	British administration introduced the Frontier Crimes Regulation to control the recently occupied Pashtun area in North West Pakistan. The regulations are re-enacted in 1873 and 1876, with a major revision in 1901.
1859	The British control most of present-day Pakistan region and incorporate it as part of the British Indian Empire.
1893	Colonial government in British-ruled India draws the Durand Line, dividing Pashtun and Baluch tribes in Afghanistan from those in what later became Pakistan.
1901	North West Frontier Province (NWFP- name later changed to Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa) formed under British India.
1906	Muslim League founded as organ of Indian Muslim separatism. It endorses the idea of separate nation for India's Muslims.
1935	A 7.7 magnitude earthquake jolted Quetta killing over 50,000 people.

### A2.2 1947 Independence

1947	Pakistan gains independence. State of East and West Pakistan created out of partition of India at the end of British rule. Hundreds of thousands die in widespread violence and millions forced to flee their homes.
1947	Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa votes to join Pakistan as NWFP. The Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) becomes semi-autonomous within Pakistan.

<sup>83</sup> The RTE took place too long after the key events in 2009 to be able to construct a detailed timeline due to some key players having moved on.

1948	First war with India over disputed territory of Kashmir.
1948	Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the first Governor General of Pakistan, dies.
1951	Prime Minister Khan Liaquat Ali Khan is assassinated.
1953	General Mohammed Daud becomes Prime Minister of Afghanistan. He introduces a number of social reforms, such as abolition of purdah. He turns to the Soviet Union for economic and military assistance.
1956	Constitution proclaims Pakistan an Islamic Republic.
1958	After a military coup General Ayub Khan takes over. Martial law is declared.
1960	Ayub Khan becomes the first elected President.
1963	Mohammed Daud is forced to resign in Afghanistan. The new government is a weak constitution monarchy riven by power struggles.
1965	Second war between Pakistan and India over Kashmir.
1969	Ayub Khan resigns; Yahya Khan declares martial law and assumes Presidency.
1970	Victory in general elections in East Pakistan for the breakaway Awami League party, leading to rising tension with West Pakistan.
1971	East Pakistan attempts to secede, leading to civil war. India intervenes in support of East Pakistanis. Pakistan fights another war with India. East Pakistan breaks away to become Bangladesh. Yahya Khan resigns.
1972	Karachi labour unrest and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto becomes President.
1972	Simla peace agreement with India sets new frontline in Kashmir.
1973	Zulfikar Ali Bhutto becomes Prime Minister.
1973	In Afghanistan Mohammed Daud seizes power in a coup and declares a republic. He tries to play off USSR against Western powers. His style alienates left-wing factions who join forces against him.
1973	Insurgency breaks out in Balochistan. Bhutto dismisses government.
1977	Riots erupt over allegations of vote-rigging by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party (PPP). General Muhammad Zia ul-Haq overthrows Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and declares martial law.
1977	Baloch insurgency ends after Zia reaches a political settlement with some Baloch leaders. <sup>1</sup>
1978	In Afghanistan, General Daud is overthrown and killed in a coup by leftist People's Democratic Party. But the party's Khalq and Parcham factions fall out, leading to purging or exile of most Parcham leaders. The Government undertook radical social reforms and executed many village Imams and headmen who opposed them. Conservative Islamic and ethnic leaders who objected to social changes begin armed revolt in countryside.
1979, July 3	July 3, 1979, US President Jimmy Carter signed a presidential finding authorizing funding for anticommunist guerrillas in Afghanistan.
1979	The Pakistani military ruler Zia Ul-Haq enacts the controversial Hudood Ordinances which had the effect of criminalising rape victims.
1979	In Afghanistan, the power struggle between leftist leaders Hafizullah Amin and Nur Mohammed Taraki in Kabul won by Amin. Revolts in countryside continue and Afghan army faces collapse.



## A2.3 1979 Soviet intervention in Afghanistan

<b>1979, December 25</b>	Soviet Union finally sends troops in large numbers into Afghanistan to remove Amin, who is executed.
<b>1979</b>	After Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, thousands of Afghans flee to Pakistan's border areas. Eventually, some 3 million Afghan refugees find safety in Pakistan.
<b>1980</b>	US pledges military assistance to Pakistan following Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.
<b>1985</b>	General elections held; Muhammad Khan Junejo becomes prime minister.
<b>1986</b>	Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's daughter Benazir returns from exile to lead PPP in campaign for fresh elections.
<b>1988</b>	Zia dismisses Junejo's government; Zia dies in a plane crash; New elections held; Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto becomes Prime Minister.
<b>1990</b>	President Ghulam Ishaq Khan dismisses Benazir Bhutto government; Mian Nawaz Sharif becomes the new prime minister.
<b>1991</b>	Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif begins economic liberalisation programme. Islamic Sharia law formally incorporated into legal code.
<b>1993</b>	President Ghulam Ishaq Khan and Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif both resign under pressure from the military. Benazir Bhutto becomes Prime Minister for the second time.
<b>1996</b>	President Farooq Leghari dismisses Bhutto government.
<b>1996</b>	Taliban seize control of Kabul and introduce hard-line version of Islam, banning women from work, and introducing Islamic disciplinary measures, which include stoning to death and amputations. Burhanuddin Rabbani flees to join anti-Taliban Northern Alliance.
<b>1997</b>	General elections held; Nawaz Sharif becomes Prime Minister for the second time.
<b>1997</b>	Taliban recognised as legitimate rulers by Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. Most other countries continue to regard Burhanuddin Rabbani as head of state. Taliban now control about two-thirds of country.
<b>1998, May 28</b>	Pakistan conducts nuclear test.
<b>1999</b>	Benazir Bhutto and her husband convicted of corruption and given jail sentences. Benazir stays out of the country.
<b>1999, October 12</b>	Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif overthrown in military coup led by General Pervez Musharraf.
<b>1999</b>	Kargil conflict: Pakistan-backed forces clash with the Indian military in the icy heights around Kargil in Indian-held Kashmir. More than 1,000 people are killed on both sides.
<b>2000</b>	Nawaz Sharif sentenced to life imprisonment on hijacking and terrorism charges.
<b>2000, December</b>	Nawaz Sharif goes into exile in Saudi Arabia after being pardoned by military authorities.
<b>2001</b>	General Pervez Musharraf dismissed the president and named himself to the post.

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- 2001** Musharraf meets Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee in the first summit between the two neighbours in more than two years. The meeting ends without a breakthrough or even a joint statement because of differences over Kashmir.
- 
- 2001** India imposes sanctions against Pakistan, to force it to take action against two Kashmir militant groups blamed for a suicide attack on parliament in New Dehli. Pakistan retaliates with similar sanctions.
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- 2001** India, Pakistan position troops along common border amid mounting fears of a looming war.
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## A2.4 2001 Western Intervention in Afghanistan

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- 2001, September 11** Terror attacks in the US using hijacked aircraft as flying bombs.
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- 2001, September** Pakistan withdraws overt support for Afghanistan's Taliban regime in favour of US-led war on terror after 9/11. Musharraf backs the U.S. in its fight against terrorism and supports attacks on Afghanistan. U.S. lifts some sanctions imposed after Pakistan's nuclear tests in 1998, but retains others put in place after Musharraf's coup.
- 
- 2001** Refugees cross into Pakistan after U.S.-led intervention of Afghanistan, accompanied by Taliban and al Qaeda fighters.
- 
- 2001, October** US, Britain launch air strikes against Afghanistan after Taliban refuse to hand over Osama bin Laden, held responsible for the 9/11 attacks on America.
- 
- 2001, 07 December** Taliban finally surrender last stronghold of Kandahar, but Mullah Omar remains at large.
- 
- 2002** General Pervez Musharraf wins a referendum thus ensuring 5 more years in office.
- 
- 2002** President Musharraf bans two militant groups - Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad - and takes steps to curb religious extremism.
- 
- 2002** First general elections since the 1999 military coup held; Mir Zafarullah Khan Jamali becomes the next Prime Minister.
- 
- 2002** Pakistan sends thousands of troops into border areas to hunt for Al Qaeda leader Osama Bin Laden and other foreign fugitives.
- 
- 2002, May** Allied forces continue their military campaign to find remnants of al-Qaeda and Taliban forces in the south-east of Afghanistan.
- 
- 2002, May** Pakistan test fires three medium-range missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads, amid rumours of impending conflict with India. President Musharraf says Pakistan does not want war, but is ready to respond with full force if attacked.
- 
- 2002, December** President Karzai and President Musharraf and Turkmen leaders sign deal to build gas pipeline through Afghanistan, carrying Turkmen gas to Pakistan.
- 
- 2003** NWFP votes to introduce Sharia law.
- 
- 2003** Pakistan declares a Kashmir ceasefire, which is swiftly matched by India.
- 
- 2004** Mir Zafarullah Khan Jamali resigns from office.
- 
- 2004** Former Citibank executive and Finance Minister Shaukat Aziz is sworn in as Prime Minister.
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**2004, April** Parliament approves creation of military-led National Security Council, institutionalising role of armed forces in civilian affairs.

