Sri Lanka at a glance

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The crisis and the response

IDPs face multiple difficulties: destroyed homes, the danger of returning to areas not yet cleared of mines and challenges regaining land.
By August 2010, 90 percent of the 280,000 Tamils forcibly interned after victory against the LTEE had been released from government-controlled camps.
Assistance includes immediate shelter cash grants of US$220 per family, supplied by the UN, NGOs and the Sri Lankan government.
CHAP 2010 initially called for US$337,688,785, but was revised down to US$287,799,870 in June 2010 due to low implementation capacity, staff security issues and funding shortfalls.
There are significant gaps in funding for some clusters: economic recovery and infrastructure (one percent funded); WASH (seven percent); mine action (22 percent) and agriculture (23 percent).
Overall response is limited by government’s micromanagement, lack of access and a diminishing number of humanitarian staff.

Donor coordination was perceived as more active and effective.
There is widespread concern that donors are now prioritising northern Sri Lanka, with severe consequences for eastern areas where humanitarian needs remain following 20 years of LTTE occupation.
Donors were criticised for not more highly prioritising the involvement of beneficiaries in the design and implementation of programmes.

The government robustly leads the response, has an antagonistic relationship with the international community and seeks to convey a negative image of aid agencies and disparage their efforts.
The government restricts access, controls reporting of the crisis, manipulates language used to describe it and continues to reject the CHAP.
Agencies generally lack access to resettlement areas and/or are unable to directly approach communities and vulnerable people.