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## A2.5 2004 Pakistan attacks militants in the border areas

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**2004, June** Pakistan mounts military offensive against suspected al-Qaeda militants and their supporters near Afghan border after attacks on checkpoints, resulting in high casualties.

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**2004, May** Pakistan readmitted to Commonwealth.

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**2005, January** Tribal militants in Balochistan attack facilities at Pakistan's largest natural gas field, forcing closure of main plant.

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**2005, 07 April** The first bus service in 60 years, operates between Muzaffarabad in Pakistani-administered Kashmir and Srinagar in Indian-occupied Kashmir.

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**2004-2006** Army operations against militants in South Waziristan, one of seven tribal territories on the Pakistan-Afghan border, lead to the displacement of tens of thousands of people according to local media, but the Geneva-based Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) has warned that estimates of numbers vary enormously.

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**2005, August** Pakistan tests its first, nuclear-capable cruise missile.

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**2005, 08 October** Powerful earthquake with its epicenter in Pakistani-administered Kashmir and parts of the NWFP kills an estimated 80,000 people in northern Pakistan and leaves 3.5 million homeless.

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**2005, October** Cluster approach rolled out in Pakistan.

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**2005-2007** Clashes in Balochistan Province, southwestern Pakistan, between government forces and Baloch tribes seeking greater autonomy lead to at least 84,000 people, mostly from the Marri and Bugti tribes, being displaced in the districts of Dera Bugti and Kohlu, according to IDMC. Pakistan army kills the prominent Baloch leader Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti.

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**2006, January** Up to 18 people are killed in a US missile strike, apparently targeting senior al-Qaeda figures, in the Northwest.

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**2006, February** IA RTE of the cluster approach - Pakistan earthquake.

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**2006, July** NATO troops in Afghanistan take over the leadership of military operations in the South. Fierce fighting ensues as the forces try to extend government control in areas where Taliban influence is strong.

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**2006, October** NATO assumes responsibility for security across the whole of Afghanistan, taking command in the East from a US-led coalition force..

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**2006, October** Raid on an Islamic seminary in the tribal area of Bajaur bordering Afghanistan kills up to 80 people, sparking anti-government protests. The army says the Madrassa was a training camp for militants.

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**2006, December** Pakistan says it has successfully test-fired a short-range missile capable of carrying a nuclear warhead..

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**2007** Chief Justice of Pakistan removed from office and reinstated. Karachi Riots. Lal Masjid Operation is initiated.

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**2007** President Pervez Musharraf declares a "State of Emergency" and later removes it due to domestic and international pressure.

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<b>2007</b>	Pakistan and India sign an agreement aimed at reducing the risk of accidental nuclear war.
<b>2007, January</b>	Islamabad rejects an assertion by the head of US National Intelligence that al-Qaeda leaders are hiding out in Pakistan.
<b>2007, January to June</b>	Tension mounts between the Government and the radical Red Mosque in Islamabad.
<b>2007, March</b>	Pakistan says it has arrested Mullah Obaidullah Akhund, the third most senior member of the Taliban's leadership council. NATO and Afghan forces launch Operation Achilles, said to be their largest offensive to date against the Taliban in the South. There is heavy fighting in Helmand province.
<b>2007, March</b>	President Musharraf suspends the Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammed Chaudhry, triggering a wave of anger across the country.
<b>2007, May</b>	Afghan and Pakistani troops clash on the border in the worst violence in decades in a simmering border dispute.
<b>2007, June -July</b>	Floods triggered by Cyclone Yemyin hit coastal areas on 26 June, affecting 2.5 million people and displacing 300,000 in the southern provinces of Sindh and Balochistan.
<b>2007, September-October</b>	IA RTE of the Pakistan floods and cyclone Yemin.
<b>2007, October</b>	Nearly 200 people die in fighting with Islamic militants in North Waziristan, stronghold of pro-Taliban and al-Qaida groups. Fighting between government troops and militants around the town of Mirali, North Waziristan, creates about 80,000 IDPs. Many stay with relatives. A camp set up for IDPs in neighbouring Bannu District by the Government but it is not clear how many people use it.
<b>2007, 25 October</b>	Government forces start fighting Taliban militants in Swat Valley (NWFP). Some 400,000-600,000 people left the area between September 2007 and February 2008, according to media reports.
<b>2007, November</b>	Gen Musharraf declares emergency rule while still awaiting Supreme Court ruling on whether he was eligible to run for re-election. Chief Justice Chaudhry is dismissed. Benazir Bhutto is briefly placed under house arrest.
<b>2007, November</b>	Musharraf resigns from army post and is sworn in for second term as President.
<b>2007, 27 December</b>	Benazir Bhutto assassinated at election campaign rally in Rawalpindi.
<b>2008</b>	Pakistan People's Party (PPP) nominee Yusuf Raza Gilani becomes Prime Minister.
<b>2008, January</b>	Up to 90 fighters killed in clashes in the tribal region of South Waziristan, near the Afghan border, where militants have been openly challenging the army.
<b>2008</b>	IMF loan to Pakistan to overcome its spiralling debt crisis.
<b>2008, February</b>	Some IDPs return to Swat after a peace deal in early 2008, but renewed conflict by the end of the year leads to further displacements.
<b>2008, June</b>	President Karzai warns that Afghanistan will send troops into Pakistan to fight militants if Islamabad fails to take action against them.
<b>2008, July</b>	Suicide bomb attack on Indian embassy in Kabul kills more than 50. Afghan government accuses Pakistani intelligence of being behind this and other recent militant attacks. Pakistan denies any involvement.

<b>2008 September</b>	Asif Ali Zardari elected by legislators as Pakistan's new President.
<b>2008, September</b>	UN and humanitarian community launches the Pakistan Humanitarian Response Plan (PHRP) which appeals for \$55 million.
<b>2008, August</b>	Security operation launched in Bajaur.
<b>2008, August</b>	US Ambassador Anne W. Patterson requested USAID/OFDA assistance to address humanitarian needs resulting from civil conflict and displacement in Pakistan.
<b>2008, August</b>	Violence displaces or severely affects nearly 50 percent of Swat's 1.8 million residents, according to OCHA. Despite access constraints, on February 7, the UN begins operations to provide relief commodities for up to 12,000 people displaced by ongoing violence.
<b>2008, August</b>	Flash floods in NWFP and Punjab affecting 300, 000 people.

## A2.6 2008 PHRP launched

<b>2008, 07 September</b>	The Pakistan Humanitarian Response Plan is launched to cover the humanitarian needs of over 300,000 people affected by heavy monsoon rains and flash floods in the NWFP and Punjab Province, as well as an estimated 26,000 people displaced by fighting and inter-tribal violence in FATA and Swat District in NWFP. The appeal seeks \$55 million and is funded at 53% of requirements at the time of revision.
<b>2008, 20 September</b>	A suicide truck bomb destroyed Marriott Hotel Islamabad killing at least 54 people and injuring 266 others. An Islamist militant group claims responsibility.
<b>2008, October</b>	Limited trade begins for the first time in 60 years between Pakistani and Indian Administered Kashmir.
<b>2008, October</b>	IDPs from Bajaur amount to 123, 375.
<b>2008, 29 October</b>	Earthquake hits Balochistan Province affecting 68, 000 people in 7 districts.
<b>2008, November</b>	ICRC launches its Emergency Appeal for Pakistan 2009 for £13.5 million.
<b>2008, November</b>	Nearly 200 people are killed and hundreds injured in a series of co-ordinated attacks by gunmen on the main tourist and business area of India's financial capital Mumbai. India blames militants from Pakistan for the attacks and demands that Islamabad take strong action against those responsible. Islamabad denies any involvement but promises to co-operate with the Indian investigation.
<b>2008, December</b>	President Karzai and new Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari agree to form a joint strategy to fight militants operating in their border regions.
<b>2008, December</b>	In response to the Mumbai attacks, India announces "pause" in peace process with Pakistan. The Indian cricket team cancels planned tour of Pakistan.
<b>2009, January</b>	The UN and humanitarian community make the first revision to PHRP, the total appeal now stands at \$174 million.
<b>2009, 02 February</b>	UNHCR official John Solencki kidnapped in Balochistan.
<b>2009, February</b>	Taliban leaders in Swat Valley announce ceasefire after local government agrees to introduce Islamic Sharia law in the area.

<b>2009, 20-29 February</b>	High-level joint UN World Food Program (WFP)–Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) mission visits Pakistan to review the ongoing international response to displacement.
<b>2009, March</b>	President Barack Obama unveils a new US strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan to combat what he calls an increasingly perilous situation.
<b>2009, 05 March</b>	ICRC revises its Emergency Appeal to a total of £29.5 million.
<b>2009, 16 March</b>	As the result of long march of the Lawyers' Movement, Iftikhar Mohammed Chaudhry was restored as Chief Justice of Pakistan and other judges dismissed by Musharraf.
<b>2009, April</b>	US accuses Pakistan of "abdicating" to Taliban militants after Zardari approves imposition of Sharia law in Malakand division, Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, including Swat Valley. Taliban suspends talks with government. The Pakistani Army attacks militants in several districts in Malakand.
<b>2009, April</b>	Swat agreement breaks down after Taliban-linked militants seek to extend their power-base. Government of Pakistan launches offensive lasting months to wrest control of north-western districts from militants.
<b>2009, May</b>	NWFP government establishes Emergency Response Unit (ERU) to help the IDPs.

## A2.7 2009 The biggest displacement since partition

<b>2009, 18 May</b>	UNICEF states that this is the biggest displacement in the history of Pakistan since partition.
<b>2009, 22 May</b>	The UN and humanitarian community revises its PHRP in response to rapidly increasing needs. The appeal now stands at US \$543 million.
<b>2009, 22 May</b>	Security forces launch operation in South Waziristan Agency (SWA).
<b>2009, 22 May</b>	DFID announces a further £10 million of humanitarian funding.
<b>2009, 27 May</b>	The GoP reports the registration of approximately 2.7 million total IDPs in NWFP.
<b>2009, 30-31 May</b>	Pakistani Military declares victory over the Taliban in Mingora – the main town of Swat.
<b>2009, June</b>	Humanitarian agency staff enter Mingora to assess damage caused by the conflict. They describe the damage to civil infrastructure as significant.
<b>2009, 02 June</b>	The UN Emergency Relief Coordinator John Holmes delivers some key messages. These highlight the scale of the crisis, vulnerability of those affected and the need for life saving intervention. He says existing services are strained, response efforts need to be scaled up and resources mobilised. Holmes warns of the vulnerability of those still exposed to fighting and also emphasises that at all times IDPs should be consulted on decisions that affect them.
<b>2009, 03 June</b>	Humanitarian agencies working in the food sector warn of potential food supply problems approaching in July without more support from the international community.
<b>2009, 03 June</b>	110,000 displaced people from Swat valley are reportedly being sheltered in 2,100 schools – these schools will have to be vacated when the school term begins in August.

<b>2009, 04 June</b>	WHO and other health agencies warn that acute diarrhoea and malaria will be diseases of concern over the coming weeks – monitoring is ongoing.
<b>2009, 04 June</b>	ICRC revises its Emergency Appeal. It now totals £52 million.
<b>2009, 05 June</b>	A new Humanitarian Coordinator is appointed to oversee the relief effort in-country.
<b>2009, 05 June</b>	ICRC issues a revised appeal which now totals £54 million for its response to the IDP crisis.
<b>2009, 08 June</b>	The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) will facilitate the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) to assess the risk of unexploded ordnances.
<b>2009, 09 June</b>	Bomb blast destroys the Pearl Continental Hotel in Peshawar killing 11 persons and wounding 55.
<b>2009, 09 June</b>	2.2 million displaced persons will continue to require humanitarian assistance.
<b>2009, 10 June</b>	UN warns that a further half million people could be displaced if the Pakistani military broadens its offensive into Waziristan in north western Pakistan.
<b>2009, 17 June</b>	UN reports spontaneous return of IDPs taking place in Bajur and Buner.
<b>2009, 25 June</b>	NWFP Government establishes a Provincial Relief, Reconstruction, and Settlement Authority (PaRRSA) to plan and coordinate recovery efforts, including resettlement of IDPs and rehabilitation of infrastructure, in Buner, Swat, Shangla, and Upper and Lower Dir districts.
<b>2009, July</b>	US army launches a major offensive against the Taliban's heartland in Afghanistan's southern Helmand province.
<b>2009, July</b>	The Pakistani and Indian Prime Ministers pledge to work together to fight terrorism at a meeting in Egypt irrespective of progress on improving broader relations..
<b>2009, July</b>	The UN Emergency Relief Coordinator John Holmes visits Pakistan. He says that "more must be done to help host families".
<b>2009, 06 July</b>	Joint WHO/UNICEF mission reports that more health workers, particularly female doctors are needed.
<b>2009, 13 July</b>	Government of Pakistan starts its organised voluntary return plan for IDPs. Six phases planned to be completed over 19 days.
<b>2009, 13 July</b>	Inter-Cluster Diagnostic Mission to Pakistan Islamabad and Peshawar,.
<b>2009, 15 July</b>	Over 20,000 IDPs return to Swat and Buner as part of GoP Return Plan.
<b>2009, 16 July</b>	UNHCR staff member shot and killed in Kacha Garhi IDP camp outside of Peshawar.
<b>2009, 20 July</b>	Two IDP camps, Sheikh Yasin and Sheikh Shahzad close because of vulnerability to flooding due to monsoon.
<b>2009, 21 July</b>	412,000 IDPs return to their home in Southern Swat, Buner and Dir District in NWFP.
<b>2009, 23 July</b>	NWFP Department of Education sets an 15 <sup>th</sup> August deadline to vacate 208,000 IDPs living in 4,040 schools.
<b>2009, 29 July</b>	600,000 registered IDPs return to Swat and Buner district. 5 camps close. 1.5m remain displaced.

<b>2010, 05 August</b>	Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan's Chief Baitullah Masood killed in a US drone attack in South Waziristan.
<b>2009, 10 August</b>	140,000 newly displaced in Lower Dir and Buner district of NWFP as a result of military operations in Upper Dir. 3 new IDP camps established.
<b>2009, 11 August</b>	Conflict continues to displace individuals in north eastern areas of Buner District, NWFP.
<b>2009, 12 August</b>	80,000 registered displaced people from South Waziristan being hosted in DI Khan and Tank Districts. First food distribution in DI Khan.
<b>2009, 16 August</b>	Flash floods from heavy rain fall cause 14 deaths and destroy 900 houses in Mardan and Swabi Districts of NWFP.
<b>2009, 17 August</b>	GoP figures show that 1.6 million IDPs have returned to their areas of origin so far.
<b>2009, 18 August</b>	Humanitarian agencies establish three additional IDP camps in Lower Dir District to accommodate the newly displaced individuals from Upper Dir District, NWFP.
<b>2009, 25 August</b>	ERU disbanded and responsibilities transferred to PDMA/PaRRSA.
<b>2009, August</b>	OCHA releases the results of assessments conducted in areas affected by mid-August flash floods in Mardan and Swabi districts, NWFP. Assessments find that recent flooding affected 84,290 individuals.
<b>2009, 28 August</b>	UN Secretary General appoints Ambassador Jean-Maurice Ripert as the Special Envoy for Assistance to Pakistan.
<b>2009, September</b>	Security forces launch operation in Khyber Agency displacing 10, 000 families.
<b>2009, 15 September</b>	Approximately 69 percent of GoP National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA)-registered individuals returned to areas of origin.
<b>2009, 22 September</b>	The National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA) registered and verified nearly 383,000 internally displaced families in Pakistan, including more than 264,000 families that have returned to areas of origin in NWFP and the FATA.
<b>2009, 05 October</b>	Suicide attack at WFP office in Islamabad claims the lives of 5 UN Staff.
<b>2009, 09 October</b>	U.S. Ambassador Anne W. Patterson declared a disaster due to continued humanitarian needs resulting from civil conflict and displacement in Pakistan.
<b>2009, October</b>	New Taliban leader Hakimullah Mehsud pledges revenge for the drone attack that killed Baitullah Mehsud. Suicide bombing in north western city of Peshawar kills 120 people.
<b>2009, 10 October</b>	Attack on Army General Headquarters in Rawalpindi.
<b>2009, 17 October</b>	Security forces launched attack in South Waziristan Agency-(SWA).
<b>2009, 21 October</b>	About 18, 142 families displaced from SWA to D.I. Khan and Tank Districts.
<b>2009, 21 October</b>	The UN World Food Program (WFP) temporarily closed humanitarian hubs in NWFP.
<b>2009, 22 October</b>	WFP reopened the majority of the hubs following the completion of various security-related adjustments designed to mitigate congestion and potential security risks.



<b>2009, 25 October</b>	UN Special Envoy Jean-Maurice Ripert arrives in Pakistan. According to the U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Ripert's overall mandate includes a review of UN operations and systems, coordination, dialogue, and focusing on long-term issues.
<b>2009, 02 November</b>	The UN announced a Security Level Four designation for Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) and Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). According to UN representatives, at Level Four the UN will only conduct emergency operations, which include humanitarian operations, and will limit the presence of international staff to those vital for emergency, humanitarian relief, or security activities.
<b>2009, December</b>	In Fiscal Year 2009, the US Government (USG) has provided more than \$279 million in humanitarian assistance for flood, earthquake, and conflict-affected populations in Pakistan.
<b>2009</b>	President Asif Ali Zardari hands control of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal to Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani, in apparent attempt to ease political pressure.
<b>2010, 09 February</b>	The UN launches an appeal for \$537 million -PHRP 2010 - to meet immediate humanitarian needs of the vulnerable and affected people of militancy-hit areas of Pakistan.
<b>2010, April</b>	More than two months into the appeal, with dwindling international attention to the ongoing displacement in Pakistan, the response is again too little, too slow.
<b>2010, April</b>	NWFP renamed as Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa.
<b>2010, 28 April</b>	Inter Cluster support mission to Pakistan is deployed.
<b>2009/2010 to date</b>	USAID/OFDA has provided more than \$103.5 million in humanitarian assistance to conflict-affected populations in Pakistan for agriculture and food security, economic recovery and market systems, health, emergency relief supplies, nutrition, shelter, and water, sanitation and hygiene programs.
<b>2009, October to date</b>	Vulnerable individuals that have returned to areas of origin, families unable to return, host families, and individuals in conflict-affected areas continued to require humanitarian assistance.
<b>2010, 04 January</b>	Landslides in Hunza Nagar District in Pakistan's Federally Administered Northern Areas (FANA) kills at least 13 people and displaces approximately 1,900 others, according to the U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA).
<b>2010, 09 February</b>	PHRP 2010 launched after GoP approval is finally received.
<b>2010, March</b>	GoP announces a decision to close four displaced person camps in Lower Dir District, NWFP, by March 15 <sup>th</sup> in order to facilitate returns and resettlement.
<b>2010, March</b>	Militants attacked the office of INGO World Vision in Oghi town, Mansehra District, NWFP, killing six staff members and injuring seven others.
<b>2010, March</b>	Bombing in Mingora, the capital of Swat District, NWFP, resulting in the deaths of three staff members from the local NGO Lasoona.
<b>2010, 10 March</b>	A UN Assessment of 3 districts of northern Swat shows that 90% of the 450, 000 IDPs from April 2009 have returned.
<b>2010, 05 April</b>	Militants bomb the US Consulate in Peshawar killing two security guards.

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<b>2010, 07 April</b>	OCHA announces the opening of new camp in Hangu to house 100 families.
<b>2010, May</b>	According to OCHA, international donors have provided nearly \$141 million towards the 2010 PHRP launched in February.
<b>2010, May</b>	Donor funding to date represents 26 percent of the \$537 million requested through the PHRP.
<b>2010, May</b>	\$100 million pledged by the Government of Saudi Arabia. This commitment would increase the PHRP funded percentage to more than 50 percent.
<b>2010, May</b>	There are now more than 200,000 IDPs in Hangu and Kohat.
<b>2010, May</b>	About 300,000 people remain displaced in the districts of Dera Ismail Khan and Tank.
<b>2010, May</b>	Nearly half a million people remain displaced in the Peshawar Valley.
<b>2010, 26 May</b>	Field work for the IA RTE of the humanitarian response to the 2009 displacement starts.

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## Appendix 3 Methodology

### A3.1 The evaluators

#### A3.1.1 JOHN COSGRAVE

John Cosgrave (Ireland) is an independent evaluator. He has more than 30 years of experience in humanitarian action and development in nearly 60 countries. His initial academic training was in engineering, and he holds three masters degrees (in engineering, management, and social science).

After two decades of managing projects and programmes for NGOs in the aftermath of natural disasters and complex political emergencies, John became a freelance consultant specialising in the evaluation of humanitarian action in 1997. Since then, John has led many evaluations, mostly of humanitarian action, including several real-time evaluations, for a wide variety of clients including donors, NGOs, and the UN.

John combines training with evaluation and brings examples from evaluation practice into his training, including for ALNAP and the IPDET. John's recently rewrote the ALNAP pilot guide for Real-Time Evaluation.

#### A3.1.2 RICCARDO POLASTRO

Riccardo Polastro (Italy) is Head of Evaluation at DARA. He has 17 years of experience in humanitarian affairs and development aid in 55 countries for the International Movement of the Red Cross, the United Nations, NGOs and donor agencies.

Since 2001, he has carried out policy and operational evaluations for the DG ECHO, EC, IASC, ICRC, OCHA, UNICEF, SIDA and other organizations. He previously conducted two I A RTEs.

Riccardo lectures in several university MA programs and provides professional training on evaluation and development-related topics. He holds an MPhil in Peace and Security, an MA in International Relations, and a Maîtrise of the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, Paris.

#### A3.1.3 FARWA ZAFAR

Ms. Farwa Zafar (Pakistan) works as a political and development specialist having served in a broad range of academic, management and advisory positions in Pakistan and overseas related to political, humanitarian, and development issues. She has long standing experience in monitoring and evaluation of development interventions on issues spanning governance, social sector development, and gender having worked with international development organisations including UNDP, the World Bank, UNDP, UNESCO, DFID, USAID, JICA and the EU; and national NGOs and research/academic institutions in Pakistan and abroad.

She has prepared numerous evaluation reports, project proposals, policy research papers, and has participated and spoken at national and international conferences, seminars and workshops. Much of her work is focused on promoting democratic culture and robust political growth. Ms. Zafar received her training in politics and international affairs at the School of International and Public Affairs, SIPA, Columbia University, New York and Punjab University, Lahore.

## A3.2 Methods

The Evaluation team used mixed method for the evaluation. The findings of the evaluation are based on:

- Document research of documents describing the humanitarian situation in Pakistan. A list of the main references used can be found in Appendix 8.
- Key informant interviews. These were probably the most important sources of information for the evaluation as they allowed the team to capture learning from interviewees, many of whom have been present since the large-scale displacement in 2009. Appendix 6 contains the question guides used for the interviews, and Appendix 4.1 contains details of the individuals met.
- Group interviews with the affected population. Appendix 6 contains the questions that were asked of beneficiary groups and the meetings numbers are summarised in Appendix 4.2
- Direct Observation. The team had the opportunity to observe distributions in the field, visit two IDP camps, and meet with host families and hosted IDPs. The team also had the opportunity to observe the processes at two HCT meetings in Islamabad. The team used an evidence table to build up a strong chain of evidence for the findings, conclusions, and recommendations (Figure 11: A chain of evidence).




Figure 11: A chain of evidence

The team built their chain of evidence by dividing the five evaluation criteria of Connectedness, Consistency, Effectiveness, Relevance, and Timeliness into 23 subtopics. The team then recorded evidence under each of these topics. The evidence consisted in anything from a sentence to a short paragraph or two.

Table 2: Summary of Evidence Table

<b>Criteria</b>	<b>Topic</b>	<b>Pieces of Evidence</b>	<b>Number or Words</b>
<b>Connectedness</b>	Changes between 2009 and 2010	57	1,384
	Connectedness/ LRRD	64	1,479
	Early recovery constraints	41	774
<b>Consistency</b>	Attention to gender issues	26	592
	Relations with the Government	53	1,214
	General learning for the future	61	1,140
	Relations with the military	35	688
	Monitoring systems	23	482
	Neutrality, Impartiality, and Independence	92	2,132
	Reviews and evaluations	7	100
<b>Effectiveness</b>	Achievements	81	1,302
	Funding and resourcing	91	2,129
	Coordination	144	2,952
	Access constraints	32	721
	Learning based changes	22	549
	Security constraints	56	1,055
<b>Relevance</b>	Needs assessments undertaken	43	663
	Camps/ Host/ Other	58	1,248
	Consultation of affected population	12	202
	Gaps between Needs and Assistance	109	2,161
	Targeting (including distribution lists and registration criteria)	82	1,948
<b>Timeliness</b>	Bureaucratic constraints	38	955
	Delays in response	18	456
<b>Total</b>		1,245	26,326

## Appendix 4 Individuals met

### A4.1 Individual and small group meetings

#### A4.1.1 SUMMARY OF INTERVIEWEES

<b>Category of person interviewed</b>	<b>Cat</b>	<b>No</b>	<b>as %</b>	<b>♀</b>	<b>♀ as %</b>
<i>OCHA Staff</i>	<i>O</i>	5	3%	1	20%
<i>Other UN Staff</i>	<i>U</i>	38	27%	13	34%
<i>NGOs and Red Cross</i>	<i>N</i>	66	46%	15	23%
<i>Government Officials</i>	<i>G</i>	17	12%	3	18%
<i>Donors</i>	<i>D</i>	13	9%	4	31%
<i>Military</i>	<i>M</i>	3	2%	0	
<i>Other</i>	<i>T</i>	1	1%	0	
Total		143	100%	36	25%

#### A4.1.2 SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW METHODS

<b>Type of interview method</b>	<b>Type</b>	<b>No</b>	<b>as %</b>	<b>of which ♀</b>	<b>♀ as %</b>
<i>General meeting</i>	<i>gm</i>	46	32%	8	17%
<i>Semi-structured Interview (Individual interviewee)</i>	<i>ssi</i>	22	15%	3	14%
<i>Semi-structured Interview (Group - two or more interviewees)</i>	<i>ssg</i>	62	43%	21	34%
<i>Brief Discussion (less than ten minutes on one or more topics)</i>	<i>bd</i>	3	2%	2	67%
<i>Detailed discussion (more than ten minutes on one or more topics)</i>	<i>dd</i>	10	7%	2	20%
<i>Telephone interview</i>	<i>ti</i>	0	0%	0	
<i>Other</i>	<i>ot</i>	0	0%	0	
Total		143	100%	36	25%

#### A4.1.3 INDIVIDUALS MET

<b>Surname, Forenames</b>	<b>Org. and function</b>	<b>♂♀</b>	<b>Method</b>	<b>Cat</b>	<b>Place</b>
Abbas, S. Shahbaz	Programme Officer, SPO	♂	gm	N	Islamabad
Afridi, Samin Ullah	OCHA, Humanitarian Affairs Officer, Field Coordination Unit	♂	dd	O	Swat
Ahmad, Ashfaq	Field Programme Manager, SCF, Focal Person Education	♂	ssg	N	Mingora, Swat
Ahmad, Hafiz Rasheed	Senator, Senate of Pakistan and Chairman Standing Committee on States and frontier Regions	♂	ssi	T	Islamabad
Ahmad, Maria	IOM, Strategic Mass Communication team Leader	♂	bd	U	Islamabad
Ahmed Bashir	Field Officer, UNHCR, Peshawar	♂	ssg	U	Peshawar
Ahmed Saleem	Programme Officer, Hujrah	♂	gm	N	Islamabad
Ahmed, Masroor	Environmental Protection Society, Project Manager	♂	gm	N	Mingora
Ahmed, Masroor	Environmental Protection Society, Project Manager	♂	gm	N	Islamabad

<i>Surname, Forenames</i>	<i>Org. and function</i>	<i>♂♀</i>	<i>Method</i>	<i>Cat</i>	<i>Place</i>
Ahmed, Myra	Monitoring and Evaluation Officer, CPRU, UNDP	♀	ssg	U	Islamabad
Akbar, Noor	Administrator, Jallozai Camp	♂	ssi	G	Jallozai, Mardan
Akbar, Nosheen	Programme Officer; GTF	♀	ssg	N	Islamabad
Akhtar, Javaid	SPADO, Project Coordinator	♂	ssi	N	Islampur, Swat
Akhtar, Javed	Programme Officer, SWWS	♂	gm	N	Islamabad
Akram, Abia	Disability Advisor; GTF	♀	ssg	N	Islamabad
Ali, Rubuina	NCA, GTF	♀	ssg	N	Islamabad
Amad, Muhammad	Programme Manager, IDEA	♂	gm	N	Islamabad
Aquino, Edward	World Visoin Pakistan, Finance Director	♂	ssg	N	Islamabad
Asfandyar, Muhammad	Programme Officer, Paiman Alumni Trust	♂	gm	N	Islamabad
Asif, Muhammad	EAD, Joint Secretary	♂	dd	G	Islamabad
Awan, Asif Taj	Team Leader, NRC; GTF	♂	ssg	N	Islamabad
Baloch Noor	Programme Officer, SPO	♀	gm	N	Islamabad
Bashir, Tahir, Major	Asst to OIC, Civil Military Liaison Cell, Army Headquarters, Malakand	♂	ssi	M	Mingora, Swat
Batool, Hina	Programme Officer, Paiman Alumni Trust	♀	gm	N	Islamabad
Bebe, Phool	LHV, Hangu Camp	♀	gm	G	Hangu Camp
Bennett, Nicki	OCHA, Senior Humanitarian Affaris Officer	♀	dd	O	Islamabad
Benzeghiba, Salha	Counselor on Multilateral Affairs ICRC	♀	ssg	N	Islamabad
Bessler, Manuel	OCHA, Head	♂	dd	O	Islamabad
Blane, Dorothy	Concern, Country Director	♀	gm	N	Islamabad
Bokhary, Kanwal	National Programme Officer, SDC	♀	ssg	D	Islamabad
Brady, Caitlin	IRC, Country Director	♀	gm	N	Islamabad
Bajracharya, Deepak	Chief Field Operation UNICEF	♂	ssg	U	Islamabad
Dilber, Shazia	CCPC, SPADO CHILD Protection Facilitator	♀	ssg	N	Islampur, Swat
Dr. Sathar	Incharge, BHU run by Merlin, Jallozai Camp	♂	ssi	N	Jallozai, Mardan
Dunne, Cecil	Trocaire	♂	gm	N	Islamabad
Durrani, Siraj	Field Monitor, WFP	♂	gm	U	Kohat
Elmigdah, Abdullah	Head of Programme, WFP	♂	ssi	U	Islamabad
Faisal, Haroon	Programme Officer, Veer	♂	gm	N	Islamabad
Faite, Alexandre	Deputy Head of Delegation ICRC	♂	ssg	N	Islamabad
Fakhr-e-Alam	Relief International, Swat, Coordinator	♂	gm	N	Mingora
Fida, Saima	Social Mobilizer, Sabaoon	♀	bd	N	Kohat
Frankefort, Dominique	WFP, Deputy Country Director	♂	ssi	U	Islamabd
Ghafoor, Muniba	Programme Officer, ABKT	♀	gm	N	Islamabad
Ghakkhar, Razaqat,	Relief Coordinator,PDMA	♂	ssg	G	Peshawar
Ghulam, Lutfia	Social Mobilizer, Sabaoon	♀	bd	N	Kohat
Gul, Hazar	Manager Operation, Caravan, Focal Person Agriculture	♂	ssg	N	Mingora, Swat
Gulmanuddin	CCPC, SPADO, Child Protection Monitor	♂	ssg	N	Islampur, Swat
Hafaz, Osman	M& E Officer, WHO	♂	ssg	U	Islamabad
Hanazana, Toruki	First Secretary, Emabssy of Japan	♀	ssg	D	Islamabad
Hanif, Saba	UN Habitat; GTF	♀	ssg	U	Islamabad

<i>Surname, Forenames</i>	<i>Org. and function</i>	<i>♂♀</i>	<i>Method</i>	<i>Cat</i>	<i>Place</i>
Hashim, Samia, Dr.	Senior Programme Officer, UNAIDS; GTF	♀	ssg	U	Islamabad
Hashmey, Hira	UNDP; GTF	♀	ssg	U	Islamabad
Hassan, Ahmea	Quatar Charity, Swat, Admin/Logistics Officer	♂	gm	N	Mingora
Hassenfeldt, Tammp	IRC, Country Director	♀	gm	N	Islamabad
Hayat Tashfeen, Neuinat	ACTED, Regional Coordinator	♂	gm	N	Mingora
Hayat, Amir	CCPC, SPADO, Child Protection Facilitator	♂	ssg	N	Islampur, Swat
Hayat, Shaukat	Team Leader, UN Habitat Swat, Focal person shelter cluster	♂	ssg	N	Mingora, Swat
Hayet, Shaukort	UN Habitat Swat, Team Leader	♂	gm	U	Mingora
Herbinger, Wolfgang	WFP, Country Director-Humanitarian Coordinator a.i.;	♂	gm	U	Islamabad
Hrasnica, Lejla	Programme Officer, UNHCR, Peshawar	♀	ssg	U	Peshawar
Hussain, Fawad	OCHA, Humanitarian Affaris Officer, National	♂	dd	O	Islamabad
Iftikhar, Amjad	EAD, Director	♂	dd	G	Islamabad
Imran, Sajjad	IRD	♂	gm	N	Islamabad
Jadoon, Tassadaq Hussain	EAD, Asst Chief UN	♂	dd	G	Islamabad
Kamal, Umair, Dr.	Public Health Officer, WHO, Focal Person Health	♂	ssg	U	Mingora, Swat
Kelly, Brian	Head of Emergency and Stabilization Programming, IOM	♂	ssg	U	Islamabad
Khan, Aftab, Colonel	Officer in Charge, Civil Military Liaison Cel, AREmy Headquarters, Malakand	♂	ssi	M	Mingora, Swat
Khan, Ajmal	CCPC, SPADO, Team Leader	♂	ssg	N	Islampur, Swat
Khan, Anika	Donor Coordination Officer, PDMA	♀	ssg	G	Peshawar
Khan, Azam	Lasoon, Executive Director	♂	gm	N	Mingora
Khan, Azmat	Field officer, Sabaoon	♂	gm	N	Kohat
Khan, Azmat	Programme Officer, Sabawon	♂	gm	N	Islamabad
Khan, Fahad	CRS, Programme Manager	♂	gm	N	Mingora
Khan, Ghenghis	Field Assistant Southern District IDPs, UNHCR Peshawar	♂	ssg	U	Peshawar
Khan, Humayun	Deputy Secretary, FDMA	♂	ssg	G	Peshawar
Khan, Muhammad Fawad, Dr.	Focal Person For IDPs, WHO	♂	ssg	U	Islamabad
Khan, Nawab	Tehsildar, Hangu Camp	♂	ssg	G	Hangu Camp
Khan, Shakeel	SRSP, Swat, Monitoring and Evaluation Officer	♂	gm	N	Mingora
Khan, Shakeel Qadir	Relief Coordinator,PDMA	♂	ssg	G	Peshawar
Khan, Tajbar	Programme Officer, Kamore	♂	gm	N	Islamabad
Khan, Wajid	Logistics Officer, SRSP	♂	gm	N	Kohat
Khan, Zahir Shah	Programme Officer, WFP	♂	ssi	U	Peshawar
Khattak, Rabia	Assistant Country Director, UNDP	♀	ssg	U	Islamabad
Khattalk, Zahid.N, Dr.	UN Habitat; GTF	♂	ssg	U	Islamabad
Kleinschmidt, Kilian	Deputy to the Special Envoy of the UN Secretary General	♂	ssg	U	Islamabad
Kloeg, Mary-Honor	Netherlands Embassy, First Secretary	♀	ssi	D	Islamabad
Knight, Rosemary	DFID, Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs Advisor	♂	ssg	D	Islamabad
Lahai, Victor	OCHA, Humanitarian Affaris Officer	♂	dd	O	Islamabad
Lauer, Katharina I.	USAID/OFDA, Senior Humanitarian Advisor	♀	ssi	D	Islamabad



<i>Surname, Forenames</i>	<i>Org. and function</i>	<i>♂♀</i>	<i>Method</i>	<i>Cat</i>	<i>Place</i>
Magan, Ahmed	Environment Health Coordinator, WHO	♂	ssg	U	Islamabd
Mahmood, Ejaz	Field officer, Sabaoon	♂	gm	N	Kohat
Malik, Jahan-ul-Mulk	Focal person Protection cluster	♂	ssg	N	Mingora, Swat
Marchand, Blaine	First Secretary Development, Canadian High Commission	♂	ssi	D	Islamabad
Marie-Fanon, Samuel	Rapid Response Coordinator, Regional Support Office South Asia, ECHO	♂	ssg	D	Islamabad
Maskun, Izora Mutya	Emergency Officer, IOM	♀	ssg	U	Islamabad
Matsumoto, Takashi	Economic Asvisor, Embassy of Japan	♂	ssg	D	Islamabad
Mehsud, Javed	Sub Divisional Magistrate	♂	ssi	G	Matta, Upper Swat
Miller, Ian James	UN DSS, Deputy Security Advisor	♂	dd	U	Islamabad
Moghaddam, Siamak	Country Programme Manager, UN Habitat	♂	ssi	U	Islamabad
Mogwanja, Martin	Representative, UNICEF & Humanitarian Coordinator	♂	ssi	U	Islamabad
Mohd, Gul	Logistics Officer, WFP	♂	gm	U	Kohat
Mohmand, Saleem Khan	Director General, FDMA	♂	ssg	G	Peshawar
Morikawa, Maki	Expert Regional Development, International Development Associates Ltd	♂	ssg	D	Islamabad
Morosin, Ernesto	Assistant Country Director, SDC	♂	ssg	D	Islamabad
Mungur, Arvind	DFID, Programme Manager	♂	ssg	D	Islamabad
Nasir, Awais	Monitoring and Evaluation Manager, PDMA	♂	ssg	G	Peshawar
Hayat, Omar M	Chief of Staff, SSG (Brigadier)	♂	ssi	M	Peshawar
Omarzai, Khalid Khan	Commissioner, Kohat	♂	ssi	G	Kohat
Paquet, Andre	Deputy Head of Delegation ICRC	♂	ssg	N	Islamabad
Pirkko Heinonen	Acting Deputy Director UNICEF	♀	ssg	U	Islamabad
Qureshi, Imran, Flt. Lft	Asst District Coordinator, District Coordination Office	♂	ssi	G	Mingora, Swat
Raaijmakers, Hendrikus, Dr.	Emergency Coordinator, WHO	♂	ssg	U	Islamabad
Rafie, Dr.	Merlin International, Swat, Programme Medical Officer	♂	gm	N	Mingora
Rahman, Atif	District Coordination Officer, District Coordination Office	♂	ssi	G	Mingora, Swat
Rantiou, Fotini	Advisor, Office of the Special Envoy of the UN Secretary General	♀	ssg	U	Islamabad
Riaz, Mohammad	Focal point WASH Cluster, Mercy Corps	♂	ssg	N	Mingora, Swat
Riaz, Muhammad	GTF	♂	ssg	N	Islamabad
Riaz, Murtaza	Monitoring Officer, CRDO	♂	gm	N	Kohat
Saadi, Fida	Head, Al-Khidmat Organisation	♂	ssi	N	Hangu
Saadi, Hassem	Save the Children, Team Leader	♂	gm	N	Islamabad
Sadiq, M.Awais	Field officer, Veer	♂	gm	N	Islamabad
Selleri, Anna Maria	Country Representative, UN Habitat	♀	ssi	U	Islamabad
Sevcik, David	Head of Office, ECHO	♂	ssg	D	Islamabad
Shackelford, Alice harding	Country Programme Director, UNIFEM, & Head Gender Task Force (GTF)	♀	ssg	U	Islamabad
Shah, Mubarak	Hub Coordinator, CRDO	♂	gm	N	Kohat
Shah, Anila	EAD, Coordination Officer	♀	dd	G	Islamabad
Shah, Zahir	Programme Coordinator, SKS	♂	gm	N	Islamabad

<i>Surname, Forenames</i>	<i>Org. and function</i>	<i>♂♀</i>	<i>Method</i>	<i>Cat</i>	<i>Place</i>
Shahzad, Asher	UNHCR; GTF	♂	ssg	U	Islamabad
Shaikh, Humaria Mumtaz	Programme Officer, Shirkat Gah	♀	gm	N	Islamabad
Sherazi, Asif Ali	Qatar Charity	♀	gm	N	Islamabad
Swahi, Abida	Programme Officer, Sungi	♀	gm	N	Islamabad
Syed, Azra Hussain	GTF	♀	ssg	N	Islamabad
Tajik, Lubna	Programme Officer, UNFPA; GTF	♀	ssg	U	Islamabad
ul Hassan, Saeed	IDEA, Porject Engineer	♂	gm	N	Mingora
ul-Haq, Anwar	Lasooana, Manager	♂	ssg	N	Islampur, Swat
Ullah, Ikram	WFP Swat, Food Monitorin Assistant	♂	gm	N	Mingora
Ullah, Najeeb	IDEA, Porject Manager	♂	gm	N	Mingora
Ullah, Sharif	Team Leader, SRSP	♂	gm	N	Kohat
Ur-Rahman, Aziz	Programme Officer, UNIFEM; GTF	♂	ssg	U	Islamabad
ur-Rehman, Shams	Programme Coordinator, PEACE	♂	gm	N	Islamabad
Wajid, Sohail	DFID, Deputy Programme Manager, Governance and Growth Group	♂	ssg	D	Islamabad
Warsame, Ahed	Head of UNHCR Sub-Office, Peshawar	♂	ssi	U	Islamabad
Watanabe, Hiroko	Project Formulation Advisor, JICA	♂	ssg	D	Islamabad
Zada, Anwar	Community Development Officer, SRSP	♂	gm	N	Kohat

## A4.2 Group meetings

### A4.2.1 SUMMARY OF GROUP MEETINGS

<i>Group meeting Summary</i>	<i>♂+♀</i>	<i>♀</i>	<i>♂</i>	<i>No of meetings</i>	<i>♀ as %</i>
<i>Individuals in Group Meetings</i>	821	260	558	23	32%

### A4.2.2 GROUP MEETINGS BY LOCATION AND MEMBERSHIP

<b>Location</b>	<b>Female participants</b>				<b>Male participants</b>				<b>Overall Total</b>
	Camp IDPs	Hosted IDPs and Hosts	Returnees and stayees	Total Females	Camp IDPs	Hosted IDPs and Hosts	Returnees and stayees	Total Males	
<i>Hangu Camp</i>	30			30	200			200	230
<i>Islampur, Swat</i>			91	91			12	12	103
<i>Jallozai Camp</i>	50			50	60			60	110
<i>Jarma DC, Kohat</i>		25		25		18		18	43
<i>Jarma DC, UC, Kohat</i>		0		0		100		100	100
<i>Landikas, Swat</i>			7	7			0	0	7
<i>Matta, Swat</i>			0	0			8	8	8
<i>Mulla Baba, Swat</i>			30	30			0	0	30
<i>Tangu Band, Swat</i>			0	0			50	50	50
<i>Zarra mailla, Kohat</i>		30		30		60		60	90
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>55</b>	<b>128</b>	<b>263</b>	<b>260</b>	<b>178</b>	<b>120</b>	<b>558</b>	<b>821</b>

## Appendix 5 Consultants' Itinerary

<b>Date</b>	<b>John Cosgrave</b>	<b>Riccardo Polastro</b>	<b>Farwa Zafar</b>
<b>Tue 25 May</b>	Depart Cork.		
<b>Wed 26 May</b>	En Route.	Depart Madrid.	Background reading.
<b>Thu 27 May</b>	Arrive Islamabad. Team meeting. Preparation of evaluation question lists and tools. Initial briefing with OCHA on programme.	Arrive Islamabad. Team meeting. Preparation of evaluation question lists and tools. Initial briefing with OCHA on programme.	Arrive Islamabad. Team meeting. Background reading. Initial briefing with OCHA on programme.
<b>Fri 28 May</b>	Meeting/Briefing with HCT at UN House. Meeting with EAD team at Govt Secretariat. Briefing with OCHA-National HAO on overall response /related issues. Detailed Meeting with Head OCHA at UN House. Work on draft report .	Meeting/Briefing with HCT at UN House. Meeting with EAD team at Govt Secretariat. Briefing with OCHA-National HAO on overall response /related issues. Detailed Meeting with Head OCHA at UN House. Work on draft report .	Meeting/Briefing with HCT at UN House. Meeting with EAD team at Govt Secretariat. Briefing with OCHA-National HAO on overall response /related issues. Detailed Meeting with Head OCHA at UN House. Work on draft report .
<b>Sat 29 May</b>	Security Briefing with UN Deputy Security Advisor at UN House. Meeting with Hum Affairs Advisor. Preparation for travel to Swat and Peshawar and update data for report.	Security Briefing with UN Deputy Security Advisor at UN House. Meeting with Hum Affairs Advisor. Preparation for travel to Swat and Peshawar and update data for report.	Security Briefing with UN Deputy Security Advisor at UN House. Meeting with Hum Affairs Advisor. Preparation for travel to Swat and Peshawar and update data for report.
<b>Sun 30 May</b>	Depart for Field visit to Swat/Peshawar. Arrive at Serena Hotel, Swat. Conduct field Visit to Islampur, meet with local NGOs and community. Hold focus group discussions with children at child protection centres run by NGOs.	Depart for Field visit to Swat/Peshawar. Arrive at Serena Hotel, Swat. Conduct field Visit to Islampur, meet with local NGOs and community. Hold focus group discussions with children at child protection centres run by NGOs.	Depart for Field visit to Swat/Peshawar. Arrive at Serena Hotel, Swat. Conduct field Visit to Islampur, meet with local NGOs and community. Hold focus group discussions with children at child protection centres run by NGOs.
<b>Mon 31 May</b>	Meetings with Officer in charge Civil Military Liaison Cell; District Coordination Officer; Six Cluster Humanitarian Focal Persons; Meetings with I/NGOs, MSF, ICRC	Meetings with Officer in charge Civil Military Liaison Cell; District Coordination Officer; Six Cluster Humanitarian Focal Persons; Meetings with male IDPs in Mingora.	Meetings with Officer in charge Civil Military Liaison Cell; District Coordination Officer; Six Cluster Humanitarian Focal Persons; Meeting with female IDPs in Mingora.
<b>Tue 01 Jun</b>	Meetings in Matta Swat with Sub-Divisional Magistrate; and Field visit in upper Swat and Community meetings. Visit to Jalozai Camp on way to Peshawar. Collation of evidence for report.	Meetings in Matta Swat with Sub-Divisional Magistrate; and Field visit in upper Swat and Community meetings. Visit to Jalozai Camp on way to Peshawar. Collation of evidence for report.	Meetings in Matta Swat with Sub-Divisional Magistrate; and Community meetings. Visit to Jalozai Camp on way to Peshawar. Collation of Evidence for Report.

<b>Date</b>	<b>John Cosgrave</b>	<b>Riccardo Polastro</b>	<b>Farwa Zafar</b>
<b>Wed 02 Jun</b>	Meetings with military officials at SSG office; Provincial Government officials -PDMA/PaRRSA /FDMA. Discussion with UNHCR officials. Evidence analysis for Report. Travel to Islamabad.	Meetings with military officials at SSG office; Provincial Government officials -PDMA/PaRRSA /FDMA. Discussion with UNHCR officials. Evidence analysis for Report. Travel to Islamabad.	Meetings with military officials at SSG office; Provincial Government officials -PDMA/PaRRSA /FDMA. Discussion with UNHCR officials. Evidence analysis for Report. Travel to Islamabad.
<b>Thu 03 Jun</b>	Travel to Kohat and visit IDP Distribution and Registration Hubs and hold community meetings with IDPs and Implementing Partners (IPs).	Travel to Kohat and visit IDP Distribution and Registration Hubs and hold community meetings with IDPs and IPs.	Travel to Kohat and visit IDP Distribution and Registration Hubs and hold community meetings with IDPs and IPs.
<b>Fri 04 Jun</b>	Travel to Hangu and hold meeting with local NGO working for IDP s and IDP Camp and hold meeting with camp officials and NGOs providing services at camp and IDPs living at camps. Travel back to Islamabad.	Travel to Hangu and hold meeting with local NGO working for IDP s and IDP Camp and hold meeting with camp officials and NGOs providing services at camp and IDPs living at camps. Travel back to Islamabad.	Travel to Hangu and hold meeting with local NGO working for IDP s and IDP Camp and hold meeting with camp officials and NGOs providing services at camp and IDPs living at camps. Travel back to Islamabad.
<b>Sat 05 Jun</b>	Meeting with IOM officials and report writing.	Meeting with IOM officials and report writing.	Meeting with IOM officials and report writing.
<b>Sun 06 Jun</b>	Report Writing.	Report Writing.	Report Writing.
<b>Mon 07 Jun</b>	Meetings with UN Agencies and HC along with report writing.	Meetings with UN Agencies and HC along with report writing.	Meetings with UN Agencies and HC along with report writing.
<b>Tue 08 Jun</b>	Meetings with UN Agencies, ECHO and ICRC and report writing.	Meetings with UN Agencies, ECHO and ICRC and report writing.	Meetings with UN Agencies, ECHO and ICRC and report writing.
<b>Wed 09 Jun</b>	Meeting with PHF, writing up notes.	Meetings with PHF, and Embassies of Switzerland, Japan, and Canada.	Meetings with Embassies of Switzerland, Japan, and Canada.
<b>Thu 10 Jun</b>	Meeting with OFDA, DFID, NGOs. Finalisation of presentation.	Meeting with OFDA, DFID, NGOs. Finalisation of presentation.	Meeting with OFDA, DFID, NGOs. Input to finalisation of presentation.
<b>Fri 11 Jun</b>	Debriefing with the HCT. Presentation of findings recommendations.	Debriefing with the HCT. Presentation of findings recommendations.	Debriefing with the HCT. Presentation of findings recommendations.
<b>Sat 12 Jun</b>	Depart Islamabad.	Depart Islamabad.	

## Appendix 6 The Interview Guides

The team developed the following guides for use in semi-structured interviews. The order of the questions varied and not all questions were asked of every interviewee.

<b>Questions for the Affected Community</b>
Did anyone ask you about what assistance you needed? When? Whom did they talk to? Did it lead to any assistance?
What was the biggest need that you had? Did anyone ask you about this? Did you get any assistance with this? When?
Which of your needs were best met? Least well met? Why? What gap in assistance had was the biggest problem for you?
What are the biggest problems you (if displaced- expect to see, if returned - experienced) when trying to re-establish your livelihood on return?
What difference did any assistance that you received make to you? Would any other types of assistance have been more useful to you? Did you get cash assistance? Would you have preferred cash?
From whom did you get assistance? How would you rank them in terms of usefulness to you? Why?
In terms of time, which needs were met first? Were they the most critical at the time? How did they vary over the cycle of displacement?
Which groups benefited most from the assistance (stayees/displaced stayees/returnees campers/hosted hosted/hosts men/women etc.)? The least? Why? Were these the neediest/least needy groups?

<b>Questions for Organisations</b>
What needs assessments did you undertake for your current work? How did you conduct assessments (method, timing, single or joint)? Who did you assess (groups, gender, age etc.)? Who did you consult? (Community leaders, beneficiaries, women etc.)? What did you learn from your assessments (did anything surprise you)?
What (and where) were needs best met/ least well met (by cluster, by group, by geography) over time?
What was the time-line for your response in 2010 (assessment, resource mobilisation, planning, procurement, implementation)? Were there any elements that led to delays or that expedited things?
What has your agency achieved in 2010? Outcomes? What constrained outcomes? How was this different from 2009?
How well is coordination working (by sector/cluster, location, function [avoiding gaps/duplication, standardisation, resource mobilisation, strategic leadership])? Where is it working best? Why is that? Is it meeting your needs?
What monitoring system have you got? When was it introduced? Has it led to any changes this year?
Have you conducted any reviews or evaluations of your programme with IDPs? Have you shared this? Did you change anything as a result? What recommendations made in previous evaluations and reviews have you incorporated in the present programme?
What is different in what you are doing in 2010 compared with in 2009? Why?
Is there general agreement on what delivery standards should apply in your cluster? What were the biggest gaps between the agreed or generally accepted delivery standards (Sphere, etc.) and the provided assistance? Why did these gaps arise?
What are the biggest operational constraints to applying the fundamental principles of

<b>Impartiality, Neutrality, and Independence in your work?</b>
What interaction do you have with the military? Do you have any interaction with other armed actors?
Do you have free passage and unimpeded access to IDPs/ civilian population as a whole? <sup>84</sup>
What distribution lists do you use to distribute assistance? How well does registration cover the displaced population? How well do the distribution lists match needs?
What are the biggest constraints facing early recovery?
Has the initial emergency response had any impact on early recovery? Has there been a smooth transition? What parts of the cycle of displacement does your programme address? Which is your primary focus? How does this relate to the other elements of the cycle and other actors?
What lessons have you learned (or had reinforced) in this response that you will take forward with you?

<b><i>Questions for the Affected Community and for Organisations</i></b>
What was the biggest gap between your needs and the assistance? Did this change over time? Did different groups have different gaps (women, aged, disabled etc)?
What were the biggest constraints that you faced in providing assistance? How did you try to get around these?
What was the biggest success that the operation has had overall? In 2010?
Are you better prepared now to meet any new displacement?
What was the biggest gap between your needs and the assistance? Did this change over time?
What were the biggest constraints you faced in receiving assistance? How did you try to get around these? Did any group (women, FHH, aged, disabled etc) face more constraints than others?

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<sup>84</sup> Deng Principle 26.3 (OCHA, 2004) states that: "All authorities concerned shall grant and facilitate the free passage of humanitarian assistance and grant persons engaged in the provision of such assistance rapid and unimpeded access to the internally displaced."

## Appendix 7 Basic Operating Rules for Humanitarian Organisations working in Pakistan

*Note: Humanitarian organisations working in Pakistan develop this document to set the rules for how they were to relate to actors in the conflict in Pakistan in line with the humanitarian principles of Humanity, Independence, Neutrality, and Impartiality. This document predated the large IDP flows of mid 2009.*

The present Basic Operating Rules provide guidance to humanitarian organisations to enhance our ability to access and assist persons affected by armed conflict, in accordance with well-established and recognised humanitarian principles and in a manner respectful of local culture and traditions.

### **Humanity**

The sole purpose of humanitarian activities is to prevent and alleviate suffering, wherever it may be found, to protect life and to ensure respect for the human being.

### **Impartiality**

Humanitarian activities must be carried out without discrimination as to ethnic origin, gender, nationality, political opinion, race or religion. They endeavour to relieve suffering and are guided solely by need, giving priority to the most urgent cases of distress.

### **Neutrality**

Humanitarian activities must be carried out without taking sides in hostilities or engaging at any time in controversies of a political, racial, religious or ideological nature.

### **Independence**

Humanitarian activities must remain autonomous from the political, economic, military or other objectives that any other actor may hold with regard to the areas where humanitarian activities are being implemented.

In order to comply with these principles, and be seen as doing so, we undertake to operate in accordance with the following Basic Operating Rules.

1. We will engage with all relevant parties to secure and maintain access to the population in need.
2. Our vehicles will only be used to transport persons or goods that have direct connection with our activities.
3. We will not transport weapons or uniformed personnel in our vehicles. We will not allow weapons in our premises. The only exception to this rule are security measures for persons identified as being at high-risk.
4. We will only use armed escorts as a measure of last resort if all other methods for ensuring our safety have been exhausted.
5. Our equipment, supplies and premises will be used exclusively for purposes connected to our activities.
6. We will take the necessary measures to ensure that our assistance reaches its intended beneficiaries and is not diverted for military, political, sectarian or other purposes. We will make every effort to involve local and beneficiary populations in the design and implementation of our activities.
7. We will report any theft, diversion or misuse of our equipment and supplies to the relevant authorities for investigation and appropriate follow up action.

8. We will refuse improper demands from any actor for relief items, assets or cash nor will we make contributions in cash or in kind to any parties or actors.
9. We will report threats, harassment, intimidation, violence and abduction of our workers to the relevant authorities for investigation and appropriate follow up action.
10. We will recruit workers on the basis of suitability and qualification for the job and not on the basis of political or any other considerations.
11. While fully committed to the humanitarian imperative, we will consider curtailing and, in extreme cases, suspending our activities if we are unable to operate in accordance with humanitarian principles and the present Basic Operating Rules. In such circumstances the humanitarian community will continue its advocacy efforts and explore alternative humanitarian options.

We expect and call upon relevant parties to comply with international humanitarian law and human rights law, including the obligations to respect humanitarian actors and to allow and facilitate the rapid and unimpeded passage of humanitarian services, supplies, equipment and personnel. We also call upon all actors to refrain from undermining our capacity to operate in a principled manner.

A Steering Committee, established by signatory organisations, will oversee adherence to the present rules and promote a coordinated and coherent approach by signatories to the issues addressed herein. The Steering Committee will report regularly to the humanitarian Country Team.

Islamabad, 28 April 2009



## Appendix 8      References

The following references are specifically cited in the document or are the sources of particular points made. In addition to these, the team used a background document set of 138 documents including OCHA situation reports and updates, USAID updates, and other key documents.

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